Contradictions in state- and civil society-driven developments in China’s ecological agriculture sector

Food Policy 45 (2014) 158–166

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Contradictions in state- and civil society-driven developments in China’s ecological agriculture sector Steffanie Scott ⇑, Zhenzhong Si, Theresa Schumilas, Aijuan Chen Dept. of Geography and Environmental Management, University of Waterloo, 200 University Ave. West, Waterloo, ON N2L 3G1, Canada

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Keywords: China Organic food Green food Ecological agriculture Certification Food quality standards

a b s t r a c t Considering certified organic production as ‘zero’ (including the absence of genetically modified seeds and feed, and synthetic pesticides and fertilizers as inputs), we outline how, since the 1990s, China has developed a unique system of progressively stringent food quality production standards—‘hazardfree’, ‘green food’, and organic—on its purported path to zero ecological impact and zero food safety risk. We describe the structures and institutions that perform these standards and their inclusion in, and impacts on, China’s agricultural sector, which is characterized by a polarization between widespread smallholder production and emerging consolidated entrepreneurial farm enterprises branded as ecological. Based on 95 key informant interviews conducted between 2010 and 2012, we discuss the contradictions within state- and civil society-led paths to zero. We argue that the government’s commitment to ecological agriculture is superficial. Due in part to the context of a state-driven yet market-oriented economy with limited civil society involvement, the system of extensive standards has not been clearly communicated to Chinese consumers. Nor has it garnered public trust in the food system, as evidenced by a rapidly expanding ‘alternative’ food sector, including community supported agriculture (CSA) ventures and home delivery schemes, many of which are based on producers and consumers negotiating trust rather than relying on the quality assurance of certification. But consumers are motivated by seeking zero food safety risk, and show limited concern about environmental protection or farmer livelihoods. Some exceptions are patrons of values-oriented CSAs, farmers’ markets, and buying clubs, which point to interesting trajectories for the future of China’s food system. Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction

In China, ‘food is god’, so food safety is essential for the health and stability of society. –staff of China Green Food Development Centre, interview, 2012. The linkages between food supply and environmental sustainability in China can hardly be ignored—with a population of 1.3 billion, an agricultural land base that is severely eroded and under pressure from accelerated urbanization, an intensive use of agro-chemical inputs that are contaminating the country’s waterways, and the growing impacts and impending threats of climate change. The paper considers the development of food quality standards in China. It explores how current debates about ecological and organic food standardization maps onto the agro-food sector in an authoritarian, yet neoliberal state with ⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 519 888 4567x37012; fax: +1 519 746 0658. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S. Scott), [email protected] (Z. Si), [email protected] (T. Schumilas), [email protected] (A. Chen). 0306-9192/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.foodpol.2013.08.002

limited civil society involvement. We explore the challenges of defining zero and the pursuit of an infallible safe and environmentally benign food system, in the context of evolving neoliberalism in an imperfect world. We explain how, on the one hand, the Chinese state is seeking a path to zero use of synthetic chemical inputs and genetically modified organisms (GMOs) through developing a set of progressively more stringent production standards (hazardfree, green, and organic). On the other hand, in response to an environment characterized by extensive food safety problems and motivated by desire for zero risk in food, Chinese consumers are trying to re-connect with farming, farmers and food production. Each of these trends, however, has inherent contradictions, as our analysis reveals. Considering certified organic production as ‘zero’ (including for example the absence of genetically modified seed and feed, synthetic pesticides and fertilizers as inputs, and antibiotic use), we outline how China has developed an elaborate system of progressively stringent food quality standards. China began down this path in the 1980s with limits on chemical inputs and then moved ‘closer to zero’ in the 1990s with the creation of the ‘green food’ and ‘hazard-free’ programs, with their focus on residue testing and inspections. Propelled further down the ‘path to zero’ by

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promising export markets, China developed organic standards, and has been seeking harmonization with the international community through the March 2012 revisions to the standards. This system of extensive standards, however, has not been clearly communicated to consumers. Nor has it been sufficient to garner public trust in the food system. There is a general lack of trust of certified organic and green food labels, which has spearheaded a trend for consumers to pursue a path toward ‘zero risk’ in their food by making direct contacts with farms through home delivery schemes, farmers’ markets, or renting a small plot on a farm to grow their own vegetables. In this way, China’s emerging ecological farming sector is also a fertile incubator for alternative ventures in which consumers, distrusting standards and seeking zero food safety risk, are actively negotiating food relationships directly with producers. This paper describes the structures and institutions that perform these standards and the inclusion of, and impacts on, China’s dominant system of smallholder production. Our research is part of a larger study of the ecological agriculture sector in China, and is based on 95 key informant interviews conducted over 9 months between 2010 and 2012.1 Our interviewees were recommended by key players in the ecological agriculture sector and alternative food networks, or identified through the media and national organic expos. They include a broad range of actors—employees and owners of organic farms, staff of organic certification bodies, government agencies and NGOs, researchers, consumers, and community organizers—in the provinces and municipalities of Beijing, Liaoning, Shandong, Henan, Jiangsu, Anhui, Shanghai, Zhejiang, Sichuan, and Hainan. The provinces along China’s east coast are the wealthiest, and thus have ready access to markets, and typically greater levels of provincial and local government subsidies for producers. Of the 10 provinces and municipalities we visited for this study, only three were inland provinces (Henan, Anhui, and Sichuan), and the development of organic markets there was typically more limited. The structure of this paper is as follows. We first provide a brief overview of the ecological agriculture sector in China. Next, we explain the role of the state in stimulating the development of this sector, in terms of institutionalizing standards, policy supports, and informal supports. We then discuss civil society initiatives in which consumers are forging direct connections to their food sources. Finally, we analyze some of the limitations and contradictions within both the state- (and market-) led and civil society-driven paths to zero ecological impact and zero food safety risks. We also identify two additional paths to zero: zero small organic farmers and zero tolerance for social unrest. Ecological agriculture in China’s agro-food system2 Unlike in the West where civil society-based initiatives have spearheaded the development of ecological agriculture, in China state intervention has played a much stronger role. Paradoxically, while globally, ecological agriculture began its emergence as an 1 Interviews were recorded by hand, and later written up more fully and crosschecked by other team members who were present. The interviews focused on background information about the farm or organization or personal initiative, market channels and producer–consumer connections, educational activities (if any), the role of networks, their motivations and values, perceptions of the ecological agriculture sector in China and the role of government. Interview data were analyzed by thematic organizing around emerging themes. This paper draws on one set of themes from the larger data set. 2 We use the phrase ‘ecological agriculture’ sector in this paper to refer to a continuum of three certification standards that define varying degrees of ecological impact. Thus, although green and hazard-free foods permit GMO, pesticides, and fertilizer, we are analyzing these, alongside organic, as a spectrum towards the path to ‘zero ecological impacts’. We recognize that green and hazard-free production practices would not be considered as ecological farming in a European/North American context.

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‘alternative’ to subvert industrial agriculture, in China it began already ‘conventionalized’ and is serving in many ways as a vehicle for reinforcing the government’s priorities for agricultural modernization and neo-productivism—largely absent of any language of justice, food sovereignty, autonomy, empowerment, or fair trade. In this way, many ‘alternative’ ecological agriculture practices in China are much more concerned with alternative production practices (i.e., limited or no chemicals) than with supporting smallscale farmers or alternative retail outlets. And yet, as we show later, one can also find counter-currents to this trend: alternative food networks in China that exemplify relations of trust—for example, through the emergence of CSAs and informal food procurement networks. In order to deal with growing demands for improved food safety and high quality products for both export and domestic markets, ‘green’, followed by organic, and later ‘hazard-free’ food quality standards, have been introduced and promoted by the Chinese government since the 1990s.3 Foods meeting one of these three standards eventually comprised over a quarter of the agri-food products, and 90% of all agricultural product exports (Paull, 2008; IOSC, 2007). Although there is a 20-year history of market-oriented—and initially export-oriented—organic farming in China, in the past 5– 10 years the domestic market for organic food has boomed, and since 2007 has outweighed the export market.4 This reflects the growing concern over food safety and quality (Veeck et al., 2010), and the rising purchasing power of the middle and upper classes in China. As of 2011, the proportion of urban residents in China exceeded the rural population (Li, 2012). A small but growing segment of upper and middle class consumers, particularly in urban areas, has been willing to pay substantial price premiums in the fast-growing niche market for organic and ‘green’ foods (Shi et al., 2011), and organic food has also become a popular gift item. The context of agriculture and state support for food security in China Beginning under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, China disbanded its communal land system and granted land use rights (but not private ownership) to rural households. This Household Responsibility System, which opened the door for farmers to independently sell surplus produce, has been a key mechanism for bringing millions of poor smallholders out of poverty (Zhang and Donaldson, 2008). Although the shift from communal land system to the Household Responsibility System enabled the rapid growth of productivity in food production, the benefit from it has been gradually exhausted. The average farm size remains very small— about 0.6 hectares (CAAS, 2011)—though there has been some consolidation through companies leasing land from farmers to establish larger scale operations. China’s agriculture sector is characterized by low income levels and a growing gap—a factor of five—between incomes in rural and urban areas (Xinhuanet, 2012). This gap is responsible for the rapid depopulation of working-age farmers in the countryside. Thus, social and economic disparities between rural and urban China have become the source of 3 These efforts were preceded, in the late 1980s, by ‘Chinese Ecological Agriculture’, which was promoted on a limited basis by the Chinese government with the stated purpose of addressing rising environmental concerns with overuse of agro-chemicals (Sanders, 2006). Chinese Ecological Agriculture practices included crop rotation, inter-cropping, use of organic fertilizer and minimizing or eliminating use of pesticides, combining crop farming, orchards, and animal husbandry, planting of trees, utilizing farm by-products, avoiding soil erosion, building of greenhouses for intensive growing throughout the year, and bio-gas generation from pig manure. There was no focus on marketing the outputs of this method of production. 4 Interview with Xiao Xingji, Director, Organic Food Development Centre, Nanjing, July 1, 2009.

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serious problems that impede a more sustainable future for China (Long et al., 2010). As a response to these problems, in 2002 the central government launched a New Socialist Countryside campaign, covering a vast range of initiatives related to rural life, from rural land consolidation, to education, medical services, and infrastructure (Wen et al., 2012). These approaches to sustainable rural development have translated into critical influences on the ecological agriculture sector, as we discuss later in this paper. To understand the context of food policy in China, we must first acknowledge China’s dedication to ensuring food security, or selfsufficiency. The central government’s priority of food security is reflected in three areas of government policy: farmland preservation, the food reserve system, and extensive policy supports for the agriculture sector. Farmland preservation has become a basic state policy since the 1980s through a series of food related regulations and laws, including the Land Management Law (National Development and Reform Commission, 2008). It is mainly supported by the designation and preservation of prime farmland, land consolidation and reclamation, and ensuring no net loss of total cultivated land. Food reserves as second pillar of food security policy were established in 1990 and have become a national strategy of macroeconomic control (Schneider, 2011). The most complicated pillar of the system is the government’s policy supports for the agricultural sector. A large part of it is intertwined with the ambitious New Socialist Countryside program, which is represented by massive investments in agricultural infrastructure.5 In part as a consequence of the Chinese government’s emphasis on boosting agricultural productivity through green revolution production techniques, agriculture over the past three decades has become highly chemical-intensive, with rampant food safety concerns, including pesticide residues in crops and toxic growth hormones in livestock, and also tainted processed foods (Xu, 2012). In response to these problems, the core objective of agricultural productivity has gradually broadened to a productivity-centered and quality-focused regime. Thus, initiatives for developing a more sustainable food system in China have emerged in response to both environmental and socio-economic problems associated with the country’s dominant agricultural regime. Moving from state support for food production to support for ecological agriculture development, in the next section of the paper we divide our discussion into state roles in establishing standards, and direct and indirect policy supports.

China’s policies on the ‘path to zero’ State roles in standardization of ecological agriculture: hazard-free, green, and organic foods A key role of the state in China has been the institutionalization of ecological agriculture standards through establishing production standards and certification procedures for hazard-free, green, and organic food. Institutionalization is also a major role that has been played by Western governments, including setting production, certification and inspecting standards (Ye et al., 2002; Michelson, 2001: 15). Certification is a key channel to institutionalize and standardize informal and diverse ecological agriculture practices. In general, it is an attempt to monitor the credibility of organic producers as well as a mechanism to provide assurances to organic consumers, who cannot directly observe the process of production (Klonsky, 2000). However, certification has also been criticized for being an ‘‘artifact of an increasingly commoditized agri-economy that distances consumers from food production’’ (Scott et al., 2009: 64). Certification, therefore, has important implications for 5

Interview with a staff from a Hong Kong-based NGO, Chengdu, May 2, 2012.

the development of the ecological agriculture sector, and for pursuing a path to zero ecological impact and zero risk of chemical residues. Green food: A made-in-China ‘green food’ designation was created in 1990, and its development exemplifies the state’s role in institutionalization.6 The Ministry of Agriculture in China launched ‘green food’ in an effort to alleviate severe ecological impacts caused by intensive farming practices and to seek a more sustainable farming model appropriate for Chinese conditions. Green food uses limited and comparatively safe chemical synthetic substances permitted during production. Although it is only mentioned in a few documents, there is a distinction that is sometimes made between a Grade A and Grade AA green food standard—a distinction that was established in 1995. Most references to green food are only to the Grade A standard, which permits certain levels of synthetic chemical inputs, whereas the Grade AA standard forbids them, making it closer to the organic standard (Lin et al., 2009; Thiers, 2006). However, we received contradictory information about the status of the Grade AA green food standard. Some sources suggest that it is no longer used in green food certification.7 The China Green Food Developmental Center (CGFDC) was established in November 1992, as an agent of the Ministry of Agriculture, responsible for the certification and governance of green food products (including crops, mushrooms, wild plants, livestock and poultry, aquaculture products, and beekeeping products and their unprocessed products, among others). The green food market value in 2009 was over US$52 billion within China and over US$2.16 billion for exports, accounting for 5% of total agricultural output and 8% of total arable land. The price of certified green foods is about 10–30% higher than conventional foods. CGFDC has established standards for different types of foods and the production environment (production, the product itself, packaging, labeling and transportation). By 2010 there were over 6000 food companies using approved green food labels, and over 16,000 certified green food products (CGFDC, 2010). Lin et al. (2009: 73) note that about 90% of green food is sold domestically. Hazard-free food: This second step taken by the Chinese government in establishing food quality standards reveals that the path to ‘zero’ is not a liner process. Eleven years after the green food standard was launched, in 2001 the Ministry of Agriculture launched the Hazard-free Food Action Plan, designed to address the food safety crisis and agro-chemical contamination. The standard for ‘hazard-free’ food (also known as ‘pollution-free’ or ‘no public harm’ food) strays further from ‘zero’ than does green food. The rationale for establishing the hazard-free food standard probably relates to the status of production and the food market in China in the late 1990s: the low tolerance for pesticide residues and other substances in the ‘green food’ standard was too stringent to be widely adopted, and a clear set of basic standards was needed for food being sold in mainstream value chains. It is important to note that although hazard-free food does help to respond to food safety concerns, its weak standards mean that it does not constitute an ecological agriculture standard. Several government officers mentioned the hazard-free food standard may evolve from its voluntary status to become a basic minimum requirement for

6 Yet, as Thiers (2002: 358) explains in a detailed analysis of the governance of green food, ‘‘The entrepreneurial activities of state-sponsored certification organizations. . .create a conflict of interest which reduces enforcement capacity and legitimacy’’ (see also Thiers, 2006). 7 But the owner of one farm we visited decided that because the new organic standards made organic certification prohibitive, he instead pursued green food AA certification, and he makes an effort to education his customers (with a large attractive banner) about the differences between the three food quality standards, including the two grades of green food. See Thiers (2006) for a detailed discussion of the politics of the government’s role in establishing green food versus organic standards.

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S. Scott et al. / Food Policy 45 (2014) 158–166 Table 1 Comparison of organic agriculture, green food and hazard-free food in China.

Year established Permits genetically modified organisms? Permits synthetic fertilizer and pesticides? Residue testing Initial force Certifiers and costs Traceability Period of validity

Organic agriculture (youji shipin)

Green food (lüse shipin)

Hazard-free food (wu gonghai shipin)

1994 (with national standards established in 2005) No

1990

2001

Yes

Yes

No

Yes (only some kinds of chemical applications are permitted and amounts are regulated)

Yes (a wider range of agro-chemicals are allowed than for green food)

Yes Market (demand-driven) Third party certification; RMB 20–40,000 (before new regulations in 2012) Yes One year

Yes Government and market Ministry of Agriculture—Green Food Development Centre; RMB 10,000 No Three years

Yes Government initiated Ministry of Agriculture—Center for Agri-Food Quality and Safety; no certification fee No Three years

conventional agricultural production in China. Table 1 summarizes the differences between the three food quality standards: organic, green, and hazard-free. Organic food: The standards for green and hazard-free food were established to meet increasing domestic as well as international demands for quality food, while certified organic agriculture was originally established to meet international demand, or at least to secure space in a rapidly growing global organic market. Unlike hazard-free food or green food, certified organic agriculture was a concept wholly imported from the West. The first product to be certified organic in China was green tea from Lin’an, Zhejiang Province, certified by the Dutch certification agency, Skal, in 1990 (Sheng et al., 2009). In 1994, the Organic Food Development Center (OFDC) was founded in Nanjing by the former Chinese State Environmental Protection Agency8 (SEPA, which later became the Ministry of Environmental Protection) as the first specialized organization engaged in research, certification, training, and promotion of organic agriculture. OFDC and the China Organic Food Certification Centre (COFCC) are the largest of 23 certification bodies in the country. In 2005, China introduced its own national organic product standards (formerly products were only certified to a given foreign standard, such as EU, Japan, or USDA). By 2007, China had the second largest acreage of certified organic land in the world—3.2 million hectares—second only to Australia. The market for organic food has been growing very rapidly, and in 2009 was valued at about US$1.7 billion for domestic sales and US$464 million for exports.9 Organic products can sometimes fetch a price premium five times higher than conventional equivalents (Sanders and Xiao, 2010). For the most part, however, consistent with the experience of other Asian countries (Sano and Prabhakar, 2009: 94), organic certification is an expensive and bureaucratic process, and beyond the resources of smaller farmers even if they were using organic practices ‘by default’. Rising public concerns over food safety has put a lot of pressure on the government to establish more stringent regulations.10 In

8 The Chinese State Environmental Protection Agency (SEPA), not the Ministry of Agriculture, initially took charge of establishing policies and issuing regulations for organic production. These regulations included the first and most important governmental regulation of organic food certification, the 2001 Administrative Measures of Organic Food Certification. SEPA also established the Technical Specification of Organic Food in April 2002, based on the basic standards constituted by IFOAM and the EU organic agriculture standard, EU2092/91 (Wu and Hu, 2007: 34). In 2004, however, the Certification and Accreditation Administration of the People’s Republic of China (CNCA) intervened to replace SEPA as the authority responsible for certification and accreditation of organic agriculture. 9 Interview with Gao Xiuwen, Assistant Director, Certification Management Department, China Organic Food Certification Centre, Beijing, April 10, 2012. 10 Interview with organic agriculture researcher, Beijing, May 9, 2012; Interview with staff of China Certification and Accreditation Institute, Shanghai, May 24, 2012.

March 2012, a revised and more stringent set of national organic standards was announced by the Certification and Accreditation Administration of the People’s Republic of China (CNCA). The motivation for this next step toward zero appears to be twofold: on the one hand, the pursuit of organic standard harmonization with the EU, and on the other, reassurances of food safety to placate public concerns domestically. Some of the elements of the recent revisions bring the Chinese organic standard further in line with standards in the EU and elsewhere (e.g., by requiring crop rotations and cover crops), but other elements—such as the requirement for independent inspections for each different crop being planted—seem to be designed to protect against fraud. In our interviews, these standards were widely criticized by researchers, certification bodies, and farmers as being too stringent. With the new standard, an organic farmer who gets de-certified, even due to contamination from pesticide sprayed by a neighbor, cannot re-apply for certification for 3 years.11 We heard repeatedly from smallholders and larger organic farms alike that in response to this further ‘step towards zero’, small and medium-sized ecological farms will either not certify or will drop certification, and larger farms will decrease the number of products being certified to reduce costs. The result may be a system of zero risk, but for a very small number of products, produced by a small number of farms. It is unclear whether this outcome was intended or unintended in the design of the revised standards, but it is consistent with the government’s drive to consolidate agricultural enterprises into larger scale operations, as we discuss later.

Direct policy support for, but ambivalence towards, ecological agriculture Beyond the roles of central government in institutionalization of standards, the second major role of the state in ecological agriculture development is its provision of policy supports. This has been particularly significant at the provincial and local government levels, although there is substantial variation. Realizing the potential to increase local farmers’ income and to boost local economic development, local governments use diverse administrative procedures, financial supports, and other incentives to encourage the development of hazard-free, green, and organic production within their jurisdictions. These supports12 include: 11 Interview with Xiao Xingji, Director, Organic Food Development Centre, Nanjing, April 20, 2012. 12 Interviews with eight government officials, two farmer cooperative leaders, five farm enterprise leaders, two organic certifiers, and two researchers in Beijing, Jiangsu, Shanghai, Hainan, Anhui, Zhejiang, Liaoning, and Shandong provinces, various dates, 2010–2012.

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 Administering standards and testing.  Establishing eco-agricultural zones, organic agriculture gardens and demonstration bases.  Providing subsidies for certification.  Assisting with branding, organizing expos, and other forms of product promotion.  Promoting ecological agri-tourism.  Training and education (Sanders and Xiao, 2010).  Providing loans with low or no interest.  Providing capital for building greenhouses and in some cases providing salaries.  Acting as a broker to negotiate land leases with farmers (either directly or via a state-owned enterprise) to consolidate rural land for investors.13  Facilitating farmers’ cooperatives.  Institutional procurement (purchasing organic food as a perk for government employees).  State-owned enterprises facilitating their suppliers’ conversion to organic production (Sanders and Xiao, 2010). Yet despite the issuing of many regulations, organic food—as the closest approximation to ‘zero’ in the system of Chinese food quality standards—has received relatively less support from the central government than green food and hazard-free food. The fear of losing the ability to supply sufficient food has become heighted in the past two decades through the continuous decline of farmland quantity and quality due to rapid urbanization and industrialization. Thus, on the ecological ‘path to zero’, the Chinese government has moved cautiously to avoid any disturbance to its food security. Among government officials, and some organic farm operators themselves, there is widespread skepticism that organic production could supply sufficient food to feed China’s population, and little research has been done to compare productivity levels.14 Many government officials felt that green and hazard-free were more appropriate food quality standards to be widely implemented in China. Zero tolerance of residues and pollution is not seen as feasible for China’s current development conditions: organic food is too advanced or avant-garde for China. The lack of support for organic farming from the central government has been only partly compensated for by various international organizations and agencies that provide their own technical and financial support for organic farming research and development (Qiao, 2009). Another contradiction lies in China’s position on GMOs. The commercialization of genetically modified (GM) crops in China underwent a remarkable policy shift in the last three decades, from relatively loose control in the 1980s to a more stringent position in the late 1990s (Falkner, 2006). Although GM crops have not been approved for commercial growing, safety certificates were issued for research on insect-resistant transgenic rice and phytase transgenic corn in 2009. Yet, GM soybean and corn have been approved for importation, mainly to produce cooking oil (Shi, 2012b). And despite the lack of approval for commercialization of GMOs in China, GM cotton is believed to be widely grown, along with rice, papaya, peppers and tomatoes, through seeds sold by government researchers (Zhang-Carraro, 2012; Jiang, 2010). It is estimated that in 2012, 7.2 million small-scale farmers in China grew four million hectares of GM cotton, comprising 80% of the country’s cotton farms (James, 2012).

In sum, China appears to be pursuing a path—albeit a non-linear and winding one—to zero ecological impact and zero food safety risk. But notwithstanding its rapid development, and the use of political authority to organize production (Thiers, 2002), ecological agriculture (certified and otherwise) is still a small sector overall. Our interviews revealed that the enforcement of policy support of organic agriculture from the central government is relatively weak, despite government declarations on paper about fostering the development of this sector.15 And there is a lack of public awareness about the differences between the various quality standards. If the state had a stronger commitment to pursue a path to zero synthetic chemicals, we might see additional measures in place to reduce or eliminate sales of chemical fertilizers and pesticides, commit to more research and development of organic agriculture, and/or education among consumers. Indirect state support: eco-agri-tourism Some important aspects of the state’s influence in the ecological agriculture sector come from polices that are not directly targeting ecological agriculture. These include the state’s involvement in eco-agri-tourism, land consolidation and New Socialist Countryside Construction. One of the most significant examples is represented by the cooperation between local government and private capital in the development of eco-agri-tourism. In addition to pursuing a path to zero environmental contaminants through its approach to developing ecological agriculture, the Chinese state is also developing policies that reflect a path to zero financial risk for farmers. A Chinese version of eco-agri-tourism can be seen as a path to lower or zero financial risk for farmers, through promoting multifunctional agriculture. Agri-tourism has come to occupy a key place in public policies in China as a local government strategy for rural development. It is particularly attractive as a mechanism to address the growing gap between urban and rural income levels, and to link ecological farming with economic viability of rural communities (Brodt et al., 2006). Ecological agri-tourism is a turning point to achieve this goal: the development of ecological agriculture is an entry-point for agri-tourism. As opposed to conventional agri-tourism, ecological farming techniques and approaches are more attractive for promoting ‘ecological harmony’ and the integration of traditional culture (Tao et al., 2010). Eco-agri-tourism is also believed to be an effective way to encourage urban consumers to support sustainable agriculture policies and embrace the direct marketing schemes such as CSAs and farmers’ markets (Brodt et al., 2006) in which consumers and producers are closer both geographically and socially (Feagan, 2007). With this understanding, local governments around the country have established different types of ecological agriculture recreational zones,16 including ecological agriculture gardens, demonstration parks, theme parks, as well as ‘Ten Thousand Mu Organic Farm’ projects, by cooperating with large business capital.17 Opportunities abound in peri-urban areas for urbanites, with their families or co-workers, to visit and often stay overnight in a hotel at a large, immaculately managed farm (often akin to a golf club) that purports to be growing ecological produce. Visitors can pick their own vegetables and chicken eggs to take home, and many other tourist attractions are offered on site. 15

Interview with former organic agriculture certifier, Nanjing, June 7, 2010. Interview with government agricultural researchers, Dalian, April 5, 2012. 17 Ten Thousand Mu (=666 hectares) organic farm projects are local government initiatives to introduce big capital investments in the organic sector by establishing large-scale organic production bases. These bases (large enterprises or clusters) often take the form of contract farming between a private company and individual farmers or farmers cooperatives. Mu is a Chinese land area measurement: 1 mu = 1/ 15 hectare. 16

13

Providing large areas of farmland for capital-intensive large-scale organic farms has become a new way for local government to obtain commission as a broker between investors and villagers. In the process, the government receives payment for the land lease from the company and only remits a portion (perhaps half) back to the villagers. 14 Interview with an agricultural scientist, Beijing, April 13, 2012.

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As eco-agri-tourism—with Chinese characteristics18—became a new trend in the tourism sector, financial incentives were offered for private sector investors, which consequently reshaped the entire ecological agriculture sector. This model is also a reflection of the Chinese government’s role as the facilitator of the penetration of agribusiness capital in the ecological farming sector. This has contributed significantly to the trend of ecological agriculture conventionalization (Tovey, 1997; Raynolds, 2004; Gómez Tovar et al., 2005). Yet large companies are not the only beneficiaries of agri-ecotourism. Although there are many enormous eco-tourist sites operated by large enterprises nearby big cities, ‘agri-tainment’ ventures are also operated by individual rural households and farmers’ cooperatives (e.g., in Jiangsu and Zhejiang provinces). These offer opportunities for urbanites to observe and learn about rural lifestyles by eating, living and working alongside farmers. Rural households and farmers’ cooperatives can increase their incomes and reduce their financial risks by operating eco-tourism/agri-tainment ventures. Many farmer cooperatives engaged in ecological agriculture are keen to produce more products and expand their market channels. Many of them view eco-tourism as an important channel to sell their produce through hosting harvest festivals or other activities. The new and more stringent organic standards will make it harder and more costly for farmer cooperatives to certify their organic products. Under these circumstances, eco-tourism and agri-tainment can be an option for small-scale farms and farmer cooperatives to continue to farm ecologically and to increase their farm income. In sum, at first glance it might be easy to conclude that China’s adoption of a path to zero tolerance for ecologically harmful agronomic practices is motivated by concerns for food safety and ecological protection. The government’s adoption of progressively stringent standards and provision of support for ecological agriculture can been seen, in part, as a response to public pressure for government to act on food safety and environmental concerns. But ecological agriculture has also been an important element of development agendas of national and local governments, and is linked to goals of economic growth and enhancement of rural livelihoods—as well as social stability, a point we return to in the conclusion. Civil society organizing as a path to zero food risk: rebuilding trust in China’s food system The food safety problems in China’s agriculture sector, as well as fraudulent organic foods, have been widely publicized (Xiu and Klein, 2010; Pei et al., 2011; Veeck et al., 2010). Despite extensive efforts by the government to establish and enforce food quality and safety standards, there is a general lack of public confidence in the enforcement of organic and green food standards. Veeck et al. (2010: 233) provide an interesting comparison of the concerns of European and Chinese consumers. Unlike in Europe where food concerns have moved beyond anxiety related to food safety to a larger debate about ‘commodification of life, the fate of the small farmer, and the global homogenization of culture by multinational capitalism’ [Heller, 2001, 27], in today’s China, the debate seems to center on the risks of a privatized economy, in which some farmers might attempt to improve crop yield by applying dangerous levels of pesticides, some factory managers

18 We use the term ‘eco-agri-tourism with Chinese characteristics’, to imply that it is not strongly ‘ecological’ but rather has an emphasis on rural and natural areas that are highly managed (or manicured) in order to highlight natural beauty and harmony between people and nature. This contrasts with Western understandings, which involves less ‘management’ of nature.

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might eschew sanitary practices to save production costs, and some private retailers might sell counterfeit or tainted food to unsuspecting customers (Veeck et al., 2010: 233). One response to the lack of trust in food quality standards has been for civil society actors to take matters into their own hands. Rather than buying certified organic or green food from supermarkets, a growing number of dedicated eaters have been establishing direct marketing channels with uncertified producers, such as through Community Supported Agriculture farms (CSAs), buying clubs, and organic ‘country fair’ farmers’ markets. Our analysis of this phenomenon is twofold. On the one hand, it is a testament to the power of civil society to take the initiative to establish alternative food networks.19 Yet, as we show below, the social and ecological values underpinning CSAs in China are often rather shallow. CSA is frequently studied as a type of producer–consumer venture in Western alternative food system scholarship (Cone and Myhre, 2000). In the West, the CSA illustrates an alternative economic model where a producer’s costs, including the costs of environmental stewardship and economic risk, are divided fairly among end consumers (usually referred to as members) who make a payment to the farmer in advance of the growing season in exchange for a share of whatever the farm produces. After emerging in the mid-1980s, the CSA model has diversified and spread across North America, Europe, Australia/New Zealand, and now seems to be rapidly evolving in China with over 80 CSA farms having developed since 2007 (Shi, 2012a). However, our research, which included interviews with 11 CSA farms, suggests that these ‘made in China’ CSAs are different from Western equivalents in important ways. Most Chinese CSAs operate more closely to a dominant market approach, with producers as entrepreneurs taking the risk, consumers dictating choices, and market-based price setting. Our interviews suggest that the majority of programs calling themselves CSAs are not values-based or structured to have consumers share in the risk of farming. Rather, they have appropriated this popular term from the West and used it as a label for privatelyoperated home delivery schemes. Consumers’ participating in these schemes are largely concerned about protecting their own health, or merely being trendy by buying organic or green food. For the most part, they have limited commitment to environmental protection or supporting farmers: in fact, many accuse peasant farmers as being the source of food safety risks through the abuse of synthetic agro-chemicals in crops and hormones and antibiotics in livestock (Xu, 2012). Klein (2009: 87) concurs with this view, and found little evidence in Kunming city of ‘ethical consumerism’ motivating urban households to purchase ecologically produced food. Thus, like the state’s pursuit of zero ecological impact through institutionalizing food quality standards, the pursuit of zero food safety risk by consumers can be seen to have its own contradictions. Despite this overall trend, a small number of CSAs, ecological farms, and organic farmers’ markets emerging in major cities in China do exemplify a nascent values-based movement to promote consumer-producer and urban–rural connections, and a nostalgia about connecting with nature and the land. This seems particularly evident in the earliest CSAs established in Anlong Village in Chengdu, Sichuan province (established in 2007) and at Little Donkey Farm in Beijing (established in 2008). 19 The strong state support for ecological agriculture in the form of eco-agri-tourism can be contrasted with the absence of support for, or endorsement of, grassroots action. This could be construed as yet another path to zero: zero tolerance for social unrest. Indeed, social harmony and social stability is a major priority for government, and organizers of some organic farmers’ markets and other community events around food and farming have had to tread extremely carefully so as not to attract undue political attention—as do organizers of any social event in China (Interviews with community organizers in Beijing, April 3, 2012, and in Chengdu, April 30, 2012).

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Another form of government support for ecological agriculture initiatives not mentioned earlier involves provision of land and infrastructure supports for CSA-type farms. The most prominent example of this is Little Donkey Farm in Beijing (Shi et al., 2011: 556), which came about through strong lobbying from Renmin University’s Professor Wen Tiejun. Generally, CSA operators reported on a lack of government support. However, in a few select instances of CSAs that do receive priority support, government seems to view CSAs as an opportunity to develop multifunctional agriculture (boosting farmer incomes, providing agri-tourism opportunities, and addressing food safety problems) on a larger scale (Little Donkey Farm Newsletter, 2012). In sum, consumers have rejected government’s efforts to ensure zero food safety risk, and CSAs have been one alternative means to address this. What are the effects of the pursuit of ‘zero’ on consumers, producers, and the supply chain? Our research has shown that one of the effects of the Chinese government-led ecological path to zero seems to be the progressive exclusion of smallholders from certified and institutionalized systems—in effect, a path to zero small organic farmers. The vision of the Chinese government for maintaining high agricultural output and high quality food production is through ‘modern’, large-scale, consolidated enterprises (see State Council, 2012b; Huang, 2011). Agricultural modernization, consolidation, and scaling up are embraced by the state as key objectives, and backed up through extensive government support, alongside a process of urbanizing small farmers (New York Times, 2013). This is also evidenced by the government’s promotion, through subsidies and a wide range of other benefits, of some 110,000 ‘‘agricultural industrialization dragon-head enterprises’’ (Ministry of Agriculture, 2012). These are private or state-owned enterprises that are processing, manufacturing and marketing agricultural produce on a large-scale (in terms of permanent assets and value of sales), with high economic benefits (high profits and low debt ratio), strong local economic capacity (integrated production–manufacturing–marketing chain, large number of contracted farmers, large scale of stable production base), and solid market competency (sound marketing channels and predominant status within the sector) (State Council, 2012a). Agricultural produce and processed food products supplied by these enterprises account for one third of the entire food market, more than two thirds of the vegetables in major cities, and more than 80% of China’s food exports (Ministry of Agriculture, 2012). Dragon-head enterprises are also encouraged to certify their food as hazard-free, green, organic and geographical indication products. In contrast to the extensive support for larger scale farm operations, ‘scattered’ small farmers are widely considered to be backward, hard to monitor or control, and unreliable in terms of maintaining production standards20 (see also Xiu and Klein, 2010). Huang (2011) argues that small-scale family farming is better suited for China’s new-age agriculture than large-scale mechanized farming because of the intensive, incremental, and variegated hand labor involved. Instead of operating as an independent economic units, family-farm must now coordinate with agro-industrial enterprises or take collective action, such as forming farmers’ professional cooperatives (Huang, 2011; Jia et al., 2010). Yet, in practice the Chinese government has been aggressively supporting capitalistic agribusiness as the preferred model of vertical integration. In our interviews, we repeatedly heard that smallholders who follow organic practices would not certify for two reasons. First, the process was too costly, especially under the 2012 revisions to

20 Interviews with rural development researchers Hangzhou, March 23, 2011 and Beijing, March 30, 2012.

the standards. But in addition, even in situations where certification costs might be subsidized by local governments, smallholders rejected certification because consumers do not trust it, and if they are selling directly to consumers, they do not need to be certified. It seems that one of the effects of these progressively stringent production standards is for consumers and small producers to reject the state’s assurances and begin the complex civil process of reconnecting and re-negotiating trust through direct relationships between producers and eaters. Who is calling for zero, and who is most affected by the regulation? In China, this move to zero was originally state initiated, in the absence of civil society organizing. The widespread food safety problems and fraud, however, have motivated the formation of nascent civil society organizing around food. It is possible that the state’s drive toward zero ecological impacts, and zero small organic farmers, is having the unintended consequence of stimulating civil society organizing. The emerging and rapidly developing ‘alternative’ models in various segments of the food system in China are strongly influenced by the local social and economic context, and local government policies. Although they are still a very small fraction of the entire food system in China, they represent a critical part of it in terms of future trajectories. The organic produce in these models tends to be uncertified. The perception of quality is based on the trust between producers and consumers— sometimes called ‘participatory’ or ‘ethical’ certification and inspection. This constitutes an entirely trust-based mechanism, significantly contrasting with the model of market-oriented organic certification. These alternative models seem to be emerging in China because the certification model is not trusted due to fraudulent organic brands in a chaotic market for organic products. Alternative models, although problematic since consumers are illequipped to be organic certifiers, enable consumers to learn about how organic food is produced, and take back the power from a system of certification that lacks public confidence. Conclusions In this paper we have shown that (1) the Chinese state has been pursuing a path to zero use of synthetic chemical inputs and GMOs by developing a progressively more stringent set of production standards (hazard-free, green, and organic); and (2) consumers have been seeking zero food safety risk and chemical residues, and are attempting to connect with farmers through direct purchasing relationships. Yet each of these pursuits has inherent contradictions. First, ecological agriculture is still a small sector, and there is absence of public awareness of the differences between food quality standards (some people think green is more stringent than organic, or that the two are equivalent). A deeper analysis of China’s path to zero might suggest that the government’s commitment to ecological agriculture is somewhat of a façade, as evidenced by a superficial treatment of ecology and much stronger support for highly managed and technologically intensive ‘ecological’ agriculture—which could be seen as a contradiction in terms (see Horlings and Marsden, 2011). If the state were genuinely committed to pursuing a path to zero synthetic chemicals, it could do much more, such as limit sales of chemical fertilizer, and build more public awareness—especially considering the significant state influence over media. Second, consumers are motivated by food safety concerns but show limited concern about environmental protection or farmer livelihoods. This is evidenced by the trend toward home delivery schemes that are devoid of any connection to real farmers or the realities of farming. Our analysis identified a third ‘path to zero’ practiced through state policies in China, in the form of a path to zero financial risk for agriculture. This is pursued through state support for land consolidation, agro-eco-tourism, and farm support policies, which are

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enticing a new group of entrepreneurs to replace peasant farmers— who are considered not modern enough, and are seen as increasing risks in the food system. However, this path contradicts the ecological ‘path to zero’ in that this support for agriculture seems motivated by productivism—and the elimination of traditional agroecological practices—by enticing this new group of entrepreneurs who are motivated by low risk, high profit opportunities. Through many private agri-tourism sites (e.g., Crab Island in Beijing, Huoshui Park in Chengdu), consumers seek out recreational venues to escape the stressful urban environment and enjoy a more ‘natural’ environment on farms. These practices are a way—albeit a superficial one—of connecting with traditional Chinese culture that focuses on ‘human-nature harmony’ and encourages people to live closer to nature. Thus, what is missing in most of these ‘alternative’ agriculture transformations is worthy of note. The kind of broad-based networks represented by food system activists in North America and Europe seems unlikely to be taken up in China in the near future. The multi-faceted concept of a food system has only been taken up on a limited basis by Chinese planners through their promotion of multifunctional agriculture. The grassroots organizations and networks—or civil society action for sustainable food systems—that are spreading these ideas at municipal, provincial, and national levels are very nascent and limited in scope.21 There are few fair trade initiatives to speak of. Nor is there a strong social justice significance to joining a CSA—unlike in the West where members are typically interested in supporting farmers to earn a fair income by sharing in their risk. Finally, while food localization in North America has been integrated into the wider organic movement, thereby encouraging consumer support of local organic producers, organic production in China, in the absence of a food localization movement, has more easily been subsumed by large food companies and transformed into a conventional food business. Nevertheless, things are changing fast within both ‘conventional’ and ‘alternative’ sectors of the food system as eaters and producers seek to bridge and mend the divided food system. Acknowledgement We would like to acknowledge funding from the Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada that made possible the fieldwork on which this article is based. References Brodt, S., Feenstra, G., Kozloff, R., Klonsky, K., Tourte, L., 2006. Farmer-community connections and the future of ecological agriculture in California. Agriculture and Human Values 23, 75–88. China Academy of Agricultural Sciences (CAAS), 2011. Why China’s Agriculture Surpasses India’s. . (accessed 29.04.12, in Chinese). China Green Food Development Centre (CGFDC), 2010. List of Current Green Food Certification Standards. (accessed 28.04.12, in Chinese). Cone, C.A., Myhre, A., 2000. Community-supported agriculture: a sustainable alternative to industrial agriculture? Human Organization 59 (2), 187–197. Falkner, R., 2006. International sources of environmental policy change in China: the case of genetically modified food. The Pacific Review 19 (4), 473– 494. Feagan, R., 2007. The place of food: mapping out the ‘local’ in local food systems. Progress in Human Geography 31 (1), 23–42. Gómez Tovar, L., Martin, L., Gómez Cruz, M.A., Muterbaugh, T., 2005. Certified organic agriculture in Mexico: market connections and certification practices in large and small producers. Journal of Rural Studies 21, 461–474. Heller, C., 2001. From risk to globalization: discursive shifts in the French debate about GMOs. Medical Anthropology Quarterly 15, 25–28. 21 Guobin Yang (2010: 134) similarly notes that ‘‘as a source of solidarity and of social power, environmentalism remains weak’’ in China.

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