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Cool words, cold war: A new look at usia's premises for propaganda
228
Reviews
BETTY J. GLASS Reference Dept. The University Library1322 University of Nevada, Reno 1664 N. Virginia St. Reno. NV 89557-0044 USA
Electronic Democracy: Using the Internet to Influence American Politics. By Graeme Wilton, CT: Pemberton Press, 1996.204~. ISBN 0-910965-20-X. $19.95.
Browning.
In Electronic Democracy: Using the Internet to Influence American Politics, Graeme Browning, a journalist who covers technology issues for the National Journal, has crafted an informative and instructive brief history of the various ways in which the Internet community has either influenced or has been influenced by the political process. After an introductory chapter with the title of “Thomas Jefferson Was A Hacker,” Browning devotes two chapters to events that demonstrate the nascent development of political savvy by the online community. Many of these events, such as Jim Warren’s campaign to ensure public access to online Cailfomia legislative materials or Jamie Love’s battles with the West Publishing Co., will be quite familiar to documents librarians and others who also actively contributed their support on these issues. For example, Browning succintly describes such successful efforts as the development of the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory and the EDGAR database as prototype examples of governmental and nonprofit entity cooperation that ultimately benefitted the public. The most useful aspect of the book, however, is the chapter entitled “Pressing the Virtual Flesh,” in which Browning addresses the issue of the applicability of standard political techniques in the online environment. Advice such as “Remember that online organizing can’t win if it’s not combined with someone from your group making face-to-face contact with the policymaker you hope to persuade” (p. 61) “Never assume that everybody who reads your alert knows all the details of the issue just because you’ve already explained those details in your preceding messages” (p. 62) and “. . . just because a defiance of convention once worked well in cyberspace doesn’t mean that it’s the right tactic for rallying supporters to a cause in the mid-1990s. Throwing just any plea up on the Internet and expecting people with a wide variety of political philosophies and technical skills to figure out what you mean and take it to heart isn’t a very good strategy” (p. 56) should be required reading for the political novices who often seem to abound in cyberspace. Browning is admirably up to date on the most useful WWW sites relating to politics, and she makes prominent mention of GPO Access, FedWorld, Thomas, US. Business Advisor, and Defenselink. A concluding chapter arranges annotations of a wide range of politically oriented WWW sites under headings like “Advocacy Organizations, ” “Voter Information,” and “Fun.” While the incompleteness of many source citations in the text, an occasionally overly breezy tone, and a lack of an analytical concluding chapter mar the overall usefulness of the book, Graeme Browning has done a good job of condensing a wide range of disparate elements into a highly readable text. KEVIN FREDE’ITE West Virginia University Charles C. Wise Library P.O. Hox 6069 Morgantown, WV 26506-6069 USA
Cool Words, Cold War: A New Look at USIA’s Premises for Propaganda. By Leo Bogart. Abridged by Agnes Bogart. Rev. ed. Washington, DC: The American University Press, 1995. 250p. ISBN l-879333383-41-1$26.50 paper; ISBN l-879383-34-9 $62.50 cloth. Cool Words, Cold War includes the complete text of the author’s Premises to Propaganda published by the Free Press in 1976 and a revised and lengthy preface examining information
Reviews
229
policy in the context of the post Cold War era. While the report contained in Premises emphasizes “the conflicts of theory and practice, the preface focuses on the dilemmas that confront USIA in the post-Cold War era” (vii). The initial work resulted from a study commissioned by the newly established United States Information Agency (USIA) in 19.53 to identify and enunciate the agency’s operating assumptions and premises in order to articulate areas for further research. Bogart postulates that the initial study is relevant and of interest today and encourages a multiperspective analysis. It may be viewed as history, policy research, a detailed case study of how a propaganda organization operates or an investigation of mass communication methods and theory. Although the study does not present generalizations about bureaucracy or government organizations, it suggests several themes endemic to federal agencies past and present; namely, conflicts of interest among internal divisions, overriding concern with the budget, desire to engage congressional favor, vulnerability to political pressures and competition with other government agencies. The questions raised by the initial research, Bogart contends, are still pertinent for contemporary propagandists. The preface is the defining difference between Cool Words and Premises to Propaganda and reviews the past, present, and future of the USIA through discussion of the struggle with communism, antecedents of the agency, the relevance of social science research, the impact of the Cold War, cultural politics, the power and purposes of broadcasting, the promotion of democracy, and the future of U.S. propaganda itself. As in the original study, selections from interviews supporting diverse points of view are included under each topic. Following the preface is the complete text of Premises to Propaganda, an appendix of the categories for the analysis of assumptions, an updated bibliography of books about the USIA, and an index. An obvious emphasis Bogart makes is that the geopolitical world of the mid-1950s when the study was conducted was characterized by the struggle between the diametrically ideological political positions of the United States and Russia. A primary focus of the USIA was fighting communism, not just because it represented an adversarial position, but because it was construed by many as inherently wicked or diabolical. It is clear from Bogart’s preface that the world is no longer painted in black or white; revisionist historians, the rise of autonomous political actions, and a disagreement among American citizens as to what constitutes ‘truth, justice, and the American way” complicate matters for democracy’s propagandists. Bogart’s preface, although opinionated, raises issues important for managing the direction of public policy. Should the United States formally try to combat the ubiquitous spread of its popular culture which emphasizes “vulgarity, inanity, and sensationalism” but scants “the serious, the searching, the innovative, the idealistic, and the moral elements of American elite culture’?” (p.xxxvi). What types of social science research can be translated into government policy today after radical academics of the 1960s “preached a return to revealed doctrine and disdain for empirical investigation?” (p.xix) Should the USIA ‘s mission be extended to those countries with whom we have correct diplomatic relations? Cogently, Bogart acknowledges that actions, not words, dictate the perceptions of American motives and policies and that until the United States has recovered from its own social domestic ills, there will be a need to communicate and explain positive aspects of American politics and culture. He offers eight suggestions for improvement of the USIA: acknowledge international communication as an important government function; give USIA clear-cut and direct responsibility for all surrogate broadcasting operations, and phase these out as quickly as political realities permit; eliminate the present advisory boards for individual services, and substitute a single bipartisan advisory commission to oversee the work of the Agency as a whole; appraise the impending consequences of the ongoing revolution in mass communications technology; crusade realistically for democracy; forget about explaining to the American public what the rest of the world is doing; keep USIA as a separate entity (not part of the State Department, as has recently been suggested) and resist political pressures to run programs to serve domestic constituencies or to placate powerful politicians. It is not stated whether these conclusions were culled from the new interviews or the interviews used in Premises, a combination of the two. or the author’s conclusions based on observation or independent research. Although not as plentiful or illustrative as in the original study, oral interviews or case histories are again incorporated into the new material and are a highlight of the work. Methodology for the original report included the perusal of material output, observation. the agency’s official documentation and public records, but interviews of program personnel were the primary investigative tool used. The informal interview method was selected because it allowed for individual
230
Reviews
latitude as well as focus on specific job experiences. The interviews had three phases. Phase one entailed the interviewee’s describing his job and previous work with the agency. Subsequently, the respondent was encouraged to characterize the premises that guided decision making in his job and the reasons behind work activities. Finally, the interviewer introduced identified problem areas in the respondent’s work or part of the agency. No statistical analysis was done because the same questions were not asked in all situations. The study concentrated on top civil-service pay grades; field personnel were underrepresented. Over 2,000 pages of transcripts systematically coded yielded 10,000 assumptions. The Final report was issued in five volumes and abridged. Conclusions consisted of 113 questions for further research and an additional 23 questions for public policy decisions. No action was ever taken by USIA on this massive work; it was labeled “Confidential” and locked away, although Bogart finally secured its release under the Freedom of Information Act. Contemporary readers, inured to government shenanigans and numerous “gate” scandals, might question the need for such secrecy. One could conjecture that the agency was concerned about revealing the diversity of opinion, lack of consensus on policy issues, and general bemusement expressed by many program personnel at a time when it was inherently necessary to present a unified front against an aggressive, monolithic enemy. The report was criticized for the anonymity of its sources and for not expressing the percentage of agency personnel who agreed or disagreed with stated assumptions; however, the diversity of frank opinions expressed bring animation and credence to the work. Bogart does not decide which convictions and impressions are more valid than others. Ambiguous purposes, shifting levels of emphasis, and selective assimilation and dissemination of information speak loudly about the reality gaps that existed and may still exist between those who formulate policy and those who carry it out. A major area of conflict concerns the main purpose of the program: should the USIA concentrate on “selling” America, or on combating communism? Another area of controversy includes the degree of truth used in communications: Should the libraries or information centers carry materials that are popular, but portray aspects of American culture (race relations, capitalism) in an unfavorable light? Even the target audience is disputed: do agents concentrate on the elites or the masses? These dominant conflicts and many subordinate others surfacing in respondent comments, describe, perhaps better than a narrative extrapolation might, how the propaganda program works. A bit puzzling is the author’s comment in the revised preface that he has retained the original format and sequence of Premise to Propaganda, but has “added brief introductory comments to each section” (p.ix). Yes, each section is preceded by comments, but they are, word-for-word, the same in both editions. Conceivably, Bogart meant that he added prefatory comments to each section of the original abridged report, but his meaning is not clear. Although these introductory remarks retain validity after 20 years, a view from the 1990s would have given the reader, especially the non-foreign policy specialist, guidance in understanding the subsequent text. The bibliography, “Books about USIA,” has been updated. All of the titles from the previous edition have been retained, but six new titles published after 1976 have been added. A major shortcoming of Cool Words is the index, which does not include the new material in the preface. The indexes are identical, word-by-word, column-by-column, page citation by page citation in both editions. For example, “Milton Eisenhower” can be located in both editions on page xix. On that same page, in Cool Words, membership growth of both the American Sociological Association and the American Psychological Association is noted; the index provides reference to neither. None of the material, new or old, on preface pages xxiii-Iii (pages added to the new edition) is indexed. One must conclude that the new preface was revised around the previous pagination. Cool Words, Cold War is highly readable and should be of particular interest to historians and those concerned with public opinion or theories of mass communication. It is a significant addition to Cold War collections. If libraries hold Premises fo Propaganda, they must consider that the purchase price for the revised edition is really for a new preface.
KATHLEEN M. CONLEY General Reference/Documents Milner Library Illinois State University Normal, IL 6179043900 USA
Reviews
BETTY J. GLASS Reference Dept. The University Library1322 University of Nevada, Reno 1664 N. Virginia St. Reno. NV 89557-0044 USA
Electronic Democracy: Using the Internet to Influence American Politics. By Graeme Wilton, CT: Pemberton Press, 1996.204~. ISBN 0-910965-20-X. $19.95.
Browning.
In Electronic Democracy: Using the Internet to Influence American Politics, Graeme Browning, a journalist who covers technology issues for the National Journal, has crafted an informative and instructive brief history of the various ways in which the Internet community has either influenced or has been influenced by the political process. After an introductory chapter with the title of “Thomas Jefferson Was A Hacker,” Browning devotes two chapters to events that demonstrate the nascent development of political savvy by the online community. Many of these events, such as Jim Warren’s campaign to ensure public access to online Cailfomia legislative materials or Jamie Love’s battles with the West Publishing Co., will be quite familiar to documents librarians and others who also actively contributed their support on these issues. For example, Browning succintly describes such successful efforts as the development of the EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory and the EDGAR database as prototype examples of governmental and nonprofit entity cooperation that ultimately benefitted the public. The most useful aspect of the book, however, is the chapter entitled “Pressing the Virtual Flesh,” in which Browning addresses the issue of the applicability of standard political techniques in the online environment. Advice such as “Remember that online organizing can’t win if it’s not combined with someone from your group making face-to-face contact with the policymaker you hope to persuade” (p. 61) “Never assume that everybody who reads your alert knows all the details of the issue just because you’ve already explained those details in your preceding messages” (p. 62) and “. . . just because a defiance of convention once worked well in cyberspace doesn’t mean that it’s the right tactic for rallying supporters to a cause in the mid-1990s. Throwing just any plea up on the Internet and expecting people with a wide variety of political philosophies and technical skills to figure out what you mean and take it to heart isn’t a very good strategy” (p. 56) should be required reading for the political novices who often seem to abound in cyberspace. Browning is admirably up to date on the most useful WWW sites relating to politics, and she makes prominent mention of GPO Access, FedWorld, Thomas, US. Business Advisor, and Defenselink. A concluding chapter arranges annotations of a wide range of politically oriented WWW sites under headings like “Advocacy Organizations, ” “Voter Information,” and “Fun.” While the incompleteness of many source citations in the text, an occasionally overly breezy tone, and a lack of an analytical concluding chapter mar the overall usefulness of the book, Graeme Browning has done a good job of condensing a wide range of disparate elements into a highly readable text. KEVIN FREDE’ITE West Virginia University Charles C. Wise Library P.O. Hox 6069 Morgantown, WV 26506-6069 USA
Cool Words, Cold War: A New Look at USIA’s Premises for Propaganda. By Leo Bogart. Abridged by Agnes Bogart. Rev. ed. Washington, DC: The American University Press, 1995. 250p. ISBN l-879333383-41-1$26.50 paper; ISBN l-879383-34-9 $62.50 cloth. Cool Words, Cold War includes the complete text of the author’s Premises to Propaganda published by the Free Press in 1976 and a revised and lengthy preface examining information
Reviews
229
policy in the context of the post Cold War era. While the report contained in Premises emphasizes “the conflicts of theory and practice, the preface focuses on the dilemmas that confront USIA in the post-Cold War era” (vii). The initial work resulted from a study commissioned by the newly established United States Information Agency (USIA) in 19.53 to identify and enunciate the agency’s operating assumptions and premises in order to articulate areas for further research. Bogart postulates that the initial study is relevant and of interest today and encourages a multiperspective analysis. It may be viewed as history, policy research, a detailed case study of how a propaganda organization operates or an investigation of mass communication methods and theory. Although the study does not present generalizations about bureaucracy or government organizations, it suggests several themes endemic to federal agencies past and present; namely, conflicts of interest among internal divisions, overriding concern with the budget, desire to engage congressional favor, vulnerability to political pressures and competition with other government agencies. The questions raised by the initial research, Bogart contends, are still pertinent for contemporary propagandists. The preface is the defining difference between Cool Words and Premises to Propaganda and reviews the past, present, and future of the USIA through discussion of the struggle with communism, antecedents of the agency, the relevance of social science research, the impact of the Cold War, cultural politics, the power and purposes of broadcasting, the promotion of democracy, and the future of U.S. propaganda itself. As in the original study, selections from interviews supporting diverse points of view are included under each topic. Following the preface is the complete text of Premises to Propaganda, an appendix of the categories for the analysis of assumptions, an updated bibliography of books about the USIA, and an index. An obvious emphasis Bogart makes is that the geopolitical world of the mid-1950s when the study was conducted was characterized by the struggle between the diametrically ideological political positions of the United States and Russia. A primary focus of the USIA was fighting communism, not just because it represented an adversarial position, but because it was construed by many as inherently wicked or diabolical. It is clear from Bogart’s preface that the world is no longer painted in black or white; revisionist historians, the rise of autonomous political actions, and a disagreement among American citizens as to what constitutes ‘truth, justice, and the American way” complicate matters for democracy’s propagandists. Bogart’s preface, although opinionated, raises issues important for managing the direction of public policy. Should the United States formally try to combat the ubiquitous spread of its popular culture which emphasizes “vulgarity, inanity, and sensationalism” but scants “the serious, the searching, the innovative, the idealistic, and the moral elements of American elite culture’?” (p.xxxvi). What types of social science research can be translated into government policy today after radical academics of the 1960s “preached a return to revealed doctrine and disdain for empirical investigation?” (p.xix) Should the USIA ‘s mission be extended to those countries with whom we have correct diplomatic relations? Cogently, Bogart acknowledges that actions, not words, dictate the perceptions of American motives and policies and that until the United States has recovered from its own social domestic ills, there will be a need to communicate and explain positive aspects of American politics and culture. He offers eight suggestions for improvement of the USIA: acknowledge international communication as an important government function; give USIA clear-cut and direct responsibility for all surrogate broadcasting operations, and phase these out as quickly as political realities permit; eliminate the present advisory boards for individual services, and substitute a single bipartisan advisory commission to oversee the work of the Agency as a whole; appraise the impending consequences of the ongoing revolution in mass communications technology; crusade realistically for democracy; forget about explaining to the American public what the rest of the world is doing; keep USIA as a separate entity (not part of the State Department, as has recently been suggested) and resist political pressures to run programs to serve domestic constituencies or to placate powerful politicians. It is not stated whether these conclusions were culled from the new interviews or the interviews used in Premises, a combination of the two. or the author’s conclusions based on observation or independent research. Although not as plentiful or illustrative as in the original study, oral interviews or case histories are again incorporated into the new material and are a highlight of the work. Methodology for the original report included the perusal of material output, observation. the agency’s official documentation and public records, but interviews of program personnel were the primary investigative tool used. The informal interview method was selected because it allowed for individual
230
Reviews
latitude as well as focus on specific job experiences. The interviews had three phases. Phase one entailed the interviewee’s describing his job and previous work with the agency. Subsequently, the respondent was encouraged to characterize the premises that guided decision making in his job and the reasons behind work activities. Finally, the interviewer introduced identified problem areas in the respondent’s work or part of the agency. No statistical analysis was done because the same questions were not asked in all situations. The study concentrated on top civil-service pay grades; field personnel were underrepresented. Over 2,000 pages of transcripts systematically coded yielded 10,000 assumptions. The Final report was issued in five volumes and abridged. Conclusions consisted of 113 questions for further research and an additional 23 questions for public policy decisions. No action was ever taken by USIA on this massive work; it was labeled “Confidential” and locked away, although Bogart finally secured its release under the Freedom of Information Act. Contemporary readers, inured to government shenanigans and numerous “gate” scandals, might question the need for such secrecy. One could conjecture that the agency was concerned about revealing the diversity of opinion, lack of consensus on policy issues, and general bemusement expressed by many program personnel at a time when it was inherently necessary to present a unified front against an aggressive, monolithic enemy. The report was criticized for the anonymity of its sources and for not expressing the percentage of agency personnel who agreed or disagreed with stated assumptions; however, the diversity of frank opinions expressed bring animation and credence to the work. Bogart does not decide which convictions and impressions are more valid than others. Ambiguous purposes, shifting levels of emphasis, and selective assimilation and dissemination of information speak loudly about the reality gaps that existed and may still exist between those who formulate policy and those who carry it out. A major area of conflict concerns the main purpose of the program: should the USIA concentrate on “selling” America, or on combating communism? Another area of controversy includes the degree of truth used in communications: Should the libraries or information centers carry materials that are popular, but portray aspects of American culture (race relations, capitalism) in an unfavorable light? Even the target audience is disputed: do agents concentrate on the elites or the masses? These dominant conflicts and many subordinate others surfacing in respondent comments, describe, perhaps better than a narrative extrapolation might, how the propaganda program works. A bit puzzling is the author’s comment in the revised preface that he has retained the original format and sequence of Premise to Propaganda, but has “added brief introductory comments to each section” (p.ix). Yes, each section is preceded by comments, but they are, word-for-word, the same in both editions. Conceivably, Bogart meant that he added prefatory comments to each section of the original abridged report, but his meaning is not clear. Although these introductory remarks retain validity after 20 years, a view from the 1990s would have given the reader, especially the non-foreign policy specialist, guidance in understanding the subsequent text. The bibliography, “Books about USIA,” has been updated. All of the titles from the previous edition have been retained, but six new titles published after 1976 have been added. A major shortcoming of Cool Words is the index, which does not include the new material in the preface. The indexes are identical, word-by-word, column-by-column, page citation by page citation in both editions. For example, “Milton Eisenhower” can be located in both editions on page xix. On that same page, in Cool Words, membership growth of both the American Sociological Association and the American Psychological Association is noted; the index provides reference to neither. None of the material, new or old, on preface pages xxiii-Iii (pages added to the new edition) is indexed. One must conclude that the new preface was revised around the previous pagination. Cool Words, Cold War is highly readable and should be of particular interest to historians and those concerned with public opinion or theories of mass communication. It is a significant addition to Cold War collections. If libraries hold Premises fo Propaganda, they must consider that the purchase price for the revised edition is really for a new preface.
KATHLEEN M. CONLEY General Reference/Documents Milner Library Illinois State University Normal, IL 6179043900 USA