Coordination practices in extreme situations

European Management Journal (2012) 30, 475– 489

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/emj

Coordination practices in extreme situations ´ Ce ´cile b,c, Drucker-Godard Carole Bouty Isabelle a, Gode `vre Pascal d, Nizet Jean e,f, Pichault Franc ¸ois g,h Lie

a,*

,

a

´ Paris Ouest Nanterre la De ´fense, UFR SEGMI, Bat G, 200 Av de la Re ´publique, 92001 Nanterre cedex, France Universite Research Centre of the French Air Force (CReA), Ecole de lÕair, BA 701, 13661 Salon Air, France c GREDEG Laboratory, UMR CNRS 6227, University of Nice Sophia-Antipolis, France d Clermont University and ESC Graduate School of Management, Centre de Recherche Clermontois en Gestion et Management (CRCGM), EA 3849, France e University of Namur, Belgium f ´ de Louvain, Faculte ´ Ouverte de Politique Economique et Sociale, Rue de la Lanterne Magique, Universite B1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium g ESCP-Europe, Paris, France h `ge, Sart Tilman, Belgium HEC-Management School, B19 - 7 bd du Rectorat, 4000 University of Lie b

KEYWORDS Coordination; Extreme situation; Practices; Case studies

Summary This article addresses coordination practices in extreme situations. Whereas past literature has heavily focused on a structural and contingent approach of the phenomena, we argue that a practice-based approach of coordination fruitfully enhances our understanding. We draw on an abductive approach and perform a systematic comparative analysis of four case studies: the crew of a sailing boat engaged in a race, military air and ground forces in theater, medical staff in a neonatology unit and a polar expedition confronted with polar bears. We outline highly heterogeneous coordination practices along four dimensions (formalization, verticality, openness, and specificity). Our results lead to invalidate both a configurational and a contingent perspective on coordination. We show that despite high heterogeneity, these four attributes represent a useful framework for managers to leverage coordination practices produced in situ. ª 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Introduction Many of us would consider it conventional discourse, even cliche ´, to state that coordination is a central preoccupation of management and organization research and practice. Whatever a platitude this may sound, it is indisputable: coordination is definitely central to organizations and * Corresponding author. Tel.: +33 1 40 97 98 45. E-mail address: [email protected] (D.-G. Carole).

management, and it has been well understood as such as early as the 1910s (e.g. Taylor, 1916). However, coordination also remains surprisingly indeterminate in regard of its centrality: our appreciation of the phenomenon is partial and limited. Past research favored an organizational or business unit level of analysis, thus preventing from opening the black box of coordination processes. It also drew on the assumption that the environment would be sufficiently foreseeable to allow the elaboration of pre-specified modes of coordination that would be assumed most efficient. Such

0263-2373/$ - see front matter ª 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.emj.2012.03.015

476 limitations appear particularly substantial for coordination in extreme situations, during which actors frequently challenge usual frameworks and generate other paths as the situation unfolds. In this article, we address coordination as a practice with the view that it is something that actors do in situ, and define extreme situations as management situations that are at the same time evolving, uncertain and highly risky. Building on an abductive approach of four case studies encompassing extreme situations (the crew of a sailing boat engaged in a race, military air and ground forces in theater, medical staff in a neonatology unit and a polar expedition), we advance current understanding of coordination with both an analytical contribution and managerial implications. The paper proceeds as follows. The second section reviews past coordination literature and delineates a research gap on coordination in extreme situations. In third section we present our methods and depict the four cases. In the fourth section we conduct a transversal abductive analysis of the cases, and highlight four attributes of coordination practices in extreme situations. In the last section, fifth section, discusses these findings, and how they enable managers to leverage coordination practices in situ.

Literature review Literature on coordination is abundant. Although it proved valuable, we suggest that it also led to developing a significantly restrictive understanding of the topic. Then we turn to extreme situations.

Intra-organizational coordination: from a contingent approach to a practice lens Explorations of the concept of coordination in management studies can be traced back to the seminal works of Taylor (1916), Fayol (1949), and March and Simon (1958). Picturing coordination as the integration of different parts of an organization through resources allocation and the alignment of individual efforts (Alse `ne & Pichault, 2004; Van de Ven, Delbecq, & Koenig, 1976), these contributions suggested a contingent view of coordination: the environment is predictable enough to characterize existing interdependencies, and design predefined mechanisms for various contingencies. As it expanded in the 1960s and 1970s (for example, Chandler, 1962; Mintzberg, 1978; Thompson, 1967; Van de Ven et al., 1976), the contingent approach broadly assumed that coordination could be shaped for the pursuit of given generic objectives in given generic contexts (Crowston, 1997). Okhuysen and Bechky (2009) outlined substantial differences in these theories though. In particular, they showed that some authors focused on the configuration of organizational work with operational specialization and the elimination of waste (for example, Chandler, 1962; Taylor, 1916), while others concentrated on organization and the design of management systems that specify exchanges through dedicated structures, roles, and rules (for example, Argote, 1982; Fayol, 1949; Gittell, 2002; Gupta, Dirsmith, & Fogarty, 1994; Mintzberg, 1978; Thompson, 1967). Overall, these studies relying on design (of work, or of organizations) resulted in a rich array of classifications

B. Isabelle et al. and typologies of coordination devices that were often produced with a normative intent. In spite of these significant contributions, our appreciation of coordination remains partial and limited (Rico, Sanchez-Manzanares, Gil, & Gibson, 2008). In particular, due to a change in the nature of organizational work and the shift away from manufacturing, interdependencies between processes, structures and actors may be difficult to pre-identify and plan (Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). Moreover, the contingency theories failed at capturing the on-going nature of the coordination process, and did not explore how coordination is generated by actors themselves regardless the organizational design. Over the last two decades, some scholars have engaged in further examining these limitations (for example, Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Foss & Lorenzen, 2009; Lechner & Kreutzer, 2010; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009; Quinn & Dutton, 2005; Rico et al., 2008). Considering coordination as a ‘‘temporally unfolding and contextualized process’’ (Faraj & Xiao, 2006, p. 1157), these scholars favored a situated perspective and brought the influences of social and cognitive factors on coordination back in. Concurring with these recent contributions, we argue that coordination is less dependent on design than on ongoing work activities that emerge in response to coordination challenges. Opening the ‘‘black box’’ of coordination requires an epistemological turn towards a practice approach of coordination (Faraj & Xiao, 2006), which allows better accounting for the unfolding and embedded nature of the doings of agents engaged in coordination. We define practices as both what people do in situations and the way they do it. Practices are knowing in action (Piaget, 1974), that is dispositions enacted in specific situations (Bourdieu, 1990). Studying coordination with a practice lens therefore implies examining people as they are engaged in coordination, what they do and the way they do it in specific situations. It also involves analyzing inter-relationships, in order to link micro and macro considerations, organizational, individual and inter-individual phenomena in order to explore how the work of coordinating is done by actors.

Extreme situations: definition We build on GirinÕs (1990) management-based definition of a situation to characterize extreme situations. A management situation occurs when ‘‘participants get together and have to accomplish a collective action within a certain time leading to a result to be subjected to an external judgment’’ (Girin, 1990, p. 142, translation by Journe ´ & Raulet-Croset, 2007). It is based on on-going actorsÕ interactions within a specific space and time frame. In that view, Girin links his definition of management situation to interactional (e.g., Goffman, 1988) and pragmatist approaches (e.g. Dewey, 1938), which consider the emerging quality of situation as the result of subjective interpretations of actors (Journe ´ & Raulet-Croset, 2007). Drawing on GirinÕs works, we define extreme situations as management situations that are at the same time (1) evolving, (2) uncertain, and (3) highly risky. The evolving nature of extreme situations refers to rapid, discontinuous and simultaneous changes (Faraj & Xiao, 2006; Wirtz, Mathieu, & Schilke, 2007). These features point to the time-speed

Coordination practices in extreme situations pressure handled by actors as their interactions unfold (Bourgeois & Eisenhardt, 1988; Eisenhardt, 1989; Hollnagel, Journe ´, & Laroche, 2009), as well as to differences in the pace of change. Concerning the later, some extreme situations can be considered as urgent, that is too pressing to permit a longer delay (Klein, Ziegert, Knight, & Xiao, 2006) while others, thought urgent, do not compel immediate action. The uncertainty of extreme situations refers to the probability of occurrence of events as well as their moment of occurrence and practical details (Rix & Lie `vre, 2010). An event can be more or less expected, but also totally unexpected. From Cunha, Clegg, and Kamoche (2006) and Weick and Sutcliffe (2007) contributions, we consider that uncertainty in extreme situations is mainly rooted in either expected issues and unexpected causes (i.e. emergence of creeping troubles in organization although expected issues are apparently well managed) or unexpected issues and expected causes (i.e. surprising outcomes stemming from pre-identified causes). Last, extreme situations entail a high level of risk. The risk can be vital (e.g. fatal injuries in the course of action) and/or symbolic (e.g. loss of leadership). Drawing from Goffman (1974), we consider that risk is linked to natural processes and/or human activities. The following develops four case studies rooted in extreme situations, describing practices of coordination developed by actors in situ.

Four case studies to explore extreme situations Drawing on a multiple-case design (Eisenhardt, 1989; Yin, 2003), we choose our four cases with regard to the diversity of extreme situations they embrace. We additionally followed Wolfe et al. (2005) and Bamberger and PrattÕs (2010) suggestions and selected cases from both conventional and sports organizations in order to enrich our sample and understanding of phenomena at stake. Each case consists of intertwined situations that differently combine the three characteristics of extreme situations previously outlined. For instance, the ‘‘evolving nature’’ attribute differs between team sailing, where members have barely more than 1 or 2 min to coordinate, and the medical follow-up case, in which the medical team can take the time of discussion, as urgent as the situation is. With regard to uncertainty, the diversity of our cases derives from various issues and causes: for example, the air-to-ground operation case depicts situations in which uncertainty is less rooted on issues, which are broadly expected (air fighters will have to deliver fire on enemy targets) than on causes (the unfolding of some non-identified sequences during the mission such as enemy positions and sophistication of armaments). On the contrary, the polar expedition case is mainly influenced by unexpected issues and sudden events, such as the loss of dogs. Last, in the polar expedition and team sailing cases, risk is mostly symbolic: losing the race or leadership. We do not mean that human lives are never endangered, yet rather that what is usually at stake in these cases is symbolic. On the other hand risk is mainly vital in the air fighters and neonatology cases. Because it allows depicting of the multiple coordination practices developed by actors to handle specific

477 extreme situations, the multiple-case design supports a process of confirming and disconfirming the inferences drawn from our four cases (Yin, 2003). We conducted the four case studies with a similar methodological approach: we concentrated on the doings of individuals in situation. For this purpose, we primarily used observation in situ (either direct and/or thanks to video recording), interviews with actors and archival data as our major data sources. However specific circumstances also required methodological opportunism (Girin, 1990) and we therefore developed ad hoc data collection devices for each case, which we further describe in turn in the following section. We analyzed our data by comparing our material across cases. As suggested by Eisenhardt (1989) we started by analyzing each case. We then collectively conducted the transversal analysis of the cases within an abductive approach (Fann, 1970; Locke, 2007; Van Maanen, Sorensen, & Mitchell, 2007) with the view to discovering regularities throughout our observations. This approach refers to an inquiry process (Peirce, 1995) investigating the relationship between data and concepts. As Van Maanen et al. (2007) argued, abduction is primarily assigned to ‘‘the empirical world, but in the service of theorizing [since] analysis proceeds by the continuous interplay between data and concepts’’ (p. 1149). Building on such cross-fertilization, the original framework and discussions should be understood as the result of both unpredicted empirical findings and conceptual insights discovered during the process (Dubois & Gadde, 2002). In that view, an abductive approach allowed exploiting our data to question established theory and move on towards new knowledge. We then first compared pairs of cases to list similarities and differences in regard of coordination practices. Then, collectively, we progressively widen this comparative process to our four cases and, building on Faraj and Xiao (2006) prior method, we identified a set of recurring themes across them. Last we turned back to cases to analyze each of these themes in more details. In the following pages, we successively recount the four cases and additional ad hoc data collection devices.

Case study No. 1: Team sailing The first case is that of the crew of a sailing yacht engaged in a fleet race (Rix & Lie `vre, 2008). We investigated onboard coordination practices that base sailboat riding. Case settings and method Team sailing is a distributed activity in which all crew members contribute to sailing the boat in a coordinated manner. The combination of hydrodynamic and aerodynamic forces that keeps the boat in motion cannot be achieved straight to the wind. It requires that the boat sails at a certain angle off the wind. In terms of on-board coordination, this means that the crew has to regularly maneuver the boat and zigzag at alternative angles to progress towards its destination. In a fleet race, such coordination is even more essential as boats compete in speed to win the race and achieving speed is, among other things, a matter of coordinated steering and trimming during this zigzagging. In addition to keeping the boat at a certain angles off the wind, the crew has to face the evolution of external

478 elements that unfold simultaneously and produce more or less expected outcomes: currents, waves, the wind, visibility (the waves periodically hide the buoys), the position of competitors around the boat, and the surrounding noise (wind in the sails, swash on the hull, and metal parts banging together). These ever evolving conditions form very quickly opening and shutting windows to maneuver and/or trim the boat and make the best of wind and currents in face of competitors, while preserving safety, and abiding by racing rules (devised and enforced by the race committee on the ground of international standards). We studied a crew a monohull designed for seven members. The helmsman and tactician stand back to back at the stern. The halyard man and a mainsail stand in the middle around the mast. The two grinders are also in this area, yet on each side of the boat. The bowman stands at the prow. The boat was engaged in fleet races based on triangle courses: boats compete from imaginary starting to finishing lines along a triangular course materialized by buoys. They try to cross the starting line at full speed exactly as the race starts, sail (zigzag) upwind to the windward buoy, then to the downwind mark. They must complete the course twice before turning into the wind once again to tack to the finish line. We collected data from six different sources in combination: direct on-board observations during training, observations from the organizing committeeÕs boat (racing rules forbade a third party on board during race), audio-recordings of each crew member during races, debriefings of the recordings with the skipper and some of the crew members, interviews with each of the seven on-board crewmembers, attendance to crewÕs briefing and debriefing sessions. We transcribed all the visual data in the form of notes. We fully transcribed all the interviews and recordings. Coordination on board The interdependency between crew members on board is very strong. They all participate to sailing the boat, each of them with a specific contribution. The tactician surveys the quadrants and competitors, and elaborates possible routes to zigzag towards the buoys. The helmsman steers the boat in accordance, to place and maintain it in chosen positions, and benefit from hydro and aerodynamic forces. The grinders, halyard man and mainsail perform relevant trimming (live ballast, and amount and angle of main sail in accordance with other sails), and provide the necessary equilibrium to achieve maximum speed. Keeping the boat in trim is essential. The other sails (especially the jib) are under the responsibility of the bow man standing at the prow. He hoists/lowers and trims them. Being at the prow, he is also the only one who can spot the buoys between waves and therefore provides crucial information to the tactician and helmsman. All these contributions are both essential and interdependent, and each of the crew members has to adjust his/her actions to that of others, in nature, quality and time. Sailing is a well documented activity. Tasks allocations and standard procedures are detailed in manuals. Becoming a sailor consists in learning them in the first place and all crew members know what they shall do in a given standard situation. These are basic and shared professional skills. The adjustment of contributions in intensity and time, however, are matters of alignment and combination that require further attention within the crew because of the ever evolving

B. Isabelle et al. context of practice. In this regard, our data suggests that multiform communication and rhythmic activity are most central to coordination and race sailing. We observed that various forms of communication coexist on board. We recorded intense exchanges between crew members. For example, each time the boat is about to jibe or tack the helmsman asks ‘‘ready about?’’ and waits for grinders to reply ‘‘ready’’ before steering the wheel. Another example is between the helmsman and tactician, who, although back to back, must exchange crucial information to conceive the course of the boat. Our data also indicate that non-verbal communication is of importance. For example, the tactician and bowman, standing at each end of the boat, exchange information about buoysÕ position by arm gestures. Our data further suggest that non-verbal also enriches verbal communication. The position of bodies, the direction towards which people look at for example provide texture, convey feelings and awareness of situations that are essential to coordination. Confirming the importance of on-board communication, we also observed that during the debriefing sessions, words and gestures were the major topic of discussion, with sometimes tensed exchanges around the intended meaning of gestures, looks, or words. Our data additionally suggest that rhythm played a crucial role for coordination, with interactions happening differently according to periods of lower or higher intensity on board. We observed that some moments are calm, with moderate verbal communication and apparent quietness despite continuous activity. The crew keeps trimming the boat and sails to achieve maximum possible speed. At these moments coordination rests on crewÕs attention towards sensations and each otherÕs positions. They are also attentive to the boat and the environment, trying to detect all the indications of a change: whether conditions, competitors, and buoys. The change itself is expected and the crew also knows that it will generate a maneuver, either to adjust the cape or trimming, or even change direction (jibe or tack). Then suddenly, intensity grows, verbal communication intensifies, tension rises, and in a short moment a maneuver is announced (by the helmsman or the bowman) and performed (with trimming in accordance). During these phases, we observed that most often a single word (as simple as ‘‘now’’) by the helmsman or bowman sets everything in motion. This indicates that it is the temporal activation of skills and procedures between crew members that is central here, not directives. Crew members expect changes to come because they read the situation, and perfectly know if the boat shall tack or jibe and what specific tasks they should accomplish. What is to be determined by the tactician and helmsman (or bowman), however, is when to engage in the maneuver; with the simple word they pronounce, they indicate to others that they can commence. Periods of lower and higher intensity give rhythm to sailing on board. This beat, which is not predetermined yet expected and enacted by crew members, is central to coordination.

Case study No. 2: Air-to-ground missions in Afghanistan The second extreme case study is that of air and ground forces in Afghanistan (Rix & Lie `vre, 2010). We explore

Coordination practices in extreme situations coordination practices developed by a Mirage 2000D aircrew and a Special Force soldier (a Forward Air Controller) in the Regional Command South of Afghanistan acknowledged as the stronghold of the Taliban. These actors are faced with highly hostile conditions, which unfold to produce unexpected outcomes and yet are too pressing to permit delayed answer. Case settings and method In Afghanistan, NATO forces are involved in asymmetric fights against a highly dissimilar adversary. The tactical situation changes in accordance with non-linear dynamics and unexpected contingencies. In such turbulent war conditions, the French fighter aircrafts Mirage 2000D are engaged in air-to-ground missions (Close Air support – CAS), which consist in providing firepower during offensive and/or defensive operations in response to Special Force requirements. Ammunition launching requires the support of the Forward Air Controller, who guides the actions of the aircraft from the ground by radio-transmitting appropriate information. War-fighters act under time-sensitive pressure and hostility, being recurrently targeted by enemy ground fire. Each service organizes CAS within its role as part of the joint force. That is the reason why Close Air support missions require perfect coordination between ground and air forces. During the specific mission we investigated, an unexpected event caused some disturbance to the aircrew. As the pilot pointed out: ‘‘between what has been planned and what we live in flight, things are potentially dissimilar. We discover the unexpected in situation, and we have to be adaptable in real time’’. We draw on a mix of data sources: 11 individual semistructured interviews (four pilots, five navigators – some of them used to fly together as aircrews – and two Forward Air Controllers), observations from shadowing of two professional meetings, several missionsÕ briefings and debriefings, as well as a simulation of bomb launching, and archival records (reports from the field and recent video and audio records). Our research department being located in a French Air Force base, we have additional daily opportunities to collect information through informal conversations and observation of the military community, its codes, languages, and practices. Coordination in theater The Mirage aircrew plans the Close Air Support (CAS) mission with accuracy, on the basis of intelligence provided by multiple sources. The pilot and the navigator precisely brief their flight just before takeoff. The briefing follows the structured process provided by the NATO Air Forces guide, including procedures related to security and ends with ‘‘what if’’ (reviewing procedures to be completed if a system problem occurs during the flight). Right after this briefing, the aircrew takes off. Primarily, execution of CAS mission is covered by rules of engagement. They are directives issued by competent military authorities that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which forces have to conduct combat engagement. Produced by nations regarding to political outlooks, rules of engagement provide a general institutional framework to achieving Close Air Support. In addition, the Mirage aircrew and the Forward Air Controller (from Special

479 Forces) make use of strict procedures and methods in the course of action. The aircrew time schedule is printed in the Air Tasking Order, and received just before taking-off. Once the target area reached, a first Forward Air Controller (FAC) passes target information onto the aircrew from a standardized document called CAS card. CAS card is made up of data lines indicating the enemy formation and disposition, flight duration (minutes and seconds) from the initial point to the target, the aircraft exit route following the attack, etc. Together with these strict procedures, the aircrew and FAC use a common language published within NATO documentations: ‘‘code words’’. The pilot explained: ‘‘code words are meaningful. They represent a strong base for a common language. You donÕt have to interpret. For example, ÔinvestigateÕ means that you must identify your target. We immediately know that weÕre gonna make a particular kind of interception to observe and identify. No ambiguity’’. Air Tasking Order, CAS card and code words are attached to specific activities, and used by war-fighters automatically. They enable them to accurately and rapidly share a large amount of information. War-fighters learn such standards through strict educational and training processes. Their skills and competences are evaluated on a regular basis to acquire and extend professional certifications and qualifications. Once above the target zone, the aircrew quickly understands that the enemy formation and disposition are different from what was expected: Taliban forces are quite more abundant, friendly and enemy forces are in close proximity, and the FAC radio is out of order. Special Forces need immediate air firepower to save their lives (a situation called Emergency Close Air Support). The aircrew cannot communicate with the FAC as usual, and is unable to put into practice typical coordination solutions; it has to rebuild sense of what is happening, in situ, in order to avoid a sudden loss of meaning that could drive to disastrous outcomes. In that way, standards remain decisive in providing the pilot and the navigator with a stable structure that they do not question in course of action. However, they have no alternative but to challenge their usual way of coordinate, building coordination in situ. In our case, the aircrew decided to ‘‘buzz’’ the area, which is a very low altitude flight intended to intimidate the Taliban. We observed that internal radio chatter between the pilot and navigator grew much higher than usual. They initiated real discussions instead of using standardized coded language. They exchange opinions on the specifics of the unfolding event and expressed their ‘‘operational creativity’’ (interview) to find the appropriate solution without the usual help of the FAC. The navigator recounted: ‘‘We decided not to fire. [. . .] there were Rules of Engagement, what we were seeing on the ground. All together, we debated the opportunity to engage the target, and we finally agreed not to and buzzed instead.’’ Mutual trust also plays an essential role in such unpredictable circumstances. In effect, the pilot and the navigator need to remain focused on their tasks and doubting othersÕ competencies is not possible. They have to take upon high responsibility and mutual trust insures that they share common knowledge regarding their goals and capabilities. The pilot told us: ‘‘trust is a kind of mutual protection insurance’’. He explained that in theater, he always flew

480 with the same navigator and that allowed them to know and trust each other: ‘‘when we are in theatre, patrols and aircrews are set, and we never change team members. It is like a tribe’’. Such arrangements leverage interpersonal trust since each flight is an opportunity to learn from the other, assess the way he works, his ability to adapt to changing circumstances and make decisions. Moreover, the navigator insisted that sustained social relationships are cultural in combat squadrons: ‘‘a squadron is like a tribe. ItÕs become cultural to trust each other’’. Finally, once landed, the aircrew debriefs its mission with a usual 30–40-min post-flight review. They focus on what happened during the sortie and the way the mission has been accomplished. They pay particular attention to errors and causes of errors as well as to alternative actions they implemented in the course of action. Concerning this specific case, they did require Special ForcesÕ viewpoint. They finally transmit a written report to the squadron leader, describing some lessons learned from that specific experience and that could affect standards in feedback.

Case study No. 3: Medical follow-up in a neonatology unit Our third case is located in the neonatology unit of an academic hospital. We followed how physicians, nurses and external stakeholders concerted their practices vis-a `-vis a patient enduring a problematic pregnancy. The situation unfolded over several days and, over time, various elements interacted to create uncertainty regarding the pregnancy and its outcome. Case settings and method The case is initially composed of a dozen-minute-long audiovisual document filmed by a public Belgian TV broadcast company. We complemented this material with in-depth interviews with the physicians in charge of the patient (Dr. F and S), as well as with several interviews with administrative employees, and other physicians and nurses within the context of intervention research that we conducted at the hospital. As the case is longitudinal, we were able to distinguish two important moments. The first episode occurs after 24 weeks of pregnancy. The patient, who has been sent to the hospital after a partial rupture of the waters, was just submitted to an echogram. Doctor S, obstetrician and expert in prenatal diagnosis, has observed ‘‘something unusual, a big bent’’, which could suggest a chromosomal malformation of the fetus. He shares his concerns with two colleagues present at this time in the neonatology unit: ‘‘I donÕt have any clear conclusion. I canÕt tell her anything definitive’’ (video recording). They agree to wait for further evolutions, not informing the patient nor proposing her any additional exam for the time being, in order to be ‘‘as less aggressive as possible’’ (video recording). Two weeks later, the case is debated during the Monday ‘‘forum’’. That day, Doctor S is engaged in other activities, and absent. Twelve persons attend the meeting: nurses and physicians (gynecologist, anesthetist, surgeon, pediatrician, etc.) of the neonatology unit, and interns. It is conducted by Doctor F, head of unit. PatientÕs external gynecologist has

B. Isabelle et al. provided new echograms. They seem to show that the fetus is a male, which sharply reduces risks of malformation. However Doctor F mentions medical researches establishing that the viability and normality rates are very low at this stage: ‘‘the probability to be alive runs around 20%’’ (video recording). One of the physicians reports that the day before he had explained the situation to the patient because she was growing anxious. Doctor F approves: ‘‘This is in line with the hospital policy to provide patients with the kind of information adapted to their worries and requests’’. The forum leads to proposing an additional blood analysis that will provide more precise information on the probability of malformation. A few hours later, Doctor F tells Doctor S. The latter rapidly breaks the conversation, explaining that he came exactly to the same conclusion. ‘‘IÕll do it tomorrow’’, he says. Doctor F launches him ‘‘Good luck!’’ when he leaves the office (video recording). Our interviews with Doctors F and S provided us with additional important information: several patients, often influenced by their own general practitioner or gynecologist, do not hesitate to sue neonatologists for various reasons linked to the pitfalls of pregnancy. Given their previous experience, Doctors F and S usually document, on a written basis, any act or decision, particularly when they do not conform to the ‘‘state of the art’’ in medical research. Once a sufficient amount of ‘‘empirical evidence’’ is gathered on a specific topic, they produce a scientific paper with which they contribute to the evolution of their discipline. In this case, actors face two types of uncertainty. The most important one is related to the patient and her childÕs situation: if the medical team decides to intervene inappropriately, it might endanger the mother and/or her child. This uncertainty evolves along the pregnancy. It is reduced by the provision of medical data (from exams, and information given by the patientÕs gynecologist), on the one hand, and by the positive or negative evolution of the pregnancy itself, on the other. The other uncertainty concerns legal actions likely to be undertaken by the patient and/or her general practitioner, in case of medical error. Coordination around problematic pregnancy The above description reveals that actors are referring to two kinds of standards for coordination. A first category of standards comes from evidence-based medical research. It provides professionals with what they call ‘‘guidelines’’, to which they refer when they decide to intervene. In our case, these guidelines deal with the probability of survival in case of premature birth. The state of the art is supposed to be known by professionals but it does not replace their capacity of judging the concrete situation they are confronted with. Remember that Doctor F says ‘‘Good luck!’’ to this colleague at the end of their meeting, which means that the professional eventually takes alone full responsibility for his/her medical acts. We may thus designate these standards as professional standards. The second category of standards reflects the specific hospital policy, more precisely concerning the moment and ways in which patients shall be informed of their health situation. Such standards may be depicted as institutional, because they diffuse some values, principles or philosophical orientations to the members of the organization.

Coordination practices in extreme situations The two categories of standards are supposed to provide global guidelines for the first type of uncertainty (risks linked to evolution of pregnancy): they thus contribute to avoiding fully ad hoc solutions. However, they are far from determining the multiple coordination practices concretely engaged. They weigh with limited intensity, and/or in combination with other practices. For instance, reference to the ‘‘hospital policy’’ occurs ex post, and only concerns a minor aspect of the teamwork: the moment at which the patient must be informed about her health situation. Moreover, our interviewees explain that professional guidelines, provided by the medical literature, should be permanently reconsidered in accordance with patientÕs characteristics: her medical situation, how she experiences her pregnancy, her attitude vis-a `-vis the possibility of having handicapped children, etc. Such judgment is mainly built on exchanges among medical staff. These exchanges may be either strictly informal (when Doctor S discusses with colleagues present at that moment within the unit) or be part of a more formal framework (the weekly forum). They also can be either limited to the members of the neonatology unit or opened to external stakeholders (the patientÕs gynecologist). We additionally observed that these coordination practices become more important than standards, particularly when physicians are confronted with uncertainty regarding the patientÕs situation. How do actors cope with the second category of uncertainty (risk of legal actions)? They systematically build files, in which they record and describe their medical acts. We can here observe practices, which do not refer to pre-existing standards elaborated by experts. Once again, they are mainly based on exchanges among professionals, particularly among physicians. The accumulation of written traces may however contribute, by turns, to the design of new professional standards. We finally observed that coordination practices and the uncertainties of the work situation influence each other. For example, the reference to information provided by the gynecologists reduces uncertainty regarding the medical state of the mother and her fetus. But such exchange with external stakeholders may also provide them with information they could use for legal actions. In this particular case, the same practice appears as ‘‘double-edged’’: it helps reducing a specific category of uncertainty while simultaneously reinforcing another. Let us consider the documentation of decisions taken during the pregnancy: such formalized practices do not only contribute to diminishing the risks of legal actions but also to improving medical standards linked to a problematic pregnancy.

Case study No. 4: Polar expedition in Labrador The fourth extreme case study is that of a polar expedition in Labrador (Rix & Lie `vre, 2010). The purpose of the expedition is to journey between two villages through the Arctic by ski in self-sufficiency. The expedition presupposes physical aptitudes, but its objective is discovery. Case settings and method The expedition is a private project, with members funding their participation. The team is made up of four members. It is led by Joe ¨l, who was fully involved in the raid from

481 preparation to its completion. The overall project ran over two and a half years, from setting up the initial idea to closing of the accounts, and feedback on the experience. The idea development and project preparation phases required two years. The field phase lasted about five weeks. Data was collected within the course of the expedition as part of a participating observation (Lie `vre & Rix-Lie `vre, 2009). It was performed in two complementary ways. First a researcher, as observing participant, completed an on board logbook accounting for the course of the expedition at the group level. It is based on a variety of material, from daily notes, to video recordings of situations filled out with comments, and interviews conducted either during or after the expedition. Second, another researcher, a participating observer, recorded data on the personal experience of each team member throughout the expedition. He followed the course of the expedition in detail while keeping certain distance in order to take advantage of confidential statements made by one or another member. Maintaining exchanges after the expedition, he was also able to focus on particular episodes ex post, based on video and self-confrontation method (Rix & Lie `vre, 2008). Coordination for bear security The critical situation that we study here is in relation to bear security. Exposing how security will be managed in face of polar bears is compulsory to obtain the expedition official authorization in Labrador. In the course of a preparation meeting, questions came up about protection against polar bears. Opinions were divided. Each member related his own experiences with polar bears and the different techniques he/she was used to. In any case, it involved carrying a gun, which was viewed as a vital tool for this kind of expedition. A second set of questions came up about the possibility of carrying two guns (one per tent). ‘‘No, itÕs too dangerous’’ stated Joe ¨l, ‘‘we need a single gun and I will keep it’’. ‘‘And what do we do about bear security during the night?’’ asked other team members. There are in fact many alternative possibilities, such as rotating watch or setting up an alarm system around the camp, etc. Joe ¨l cut through the problem and suggested that they will take dogs, as he had already done before. Other team members had never used dogs to cope with bear threat and were skeptical. In particular, they considered that dogs could also attract bears. Joe ¨l specified that Gilles and he will handle the dogs during the expedition. The decision was made: he would buy two dogs once in Labrador. On the second day of the expedition, the weather is nice despite a strong wind. Moving forward is difficult with the dogs never having experienced this type of journey before: walking beside a skier, pulling a small sled that contains their food. There is a 300 m slope to reach the pass, which is always a physical challenge when pulling a pulka weighing an average of 90 kg. Joe ¨l left early this morning to find a passageway. It is cold. One of his thumbs has frozen but he does not tell his teammates. By the beginning of the afternoon, the wind blows even harder and Joe ¨l has not managed to warm his finger up. The team is worried. Pierre decides to set up the camp immediately so Joe ¨l can warm up. The next day, Joe ¨l leaves ahead with one dog without saying a word, as if nothing ever happened. The others follow and then catch up with him. They reach a tricky crossing

482

Table 1

Attributes of coordination practices.

Team sailing

Formalization

Verticality

Openness

Specificity

‘‘Competitors in the sport of sailing are governed by a body of rules that they are expected to follow and enforce. A fundamental principle of sportsmanship is that when competitors break a rule they will promptly take a penalty, which may be to retire.’’ (International Sailing Federation)

Intense communication between all crewmembers, yet with variations according to different moments

Racing rules forbid that the crew communicates with third parties or even embarks noncrewmembers on board

All crew members know what they shall do for each maneuver given their position on board

Racing rules specify: the type of course, priority rules, weigh constrains, race signals, and penalties

On board recordings and observation: ‘‘Have you seen the buoy?’’ (tactician, shouting) ‘‘Many waves over here.’’ (bowman, gesturing in addition) ‘‘Careful guys, we got to be real quick on this one. The time time!’’ (helmsman to all crew members) ‘‘OK? Timing. OK? OK, guys, weÕre OK.’’ ‘‘SpeedÕs fine?’’ (helmsman) ‘‘Fine weÕre picking up’’ (tactician) Sequence repeatedly observed on board: ‘‘Ready about?’’ (helmsman to the crew) ‘‘Yep’’ (grinders) ‘‘Now’’ (helmsman). Then the helmsman steers the wheel while all crew members trimming the boat in accordance without talking, yet looking at each other and at the sails

How to perform manoeuvres is documented, and taught in sailing schools

Crewmembers feel the tension of the ropes between their hands; make judgements about sails trimming after their shape and their sound. The position of bodies, the direction towards which people look at provide texture, convey feelings and awareness of situations: ‘‘Each of us truly feels his role on board.’’ (interview)

B. Isabelle et al.

Language of the specific crew: ‘‘Guys, guys, [competitor 1]Õs spinnaker! He breathes back. Come on, come on!’’ (helmsman; on-board recording) ‘‘I try to speak the least possible. I use gestures, mostly always the same ones, because I havenÕt sailed enough with them so that we have our own communication mode.’’ (interview) ‘‘We have to agree with each other in general. I say something, he says something else and time goes by. Either he doesnÕt see what I mean andI donÕt have time to explain and in the end itÕs too late. Sometimes I am not sure we understand each other well.’’ (interview) ‘‘No! When I do that [the bowman gestures his arm above his head] it means that itÕs OK. We did it before. It means itÕs OK!!! We must agree on that or it goes on and on and weÕll have the problem again’’ (Observation debriefing)

‘‘Yes or no? Can we go or not? What do you think?’’ (helmsman to the tactician) ‘‘Yes. No. Wait’’ (tactician) ‘‘What? What do you think? Now? The speed? ItÕs gonna be too late.’’ (helmsman) ‘‘Now we missed it!’’ (helmsman) (onboard recordings)

Rules of Engagement: directives issued by competent military authorities that delineate the circumstances and limitations under which forces have to conduct combat engagement

Aircrew members mostly use code word in flight

Standardized document (CAS card): data lines indicating the enemy formation and disposition, flight duration (minutes and seconds) from the initial point to the target

When the radio turned down, the pilot and navigator suddenly switched to common language and exchanged opinions on the unfolding situation (archival data). ‘‘Our aim is to keep communicating between each other.’’ (interview with a pilot) ‘‘We decided to not fire. [. . .] There were Rules of Engagement, what we were seeing on the ground. All together, we debated the opportunity to engage the target, and we finally agreed not to.’’ (interview with the pilot)

Common language, published within NATO documents: code words

‘‘Code words are meaningful. They represent a strong base for a common language.’’ (interview with a pilot)

Permanent exchange of information between actors: ground controllers, ground forces, aircrew, and military authorities Communication with other actors ceases only when the radio brakes down

‘‘We use well known stereotypes to respond to each stage of the mission.’’ (interview with a navigator)

‘‘Having interpersonal relationships—itÕs a part of our job. ItÕs necessary to be curious and interact with pilots, know their procedures and be in line with what they do.’’ (interview with a Forward Air Controller)

It is ‘‘operational creativity’’ (interview with a pilot)

When the radio broke down, the pilot and navigator exchanged opinions and decided to ‘‘buzz’’ (standard word referring to very low altitude flight procedure intended to intimidate enemies)

Coordination practices in extreme situations

Air-to-ground operations

‘‘Mutual trust is a kind of mutual protection insurance.’’ (interview with a navigator)

The pilot and the navigator precisely brief their flight just before takeoff. The NATO Air Forces Guide ends with ‘‘what if’’ (reviewing procedures to be completed if a system problem occurs during the flight) The Mirage aircrew and the Forward Air Controller make use of strict procedures and methods in the course of action. Procedures specify contacts between them: time and identification codes (continued on next page)

483

484

Table 1

(continued)

Medical follow-up in a neonatology unit

Formalization

Verticality

Openness

Specificity

Hospital local standards: ‘‘This is in line with the hospital policy to provide patients with the kind of information adapted to their worries and requests.’’ (video recording)

Multiple informal exchanges among medical staff during the Monday forum (video recording of Monday forum): ‘‘I told her that something is going wrong: it may be either the signal of a polymalformation, or nothing at all! We have no clear explanation to give you at the moment! (1st physician)

The Monday forum is held every week to review cases

Evidence-based medical research, ‘‘guidelines’’. Doctor F mentions medical researches establishing that ‘‘his probability to be alive runs around 20%’’. (video recording of Monday forum)

‘‘If we are sure that itÕs a boy, the problem may not be a genetic syndrome. Is the mother ready for a caesarean?’’ (head of unit)

Many exchanges within the neonatology unit (video recording of Monday forum): ‘‘I think we must be clear with the mother. Sabine told her yesterday that, for the moment, we are waiting and that we try to be the less aggressive as possible.’’ (1st obstetrician) ‘‘You didnÕt speak to her during the ultra-sound scan?’’ (2nd obstetrician)

‘‘Yes she is, but only for a child without any malformation.’’ (2nd physician)

‘‘I told her that it was not easy to see because the liquid was lacking’’ (1st obstetrician)

‘‘And she does not want to give birth to a child with a mental problem.’’ (1st physician)

Exchanges with members external to the neonatology unit: ‘‘The patient told me: ÔDidnÕt you receive the reports from my gynaecologist? My baby is not a girl but a small guy!Õ Then I had to adjust my discourse’’ (physician during the Monday forum)

B. Isabelle et al.

‘‘But in statistical terms, his probability to be alive runs around 20%.’’ (head of unit) Doctor F rapidly discusses the case with S and reports the decision made during the forum: take an additional blood analysis. ‘‘IÕll do it tomorrow’’ (Doctor S) ‘‘Good luck’’ (Doctor F)

Professional guidelines, provided by the medical literature, should be permanently reconsidered in accordance with the patientÕs characteristics: medical situation, attitude, etc. ‘‘We have to judge the concrete situation we are confronted with.’’ (interview) Doctor F and S usually document, on a written basis, any act or decision particularly when they donÕt conform to the ‘‘state of the art’’ in medical research

Ad hoc solutions adopted: responsibility for dogs, and fence once the dogs have escaped

485

Once the dogs lost, tension grows within the team. Joe ¨l minimizes the problem: ‘‘There are not many bears around here.’’ (logbook) Informal exchanges about alternative solutions between the team; Joe ¨lÕs thum has frozen but he didnÕt tell his teammates. Joe ¨l is not involved in the exchanges. ‘‘Pierre decides to set up the camp immediately so that Joe ¨l can warm up.’’ (logbook) Most arrangements are made orally at the team level by the expedition leader: ‘‘I have a good working knowledge of Labrador, but I donÕt have aerial pictures to precisely spot the passageways.’’ (Joe ¨l; recording; preparation phase) ‘‘The next day, we departure without coordination instructions. We do not know who is supposed to go first and who is to walk behind.’’ (on board logbook)

‘‘Today, we departure without Joe ¨l issuing any instruction; he simply leaves ahead.’’ (on board logbook)

Informal exchanges about alternative solutions between the team in the preparation phase. Joe ¨l imposes the solution he favors: ‘‘Two guns. ItÕs two dangerous. We need a single gun and I will keep it [. . .]. We will use dogs.’’ (Joe ¨l; logbook) Polar expedition

Expedition official authorization in Labrador: requires carrying a gun to enforce bear security

Because of the nature of the raid (selfsufficiency in Labardor), communication with third parties is a priori not necessary, and very difficult. New dog are bought from natives after the first ones escaped

Alternative ways of ensuring security against bears: rotation watch, gun, dogs, and fence

Coordination practices in extreme situations

on a river of ice that requires putting on crampons. The dogs are afraid and they eventually slide. As Joe ¨l and Gilles (who were supposed to handle the dogs) are up ahead, Pierre and his friend salvage the dogs. Moving forward is slow. They come to a break in the ice slope: a gap of 2–3 m. Pierre proceeds slowly, with one of the dogs and slips. So as not to hurt the dog, he lets it go and slide down forward to Joe ¨l who was waiting at the bottom. Instead of rushing toward the dog and hold it, Joe ¨l says: ‘‘we mustnÕt deal with it, it will not go far’’. However the dog runs off, soon followed in panic by the second one, and they manage to escape. The dogs will not come back. After this mishap, tension grows in the team. Teammates are worried that they no longer have bear security. Joe ¨l however minimizes the problem, which does not even seem to be a concern to him: ‘‘There are not many bears around here’’ (logbook). Yet Pierre has brought pieces of security equipment inherited from former expeditions: alarm flares, strings, and rubber bands. He builds an anti-bear fence that will protect the camp over the night. The next day, Joe ¨l calls up upon natives to buy new dogs and return to initial arrangements. The case highlights the importance of the expedition leader in coordination, as well as that of the history of interactions between actors all along the project. This expedition is a project which primarily fits with JoelÕs expectations and experience, his main goal being ‘‘exploration and discovery’’. He manages the expedition with few deviations from these expectations. His key concern is to maintain his authority during progression. In this regard, two elements appear of importance. First, Joe ¨l only recruited people he knew and who would accept his authority. Second, he proposed to acquire a gun for protection against bears – a legal obligation – yet to keep this gun, even though he was not the best shot. Therefore the team could not significantly deviate to from his track. However and to manage bear security, the ‘‘dog solution’’ is more efficient because it is less demanding in terms of maintenance. Once the dogs lost, Pierre proposed and built an alternative solution to be protected against bear. That this alternative solution was set up was not a problem for Joe ¨l since he was not directly involved in its implementation. With the new dogs, he soon turned back to the initial plan. The standard of coordination that Joe ¨l puts into practice for bear security stems from his personal experience: both from his practice as an expedition leader and his reflective practice since he writes and teaches in mountain clubs. Joe ¨l planned this expedition as he used to plan others, without communicating to his teammates or briefing the daily track of the shipment every morning. Yet, as the planned solution does not work out in situation, it is on the resources supplied by another member that the team relies, before calling upon external help to be able to turn back to the initial arrangement.

Transversal analysis The comparative analysis of coordination practices in extreme situations across our cases reveals four common attributes: formalization, verticality, openness, and specificity. As displayed in Table 1, each of our case exhibits these attributes. Here, we present and analyze each of them in turn. .

486

B. Isabelle et al.

The first dimension common to our cases is formalization of coordination practices (first column of Table 1). In our four cases we found that formal standards play a role in coordination practices. This is congruent with past coordination literature that insists on plans and rules (e.g. Bigley & Roberts, 2001; Lechner & Kreutzer, 2010; March & Simon, 1958). These formal standards refer to devices that purport ways to coordinate in given situations. Our cases, however, additionally suggest that they can take multiple forms, from written document (such as racing rules, NATO documentations, scientific literature, and law) to material devices (quadrants, code words, medical appliances, or guns). Their sources are also highly diversified: standards may stem from institutions (political or administrative regulation), from a professional community (ethical principles, scientific literature) or be produced by organizational analysts (such as air tasking orders). Yet in addition, the stories further exhibit various degrees to which the standards are important in coordination practice. For example, air-to-ground operations in Afghanistan are usually run in accordance with tight standards. When aircrew members are confronted with unexpected events, they communicate with each other in natural language in order to reach a common understanding of the current situation and select the relevant standards to stick to. In this case, the alignment with standards is perfect and even drives coordination practice. Inversely, in the neonatology unit, staff members – in particular physicians – interpret the relevance of professional standards according to the nature of the situation they cope with. In this case, coordination practices are partly informal despite the existence of standards. On this base, we suggest that a particular coordination practice can be considered as formalized if it is aligned with one or several existing standards (Lechner & Kreutzer, 2010). Reversely, a coordination practice is informal when it is not aligned with existing standards. The second attribute that emerges from the comparative analysis of cases is verticality, reflecting the varying role of the hierarchical line (Lechner & Kreutzer, 2010). As shows in Table 1, our four cases occupy differentiated positions on this dimension, with some coordination practices developing vertically around a hierarchical line (e.g. air–ground operations) whereas others hardly do so (for example in the neonatology unit). Team sailing occupies an intermediary situation on this dimension that is particularly illustrative of possible further variations. The hierarchical line plays a fluctuant role on board, from strong (when the helmsman announces the beginning of a maneuver), to nil

Table 2

when crewmembers sail and trim the boat between maneuvers. In this light, we define coordination practices as ‘‘vertical’’ when they grant important power to the hierarchical line and/or the analysts. They are ‘‘horizontal’’ when they empower to the operators themselves. The third trait that emerges from our comparative analysis refers to what we termed openness of coordination practices. In our cases, coordination is achieved thanks to a variable recourse to external agents. We propose that a coordination practice is closed if it only involves actors directly in charge of the problem at stake; the practice is opened if other stakeholders are associated to resolving the problem. As shows trough Table 1, many variations once again exist along this dimension. Only the crew of the sailing yacht is engaged in a practice that remains closed. In all three other cases intermediary situations and evolutions are observable. The initial degree of openness is highest in the case of air-to-ground operations in Afghanistan: aircrew members interact continuously with other actors (ground forces, and Forward Air Controller). However such openness may be suddenly reduced once the aircrew realizes that keeping contact with ground forces becomes impossible. In the neonatology unit, intermediate openness may be acknowledged when the participants refer to the echogram performed by the patientÕs gynecologist. Last, in the polar expedition, similar intermediate and temporary openness can be registered when natives are called upon to supply new dogs. Last, the fourth attribute common to our cases is specificity. Congruent with past literature, our data shows that sticking to repeated patterns may be important in coordination practices (for example Gittell, 2002; Okhuysen & Bechky, 2009). However, our data also suggest that there exist variations in the extent to which routines are rested upon: in our cases, similar situations requiring coordination might in fact be addressed differently. For example, in the polar expedition a given issue is addressed with alternative responses: confronted several times with a similar problem (bear security), actors successively apply different solutions (dogs, gun, alarm flares, string, rubber bands, etc.). On the contrary, in team sailing, coordination practices are highly stable: a typical answer corresponds to each maneuver and is mobilized each time a situation requires that maneuver (tacking, jibing, and trimming of sails or the boat, etc.). On this ground, we propose that a coordination practice is generic when similar working situations are managed the same way; it is specific if the modus operandi is different.

Variations in the attributes of coordination practices.

Situations

Attributes of coordination practices Formalization

Verticality

Openness

Specificity

Team sailing

Intermediate

Highly closed

Highly generic

Air–ground operations Medical follow-up in a neonatology unit Polar expedition

Very high Intermediate

Highly horizontal or vertical depending on moments Highly vertical Highly horizontal

Highly open Intermediate

Highly generic Moderately specific

Intermediate

Highly specific

Very low

Highly vertical with clandestine horizontality

Coordination practices in extreme situations Overall, each of our four cases exhibits the four attributes. However, the cases differ in terms of degree along each dimension. These variations are synthesized in Table 2. As shown in Table 2, there are many variations in how the cases display the four attributes; from different degrees to which a coordination practice exhibits a property, to possible changes as coordination unfolds, and possibly different combinations of these attributes.

Discussion Our analyses reveal the heterogeneity of coordination practices in extreme situations. Four attributes at least are necessary to describe them. It is, however, difficult to classify coordination practices in a binary way on the basis of these attributes. The practices are not simply open or closed, horizontal or vertical, etc., but they express multiple nuances and graduations. On this base, we acknowledge the need for further research on other extreme situations, in order to validate the completeness of our list of four criteria. Heterogeneity is even greater if one takes the temporal dimension into account. For several cases, the coordination practices vary according to times, periods, etc. These variations can be observed in the short term: for example in the sailing race, practices may be either more horizontal or more vertical at different moments. They also vary on the longer term. For example, in the medical follow-up in the neonatology unit, a first informal meeting may be observed and, two weeks later, another meeting held in a more formalized space–time, with explicit references to both professional and institutional standards. Another aspect of this heterogeneity is that coordination practices do not seem to form structural configurations with the four analytical criteria. A particular attribute does not usually vary in accordance with the others, either positively or negatively. In the polar expedition for example, coordination practices are predominantly vertical and associated with a very low level of formalization, while in air-to-ground operations coordination practices, although they are highly vertical too, are instead highly formalized. A closer examination of our results shows that a relationship may emerge for only one of the six pairs of criteria, namely between formalization and specificity. It is noteworthy that in the polar expedition, coordination practices are less formal and more specific, whereas in the air-to-ground operations, they are simultaneously more formal and less specific. However, the neonatology and sailing cases exhibit intermediate degrees of formalization yet are also respectively more specific and generic. Additional research will be necessary to further inform this potential relationship. Last, our analyses are inconsistent with the contingent perspective, which attempts to relate coordination modalities to contextual characteristics of extreme situations (evolving nature, uncertainty due to causes or issues, vital or symbolic risks). The cases under scrutiny do not support this perspective. For example, the situation with the undoubtedly slowest pace of change, i.e. the medical follow-up in a neonatology unit, leads to coordination practices that are not significantly different from those adopted in situations with a faster pace (air-to-ground operations, sailing race). Similarly, the coordination practices mobilized in the sailing race,

487 where the risks mainly remain symbolic (a lower classification) do not significantly differ from those observed in other situations, mainly characterized by physical risks. Overall, our results lead to invalidate both a configurational perspective on coordination (the four properties would be linked to each other, forming bundles) and a contingent perspective (practices configurations would be determined by the contextual characteristics of extreme situations). They however pave the way to taking into consideration the power of actors and their sensemaking activities. The four cases highlight, in various ways, the importance of the strategic assets possessed by the stakeholders involved (information accessed by the tactician and the helmsman in team sailing, rules and procedures definition by military authorities in NATO air-to-ground operations, professional expertise of physicians in the neonatology unit, etc.). The sensemaking activities are also highly notable: the leader of the polar expedition minimizes the danger after having lost the dogs; the head of the neonatology unit refers to the probability of childÕs survival in order to orient the choice of the intervention mode, etc. More precisely, we can formulate the hypothesis of systemic relations between attributes of coordination practices, on the one hand, and strategic assets and sensemaking activities, on the other hand. For example, physicians will use their professional expertise in order to maintain – or even to reinforce – the horizontality of coordination practices and they will also take distance from the standards provided by the scientific literature given their enactment of patientÕs characteristics and attitudes. Inversely, a high formalization of coordination practices via organizational standards – as is the case in the NATO air-toground operations – will limit the chamber of maneuver for pilots and their possibility to interpret specific situations. The previous conclusions and the proposed systemic hypothesis obviously remain tentative, given the limitations of our study, especially the very small size of our sample. Our results also lead to suggesting novel managerial implications in order to tackle coordination practices in extreme situations. In the first place, our study directs attention towards the complexity of coordination ‘‘making’’. Whereas past studies of coordination, relying on the design of work or of organizations, often conveyed the image of a linear and unequivocal phenomenon, we point at coordination practices as multifaceted, heterogeneous and highly dependent on the unfolding of the situation in which actors are engaged. As a result, managers should be aware that coordination cannot in fact be predefined as a practice. Second, and however, the heterogeneousness and situated nature of coordination practices do not imply that managers cannot ‘‘guide’’ or sustain coordination making. As our study reveals, coordination practices exhibit distinctive but recognizable attributes that stress the importance of proactive managerial posture. More specifically, in order to coordinate in extreme circumstances, the desirable influence of managers appears less focused on pre-specifying modes of coordination than on leveraging the conditions favorable to the emergence of appropriate coordination practices. For example, our study indicates that pre-existing standards serve as references in coordination. They do not determine coordination between agents but rather sustain it. As such, managing coordination should not be confused with merely devising these standards. In revealing

488 the role played by the varying specificity of coordination practices, our study also points to the importance of being creative to face readily and uncertain conditions. Creativity is much more than an attitude; it can be viewed as a personal and/or collective ability to both generate alternative solutions from existing ones and evaluate their relevance. Sharing the same interpretation of the environment and applying common sense to the events can be essential in these conditions. Managers can play proactive roles at this level by creating the space and conditions for creativity to emerge: for example, fostering socialization processes, taking actorsÕ expectations and values into account. Overall, in this article, we show that coordination is a phenomenon that is more complex than usually pictured. Building on an abductive approach and the comparative analysis of extreme situations, we identify four attributes of coordination practices – formalization, verticality, openness, and specificity. On this base, we suggest that both a configurational and a contingent perspective are insufficient to address the heterogeneity of coordination practices that emerge in situ. However, that does not imply that managers cannot ‘‘guide’’ coordination.

References Alse `ne, E., & Pichault, F. (2004). Ajustement mutuel et autocoordination en entreprise. Canadian Journal of Administrative Sciences, 21(3), 272–286. Argote, L. (1982). Input uncertainty and organizational coordination in hospital emergency units. Administrative Science Quarterly, 27(3), 420–434. Bamberger, P. A., & Pratt, M. G. (2010). Moving forward by looking back: reclaiming unconventional research contexts and samples in organizational scholarship. Academy of Management Journal, 53(4), 665–671. Bigley, G. A., & Roberts, K. H. (2001). The incident command system: High-reliability organizing for complex and volatile task environments. Academy of Management Journal, 44(6), 1281–1299. Bourdieu, P. (1990). The logic of practice. Stanford: Cambridge University Press. Bourgeois, L., & Eisenhardt, K. (1988). Strategic decision process in high-velocity environments: Four cases in the microcomputer industry. Management Science, 34(7), 816–835. Chandler, A. (1962). Strategy and structure: Chapters in history of the industrial enterprises. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Crowston, K. (1997). A coordination theory approach to organizational process design. Organization Science, 8(2), 157–175. Cunha, M., Clegg, S., & Kamoche, K. (2006). Surprises in management and organization: Concept, Sources and a Typology. British Journal of Management, 17, 317–329. Dewey, J. (1938). Logic: The theory of inquiry. New York: Henry Holt and Company. Dubois, A., & Gadde, L. E. (2002). Systematic combining: an abductive approach to case research. Journal of Business Research, 55(2002), 553–560. Eisenhardt, K. (1989). Building theories from case study research. Academy of Management Review, 14(4), 532–550. Fann, K. T. (1970). PierceÕs theory of abduction. The Hague, Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff. Faraj, S., & Xiao, Y. (2006). Coordination in fast-response organizations. Management Science, 52(8), 1155–1169. Fayol, H. (1949). General and industrial management. London: Pitman Publishing Company.

B. Isabelle et al. Foss, N., & Lorenzen, M. (2009). Towards an understanding of cognitive coordination: Theoretical development and empirical illustrations. Organization Studies, 30(11), 1201–1226. Girin, J. (1990). LÕanalyse empirique des situations de gestion: e ´le ´ments de the ´orie et de me ´thode. In A. C. Martinet (Ed.), ´mologie et sciences de gestion (pp. 141–182). Paris: Episte Economica. Gittell, J. (2002). Coordinating mechanisms in care providing groups: Relational coordination as a mediator and input uncertainty as a moderator of performance effects. Management Science, 48(11), 1408–1426. Goffman, E. (1974). Frame analysis: An essay on the organization of experience. London: Harper and Row. Goffman, E. (1988). La situation ne ´glige ´e. In E. Goffman (Ed.), Les moments et leurs hommes (pp. 143–149). Paris: Editions de minuit. Gupta, P., Dirsmith, M., & Fogarty, T. (1994). Coordination and control in a government agency: Contingency and institutional theory perspectives on GAO audits. Administrative Science Quarterly, 39(2), 264–284. Hollnagel, E., Journe ´, B., & Laroche, H. (2009). Reliability and resilience as dimensions of organizational performance: Introduction. Management, 12(4), 224–229. Journe ´, B., & Raulet-Croset, N. (2007). Of organizations and situations: A pragmatist view of organizing through the process of inquiry. In 23rd EGOS colloquium, Vienna, Austria. Klein, K., Ziegert, J., Knight, A., & Xiao, Y. (2006). Dynamic delegation: Shared, hierarchical, and deindividualized leadership in extreme action teams. Administrative Science Quarterly, 51, 590–621. Lechner, C., & Kreutzer, M. (2010). Coordinating growth initiatives in multi-units firms. Long Range Planning, 43, 6–32. Lie `vre, P., & Rix-Lie `vre, G. (2009). LÕobservatoire de lÕorganisant: mode dÕinterpre ´tation des mate ´riaux qui en sont issus. Revue Internationale de Psychosociologie, 15(35), 161–178. Locke, K. (2007). Rational control and irrational free-play; dual thinking modes as necessary tension in grounded theorizing. In A. Bryant & K. Charmaz (Eds.), The sage handbook of grounded theory (pp. 569–579). London: Sage. March, J., & Simon, H. (1958). Organizations. New York: John Wiley and Sons. Mintzberg, H. (1978). The structuring of organizations: A synthesis of the research. New York: Prentice-Hall Inc.. Okhuysen, G., & Bechky, B. (2009). Coordination in organizations: An integrative perspective. The Academy of Management Annals, 3(1), 463–502. Piaget, J. (1974). La prise de conscience. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Peirce, C. (1995). Philosophical writings of Peirce. Selected and edited with an introduction by Justus Buchler. New York: Dover Publications. Quinn, R., & Dutton, J. (2005). Coordination as energy-in-conversation. Academy of Management Review, 30(1), 36–57. Rico, R., Sanchez-Manzanares, M., Gil, F., & Gibson, C. (2008). Team implicit coordination processes: A team knowledge-based approach. Academy of Management Review, 33(1), 163–184. Rix, G., & Lie `vre, P. (2008). Towards a codification of practical knowledge. Knowledge Management Research & Practice, 6, 225–232. Rix, G., & Lie `vre, P. (2010). An innovative observatory of polar expedition projects: an investigation of organizing. Project Management Journal, 41(3). Thompson, J. (1967). Organizations in action: Social science bases of administrative theory. New Brunswick, New Jersey: McGrawHill. Taylor, F. W. (1916). The principles of scientific management. Bulletin of the Taylor Society, Reprinted in J. M. Shafritz, & J. S.

Coordination practices in extreme situations Ott (Eds.), Classic organization theory (pp. 66–79). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth Publishing Company.. Van de Ven, A. H., Delbecq, A. L., & Koenig, R. (1976). Determinants of coordination modes within organizations. American Sociological Review, 41(2), 322–338. Van Maanen, J., Sorensen, J., & Mitchell, T. (2007). Introduction to special topic forum: The interplay between theory and method. Academy of Management Review, 32(4), 1145–1154. Weick, K., & Sutcliffe, K. (2007). Managing the unexpected: Resilient performance in an age of uncertainty. London: Jossey-Bass. Wirtz, B., Mathieu, A., & Schilke, O. (2007). Strategy in highvelocity environment. Long Range Planning, 40, 293–313. Wolfe, R. A., Weick, K. E., Usher, J. M., Terborg, J. R., Poppo, L., Murrell, A. J., et al (2005). Sport and organizational studies: Exploring synergies. Journal of Management Inquiry, 14(2), 182–210. Yin, R. (2003). Case study research: Design and methods (3rd ed.). Applied social research methods series. London: Sage Publication. BOUTY ISABELLE is an assistant professor at the Universite ´ Paris Ouest Nanterre la De ´fense, France, and member of the CEROS research laboratory (Centre dÕEtudes et de Recherches sur les Organisations et leur Strate ´gie). She researches the fields of strategic management and knowledge, where she carries out her investigations within a practice-based approach of organizations. Her current reach topics include individual and organizational knowing, organizational knowing integration, organizational coordination and competitive advantage.

´-SANCHEZ CE ´CILE is currently a senior GODE researcher at the Research Centre of the French Air Force (CReA), in charge of the management research team. She is also an associate researcher at the Rodige Laboratory, GREDEG – UMR CNRS 6227, University of Nice-Sophia Antipolis. Her privileged research fields are information system management and strategic management. Her current investigations focus both on social aspects of technological change and coordination processes in extreme environment.

DRUCKER-GODARD CAROLE is an assistant professor at the Universite ´ Paris Ouest Nanterre la De ´fense, France, and member of the CEROS Research Laboratory (Centre dÕEtudes et de Recherches sur les Organisations et leur Strate ´gie). She researches the fields of strategic management and decision making. Her current reach topics include management of top executiveÕs priorities, individual and organizational knowing, and organizational coordination.

489 `VRE PASCAL holds a PhD in Production LIE Economics from the University of Lyon-II, he is a professor (HDR, University of Aix-Marseille-II) in Management Science at the Clermont University and ESC Clermont Graduate School of Management. He works as a researcher for the Centre de Recherche Clermontois de Gestion et de Management (CRCGM). He has directed or co-directed five books on management and logistics, and recently he is a Guest Editor of Special Issue ‘‘Project Management In Extreme Environnement’’ in Project Management Journal 2010 Vol.

NIZET JEAN is professor of sociology at the University of Namur and at the University of Louvain, in Belgium. His research fields are organizational structure, business coaching and organic agriculture.

PICHAULT FRANC ¸OIS, PhD in sociology, is full professor at HEC-Management School (University of Lie `ge, Belgium). He is also affiliated professor in human resource management at ESCP-Europe, Paris. He chairs, at the University of Lie `ge, an actionresearch centre (LENTIC) focussed on human and organizational aspects of change and innovation processes. He is currently Research Director at HEC – Management School (University of Lie `ge). He produced numerous publications in organization theory and human resource management. His current research interests are focused on organizational change and new forms of employment.