Inter-Organizational Conflicts
Coping with Inter-Organizational Efficient Interaction Organization
405
J‘BUSN RES 1985:13:40-420
Conflicts
Strategies for Buyer and Seller
Hans Georg Gemiinden University of Kiel, Germany
The author analyzes how buyer and seller organization can cope effectively with their inter-organizational conflicts. A general efficiency hypothesis is deducted proposing an inverted u-shaped relation between conflict handling intensity and efficiency. It is argued that the seller will reach a maximum efficiency at a quite low level of conflict handling intensity whereas the buyer will reach a maximum efficiency at a quite high level of conflict handling intensity. To test these propositions a concept to measure the transactional efficiency of buyer and seller organization and a typology of conflict handling interaction strategies are developed and applied to 195interaction processes in which computers were bought or leased for the first time. The empirical findings confirm both hypotheses. They show that buyer and seller should neither smooth over existing conflicts nor let them escalate. They should either renounce at conflict handling activities and strive for a modest solution which can be implemented soon and improved in further transaction processes, or they should consciously fight out their conflicts in an open manner and restrict these activities to the decision stage. The first strategy seems sufficient for a solution with a low level of aspiration, the second is appropriate when a solution with a high level of aspiration is intended. Therefore, both parties should first agree upon the level of aspiration of their innovative solution and then choose an interaction strategy which corresponds to this goal.
Marketing for Complex Innovations - A Challenging Interaction Problem for Buyer and Seller Organization Although Industrial Marketing has received great and rapidly growing attention [l, 4, 5, 13, 17, 33, 47, 52, 621, it is still strongly neglected relative to its economic importance and relative to the complexity and heterogeneity of its problems. This is especially true for the exchange process of an innovative capital good, which is analyzed here. Such an exchange raises a crucial marketing problem with great chances and risks for both parties: seller and buyer organization. The seller may
Address correspondence to Dr. Hans Georg Gemiinden, Institut fiir Betriebswirtschaftslehre, Albrechts-Universitlt zu Kiel, Olshausenstrabe 40-60, D-2300 Kiel, West Germany.
Journal of Business Research 13, 405-420 (1985) 0 Elsevier Science Publishing Co., Inc. 1985 52 Vanderbilt Ave., New York, NY 10017
Christian-
0148-2963/85/$3.30
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sell an expensive capital good, find a model client who gives excellent references for his product, gain useful experiences how to implement his product, and break well-established relationships [5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 11, 13, 14, 15, 21, 29, 35, 39, 41, 43, 46, 48, 53, 58, 59, 61, 65, 66, 681 between buyers and competing sellers. But he also runs the risk that he may not get his customer. He can get a bad word-ofmouth if his customer is dissatisfied, and he may loose know-how if it is diffused by a lost customer to his competitors. The buyer may find a cost-saving method for his problems or he may get a higher solution quality. But he must invest a lot of time to learn to know the innovative technology. He must overcome barriers to innovate and he runs the risk that the seller may not support him in the promised way. How these challenges are managed is an interaction problem between a buyer and seller organization. Therefore, an interaction approach [German: 1, 2, 12, 13, 16, 17, 19, 20, 32, 35, 36, 37, 38,49, 51,62; Scandinavian: 21,23,24, 25, 26, 27, 40, 41, 42; Anglo-American: 3, 4, 15, 30, 31, 44, 45, 60, 631 is needed to analyze this problem. Following this idea, we will first develop a model with different interaction strategies and derive hypotheses for their assumed efficiency. Then, we develop a concept to measure the efficiency of buyer and seller organization and apply it to our empirical example. Finally, we will test our hypotheses and discuss the results.
The
Optimal
Hypotheses
Level
of Intensity
of Coping
with
Conflicts: Efficiency
for Buyer and Seller Organization
. Conflicts between buyer and seller cannot be “resolved” definitely once and for all; they have to be regulated and tolerated permanently. Conflicts should not be seen as an annoying, pestering plague. They should be accepted as potentially productive tensions, as challenges which can motivate to action and clarify the goal structure. The problem is to find the right course between Skylla and Charybdis: Skylla, that is the smoothing over conflicts policy which denies existing and leads to unresolvable problems during the implementation. Charybdis, that is the escalation of fighting out conflicts which boundless time and energy consuming decision processes.
may
conflicts
lead
to
Between both intensities of engaging in conflict handling activities, there is an intermediate level leading to better results for buyer and seller. This is our general efficiency hypothesis, which states an inverted U-shaped relationship between level of conflict handling intensity and efficiency. But, where is the “optimal” point? Does the curve have the same shape for buyer and seller? What instruments can be used to cope with inter-organizational conflicts? To answer these questions we develop a typology of different interaction strategies to measure the degree of conflict handling intensity. There are two ways of managing inter-organizational conflicts with a given seller organization: 1. Using
a direct approach,
the decision
makers
of the buyer
organization
ne-
Inter-Organizational
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Conflicts
Table 1. Conflict handling interaction
strategies. Consultation only
Consultation
407
before choice
the final
Consultation after the final choice
Without Negotiation
Tolerated Conflict
Considered Confrontation
Smoothing Conflicts
With Negotiation
Prevented Confrontation
Open Confrontation
Escalated Confrontation
over
gotiate with the representatives of that specific organization. (“Negotiation Strategy”) 2. Using an indirect approach, the decision makers of the buyer organization consult representatives of other seller organization. (“Consultation Strategy”) Both activities can be performed in four temporal modes: only before the final choice, only after the final choice, before and after the final choice, and not at all. On a purely deductive basis, we could distinguish between 4x4= 16 different interaction strategies. But such an approach is only of limited practical use: first, we had to restrict our operationalization of “negotiations” on bargaining activities which occurred before the final choice. For bargaining activities which occurred after the final choice, our data base did not allow us to decide whether a discussion of conflicting issues was a real negotiation or not. Second, because of the seldom occurrence of post-decisional consultations of competing sellers, we combined the and “decision and implementation consulmodes “implementation consultation” tation.” Both cases show a symptomatic post-decisional escalation of conflicts. The resulting typology is shown in Table 1. These strategies are now ordered on an ordinal intensity scale of carrying out conflicts: 1. The lowest rank is given to the “smoothing over conj?icts” strategy. We suppose that the renunciation at negotiations corresponds to a denial of conflicts: as the post-choice consultation of competitors shows, existing conflicts have only been postponed but not resolved. 2. The second lowest rank is assigned to the “tolerated conflict” strategy where neither negotiations nor consultations of competing sellers also occurred before the final choice. But, in contrast to the smoothing over conflicts strategy, no competing sellers are consulted after the final choice. We assume that at least a rudimentary discussion about conflicting issues has taken place in this case. 314. The “prevented” and the “considered confrontation” are characterized by the fact that only one instrument for tackling conflicts has been used. We assign a lower rank to the prevented confrontation, since we assume that the seller could prevent the buyer from consulting competitors by early concessions. Such a limitation of the conflict handling intensity is not given in case of the considered confrontation. It is more likely that the perception of a new offer intensifies the inter-organizational conflicts. 5. The “open confrontation” gets the second highest intensity rank because two conflicts handling instruments are used during the decision stage.
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Table 2. Predicted Intensity Rank 6
efficiency
values for buyer and seller for different
Interaction Strategy Smoothing over conflicts Tolerated confict Prevented Confrontation Prevented Confrontation Open Confrontation Escalated Confrontation
5 4 3 2 1
Seller’s Efficiency
interaction
strategies
Buyer’s Efficiency
low
low
high average
average average
average
average
average
high
low
IOW
6. The highest rank is given to the “escalated confrontation” since the high intensity of carrying out conflicts is not restricted to the decision process but continued during the implementation process. We predict the following effects (see Table 2). A low efficiency for buyer and seller if they choose a smoothing over conjlicts strategy or an escalated confrontation. A high seller efficiency for the tolerated conflict strategy where conflicts are not carried out during the decision process and where these conflicts can be tolerated later on. A high buyer efjiciency for the open confrontation, where conflicts are not denied, but carried out consciously and where they are limited to the decision process. An average eficiency for buyer and seller for the prevented confrontation, where the seller makes concessions and the buyer renounces to consult competitors. An average efficiency for buyer and the buyer expresses substantial determined enough to negotiate the seller gets his customer but
seller for the considered confrontation, where
interest for offers of competitors but is not for better commercial conditions, and where a skeptical one.
The Efficiency of Buyer and Seller Organization: Concept and its Application The Measurement
A Measurement
Concept
Our measurement
concept comprises the following steps:
1. The theoretical derivation starts with the formal definition of “efficiency” [17,18,22,34,54,55,57,64]. We define efficiency as a summarizing statement upon the attainment of several efficiency dimensions. 2. To clarify the meaning of efficiency, the next step requires a specification of several theoretical ejjiciency dimensions. 3. These dimensions have to be operational by empirical indicators in the next step.
Inter-Organizational
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409
4. To reduce our many efficiency indicators, we used factor analyses. The resulting factors can be interpreted as empirical eficiency dimensions. 5. Since this step produced several empirical dimensions, a further summarizing step was required. We used cluster analyses to find transaction processes with similar efficiency profiles.
Applying
the Concept Our empirical object is a random sample of 195 transaction processes completed until June 30, 1966 to obtain an EDP system for an organization with no previous EDP equipment. The data were collected by Witte and his research team [5, 17:771021. They performed a systematic content analysis of about 147,000 documents filed by the four major EDP manufacturers. The analyzed documents included: “ . . . correspondence, offers, system proposals, contracts, estimates of the data volume and of the cost effectiveness, complaints, invoices, internal statistics, and internal memos concerning the enterprises in the sample.” [5:161] To gain our theoretical efficiency dimensions, we ask two questions: 1. Which object is to be evaluated as efficient or inefficient? 2. From whose perspective is something called efficient or inefficient? The evaluated objects are: the activities of the decision process reaching from the initiative, when a competent member of the buyer organization decides to allocate resources to the decision process [50:27], to the final choice of an EDP configuration when the (first) contract is signed, the chosen solution, at the end of the decision process, and the activities of the implementation process, reaching from the formal choice of an EDP-configuration to the (first) installation of an EDP-configuration. The perspective of evaluation comprises three categories: the buyer organization’s point of view, the seller organization’s point of view, and the common perspective of buyer and seller organization. With this classification we want to make a pragmatic distinction between efficiency aspects dominantly related to the buyer organization, to the seller organization, and those aspects related to both organizations. Combining these two criteria gives us nine theoretical efficiency dimensions which are operationalized by 40 efficiency indicators. (Figures 3, 4, and 5 show the results of this scaling procedure). These efficiency indicators were now factor-analyzed using principal component analysis and varimax rotation. Five factors were extracted, explaining 50.4 percent of the common variance. We interpret the fiv- factors in the following manner: (cf. Table 1). 1. Our first factor, the “rationality of the decision process” comprises the efficiency indicators of the decision process. High factor loadings indicate a wide problem definition, with a high willingness to decide, a great degree of transparency, and a wide and deep goal structure. On the other hand high factor loadings also document high decision expenditures for buyer and seller organization and a long duration of the decision process. 2. Our second factor, the “stability of choice” is characterized by high positive loadings on stability and definiteness of choice, and uninterruptedness of the
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H. G. Gemiinden
Table 3. Buyer’s
Efficiency
Indicators Measurements
Indicator Buver’s Width
of the problem
definition
Equality of the problem activities Willingness
solving
to decide
Decision
Efficiencv
Weighed sum of the problem makers
objects
considered
by the decision
Entropy measure of the distribution of the problem activities over various problem components
solving
Weighed sum of problem before the final choice
were made
objects
for which choices
Degree
of transparency
Number of alternative EDP-systems considered during the decision process, relative to the offer of the EDP-market
Degree
of rationality
Counts how many kinds of typical rational performed during the decision process
Thoroughness
Number
of goal sections
goals
Number
of goal attributes
of the buyer-
Time consumption decision stage
Width of the decision Depth
General rating from the data collectors superficial to [6] meticulous
of decision goals
of the decision
Decision expenditure organization
Buyer’s Degree
Solution
considered
activities
reaching
from [2]
by the decision
considered
makers
by the decision
of buyer-organization
members
makers
during
the
Efficiency
Summarizing expert judgment considering chosen hardware, software, and utilization of the computer relatively to the firm’s historical situation
of innovation
Time lag between the firm’s adoption pioneers in the firm’s branch
of the EDP-
and the adoption
Technical system
novelty
Adequacy
of solution
Quantative
flexibility
Number of capacity steps (in a given computer changing the type of central unit
Qualitative
flexibility
Possibilities
components
Expert rating of the adequacy periphery devices
Buyer’s Adequacy
have been
of means-ends-changes
to connect
Implementation
of the central
external
devices
unit and the family)
without
with the central
unit
Efficiency
Ratio of changes related to the EDP-hardware the changes related to the EDP-application
and software,
to
Corrections objects
related
to reference
Number of EDP-applications designed during the decision stage minus supplementary EDP-configurations designed and programmed during the implementation stage
Corrections
related
to focal objects
Ratio of considerations EDP-configurations
of the chosen EDP-configuration during the implementation stage
Weighed sum of major contracts
corrections
Major Stability
correction
steps
Rating of the data collectors changes to [S] no changes
of choice
Definiteness
Similarity
of choice
Uninterruptedness implementation
the chosen
steps such as annulment
reaching from [2] great of the chosen solution and installed
of
and many
EDP-configuration
Number of postponements of major implementing activities like installation, programming, and training of buyer-organization members
of the
Implementation expenditure buyer-organization
between
to all
of the
Time consumption implementation
of buyer-organization stage
members
during
the
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411
Table 4. Seller’s Efficiency Indicators Measurements
Indicator Seller’s Decision Improvement
Difference between central unit
of volume (DP)
Elimination
of competitors
Decision expenditure organization
Intensity
(DP)
of competitors’
Training
Measured
scale)
Elimination
Difference unit
(IP)
of competitors
Intensity stage
(IP)
Implementation expenditure seller-organization
during
the decision
members
during
stage the
members
Efficiency
on a monetary
Seller’s Implementation of volume
influence
and contracted
scale with 6 categories
Measured on a capacity scale with 9 categories Rating, reaching from [2] many, and severe reservations no reservations at all
Sales volume (capacity scale) Contractual reservations
Improvement
of first offered
time given to the buyer-organization
Seller’s Solution (monetary
volume
Time consume of seller-organization decision stage
of the seher-
Expenditure for the training of buvina-organization members
Sales volume
Efficiency
of the
to [6]
Efficiency
between
volume
of competitors’
of contracted
influence
and installed
during
Time consume of seller-organization implementation stage
central
the implementation
members
during
the
Table 5. Common Efficiency Indicators Indicator
Measurements Common
Bargaining
climate
Style of the buyer-seller correspondence Duration
of the decision
Major interruptions process
from [2] extreme
Data collector’s rating extremely warm
ranging
Date of the contract
process
of the decision
with chosen
solution
behavior
Goal attainment
evaluation
Duration of the implementation process
Solution
disputes
from [l] extremely
to [5] kind and cold to [7]
event minus date of the start event
Sum of the three largest
interruptions
of the decision
process
Efficiency
Data collector’s rating of buyer’s satisfaction with chosen solution ranging from [l] extremely unsatisfied to [7] extremely satisfied Common
Complaint
Efficiency
Data collector’s rating open atmosphere
Common Satisfaction
Decision
Implementation
Efficiency
Number and intensity of buyer’s implementation stage
complaints
during
the
Positive and negative evaluations of the implemented by members of the buyer-organization Date of the installation the contract event
of the EDP-configuration
solution
minus date of
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H. G. Gemiinden
Table 6. Matrix of Factor Loadings of the Efficiency Indicators Efficiency
Indicator
Factor I
Factor II
Width of problem definition Equality of problem definition Willingness to decide Degree of Transparency Degree of Rationality Thoroughness of the decision Width of the decision goals Depth of the decision goals Decision expenditure (BO)
Factor III
.15 .20
Factor IV
-.17 -.I5
Factor V
Comm.
r .42 -I #____I
.14 -.ll
Degree of innovation Technical novelty of EDP-System Adequacy of solution components Quantitative flexibility Qualitative flexibility Adequacy of means-ends-changes Corrections of reference objects Corrections of focal object: Major correction steps Stability of choice Definiteness of choice Uninterruptedness of implementation Implementation expenditure (BO) Improvement of volume (DP) Elimination of competitors (DP) Decision expenditure (SO) Expenditure for training Sales volume (monetary scale) Sales volume (capacity scale) Contractual reservations Improvement of volume (IP) Elimination of competitors (IP) Implementation expenditure (SO)
.18 -.I6
-.23 -.lS .18 -.28 -.21
.27 -.21
-.I8 -.I6 .18
.24 .24 .29 -.23
-.13 -.12 .17 .13
-.22
-.31 .38 .66
-.19
-.19 -.13 .14 .14
;I?!?
.I1 -.17
-.38 .20
-.20 -.29 .26
I 1
.11 .34 .26
:z
.13
-.16
-.12
1 -.23 .22
I
pj
.lO -.25
-.24
.ll
.lI r--7 I .47 I .37
.62 .32 .67 .61 .63 .I7 .58 .60 .79
.14
.30 .26 .55 .79 .50 .72 .74 .84
.12
.17 .53 .73 .52
.25
.hl .45 .22
.14
.39 .60 .7x
Bargaining climate Style of correspondence Duration of decision process Interruptions of decision process Satisfaction
with solution
Complaint behavior Goal attainment evaluation Duration of implementation
proc.
implementation process. The negative loadings show that a low stability of choice is empirically equivalent with many major correction steps, and a long duration of the implementation process. The high loading of improvement of volume during the implementation process points out that the seller can only sell a greater configuration if he is willing to accept a longer implementation process. 3. High loadings on the third factor document high implementation expendi-
Inter-Organizational
Conflicts
_I BUSN RES 1985: 13:405-420
413
tures. We multiply the factor loadings with -1 and name our new factor “economy of implementation” since it indicates cost savings, as compared to other transaction processes. 4. Our fourth factor comprises the efficiency indicators of our common perspective. High positive factor loadings announce a good bargaining climate, a friendly style of correspondence, high satisfaction with the chosen solution, and positive evaluation of goal attainment. Negative loadings are symptomatic for many and severe complaints. We will therefore label this factor “harmony of interaction. ” 5. Our last factor shows high loadings for the qualitative flexibility and the sales volume (monetary scale). The substantially positive loadings of quantitative flexibility, technical novelty, and sales volume (capacity scale) suggest that a certain “flexibility slack” may have been paid by the buyer organization. This assumption is confirmed by a substantial negative loading of the adequacy of solution components. Leaving the question open whether some overselling has taken place or not, we can state that higher factor loadings indicate a higher sales volume and label our fifth factor therefore “sales success.” The last step of our scaling procedure is a cluster analysis of the transaction processes using Ward’s hierarchical method which produces the following solution: Three clusters which are inefficient for buyer and seller. They comprise solutions with a very low stability of choice, a very bad interaction climate, or very high expenditures during the decision and implementation process. One seller-eficient cluster with a very low decision expenditure, a high stability of choice, and average values for the other factors. One buyer-efJicient cluster: it is characterized by a low sales volume and average values for the other factors. This means that the buyer has got a very good problem-solving support/price ratio. One cluster which is efficient for both parties. This cluster has positive values on all five factors.
The
Empirical
Test
To test our predictions we have to determine the percentages of favorable solutions per chosen interaction strategy. We determine buyer’s (seller’s) favorable solutions by summing up the relative frequencies of the buyer-efficient (seller-efficient) cluster and the cluster which is efficient for both parties. Figure 6 confirms our predictions:’ 1. A very low and a very high intensity inefficient solution for both parties. lated confrontation”)
of conflict handling activities lead to an (“smoothing over conflicts” and “esca-
‘The m&hypothesis that the relative frequencies of the efficiency clusters are equal for all strategies may be rejected (p
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H. G. Gemiinden
2. The seller reaches his maximum efficiency at a quite low level of conflict handling intensity. (“tolerated conflict”) 3. The buyer reaches his maximum at a quite high level of conflict handling intensity. (“open confrontation”) But, the optimal solution of each party also appears to be a second-best solution for the partner-organization.’ So, there do exist two strategies which are favorable for both parties. Which of both interaction pattern is chosen, seems to be of secondary importance. It appears to be of primary importance that the parties agree to choose one good solution and avoid their inejjkient neighbors. Let us now take a closer look at the interaction strategies by inspecting the relative frequencies of our four cluster types: (see Figure 2.) The curve of ineficient solutions () underlines the dysfunctional effects of a smoothing over conflict policy and of an escalated confrontation. It also shows a substantial risk for the considered confrontation. A detailed analysis proves that in one of four transactions with this interaction pattern comes a very bad interaction climate. The curve of seller-efJicient solutions (- - -) confirms our prediction that the seller reaches his maximum efficiency at a quite low level of conflict handling intensity. It seems to be the buyer’s renunciation at consulting competing sellers which leads to a seller-efficient solution with a very low decision expenditure. (The “tolerated conflict” and the “prevented confrontation” strategies in which no decision consultation took place) The curve of buyer-eficient solutions (.....) reaches its maximum for the prevented and not for the open confrontation as we have expected. But fighting out conflicts costs time and resources and therefore inhibits buyer-efficient solutions which are characterized by quite low decision expenditures. The curve of solutions which are efjicient for both parties (---) reaches its maximum with the open confrontation strategy. Its high frequency overcompensates the seldom occurrence of buyer- or seller-efficient solutions. From an inspection of the detailed findings of the efficiency factors we may conclude that an intensive, but limited confrontation costs time and resources, but it also yields a stable solution, a very good interaction c!imatr, _nd a high sales success. Moreover, this strategy also leads to a very high degree of innovation of the chosen solution. (See Table 2 for this indicator.)
CONCLUSIONS 1. Buyer and seller should neither smooth over existing conflicts nor let them escalate. 2. They should either renounce at conflict handling activities and strive for a modest solution which can be tested soon and improved in further transactions, or
*The buyer’s second best solution is the prevented confrontation and not the tolerated seller’s best solution. But the difference is so small that it can be neglected.
conflict strategy
which is the
+
+
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3. they should consciously fight out these conflicts in an open manner and restrict these activities to the decision stage. The latter interaction strategy seems promising when a high level of aspiration is intended. Then it will pay back to engage into time-consuming activities for carrying out conflicts. 4. Buying and selling an innovative capital good is a difficult interaction problem for both parties, buyer and seller organization. According to our findings their marketing task is: a. to come to an agreement with each other upon the level of aspiration of their innovative solution, and b. to choose an interaction strategy which corresponds to this goal.
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