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Corrigendum to “Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics” [J. Econ. Theory 145 (1) (2010) 216–248]
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ScienceDirect Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014) 668–669 www.elsevier.com/locate/jet
Corrigendum
Corrigendum to “Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics” [J. Econ. Theory 145 (1) (2010) 216–248] Jon X. Eguia a , Marcin P˛eski b,∗ a University of Bristol, 8 Woodland Rd., Bristol, BS8 1TN, England, UK b Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Max Gluskin House, 150 St. George St., Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G7,
Canada Received 10 June 2014; accepted 11 June 2014 Available online 29 October 2014
The authors regret that the above referenced paper imprecisely discusses the connection to the previous literature. That paper proposes two equilibrium refinements (cardinal and ordinal GR-dominance) that are related to Harsanyi–Selten’s risk-dominance [1] and that turn out to be useful in extending the previously known results about evolutionary equilibrium selection to larger class of games, including games on networks. In the same time, the paper contains two informal claims that are incorrect. Specifically, • In the abstract and in the 12–13 lines of page 217 of the introduction, the paper claims to propose two generalizations of Harsanyi–Selten risk dominance. That is incorrect: First of all, Harsanyi and Selten had defined risk-dominance for all finite games. Second, the two proposed concepts are clearly different from Harsanyi–Selten’s definition outside the domain of symmetric 2 × 2 coordination games. • In the last two lines of page 217 of the introduction, the paper claims that “With two players and two actions, a profile is cardinal GR-dominant if and only if it is [Harsanyi–Selten] riskdominant.” That is incorrect and it should be replaced by “In symmetric 2 × 2 coordination games, a profile is cardinal GR-dominant if and only if it is risk-dominant.” All of the formal results stated in the main body of the paper are correct. DOI of original article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.007. * Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (J.X. Eguia), [email protected] (P˛eski). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.06.004 0022-0531/© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
J.X. Eguia, M. P˛eski / Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014) 668–669
669
The author of the original paper apologizes for any inconvenience caused. Reference [1] John C. Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press Books, 1988.
ScienceDirect Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014) 668–669 www.elsevier.com/locate/jet
Corrigendum
Corrigendum to “Generalized risk-dominance and asymmetric dynamics” [J. Econ. Theory 145 (1) (2010) 216–248] Jon X. Eguia a , Marcin P˛eski b,∗ a University of Bristol, 8 Woodland Rd., Bristol, BS8 1TN, England, UK b Department of Economics, University of Toronto, Max Gluskin House, 150 St. George St., Toronto, Ontario M5S 3G7,
Canada Received 10 June 2014; accepted 11 June 2014 Available online 29 October 2014
The authors regret that the above referenced paper imprecisely discusses the connection to the previous literature. That paper proposes two equilibrium refinements (cardinal and ordinal GR-dominance) that are related to Harsanyi–Selten’s risk-dominance [1] and that turn out to be useful in extending the previously known results about evolutionary equilibrium selection to larger class of games, including games on networks. In the same time, the paper contains two informal claims that are incorrect. Specifically, • In the abstract and in the 12–13 lines of page 217 of the introduction, the paper claims to propose two generalizations of Harsanyi–Selten risk dominance. That is incorrect: First of all, Harsanyi and Selten had defined risk-dominance for all finite games. Second, the two proposed concepts are clearly different from Harsanyi–Selten’s definition outside the domain of symmetric 2 × 2 coordination games. • In the last two lines of page 217 of the introduction, the paper claims that “With two players and two actions, a profile is cardinal GR-dominant if and only if it is [Harsanyi–Selten] riskdominant.” That is incorrect and it should be replaced by “In symmetric 2 × 2 coordination games, a profile is cardinal GR-dominant if and only if it is risk-dominant.” All of the formal results stated in the main body of the paper are correct. DOI of original article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2009.05.007. * Corresponding author.
E-mail addresses: [email protected] (J.X. Eguia), [email protected] (P˛eski). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2014.06.004 0022-0531/© 2014 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.
J.X. Eguia, M. P˛eski / Journal of Economic Theory 154 (2014) 668–669
669
The author of the original paper apologizes for any inconvenience caused. Reference [1] John C. Harsanyi, Reinhard Selten, A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games, MIT Press Books, 1988.