Cotton certification in Ethiopia: Can an increasing demand for certified textiles create a ‘fashion revolution’?

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Cotton certification in Ethiopia: Can an increasing demand for certified textiles create a ‘fashion revolution’?

T

Lena Partzsch , Laura Kemper ⁎

University of Freiburg, Sustainability Governance, Tennenbacher Strasse 4, D-79106 Freiburg, Germany

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

Keywords: Cotton Certification Ethiopia Organic Power Textiles

Ethiopia is witnessing a cotton revival. Voluntary certification programs, such as the Global Organic Textile Standard (GOTS) and Cotton made in Africa (CmiA), promise to ensure the sustainability of this development. When advertising certification, companies call upon consumers to ‘join the fashion revolution’ and overcome grievances of ‘dirty fashion’. We are interested in the types of relations through which certification initiatives can facilitate a transition to greater sustainability. So far, scholars have shown that sustainability certification emerges from a neoliberal agenda and therefore reproduces asymmetries. Complementing these studies, we make a strong claim for acknowledging the capacity of agency or agents in the debate about power in certification. For this purpose, we use concepts of power to (empowerment and resistance) and power with (cooperation and learning) to explore the two cases of GOTS and CmiA. Both concepts represent different forms of exercising power and bringing about change. We find that GOTS offers consumers the opportunity to alter their position. They have the power to establish an alternative (niche) system of ethical trade. By contrast, CmiA represents power with conventional producers, retailers and consumers. This certification initiative can be considered less radical, but it has a much better market outreach. While we argue that only certification that demands the creation of alternative market structures can be a starting point for a ‘revolutionary’ transition, we also see a need for the conventional industry to change in countries such as Ethiopia.

1. Introduction In Ethiopia, the recent recovery of the cotton price, and the government’s focus on intensifying exports, is fueling a cotton revival (EIA, 2012). There are plans for the country to become the fifth largest cotton producing country in the world (Aga and Woldu, 2014).1 Voluntary certification programs promise to ensure the sustainability of this development (Textile Exchange, 2017). Companies call upon consumers to “join the fashion revolution” by buying certified clothes (Armedangels, 2016). Some certification programs evolved from activist movements and in opposition to the conventional system; one example is the Global Organic Textile Standard (GOTS). In other cases, the conventional textile industry created standards itself; an example is Cotton made in Africa (CmiA) (Raynolds et al., 2007). Drawing upon the case of certification in Ethiopia, our article explores the power of these initiatives to stimulate positive change. Today, certified textiles have a market share of almost 20% (BCI, 2018). As companies disclose information and guarantee compliance to specific standards, such as minimum wages and prohibition of toxic

pesticides and fertilizers, consumers are increasingly willing to pay a higher price for their textiles (Haufler, 2003; Sneyd, 2014). However, scholars face limits when it comes to assessing the power of certification programs in global supply chains, in particular with regard to producer countries. They have shown that sustainability certification emerges from a neoliberal agenda and have remained cautious about whether certification benefits poor producers in the Global South. Understanding power as the capability of dominant actors, structures and discourse over others, scholars have demonstrated why positive change, such as a ‘fashion revolution’, does not happen (Hilson, 2014; Levidow, 2013; McDermott et al., 2015). Only a few scholars have considered the possibility of voluntary certification “privatizing up” (Cashore et al., 2004, p. 5; O'Rourke, 2003) existing public policy rules, i.e. pioneering change with regard to environmental and social issues. Complementing these studies, we make a strong claim for acknowledging the capacity of agency or agents in the debate about power in certification. We are interested in the types of relations through which agents can bring about a ‘turn around’ (translation of revolution from Latin) or whether they face structural and discursive constraints. For this purpose, we

Corresponding author. E-mail address: [email protected] (L. Partzsch). 1 After China, India, the United States and Pakistan. ⁎

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geoforum.2018.11.017 Received 5 March 2018; Received in revised form 9 November 2018; Accepted 28 November 2018 Available online 07 December 2018 0016-7185/ © 2018 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/BY/4.0/).

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production for traditional reasons.3 For the most part, cotton is still grown by smallholders with 1–3 ha of land, along with other crops, such as maize and sesame (Bassett, 2010; EIA, 2012). In colonial times, African dominions served as suppliers of cotton, among other primary goods, for their colonial masters. As a result, Africans now face the challenge of developing cotton processing industries in a highly competitive global market, whereas the African labor for cotton production continues to receive only a tiny proportion of the final sale price (Brooks, 2015, p. 106). There is a base salary of about 25 USD per month in the Ethiopian textile industry (Donahue, 2018). Furthermore, cotton field workers receive as little as 0.60 USD per day, and almost 90% are casually employed as day laborers, which generally provides between three and four months of full-time employment per year. Children and young adults are also commonly employed in order to gain supplementary family income (Schoneveld and Shete, 2014, p. 31). Besides social issues, the production of cotton raises major environmental concerns. Cotton is one of the ‘thirstiest’ agricultural crops, and irrigation allows for higher cotton yields and fiber quality. Most cotton crops in Ethiopia are irrigated (FAO and IFC, 2015), which can deplete water resources, increase soil salinity and exacerbate chemical runoff from farms (Williamson, 2011). Today, over 90% of farmers rely on chemical inputs such as pesticides and fertilizers in Ethiopia. Pesticide application has adverse effects for human health and the environment, which are exacerbated by lack of knowledge of cotton farmers and no access to alternatives (Amera and Abate, 2008; Mekonnen and Agonafir, 2002). Application of chemical inputs can also cause biodiversity loss, contaminate water, soil and air, poison livestock and wildlife and compromise ecosystem services (FAO and ICAC, 2015, p. 15). Twenty-eight percent of all African reservoirs and lakes have been found to be in a eutrophic state (IUCN, 2018). At the same time, a large share of the population relies on untreated surface water; for example, in the highest region of Ethiopia, 44% do, and 80% also on open defecation (UNICEF, 2017, annex 6). Against this backdrop, mega-dam building and the introduction of genetically modified (GM, transgenic) organisms have been highly controversial issues in Ethiopia.4 Both demonstrate the Ethiopian path to further industrialize agriculture. Several scholars have outlined how dam building, such as the Ghibe-3 dam venture on the Omo River, have taken away large tracts of land from pastoral and agrarian peoples for the sake of ‘development’ and central state control (Beyene and Sandström, 2016; Lefort, 2012). Since 2015, the Oromo have been staging mass protests to decry, among other things, land grabs from farmers for textile factories (Donahue, 2018). While the government insists on the damming to serve hydropower purposes, the expansion of irrigation is only the next logical step in enhancing large-scale cotton farming (FAO and IFC, 2015; Schoneveld and Shete, 2014). To this effect, the approval of Bt cotton in June 2018, only two months after Abiy Ahmed became Prime Minister, underlines the fact that the current Ethiopian government has continued to follow the chosen path of the ‘developmental state’ that has been in place since 2005 (Abbink, 2011; Fikade, 2018). While scholars found a disconnect between the interventions emerging from national and international institutions and the local context, for example, in the pursuit of climate resilience in the coffee sector (Hirons et al., 2018), we found general support for Abiy Ahmad’s political course in cotton agriculture and trade across scales. Voluntary certification programs – organized and coordinated by non-state actors – are the most substantial private regulatory effort to address social and environmental challenges, neglected or deferred by governments and other state actors (Raynolds et al., 2007; Sneyd, 2011). While a range of international certification schemes have

introduce and operationalize the concepts of power to (empowerment and resistance) and power with (cooperation and learning) (Allen, 1998; Partzsch, 2017). Power to corresponds to the ability of agents “to get things done” (Parsons, 1963, p. 232). Power with means collective empowerment through convincing and learning with and from each other. It refers to processes of developing shared values, finding common ground, and generating collective strength (Partzsch, 2017). The first part of this article outlines cotton agriculture as an example of the ‘developmental state’ in Ethiopia. Certification initiatives are an effort to address the associated social and environmental concerns (Lefort, 2012; Raynolds et al., 2007). In a second part, we introduce the concepts of power to and power with in more detail. We then use the two concepts to empirically analyze GOTS and CmiA in the third part of the article. This analysis is based on documents (homepages, self-portrayals, etc.), transcripts from semi-structured interviews conducted with smallholders, certifiers, retailers (merchants, manufacturers, etc.), government officials and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as notes from group discussions with the stakeholders. We also used notes from participatory observations at a Fair Trade Fair in Germany in May 2017, and we visited certified cotton farms in Ethiopia in September 2017. The findings demonstrate that the two certification cases represent different forms of power and agency that can enable a transition to sustainability. With GOTS, rather than reproducing their position in the conventional trade system, consumers have the power to turn over systems of industrial agriculture by buying organic, certified clothes. In contrast, CmiA stands for power with conventional producers, retailers and consumers. Although this certification initiative can be considered less radical, it has a much better market outreach. While we argue that only certification demanding the creation of alternative market structures can be a starting point for a ‘revolutionary’ transition, we also see a need for the conventional industry to change. 2. Cotton certification in Ethiopia The Ethiopian government is encouraging cotton cultivation and exports in order to increase foreign exchange earnings to stabilize the country’s currency, generate fiscal revenues and provide inputs for import-substituting industries.2 After limited success with agricultural policies since the 1990s, which placed a strong emphasis on smallholder productivity and domestic linkages, the government increasingly started to focus on more trade-oriented, large-scale commercial agriculture as an impetus for agricultural industrialization (Lefort, 2012; Schoneveld and Shete, 2014). In the 2015 five-year Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP II), the promotion of large-scale commercial agriculture became one of the core objectives of the Ethiopian government (NPC, 2015). The promotion of cotton agriculture, which is highly export-oriented, is an illustrative example of this. The GTP II is advancing a neoliberal agenda under the guise of naturalized representations of property, market and capital (Newell, 2008). It foresees a central role for smallholder cooperatives in increasing productivity and household incomes, a concept that some scholars have found to be effective (Tefera et al., 2017). However, considerations of social equity and environmental protection are second to economic growth (Abbink, 2011; Lefort, 2012). The Ethiopian Cotton Producers, Ginners and Exporters Association (ECPGEA) estimates that more than 2.6 million hectares of land are suitable for cotton production in Ethiopia (Aga and Woldu, 2014). However, cotton has only recently been reintroduced in Ethiopia, with 54,000 ha of land under cultivation (EIA, 2012). Cotton is a cash crop that is strongly affected by fluctuating world market prices (FAO and ICAC, 2015). After the cotton price dropped to 0.5 Ethiopian Birr (ETB) per kg (0.01 USD) in the 1990s, farmers only continued small-scale 2

3 Group interview, representatives of ISD and PAN Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 2 September 2017. 4 Interview, private person working in cotton industry, Addis Ababa, 2 September 2017.

Interview, Ethiopian government employee, 7 September 2017. 112

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emerged in the cotton/textile sector in the last one-and-a-half decades (Bartley, 2007; Sneyd, 2014), their origins date back a lot further. Organic movements started certifying agricultural production almost a century ago (Paull, 2010). Alternative farmers and consumer associations established the International Federation of Organic Agriculture Movements (IFOAM), an international umbrella organization, in 1972 (IFOAM, 2012; Paull, 2010). IFOAM helped to develop the US National Organic Program (NOP) and the EU Organic Regulation (EC 834/2007), which require farmers to maintain and replenish soil fertility without the use of toxic, persistent pesticides and fertilizers. In addition, organic production relies on adequate animal husbandry and excludes the use of GMOs (IFOAM, 2018). IFOAM members not only developed organic farming methods, but also created an alternative retail system (organic shops, etc.). Today, IFOAM has 800 member organizations in more than 100 countries, including two members in Ethiopia: Kihedam Trading PLC and the Institute for Sustainable Development (ISD). Worldwide, 57.8 million hectares of farmland is certified organic (including inconversion farmland), and farmers produced a total amount of 107,980 mt of organic certified cotton (in 2015–16), which is equivalent to less than 1% of the global market share (Willer and Lernoud, 2018). The Global Organic Textile Standard (GOTS) originates from this alternative context. Four organizations, which had already created their own national or regional standards, founded this international standard in 2009 (GOTS, 2017b). These member organizations are the Organic Trade Association (OTA) in the United States; the International Association of Natural Textiles (IVN) in Germany; the Japan Overseas Cooperative Association (JOCA); and the Soil Association in the United Kingdom (UK). The GOTS is based on IFOAM and International Labor Organization (ILO) standards. A textile product carrying the GOTS ‘organic’ label must contain a minimum of 95% certified organic fibers, whereas a product with the ‘made with organic’ label must contain a minimum of 70% certified organic fibers (GOTS, 2017b). Pesticide Action Nexus (PAN) Ethiopia, a local NGO that collaborates with PAN UK (a UK charity tackling the problems caused by pesticides) currently runs the only organic cotton project in Ethiopia. This is the project that we visited (see below). PAN is closely collaborating, and sharing office space in Addis, with ISD (aforementioned IFOAM member).5 With funding from the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the UK charities TRIAD and the Sainsbury Family Charitable Trusts, the NGO works with 2000 cotton smallholders close to Arba Minch, and helps them obtain the IFOAM (EU Organic) certification (Amera, 2016; PAN UK, 2017). Once this is achieved, their cotton will then qualify for GOTS certification. In addition to this alternative organic movement, we can also observe an increasing interest by conventional retailers in voluntary certification (Raynolds et al., 2007). Haufler (2003, 248) explains this increase with the ‘twin threats’: First, movement activism targeted the public reputation of specific firms and sectors. Second, businesses feared the ‘shadow of hierarchy’: mandatory regulation to address environmental and social shortcomings of global agriculture and trade. While most voluntary efforts in the conventional apparel sector focus only on labor standards in the processing industries (Bartley, 2007), there are a few initiatives dealing with cotton production. One such standard is Cotton made in Africa (CmiA), which emerged from within the conventional market. In Ethiopia, the CmiA initiative is the local partner of the Better Cotton Initiative (BCI), another international standard invented by NGOs and conventional textile businesses. Farmers who qualify for the CmiA certification are therefore able to market their cotton as both BCI and CmiA (BCI, 2018). Michael Otto, a German businessperson and owner of one of the world’s largest ecommerce companies, established the Aid for Trade Foundation in 2005, which holds CmiA (CmiA, 2018). Several international NGOs,

such as the German NABU and WWF, contributed to formulating the CmiA standard (CmiA, 2018). In Ethiopia, CmiA has three partners: the ECPGEA; Metema Union, a cooperative with 10,000 members in the northeast of the country; and Kanoria Africa Textiles PLC Ethiopia, a subsidiary of an Indian chemical company. In 2016, 50 million textiles were marked with the CmiA label (CmiA, 2018). While the GOTS label ensures certification of the entire supply chain from seed to sale (GOTS, 2017b), CmiA focuses only on cotton production and the ginning process (BCI, 2018; CmiA, 2018). Instead of prohibiting toxic pesticides and fertilizers, CmiA aims to progressively reduce their use. The standard only prohibits the use of illegal pesticides, and vulnerable people, such as pregnant women and nursing mothers, are kept from working with pesticides on CmiA farms. Furthermore, CmiA does not allow farmers to use any artificial irrigation and prohibits deforestation of primary forests as well as encroaching upon nature reserves. Like GOTS, CmiA excludes GMOs. However, CmiA only commits to some articles of the ILO standards, including prohibition of forced and child labor, discrimination, commitment to equal remuneration for men and women and free association. For other criteria, such as compliance with national minimum wages and fair pay on time, lower requirements are set, but improvements must be demonstrated (CmiA, 2018). CmiA only certifies smallholders with 1–3 ha of land, rather than medium or large-scale farmers (CmiA, 2018). As these farmers usually work on their own farms, they work at their own expense, without wages.6 CmiA uses a mass balance approach that allows CmiA cotton to be processed together with conventional cotton. While retailers label a volume equivalent to the volume produced by certified farmers (volume-based license fee), a final textile product carrying the CmiA label does not necessarily contain any fibers from certified production.7 As such, CmiA products are completely integrated into the conventional textile supply system. This allows labelled products to be modestly priced. For example, Otto offers a t-shirt carrying the CmiA label for about a third of the price of a similar t-shirt carrying the GOTS label (Armedangels, 2018; Otto Shopping, 2018). Consequently, CmiA has much higher outreach compared to GOTS (CmiA, 2018; GOTS, 2018). 3. Theoretical framework: ‘Power to’ and ‘power with’ Scholars face limits when it comes to assessing the power of certification programs. Countries of the Global South interpret private certification as a form of hidden protectionism (Biermann, 2001). Standards are seen as ‘trade weapons’ that Western firms and states use to retain their dominance in global trade (Quark, 2013, p. 5). Forestry studies have demonstrated that voluntary certification indeed favors large-scale producers from the Global North (McDermott et al., 2015, p. 134). In other fields, such as minerals, certification has helped to alleviate consumers’ concerns about circumstances of production, while providing very little benefit to poor producers (Hilson, 2014). Levidow (2013, p. 211) blames the EU especially for using sustainability certification as a means to depoliticize its “global plunder of resources”. Such understanding of power as an asymmetrical relation contrasts with the broader public perception of certification. The initiatives present themselves as pioneering change and having the potential to positively influence global agriculture and trade. When participating in certification programs, NGOs deliberately chose to replace strategies of ‘naming and shaming’. Instead, they aim to support businesses in “getting the process right” (Cashore et al., 2004, preface x). The two concepts of power to (empowerment and resistance) and power with (cooperation and learning) represent positive perceptions of power (Allen, 1998; Partzsch, 2017). While admitting that structure 6 Interviews, private person working in the cotton industry, Addis Ababa, 2 September 2017; smallholders, outside of Arba Minch, 4 September 2017. 7 Interview, representative of CmiA, phone, 10 July 2017.

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and agency are mutually constitutive (Giddens, 1984; Wight, 1999), both concepts emphasize agency via-à-vis economic structures and/or ideational discourses (Partzsch, 2017). While power to stresses the agency of individuals or separate groups to develop alternatives, power with deals with joint action and collective empowerment. In the following two subsections, we introduce the two concepts and operationalize them for the empirical power analysis. In Appendix A, the first column separates the two concepts’ agency and limits, and the second column contains the detailed list of analytical questions.

systems by altering their own positions, power with means bringing about a change through cooperation and learning with and from each other. It refers to processes of developing shared values, finding common ground, and generating collective strength within systems (Allen, 1998; Eyben et al., 2006). Against the backdrop of the structure–agency debate, and from the perspective of power with, actors with a transformational orientation have substantial agency, if they act in concert (Partzsch, 2017). In this vein, certification initiatives are based on the, at least, implicit assumption that such actions in solidarity are possible. A ‘fashion revolution’ may follow a societal change in thinking about agriculture and trade. Power with is often linked to Arendt’s (1970, p. 44) definition of power. She defines power as joint action in the public sphere:

3.1. ‘Power to’: Empowerment and resistance Power to refers to the agency of individuals and separate groups, such as smallholder farmers and co-operatives in the Global South. Pitkin (1972, p. 177) emphasizes that

“Power corresponds to the human ability not just to act but to act in concert. Power is never the property of an individual …. When we say of somebody that he is ‘in power’ we actually refer to his being empowered by a certain number of people to act in their name.”

“(o)ne man … may have power to do or accomplish something by himself, and that power is not relational at all; it may involve other people if what he has power to do is a social or political action, but it need not.”

An example, to which Arendt consistently refers, is the student protests at Berkeley and elsewhere at the end of the 1960s. She contrasts the power of the students – “obviously the strongest power on every campus simply because of the students’ superior number” – with the violence of the university authorities (Arendt, 1970, p. 45). In this context, if we say that a student leader exercises power, he or she actually exercises power with others and is empowered by them to speak in their name. Analogously to the student leader, we can study whether certification initiatives are empowered by the diverse participants of global supply chains (producers, retailers, consumers etc.). For this purpose, we should study whether joint action and finding agreement was an end in itself in the two cases of GOTS and CmiA. What was the motivation for starting the certification initiative? Does mutual learning take place? If the latter is the case, a certification initiative should be more likely to change or adopt its standard and criteria over time. Finally, a crucial question is whether actors develop a new understanding of what is just and unjust. Again, a theoretical reflection allows us to also work out the limits of agency and agents in processes of power with. Arendt’s definition of power is characterized by her understanding of the polity, and should not be considered independently (Canovan, 1978; Göhler, 2009). She refers to Aristotle and the ancient polis when she describes politics as a relation among equals who govern themselves. However, only citizens, those who presided over the household in the ancient world, had access to the public sphere of the polis. This means that Arendt’s power conceptualization is based on the exclusion and displacement of non-citizens such as women, slaves, etc. into the private sphere of the household, including supposedly non-political issues such as economics and bodily health. Therefore, Arendt’s conception of power is often said to be based on an utopian or elite version of polity (Canovan, 1978); she simply assumes that people have basic capabilities at their disposal to act upon in the public sphere. Regarding the limits of agency in processes of power with, we should study forms of exclusion as well as asymmetries among participants of certification initiatives: Do participants (smallholders, retailers etc.) and/or addressees of certification (consumers) have different resources and capabilities? Who is included and excluded at the different stages of certification? Methodologically, we use these questions derived from the theoretical framework to code a wide range of GOTS and CmiA documents (certification standards, websites, press releases etc.); transcripts of 15 semi-structured interviews with people involved in the certification initiatives (certifiers, producers, auditors, distributers and NGOs); and notes from group discussions and participatory observations. We participated in the Fair Trade Fair in Freiburg, Germany, on 19 May 2017, where we observed how downstream suppliers presented their certified textile products. We had the opportunity for several discussions and

Pitkin’s understanding of power to assumes that actors are self-determined, i.e. they have the self-confidence and capabilities to pursue their decisions (see also Eyben et al., 2006). Power to is therefore often linked to Parsons’ (1963) understanding of power that highlights a productive agency, especially in the cases where actors’ goals are opposed or resisted. In the context of sustainability, actors who do not conform to their roles are often seen as pioneers. Their number is ultimately limited as long as unsustainable systems, which they oppose, remain dominant. When studying power to below, we should hence assess what the narrated objective of the certification initiative is regarding its relation to the current system of cotton production. Are the two certification cases directed against anyone in particular; for example, against the conventional textile industry? Which new resources and capabilities do the initiatives’ participants gain from certification? Pitkin’s definition of non-relational power is highly controversial. In contrast to her, Barnett and Duvall (2005) focus on the social production of actors’ power to (see also Allen, 1998, pp. 34–35). Through the production and reproduction of knowledge (seen in terms of shared understandings or dominant discourses reflecting categories like ‘certification’, ‘ethical clothing’ etc.), actors work to mainly reproduce systems and positions (Foucault, 1982; Guzzini, 2007). For example, scholars emphasize that only educated and affluent consumers have the capability to buy certified clothes, and demonstrating ‘ethical consciousness’ helps them “to get a (better) job, a partner or social standing” (Hoskins, 2014, p. 198). Nygren (2015) explains how, at the same time, certification initiatives build upon images of producers in the Global South as authentic ‘others’. Following her, only producers, who are able to provide “marvelous landscapes” and “exotic faces” qualify for certification (Nygren, 2015, p. 403). In this vein, certification makes actors reproduce their positions and respective systems; they are only “would-be revolutionaries” (Wendt, 1992, p. 418) who themselves are effects of socialization to structures. Following Lukes (1974), certain issues, such as social injustices and environmental degradation in cotton cultivation, are not simply hidden from political agendas, but there also exists manipulation of the ‘very wants’ (Lukes, 1974, p. 23) of disadvantaged actors. In order to contribute to a ‘real’ revolution, actors would need to newly define system and positions. When empirically analyzing power to, we should thus not only look for evidence of agency, but also study its limits: What economic structures and ideational discourses constitute agents involved in certification? Are there variances? In which sense do actors alter or only reproduce systems and positions? 3.2. ‘Power with’: cooperation and learning While power to allows pioneer actors to potentially ‘turn around’ 114

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conducted two semi-structured interviews at the Fair. Moreover, we joined a group discussion with about 20 consumers following a presentation by a fair trade textile producer. We also met several times with an importer of fair trade and organically-certified products from Ethiopia (to Germany). In addition, we conducted participatory observations in the upstream part of the supply chain by visiting the aforementioned organic cotton project in the area of Arba Minch. In presence of a PAN Ethiopia representative, on 4 September 2017, we conducted a first group discussion with farmers who did not participate in the certification process, but PAN Ethiopia had trained them in farming without pesticides. The second group discussion, on 5 September 2017, included the two heads of the cooperative that the farmers formed in order to apply for the EU Organic certificate. The farmers celebrated an annual agricultural day on September 5, with two stalls, several talks, a theater play and field visits, to which we were invited. Again, we were able to conduct two semi-structured interviews before and after the event. We also conducted five semi-structured interviews in Addis with people involved in the textile industry and/or certification. In addition, we met for a longer semi-structured discussion (group interview) with several representatives of PAN Ethiopia and ISD in Addis. All interviews and the discussions lasted between 30 min and three hours. The interviewees insisted on anonymity as they revealed sensitive economic and political information.

South, it differentiates between ‘thoughtful’ and ‘unthoughtful’ consumers in a rather simplistic way. From our observations and discussions with people in the downstream part of the supply chain, we learned that they decide whether or not to buy certified clothes for a variety of reasons. However, they all considered certification to be a tool of consumer empowerment on behalf of the environment and producers.8 Regarding the limits of agency, GOTS tends to conform to global market structures that (re-) constitute a system in which producers are located in the Global South and consumers are located in the Global North. In the video, Peter and May are dressed in Western-style clothes, while ‘workers’ wear traditional Southern-style costumes (headscarves, long dresses etc.). This means that GOTS, on the one hand, allows consumers to alter their position by buying ethical textiles instead of aiming for the least-expensive product options. However, on the other hand, Southern community producers are presented as exotic ‘others’. This presentation (re-) constitutes the producers’ subordinate position in the system. In fact, unlike their representation in the GOTS video, the farmers and certifiers we met on our field trip to Arba Minch were often dressed in Western-style clothes like Peter and May. Our observations and interviewees confirmed continued asymmetries in organic certification between consumers and retailers on one side, and producers on the other side. When asked why they decided to participate in organic certification, the Ethiopian farmers were not aware of other types of certification initiatives (such as fair trade standards with higher social benefits).9 PAN Ethiopia told us that the NGO had chosen EU Organic on behalf of the farmers, because this organic standard was the most easily to fulfill.10 The farmers agreed, having the expectation they would be able to export their cotton harvest to the EU and receive higher prices for their yield.11 While still in the process of being certified, farmers’ earnings had already risen from 10 ETB (ca. 0.36 USD) per kg in 2013 when the project started, to 16 ETB (ca. 0.57 USD) per kg in 2014. The creation of the cooperative helped farmers to circumvent the ‘middlemen’ (people who buy the cotton produce from the smallholders to sell it at a higher price at trading venues).12 However, the Arba Minch smallholders’ expectations regarding certification did not match reality. As there was no organic buyer in the area of Arba Minch, smallholders had to sell their certified cotton at the normal price.13 Therefore, unless external donors financially and technically support certification projects (like in Arba Minch), the high labor costs and price caps prevent most farmers, in Ethiopia and elsewhere, from producing cotton organically (Textile Exchange, 2017, p. 25). In sum, by studying power to in terms of agency and its limits, we see that GOTS offers consumers the opportunity to alter their position and establish an alternative (niche) system of ethical trade by purchasing GOTS-certified clothes. At the same time, however, GOTS reaffirms asymmetric relations between consumers and producers along global supply chains. Despite this, the creation of the cooperative, which was only a by-product of the Arba Minch project, allowed farmers to receive a higher price for their yield.

4. The Global Organic Textile Standard (GOTS) In this section, we present our results on GOTS’ power to and power with. While we focus on indivual as well as collective agency and empowerment, we also discuss their limits. In Appendix A, the third column summarizes our results for GOTS. 4.1. GOTS: Empowerment and resistance (power to) With regard to power to and agency, we can argue that the four GOTS member organizations – OTA, IVN, JOCA and the Soil Association – exercised agency when creating GOTS and establishing alternative cotton/textile supply chains in the sense of ‘getting things done’ on their own. This does not mean that they did not have any relationships with actors in the conventional system of agriculture and trade, but GOTS demonstrates that they were able to exercise self-determined agency. Organic certification maintains the narrative of resisting the industrial expansion of agriculture (IFOAM, 2018). Hence, the certification initiatives’ objectives in opposition to the current system of cotton production. On its homepage, the Soil Association (2017) states: “Dirty fashion: The fashion industry is the world’s second most polluting industry after oil … There are several reasons why organic textiles are kinder, cleaner and better.” As mentioned above, Armedangels (2016) calls upon consumers to join a ‘fashion revolution’. Hence, in the case of GOTS, certification is directed against conventional businesses. Moreover, the GOTS central information video, an animated film in which an off-screen voice explains the Standard, illustrates the agency attributed to consumers. The video starts with the introduction of two ‘consumers’ – Peter and May in the English language version (GOTS, 2017a). They are presented as ‘thoughtful people’ (GOTS, 2017a, 0:11 min). The off-screen voice asks: ‘What can they do to make sure their clothes are sustainable?’ (GOTS, 2017a, 0:20 min). The options are that they can either ‘raise some sheep and knit clothes themselves’, ‘go naked’ or buy GOTS-labelled products, which is claimed to be ‘the realistic solution’ (GOTS, 2017a, 0:22–0:42 min). In this vein, GOTS presents itself as allowing ‘thoughtful’ consumers to newly define their position in the global trade system when purchasing GOTS-certified clothes and respecting environmental and social standards. While the video most illustratively demonstrates a new discourse about Western consumers’ responsibility regarding production conditions in the Global

4.2. GOTS: Cooperation and learning (power with) When asking what Peter and May can do ‘to make sure their clothes 8

Participatory observations in the Fair Trade Fair in Freiburg, 19 May 2017. Interviews, smallholders, outside of Arba Minch, 5 September 2017. 10 Group interview, representatives of ISD and PAN Ethiopia, Addis Ababa, 2 September 2017. 11 Interviews, smallholders, outside of Arba Minch, 5 September 2017. 12 Interviews, representative of PAN Ethiopia and project’s smallholders, Addis Ababa, 2 September 2017; outside of Arba Minch, 4–5 September 2017. 13 Interviews, smallholders, outside of Arba Minch, 4 September 2017. 9

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as a kind of incentive for them to participate.18 In 2014, the smallholders received 14 ETB (ca. 0.50 USD) per kg cotton19 (while the Arba Minch farmers received 16 ETB per kg in the same year)20. Their acquired knowledge on cultivation methods and business practices allows smallholders to produce cotton in a less harmful and more efficient way (CmiA, 2018). In addition, guaranteed purchases reduce risk, which grants them access to less expensive loans.21 CmiA hence provides smallholders with new resources and capabilities. However, their agency is limited, as the Ethiopian farmers continue to be dependent on retailers purchasing their harvest. The retailers continue to determine the price paid to the CmiA farmers.22 The price is calculated based on the world market price and quality, and in comparison to the price that farmers receive for other crops, such as the price per kg of sesame (for sesame they received more compared to cotton in the last decade).23 In addition to these global market structures, which constrain the agency of producers in the Global South, CmiA also does not grant new agency to consumers in the Global North, as the new discourse on consumer responsibility concentrates on consumers paying for farmers’ training. The mass balance approach does not allow consumers to ensure that the clothes they purchase are made from certified cotton.24 Instead, their clothes may have been produced under environmentally and socially harmful conditions. Consumers hence do not alter their position in the trade system.

are sustainable’, the GOTS information video does not suggest ‘naming and shaming’ harmful producers or boycotting them (GOTS, 2017a: 0:20 min). Although GOTS originates from resistance to industrial expansion and ‘dirty fashion’, the international standard does not openly confront conventional businesses. As such, for analytical purposes, we may also explore whether GOTS exemplifies power with, rather than power to. GOTS unifies earlier national and regional standards for organic textiles. While the different standards were considered an obstacle to international trade, the motivation behind GOTS was to increase the visibility and greater outreach of the organic textile market (GOTS, 2017b). Mutual learning took place in terms of recognizing the producers’ need for flexibility regarding the relations to conventional markets.14 GOTS compromised in this regard by allowing a mixture of 30% non-organic cotton. Moreover, the request for the ILO standard is a concession to producers in the Global South, and a result of learning about their interests in improving social circumstances of production.15 The GOTS standard was revised several times, especially in this regard (GOTS, 2018). However, under GOTS, there is no joint action with conventional retailers and those pursuing the industrial expansion of agriculture. Instead, only alternative producers, retailers and consumers involved in organic supply chains have developed a new understanding amongst themselves as to what is just trade and environmentally friendly production. Ethiopian smallholders are often illiterate and have trouble understanding the concept of certification as such. In the case of the Arba Minch project, they were excluded from standard-setting, and only implemented the standard chosen by the NGO that received donor funding to help them to achieve the EU Organic certificate.16 Furthermore, because member organizations are the ones who establish the conditions of ethical production, consumers and farmers are not directly involved in the standard setting. As outlined above, the farmers’ main motivation for participation was to receive higher prices for their yield, while organic production focuses on environmental protection.17 As such, the GOTS is hardly exercising power with. Instead, the ‘fashion revolution’ is pursued by a few pioneers altering their position and respective systems of agriculture and trade.

5.2. CmiA: Cooperation and learning (power with) Otto, the businessperson who founded CmiA, is often presented as a leader who is empowered by the members of the global cotton supply chain for a transition to greater sustainability (Kunze, 2011; Viehöver, 2007). To that effect, CmiA brings together various actors involved in the global cotton production and processing supply chain, including various NGOs, to develop a standard with “the goal (…) to sustainably improve the living conditions of cotton farmers in Sub-Saharan Africa” (CmiA, 2018). A motivation to develop CmiA was to stimulate cultivation of high quality cotton in Ethiopia and other African countries.25 Mutual learning led to a focus on income improvements and health issues of smallholders. While the training provided to farmers was first intended to meet the retailers’ needs, it was also based on intense communication with smallholders in Ethiopia, as well as an initial assessment of their situation.26 For example, the requirement to use nonplastic bags for cotton collection seemed like an unnecessary obstacle to the farmers, especially since jute bags are not purchasable in the Ethiopian countryside. However, when CmiA partners explained that plastic and hair particles prevent textile materials from being colored uniformly, the farmers understood the need for a ‘clean’ collection.27 In turn, it was the assessment of the smallholders’ situation which led CmiA to implement purchase guarantees for smallholders.28 The purchase guarantees help farmers to improve their income (they often have to take loans in order to buy seeds).29 Training in use of pesticides and fertilizers are seen as improvement of farmers’ health, rather than

5. Cotton Made in Africa (CmiA) While we have seen that GOTS is an initiative developed and run by a few pioneers exercising power to, rather than power with other actors along global supply chains, this is not the case for CmiA. CmiA is a standard that emerged from within the conventional market. In this section, we present our results on CmiA’s power to and power with. In Appendix A, the fourth column summarizes our results for CmiA. 5.1. CmiA: Empowerment and resistance (power to) While the CmiA initiative recognizes that there are environmental and social concerns related to global cotton supply chains, and that these problems disadvantage African smallholders, its partners do not agree that environmentally harmful and socially disadvantageous practices are inherent to the conventional system of agriculture and trade. Disadvantages are considered to be caused by a lack of knowledge among African farmers about efficient and environmentally friendly cultivation. CmiA partners therefore generate revenue through certification licensing fees, which they can allocate to training smallholders (CmiA, 2018). They also guarantee the purchase of their harvest 14

Interview, representative Interviews, smallholders, 16 Interviews, smallholders, 17 Interviews, smallholders, 15

of certification initiative, outside of Arba Minch, 5 outside of Arba Minch, 4 outside of Arba Minch, 4

18

Interview, private person working in the cotton industry, Addis Ababa, 2 September 2017. 19 Interviews, smallholders, outside of Arba Minch, 5 September 2017. 20 Interviews, smallholders, outside of Arba Minch, 4 September 2017. 21 Interview, organic farmer, Addis Ababa, 2 September 2017. 22 Interview, private person working in the cotton industry, Addis Ababa, 2 September 2017. 23 Interviews, smallholders, outside of Arba Minch, 5 September 2017. 24 Interview, representative of CmiA, phone, 10 July 2017. 25 Interview, private person working in the cotton industry, Addis Ababa, 2 September 2017. 26 Interviews, smallholders, outside of Arba Minch, 5 September 2017. 27 Interviews, smallholders, outside of Arba Minch, 5 September 2017. 28 Interviews, smallholders, outside of Arba Minch, 5 September 2017. 29 Interviews, smallholders, outside of Arba Minch, 4 September 2017.

12 July 2017. September 2017. September 2017. September 2017. 116

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measures of environmental protection.30 Moreover, while the standard includes a set of mandatory criteria, it also includes other lower requirements for which smallholders need to demonstrate improvements over time (CmiA, 2018).31 CmiA has hence engaged in a process of mutual learning and developed a new understanding of others’ needs along the global supply chain. However, there are limits to agency and collective empowerment through processes of power with. Despite mutual learning, asymmetries continue to exist within CmiA. Like GOTS, CmiA uses a video to bring across central information about the standard on its homepage (CmiA, 2018).32 In the documentary-style clip, we first see African farmers dancing and singing traditional songs in cotton fields. Therefore, again, this certification initiative also builds upon images of producers in the Global South as exotic ‘others’. In the clip, an off-screen voice explains that CmiA aims to promote the sustainable production and sales of cotton and, thereby improving the living conditions of smallholders. While the video shows African farmers doing fieldwork with an antiquated team of oxen in the back, Otto appears in the front. He is a white-skinned European dressed in tropical clothes. Otto’s first sentence is: ‘It is important to facilitate their [the farmers’] self-reliance’ (CmiA, 2018). He continues to explain how market integration serves the farmers’ wellbeing (CmiA, 2018), neglecting structural constraints that African smallholders face when integrating in global market structures. The certification initiative is oriented towards Western markets and respective standards. The initiative does not aim for fundamental change, nor does it turn away from industrial agriculture. Instead, it follows the discourse that Western standards and norms of technology, productivity and market efficiency need to be shared. As a result, African resources continue to be exported to Europe at a price not determined by the African farmers or governments. By not problematizing continuous asymmetries in global supply chains, CmiA reconstitutes the conventional agriculture and trade system and the positions therein. However, the initiative is not openly opposed in Ethiopia.33 To the contrary, CmiA is welcomed by members of the conventional textile supply chain. It fits with the ‘developmental state’ in Ethiopia and hence stands for power with all actors in global supply chains. In this vein, the initiative pursues a societal change in thinking, rather than a ‘revolution’ with the effect of greater sustainability in cotton cultivation.

industrial agriculture and unfair trade by not reproducing their position in the conventional trade system and, instead, buying GOTS-certified clothes. So far, the initiative has only established an alternative niche market. By contrast, CmiA follows a strategy of power with and promotes a change in thinking but still operating within conventional markets. This certification initiative can be considered less radical (and less ‘revolutionary’), but has a much better market outreach. However, what both initiatives have in common is that they compete for the increasing share of more ethically conscious and affluent consumers who are willing to pay more for the same final product (see also Hoskins, 2014; Nygren, 2015). While there are differences in how certified and non-certified textiles are produced, these differences are not visible in the final product. Only certification provides a guarantee for consumers that particular environmental and social standards were fulfilled in the production process. When paying more for certified clothes, consumers mainly act on behalf of the environment and producers in the Global South. They do not directly benefit from the certification themselves. In the case of GOTS, consumers need to be considered political rather than market actors. We have seen in the empirical analysis that GOTS originates from organic movements, which oppose the conventional system of cotton production, and developed alternative cotton and textile markets (see also Paull, 2010). Actors involved in GOTS certification are pioneers: their numbers are limited as long as the conventional system of cotton production remains dominant. They exercise power to, in the sense that they do not conform to the conventional system of ‘dirty fashion’ and, instead, develop valid, ‘ethical fashion’ alternatives. However, also studying the limits of power to, allowed us to show that, in doing so, GOTS tends to underestimate the limits of agency and hence obstacles to a ‘fashion revolution’ (see also Hoskins, 2014; Sneyd, 2014). By contrast, the empirical analysis demonstrated that CmiA evolved from within the conventional system to which GOTS developed an alternative. We found that participants do not agree that environmentally harmful and socially unacceptable production conditions are inherent to conventional cotton production. Instead, CmiA has the perspective that disadvantages result from knowledge gaps about agricultural production. In this vein, gaining new knowledge does not allow marginalized groups to oppose a system that has been disadvantaging them so far. Our analysis thus revealed that CmiA does not illustrate power to. Instead, CmiA typifies power with. The initiative’s agricultural and business training reaffirms conventional systems and positions of producers, retailers and consumers in global supply chains. Businesses participating in the initiative support, rather than oppose, the developmental state in Ethiopia. Although increasing smallholders’ income is not a priority for GOTS, and the EU Organic and GOTS Standard do not guarantee the purchase of the smallholders’ harvest, the Arba Minch farmers had already received a higher price for their cotton in 2014 (16 ETB), compared to the price paid by CmiA (14 ETB). This was before, and hence independent from, obtaining organic certification. Nevertheless, the certification initiative gave the farmers the impetus to organize amongst themselves and to get things done on their own, in order to overcome structural constraints. The Arba Minch case hence underlines earlier studies that agricultural cooperatives can improve the productivity and household incomes of smallholders (Tefera et al., 2017). At the same time, our empirical results demonstrate that, due to the PAN Ethiopia organic project, the farmers have started to pioneer their own transformation of a system disadvantaging them and their environment. Certification that is based on power to and demands the creation of alternative market structures may hence be a starting point for a ‘revolutionary’ transition. If certification empowers farmers by discovering their potential for resistance, as we found to be the case for GOTS, it might be a means for positive change. Looking at the prospects for achieving greater sustainability through certification, we can conclude that certification allows for new agency

6. Discussion and conclusions The recent revival of cotton production in Ethiopia has the potential to reduce poverty and increase foreign exchange earnings (Bosena et al., 2011), but also comes with several social and environmental problems, and risks intensifying power asymmetries in global supply chains. While earlier studies on power in certification emphasized the latter (Nygren, 2015; McDermott et al., 2015), using concepts of power to and power with have allowed us to also recognize opportunities to accomplish positive change. Furthermore, the concepts have allowed us to acknowledge differences among the diverse initiatives. Consequently, our analysis has revealed that the two certification initiatives – GOTS and CmiA – exercise different forms of power in order to lead to greater sustainability. GOTS focuses on the exercise of power to in order to pursue a ‘fashion revolution’. Pioneer businesses, such as Armedangels, have established alternative supply chains highly independent from the conventional markets. They ask consumers to turn over systems of 30 Interview, private person working in the cotton industry, Addis Ababa, 2 September 2017. 31 Interviews, smallholders, outside of Arba Minch, 5 September 2017. 32 The video is no longer available on the homepage, but on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pttNnwYDVjI [accessed 01.10.2017]. 33 Interview, private person working in the cotton industry, Addis Ababa, 2 September 2017.

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and agents; in particular, the new position of an ‘ethical consumer’. Ethical consumption has allowed for the set-up of alternative niche markets. A significantly increasing demand for certified textiles could indeed create a ‘fashion revolution’ if it were to replace the current system. However, regarding the minimal share of organic agriculture, organic alternatives, using their power to get things done, so far only exist in parallel to conventional systems. Most consumers probably purchase organic clothes in addition to, rather than instead of, conventional textiles (even consumers attending the discussion at the Fair Trade Fair did not consider completely refraining from buying conventional clothes). Forms of power to have failed to provoke a replacement in the sense of abolishing the current system. CmiA, which uses power with the conventional industry, does not aim to fundamentally change the system in place. Consequently, in countries such as Ethiopia, the developmental state and industrial agriculture are gaining ground. In the textile sector as well as other sectors, a ‘niche revolution’ is helpful to a few people, like in the case of Arba Minch, where farmers received better knowledge and higher prices for their yield. However, certification that is limited to particular market shares is not a sufficient tool to address the challenges of social equity and environmental

protection in countries such as Ethiopia. Against this backdrop, Greenpeace International recently announced that it would not renew its membership in the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC), the wellknown timber certification scheme, for which the NGO was a founding member 25 years ago. Pioneering brands, such as Armedangels, have led the way by means of certification. However, now the whole industry needs to follow. Paying living wages and the prohibition of toxic pesticides and fertilizers should be considered self-evident, rather than ‘revolutionary’ in the 21st century. Acknowledgements Funding: This work was supported by the German Federal Ministry of Education and Research (grant no. 031B0235A). The authors would like to thank Abebe Beyene, Atakilte Beyene and Tadesse Amera for their support when conducting the field research in Ethiopia. A warm word of thanks also goes to the anonymous reviewers. Declarations of interest None.

Appendix A. Overview of empirical results Power to

Questions for empirical analysis

Agency

Global Organic Textile Standard (GOTS)

is the objective/narrative of the certifiagainst industrial expansion of agriculture and • What • Resistance cation initiative regarding its relation to the ‘dirty fashion’

are caused by a lack of • Disadvantages knowledge among African farmers about

• •

• • gain new knowledge on culti• Smallholders vation methods and cotton business from

current system of cotton production?

Limits

Power with Agency

Is certification directed against anyone (for example, multinational corporations)? Which new resources and capabilities do the participants gain from certification?

• as tool of consumer empowerment on behalf of • Certification the environment and producers Directed against conventional agriculture and trade

efficient and environmentally friendly cultivation Training and purchase guarantees allow farmers to improve their position Certification is not directed against anyone

training

structures/discourses constitute agents? with ‘thoughtful’ consumers in the Global North and farmers continue to be in a de• What • Market • Ethiopian Are there variances? ‘exotic’ producers in the Global South; smallholders continue pendent position in the global market; for sense do actors alter or only repro• Inducewhich their positions?

to be dependent on actors further down the chain

alter their position by buying ethical products • Consumers instead of the least expensive options

example, retailers determine the cotton price

discourse on consumer responsibility • New concentrates on higher consumer prices

joint action and finding agreement an end in unifies earlier national and regional standards of is a leader who is empowered by • Isitself? • GOTS • Otto organic agriculture members of global cotton supply chain was the motivation for starting the was stimulating African cotton • What • Motivation was greater outreach of organic market • Motivation initiative? cultivation mixture of 30% non-organic cotton and ILO standard are learning led to the focus on income • Does mutual learning take place? • Aconcession • Mutual to producers in Global South and a result of mutual improvements and health issues of smalllearning

the initiative change or adopt the standard • Did • GOTS standard was revised several times and criteria over time?

Limits

Cotton Made in Africa (CmiA)

there a new understanding of what is just and understanding of what is just trade only among alter• Isunjust? • New native/ organic producers, retailers and consumers participants (smallholders, retailers etc.) • Do • Smallholders depend on donor funding for implementation and/or addressees of certification (consumers) have different resources and capabilities?

holders

criteria and lower requirements • Mandatory for which producers need to demonstrate improvements over time

• New understanding of each others’ needs continue to exist within CmiA • Asymmetries through orientation towards Western markets and standard

is included and excluded at the different organizations are the ones who establish the condiis welcomed by members of conven• Who • Member • CmiA stages of certification? tions of ethical production; consumers and farmers are not tional textile supply chain directly involved in the standard setting

Source: Authors.

Conference on ‘Cotton textile value chain in Africa’) [Online], Bahir Dar University. Allen, A., 1998. Rethinking power. Hypatia 13 (1), 21–40. Amera, T., 2016. Cotton farmers do better with IPM in Arba Minch, Ethiopia [Online], Addis Ababa. Available at http://afsafrica.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/02/IPMin-Arba-Minch-Ethiopia.pdf (accessed 27 June 2017). Amera, T., Abate, A., 2008. An assessment of the pesticide use, practice and hazards in the Ethiopian Rift Valley: Africa Stock Program [Online]. Available at www.thenrgroup. net/theme/PAN-ecotox/pdf/annex_6_ethiopia_mini-project_report.pdf (accessed 20

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