Crew Resource Management (CRM): Cooperation of the rescue helicopter crew at mountain missions

Results: Fatigue is insidious. Without the direct elimination of night flight and shift working, preventive strategies should be adapted for aircrews. Fatigue can cause disruption of timing, which is critical to safe inflight performance by aircrews. It can lead to perceptual distortions, decreased reaction and decisionmaking time, and decreased memory for recent events. Fatigue can shorten attention span and increase irritability, confusion, and error rates, ultimately leading to the preservation of ideas, crucially affecting decision-making. Fatigued aircrews also exhibit a tendency to accept lower standards of performance. Conclusion: Although there is only one cure for sleep deprivation-sleep-there are specific countermeasures aircrews can take to reduce the effects of fatigue. These involve critically timed exposure to bright light, similar to sunlight, that may shut down the biologic clock. There are dietary changes that significantly as-. sist your physiology in adapting to shift work. Certain amounts of physical exercise help promote sleep at appropriate times. Finally, autogenic training/biofeedback relaxation techniques help combat stress and tension and are favorable to sleep. Killers in Aviation: A Report From the Flight Safety Foundation's CFIT and Approachand Landing Accident Reduction Task Force

Erik Reed-Mohn, Manager Governm. & Ext. Affairs, SAS Flight Academy, Va~kemveien139, 0383 Oslo, Norway Purpose: To alert the audience to the findings of the Flight Safety Foundation's (FSF) Approach-and-Landing Accident Reduction (ALAR) Task Force. This task force, created in 1996 as the followup to the FSF's CFIT Task Force, comprises more than 125 members from all continents and facets of aviation. The final product consists of four main reports from the different specialist groups that made up the task force: • Data Acquisition and Analysis Working Group (DAAWG) • Operations and Training Working Group (OTWG) • Aircraft Equipment Working Group (AEWG) • Air Traffic Control Training and Procedures/Airport Facilities Working Group Other products are still in the pipeline. This presentation intends to concentrate mainly on operations and training. The OTWG came up with eight conclusions and numerous recommendations intended to further safe approach and landing operations. The conclusions all are based on the data from the DAAWG. The recommendations are the best judgments of the experts on the OTWG. A short section of the presentation also will summarize the AEWG. Additionally the presentation will include the latest available statistics on CFIT and ALAR accidents. Crew Resource Management (CRM): Cooperation of the Rescue Helicopter Crew at Mountain Missions

Gregor Schmeiser, T.V. B~mmel, V. B~hren, Berufsgenossenschaftliche Unfallsklinik Mumau, Prof. K[)ntscher-Str. 8, 82418 Mumau, Germany Purpose: The quality of helicopter mountain rescue operations is determined in particular by the quality of the recovery from the difficult area itself. Medical attendance often is of lesser significance. The complex procedure of a mountain rescue mission, particularly with use of a winch, places highest demands on the cooperation of the crew. An incident during a mission was used as an opportunity to review in retrospect all recent mountain rescue operations according to the criteria of crew resource managemefit (CRM) in order to detect possible sources of error and optimize cooperation among the team. 118

Methods: Based on NASA research in the field of the CRM, a questionnaire was developed and given to all crew members shortly after each mission. All mountain rescue missions in the time period from July 1999 to January 2000 were included. Evaluation was carried out anonymously; only occupation and nature of the mission were recorded. Results: Before beginning mountain rescue missions, a conjoint training in winch use was carried out with all pilots (3), winch operators (3), paramedics (4), emergency doctors (22), and mountain rescue service groups (10). After 60 missions, a total of 240 questionnaires were evaluated. The distinct sections of the questionnaire (communication, adaptability, decision-making, assertiveness) were looked at separately. Particularly communications and adaptability turned out to be of paramount importance for the successful performance of a mountain rescue operation. It became apparent that the most substantial factor--communications, increases with the number of flown missions. Conclusion: The use of winches in mountain rescue operations requires perfect cooperation between all members of the helicopter crew. Throughout 60 helicopter mountain operations, only one serious incident occurred when a person tried to jump on a hovering helicopter, resulting in the damage of the stinger of the tail rotor. We conclude that cooperation among the team cannot be taken for granted but requires extra training to improve CRM. The incorporation of the medical staff into this training in particular is indispensable, even though it is not provided for in the new edition of the JAR OPS 3. Air Medical Accidents--A 20-Year Search for Information

Richard S. Frazer,RockyMt. Helicopters, LLC,Anderson, S.C., USA Purpose: The aviation accident rate for EMS helicopters in the U.S. has been a problem since the mid-1980s and has started to raise concern among regulators again in the late 1990s. The purpose of collecting data and studying causes of EMS accidents as defined by the NTSB is to trend common practices that may lead to accidents and ultimately heighten safety awareness. Methods: Final reports collected from the NTSB along with the full narrative. Information is put into a Microsoft Access database and. queried for trending purposes. Results: There are 122 EMS accidents in my database from 1980 to 1999:104 rotor-wing, 15 fixed-wing, and 3 public EMS accidents. I compared the total number of accidents by demographics such as day of the week, time of the day, and condition of light. I also compared the number of fatal accidents to the total number of accidents. I looked at the mission profile such as interfacility versus scene; purpose of the mission; and the phase of the mission. Single versus twin engine helicopters were analyzed, as well as the extent of damage to the aircraft and whether there was fire before or on impact. Pilot ages and experience levels were compared. Finally, accident causes, as ruled by the NTSB, are trended for common findings. Conclusion: In 122 EMS accidents 52% happened at night with three noticeable peak times in a 24-hour period--between 6 and 7 PM; 12 noon and 1 PM; and 10 and 11 PM. In the 1990s, 56% were fatal accidents as compared to 42% fatal accidents in the 1980s. In total, there were 407 personnel, patients, and observers who sustained fatal injuries, with an additional 50 who sustained serious injuries. While postimpact fires occurred only 15% of the time in helicopters, postimpact fires on fixed-wing aircraft occurred 67% of the time. There were 23 (RW) weather-related accidents with an additional 5 reported as spatial disorientation. Of these, 21 happened at night, and four of the five spatial disorientation accidents were fatal accidents. July-September 2000 19:3 Air Medical Journal