- Email: [email protected]
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work Practice
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work Practice Christine Morley, University of the Sunshine Coast, Maroochydore DC, QLD, Australia Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Abstract Critical reflexivity is an epistemological position that brings together the social constructionist stance of reflexivity with the emancipatory goals of critical social science. Critical reflexivity is a vial precondition for critical reflection, yet not sufficient in its own right to activate the transformative deconstruction and reconstruction processes that critical reflection enables. The related concepts of reflection, reflexivity, and critical reflection will also be discussed. A critically reflexive stance is essential to further a critical social work agenda that is committed to social justice and human rights, despite the challenges presented by the contemporary, neoliberal context.
Introduction Critical reflexivity is an epistemological position that brings together the social constructionist stance of reflexivity with the emancipatory goals of critical social science. It is a contested concept and often conflated with critical reflection. Critical reflexivity is a vial precondition for critical reflection, yet not sufficient on its own to activate the transformative deconstruction and reconstruction processes that critical reflection enables. In order to clarify the concept of critical reflexivity, the related concepts of reflection, reflexivity, and critical reflection will also be discussed. A critically reflexive stance is essential to further a critical social work agenda that is committed to social justice and human rights, because it enables critical reflection. These concepts are intimately connected as critical reflection can support social work practitioners to maintain a critically reflexive stance, despite the challenges presented by contemporary, neoliberal contexts that privilege objectivist paradigms including evidence-based practice and research. Several writers have noted the distinct lack of consensus over definitions of reflection, reflexivity, and critical reflection (Fook et al., 2006), and critical reflexivity (Kessl, 2009: p. 305). As Askeland and Fook (2009: p. 289) state, “The terms reflection, reflective practice, reflexivity and critical reflection/ reflexivity are often conflated or used indiscriminatingly, without clear definition.” D’Cruz et al. (2007) similarly point out that “‘Reflexivity’ is often used interchangeably with other terms such as ‘reflectivity’ ‘reflection’ and ‘critical reflection’” (see, e.g., Jessup and Rogerson, 1999: p. 176; Leonard, 1997: p. vii). Despite the complementarity of these terms, articulating clearer delineation between them is important for social work as they explicitly relate to improving professional practice and facilitating social change (D’Cruz et al., 2007).
Reflection Reflection, also referred to as reflectivity (Fook, 1999), the reflective approach (Argyris and Schon, 1976; Schon, 1987), the reflective model (Pray, 1991), and reflective practice (Fook, 1996; Gould and Taylor, 1996), is “a process of thinking, of comparing and verifying for the purpose of learning about and
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 5
improving practice, developing practice-based theory, connecting theory to practice, and improving and changing practice” (Fook and Askeland, 2006: p. 12). The ideas about a reflective practice are usually traced to educationalists Argyris and Schon (1976) (later developed by Schon, 1987), who proposed a reflective process for uncovering hidden assumptions, particularly regarding professional learning. These authors were critical of professionals, identifying wide-ranging differences between their espoused theories and their actual practice (Argyris and Schon, 1976; Schon, 1987). Schon (1987) questioned the usefulness of traditional approaches to building knowledge, and was dubious of the capacity of technical rationality to respond to the relationship between theory and practice. Some authors credit the earlier work of Dewey (1916, 1933) in developing current understandings of reflective practice (Mezirow et al., 1990; Fook et al., 2006: p. 8). Whilst closing the gap between theory and practice is the ultimate goal of reflection (Schon, 1987), this may simply reinforce conservative practice. If a mental health practitioner espouses an acceptance of psychiatry, then deferring to medical experts that accept the status quo, and individualize social problems, is not identified as problematic practice by a reflective approach (Taylor and White, 2000). As Taylor (2013) explains reflective practice potentially occupies an apolitical space, over emphasizing the role of individual relationships and presenting an inadequate view of the impact social structures. This point clearly demarcates reflection from critical reflection, and some authors, suggest that such limitations can be enhanced by reflexivity (Lipp, 2007; Finlay, 2008).
Reflexivity Reflexivity refers to one’s capacity to look or act back upon oneself. The concept of reflexivity has figured prominently in epistemological debates concerning the relationships between knowledge, self, and society; and has emerged as a key concept in social constructionist approaches. The basic constructionist insight posits that knowledge of the world does not exist apart from people’s involvement in it, which in turn shapes knowledge. Socially conditioned subjectivity decisively
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.28021-5
281
282
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work Practice
affects knowledge production and truth claims (Seidman, 2013). Reflexivity is the self-conscious application of this insight, that social scientists apply to the truth claims of themselves and others. One of the first writers to coin the term ‘reflexivity’ was Kelly (1955), who referred to the reflexive qualities of his work based on his acknowledgment of personal constructs (cited in Holland, 1999: p. 465). Later, in developing ethnomethodology, Garfinkel (1967) employed self-reflexive insight to show how the meaningfulness of statements and practices within academic disciplines are contingent upon the context of their production. This anticipated the contemporary movement from a social science based on establishing universal and objective knowledge to recognition of emergent, situated, and partial truths. Gouldner (1970), in formulating a critical sociology as an alternative to systems theory and functionalism, contrasted its self-critical ‘reflexivity’ (explicating the social scientists’ own assumptions and positionality in the construction of knowledge) with the contrived objectivism of mainstream sociology. Throughout the social work literature, reflexivity has been defined in myriad ways, yet most writers accentuate the impact and influence of the researcher on the research, especially motivations for undertaking the research, the design and methodology of the research, and how ‘findings’ are interpreted and presented, e.g., the privileging or exclusion of particular data in the final presentation of the research (Fook, 1999). This applies to both formal research in social work, and informal research that practitioners undertake on a daily basis, i.e., the knowledge that social workers produce about their practice and clients when interpreting situations to inform their responses to clients. Out of the multitude of ways that the worker could understand the client’s narrative, how has the practitioner’s values, assumptions, and interpretations shaped the information they have chosen to privilege, marginalize, or exclude in their presentation of the client’s story in their case notes, research reports, or assessments? (This is discussed further below.) Reflexivity exposes the researcher as the main instrument of data collection and a primary factor in the production of the knowledge (Fook, 2013). It asks researchers and practitioners to cease impersonating “‘shamans’ of objectivity” (Ruby, 1980: p. 154 cited in Smyth and Shacklock, 1998: p. 7) and transparently acknowledge that “the person producing the theory is included within the subject matter [s/]he attempts to understand” (Holland, 1977: p. 82 cited in Holland, 1999: p. 465). Instead of indulging the pretense of objectivity, and “engaging in futile attempts to eliminate the effects of the researcher . reflexivity enables researchers to.set about understanding them” (May, 1993: p. 75 cited in Smyth and Shacklock, 1998: p. 3) and use these to develop deeper insights into the social phenomena being explored (Morley, 2013). Reflexivity is increasingly a compulsory requirement in evaluating qualitative social work research (Daley, 2010; Lipp, 2007). It appears in the research literature as an alternative to objectivist notions of reliability and validity, offering another approach to conceptualize ethical and epistemologically and methodologically sound research (D’Cruz and Jones, 2004). Lipp (2007) argues that complexities associated with developing a clear, universal definition of reflexivity lie in
acknowledging its use in different situations for various purposes. Whilst originating from research to “allow the researcher to examine how their research acts on the world and how the world acts on their research” (Lipp, 2007: n.p.), its applicability to enhance professional learning and social work practice is equally profound.
Reflexivity and Social Work Practice More recently, reflexivity has emerged within the social work literature (Taylor and White, 2000; Powell, 2002; D’Cruz et al., 2007). For social work, reflexivity carries significant implications for informing research and critical practice. In the context of social work practice, being reflexive requires “an ability to recognize our own influence – and the influence of our social and cultural contexts .. In this sense, then, it is . about factoring ourselves as players into the situations we practice in” (Fook and Askeland, 2006: p. 12). Other writers further articulate: “Reflexivity is manifested in asking fundamental questions about assumptions generated by formal and practice theories; it addresses the multiple interrelations between power and knowledge, and acknowledges the inclusion of self in the process of knowledge creation in social work practice” (Lam et al., 2007: p. 91). Paralleling this, Otto et al. (2009: p. 476) have drawn on work by Taylor and White (2000) to define reflexivity as a “primarily practical and ethical skill in social work . one that is fundamental for judging what is desirable and appropriate in specific circumstances by applying particular informal heuristics, rules and values, and the one that is particularly important in ambiguous and undetermined settings, circumstances, and contexts.” Other important work on reflexivity in social work argues that reflexivity demands recognition of practitioners’ role in engaging with, interpreting, and therefore recreating, and reproducing understandings of reality (Taylor, 2006). Given that reflexivity highlights “he relevance of understanding how one’s self can influence what and how knowledge is made, and can therefore shed light on how specific assumptions we make can arise from our own background and experience” (Fook, 2013: p. 6), it holds particular implications for practice, especially in relation to how social workers conduct assessments. In taking a reflexive position, social work practitioners choose from competing sets of discourses to assess the nature of issues presented by the person, group, or community they are working with. Each story the social worker collects has been assembled from a series of social constructions that are elevated to the status of facts and privileged in a coconstruction of the service user’s particular account of their experience and the worker’s engagement with it. Therefore, as the person to whom the stories are being told, the practitioner is implicated in constructing the service user’s narratives (Frost, 2006). Developing a reflexive awareness about intrinsically political process of meaning making reveals that the practitioner’s own subjectivity inevitably influences how they interpret and assess situations or behaviors. The implications of this are troubling for the dominant objectivist paradigms that contend it is possible to isolate the object from the subject, the researcher from the researched, and the social worker from their assessment (Meinert et al., 2000).
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work Practice
That which can be known, from an objectivist epistemological position, is assumed to exist independently of the knower (Arnd-Caddigan and Pozzuto, 2006). Conversely, reflexive practitioners recognize the impact of self on the knowledge that is created and factor this understanding into how professional decisions are made (Fook, 2013). Thus, the practitioner becomes the main tool of data generation during an assessment, which arguably contributes to a much deeper understanding of the service user’s situation (Powell, 2002; White, 2001). Hence, the objectivist notion that assessments are fact-finding missions that can be undertaken as neutral and detached, technical activities is flawed (Rodwell, 1987; Fook, 2012). This type of reflexivity challenges the instrumental accountability inherent in evidence-based practice protocols and guidelines. For example, a child protection worker who undertakes an assessment using an objectivist/realist paradigm would attempt to gain information through the use of technical tools such as risk assessments, believing that it is possible to gain objective knowledge about reality that is untouched by their interpretation (Meinert et al., 2000; Loftus et al., 2011). In contrast, reflexive practitioners recognize that they are the key tool in any assessment process and so they scrutinize the ways their interpretive lens has informed the knowledge they produce. When Kelly (1955 cited in Holland, 1999) first referred to the reflexive qualities of his work, he did so to differentiate himself from the behaviorists and psychoanalysts that he detested. This need for differentiation closely relates to the more contemporary debates that position reflexivity as a counter discourse to objectivist paradigms (D’Cruz and Jones, 2004); or reflective practice as a “new epistemology of practice” (Napier and Fook, 2000) and a refusal to reproduce the assumptions embedded within the natural sciences within social work practice (Taylor, 2013); and critical social work as an agent of critique and resistance to dominant discourses such as objectivism, evidence-based practice, and neoliberalism (Dominelli, 2004; Gray and Webb, 2013). Indeed, “In the context of the welfare state the definition of critical or radical social work – and therefore critical reflexivity – seem[s] to be relatively evident as ‘oppositional’ to the dominant paradigms” (Kessl, 2009: p. 312). Gray and Webb (2013) concur with this view, arguing that the new politics of critical social work take an innately political stance that that challenges capitalism and neoliberalism whilst facilitating emancipatory practices that address structural inequalities and injustices.
Critical Reflexivity It is this political orientation that enables reflexivity to become critical reflexivity: by challenging and contesting the truth claims of dominant paradigms and the associated power relations; by elucidating the socially constructed nature of reality; and creating the conceptual space for alternative emancipatory discourses to emerge (Dominelli, 2004). For some writers, an analysis based on both modernist and postmodernist notions of critical social theory, implicitly, yet distinctively underpin their use of reflexivity in social work.
283
These writers do not use the term critical reflexivity, but define reflexivity in critical terms. For example, Giles and Pockett (2013: p. 209) describe reflexivity as “an active process of critically analysing the knowledge and values that influence practice.” Related to this, Ferguson (2003: p. 199) argues for a definition of reflexivity that draws on Giddens (1990) and Beck (1992) suggesting that reflexivity is “the ability to act in the world and to critically reflect on our action and in ways that may reconstitute how we act and even reshape the very nature of identity itself.” Taylor and White (2000) refer to ‘epistemic reflexivity’ that promotes selfawareness of the impact of dominant discourses on tacit assumptions (Polanyi, 1966; Giles and Pockett, 2013: p. 209). Gouldner (1970: pp. xiii, 489), writing prior to these debates, conceptualized “the historical mission of a ‘reflexive sociology’ as the ‘transcend[ence] [of] sociology as it now exists.” This representation of reflexivity invokes notions of fundamental transformations of the discipline, and is aspirational about social change. Lipp (2007) similarly devises a critical model of reflexivity that utilizes a form of reflective knowledge that takes account of technical practice and emancipatory dimensions of knowledge through critical theory. In addition, Freshwater and Rolfe’s model of reflexivity implicitly incorporates a critical perspective including three types of reflexivity: a deep level of reflection; an account of the sociopolitical context; and reflection-in-action (cited in Lipp, 2007). Finlay (2008: p. 5) also depicts reflexivity as involving both ‘personal reflection and social critique.’ In her construction of reflexivity she asserts that “Reflexive practitioners engage in critical self-reflection: reflecting critically on the impact of their own background, assumptions, positioning, feelings, behaviour while also attending to the impact of the wider organisational, discursive, ideological and political context” (Finlay, 2008: p. 6). Such interpretations of reflexivity are clearly informed by the emancipatory goals of critical social work, despite the language of critical reflexivity not being explicitly used. However, some discussions of both reflection and reflexivity have the potential to contribute to a critical emancipatory agenda, but are not inherently critical of their own volition (Lay and McGuire, 2009). Without explicit links to a critical theoretical analysis, these two concepts can become technicized and conservative (Taylor, 2013). For example, for Thomson (2013: p. 54) “the essence” of reflexivity in social work concerns “understanding how I am perceived by others. How others respond to me. And how I perceive myself working with others. It also concerns how I think and feel about my work, how I perceive myself in the job, and what the job means to me.” This representation of reflexivity is neither politically conservative nor progressive and therefore, is inadequate for a critical social work project that “is primarily concerned with practising in ways which further a society without domination, exploitation or oppression” (Fook, 2012: p. 18). Whilst reflexivity involves an awareness of how a biographical lens shapes interpretations of individuals’ constructions of their ‘reality’ over and above a range of competing perceptions, ultimately they need to be able to make decisions about which interpretations they privilege and why (Taylor and White, 2000). Critical theories provide an important framework on
284
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work Practice
which to base such judgments if individuals are committed to critical social work practice (Fook, 2012).
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work This emphasis on the ‘critical’ is at the core of the difference between reflexivity and critical reflexivity. Although many authors have historically used an implicit critical lens when discussing reflexivity, the term critical reflexivity has more recently started to appear in the social work literature. Trevelyan et al. (2012: n.p.) position critical reflexivity as a principle aim of social work education, and argue that “critical reflexivity can be distinguished from non-critical forms of reflexivity by its emphasis on the socially constructed, power-laden nature of knowledge and subjectivity, and its embracement of anxiety and other difficult emotions in social work practice.” Kessl (2009: p. 307) positions critical reflexivity as a way for social work to locate itself within a ‘transformatory agenda.’ Kessl (2009) links critical approaches and reflexivity by drawing on Fook et al. (2006: p. 118) who connect the goals of social change to social workers that “are able to create critical knowledge which potentially challenges and resists current forms of domination.” Kessl (2009) argues that a systematic approach to critical reflexivity in social work needs to be “augmented by and reconnected to a political, theory-based analysis of the actual contexts in which social work operates” and “need to be seen in connection with a fundamental transformation of the social order” (Kessl, 2009: p. 307). Kondrat (1999) critiques the notion of reflexive selfawareness to develop critical reflexivity, which can be “taught as a skill . as a means for emancipation and selfactualization” (cited in D’Cruz et al., 2007: p. 77). Paralleling this, Brown (2012) posits critical reflexivity as a conceptual tool to identity the unintended, consequences of modernist discourses of power, which limits antioppressive practice. This is instructive for wellintentioned practitioners who seek to empower clients by giving them power. Brown (2012) highlights how assumptions embedded in modernist constructions of power as a commodity can inadvertently reproduce dominant power relations. In the example above, a lack of critical reflexivity could further disempower the client by reinforcing the idea that the client can only become empowered through practitioners’ intervention, rather than their own actions. A critically reflexive practitioner would be more attentive to how the processes of their practice can be empowering, rather than assuming their intention will automatically produce an empowering outcome. Critical reflexive practitioners are more sensitive to unintended harm that social workers can cause through unreflexive practice.
Critical Reflexivity and Critical Reflection This emphasis on the ‘critical’ is a key difference between reflection and critical reflection. Whilst some authors conflate the two concepts and use them interchangeably (e.g., Kondrat, 1999; Ruch, 2002), others debate whether they are the same (Parton and O’Byrne, 2000; Taylor and White,
2000), and some writers explicitly distinguish between them (e.g., Fook, 1999, 2012; Powell, 2002; D’Cruz et al., 2007; Finlay, 2008). Both reflection and critical reflection are primarily identified as educational tools to improve congruence between professionals’ use of theory and practice. However, more explicitly aligned with a radical politics, “[c]ritical reflection . is about understanding the technologies of power, language and practice that produce and legitimate forms of moral and political regulation” (Fook et al., 2006: p. 10). As Fook (2012: p. 113) claims: “The prime purpose of critical reflection is to unearth how we ourselves participate in discourses which shape existing power relations.” The critical component of critical reflection essentially challenges social inequalities that create injustice. This includes a key emphasis on power relations and domination (Gray and Webb, 2013). Critical reflection exposes the ways in which social work practitioners may be implicated in, or complicit with, dominant social power relations and structures that are unjust, inequitable, and/or undemocratic (Fook, 2012). To critically reflect on implicit values and assumptions and scrutinize how these affect professional practice, practitioners can adopt a critically reflexive epistemological position. A critically reflective process cannot be undertaken from a position of objectivity. Critical reflexivity is a central component and necessary precondition of critical reflection. Both critical refection and critical reflexivity are underpinned by social constructivism, which fundamentally informs postmodernism. However, the key difference remains that critical reflexivity enables a practitioner to undertake critically reflective practice. Critical reflection incorporates a critically reflexive stance that activates broader transformative processes of deconstruction and reconstruction and takes account of critical postmodern theoretical frameworks (e.g., Allan et al., 2009; Fook, 2012); constructivist and experiential approaches to adult learning (Mezirow et al., 1990); and the reflective approach (Argyris and Schon, 1976; Schon, 1987) to generate theory inductively through critical reflection on practice. Differentiation between critical reflexivity and critical reflection is contested, and some authors use the term critical reflexivity, as documented by Fook (2012) as critical reflection. Allan (2009: p. 1), in contrast, describes her autoethnographic study as one that used a “critically reflexive methodology to investigate [her] underlying assumptions about spirituality in social work and their impact on [her] practice with women survivors of sexual trauma.” As in critical reflection, Allan (2009: p. 1) refers to analyzing ‘critical practice moments’ to identify ‘existing and newly emerging assumptions’ and refers to identifying the ‘intended and unintended consequences of these assumptions’ for her practice and engages in a ‘deconstruction/reconstruction process’ that develops new knowledge to inform her future practice. Hence critical reflexivity as defined here, is how others describe critical reflection. Alternatively, other writers have presented reflection, critical reflection, and reflexivity on a continuum (Finlay and Gough, 2003). They contend that reflection stands at the
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work Practice less sophisticated end of the continuum. “At the other end stands reflexivity: a more immediate and dynamic process which involves continuing self-awareness. Critical reflection lies somewhere in between” (Finlay, 2008: n.p.). The concepts of reflection, critical reflection, reflexivity, and critical reflexivity are presented, interpreted, and used differently, depending on the context and position of the author, and thus remain relatively elusive concepts, resisting universal definition.
Challenges to Critical Reflexivity in the Current Context This article has discussed the development of critical reflexivity in social work, considering its implications for the practices of research and assessment. The related concepts of reflection, reflexivity, and critical reflection have been explored, demonstrating that the relationship between these concepts and critical reflexivity is contested and contentious. Regardless of the complexities and nuances between interpretations, most authors are in broad agreement that these concepts can support the emancipatory goals of critical social work. The impact of neoliberalism has been well documented (Holscher and Sewpaul, 2006; Madhu, 2011) with the consensus being that neoliberal priorities can undermine critical social work objectives (see, e.g., Gray and Webb, 2013). These neoliberal priorities are augmented by imposing the practices of cost containment, standardization, compliance, an increased emphasis on risk assessment, and a quest of objectivity to eliminate uncertainty (Dominelli, 2004). This supports a view of social work that is less concerned with social justice and human rights, and more focused on individualizing social problems through developing technical proficiency in procedural knowledge that treats and manages apparently dysfunctional others (Holscher and Sewpaul, 2006; Madhu, 2011). Within this context, many challenges exist for social work practitioners, researchers, and educators alike, who are committed to a critically reflexive stance. The dominant discourses are hostile toward this critical position, which is essentially constructed as at odds with the prevailing paradigms (Kessl, 2009; Gray and Webb, 2013). The debates about critical reflexivity, and attempts to develop further the concept, occur alongside policy mandates to make practice more scientific, objective, and evidence based (Taylor, 2013). Kessl (2009: p. 309) describes this as an “evidence-based practice or the ‘what works agenda’, that is designed to elicit a ‘direct knowledge transfer’ from positivist, experimental sources into the particular social work intervention” (Kessl, 2009: p. 309). Within this context, Kessl (2009: p. 309) argues that the concepts and practices of reflexivity (and critical reflexivity and critical reflection) are “under siege . and in danger of becoming more and more substituted by a technical-rational intervention agency which is still called ‘social work’, but represents a mode of intervention which is reduced to finding ways to achieve predetermined goals.” Arguably critical reflexivity and critical reflection are precisely what is needed to expose and oppose this situation: critical reflexivity to assist social workers to avoid becoming complicit in dominant power relations and being seduced by
285
the ‘tactics of governmentality’ (Foucault cited in Madhu, 2011: p. 9); and critical reflection to reconstruct opportunities to create discretionary practice spaces for resistance and change. A lack of reflexivity, and particularly, critical reflexivity allows social work to function in a depoliticized mode (Taylor, 2013). Both critical reflexivity and critical reflection are vital if social work is to strengthen a critical agenda. As Gray and Webb (2013) argue social work is charged with the responsibility to militantly challenge social injustices and the systems of domination that create them. The very acts of taking a critically reflexive epistemological position and developing the courage and humility to engage in critical reflection can in themselves, constitute undertakings of resistance to the dominant paradigms, and facilitate capacity to work toward emancipatory social change.
Acknowledgments Thanks to Dr Phillip Ablett, University of the Sunshine Coast, for helping me to formulate and refine my ideas for this article. Acknowledgments to Judi Moir, University of the Sunshine Coast, for her assistance with the library research undertaken for this article.
See also: Critical Social Work Practice; Reflexivity; Social Work Theory.
Bibliography Allan, J., 2009. Constructing the Spiritual in Social Work: A Critically Reflexive, Autoethnographic Process. Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS. Allan, J., Briskman, L., Pease, B. (Eds.), 2009. Critical Social Work, second ed. Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW. Argyris, C., Schon, D., 1976. Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional Effectiveness. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Arnd-Caddigan, M., Pozzuto, R., 2006. Truth in our time. Qualitative Social Work 5 (4), 423–440. Askeland, G.A., Fook, J., 2009. Critical reflection in social work. European Journal of Social Work 12 (3), 287–292. Beck, U., 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Sage, London. Brown, C.G., 2012. Anti-oppression through a postmodern lens: dismantling the Master’s conceptual tools in discursive social work practice. Critical Social Work 13 (1), n.p. Daley, A., 2010. Refections on reflexivity and critical reflection as critical research practices. Journal of Women and Social Work 25 (1), 68–82. D’Cruz, H., Jones, M., 2004. Social Work Research: Ethical and Political Contexts. Sage, London. D’Cruz, H., Gillingham, P., Melendez, S., 2007. Reflexivity, its meanings and relevance for social work: a critical review of the literature. British Journal of Social Work 37 (1), 73–90. Dewey, J., 1916. Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. The Free Press, New York. Dewey, J., 1933. How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking the Education Process. Heath, Boston. Dominelli, L., 2004. Social Work: Theory and Practice for a Changing Profession. Polity Press, Cambridge. Ferguson, H., 2003. Welfare, social exclusion and reflexivity: the case of child and woman protection. Journal of Social Policy 32 (2), 199–216. Finlay, L., January 2008. Reflecting on ‘Reflective Practice’ PBPL Paper No. 52. A discussion paper prepared for PBPL CETL. www.open.ac.uk/pbpl. http://www. open.ac.uk/cetl-workspace/cetlcontent/documents/4bf2b48887459.pdf (accessed 01.08.12.). Finlay, L., Gough, B., 2003. Reflexivity: A Practical Guide for Researcher’s in Health and Social Sciences. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
286
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work Practice
Fook, J., 1996. The reflective researcher: developing a reflective approach to practice. In: Fook, J. (Ed.), The Reflective Researcher: Social Workers’ Theories of Practice Research. Allen and Unwin, Sydney, pp. 1–8. Fook, J., 1999. Reflexivity as Method. La Trobe University, Bundoora, Melbourne. Fook, J., 2012. Social Work: A Critical Approach to Practice, second ed. Sage, London. Fook, J., 2013. Critical reflection in context: contemporary perspectives and issues. In: Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Context: Applications in Health and Social Care. Routledge, Oxon, UK. Fook, J., Askeland, G., 2006. The ‘critical’ in critical reflection. In: White, S., Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Health and Social Care. Open University Press, Maidenhead, pp. 40–53. Fook, J., White, S., Gardner, F., 2006. Critical reflection: a review of contemporary literature and understandings. In: White, S., Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Health and Social Care. Open University Press, Maidenhead, England, pp. 3–20. Frost, S., 2006. Recasting individual practice through reflection on narratives. In: White, S., Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Health and Social Care. Open University Press, Maidenhead, pp. 107–117. Garfinkel, H., 1967. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Giddens, A., 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Polity Press/Blackwell, Oxford. Giles, R., Pockett, R., 2013. Critical reflection in social work education. In: Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Context: Applications in Health and Social Care. Routledge, Abingdon Oxon, UK. Gould, T., Taylor, I. (Eds.), 1996. Reflective Learning for Social Work. Arena, Aldershot. Gouldner, A., 1970. The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. Basic Books, New York. Gray, M., Webb, S., 2013. Towards a new politics of social work. In: Gray, M., Webb, S. (Eds.), The New Politics of Critical Social Work. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills. Holland, R., 1999. Reflexivity. Human Relations 52 (4), 463–484. Holscher, D., Sewpaul, V., 2006. Ethics as a site of resistance: the tension between social control and critical reflection. Research Reports 48 (1), 251–272. Jessup, H., Rogerson, S., 1999. Postmodernism and the teaching and practice of interpersonal skills. In: Pease, B., Fook, J. (Eds.), Transforming Social Work Practice: Postmodern Critical Perspectives. Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW. Kessl, F., 2009. Critical reflexivity, social work, and the emerging European postwelfare states. European Journal of Social Work 12 (3), 305–317. Kondrat, M.E., 1999. Who is the “self” in self aware: professional self awareness from a critical theory perspective. Social Service Review 74 (4), 451–477. Lam, C.M., Wong, H., Leung, T.T.F., 2007. An unfinished reflexive journey: social work students’ reflection on their placement experiences. British Journal of Social Work 37, 91–105. Lay, K., McGuire, L., 2009. Building a lens for critical reflection and reflexivity in social work education. Social Work Education 29 (5), 539–550. Leonard, P., 1997. Postmodern Welfare. Sage, London. Lipp, A., 2007. Developing the reflexive dimension of reflection: a framework for debate. International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches 1 (1), 18–26. Loftus, S., Higgs, J., Trede, F., 2011. Researching living spaces: trends in creative qualitative research. In: Higgs, A., Titches, D., Horsfall, Bridges, D. (Eds.), Critical Spaces for Qualitative Researching: Living Research. Sense Publishers, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, pp. 3–12. Madhu, P., 2011. Praxis Intervention: Towards a New Critical Social Work Practice, 20th February. Social Science Research Network. http://ssrn.com/ abstract¼1765143 (accessed 14.02.12.).
Meinert, R., Pardeck, J., Kreuger, L., 2000. Social Work: Seeking Relevancy in the Twenty-First Century. Hapworth Press, Binghampton, NY. Mezirow, J., et al., 1990. Fostering Critical Reflection in Adulthood. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Morley, C., 2013. Some methodological and ethical tensions in using critical reflection as a research methodology. In: Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Context: Applications in Health and Social Care. Routledge, Abingdon Oxon, UK. Napier, L., Fook, J., 2000. Reflective practice in social work. In: Napier, L., Fook, J. (Eds.), Breakthroughs in Practice: Theorising Critical Moments in Social Work. Whiting and Birch, London, pp. 1–11. Otto, H., Polutta, A., Ziegler, H., 2009. Reflexive professionalism as a second generation of evidence-based practice: some considerations on the special issue “what works? Modernizing the knowledge-base of social work”. Research on Social Work Practice 19 (4), 472–478. Parton, N., O’Byrne, 2000. Constructive Social Work; Towards a New Practice. Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW. Polanyi, M., 1966. The Tacit Dimension. Anchor Books, New York. Powell, J., 2002. The changing conditions of social work research. British Journal of Social Work 32 (1), 17–33. Pray, J.E., 1991. Respecting the uniqueness of the individual: social work practice within a reflective model. Social Work 36 (1), 80–85. Rodwell, K., June 1987. Naturalistic inquiry: an alternative model for social work assessments. Social Service Review 61 (2), 233–246. Ruch, G., 2002. From triangle to spiral: reflective practice in social work education, practice and research. Social Work Education 21 (2), 199–216. Schon, D., 1987. Educating the Critically Reflective Practitioner: Toward a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Scott, D., 1989. Meaning construction and social work practice. Social Service Review 63 (1), 39–51. Seidman, S., 2013. Contested Knowledge: Social Theory Today, fifth ed. Cambridge University Press, New York. Smyth, J., Shacklock, G., 1998. Behind the cleansing of socially critical research accounts. In: Shacklock, G., Smyth, J. (Eds.), Being Reflexive in Critical Educational and Social Research. Falmer Press, London, pp. 1–13. Taylor, C., 2006. Practicing reflexivity: narrative, reflection and the moral order. In: White, S., Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Health and Social Care. Open University Press, Maidenhead, UK, pp. 73–88. Taylor, C., 2013. Critically reflective practice. In: Gray, M., Webb, S. (Eds.), The New Politics of Critical Social Work. Palgrave Macmillan, Baskingstoke. Taylor, C., White, S., 2000. Practising Reflexivity in Health and Welfare: Making Knowledge. Open University Press, Maidenhead, UK. Thomson, G., 2013. Not beating around the bush: critical reflection in a rural community health service. In: Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Context: Applications in Health and Social Care. Routledge, Abingdon Oxon, UK. Trevelyan, C., Crath, R., Chambon, A., 2012. Promoting critical reflexivity through arts-based media: a case study. British Journal of Social Work. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1093/bjsw/bcs090. First published online: June 24. White, S., 2001. Auto-ethnography as reflexive inquiry: the research act as selfsurveillance. In: Shaw, I., Gould, N. (Eds.), Qualitative Research in Social Work. Sage, London, pp. 100–115.
Abstract Critical reflexivity is an epistemological position that brings together the social constructionist stance of reflexivity with the emancipatory goals of critical social science. Critical reflexivity is a vial precondition for critical reflection, yet not sufficient in its own right to activate the transformative deconstruction and reconstruction processes that critical reflection enables. The related concepts of reflection, reflexivity, and critical reflection will also be discussed. A critically reflexive stance is essential to further a critical social work agenda that is committed to social justice and human rights, despite the challenges presented by the contemporary, neoliberal context.
Introduction Critical reflexivity is an epistemological position that brings together the social constructionist stance of reflexivity with the emancipatory goals of critical social science. It is a contested concept and often conflated with critical reflection. Critical reflexivity is a vial precondition for critical reflection, yet not sufficient on its own to activate the transformative deconstruction and reconstruction processes that critical reflection enables. In order to clarify the concept of critical reflexivity, the related concepts of reflection, reflexivity, and critical reflection will also be discussed. A critically reflexive stance is essential to further a critical social work agenda that is committed to social justice and human rights, because it enables critical reflection. These concepts are intimately connected as critical reflection can support social work practitioners to maintain a critically reflexive stance, despite the challenges presented by contemporary, neoliberal contexts that privilege objectivist paradigms including evidence-based practice and research. Several writers have noted the distinct lack of consensus over definitions of reflection, reflexivity, and critical reflection (Fook et al., 2006), and critical reflexivity (Kessl, 2009: p. 305). As Askeland and Fook (2009: p. 289) state, “The terms reflection, reflective practice, reflexivity and critical reflection/ reflexivity are often conflated or used indiscriminatingly, without clear definition.” D’Cruz et al. (2007) similarly point out that “‘Reflexivity’ is often used interchangeably with other terms such as ‘reflectivity’ ‘reflection’ and ‘critical reflection’” (see, e.g., Jessup and Rogerson, 1999: p. 176; Leonard, 1997: p. vii). Despite the complementarity of these terms, articulating clearer delineation between them is important for social work as they explicitly relate to improving professional practice and facilitating social change (D’Cruz et al., 2007).
Reflection Reflection, also referred to as reflectivity (Fook, 1999), the reflective approach (Argyris and Schon, 1976; Schon, 1987), the reflective model (Pray, 1991), and reflective practice (Fook, 1996; Gould and Taylor, 1996), is “a process of thinking, of comparing and verifying for the purpose of learning about and
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 5
improving practice, developing practice-based theory, connecting theory to practice, and improving and changing practice” (Fook and Askeland, 2006: p. 12). The ideas about a reflective practice are usually traced to educationalists Argyris and Schon (1976) (later developed by Schon, 1987), who proposed a reflective process for uncovering hidden assumptions, particularly regarding professional learning. These authors were critical of professionals, identifying wide-ranging differences between their espoused theories and their actual practice (Argyris and Schon, 1976; Schon, 1987). Schon (1987) questioned the usefulness of traditional approaches to building knowledge, and was dubious of the capacity of technical rationality to respond to the relationship between theory and practice. Some authors credit the earlier work of Dewey (1916, 1933) in developing current understandings of reflective practice (Mezirow et al., 1990; Fook et al., 2006: p. 8). Whilst closing the gap between theory and practice is the ultimate goal of reflection (Schon, 1987), this may simply reinforce conservative practice. If a mental health practitioner espouses an acceptance of psychiatry, then deferring to medical experts that accept the status quo, and individualize social problems, is not identified as problematic practice by a reflective approach (Taylor and White, 2000). As Taylor (2013) explains reflective practice potentially occupies an apolitical space, over emphasizing the role of individual relationships and presenting an inadequate view of the impact social structures. This point clearly demarcates reflection from critical reflection, and some authors, suggest that such limitations can be enhanced by reflexivity (Lipp, 2007; Finlay, 2008).
Reflexivity Reflexivity refers to one’s capacity to look or act back upon oneself. The concept of reflexivity has figured prominently in epistemological debates concerning the relationships between knowledge, self, and society; and has emerged as a key concept in social constructionist approaches. The basic constructionist insight posits that knowledge of the world does not exist apart from people’s involvement in it, which in turn shapes knowledge. Socially conditioned subjectivity decisively
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.28021-5
281
282
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work Practice
affects knowledge production and truth claims (Seidman, 2013). Reflexivity is the self-conscious application of this insight, that social scientists apply to the truth claims of themselves and others. One of the first writers to coin the term ‘reflexivity’ was Kelly (1955), who referred to the reflexive qualities of his work based on his acknowledgment of personal constructs (cited in Holland, 1999: p. 465). Later, in developing ethnomethodology, Garfinkel (1967) employed self-reflexive insight to show how the meaningfulness of statements and practices within academic disciplines are contingent upon the context of their production. This anticipated the contemporary movement from a social science based on establishing universal and objective knowledge to recognition of emergent, situated, and partial truths. Gouldner (1970), in formulating a critical sociology as an alternative to systems theory and functionalism, contrasted its self-critical ‘reflexivity’ (explicating the social scientists’ own assumptions and positionality in the construction of knowledge) with the contrived objectivism of mainstream sociology. Throughout the social work literature, reflexivity has been defined in myriad ways, yet most writers accentuate the impact and influence of the researcher on the research, especially motivations for undertaking the research, the design and methodology of the research, and how ‘findings’ are interpreted and presented, e.g., the privileging or exclusion of particular data in the final presentation of the research (Fook, 1999). This applies to both formal research in social work, and informal research that practitioners undertake on a daily basis, i.e., the knowledge that social workers produce about their practice and clients when interpreting situations to inform their responses to clients. Out of the multitude of ways that the worker could understand the client’s narrative, how has the practitioner’s values, assumptions, and interpretations shaped the information they have chosen to privilege, marginalize, or exclude in their presentation of the client’s story in their case notes, research reports, or assessments? (This is discussed further below.) Reflexivity exposes the researcher as the main instrument of data collection and a primary factor in the production of the knowledge (Fook, 2013). It asks researchers and practitioners to cease impersonating “‘shamans’ of objectivity” (Ruby, 1980: p. 154 cited in Smyth and Shacklock, 1998: p. 7) and transparently acknowledge that “the person producing the theory is included within the subject matter [s/]he attempts to understand” (Holland, 1977: p. 82 cited in Holland, 1999: p. 465). Instead of indulging the pretense of objectivity, and “engaging in futile attempts to eliminate the effects of the researcher . reflexivity enables researchers to.set about understanding them” (May, 1993: p. 75 cited in Smyth and Shacklock, 1998: p. 3) and use these to develop deeper insights into the social phenomena being explored (Morley, 2013). Reflexivity is increasingly a compulsory requirement in evaluating qualitative social work research (Daley, 2010; Lipp, 2007). It appears in the research literature as an alternative to objectivist notions of reliability and validity, offering another approach to conceptualize ethical and epistemologically and methodologically sound research (D’Cruz and Jones, 2004). Lipp (2007) argues that complexities associated with developing a clear, universal definition of reflexivity lie in
acknowledging its use in different situations for various purposes. Whilst originating from research to “allow the researcher to examine how their research acts on the world and how the world acts on their research” (Lipp, 2007: n.p.), its applicability to enhance professional learning and social work practice is equally profound.
Reflexivity and Social Work Practice More recently, reflexivity has emerged within the social work literature (Taylor and White, 2000; Powell, 2002; D’Cruz et al., 2007). For social work, reflexivity carries significant implications for informing research and critical practice. In the context of social work practice, being reflexive requires “an ability to recognize our own influence – and the influence of our social and cultural contexts .. In this sense, then, it is . about factoring ourselves as players into the situations we practice in” (Fook and Askeland, 2006: p. 12). Other writers further articulate: “Reflexivity is manifested in asking fundamental questions about assumptions generated by formal and practice theories; it addresses the multiple interrelations between power and knowledge, and acknowledges the inclusion of self in the process of knowledge creation in social work practice” (Lam et al., 2007: p. 91). Paralleling this, Otto et al. (2009: p. 476) have drawn on work by Taylor and White (2000) to define reflexivity as a “primarily practical and ethical skill in social work . one that is fundamental for judging what is desirable and appropriate in specific circumstances by applying particular informal heuristics, rules and values, and the one that is particularly important in ambiguous and undetermined settings, circumstances, and contexts.” Other important work on reflexivity in social work argues that reflexivity demands recognition of practitioners’ role in engaging with, interpreting, and therefore recreating, and reproducing understandings of reality (Taylor, 2006). Given that reflexivity highlights “he relevance of understanding how one’s self can influence what and how knowledge is made, and can therefore shed light on how specific assumptions we make can arise from our own background and experience” (Fook, 2013: p. 6), it holds particular implications for practice, especially in relation to how social workers conduct assessments. In taking a reflexive position, social work practitioners choose from competing sets of discourses to assess the nature of issues presented by the person, group, or community they are working with. Each story the social worker collects has been assembled from a series of social constructions that are elevated to the status of facts and privileged in a coconstruction of the service user’s particular account of their experience and the worker’s engagement with it. Therefore, as the person to whom the stories are being told, the practitioner is implicated in constructing the service user’s narratives (Frost, 2006). Developing a reflexive awareness about intrinsically political process of meaning making reveals that the practitioner’s own subjectivity inevitably influences how they interpret and assess situations or behaviors. The implications of this are troubling for the dominant objectivist paradigms that contend it is possible to isolate the object from the subject, the researcher from the researched, and the social worker from their assessment (Meinert et al., 2000).
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work Practice
That which can be known, from an objectivist epistemological position, is assumed to exist independently of the knower (Arnd-Caddigan and Pozzuto, 2006). Conversely, reflexive practitioners recognize the impact of self on the knowledge that is created and factor this understanding into how professional decisions are made (Fook, 2013). Thus, the practitioner becomes the main tool of data generation during an assessment, which arguably contributes to a much deeper understanding of the service user’s situation (Powell, 2002; White, 2001). Hence, the objectivist notion that assessments are fact-finding missions that can be undertaken as neutral and detached, technical activities is flawed (Rodwell, 1987; Fook, 2012). This type of reflexivity challenges the instrumental accountability inherent in evidence-based practice protocols and guidelines. For example, a child protection worker who undertakes an assessment using an objectivist/realist paradigm would attempt to gain information through the use of technical tools such as risk assessments, believing that it is possible to gain objective knowledge about reality that is untouched by their interpretation (Meinert et al., 2000; Loftus et al., 2011). In contrast, reflexive practitioners recognize that they are the key tool in any assessment process and so they scrutinize the ways their interpretive lens has informed the knowledge they produce. When Kelly (1955 cited in Holland, 1999) first referred to the reflexive qualities of his work, he did so to differentiate himself from the behaviorists and psychoanalysts that he detested. This need for differentiation closely relates to the more contemporary debates that position reflexivity as a counter discourse to objectivist paradigms (D’Cruz and Jones, 2004); or reflective practice as a “new epistemology of practice” (Napier and Fook, 2000) and a refusal to reproduce the assumptions embedded within the natural sciences within social work practice (Taylor, 2013); and critical social work as an agent of critique and resistance to dominant discourses such as objectivism, evidence-based practice, and neoliberalism (Dominelli, 2004; Gray and Webb, 2013). Indeed, “In the context of the welfare state the definition of critical or radical social work – and therefore critical reflexivity – seem[s] to be relatively evident as ‘oppositional’ to the dominant paradigms” (Kessl, 2009: p. 312). Gray and Webb (2013) concur with this view, arguing that the new politics of critical social work take an innately political stance that that challenges capitalism and neoliberalism whilst facilitating emancipatory practices that address structural inequalities and injustices.
Critical Reflexivity It is this political orientation that enables reflexivity to become critical reflexivity: by challenging and contesting the truth claims of dominant paradigms and the associated power relations; by elucidating the socially constructed nature of reality; and creating the conceptual space for alternative emancipatory discourses to emerge (Dominelli, 2004). For some writers, an analysis based on both modernist and postmodernist notions of critical social theory, implicitly, yet distinctively underpin their use of reflexivity in social work.
283
These writers do not use the term critical reflexivity, but define reflexivity in critical terms. For example, Giles and Pockett (2013: p. 209) describe reflexivity as “an active process of critically analysing the knowledge and values that influence practice.” Related to this, Ferguson (2003: p. 199) argues for a definition of reflexivity that draws on Giddens (1990) and Beck (1992) suggesting that reflexivity is “the ability to act in the world and to critically reflect on our action and in ways that may reconstitute how we act and even reshape the very nature of identity itself.” Taylor and White (2000) refer to ‘epistemic reflexivity’ that promotes selfawareness of the impact of dominant discourses on tacit assumptions (Polanyi, 1966; Giles and Pockett, 2013: p. 209). Gouldner (1970: pp. xiii, 489), writing prior to these debates, conceptualized “the historical mission of a ‘reflexive sociology’ as the ‘transcend[ence] [of] sociology as it now exists.” This representation of reflexivity invokes notions of fundamental transformations of the discipline, and is aspirational about social change. Lipp (2007) similarly devises a critical model of reflexivity that utilizes a form of reflective knowledge that takes account of technical practice and emancipatory dimensions of knowledge through critical theory. In addition, Freshwater and Rolfe’s model of reflexivity implicitly incorporates a critical perspective including three types of reflexivity: a deep level of reflection; an account of the sociopolitical context; and reflection-in-action (cited in Lipp, 2007). Finlay (2008: p. 5) also depicts reflexivity as involving both ‘personal reflection and social critique.’ In her construction of reflexivity she asserts that “Reflexive practitioners engage in critical self-reflection: reflecting critically on the impact of their own background, assumptions, positioning, feelings, behaviour while also attending to the impact of the wider organisational, discursive, ideological and political context” (Finlay, 2008: p. 6). Such interpretations of reflexivity are clearly informed by the emancipatory goals of critical social work, despite the language of critical reflexivity not being explicitly used. However, some discussions of both reflection and reflexivity have the potential to contribute to a critical emancipatory agenda, but are not inherently critical of their own volition (Lay and McGuire, 2009). Without explicit links to a critical theoretical analysis, these two concepts can become technicized and conservative (Taylor, 2013). For example, for Thomson (2013: p. 54) “the essence” of reflexivity in social work concerns “understanding how I am perceived by others. How others respond to me. And how I perceive myself working with others. It also concerns how I think and feel about my work, how I perceive myself in the job, and what the job means to me.” This representation of reflexivity is neither politically conservative nor progressive and therefore, is inadequate for a critical social work project that “is primarily concerned with practising in ways which further a society without domination, exploitation or oppression” (Fook, 2012: p. 18). Whilst reflexivity involves an awareness of how a biographical lens shapes interpretations of individuals’ constructions of their ‘reality’ over and above a range of competing perceptions, ultimately they need to be able to make decisions about which interpretations they privilege and why (Taylor and White, 2000). Critical theories provide an important framework on
284
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work Practice
which to base such judgments if individuals are committed to critical social work practice (Fook, 2012).
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work This emphasis on the ‘critical’ is at the core of the difference between reflexivity and critical reflexivity. Although many authors have historically used an implicit critical lens when discussing reflexivity, the term critical reflexivity has more recently started to appear in the social work literature. Trevelyan et al. (2012: n.p.) position critical reflexivity as a principle aim of social work education, and argue that “critical reflexivity can be distinguished from non-critical forms of reflexivity by its emphasis on the socially constructed, power-laden nature of knowledge and subjectivity, and its embracement of anxiety and other difficult emotions in social work practice.” Kessl (2009: p. 307) positions critical reflexivity as a way for social work to locate itself within a ‘transformatory agenda.’ Kessl (2009) links critical approaches and reflexivity by drawing on Fook et al. (2006: p. 118) who connect the goals of social change to social workers that “are able to create critical knowledge which potentially challenges and resists current forms of domination.” Kessl (2009) argues that a systematic approach to critical reflexivity in social work needs to be “augmented by and reconnected to a political, theory-based analysis of the actual contexts in which social work operates” and “need to be seen in connection with a fundamental transformation of the social order” (Kessl, 2009: p. 307). Kondrat (1999) critiques the notion of reflexive selfawareness to develop critical reflexivity, which can be “taught as a skill . as a means for emancipation and selfactualization” (cited in D’Cruz et al., 2007: p. 77). Paralleling this, Brown (2012) posits critical reflexivity as a conceptual tool to identity the unintended, consequences of modernist discourses of power, which limits antioppressive practice. This is instructive for wellintentioned practitioners who seek to empower clients by giving them power. Brown (2012) highlights how assumptions embedded in modernist constructions of power as a commodity can inadvertently reproduce dominant power relations. In the example above, a lack of critical reflexivity could further disempower the client by reinforcing the idea that the client can only become empowered through practitioners’ intervention, rather than their own actions. A critically reflexive practitioner would be more attentive to how the processes of their practice can be empowering, rather than assuming their intention will automatically produce an empowering outcome. Critical reflexive practitioners are more sensitive to unintended harm that social workers can cause through unreflexive practice.
Critical Reflexivity and Critical Reflection This emphasis on the ‘critical’ is a key difference between reflection and critical reflection. Whilst some authors conflate the two concepts and use them interchangeably (e.g., Kondrat, 1999; Ruch, 2002), others debate whether they are the same (Parton and O’Byrne, 2000; Taylor and White,
2000), and some writers explicitly distinguish between them (e.g., Fook, 1999, 2012; Powell, 2002; D’Cruz et al., 2007; Finlay, 2008). Both reflection and critical reflection are primarily identified as educational tools to improve congruence between professionals’ use of theory and practice. However, more explicitly aligned with a radical politics, “[c]ritical reflection . is about understanding the technologies of power, language and practice that produce and legitimate forms of moral and political regulation” (Fook et al., 2006: p. 10). As Fook (2012: p. 113) claims: “The prime purpose of critical reflection is to unearth how we ourselves participate in discourses which shape existing power relations.” The critical component of critical reflection essentially challenges social inequalities that create injustice. This includes a key emphasis on power relations and domination (Gray and Webb, 2013). Critical reflection exposes the ways in which social work practitioners may be implicated in, or complicit with, dominant social power relations and structures that are unjust, inequitable, and/or undemocratic (Fook, 2012). To critically reflect on implicit values and assumptions and scrutinize how these affect professional practice, practitioners can adopt a critically reflexive epistemological position. A critically reflective process cannot be undertaken from a position of objectivity. Critical reflexivity is a central component and necessary precondition of critical reflection. Both critical refection and critical reflexivity are underpinned by social constructivism, which fundamentally informs postmodernism. However, the key difference remains that critical reflexivity enables a practitioner to undertake critically reflective practice. Critical reflection incorporates a critically reflexive stance that activates broader transformative processes of deconstruction and reconstruction and takes account of critical postmodern theoretical frameworks (e.g., Allan et al., 2009; Fook, 2012); constructivist and experiential approaches to adult learning (Mezirow et al., 1990); and the reflective approach (Argyris and Schon, 1976; Schon, 1987) to generate theory inductively through critical reflection on practice. Differentiation between critical reflexivity and critical reflection is contested, and some authors use the term critical reflexivity, as documented by Fook (2012) as critical reflection. Allan (2009: p. 1), in contrast, describes her autoethnographic study as one that used a “critically reflexive methodology to investigate [her] underlying assumptions about spirituality in social work and their impact on [her] practice with women survivors of sexual trauma.” As in critical reflection, Allan (2009: p. 1) refers to analyzing ‘critical practice moments’ to identify ‘existing and newly emerging assumptions’ and refers to identifying the ‘intended and unintended consequences of these assumptions’ for her practice and engages in a ‘deconstruction/reconstruction process’ that develops new knowledge to inform her future practice. Hence critical reflexivity as defined here, is how others describe critical reflection. Alternatively, other writers have presented reflection, critical reflection, and reflexivity on a continuum (Finlay and Gough, 2003). They contend that reflection stands at the
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work Practice less sophisticated end of the continuum. “At the other end stands reflexivity: a more immediate and dynamic process which involves continuing self-awareness. Critical reflection lies somewhere in between” (Finlay, 2008: n.p.). The concepts of reflection, critical reflection, reflexivity, and critical reflexivity are presented, interpreted, and used differently, depending on the context and position of the author, and thus remain relatively elusive concepts, resisting universal definition.
Challenges to Critical Reflexivity in the Current Context This article has discussed the development of critical reflexivity in social work, considering its implications for the practices of research and assessment. The related concepts of reflection, reflexivity, and critical reflection have been explored, demonstrating that the relationship between these concepts and critical reflexivity is contested and contentious. Regardless of the complexities and nuances between interpretations, most authors are in broad agreement that these concepts can support the emancipatory goals of critical social work. The impact of neoliberalism has been well documented (Holscher and Sewpaul, 2006; Madhu, 2011) with the consensus being that neoliberal priorities can undermine critical social work objectives (see, e.g., Gray and Webb, 2013). These neoliberal priorities are augmented by imposing the practices of cost containment, standardization, compliance, an increased emphasis on risk assessment, and a quest of objectivity to eliminate uncertainty (Dominelli, 2004). This supports a view of social work that is less concerned with social justice and human rights, and more focused on individualizing social problems through developing technical proficiency in procedural knowledge that treats and manages apparently dysfunctional others (Holscher and Sewpaul, 2006; Madhu, 2011). Within this context, many challenges exist for social work practitioners, researchers, and educators alike, who are committed to a critically reflexive stance. The dominant discourses are hostile toward this critical position, which is essentially constructed as at odds with the prevailing paradigms (Kessl, 2009; Gray and Webb, 2013). The debates about critical reflexivity, and attempts to develop further the concept, occur alongside policy mandates to make practice more scientific, objective, and evidence based (Taylor, 2013). Kessl (2009: p. 309) describes this as an “evidence-based practice or the ‘what works agenda’, that is designed to elicit a ‘direct knowledge transfer’ from positivist, experimental sources into the particular social work intervention” (Kessl, 2009: p. 309). Within this context, Kessl (2009: p. 309) argues that the concepts and practices of reflexivity (and critical reflexivity and critical reflection) are “under siege . and in danger of becoming more and more substituted by a technical-rational intervention agency which is still called ‘social work’, but represents a mode of intervention which is reduced to finding ways to achieve predetermined goals.” Arguably critical reflexivity and critical reflection are precisely what is needed to expose and oppose this situation: critical reflexivity to assist social workers to avoid becoming complicit in dominant power relations and being seduced by
285
the ‘tactics of governmentality’ (Foucault cited in Madhu, 2011: p. 9); and critical reflection to reconstruct opportunities to create discretionary practice spaces for resistance and change. A lack of reflexivity, and particularly, critical reflexivity allows social work to function in a depoliticized mode (Taylor, 2013). Both critical reflexivity and critical reflection are vital if social work is to strengthen a critical agenda. As Gray and Webb (2013) argue social work is charged with the responsibility to militantly challenge social injustices and the systems of domination that create them. The very acts of taking a critically reflexive epistemological position and developing the courage and humility to engage in critical reflection can in themselves, constitute undertakings of resistance to the dominant paradigms, and facilitate capacity to work toward emancipatory social change.
Acknowledgments Thanks to Dr Phillip Ablett, University of the Sunshine Coast, for helping me to formulate and refine my ideas for this article. Acknowledgments to Judi Moir, University of the Sunshine Coast, for her assistance with the library research undertaken for this article.
See also: Critical Social Work Practice; Reflexivity; Social Work Theory.
Bibliography Allan, J., 2009. Constructing the Spiritual in Social Work: A Critically Reflexive, Autoethnographic Process. Dalhousie University, Halifax, NS. Allan, J., Briskman, L., Pease, B. (Eds.), 2009. Critical Social Work, second ed. Allen and Unwin, Crows Nest, NSW. Argyris, C., Schon, D., 1976. Theory in Practice: Increasing Professional Effectiveness. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Arnd-Caddigan, M., Pozzuto, R., 2006. Truth in our time. Qualitative Social Work 5 (4), 423–440. Askeland, G.A., Fook, J., 2009. Critical reflection in social work. European Journal of Social Work 12 (3), 287–292. Beck, U., 1992. Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity. Sage, London. Brown, C.G., 2012. Anti-oppression through a postmodern lens: dismantling the Master’s conceptual tools in discursive social work practice. Critical Social Work 13 (1), n.p. Daley, A., 2010. Refections on reflexivity and critical reflection as critical research practices. Journal of Women and Social Work 25 (1), 68–82. D’Cruz, H., Jones, M., 2004. Social Work Research: Ethical and Political Contexts. Sage, London. D’Cruz, H., Gillingham, P., Melendez, S., 2007. Reflexivity, its meanings and relevance for social work: a critical review of the literature. British Journal of Social Work 37 (1), 73–90. Dewey, J., 1916. Democracy and Education: An Introduction to the Philosophy of Education. The Free Press, New York. Dewey, J., 1933. How We Think: A Restatement of the Relation of Reflective Thinking the Education Process. Heath, Boston. Dominelli, L., 2004. Social Work: Theory and Practice for a Changing Profession. Polity Press, Cambridge. Ferguson, H., 2003. Welfare, social exclusion and reflexivity: the case of child and woman protection. Journal of Social Policy 32 (2), 199–216. Finlay, L., January 2008. Reflecting on ‘Reflective Practice’ PBPL Paper No. 52. A discussion paper prepared for PBPL CETL. www.open.ac.uk/pbpl. http://www. open.ac.uk/cetl-workspace/cetlcontent/documents/4bf2b48887459.pdf (accessed 01.08.12.). Finlay, L., Gough, B., 2003. Reflexivity: A Practical Guide for Researcher’s in Health and Social Sciences. Blackwell Publishing, Oxford.
286
Critical Reflexivity and Social Work Practice
Fook, J., 1996. The reflective researcher: developing a reflective approach to practice. In: Fook, J. (Ed.), The Reflective Researcher: Social Workers’ Theories of Practice Research. Allen and Unwin, Sydney, pp. 1–8. Fook, J., 1999. Reflexivity as Method. La Trobe University, Bundoora, Melbourne. Fook, J., 2012. Social Work: A Critical Approach to Practice, second ed. Sage, London. Fook, J., 2013. Critical reflection in context: contemporary perspectives and issues. In: Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Context: Applications in Health and Social Care. Routledge, Oxon, UK. Fook, J., Askeland, G., 2006. The ‘critical’ in critical reflection. In: White, S., Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Health and Social Care. Open University Press, Maidenhead, pp. 40–53. Fook, J., White, S., Gardner, F., 2006. Critical reflection: a review of contemporary literature and understandings. In: White, S., Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Health and Social Care. Open University Press, Maidenhead, England, pp. 3–20. Frost, S., 2006. Recasting individual practice through reflection on narratives. In: White, S., Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Health and Social Care. Open University Press, Maidenhead, pp. 107–117. Garfinkel, H., 1967. Studies in Ethnomethodology. Prentice-Hall, Englewood Cliffs, NJ. Giddens, A., 1990. The Consequences of Modernity. Polity Press/Blackwell, Oxford. Giles, R., Pockett, R., 2013. Critical reflection in social work education. In: Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Context: Applications in Health and Social Care. Routledge, Abingdon Oxon, UK. Gould, T., Taylor, I. (Eds.), 1996. Reflective Learning for Social Work. Arena, Aldershot. Gouldner, A., 1970. The Coming Crisis of Western Sociology. Basic Books, New York. Gray, M., Webb, S., 2013. Towards a new politics of social work. In: Gray, M., Webb, S. (Eds.), The New Politics of Critical Social Work. Palgrave Macmillan, Houndmills. Holland, R., 1999. Reflexivity. Human Relations 52 (4), 463–484. Holscher, D., Sewpaul, V., 2006. Ethics as a site of resistance: the tension between social control and critical reflection. Research Reports 48 (1), 251–272. Jessup, H., Rogerson, S., 1999. Postmodernism and the teaching and practice of interpersonal skills. In: Pease, B., Fook, J. (Eds.), Transforming Social Work Practice: Postmodern Critical Perspectives. Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW. Kessl, F., 2009. Critical reflexivity, social work, and the emerging European postwelfare states. European Journal of Social Work 12 (3), 305–317. Kondrat, M.E., 1999. Who is the “self” in self aware: professional self awareness from a critical theory perspective. Social Service Review 74 (4), 451–477. Lam, C.M., Wong, H., Leung, T.T.F., 2007. An unfinished reflexive journey: social work students’ reflection on their placement experiences. British Journal of Social Work 37, 91–105. Lay, K., McGuire, L., 2009. Building a lens for critical reflection and reflexivity in social work education. Social Work Education 29 (5), 539–550. Leonard, P., 1997. Postmodern Welfare. Sage, London. Lipp, A., 2007. Developing the reflexive dimension of reflection: a framework for debate. International Journal of Multiple Research Approaches 1 (1), 18–26. Loftus, S., Higgs, J., Trede, F., 2011. Researching living spaces: trends in creative qualitative research. In: Higgs, A., Titches, D., Horsfall, Bridges, D. (Eds.), Critical Spaces for Qualitative Researching: Living Research. Sense Publishers, Rotterdam, The Netherlands, pp. 3–12. Madhu, P., 2011. Praxis Intervention: Towards a New Critical Social Work Practice, 20th February. Social Science Research Network. http://ssrn.com/ abstract¼1765143 (accessed 14.02.12.).
Meinert, R., Pardeck, J., Kreuger, L., 2000. Social Work: Seeking Relevancy in the Twenty-First Century. Hapworth Press, Binghampton, NY. Mezirow, J., et al., 1990. Fostering Critical Reflection in Adulthood. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Morley, C., 2013. Some methodological and ethical tensions in using critical reflection as a research methodology. In: Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Context: Applications in Health and Social Care. Routledge, Abingdon Oxon, UK. Napier, L., Fook, J., 2000. Reflective practice in social work. In: Napier, L., Fook, J. (Eds.), Breakthroughs in Practice: Theorising Critical Moments in Social Work. Whiting and Birch, London, pp. 1–11. Otto, H., Polutta, A., Ziegler, H., 2009. Reflexive professionalism as a second generation of evidence-based practice: some considerations on the special issue “what works? Modernizing the knowledge-base of social work”. Research on Social Work Practice 19 (4), 472–478. Parton, N., O’Byrne, 2000. Constructive Social Work; Towards a New Practice. Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW. Polanyi, M., 1966. The Tacit Dimension. Anchor Books, New York. Powell, J., 2002. The changing conditions of social work research. British Journal of Social Work 32 (1), 17–33. Pray, J.E., 1991. Respecting the uniqueness of the individual: social work practice within a reflective model. Social Work 36 (1), 80–85. Rodwell, K., June 1987. Naturalistic inquiry: an alternative model for social work assessments. Social Service Review 61 (2), 233–246. Ruch, G., 2002. From triangle to spiral: reflective practice in social work education, practice and research. Social Work Education 21 (2), 199–216. Schon, D., 1987. Educating the Critically Reflective Practitioner: Toward a New Design for Teaching and Learning in the Professions. Jossey-Bass, San Francisco, CA. Scott, D., 1989. Meaning construction and social work practice. Social Service Review 63 (1), 39–51. Seidman, S., 2013. Contested Knowledge: Social Theory Today, fifth ed. Cambridge University Press, New York. Smyth, J., Shacklock, G., 1998. Behind the cleansing of socially critical research accounts. In: Shacklock, G., Smyth, J. (Eds.), Being Reflexive in Critical Educational and Social Research. Falmer Press, London, pp. 1–13. Taylor, C., 2006. Practicing reflexivity: narrative, reflection and the moral order. In: White, S., Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Health and Social Care. Open University Press, Maidenhead, UK, pp. 73–88. Taylor, C., 2013. Critically reflective practice. In: Gray, M., Webb, S. (Eds.), The New Politics of Critical Social Work. Palgrave Macmillan, Baskingstoke. Taylor, C., White, S., 2000. Practising Reflexivity in Health and Welfare: Making Knowledge. Open University Press, Maidenhead, UK. Thomson, G., 2013. Not beating around the bush: critical reflection in a rural community health service. In: Fook, J., Gardner, F. (Eds.), Critical Reflection in Context: Applications in Health and Social Care. Routledge, Abingdon Oxon, UK. Trevelyan, C., Crath, R., Chambon, A., 2012. Promoting critical reflexivity through arts-based media: a case study. British Journal of Social Work. http://dx.doi.org/ 10.1093/bjsw/bcs090. First published online: June 24. White, S., 2001. Auto-ethnography as reflexive inquiry: the research act as selfsurveillance. In: Shaw, I., Gould, N. (Eds.), Qualitative Research in Social Work. Sage, London, pp. 100–115.