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Critique of the regulatory limitations of exhaust CO2 emissions from passenger cars in European union
Energy Policy 39 (2011) 7794–7802
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Critique of the regulatory limitations of exhaust CO2 emissions from passenger cars in European union Christina Bampatsou, Efthimios Zervas n Hellenic Open University, School of Science and Engineering, Riga Feraiou 167, 262 22 Patra, Greece
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history: Received 13 December 2010 Accepted 13 September 2011 Available online 5 October 2011
Transport is the second emitter of CO2 in the European Union, after the energy production sector, with constantly increased trend. European Union proposed the regulation 443/2009 to control the CO2 emissions from new passenger cars. According to that regulation, the average, for each car manufacturer, CO2 emissions of the new passenger cars registered in 2020 in European Union should not exceed the value of 95 g CO2/km on the New European Driving Cycle. In the present work the regulation 443/ 2009 is analyzed and a critique is addressed to four points. The first point concerns the average upper limit of CO2 emissions of each car manufacturer. The second point concerns the possible derogation for the low volume manufacturers and the third to the penalties for the extra CO2 emissions. The fourth point concerns the value of the proposed average upper limit of CO2 emissions and the possibility to be changed in the future. A change to the above points is proposed. The maximum decrease of CO2 emissions and the principle of equality of citizens are the two principles of our propositions for the CO2 regulations. & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: CO2 emissions Passenger cars European union regulations
1. Introduction The increasing amount of CO2 emitted by passenger cars is a result of the increasing demand for mobility. Since some years, the European Union (EU) started several actions to control the CO2 emitted from the transport sector. Special attention was given to CO2 emissions of new passenger cars (PCs), as they are responsible for about 12% of the total CO2 emissions (Zervas, 2010a). The introduction of the regulation 443/2009 states that ‘‘Road transport is the second largest greenhouse-gas emitting sector in the Union and its emissions continue to rise’’. Based on the Community Strategy, which was founded on 1995 by the EU, the aim was to reach 120 g CO2/km from the new PCs till 2012 (EC, 1995). In the framework of this effort, some accords were made with automobile manufacturers in order to reduce emissions from the new models of PCs. In 1998, the Association of European Car Manufacturers (ACEA) committed with the target of 140 g CO2/km for new PCs till 2008 and in 1999, the Japanese and Korean Associations of Car Manufacturers (JAMA and KAMA) committed with the target of 140 g CO2/km for new PCs till 2009 (Commission Recommendation, 1999/125/EC). The European Commission announced in 2007 the intention to set a special series of laws, as the rhythm of CO2 reduction was lower
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than the desired one (EU Regulation (EC) No. 715/2007). In April 2009, appeared the EU regulation 443/2009 setting an upper limit to the exhaust CO2 emitted from new PCs (EU Regulation (EC) No. 443/2009). According to that regulation, the emissions from new PCs registered in the EU must not exceed, on 2020 and afterwards, 95 g CO2/km on average for each car manufacturer. The target of the current study is to analyze the regulation 443/2009. We agree with the main point of the regulation, which is the need to control exhaust CO2 emissions from new PCs; however we focus our analysis on four critical points that, we believe, are against the general idea of CO2 reduction. The first one is the average upper limit of CO2 emissions of each car manufacturer and not of each passenger car. At this point, the proposed regulation is compared with the previous and current regulations of the other exhaust pollutants (CO, HC, NOx and particulate matter (PM), Euro1-Euro4 for the past regulations (EU Directive 98/69/EC) and Euro5, Euro6 for the current regulations (Regulation 715/2007)). The second one is the possible derogation of manufacturers with low production (less than 10,000 vehicles per year). The third one is the penalties for the extra CO2 emissions. The fourth one is the value of the proposed average upper limit of 95 g/km. For each one of the above four points an adaptation is proposed. Another critical point is the CO2 emission target of vehicles using biofuels. However, as this last point is a part of a more general approach about biofuels, we prepare a specific paper dealing with biofuels and emission targets. Finally, we must note that the purpose of this article is not to criticize car manufactures but only some points of the regulation 443/2009.
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each manufacturer sales and not a limit for each passenger car. The principal idea is that if a car manufacturer sells a number of PCs with CO2 emissions higher than the limit, it has to sell a number of PCs with CO2 emissions lower than the limit to compensate the difference. Moreover, this regulation allows the manufactures to create groups of manufactures and in that last case the average value of CO2 emissions is applied in the case of the entire group. This is based on the idea of ‘‘flexibility’’, i.e. to give to the car manufactures the possibility to decrease gradually the CO2 emissions. We believe that point has some issues. The first one is that we could not find any bibliographic reference arguing that increased flexibility in a target attainment facilitates the compliance with the target. But, in contrary, we can find several cases where flexibility is excluded. The first is that the other regulations/ directives concerning emissions, safety or other issues of passenger cars are not flexible but they have specific targets (for example, the Euro5/Euro 6 regulation concerning the emission of regulated pollutants (EU Regulation (EC) No. 715/2007) or other regulations concerning safety (EU Regulation No. 19/2011); Directive 2002/85/EC). Other authors are also not in favor of flexibility. For example, the European Federation for Transport and Environment argues in the position paper in response to the European Commission proposal that ‘‘The proposed law has enough flexibility mechanisms. Exemptions create distortions of competition’’ (EFTE, 2008). The second example is ‘‘This (the pooling of manufacturers) has the benefit of spreading the burden to meet the targets, although it also has the potential to foster manufacturing complacency and the delay in technological advancement depending upon the composition of the pool’’ (Wells et al., 2010).
2. Data used This work uses the values of exhaust CO2 emissions of new passenger cars (PCs) measured on the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC), which is the official regulatory driving cycle in EU according to European directive 70/220/EEC (Directive 70/220/EEC). The total distance of NEDC is 11 km (Fig. 1), from which 4 km simulate urban driving conditions (UDC) and 7 km extra urban ones (EUDC). The total driving time is about 20 min; the highest speed is 120 km/h, while the average speed is 33.6 km/h. It must be noticed that NEDC is just a regulatory driving cycle and real CO2 emissions per kilometer can be different. Real exhaust CO2 emissions per kilometer depend on the driving profile, annual mileage, etc. The European PCs fleet is divided into eleven different segments, mainly based on their size. Table 1 shows these segments and some representative models of each segment (Zervas, 2010b). The average annual mileage of passenger cars is used in a part of this work. This average mileage comes from the analysis of the annual mileage of 822 different passenger cars (gasoline and diesel) in France. Each passenger car is followed from 1995 to 2005 and its annual mileage is recorded each year. The data published by ACEA and the European Commission were used for the analysis of new PCs sales, mass and CO2 emissions (ACEA, 2010; CEC, 2000; EC, 2008).
3. Critique of the regulation 443/2009 3.1. Average value of CO2 emissions of each manufacturer The first critique is that the regulation 443/2009 proposes a limit on exhaust CO2 emissions based on the average emissions of
NEDC Cycle
Max. speed = 120 km/h Average speed = 33.6 km/h Duration = 1 180 s Distance = 11.007 km
120 Speed (km/h)
2nd part: extra-urban (EUDC): 6,955 km
1st part: urban (ECE): 4,052 km
140
100
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80 Elementary urban cycle
60 40 20 0 0
100
200
300
400
500
600 700 Time (s)
800
900
1000
1100
1200
Fig. 1. New European Driving Cycle (NEDC).
Table 1 The 11 segments of the EU PC market, their average weight in 2003 and some representative models of each segment during the years 1995–2003. Segments
Gasoline (kg)
Diesel (kg)
Models
Economic Small car Lower medium Upper medium Superior Compact Prestige SUV (o4.5 m) SUV (44.5 m) 4 4 ( o4.5 m) 4 4 ( 44.5 m)
839 947 1138 1340 1510 1697 1712 1345 2004 1406 1982
900 1021 1217 1396 1568 1716 1779 1631 1970 1749 1969
Citroen Saxo, Peugeot 106, VW Lupo Fiat Uno, Ford Fiesta, Peugeot 206, Renault Clio, Seat Ibiza, VW Polo Audi A3, Ford Focus, Peugeot 306, Renault Megane, Toyota Corolla, VW Golf Audi A4, BMW 320, Ford Mondeo, Peugeot 406, Renault Laguna, VW Passat Audi A6, BMW 525, Mercedes Class E, Opel Omega, Peugeot 607, Volvo V70 Ford Galaxy, Mercedes Class V, Renault Espace, VW Sharan Audi A8, BMW 728, Mercedes Class C Ford Maverick, Land Rover Freelander, KIA Sportage BMW X5, Jeep Grand Cherokee, Mercedes Class M, VW Touareg Jeep Cherokee, Nissan Partol, Opel Frontera, Suzuki Vitara, Toyota Land Cruiser Hyundai Terracan, Land Rover Discovery
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The second issue is that specific CO2 emissions are measured on the NEDC for all PCs, but all PCs do not have the same annual traveling distance. Figs. 2 and 3 show, for gasoline and diesel PCs, the average annual mileage of new PCs, as a function of segment and life year of the vehicle. The data come from the analysis of 822 different passenger cars in France from 1995 to 2005. Some segments are grouped as they have very similar values. Figs. 2 and 3 show that there are significant differences between the annual mileage of each segment. This difference is particularly high in the case of gasoline PCs, with bigger cars, and thus higher CO2 emitters, to run higher mileages than the smaller ones. This statement indicates that real CO2 emissions will be higher in the case of the use of an average CO2 emissions limit than the same limit for each PC, because higher CO2 emitters run higher mileages.
160000 Eco+SC LM UM Sup+Pre Comp+SUV+4x4
Mileage (km)
120000
80000
40000
Gasoline
0 0
2
4
6 Year
8
10
Fig. 2. Annual average mileage of gasoline as a function of the segment.
The difference in real exhaust CO2 emissions observed previously will be higher in the case of a bigger PC fleet. Fig. 4 shows the evolution of total new PCs in EU15 and also the sales of gasoline and diesel new PCs (ACEA, 2010). This figure shows clearly that new PC sales show a significant increase during last years. A simple extrapolation of this curve leads to a number of about 16,000,000 new PC sales in 2020. Other estimations with higher values can also be found (e.g. 20 million of new PCs in 2020 from the Tremove Internet site). From the other side, this figure shows the significant increase of diesel share. That last trend contributes to a reduction of CO2 emissions (Fontaras and Samaras, 2007). Even if Figs. 2 and 3 show that the difference between average annual mileage of bigger and smaller cars is lower than in the case of gasoline PCs and the part of gasoline PCs generally decreases, Fig. 4 shows that the part of gasoline new PCs will remain significant even in the worst case. It must be noticed that in the last few years there is a decrease in the total sales of diesel PCs and a slight increase in the case of gasoline ones. Moreover, the segment distribution of gasoline and diesel PCs are different and also variable in time (Zervas, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). In a previous work (Zervas, 2010b), the evolution of segment percentage from 1995 to 2003 is shown. The main results of this work show that during this period the total diesel sales were increased by 2.3 times with a general shift to bigger segments (the sales of diesel SUVo4.5 m increased by 27 times during that period, the sales of SUV44.5 m by 5.8 times and sales of Prestige by 4.4 times) with a parallel increase of smaller cars. The same trend to the two extremes is observed in the case of gasoline PCs (for example, even if the total gasoline sales decrease during that period, the sales of three segments increase: small cars by 6%, SUVo4.5 m by 4 times and SUV44.5 m by 4.6 times). There are two different ways to decrease total or real CO2 emissions. The first is to decrease the mileage and the second is to decrease the emissions per kilometer. In theory, a fuel tax can decrease the mileage of a PC; however, practice shows that there is little correlation between mileage and fuel price (of course within certain limits of fuel price increase). The second way is to have vehicles emitting less per kilometer, which is also the general idea of the regulation 443/2009. Of course, the two ways can be used independently and also together. However, there is a general shift to bigger segments with a parallel increase of
200000
20000000
Eco+SC LM UM Sup+Pre Comp+SUV+4x4
160000
Total Gasoline Diesel
18000000 16000000
12000000
120000
Sales
Mileage (km)
14000000
10000000 8000000
80000
6000000 4000000 40000
2000000 Diesel
0
0 1970
0
2
4
6 Year
8
10
Fig. 3. Annual average mileage of diesel PCs as a function of the segment.
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
Year Fig. 4. Total sales of new PCs and sales of diesel and gasoline new PCs in EU15 from 1970 to 2009 and projection to 2020 (data from ACEA (2010).
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smaller cars (Zervas, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c), and thus real exhaust CO2 emissions will be clearly higher in the case of a limit using an average value than in the case of a limit using the same limit for each new passenger car. The last statements also prove that flexibility will have the opposite effect in the total C02 emissions. 3.2. Derogation of manufactures with low production and grouping of manufactures The second point of the European regulation 443/2009 is the possible derogation for a number of years of car manufactures producing less than 10,000 vehicles per year. Even if this fleet is very small comparing to the total annual sales in EU, it is clear that the above derogation violates the principle of equality of citizens and creates a distortion of the market against the main purpose of the regulation which states that ‘‘The legislative framework for implementing the average new car fleet target should ensure competitively neutral, socially equitable and sustainable reduction targets which take account of the diversity of
8000 Ferrari, Maserati Bentley, Bugatti, Lamborghini
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European automobile manufacturers and avoid any unjustified distortion of competition between them.’’ In practice, a few brands are concerned today: Ferrari and Maserati (of FIAT group) and Bentley, Bugatti and Lamborghini (of VW group). Fig. 5 shows the annual registrations of the above manufactures (ACEA, 2010). Table 2 shows the prices and the CO2 emissions on the NEDC of some characteristic models of those manufacturers (CARMAGAZINE, 2009; CARZINE, 2009). We show the prices in two countries, UK and Greece in 2009; however, the prices are not very different in the other EU countries. It is clear that those models are not addressed to the great majority EU citizens, as their prices are extremely high. Furthermore, CO2 emissions of those cars are also extremely high. On the other hand, those firms can also create a group with FIAT and VW and as their production is very low, those firms have no reason to decrease their CO2 emissions, as the average values of CO2 emissions of the entire group will not change significantly. As a result, those firms can keep their CO2 emissions much higher than the majority of all other PCs. It is clear that, buying those cars, certain very rich EU citizens have the right to pollute more than the other EU citizens. The fact not to decrease the emissions of luxury car is translated as to give the right to their owners not only to pollute more than the others, but to shift the consequences of their high emissions (climate changes) to the other citizens. This is not an acceptable ethical point of view, as the ‘‘polluter-pays’’ principle becomes ‘‘someone who can pay, can pollute’’ principle.
6000
Sales
3.3. Penalties for the exceeding CO2 emissions
4000
2000
0 1998
2000
2002
2004 Year
2006
2008
2010
Fig. 5. Annual registrations from 1999–2009 of low volume car manufacturers.
The third critical point of the European regulation 443/2009 is the penalty proposed for the CO2 emissions exceeding the average upper limit. The penalty proposed is 95 euro per exceeding gram of CO2/km per vehicle. This penalty is paid from the car manufacturer, but in practice it will be included in the final price of the vehicle. The idea of the legislators is that this increased price will motivate the car buyers to buy cheaper cars and thus lower CO2 emitters. This will probably be true in the case of less expensive cars. For example 95 Euros (for 1 exceeding gram of CO2/km) correspond to about 1% of the total price of a passenger car with a price of 10,000 Euros and can be a real motivation to buy another car model. However, this will probably not be an issue for the buyers of expensive cars. To prove that statement, we show here that there is a general increase of CO2 emissions with vehicle price. For that, we extracted the prices and CO2 emissions of all 2010 gasoline and diesel models, in particular of UK market of one
Table 2 Prices (in UK and Greece, 2009) and CO2 emissions on the NEDC of some characteristic models of low volume car manufactures. The prices are in British pounds and in Euro taking the exchange rate 1 Euro ¼0.87 British pounds and rounded to the nearest hundredth. Car make and model
Price (£)
Price (Euros)
CO2 emissions (g/km)
Source
Aston Martin V12 Vantage Aston Martin DBS Volante Bentley Continental Supersports Bentley Continental Flying Spur Bentley Brooklands Coupe Bugatti Veyron Grand Sport Ferrari Scuderia Spider 16M Ferrari 599 HGTE Ferrari California Ferrari 612 Scaglietti Lamborghini Gallardo LP560-4 Spyder Lamborghini Gallardo LP550-2 Valentino Balboni Lamborghini Murcielago LP670-4 SV Lamborghini Gallardo LP560 Lamborghini Reventon Roadster Maserati Granturismo S Automatic Maserati Quattroporte S
135,000 167,851 163,000
155,200 193,000 187,300 257,600 473,000 1,609,200 228,200 238,200 180,000 232,100 171,800 187,600 305,700 220,000 1,100,000 97,000 97,700
388 388 388 396 465 596 360 415 299 470 330 341 408 325 495 354 365
UK UK UK GR GR UK UK UK GR GR UK UK UK GR GR UK UK
1,400,000 198,524 207,194
149,500 163,245 265,937
84,395 85,000
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public source (PARKERS, 2010). Even if the prices of each vehicle are not the same in all EU countries, the trend remains the same. The extracted data are shown in Fig. 6 for gasoline PCs and Fig. 7 for diesel ones. It is clear that, for both types of vehicles, CO2 emissions increase with vehicle price. Figs. 6 and 7 show that, today, the very expensive cars have very high CO2 emissions. Figs. 6 and 7 show that the penalty proposed can be very affordable for the buyers of vehicles of very expensive cars, as the extra price is a very low part of the total vehicle price. A mathematical example can be used to demonstrate the above
400 GASOLINE
CO2 (g/km)
300
200
statement. A penalty of even 1000 Euros, which roughly correspond to a significant extra emission of 10 g CO2/km, even if it corresponds to 1% of the total price of a car of 100,000 Euros, is more affordable for the potential buyers of that vehicle than extra price of 100 Euros for the potential buyer of a car of 10,000 Euros. We can take as example a very expensive car: the Bugatti Veyron Grand Sport. The 2009 model of this vehicle emits the extremely high value of 596 g of CO2/km and costs the extraordinary, for the extreme majority of EU citizens, price of 1,600,000 Euros (in UK, Table 2). If that vehicle (or a similar one) emits in 2020 200, 300, 400 or 500 g CO2/km, the corresponding penalties reach roughly the values of 10,000, 20,000, 30,000 and 40,000 Euros. It is evident that the final price will be very little impacted, and reach the value of 1,640,000 Euros in the worst case. We believe that the potential buyers of that extremely expensive car will pay even that extra price. Once more the principle of equality of EU citizens is violated, giving the right to the richer citizens to pollute more than the poorest ones. One solution to the above problem would be the progressive penalty, something like 95 Euros for the first exceeding grams of CO2/km (for example for 1–10 g CO2/km, and the high increase in that penalty to 500 or 1000 Euros or even more for each exceeding gram of CO2/km for a further excess. However, we believe that only the limit of 95 g/km for each passenger car without derogations and penalties will solve the problem and not violate the principle of social equality.
100 3.4. Value of the upper limit of CO2 emissions
0 0
50
100
150
200
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300
Price (Euros x 1000) Fig. 6. CO2 on the NEDC for all 2010 gasoline models as a function of price in Great Britain (taxes included, the original prices are in British pounds and converted in Euro taking the exchange rate 1 Euro¼ 0.87 British pounds).
The fourth critical point of the European regulation 443/2009 is the proposed upper limit of CO2 emissions. This upper limit is proposed to be 95 g/km in 2020; however, a re-evaluation of this target will probably be performed in the future. Fig. 8 shows the average CO2 emissions in EU15 (CEC, 2000; EC, 2008). It is clear that the progress made since 1995 is significant. Average EU15 CO2 emissions decreased from 186.6 g/km in 1995 to 153 g/km in 2008, which corresponds to a decrease of 17.67% during those 13 years. The decrease of CO2
300
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DIESEL
Total Gasoline Diesel 180 Y = -2.39*X+4963.8 r2 = 0.98
CO2 (g/km)
CO2 (g/km)
200
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120 Y = -3.94*X+8068.7 r2 = 0.96
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0 0
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40 60 Price (Euros x 1000)
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Fig. 7. CO2 on the NEDC for all 2010 diesel models as a function of price in Great Britain (taxes included, the original prices are in British pounds and converted in Euro taking the exchange rate 1 Euro¼ 0.87 British pounds).
1990
2000
2010
2020
Year Fig. 8. Total, gasoline and diesel average CO2 on the NEDC in EU15 from 1995 to 2008 and projection to 2020 using all points (solid line) or only the last three years (dashed line).
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180
240 AU BE DK FI FR GE GR IR IT LU NL PO SP SW UK
CO2 (g/km)
200
160
120
2000
1990
2010
2020
Year Fig. 10. Average CO2 on the NEDC in the 15 countries from 1995 to 2008 (AU: Austria, BE: Belgium, DK: Denmark, FI: Finland, FR: France, GE: Germany, GR: Greece, IR: Ireland, IT: Italy, LU: Luxemburg, NL: Netherlands, PO: Portugal, SP: Spain, SW: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom).
60 1995 to 2008 1995 to 95g/km 2008 to 95g/km
Change in average CO2 (%)
emissions of gasoline PCs is quite constant until 2005 (from 188.6 g/km in 1995 to 168.8 g/km in 2005, corresponding to a decrease of about 0.5–1.5% per year), where a more sharp decrease is observed to reach 156.5 g/km in 2008 (annual decrease of 1.8–3%). The trend of diesel CO2 emissions is more complex. After a significant decrease from 178.9 g/km in 1995 to 160.0 g/km in 2000 (annual decrease from 0.5% to 3.6%), diesel CO2 emissions remain practically constant until 2007 and show a decrease of 3.2% in 2008 to reach 151 g/km. Adding a simple linear fit to the total CO2 average emissions and using a projection to 2020, the average value of 136 g/km is estimated when all values are used. When only the values of the last three years are used, the value of 109.9 g/km is estimated for 2020. It is clear that the value of 95 g/km is quite far from the above values and more effort must be made from car manufactures to achieve it. Fig. 9 shows the average CO2 emissions in EU15 and in the 15 countries in 2008 and Fig. 10 the progress made in each country since 1995. It is clear that some countries like Sweden, Germany or Finland, despite the progress made, are quite far from the target of 95 g/km. Of course the target of 95 g/km is a target for the average values of each manufacturer and the emissions of each country are different due to the different distribution of each firm. Fig. 11 shows for EU15 and the 15 countries the progress made from 1995 to 2008 (in % change using as base the 1995 average values). The average EU15 change from 1995 to 2008 is 17.66% and the necessary change to reach 95 g/km is 49.1%. This means that the remaining 12 years from 2008 to 2020 shows a supplementary decrease of 31.4% (using the 1995 values as base) while the 13 years from 1995 to 2008 shows a decrease of 17%. From the first point of view this seems a very difficult task. Fig. 11 shows that several countries have a very significant effort to made to reach 95 g/km in 2020, especially Germany (36.0% remaining), Sweden (35.9% remaining) and Greece (35.1% remaining). It is already reported that vehicle mass influences exhaust CO2 emissions of PCs (Sullivan et al., 2004; Zervas and Lazarou, 2008;
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UK
Spain
Sweden
Portugal
Netherlands
Italy
Luxembourg
Ireland
Greece
France
Finland
Belgium
Germany
120
Denmark
EU15
0 Austria
Average CO2 (g/km, 2008)
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Fig. 11. Average change in CO2 emissions on the NEDC from 1995 to 2008 in EU15 and in the 15 countries.
UK
Spain
Sweden
Portugal
Netherlands
Italy
Luxembourg
Ireland
Greece
France
Germany
Finland
Belgium
Denmark
EU15
Austria
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Fig. 9. Average CO2 on the NEDC in EU15 and in the 15 countries on 2008.
Fontaras and Samaras, 2010). However, in previous works (Zervas, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c) we have shown that the market characteristics are also very important for the control of exhaust CO2 emissions. Figs. 9–11 confirm those results. Fig. 12 shows that vehicle mass constantly increases with time. Sweden, Luxembourg, Ireland, Denmark and Germany are the countries with heavier PCs. Generally, those countries also have high average CO2 emissions. The above results show that, mass control, even if it is
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not the only factor, is very important for the control of CO2 emissions (Zervas and Lazarou, 2008; Fontaras and Samaras, 2010). All previous analyses have shown that even if there is a target of 95 g/km in 2020, this target is very difficult to be reached if the current trend is continued. Moreover, there are significant differences between each country due to the different distribution of each firm. Once more the principle of social equality is violated. Keeping as limit the average value of each car manufacturer, the richest countries like Germany or Sweden will have in practice the right to pollute more than the poorest countries as their market is composed
1600 AU BE DK FI FR GE GR IR IT LU NL PO SP SW UK
Average mass (kg)
1400
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from bigger cars. Some countries are closer to the target of 95 g/ km than others, which is due to the different market; those countries have generally smaller cars with lower CO2 emissions. For that reason, we believe that the target of 95 g/km is achievable, but only with significant changes in the markets, especially those of richest countries. At this point we show the average emissions of each firm in 2008 and the progress to be made to reach the value of 95 g/km in 2020. Fig. 13 shows the average CO2 emissions of all firms of the European market in 2008 (EC, 2008). This figure shows that there are several firms with very high average emissions (usually firms with very luxury cars, such as Lamborghini, TVR, Ferrari, etc.), up to 400 g/km. Also, there is a very significant difference between each firm. Fig. 14 shows the progress made by each firm from 1995 to 2008 (in % change using as base the 1995 average values). The first remark is that several firms like TVR, Bendley, etc., show an increase of average CO2 emissions from 2000 to 2008. The second remark is that there are many firms with very little progress in CO2 decrease from 2000 to 2008. The third remark is that the remaining progress is significant for most of the firms. We believe that several firms, especially those at the left of the figure, have no chance to reach the limit of 95 g/km. The above results show that the limit of 95 g/km will not be reached easily and that there is a severe risk to be set in a higher value, with severe consequences to the environment.
4. Propositions for the CO2 regulations in 2020 1000
1990
2000
2010
2020
Year Fig. 12. Average mass of new PCs in the 15 countries from 1995 to 2008 (AU: Austria, BE: Belgium, DK: Denmark, FI: Finland, FR: France, GE: Germany, GR: Greece, IR: Ireland, IT: Italy, LU: Luxemburg, NL: Netherlands, PO: Portugal, SP: Spain, SW: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom).
The propositions for the CO2 regulations must be based on two principles: the maximum decrease of CO2 emissions and the principle of equality of citizens. The maximum decrease of CO2 emissions must of course be efficient, meaning that the priority must be given where the decrease is greater with a smaller effort (mainly cost). Moreover, the regulation 443/2009 states that ‘‘The legislative framework for implementing the average new car fleet target should ensure competitively neutral, socially equitable and sustainable reduction targetsy’’. The principle of equality of citizens is based on the ‘‘social equitable’’ term of the above phrase.
400
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100 LAMBORGHINI TVR FERRARI BENTLEY ROLLS ROYCE ASTON MARTIN MASERATI QUATTRO PORSCHE LAND ROVER ALPINA ISUZU SSANGYONG CHRYSLER AVTOVAZ LOTUS JAGUAR MORGAN FUJIHEAVY INDUSTRIES SAAB MG ROVER VOLVO CATERHAM DAIMLER AUDI MITSUBISHI SANTANA NISSAN GENERAL MOTORS VOLKSWAGEN MAZDA PROTON SUZUKI TATA BMW HONDA GMDAEWOO KIA OPEL SKODA FORD HYUNDAI TOYOTA MAGYARSUZUKI DAIHATSU SEAT CITROEN RENAULT PEUGEOT FIAT NETHERLANDS CAR
Average CO2 (g/km, EU25, 2008)
500
Fig. 13. Average CO2 emissions in 2008 of new PCs for each firm of the European Market.
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Change in average CO2 (%)
2000 to 2008 2000 to 95g/km 2008 to 95 g/km
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LAMBORGHINI TVR FERRARI BENTLEY ROLLS ROYCE ASTON MARTIN MASERATI QUATTRO PORSCHE LAND ROVER ALPINA ISUZU SSANGYONG CHRYSLER AVTOVAZ LOTUS JAGUAR MORGAN FUJIHEAVY INDUSTRIES SAAB MG ROVER VOLVO CATERHAM DAIMLER AUDI MITSUBISHI SANTANA NISSAN GENERAL MOTORS VOLKSWAGEN MAZDA PROTON SUZUKI TATA BMW HONDA GMDAEWOO KIA OPEL SKODA FORD HYUNDAI TOYOTA MAGYAR SUZUKI DAIHATSU SEAT CITROEN RENAULT PEUGEOT FIAT NETHERLANDS CAR
-40
Fig. 14. Average change in CO2 emissions on the NEDC from 1995 to 2008 for the firms of the European market.
For that, the proposed upper limit of CO2 emissions must be applied to every PC, following the same logic with the regulations of the other four regulated exhaust pollutants (CO, HC, NOx, PM). The same limit at each passenger has several advantages: 1. The first issue was the higher mileage of heavier vehicles. Applying the same CO2 limit, real world CO2 emissions will decrease more. 2. The equality of all EU citizens is respected. 3. Each country and car manufacturer will have the same average CO2 emissions and thus the limit is more social equitable. 4. Car manufactures will increase their efforts to decrease CO2 emissions. From the second point of view, all derogations must be suspended and all car manufactures must have the same treatment. Also, the penalties for the exceeding CO2 emissions must be suspended. A passenger car of extra CO2 emissions must be eliminated during the approval test as is the case of the other regulated exhaust pollutants. The other point is the possible re-evaluation of the CO2 limit target. From the above analysis it becomes clear that this target is quite difficult. Using the same upper limit of CO2 emissions for all new PCs, the target of 95 g/km is much easier to be achieved. This limit must be firmly established without the possibility of a future re-evaluation to a higher value. Here we must clarify a point. Certainly CO2 is not like the other pollutants. It is true that the consequences of the greenhouse effect gases will be visible in a longer term than the air quality of cities. However, those consequences will be much more severe than the other regulated pollutants. For that reason, the efforts must be much more intense today.
5. Conclusions The current work analyses and criticizes four points of the European Regulation 443/2009 for the control of exhaust CO2
emissions of new passenger cars in EU in 2020. The first point concerns the limit on exhaust CO2 emissions, which is based on the average emissions of the sales of each manufacturer. Using this value, car manufacturers can produce vehicles with low and high levels of CO2 emissions, as long as the average does not exceed the value of 95 g CO2/km. However, as bigger cars (usually cars with higher CO2 emissions) also have a higher mileage, the total real CO2 emissions will decrease less than the case of the same limit of all PCs. Furthermore, the new legislation allows a pooling arrangement between manufacturers, as long as the total emissions do not exceed its specific emissions target. Using this pooling, car manufactures that produce extremely polluting cars (e.g. Ferrari and Maserati (of FIAT group) and Bentley, Bugatti and Lamborghini (of VW group)) are allowed to pool together with others without, in practice, a significant decrease of the emissions of their models. This fact in combination with the extremely high prices of these models legalizes the very rich EU citizens to pollute more than the other EU citizens and put into question the principle of equality and the polluter-pays one that becomes ‘‘someone who can pay, can pollute’’. The second point concerns the possible derogation for some years to the low volume manufacturers. However, as those car manufacturers are those producing very expensive models (and very high CO2 emitters), the principle of social equality is also violated. The third point concerns the penalty of 95 Euro per exceeding gram of CO2/km per vehicle. In fact this penalty will be included in the final price of the vehicle, motivating the buyers to buy cars with lower CO2 emissions. However, this measure is not applied in practice in the case of very expensive cars as price is not the first argument for their sale. Again, richer citizens will have the right to pollute more than the poorest ones. The fourth point concerns the proposed upper limit of CO2 emissions. The analysis of the EU countries, but also of the different car manufacturers, shows that the target of 95 g/km seems quite difficult to be reached. In order to reverse this situation, significant changes must be done in the markets to eliminate the emissions gap between richest and poorest EU countries.
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Our proposition is based on the principle of the same CO2 emissions of all new passenger cars without derogations and penalties. If a new car cannot satisfy that limit, it could not pass the approval test, as it occurs with the other exhaust pollutants. Furthermore an application of the same emission limit for each passenger car makes the target of 95 g/km much easier to be achieved, reducing the possibility of re-evaluating the upper limit of CO2 emissions to a higher value. The desire for mobility in times of a growing world population is a fact and this desire is unfortunately associated with emissions of pollutants. As is generally known there is not a patent solution for solving the pollutants issue. It requires a cross-disciplinary cooperation between different industry segments and political institutions for looking after sustainable solutions to that problem by assuring mobility in the society. References ACEA, 2010. New Vehicle Registrations. ACEA website /http://www.acea.be/ index.php/collection/statisticsS. CARMAGAZINE, 2009. Automobile Magazine. CARMAGAZINE website /www. carmagazine.co.ukS. CARZINE, 2009. Automobile Magazine. CARZINE website /www.carzine.gr/S. CEC (Commission of the European Communities), 2000. Monitoring of ACEA/ JAMA/KAMA’s Commitment on CO2 Emission Reductions from Passenger Cars (1995–1999). Joint Report of the European/Japan/Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association and the Commission Services. Brussels, 10.07.2000. Available at /http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/transport/vehicles/docs/1999_ annexes_en.pdfS. Commission Recommendation, 1999/125/EC. /http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:040:0049:0050:EN:PDFS. EC (European Commission), 1995. A Community Strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and improve fuel economy. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (COM95 689) (Council conclusions of 25.6.1996). EC (European Commission), 2008. Climate Action. Database _ Summary Tables. /http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/transport/vehicles/implementation_ en.htmS.
EFTE (European Federation for Transport and Environment), 2008. Emissions from new cars. /http://www.thepep.org/ClearingHouse/docfiles/New.Car.CO2.Emis sions.pdfS. EU Directive 70/220/EEC. /http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= CELEX:31970L0220:EN:HTMLS. EU Directive 98/69/EC. /http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= CELEX:31998L0069:EN:HTMLS. EU Directive 2002/85/EC. /http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri= OJ:L:2002:327:0008:0009:EN:PDFS. EU Regulation (EC) No 715/2007. /http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=OJ:L:2007:171:0001:0016:EN:PDFS. EU Regulation (EC) No 443/2009. /http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=OJ:L:2009:140:0001:0015:EN:PDFS. EU Regulation (EC) No 19/2011. /http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ. do?uri=OJ:L:2011:008:0001:0013:EN:PDFS. Fontaras, G., Samaras, Z., 2007. A quantitative analysis of the European Automakers’ voluntary commitment to reduce CO2 emissions from new passenger cars based on independent experimental data. Energy Policy 35, 2239–2248. Fontaras, G., Samaras, Z., 2010. On the way to 130 g CO2/km—Estimating the future characteristics of the average European passenger car. Energy Policy 38, 1826–1833. PARKERS, 2010. Car buying—owning and selling advice site on the web. PARKERS website /www.parkers.co.ukS. Sullivan, J.L., Baker, R.E., Boyer, B.A., Hammerle, R.H., Kenney, T.E., Muniz, L., Wallington, T.J., 2004. CO2 emission benefit of diesel (versus gasoline) powered vehicles. Environmental Science and Technology 38 (12), 3217–3223. TREMOVE. A policy assessment model to study the effects of different transport and environment policies on the transport sector for all European countries. /www.tremove.orgS. Wells P., Nieuwenhuis P., Nash H., Frater L., 2010. Lowering the bar: options for the automotive industry to achieve 80 g/km CO2 by 2020 in Europe. /http://www. greenpeace.de/fileadmin/gpd/user_upload/themen/verkehr/lowering-the-barfor-cars-20-05-10.pdfS. Zervas, E., Lazarou, C., 2008. Influence of European passenger cars weight to exhaust CO2 emissions. Energy Policy 36, 248–257. Zervas, E., 2010a. Analysis of the CO2 emissions and of the other characteristics of the European Market of new passenger cars. 1. Analysis of general data and analysis per country. Energy Policy 38, 5413–5425. Zervas, E., 2010b. Analysis of the CO2 emissions and of the other characteristics of the European market of new passenger cars. 2. Segment analysis. Energy Policy 38, 5426–5441. Zervas, E., 2010c. Analysis of the CO2 emissions and of the other characteristics of the European Market of new passenger cars. 3. Firm analysis. Energy Policy 38, 5442–5456.
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Critique of the regulatory limitations of exhaust CO2 emissions from passenger cars in European union Christina Bampatsou, Efthimios Zervas n Hellenic Open University, School of Science and Engineering, Riga Feraiou 167, 262 22 Patra, Greece
a r t i c l e i n f o
a b s t r a c t
Article history: Received 13 December 2010 Accepted 13 September 2011 Available online 5 October 2011
Transport is the second emitter of CO2 in the European Union, after the energy production sector, with constantly increased trend. European Union proposed the regulation 443/2009 to control the CO2 emissions from new passenger cars. According to that regulation, the average, for each car manufacturer, CO2 emissions of the new passenger cars registered in 2020 in European Union should not exceed the value of 95 g CO2/km on the New European Driving Cycle. In the present work the regulation 443/ 2009 is analyzed and a critique is addressed to four points. The first point concerns the average upper limit of CO2 emissions of each car manufacturer. The second point concerns the possible derogation for the low volume manufacturers and the third to the penalties for the extra CO2 emissions. The fourth point concerns the value of the proposed average upper limit of CO2 emissions and the possibility to be changed in the future. A change to the above points is proposed. The maximum decrease of CO2 emissions and the principle of equality of citizens are the two principles of our propositions for the CO2 regulations. & 2011 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
Keywords: CO2 emissions Passenger cars European union regulations
1. Introduction The increasing amount of CO2 emitted by passenger cars is a result of the increasing demand for mobility. Since some years, the European Union (EU) started several actions to control the CO2 emitted from the transport sector. Special attention was given to CO2 emissions of new passenger cars (PCs), as they are responsible for about 12% of the total CO2 emissions (Zervas, 2010a). The introduction of the regulation 443/2009 states that ‘‘Road transport is the second largest greenhouse-gas emitting sector in the Union and its emissions continue to rise’’. Based on the Community Strategy, which was founded on 1995 by the EU, the aim was to reach 120 g CO2/km from the new PCs till 2012 (EC, 1995). In the framework of this effort, some accords were made with automobile manufacturers in order to reduce emissions from the new models of PCs. In 1998, the Association of European Car Manufacturers (ACEA) committed with the target of 140 g CO2/km for new PCs till 2008 and in 1999, the Japanese and Korean Associations of Car Manufacturers (JAMA and KAMA) committed with the target of 140 g CO2/km for new PCs till 2009 (Commission Recommendation, 1999/125/EC). The European Commission announced in 2007 the intention to set a special series of laws, as the rhythm of CO2 reduction was lower
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than the desired one (EU Regulation (EC) No. 715/2007). In April 2009, appeared the EU regulation 443/2009 setting an upper limit to the exhaust CO2 emitted from new PCs (EU Regulation (EC) No. 443/2009). According to that regulation, the emissions from new PCs registered in the EU must not exceed, on 2020 and afterwards, 95 g CO2/km on average for each car manufacturer. The target of the current study is to analyze the regulation 443/2009. We agree with the main point of the regulation, which is the need to control exhaust CO2 emissions from new PCs; however we focus our analysis on four critical points that, we believe, are against the general idea of CO2 reduction. The first one is the average upper limit of CO2 emissions of each car manufacturer and not of each passenger car. At this point, the proposed regulation is compared with the previous and current regulations of the other exhaust pollutants (CO, HC, NOx and particulate matter (PM), Euro1-Euro4 for the past regulations (EU Directive 98/69/EC) and Euro5, Euro6 for the current regulations (Regulation 715/2007)). The second one is the possible derogation of manufacturers with low production (less than 10,000 vehicles per year). The third one is the penalties for the extra CO2 emissions. The fourth one is the value of the proposed average upper limit of 95 g/km. For each one of the above four points an adaptation is proposed. Another critical point is the CO2 emission target of vehicles using biofuels. However, as this last point is a part of a more general approach about biofuels, we prepare a specific paper dealing with biofuels and emission targets. Finally, we must note that the purpose of this article is not to criticize car manufactures but only some points of the regulation 443/2009.
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each manufacturer sales and not a limit for each passenger car. The principal idea is that if a car manufacturer sells a number of PCs with CO2 emissions higher than the limit, it has to sell a number of PCs with CO2 emissions lower than the limit to compensate the difference. Moreover, this regulation allows the manufactures to create groups of manufactures and in that last case the average value of CO2 emissions is applied in the case of the entire group. This is based on the idea of ‘‘flexibility’’, i.e. to give to the car manufactures the possibility to decrease gradually the CO2 emissions. We believe that point has some issues. The first one is that we could not find any bibliographic reference arguing that increased flexibility in a target attainment facilitates the compliance with the target. But, in contrary, we can find several cases where flexibility is excluded. The first is that the other regulations/ directives concerning emissions, safety or other issues of passenger cars are not flexible but they have specific targets (for example, the Euro5/Euro 6 regulation concerning the emission of regulated pollutants (EU Regulation (EC) No. 715/2007) or other regulations concerning safety (EU Regulation No. 19/2011); Directive 2002/85/EC). Other authors are also not in favor of flexibility. For example, the European Federation for Transport and Environment argues in the position paper in response to the European Commission proposal that ‘‘The proposed law has enough flexibility mechanisms. Exemptions create distortions of competition’’ (EFTE, 2008). The second example is ‘‘This (the pooling of manufacturers) has the benefit of spreading the burden to meet the targets, although it also has the potential to foster manufacturing complacency and the delay in technological advancement depending upon the composition of the pool’’ (Wells et al., 2010).
2. Data used This work uses the values of exhaust CO2 emissions of new passenger cars (PCs) measured on the New European Driving Cycle (NEDC), which is the official regulatory driving cycle in EU according to European directive 70/220/EEC (Directive 70/220/EEC). The total distance of NEDC is 11 km (Fig. 1), from which 4 km simulate urban driving conditions (UDC) and 7 km extra urban ones (EUDC). The total driving time is about 20 min; the highest speed is 120 km/h, while the average speed is 33.6 km/h. It must be noticed that NEDC is just a regulatory driving cycle and real CO2 emissions per kilometer can be different. Real exhaust CO2 emissions per kilometer depend on the driving profile, annual mileage, etc. The European PCs fleet is divided into eleven different segments, mainly based on their size. Table 1 shows these segments and some representative models of each segment (Zervas, 2010b). The average annual mileage of passenger cars is used in a part of this work. This average mileage comes from the analysis of the annual mileage of 822 different passenger cars (gasoline and diesel) in France. Each passenger car is followed from 1995 to 2005 and its annual mileage is recorded each year. The data published by ACEA and the European Commission were used for the analysis of new PCs sales, mass and CO2 emissions (ACEA, 2010; CEC, 2000; EC, 2008).
3. Critique of the regulation 443/2009 3.1. Average value of CO2 emissions of each manufacturer The first critique is that the regulation 443/2009 proposes a limit on exhaust CO2 emissions based on the average emissions of
NEDC Cycle
Max. speed = 120 km/h Average speed = 33.6 km/h Duration = 1 180 s Distance = 11.007 km
120 Speed (km/h)
2nd part: extra-urban (EUDC): 6,955 km
1st part: urban (ECE): 4,052 km
140
100
7795
80 Elementary urban cycle
60 40 20 0 0
100
200
300
400
500
600 700 Time (s)
800
900
1000
1100
1200
Fig. 1. New European Driving Cycle (NEDC).
Table 1 The 11 segments of the EU PC market, their average weight in 2003 and some representative models of each segment during the years 1995–2003. Segments
Gasoline (kg)
Diesel (kg)
Models
Economic Small car Lower medium Upper medium Superior Compact Prestige SUV (o4.5 m) SUV (44.5 m) 4 4 ( o4.5 m) 4 4 ( 44.5 m)
839 947 1138 1340 1510 1697 1712 1345 2004 1406 1982
900 1021 1217 1396 1568 1716 1779 1631 1970 1749 1969
Citroen Saxo, Peugeot 106, VW Lupo Fiat Uno, Ford Fiesta, Peugeot 206, Renault Clio, Seat Ibiza, VW Polo Audi A3, Ford Focus, Peugeot 306, Renault Megane, Toyota Corolla, VW Golf Audi A4, BMW 320, Ford Mondeo, Peugeot 406, Renault Laguna, VW Passat Audi A6, BMW 525, Mercedes Class E, Opel Omega, Peugeot 607, Volvo V70 Ford Galaxy, Mercedes Class V, Renault Espace, VW Sharan Audi A8, BMW 728, Mercedes Class C Ford Maverick, Land Rover Freelander, KIA Sportage BMW X5, Jeep Grand Cherokee, Mercedes Class M, VW Touareg Jeep Cherokee, Nissan Partol, Opel Frontera, Suzuki Vitara, Toyota Land Cruiser Hyundai Terracan, Land Rover Discovery
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The second issue is that specific CO2 emissions are measured on the NEDC for all PCs, but all PCs do not have the same annual traveling distance. Figs. 2 and 3 show, for gasoline and diesel PCs, the average annual mileage of new PCs, as a function of segment and life year of the vehicle. The data come from the analysis of 822 different passenger cars in France from 1995 to 2005. Some segments are grouped as they have very similar values. Figs. 2 and 3 show that there are significant differences between the annual mileage of each segment. This difference is particularly high in the case of gasoline PCs, with bigger cars, and thus higher CO2 emitters, to run higher mileages than the smaller ones. This statement indicates that real CO2 emissions will be higher in the case of the use of an average CO2 emissions limit than the same limit for each PC, because higher CO2 emitters run higher mileages.
160000 Eco+SC LM UM Sup+Pre Comp+SUV+4x4
Mileage (km)
120000
80000
40000
Gasoline
0 0
2
4
6 Year
8
10
Fig. 2. Annual average mileage of gasoline as a function of the segment.
The difference in real exhaust CO2 emissions observed previously will be higher in the case of a bigger PC fleet. Fig. 4 shows the evolution of total new PCs in EU15 and also the sales of gasoline and diesel new PCs (ACEA, 2010). This figure shows clearly that new PC sales show a significant increase during last years. A simple extrapolation of this curve leads to a number of about 16,000,000 new PC sales in 2020. Other estimations with higher values can also be found (e.g. 20 million of new PCs in 2020 from the Tremove Internet site). From the other side, this figure shows the significant increase of diesel share. That last trend contributes to a reduction of CO2 emissions (Fontaras and Samaras, 2007). Even if Figs. 2 and 3 show that the difference between average annual mileage of bigger and smaller cars is lower than in the case of gasoline PCs and the part of gasoline PCs generally decreases, Fig. 4 shows that the part of gasoline new PCs will remain significant even in the worst case. It must be noticed that in the last few years there is a decrease in the total sales of diesel PCs and a slight increase in the case of gasoline ones. Moreover, the segment distribution of gasoline and diesel PCs are different and also variable in time (Zervas, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c). In a previous work (Zervas, 2010b), the evolution of segment percentage from 1995 to 2003 is shown. The main results of this work show that during this period the total diesel sales were increased by 2.3 times with a general shift to bigger segments (the sales of diesel SUVo4.5 m increased by 27 times during that period, the sales of SUV44.5 m by 5.8 times and sales of Prestige by 4.4 times) with a parallel increase of smaller cars. The same trend to the two extremes is observed in the case of gasoline PCs (for example, even if the total gasoline sales decrease during that period, the sales of three segments increase: small cars by 6%, SUVo4.5 m by 4 times and SUV44.5 m by 4.6 times). There are two different ways to decrease total or real CO2 emissions. The first is to decrease the mileage and the second is to decrease the emissions per kilometer. In theory, a fuel tax can decrease the mileage of a PC; however, practice shows that there is little correlation between mileage and fuel price (of course within certain limits of fuel price increase). The second way is to have vehicles emitting less per kilometer, which is also the general idea of the regulation 443/2009. Of course, the two ways can be used independently and also together. However, there is a general shift to bigger segments with a parallel increase of
200000
20000000
Eco+SC LM UM Sup+Pre Comp+SUV+4x4
160000
Total Gasoline Diesel
18000000 16000000
12000000
120000
Sales
Mileage (km)
14000000
10000000 8000000
80000
6000000 4000000 40000
2000000 Diesel
0
0 1970
0
2
4
6 Year
8
10
Fig. 3. Annual average mileage of diesel PCs as a function of the segment.
1980
1990
2000
2010
2020
Year Fig. 4. Total sales of new PCs and sales of diesel and gasoline new PCs in EU15 from 1970 to 2009 and projection to 2020 (data from ACEA (2010).
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smaller cars (Zervas, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c), and thus real exhaust CO2 emissions will be clearly higher in the case of a limit using an average value than in the case of a limit using the same limit for each new passenger car. The last statements also prove that flexibility will have the opposite effect in the total C02 emissions. 3.2. Derogation of manufactures with low production and grouping of manufactures The second point of the European regulation 443/2009 is the possible derogation for a number of years of car manufactures producing less than 10,000 vehicles per year. Even if this fleet is very small comparing to the total annual sales in EU, it is clear that the above derogation violates the principle of equality of citizens and creates a distortion of the market against the main purpose of the regulation which states that ‘‘The legislative framework for implementing the average new car fleet target should ensure competitively neutral, socially equitable and sustainable reduction targets which take account of the diversity of
8000 Ferrari, Maserati Bentley, Bugatti, Lamborghini
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European automobile manufacturers and avoid any unjustified distortion of competition between them.’’ In practice, a few brands are concerned today: Ferrari and Maserati (of FIAT group) and Bentley, Bugatti and Lamborghini (of VW group). Fig. 5 shows the annual registrations of the above manufactures (ACEA, 2010). Table 2 shows the prices and the CO2 emissions on the NEDC of some characteristic models of those manufacturers (CARMAGAZINE, 2009; CARZINE, 2009). We show the prices in two countries, UK and Greece in 2009; however, the prices are not very different in the other EU countries. It is clear that those models are not addressed to the great majority EU citizens, as their prices are extremely high. Furthermore, CO2 emissions of those cars are also extremely high. On the other hand, those firms can also create a group with FIAT and VW and as their production is very low, those firms have no reason to decrease their CO2 emissions, as the average values of CO2 emissions of the entire group will not change significantly. As a result, those firms can keep their CO2 emissions much higher than the majority of all other PCs. It is clear that, buying those cars, certain very rich EU citizens have the right to pollute more than the other EU citizens. The fact not to decrease the emissions of luxury car is translated as to give the right to their owners not only to pollute more than the others, but to shift the consequences of their high emissions (climate changes) to the other citizens. This is not an acceptable ethical point of view, as the ‘‘polluter-pays’’ principle becomes ‘‘someone who can pay, can pollute’’ principle.
6000
Sales
3.3. Penalties for the exceeding CO2 emissions
4000
2000
0 1998
2000
2002
2004 Year
2006
2008
2010
Fig. 5. Annual registrations from 1999–2009 of low volume car manufacturers.
The third critical point of the European regulation 443/2009 is the penalty proposed for the CO2 emissions exceeding the average upper limit. The penalty proposed is 95 euro per exceeding gram of CO2/km per vehicle. This penalty is paid from the car manufacturer, but in practice it will be included in the final price of the vehicle. The idea of the legislators is that this increased price will motivate the car buyers to buy cheaper cars and thus lower CO2 emitters. This will probably be true in the case of less expensive cars. For example 95 Euros (for 1 exceeding gram of CO2/km) correspond to about 1% of the total price of a passenger car with a price of 10,000 Euros and can be a real motivation to buy another car model. However, this will probably not be an issue for the buyers of expensive cars. To prove that statement, we show here that there is a general increase of CO2 emissions with vehicle price. For that, we extracted the prices and CO2 emissions of all 2010 gasoline and diesel models, in particular of UK market of one
Table 2 Prices (in UK and Greece, 2009) and CO2 emissions on the NEDC of some characteristic models of low volume car manufactures. The prices are in British pounds and in Euro taking the exchange rate 1 Euro ¼0.87 British pounds and rounded to the nearest hundredth. Car make and model
Price (£)
Price (Euros)
CO2 emissions (g/km)
Source
Aston Martin V12 Vantage Aston Martin DBS Volante Bentley Continental Supersports Bentley Continental Flying Spur Bentley Brooklands Coupe Bugatti Veyron Grand Sport Ferrari Scuderia Spider 16M Ferrari 599 HGTE Ferrari California Ferrari 612 Scaglietti Lamborghini Gallardo LP560-4 Spyder Lamborghini Gallardo LP550-2 Valentino Balboni Lamborghini Murcielago LP670-4 SV Lamborghini Gallardo LP560 Lamborghini Reventon Roadster Maserati Granturismo S Automatic Maserati Quattroporte S
135,000 167,851 163,000
155,200 193,000 187,300 257,600 473,000 1,609,200 228,200 238,200 180,000 232,100 171,800 187,600 305,700 220,000 1,100,000 97,000 97,700
388 388 388 396 465 596 360 415 299 470 330 341 408 325 495 354 365
UK UK UK GR GR UK UK UK GR GR UK UK UK GR GR UK UK
1,400,000 198,524 207,194
149,500 163,245 265,937
84,395 85,000
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public source (PARKERS, 2010). Even if the prices of each vehicle are not the same in all EU countries, the trend remains the same. The extracted data are shown in Fig. 6 for gasoline PCs and Fig. 7 for diesel ones. It is clear that, for both types of vehicles, CO2 emissions increase with vehicle price. Figs. 6 and 7 show that, today, the very expensive cars have very high CO2 emissions. Figs. 6 and 7 show that the penalty proposed can be very affordable for the buyers of vehicles of very expensive cars, as the extra price is a very low part of the total vehicle price. A mathematical example can be used to demonstrate the above
400 GASOLINE
CO2 (g/km)
300
200
statement. A penalty of even 1000 Euros, which roughly correspond to a significant extra emission of 10 g CO2/km, even if it corresponds to 1% of the total price of a car of 100,000 Euros, is more affordable for the potential buyers of that vehicle than extra price of 100 Euros for the potential buyer of a car of 10,000 Euros. We can take as example a very expensive car: the Bugatti Veyron Grand Sport. The 2009 model of this vehicle emits the extremely high value of 596 g of CO2/km and costs the extraordinary, for the extreme majority of EU citizens, price of 1,600,000 Euros (in UK, Table 2). If that vehicle (or a similar one) emits in 2020 200, 300, 400 or 500 g CO2/km, the corresponding penalties reach roughly the values of 10,000, 20,000, 30,000 and 40,000 Euros. It is evident that the final price will be very little impacted, and reach the value of 1,640,000 Euros in the worst case. We believe that the potential buyers of that extremely expensive car will pay even that extra price. Once more the principle of equality of EU citizens is violated, giving the right to the richer citizens to pollute more than the poorest ones. One solution to the above problem would be the progressive penalty, something like 95 Euros for the first exceeding grams of CO2/km (for example for 1–10 g CO2/km, and the high increase in that penalty to 500 or 1000 Euros or even more for each exceeding gram of CO2/km for a further excess. However, we believe that only the limit of 95 g/km for each passenger car without derogations and penalties will solve the problem and not violate the principle of social equality.
100 3.4. Value of the upper limit of CO2 emissions
0 0
50
100
150
200
250
300
Price (Euros x 1000) Fig. 6. CO2 on the NEDC for all 2010 gasoline models as a function of price in Great Britain (taxes included, the original prices are in British pounds and converted in Euro taking the exchange rate 1 Euro¼ 0.87 British pounds).
The fourth critical point of the European regulation 443/2009 is the proposed upper limit of CO2 emissions. This upper limit is proposed to be 95 g/km in 2020; however, a re-evaluation of this target will probably be performed in the future. Fig. 8 shows the average CO2 emissions in EU15 (CEC, 2000; EC, 2008). It is clear that the progress made since 1995 is significant. Average EU15 CO2 emissions decreased from 186.6 g/km in 1995 to 153 g/km in 2008, which corresponds to a decrease of 17.67% during those 13 years. The decrease of CO2
300
200
DIESEL
Total Gasoline Diesel 180 Y = -2.39*X+4963.8 r2 = 0.98
CO2 (g/km)
CO2 (g/km)
200
160
140
100
120 Y = -3.94*X+8068.7 r2 = 0.96
100
0 0
20
40 60 Price (Euros x 1000)
80
100
Fig. 7. CO2 on the NEDC for all 2010 diesel models as a function of price in Great Britain (taxes included, the original prices are in British pounds and converted in Euro taking the exchange rate 1 Euro¼ 0.87 British pounds).
1990
2000
2010
2020
Year Fig. 8. Total, gasoline and diesel average CO2 on the NEDC in EU15 from 1995 to 2008 and projection to 2020 using all points (solid line) or only the last three years (dashed line).
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180
240 AU BE DK FI FR GE GR IR IT LU NL PO SP SW UK
CO2 (g/km)
200
160
120
2000
1990
2010
2020
Year Fig. 10. Average CO2 on the NEDC in the 15 countries from 1995 to 2008 (AU: Austria, BE: Belgium, DK: Denmark, FI: Finland, FR: France, GE: Germany, GR: Greece, IR: Ireland, IT: Italy, LU: Luxemburg, NL: Netherlands, PO: Portugal, SP: Spain, SW: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom).
60 1995 to 2008 1995 to 95g/km 2008 to 95g/km
Change in average CO2 (%)
emissions of gasoline PCs is quite constant until 2005 (from 188.6 g/km in 1995 to 168.8 g/km in 2005, corresponding to a decrease of about 0.5–1.5% per year), where a more sharp decrease is observed to reach 156.5 g/km in 2008 (annual decrease of 1.8–3%). The trend of diesel CO2 emissions is more complex. After a significant decrease from 178.9 g/km in 1995 to 160.0 g/km in 2000 (annual decrease from 0.5% to 3.6%), diesel CO2 emissions remain practically constant until 2007 and show a decrease of 3.2% in 2008 to reach 151 g/km. Adding a simple linear fit to the total CO2 average emissions and using a projection to 2020, the average value of 136 g/km is estimated when all values are used. When only the values of the last three years are used, the value of 109.9 g/km is estimated for 2020. It is clear that the value of 95 g/km is quite far from the above values and more effort must be made from car manufactures to achieve it. Fig. 9 shows the average CO2 emissions in EU15 and in the 15 countries in 2008 and Fig. 10 the progress made in each country since 1995. It is clear that some countries like Sweden, Germany or Finland, despite the progress made, are quite far from the target of 95 g/km. Of course the target of 95 g/km is a target for the average values of each manufacturer and the emissions of each country are different due to the different distribution of each firm. Fig. 11 shows for EU15 and the 15 countries the progress made from 1995 to 2008 (in % change using as base the 1995 average values). The average EU15 change from 1995 to 2008 is 17.66% and the necessary change to reach 95 g/km is 49.1%. This means that the remaining 12 years from 2008 to 2020 shows a supplementary decrease of 31.4% (using the 1995 values as base) while the 13 years from 1995 to 2008 shows a decrease of 17%. From the first point of view this seems a very difficult task. Fig. 11 shows that several countries have a very significant effort to made to reach 95 g/km in 2020, especially Germany (36.0% remaining), Sweden (35.9% remaining) and Greece (35.1% remaining). It is already reported that vehicle mass influences exhaust CO2 emissions of PCs (Sullivan et al., 2004; Zervas and Lazarou, 2008;
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UK
Spain
Sweden
Portugal
Netherlands
Italy
Luxembourg
Ireland
Greece
France
Finland
Belgium
Germany
120
Denmark
EU15
0 Austria
Average CO2 (g/km, 2008)
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Fig. 11. Average change in CO2 emissions on the NEDC from 1995 to 2008 in EU15 and in the 15 countries.
UK
Spain
Sweden
Portugal
Netherlands
Italy
Luxembourg
Ireland
Greece
France
Germany
Finland
Belgium
Denmark
EU15
Austria
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Fig. 9. Average CO2 on the NEDC in EU15 and in the 15 countries on 2008.
Fontaras and Samaras, 2010). However, in previous works (Zervas, 2010a, 2010b, 2010c) we have shown that the market characteristics are also very important for the control of exhaust CO2 emissions. Figs. 9–11 confirm those results. Fig. 12 shows that vehicle mass constantly increases with time. Sweden, Luxembourg, Ireland, Denmark and Germany are the countries with heavier PCs. Generally, those countries also have high average CO2 emissions. The above results show that, mass control, even if it is
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not the only factor, is very important for the control of CO2 emissions (Zervas and Lazarou, 2008; Fontaras and Samaras, 2010). All previous analyses have shown that even if there is a target of 95 g/km in 2020, this target is very difficult to be reached if the current trend is continued. Moreover, there are significant differences between each country due to the different distribution of each firm. Once more the principle of social equality is violated. Keeping as limit the average value of each car manufacturer, the richest countries like Germany or Sweden will have in practice the right to pollute more than the poorest countries as their market is composed
1600 AU BE DK FI FR GE GR IR IT LU NL PO SP SW UK
Average mass (kg)
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from bigger cars. Some countries are closer to the target of 95 g/ km than others, which is due to the different market; those countries have generally smaller cars with lower CO2 emissions. For that reason, we believe that the target of 95 g/km is achievable, but only with significant changes in the markets, especially those of richest countries. At this point we show the average emissions of each firm in 2008 and the progress to be made to reach the value of 95 g/km in 2020. Fig. 13 shows the average CO2 emissions of all firms of the European market in 2008 (EC, 2008). This figure shows that there are several firms with very high average emissions (usually firms with very luxury cars, such as Lamborghini, TVR, Ferrari, etc.), up to 400 g/km. Also, there is a very significant difference between each firm. Fig. 14 shows the progress made by each firm from 1995 to 2008 (in % change using as base the 1995 average values). The first remark is that several firms like TVR, Bendley, etc., show an increase of average CO2 emissions from 2000 to 2008. The second remark is that there are many firms with very little progress in CO2 decrease from 2000 to 2008. The third remark is that the remaining progress is significant for most of the firms. We believe that several firms, especially those at the left of the figure, have no chance to reach the limit of 95 g/km. The above results show that the limit of 95 g/km will not be reached easily and that there is a severe risk to be set in a higher value, with severe consequences to the environment.
4. Propositions for the CO2 regulations in 2020 1000
1990
2000
2010
2020
Year Fig. 12. Average mass of new PCs in the 15 countries from 1995 to 2008 (AU: Austria, BE: Belgium, DK: Denmark, FI: Finland, FR: France, GE: Germany, GR: Greece, IR: Ireland, IT: Italy, LU: Luxemburg, NL: Netherlands, PO: Portugal, SP: Spain, SW: Sweden, UK: United Kingdom).
The propositions for the CO2 regulations must be based on two principles: the maximum decrease of CO2 emissions and the principle of equality of citizens. The maximum decrease of CO2 emissions must of course be efficient, meaning that the priority must be given where the decrease is greater with a smaller effort (mainly cost). Moreover, the regulation 443/2009 states that ‘‘The legislative framework for implementing the average new car fleet target should ensure competitively neutral, socially equitable and sustainable reduction targetsy’’. The principle of equality of citizens is based on the ‘‘social equitable’’ term of the above phrase.
400
300
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100 LAMBORGHINI TVR FERRARI BENTLEY ROLLS ROYCE ASTON MARTIN MASERATI QUATTRO PORSCHE LAND ROVER ALPINA ISUZU SSANGYONG CHRYSLER AVTOVAZ LOTUS JAGUAR MORGAN FUJIHEAVY INDUSTRIES SAAB MG ROVER VOLVO CATERHAM DAIMLER AUDI MITSUBISHI SANTANA NISSAN GENERAL MOTORS VOLKSWAGEN MAZDA PROTON SUZUKI TATA BMW HONDA GMDAEWOO KIA OPEL SKODA FORD HYUNDAI TOYOTA MAGYARSUZUKI DAIHATSU SEAT CITROEN RENAULT PEUGEOT FIAT NETHERLANDS CAR
Average CO2 (g/km, EU25, 2008)
500
Fig. 13. Average CO2 emissions in 2008 of new PCs for each firm of the European Market.
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Change in average CO2 (%)
2000 to 2008 2000 to 95g/km 2008 to 95 g/km
80
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0
LAMBORGHINI TVR FERRARI BENTLEY ROLLS ROYCE ASTON MARTIN MASERATI QUATTRO PORSCHE LAND ROVER ALPINA ISUZU SSANGYONG CHRYSLER AVTOVAZ LOTUS JAGUAR MORGAN FUJIHEAVY INDUSTRIES SAAB MG ROVER VOLVO CATERHAM DAIMLER AUDI MITSUBISHI SANTANA NISSAN GENERAL MOTORS VOLKSWAGEN MAZDA PROTON SUZUKI TATA BMW HONDA GMDAEWOO KIA OPEL SKODA FORD HYUNDAI TOYOTA MAGYAR SUZUKI DAIHATSU SEAT CITROEN RENAULT PEUGEOT FIAT NETHERLANDS CAR
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Fig. 14. Average change in CO2 emissions on the NEDC from 1995 to 2008 for the firms of the European market.
For that, the proposed upper limit of CO2 emissions must be applied to every PC, following the same logic with the regulations of the other four regulated exhaust pollutants (CO, HC, NOx, PM). The same limit at each passenger has several advantages: 1. The first issue was the higher mileage of heavier vehicles. Applying the same CO2 limit, real world CO2 emissions will decrease more. 2. The equality of all EU citizens is respected. 3. Each country and car manufacturer will have the same average CO2 emissions and thus the limit is more social equitable. 4. Car manufactures will increase their efforts to decrease CO2 emissions. From the second point of view, all derogations must be suspended and all car manufactures must have the same treatment. Also, the penalties for the exceeding CO2 emissions must be suspended. A passenger car of extra CO2 emissions must be eliminated during the approval test as is the case of the other regulated exhaust pollutants. The other point is the possible re-evaluation of the CO2 limit target. From the above analysis it becomes clear that this target is quite difficult. Using the same upper limit of CO2 emissions for all new PCs, the target of 95 g/km is much easier to be achieved. This limit must be firmly established without the possibility of a future re-evaluation to a higher value. Here we must clarify a point. Certainly CO2 is not like the other pollutants. It is true that the consequences of the greenhouse effect gases will be visible in a longer term than the air quality of cities. However, those consequences will be much more severe than the other regulated pollutants. For that reason, the efforts must be much more intense today.
5. Conclusions The current work analyses and criticizes four points of the European Regulation 443/2009 for the control of exhaust CO2
emissions of new passenger cars in EU in 2020. The first point concerns the limit on exhaust CO2 emissions, which is based on the average emissions of the sales of each manufacturer. Using this value, car manufacturers can produce vehicles with low and high levels of CO2 emissions, as long as the average does not exceed the value of 95 g CO2/km. However, as bigger cars (usually cars with higher CO2 emissions) also have a higher mileage, the total real CO2 emissions will decrease less than the case of the same limit of all PCs. Furthermore, the new legislation allows a pooling arrangement between manufacturers, as long as the total emissions do not exceed its specific emissions target. Using this pooling, car manufactures that produce extremely polluting cars (e.g. Ferrari and Maserati (of FIAT group) and Bentley, Bugatti and Lamborghini (of VW group)) are allowed to pool together with others without, in practice, a significant decrease of the emissions of their models. This fact in combination with the extremely high prices of these models legalizes the very rich EU citizens to pollute more than the other EU citizens and put into question the principle of equality and the polluter-pays one that becomes ‘‘someone who can pay, can pollute’’. The second point concerns the possible derogation for some years to the low volume manufacturers. However, as those car manufacturers are those producing very expensive models (and very high CO2 emitters), the principle of social equality is also violated. The third point concerns the penalty of 95 Euro per exceeding gram of CO2/km per vehicle. In fact this penalty will be included in the final price of the vehicle, motivating the buyers to buy cars with lower CO2 emissions. However, this measure is not applied in practice in the case of very expensive cars as price is not the first argument for their sale. Again, richer citizens will have the right to pollute more than the poorest ones. The fourth point concerns the proposed upper limit of CO2 emissions. The analysis of the EU countries, but also of the different car manufacturers, shows that the target of 95 g/km seems quite difficult to be reached. In order to reverse this situation, significant changes must be done in the markets to eliminate the emissions gap between richest and poorest EU countries.
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Our proposition is based on the principle of the same CO2 emissions of all new passenger cars without derogations and penalties. If a new car cannot satisfy that limit, it could not pass the approval test, as it occurs with the other exhaust pollutants. Furthermore an application of the same emission limit for each passenger car makes the target of 95 g/km much easier to be achieved, reducing the possibility of re-evaluating the upper limit of CO2 emissions to a higher value. The desire for mobility in times of a growing world population is a fact and this desire is unfortunately associated with emissions of pollutants. As is generally known there is not a patent solution for solving the pollutants issue. It requires a cross-disciplinary cooperation between different industry segments and political institutions for looking after sustainable solutions to that problem by assuring mobility in the society. References ACEA, 2010. New Vehicle Registrations. ACEA website /http://www.acea.be/ index.php/collection/statisticsS. CARMAGAZINE, 2009. Automobile Magazine. CARMAGAZINE website /www. carmagazine.co.ukS. CARZINE, 2009. Automobile Magazine. CARZINE website /www.carzine.gr/S. CEC (Commission of the European Communities), 2000. Monitoring of ACEA/ JAMA/KAMA’s Commitment on CO2 Emission Reductions from Passenger Cars (1995–1999). Joint Report of the European/Japan/Korea Automobile Manufacturers Association and the Commission Services. Brussels, 10.07.2000. Available at /http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/transport/vehicles/docs/1999_ annexes_en.pdfS. Commission Recommendation, 1999/125/EC. /http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUri Serv/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:1999:040:0049:0050:EN:PDFS. EC (European Commission), 1995. A Community Strategy to reduce CO2 emissions from passenger cars and improve fuel economy. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament (COM95 689) (Council conclusions of 25.6.1996). EC (European Commission), 2008. Climate Action. Database _ Summary Tables. /http://ec.europa.eu/clima/documentation/transport/vehicles/implementation_ en.htmS.
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