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Culture and Cognition
C H A P T E R
6 Culture and Cognition: A FortyYear Overview John W. Berry Department of Psychology, Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada; and National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
INTRODUCTION In the 1970s, both J. P. Das and I were examining the relationship between cognition and the cultural context in which it developed. In particular, we began to question the meaning and cultural relevance of the concept of general intelligence (e.g., Berry, 1972; Das, Manos, & Kanungo, 1975). In its place we both considered that it is more important to study specific cognitive abilities, and the patterns of abilities, that are rooted in particular cultural and social contexts (Berry, 1971; Krywaniuk & Das, 1976). The work by Das examined the pattern of cognitive abilities and cognitive strategies of native children in Alberta, while I examined the cognitive styles of indigenous peoples in Canada, Africa, and Australia. Not only was the date a coincidence, but the focus by Das on the pattern of cognitive abilities paralleled the conception of cognitive styles that I employed. Our similarities are further enlarged by our shared acceptance of two core assumptions that now form the basis of the field of cross-cultural psychology. First, we agree that there are likely to be basic cognitive processes that are shared by all cultural groups. For example, Das (2009) has asserted the commonality of cognitive activity across cultures: “Cognitive processing is a common base for cognitive theories of intelligence in both the East (India) and in the West (Europe and America)” (p. 38). Second, we both take the position that understanding the development, display, and assessment of cognitive functions needs to be rooted
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in an understanding of the cultural contexts in which they take place. For example, Das (1984, p. 37) has defined intelligence as “the ability to plan and structure one’s behavior with an end in view.” He later expanded this functional conception to argue that intelligence is a number of domains that represent the interaction of the individual’s biological predispositions with the environment and cultural context (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994). I have also argued that intelligence is a set of competencies that permit individuals and groups to adapt to and survive in particular ecological and cultural contexts (Berry, 1976). Both of us have examined the cognitive styles of various indigenous peoples. In my work, I hypothesized a link between variations in specific ecological and cultural features of a person’s habitat (ranging from hunters/ gatherers to agriculturalists) and their relative degree of FieldDependence and Field-Independence (Witkin & Berry, 1995; see below for more detail). Das, Janzen, and Georgiou (2007) examined the cognitive and learning styles of a heterogeneous group of native children in Canada. However, they found no specific cognitive style, possibly because the sample was made up of a number of different cultural groups. Despite the differences in empirical findings, we have shared these conceptual approaches and perspectives
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES Combining these two positions (the existence of common processes and the cultural shaping of cognition), we arrive at the two principal foundations of the field of cross-cultural psychology (Berry, Poortinga, Bruegelmans, Chasiotis & Sam, 2011). First, all valid cross-cultural comparisons of behavior need to be rooted in shared psychological features of human populations; without some commonality, there can be no comparisons. And second, culturally appropriate conceptions and assessment procedures are required in order to obtain valid information on the variable expression of these underlying commonalities. These two features have not always been accepted in the study of cognition across cultures, nor are they at the present time. For the first feature, the view that all psychological processes are common to all peoples in all cultures is currently being challenged. For example, in his comparative studies of cognition in Eastern and Western societies, Nisbett (2003) has asserted that most of the time “Easterners and Westerners were found to behave in ways that were qualitatively distinct” (p. 191). This claim challenges the first principle, that cognitive processes are common to all human beings. However, the conclusion that there are qualitative differences in basic processes is not supported by his own data. First, his review of the findings of mean differences in
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performance on a variety of cognitive tasks all refer to quantitative rather than qualitative differences. In fact, all samples were able to perform all tasks; they just did so to different degrees. Hence, there can be no claim of a cognitive process being present in one group but absent in the other. Second, even if there were qualitative differences in performance, this would not permit an easy claim for there being differences in underlying basic cognitive processes. The reason is that the inferences required to go back from overt performance to the underlying process are complex. For the second feature, there are still some contemporary characterizations of cultural groups as being less or more “intelligent” than other groups, without any regard for the cultural context of the group. This represents a throwback to kinds of claims that were being made in the 1960s. For example, Lynn (2006) has produced a map of the world that is color-coded for mean level of intelligence of geographical regions. He reviewed more than 500 studies that reported mean IQ scores for countries. These scores were not examined for either their cultural validity or their equivalence. The main findings were that the average world IQ is around 90, and that there is a gradient across countries, with mean scores declining from north to south. This variation is explained in evolutionary terms: intelligence is related to the need for survival in cold climates. The argument is that as human beings migrated from Africa, they encountered a cognitively demanding environment where survival required greater intelligence than in the warmer homelands. This simplistic use of environmental determinism has been largely dismissed (Feldman, 1975) but appears here as an “explanation” for population differences in IQ scores. An alternative to these two views (that there are different cognitive processes used in different cultures, or that cultural factors are unimportant in coming to a valid understanding of the cognitive life of a cultural group) is to seek evidence for cultural meanings of the very notion of cognitive competence. Many studies have been carried out on the cultural conceptions of what it means to be an intelligent person in a particular society (e.g., Berry & Bennett, 1992; Dasen, 1984). These studies reveal both some differences from current notions in Western psychology but also some similarities with them. These differences make it very difficult to make valid cross-cultural comparisons. However, they are not impossible, as we shall see next.
PROCESS, COMPETENCE, AND PERFORMANCE The well-established distinction in psychology among process, competence, and performance (e.g., Irvine & Berry, 1988; Sternberg &
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Grigorenko, 2004) is an important foundation for understanding the universalist and ecocultural perspectives. Processes are those psychological features of individuals that are the fundamental ways in which people deal with their day-to-day experiences, such as perception, learning, and categorization. Competencies are those features of individuals that develop with cultural experience, such as abilities, attitudes, and values. They are developed on the basis of the interaction between the basic underlying processes and peoples’ encounters with the outside world. Performances are those activities of individuals that are expressed as behavior, such as skilled work, carrying out projects, or engaging in political action. Performances are those expressions of competencies that are appropriate to, or are triggered by, the need to act in a suitable way in a particular context. The actual performance will depend not only on the competence but also on a host of situational factors. For example, all individuals have the basic processes required to learn a language (or multiple languages). Which language(s) will be learned (competencies) depends on the cultural context in which the individual develops. And in a situation in which there is a choice of language, the performance will depend on the language of the interlocutor and the requirement to speak a particular language in any specific situation (such as at work or in one’s cultural community). These distinctions allow us to claim that there are both commonalities in psychological functioning (processes) that permit comparisons, as well as differences (competencies and performances) that provide the observations from which inferences to underlying processes may be made. They provide the conceptual basis for claiming both commonality at a deep level and cultural variability at the surface level. These distinctions also provide the conceptual tools with which to build the universalist and the ecocultural perspectives that can be used to examine the relationships between cultural experience and cognitive performance. The universalist perspective asserts that all human societies exhibit commonalities (“cultural universals”) and that all individual human beings possess basic psychological processes (“psychological universals”). These processes are shared, species-common characteristics of all human beings on which culture plays infinite variations during the course of development and daily activity. The ecocultural perspective is rooted in the processes of cultural and psychological adaptation. Cultures and behaviors are differentially developed and expressed in response to ecological and cultural contexts. These two perspectives allow for comparisons across cultures and individuals (on the basis of the common underlying process), but make comparison worthwhile (using the surface variation as basic evidence). First, I examine the universalist position; then I turn to a presentation of the adaptation position, using the ecocultural perspective to structure the discussion
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THE UNIVERSALIST PERSPECTIVE With respect to cultural universals, there is evidence for their existence in our cognate disciplines of anthropology (e.g., Murdock, 1975), sociology (e.g., Aberle, Cohen, Davis, Levy, & Sutton, 1950), and linguistics (e.g., Chomsky, 2000): cultural groups everywhere possess shared sociocultural attributes. For example, all peoples have tools, social structures (e.g., norms, roles), social institutions (e.g., marriage, justice), and language. It is also evident that such underlying commonalities are expressed by cultural groups in vastly different ways from one time and place to another. That is, common processes become developed and expressed differentially across groups. There is parallel evidence, at the psychological level, for both underlying similarity and surface variation (Berry et al., 2011). For example, all individuals have been shown to have the basic processes needed to develop, learn, and perform speech, technology, role playing, and norm observance. I know of no studies that reveal the absence of any basic psychological process in any cultural group. This point of view was captured early by Cole, Gay, Glick, and Sharp (1971, p. 233): “. . .cultural differences in cognition reside more in the situations to which particular cognitive processes are applied than in the existence of a process in one cultural group and its absence in another.” Even with the existence of these common processes, there are obviously vast group and individual differences in the development and in the way of expressing these shared underlying processes.
THE ECOCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE The ecological approach to understanding any phenomenon is to examine it in context and attempt to identify relationships between the phenomenon and its context. These contexts can be naturally occurring or human-made. Essential to this approach are the concepts of interaction and adaptation. Interaction implies reciprocal relationships among elements in an ecosystem; adaptation implies changes in these elements that increase their mutual fit or compatibility. The core ideas of the ecocultural approach to understanding human behavior are that (1) cultural and biological features of human populations are adaptive to the ecological contexts in which they develop and live; and (2) the development and display of individual human behavior are adaptive to these ecological and cultural contexts. The relationships between culture and ecology have been postulated for a long time in anthropology (see Feldman, 1975). The claim that culture is adaptive (see Ember & Ember, 1999, pp. 182 185) has roots that
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go back to Forde’s (1934) classic analysis of relationships between physical habitat and societal features in Africa, and Kroeber’s (1939) early demonstration that cultural areas and natural areas co-vary in Aboriginal North America. In biology, the links between biology and habitat go back at least to Darwin (1859) and continue to this day. The linking of human behavioral development to cultural and biological adaptation, and thence to ecology, has an equally long history in psychology (Jahoda, 1995). Contemporary thinking about this sequence (ecology-culture-behavior) is often traced to the work of Kardiner and colleagues (e.g., Kardiner & Linton, 1939). In the 1970s there began a series of articles and books that were more explicitly focused on the psychological outcomes of the process of adapting to ecological, cultural, and biological contexts (Berry, 1975, 1976; Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Whiting, 1977; Whiting & Whiting, 1975). These were soon followed by elaborations of this way of thinking, especially focused on child development (Super & Harkness, 1986, 1997; Weisner, 1984; see also Keller, Poortinga & Scholmerich, 2002). I called my framework an “Ecological-Cultural-Behavioral” model (later shortened to “Ecocultural”); Bronfenbrenner named his approach “Ecological”; and the Whitings referred to their approach as “Psychocultural,” and also used the concept of “Ecological Niche.” Super and Harkness coined the term “Developmental Niche,” and Weisner continued the use of the term “Ecocultural.” All of these approaches attempt to understand the development and display of human behavior as a function of the process of individual adaptation to ecological, cultural, and biological settings. My ecocultural approach has evolved through a series of research studies devoted to understanding similarities and differences in cognition and social behavior across ecological and cultural contexts (e.g., Berry, 1966, 1976, 1979; Berry et al., 1986; Berry, Bennett, Denny, & Mishra, 2000; Georgas, Berry, van de Viver, Kagitcibasi, & Poortinga, 2006; Mishra, Sinha & Berry, 1996) to achieve a broad understanding of the roots of human diversity. As noted previously, the core ideas have a long history (Jahoda, 1995) and have become assembled into conceptual frameworks (Berry, 1975, 1995) used in empirical research, and in coordinating textbooks in cross-cultural psychology (Berry, Poortinga, Segall & Dasen, 1992/2002; Berry et al., 2011; Segall, Dasen, Berry & Poortinga, 1990/1999). Following is an outline of my current thinking about how people adapt culturally (as a group) to their longstanding ecological settings and then how people during their lifetime develop and perform (as individuals) in adaptation to their ecocultural situation. The ecocultural framework (see Figure 6.1) proposes to account for human psychological diversity (both individual and group similarities
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THE ECOCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE
Ecological context
Ecological influences Observable behaviors
Biological adaptation
and
Cultural adaptation
Genetic transmission
Cultural transmission Sociopolitical context
Background variables
Inferred characteristics
Acculturation
Process Population level
Variables
Psychological variables Individual level
FIGURE 6.1 The ecocultural framework.
and differences) by taking into account two fundamental sources of influence (ecological and sociopolitical) and two features of human populations that are adapted to them: cultural and biological characteristics. These population variables are transmitted to individuals by various “transmission variables” such as enculturation, socialization, genetics, and acculturation. Both cultural and genetic transmission have been strongly advanced by work on culture learning (e.g., Keller, 2002). Work on acculturation has also been advancing (e.g., Chun, Balls-Organista & Marin, 2003; Sam & Berry, 2006) due to the dramatic increases in intercultural contacts and the changes that result from them. The ecocultural framework considers human diversity (both cultural and psychological) to be a set of collective and individual adaptations to context. Within this general perspective, it views cultures as evolving adaptations to ecological and sociopolitical influences, and views individual psychological characteristics in a population as adaptive to their cultural context, as well as to the broader ecological and sociopolitical influences. It also views (group) culture and (individual) behavior as distinct phenomena that need to be examined independently (as discussed previously). The ecocultural approach offers a “value neutral” framework for describing and interpreting similarities and differences in human
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behavior across cultures (Berry, 1994). As adaptive to context, psychological phenomena need to be understood in their own terms (as advocated by the field of anthropology); in this way external evaluations can usually be avoided. This is a critical point, since it allows for the conceptualization, assessment, and interpretation of culture and behavior in non-ethnocentric ways. It explicitly rejects the idea that some cultures or behaviors are more advanced or more developed than others (Berry, Dasen, & Witkin, 1983; Dasen, Berry, & Witkin, 1979). Any argument about cultural or behavioral differences being ordered hierarchically requires the adoption of some absolute (usually external) standard. But who is so bold, or so unwise, to assert and verify such a standard?
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF PERCEPTION AND COGNITION Initially (Berry, 1966), I elaborated the link between ecology, culture, and behavior into a framework to predict differential development of visual disembedding, and analytic and spatial abilities between hunting-based and agriculture-based peoples. The first step was to propose that the “ecological demands” for survival that were placed on hunting peoples were for a high level of these perceptual-cognitive abilities, in contrast with people employing other (particularly agricultural) economic subsistence strategies. Second, it was proposed that “cultural aids” (such as socialization practices, linguistic differentiation of spatial information, and the use of arts and crafts) would promote the development of these abilities. As predicted, empirical studies with Inuit hunters (then called Eskimo) in the Canadian Arctic and Temne farmers in Sierra Leone revealed marked differences in these abilities. Further studies were carried out, and during the course of this empirical work, the ideas became further elaborated into an ecocultural framework. In each case, a consideration of ecological and cultural features of the group was taken as a basis for predicting differential psychological outcomes in a variety of domains. For example (Berry, 1967, 1979), differential degrees of reliance on hunting and of social stratification (ranging from “loose” to “tight”; Pelto, 1968), and variations in child socialization practices (ranging from emphases on “assertion” to “compliance”; Barry, Child & Bacon, 1959) were used to predict variations in the development of these functional abilities. Further work on perceptual and cognitive abilities (aligned in part to the theory of psychological differentiation, particularly the cognitive style of field dependence field independence; Witkin & Berry, 1975) resulted in three volumes (Berry, 1976; Berry et al., 1986; Mishra et al., 1996)
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reporting results of studies in the Arctic, Africa, Australia, New Guinea, and India. The ecocultural framework has also been used to understand sources of variation in perceptual-cognitive development (Dasen, 1975; Nsamenang, 1992; Zimba, 2002). It has also been used to comprehend the spatial orientation frames of reference used by children in Nepal (e.g., Dasen & Mishra, 2012; Mishra, Dasen & Niraula, 2003). These studies have clear relations to an increasing interest in cross-cultural psychology in indigenous conceptions of cognitive competence and in the cognitive tasks faced by people in daily life (e.g., Allwood & Berry, 2006; Berry & Irvine, 1986; Berry, Irvine & Hunt, 1988). In these studies, it is argued that the indigenous conceptions of competence need to be uncovered; competencies are to be seen as developments nurtured by activities of daily life (“bricolage”), and as adaptive to ecological context. Understanding the indigenous conceptions, the cognitive values, the daily activities, and the contexts is an essential prerequisite for valid cognitive assessment. One again, as for the cross-cultural and intercultural research strategies, these indigenous (within-culture) studies need to be carried out from a nonethnocentric standpoint (e.g., Berry & Bennett, 1992). Most recently, the ecocultural framework has been used to guide research on the development of cognitive style in Canada, China, Ghana, and India among adults engaged in hunting, agriculture, and industrial activities and among children in hunting-gathering and agricultural groups in India (Mishra & Berry, 2008). In this latter study, we examine the distribution of cultural dimensions of societal size and social conformity in different subsistence level groups, the development of cognitive differentiation and contextualization in relation to subsistence strategies of groups, and the relationship between the two cultural and two cognitive dimensions. In earlier research (Berry, 1976), two indices were created for each cultural sample. First, an ecological index was produced using three factors: subsistence practices (hunting to agricultural); settlement style (nomadic to sedentary); and size of local community. A cultural index was produced combining four variables: degree of political stratification, degree of social stratification, type of family, and socialization emphases on assertion or compliance. The ecological index was then combined with the cultural index to produce an ecocultural index (Berry, 1976), which was used as a unidimensional and bipolar index of ecological and cultural adaptation. Later research suggested the possibility of the existence of two independent dimensions similar to the “differentiation-integration” distinction proposed by Lomax and Berkowitz (1972). In view of these suggestions, Berry, Bennett, Denny, and Mishra (2002) have proposed
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and operationalized “societal size” and “social conformity” as two cultural dimensions, which tend to vary considerably as a function of subsistence strategies of the groups. While societal size seems to be a linear function of subsistence strategy, social conformity seems to present a curvilinear relationship (relatively low in gathering, hunting, and industrial societies, but higher in rudimentary and irrigation agricultural societies). It is important to note that the variations on these ecological and cultural dimensions do not imply any differential value or ranking. As argued previously, each ecological and cultural adaptation is viewed in its own terms. The hunting way of life is no better or worse than the industrial way; each meets the needs of the population in its own specific way. A similar distinction has been proposed with respect to cognition. Cognition consists of a number of units and parts. For example, a block design (unit) consists of several blocks (parts). The units and parts may have two basic relations. One, called “distinctiveness,” refers to the recognition of parts and units as distinct from one another. The second, called “connectedness,” refers to the recognition of relationships among parts and units. These relationships may be either intraunit (among the parts within a unit) or extraunit (among different units). If these notions are combined, we get four cognitive functions. Two of these, intraunit distinctiveness (ID) and extraunit connectedness (EC), have been of main interest in research on cognition in a cross-cultural perspective. For example, ID involves the breaking apart of cognitive information (such as in disembedding a small figure hidden in a larger context, or analyzing features of a complex pattern). In contrast, EC involves discerning and making linkages between cognitive elements in order to build up a more complex understanding of the information presented. In some previous research, these dimensions have been referred to as “differentiation” and “contextualization,” respectively. The findings of various studies provide evidence for a curvilinear relationship of ID with subsistence economy. The tendency to emphasize distinction among parts of a cognitive unit appears to be low among gatherers, high among hunters, low among rudimentary agriculturists, medium among irrigation agriculturists, and high among urban industrial societies (Berry, 1976; Mishra et al., 1996). On the other hand, the relationship of EC with subsistence economy appears to be linear, showing a systematic decrease from gatherers and hunters to industrial society. This conclusion is largely based on studies of syllogistic reasoning (Denny, 1986, Luria, 1976) and mathematical thinking (Denny, 1986). In sum, anthropological research suggests the existence of two dimensions: “societal size” and “social conformity.” Cognitive research also provides evidence for two dimensions: ID and EC. Some crosscultural research on cognition does suggest the possibility of a
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predictable relationship between the two cultural and cognitive dimensions. However, these relationships have not been systematically examined by employing measures of differentiation (ID) and contextualization (EC). In keeping with these observations, ongoing research with Adivasi (“Tribal”) children in India aged 9 to 12 years (Mishra & Berry, 2008) sampled across the ecological and cultural dimensions (from huntinggathering to agricultural to industrial/wage employment). We proposed that societal size would be low in hunting-gathering societies and increase over agricultural societies to a high in industrial societies, and that social conformity would be low in hunting-gathering and industrial samples and higher in rudimentary and irrigation agricultural samples. With respect to cognitive performance, we predicted that ID would be relatively higher in hunting-gathering and industrial samples than in the agricultural samples, and that there would be a decrease in the level of EC from hunting-gathering to agricultural to industrial samples. The group variable of societal size was assessed by a number of indicators (e.g., population size, political stratification). Social conformity was assessed by indicators such as the presence of hereditary social distinctions, socialization for compliance versus assertion, and role obligations. The cognitive tests assessed the processes of differentiation and contextualization. Differentiation was assessed by using the StoryPictorial Embedded Figures Test (SPEFT; Sinha, 1984) in which a small natural object (such as a bird or snake) is embedded in a larger forest scene. A story is told about the scene, and the child is then asked to find the small object. Contextualization was assessed by a syllogistic reasoning test modeled on Luria’s (1976) test. Two of the syllogisms presented problems that were familiar to children; the remaining two posed problems that were unfamiliar to children due to not being in the normal range of their experiences. Each problem consisted of a premise, a factual statement, and a question to which the answer required an inference based on previously provided information. The children were presented with these syllogisms and were asked to answer the questions. The answers were recorded and evaluated as “correct” or “incorrect.” Greater discrepancy in reasoning between familiar and unfamiliar problems (familiar minus unfamiliar) is taken to indicate more contextualization. Results for the two cultural dimensions show relationships with the subsistence strategy as expected: there is a progressive increase from hunting-gathering to wage employment through the two agricultural samples on the measure of societal size, and the relationship of social conformity with subsistence strategies is curvilinear (low in hunting and wage employment, but high in the two agricultural groups). With
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respect to cognitive performance, for ID (differentiation), there were variations on the SPEFT that revealed a significant main effect of subsistence economy. Hunting-gathering and wage employment samples scored higher than the agricultural samples, and males scored higher than females. However, for EC (contextualization), not one of the mean comparisons was significant on the measures of syllogistic reasoning. These findings portray a relatively complex set of results. It is clear that peoples’ subsistence activities do relate in important ways to their cultural features and cognitive characteristics. These results generally support the hypothesis regarding the existence of and links between ecological and cultural dimensions of subsistence practices and societal size and social conformity. However, the expectation about the relationship between subsistence strategies and cognitive dimensions is fulfilled only for differentiation. For contextualization, the findings do not allow us to draw a general conclusion.
CONCLUSIONS This review of research on the relationship between culture and cognition has focused on some specific features of cultural contexts (guided by the ecocultural framework), and the development and display of some specific perceptual and cognitive phenomena. This work has paralleled the contributions of J. P. Das in many ways. First, it has moved away from making broad generalizations about the “intelligence” of populations and individuals within them. Instead, the research has examined linkages between some cognitive performances and some experiences available to individuals within their ecocultural contexts. We have also attempted to elucidate variations in cognition between India and Canada, examining the links between specific features of both societies and their cognitive styles. The parallel has also included an attempt to make inferences from performances, down to some of the processes that may underlie daily cognitive activities. These contributions by my good friend and colleague have provided me with inspiration and food for thought, both of which have their origins in Orissa!
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Berry, J. W. (1966). Temne and Eskimo perceptual skills. International Journal of Psychology, 1, 207 229. Berry, J. W. (1967). Independence and conformity in subsistence-level societies. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 7, 415 418. Berry, J. W. (1971). Ecological and cultural factors in spatial perceptual development. Canadian Journal of Behavioural Science, 3, 324 336. Berry, J. W. (1972). Radical cultural relativism and the concept of intelligence. In L. J. Cronbach, & P. Drenth (Eds.), Mental Tests and Cultural Adaptation (pp. 77 88). The Hague: Mouton. Berry, J. W. (1975). An ecological approach to cross-cultural psychology. Nederlands Tijdschrift voor de Psychologie, 30, 51 84. Berry, J. W. (1976). Human ecology and cognitive style: Comparative studies in cultural and psychological adaptation. New York: Sage/Halsted. Berry, J. W. (1979). A cultural ecology of social behaviour. In L. Berkowitz (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 12, pp. 177 206). New York: Academic Press. Berry, J. W. (1994). An ecological approach to cultural and ethnic psychology. In E. Trickett (Ed.), Human diversity (pp. 115 141). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Berry, J. W. (1995). The descendants of a model. Culture & Psychology, 1, 373 380. Berry, J. W., & Bennett, J. A. (1992). Cree conceptions of cognitive competence. International Journal of Psychology, 27, 73 88. Berry, J. W., Bennett, J. A., Denny, J. P. & Mishra, R. C. (2000) Ecology, culture and cognitive processing. Paper presented at IACCP Congress, Pultusk, Poland. Berry, J. W., Dasen, P. R., & Witkin, H. A. (1983). Developmental theories in cross-cultural perspective. In L. Alder (Ed.), Cross-cultural research at issue (pp. 13 21). New York: Academic Press. Berry, J. W., & Irvine, S. H. (1986). Bricolage: Savages do it daily. In R. Sternberg, & R. Wagner (Eds.), Practical intelligence: Nature and origins of competence in the everyday world (pp. 271 306). New York: Cambridge University Press. Berry, J. W., Irvine, S. H., & Hunt, E. B. (Eds.), (1988). Indigenous cognition: Functioning in cultural context. Dordrecht: Ninjhoff. Berry, J. W., Poortinga, H. H., Segall, M. H., & Dasen, P. R. (1992). Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications. New York: Cambridge University Press. Berry, J. W., Poortinga, Y. H., Breugelmans, S. M., Chasiotis, A., & Sam, D. L. (2011). Cross-cultural psychology: Research and applications (3rd ed.). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Berry, J. W., van de Koppel, J. M. H., Se´ne´chal, C., Annis, R. C., Bahuchet, S., CavalliSforza, L. L., & Witkin, H. A. (1986). On the edge of the forest: Cultural adaptation and cognitive development in Central Africa. Lisse: Swets and Zeitlinger. Bronfenbrenner, U. (1979). The ecology of human development. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Chomsky, N. (2000). New horizons in the study of language. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Chun, K., Balls-Organista, P., & Marin, G. (Eds.), (2003). Acculturation. Washington: APA Books. Cole, M., Gay, J., Glick, J., & Sharp, D. (1971). The cultural context of learning and thinking. New York: Basic Books. Darwin, C. (1859). On the origin of species. New York: Random House. Das, J. P. (1984). Aspects of planning. In J. R. Kirby (Ed.), Cognitive strategies and educational performance (pp. 35 50). Orlando, FL: Academic Press. Das, J. P. (2009). Unity and diversity of views on intelligence and consciousness: Where the East meets the West. Psychological Studies, 54, 38 41.
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Das, J. P., Janzen, T., & Georgiou, G. (2007). Correlates of Canadian native children’s reading performance: From cognitive styles to cognitive processes. Journal of School Psychology, 45, 589 602. Das, J. P., Manos, J., & Kanungo, R. N. (1975). Performance of Canadian native, black and white children on some cognitive and personality tests. Alberta Journal of Educational Research, 21, 183 195. Das, J. P., Naglieri, J. A., & Kirby, J. R. (1994). Assessment of cognitive processes. Needham Heights, MA: Allyn & Bacon. Dasen, P. R. (1975). Concrete operational development in three cultures. Journal of CrossCultural Psychology, 6, 156 172. Dasen, P. R. (1984). The cross-cultural study of intelligence: Piaget and the Baoule´. International Journal of Psychology, 19, 407 434. Dasen, P. R., Berry, J. W., & Witkin, H. A. (1979). The use of developmental theories crossculturally. In L. Eckensberger, W. Lonner, & Y. Poortinga (Eds.), Cross-cultural contributions to psychology (pp. 69 82). Lisse: Swets & Zeitlinger. Dasen, P. R., & Mishra, R. C. (2012). Development of geocentric spatial language and cognition: An ecocultural perspective. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Denny, J. P. (1986). Cultural ecology of mathematics: Ojibway and Inuit hunters. In M. Closs (Ed.), Native American mathematics (pp. 110 122). Austin: University of Texas Press. Ember, C., & Ember, M. (1999). Anthropology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall. Feldman, C. (1975). The history of the relationship between environment and culture in ethnological thought. Journal of the History of the Behavioural Sciences, 110, 67 81. Forde, D. (1934). Habitat, economy and society. New York: Dutton. Georgas, J., & Berry, J. W. (1995). An ecocultural taxonomy for cross-cultural psychology. Cross-Cultural Research, 29, 121 157. Georgas, J., Berry, J. W., van de Vijver, F. J. R., Kagitcibasi, C., & Poortinga, Y. H. (Eds.), (2006). Family structure and function: A 30 nation psychological study. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Irvine, S. H., & Berry, J. W. (1988). The abilities of mankind. In S. H. Irvine, & J. W. Berry (Eds.), Human abilities in cultural context (pp. 3 59). New York: Cambridge University Press. Jahoda, G. (1995). The ancestry of a model. Culture & Psychology, 1, 11 24. Kardiner, A., & Linton, R. (1939). The individual and his society. New York: Colombia University Press. Keller, H., Poortinga, Y. H., & Schlomerlich, A. (Eds.), (2002). Between culture and biology: Perspectives on ontogenetic development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Kroeber, A. (1939). Cultural and natural areas of native North America. Berkeley: University of California Press. Krywaniuk, L., & Das, J. P. (1976). Cognitive strategies in Native children: Analysis and intervention. Alberta Journal of Educational Research, 22, 271 280. Lomax, A., & Berkowitz, W. (1972). The evolutionary taxonomy of culture. Science, 177, 228 239. Luria, A. R. (1976). Cognitive development: Its cultural and social foundations. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Lynn, R. (2006). Race differences in intelligence. An evolutionary analysis. Augusta, GA: Washington Summit Publishers. Mishra, R. C., & Berry, J. W. (2008). Cultural adaptations and cognitive style in Adivasi children in Chotanagphur. In N. Srinivasan, A. Gupta, & J. Pandey (Eds.), Advances in Cognitive Science. New Delhi: Sage Publications. Mishra, R. C., Dasen, P. R., & Niraula, S. (2003). Ecology, language, and performance on spatial cognitive tasks. International Journal of Psychology, 38, 366 383.
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Mishra, R. C., Sinha, D., & Berry, J. W. (1996). Ecology, acculturation and psychological adaptation: A study of Advasi in Bihar. Delhi: Sage Publications. Murdock, G. P. (1975). Outline of cultural materials. New Haven: Human Relations Area Files. Nisbett, R. E. (2003). The geography of thought: How Asians and Westerners think differently . . . and why. New York: The Free Press. Nsamenang, B. (1992). Human development in cultural context. Newbury Park: Sage. Pelto, P. (1968). The difference between “tight” and “loose” societies. Transaction, 5, 37 40. Sam, D. L., & Berry, J. W. (Eds.), (2006). Cambridge handbook of acculturation psychology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Segall, M. H., Dasen, P. R., Berry, J. W., & Poortinga, Y. H. (1990). Human behavior in global perspective: An introduction to cross-cultural psychology. New York: Pergamon. Segall, M. H., Dasen, P. R., Berry, J. W., & Poortinga, Y. H. (1999). Human behavior in global perspective (2nd ed.). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Sinha, D. (1984). Manual for Story-Pictorial E.F.T. Varanasi: Rupa. Sternberg, R. J., & Grigorenko, E. (Eds.), (2004). Culture and competence. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Super, C., & Harkness, S. (1986). The developmental niche: A conceptualisation at the interface of childhood and culture. International Journal of Behavioural Development, 9, 545 569. Super, C., & Harkness, S. (1997). The cultural structuring of child development. In J. W. Berry, P. R. Dasen, & T. S. Saraswathi (Eds.), Handbook of cross-cultural psychology, Vol. 2. Basic processes and human development (pp. 1 39). Boston: Allyn & Bacon. Weisner, T. (1984). A cross-cultural perspective: Ecocultural niches in middle childhood. In A. Collins (Ed.), The elementary school years (pp. 335 369). Washington: Academy Press. Whiting, J. W. (1977). A model for psychocultural research. In H. Lieiderman, S. Tulkin, & A. H. Rosenfeld (Eds.), Culture and infancy: Variations in the human experience (pp. 29 48). New York: Academic Press. Whiting, B. B., & Whiting, J. W (1975). Children of six cultures: A psychocultural analysis. Cambridge: Harvard University Press. Witkin, H., & Berry, J. W. (1975). Psychological differentiation in cross-cultural perspective. Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 6, 4 87. Zimba, R. (2002). Indigenous conceptions of childhood development and social realities in southern Africa. In H. Keller, Y. H. Poortinga, & A. Schomerich (Eds.), Between culture and biology: Perspectives on ontogenetic development (pp. 89 115). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
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6 Culture and Cognition: A FortyYear Overview John W. Berry Department of Psychology, Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada; and National Research University Higher School of Economics, Moscow, Russia
INTRODUCTION In the 1970s, both J. P. Das and I were examining the relationship between cognition and the cultural context in which it developed. In particular, we began to question the meaning and cultural relevance of the concept of general intelligence (e.g., Berry, 1972; Das, Manos, & Kanungo, 1975). In its place we both considered that it is more important to study specific cognitive abilities, and the patterns of abilities, that are rooted in particular cultural and social contexts (Berry, 1971; Krywaniuk & Das, 1976). The work by Das examined the pattern of cognitive abilities and cognitive strategies of native children in Alberta, while I examined the cognitive styles of indigenous peoples in Canada, Africa, and Australia. Not only was the date a coincidence, but the focus by Das on the pattern of cognitive abilities paralleled the conception of cognitive styles that I employed. Our similarities are further enlarged by our shared acceptance of two core assumptions that now form the basis of the field of cross-cultural psychology. First, we agree that there are likely to be basic cognitive processes that are shared by all cultural groups. For example, Das (2009) has asserted the commonality of cognitive activity across cultures: “Cognitive processing is a common base for cognitive theories of intelligence in both the East (India) and in the West (Europe and America)” (p. 38). Second, we both take the position that understanding the development, display, and assessment of cognitive functions needs to be rooted
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in an understanding of the cultural contexts in which they take place. For example, Das (1984, p. 37) has defined intelligence as “the ability to plan and structure one’s behavior with an end in view.” He later expanded this functional conception to argue that intelligence is a number of domains that represent the interaction of the individual’s biological predispositions with the environment and cultural context (Das, Naglieri, & Kirby, 1994). I have also argued that intelligence is a set of competencies that permit individuals and groups to adapt to and survive in particular ecological and cultural contexts (Berry, 1976). Both of us have examined the cognitive styles of various indigenous peoples. In my work, I hypothesized a link between variations in specific ecological and cultural features of a person’s habitat (ranging from hunters/ gatherers to agriculturalists) and their relative degree of FieldDependence and Field-Independence (Witkin & Berry, 1995; see below for more detail). Das, Janzen, and Georgiou (2007) examined the cognitive and learning styles of a heterogeneous group of native children in Canada. However, they found no specific cognitive style, possibly because the sample was made up of a number of different cultural groups. Despite the differences in empirical findings, we have shared these conceptual approaches and perspectives
CONCEPTUAL ISSUES Combining these two positions (the existence of common processes and the cultural shaping of cognition), we arrive at the two principal foundations of the field of cross-cultural psychology (Berry, Poortinga, Bruegelmans, Chasiotis & Sam, 2011). First, all valid cross-cultural comparisons of behavior need to be rooted in shared psychological features of human populations; without some commonality, there can be no comparisons. And second, culturally appropriate conceptions and assessment procedures are required in order to obtain valid information on the variable expression of these underlying commonalities. These two features have not always been accepted in the study of cognition across cultures, nor are they at the present time. For the first feature, the view that all psychological processes are common to all peoples in all cultures is currently being challenged. For example, in his comparative studies of cognition in Eastern and Western societies, Nisbett (2003) has asserted that most of the time “Easterners and Westerners were found to behave in ways that were qualitatively distinct” (p. 191). This claim challenges the first principle, that cognitive processes are common to all human beings. However, the conclusion that there are qualitative differences in basic processes is not supported by his own data. First, his review of the findings of mean differences in
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performance on a variety of cognitive tasks all refer to quantitative rather than qualitative differences. In fact, all samples were able to perform all tasks; they just did so to different degrees. Hence, there can be no claim of a cognitive process being present in one group but absent in the other. Second, even if there were qualitative differences in performance, this would not permit an easy claim for there being differences in underlying basic cognitive processes. The reason is that the inferences required to go back from overt performance to the underlying process are complex. For the second feature, there are still some contemporary characterizations of cultural groups as being less or more “intelligent” than other groups, without any regard for the cultural context of the group. This represents a throwback to kinds of claims that were being made in the 1960s. For example, Lynn (2006) has produced a map of the world that is color-coded for mean level of intelligence of geographical regions. He reviewed more than 500 studies that reported mean IQ scores for countries. These scores were not examined for either their cultural validity or their equivalence. The main findings were that the average world IQ is around 90, and that there is a gradient across countries, with mean scores declining from north to south. This variation is explained in evolutionary terms: intelligence is related to the need for survival in cold climates. The argument is that as human beings migrated from Africa, they encountered a cognitively demanding environment where survival required greater intelligence than in the warmer homelands. This simplistic use of environmental determinism has been largely dismissed (Feldman, 1975) but appears here as an “explanation” for population differences in IQ scores. An alternative to these two views (that there are different cognitive processes used in different cultures, or that cultural factors are unimportant in coming to a valid understanding of the cognitive life of a cultural group) is to seek evidence for cultural meanings of the very notion of cognitive competence. Many studies have been carried out on the cultural conceptions of what it means to be an intelligent person in a particular society (e.g., Berry & Bennett, 1992; Dasen, 1984). These studies reveal both some differences from current notions in Western psychology but also some similarities with them. These differences make it very difficult to make valid cross-cultural comparisons. However, they are not impossible, as we shall see next.
PROCESS, COMPETENCE, AND PERFORMANCE The well-established distinction in psychology among process, competence, and performance (e.g., Irvine & Berry, 1988; Sternberg &
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Grigorenko, 2004) is an important foundation for understanding the universalist and ecocultural perspectives. Processes are those psychological features of individuals that are the fundamental ways in which people deal with their day-to-day experiences, such as perception, learning, and categorization. Competencies are those features of individuals that develop with cultural experience, such as abilities, attitudes, and values. They are developed on the basis of the interaction between the basic underlying processes and peoples’ encounters with the outside world. Performances are those activities of individuals that are expressed as behavior, such as skilled work, carrying out projects, or engaging in political action. Performances are those expressions of competencies that are appropriate to, or are triggered by, the need to act in a suitable way in a particular context. The actual performance will depend not only on the competence but also on a host of situational factors. For example, all individuals have the basic processes required to learn a language (or multiple languages). Which language(s) will be learned (competencies) depends on the cultural context in which the individual develops. And in a situation in which there is a choice of language, the performance will depend on the language of the interlocutor and the requirement to speak a particular language in any specific situation (such as at work or in one’s cultural community). These distinctions allow us to claim that there are both commonalities in psychological functioning (processes) that permit comparisons, as well as differences (competencies and performances) that provide the observations from which inferences to underlying processes may be made. They provide the conceptual basis for claiming both commonality at a deep level and cultural variability at the surface level. These distinctions also provide the conceptual tools with which to build the universalist and the ecocultural perspectives that can be used to examine the relationships between cultural experience and cognitive performance. The universalist perspective asserts that all human societies exhibit commonalities (“cultural universals”) and that all individual human beings possess basic psychological processes (“psychological universals”). These processes are shared, species-common characteristics of all human beings on which culture plays infinite variations during the course of development and daily activity. The ecocultural perspective is rooted in the processes of cultural and psychological adaptation. Cultures and behaviors are differentially developed and expressed in response to ecological and cultural contexts. These two perspectives allow for comparisons across cultures and individuals (on the basis of the common underlying process), but make comparison worthwhile (using the surface variation as basic evidence). First, I examine the universalist position; then I turn to a presentation of the adaptation position, using the ecocultural perspective to structure the discussion
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THE UNIVERSALIST PERSPECTIVE With respect to cultural universals, there is evidence for their existence in our cognate disciplines of anthropology (e.g., Murdock, 1975), sociology (e.g., Aberle, Cohen, Davis, Levy, & Sutton, 1950), and linguistics (e.g., Chomsky, 2000): cultural groups everywhere possess shared sociocultural attributes. For example, all peoples have tools, social structures (e.g., norms, roles), social institutions (e.g., marriage, justice), and language. It is also evident that such underlying commonalities are expressed by cultural groups in vastly different ways from one time and place to another. That is, common processes become developed and expressed differentially across groups. There is parallel evidence, at the psychological level, for both underlying similarity and surface variation (Berry et al., 2011). For example, all individuals have been shown to have the basic processes needed to develop, learn, and perform speech, technology, role playing, and norm observance. I know of no studies that reveal the absence of any basic psychological process in any cultural group. This point of view was captured early by Cole, Gay, Glick, and Sharp (1971, p. 233): “. . .cultural differences in cognition reside more in the situations to which particular cognitive processes are applied than in the existence of a process in one cultural group and its absence in another.” Even with the existence of these common processes, there are obviously vast group and individual differences in the development and in the way of expressing these shared underlying processes.
THE ECOCULTURAL PERSPECTIVE The ecological approach to understanding any phenomenon is to examine it in context and attempt to identify relationships between the phenomenon and its context. These contexts can be naturally occurring or human-made. Essential to this approach are the concepts of interaction and adaptation. Interaction implies reciprocal relationships among elements in an ecosystem; adaptation implies changes in these elements that increase their mutual fit or compatibility. The core ideas of the ecocultural approach to understanding human behavior are that (1) cultural and biological features of human populations are adaptive to the ecological contexts in which they develop and live; and (2) the development and display of individual human behavior are adaptive to these ecological and cultural contexts. The relationships between culture and ecology have been postulated for a long time in anthropology (see Feldman, 1975). The claim that culture is adaptive (see Ember & Ember, 1999, pp. 182 185) has roots that
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go back to Forde’s (1934) classic analysis of relationships between physical habitat and societal features in Africa, and Kroeber’s (1939) early demonstration that cultural areas and natural areas co-vary in Aboriginal North America. In biology, the links between biology and habitat go back at least to Darwin (1859) and continue to this day. The linking of human behavioral development to cultural and biological adaptation, and thence to ecology, has an equally long history in psychology (Jahoda, 1995). Contemporary thinking about this sequence (ecology-culture-behavior) is often traced to the work of Kardiner and colleagues (e.g., Kardiner & Linton, 1939). In the 1970s there began a series of articles and books that were more explicitly focused on the psychological outcomes of the process of adapting to ecological, cultural, and biological contexts (Berry, 1975, 1976; Bronfenbrenner, 1979; Whiting, 1977; Whiting & Whiting, 1975). These were soon followed by elaborations of this way of thinking, especially focused on child development (Super & Harkness, 1986, 1997; Weisner, 1984; see also Keller, Poortinga & Scholmerich, 2002). I called my framework an “Ecological-Cultural-Behavioral” model (later shortened to “Ecocultural”); Bronfenbrenner named his approach “Ecological”; and the Whitings referred to their approach as “Psychocultural,” and also used the concept of “Ecological Niche.” Super and Harkness coined the term “Developmental Niche,” and Weisner continued the use of the term “Ecocultural.” All of these approaches attempt to understand the development and display of human behavior as a function of the process of individual adaptation to ecological, cultural, and biological settings. My ecocultural approach has evolved through a series of research studies devoted to understanding similarities and differences in cognition and social behavior across ecological and cultural contexts (e.g., Berry, 1966, 1976, 1979; Berry et al., 1986; Berry, Bennett, Denny, & Mishra, 2000; Georgas, Berry, van de Viver, Kagitcibasi, & Poortinga, 2006; Mishra, Sinha & Berry, 1996) to achieve a broad understanding of the roots of human diversity. As noted previously, the core ideas have a long history (Jahoda, 1995) and have become assembled into conceptual frameworks (Berry, 1975, 1995) used in empirical research, and in coordinating textbooks in cross-cultural psychology (Berry, Poortinga, Segall & Dasen, 1992/2002; Berry et al., 2011; Segall, Dasen, Berry & Poortinga, 1990/1999). Following is an outline of my current thinking about how people adapt culturally (as a group) to their longstanding ecological settings and then how people during their lifetime develop and perform (as individuals) in adaptation to their ecocultural situation. The ecocultural framework (see Figure 6.1) proposes to account for human psychological diversity (both individual and group similarities
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Ecological context
Ecological influences Observable behaviors
Biological adaptation
and
Cultural adaptation
Genetic transmission
Cultural transmission Sociopolitical context
Background variables
Inferred characteristics
Acculturation
Process Population level
Variables
Psychological variables Individual level
FIGURE 6.1 The ecocultural framework.
and differences) by taking into account two fundamental sources of influence (ecological and sociopolitical) and two features of human populations that are adapted to them: cultural and biological characteristics. These population variables are transmitted to individuals by various “transmission variables” such as enculturation, socialization, genetics, and acculturation. Both cultural and genetic transmission have been strongly advanced by work on culture learning (e.g., Keller, 2002). Work on acculturation has also been advancing (e.g., Chun, Balls-Organista & Marin, 2003; Sam & Berry, 2006) due to the dramatic increases in intercultural contacts and the changes that result from them. The ecocultural framework considers human diversity (both cultural and psychological) to be a set of collective and individual adaptations to context. Within this general perspective, it views cultures as evolving adaptations to ecological and sociopolitical influences, and views individual psychological characteristics in a population as adaptive to their cultural context, as well as to the broader ecological and sociopolitical influences. It also views (group) culture and (individual) behavior as distinct phenomena that need to be examined independently (as discussed previously). The ecocultural approach offers a “value neutral” framework for describing and interpreting similarities and differences in human
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behavior across cultures (Berry, 1994). As adaptive to context, psychological phenomena need to be understood in their own terms (as advocated by the field of anthropology); in this way external evaluations can usually be avoided. This is a critical point, since it allows for the conceptualization, assessment, and interpretation of culture and behavior in non-ethnocentric ways. It explicitly rejects the idea that some cultures or behaviors are more advanced or more developed than others (Berry, Dasen, & Witkin, 1983; Dasen, Berry, & Witkin, 1979). Any argument about cultural or behavioral differences being ordered hierarchically requires the adoption of some absolute (usually external) standard. But who is so bold, or so unwise, to assert and verify such a standard?
EMPIRICAL STUDIES OF PERCEPTION AND COGNITION Initially (Berry, 1966), I elaborated the link between ecology, culture, and behavior into a framework to predict differential development of visual disembedding, and analytic and spatial abilities between hunting-based and agriculture-based peoples. The first step was to propose that the “ecological demands” for survival that were placed on hunting peoples were for a high level of these perceptual-cognitive abilities, in contrast with people employing other (particularly agricultural) economic subsistence strategies. Second, it was proposed that “cultural aids” (such as socialization practices, linguistic differentiation of spatial information, and the use of arts and crafts) would promote the development of these abilities. As predicted, empirical studies with Inuit hunters (then called Eskimo) in the Canadian Arctic and Temne farmers in Sierra Leone revealed marked differences in these abilities. Further studies were carried out, and during the course of this empirical work, the ideas became further elaborated into an ecocultural framework. In each case, a consideration of ecological and cultural features of the group was taken as a basis for predicting differential psychological outcomes in a variety of domains. For example (Berry, 1967, 1979), differential degrees of reliance on hunting and of social stratification (ranging from “loose” to “tight”; Pelto, 1968), and variations in child socialization practices (ranging from emphases on “assertion” to “compliance”; Barry, Child & Bacon, 1959) were used to predict variations in the development of these functional abilities. Further work on perceptual and cognitive abilities (aligned in part to the theory of psychological differentiation, particularly the cognitive style of field dependence field independence; Witkin & Berry, 1975) resulted in three volumes (Berry, 1976; Berry et al., 1986; Mishra et al., 1996)
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reporting results of studies in the Arctic, Africa, Australia, New Guinea, and India. The ecocultural framework has also been used to understand sources of variation in perceptual-cognitive development (Dasen, 1975; Nsamenang, 1992; Zimba, 2002). It has also been used to comprehend the spatial orientation frames of reference used by children in Nepal (e.g., Dasen & Mishra, 2012; Mishra, Dasen & Niraula, 2003). These studies have clear relations to an increasing interest in cross-cultural psychology in indigenous conceptions of cognitive competence and in the cognitive tasks faced by people in daily life (e.g., Allwood & Berry, 2006; Berry & Irvine, 1986; Berry, Irvine & Hunt, 1988). In these studies, it is argued that the indigenous conceptions of competence need to be uncovered; competencies are to be seen as developments nurtured by activities of daily life (“bricolage”), and as adaptive to ecological context. Understanding the indigenous conceptions, the cognitive values, the daily activities, and the contexts is an essential prerequisite for valid cognitive assessment. One again, as for the cross-cultural and intercultural research strategies, these indigenous (within-culture) studies need to be carried out from a nonethnocentric standpoint (e.g., Berry & Bennett, 1992). Most recently, the ecocultural framework has been used to guide research on the development of cognitive style in Canada, China, Ghana, and India among adults engaged in hunting, agriculture, and industrial activities and among children in hunting-gathering and agricultural groups in India (Mishra & Berry, 2008). In this latter study, we examine the distribution of cultural dimensions of societal size and social conformity in different subsistence level groups, the development of cognitive differentiation and contextualization in relation to subsistence strategies of groups, and the relationship between the two cultural and two cognitive dimensions. In earlier research (Berry, 1976), two indices were created for each cultural sample. First, an ecological index was produced using three factors: subsistence practices (hunting to agricultural); settlement style (nomadic to sedentary); and size of local community. A cultural index was produced combining four variables: degree of political stratification, degree of social stratification, type of family, and socialization emphases on assertion or compliance. The ecological index was then combined with the cultural index to produce an ecocultural index (Berry, 1976), which was used as a unidimensional and bipolar index of ecological and cultural adaptation. Later research suggested the possibility of the existence of two independent dimensions similar to the “differentiation-integration” distinction proposed by Lomax and Berkowitz (1972). In view of these suggestions, Berry, Bennett, Denny, and Mishra (2002) have proposed
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and operationalized “societal size” and “social conformity” as two cultural dimensions, which tend to vary considerably as a function of subsistence strategies of the groups. While societal size seems to be a linear function of subsistence strategy, social conformity seems to present a curvilinear relationship (relatively low in gathering, hunting, and industrial societies, but higher in rudimentary and irrigation agricultural societies). It is important to note that the variations on these ecological and cultural dimensions do not imply any differential value or ranking. As argued previously, each ecological and cultural adaptation is viewed in its own terms. The hunting way of life is no better or worse than the industrial way; each meets the needs of the population in its own specific way. A similar distinction has been proposed with respect to cognition. Cognition consists of a number of units and parts. For example, a block design (unit) consists of several blocks (parts). The units and parts may have two basic relations. One, called “distinctiveness,” refers to the recognition of parts and units as distinct from one another. The second, called “connectedness,” refers to the recognition of relationships among parts and units. These relationships may be either intraunit (among the parts within a unit) or extraunit (among different units). If these notions are combined, we get four cognitive functions. Two of these, intraunit distinctiveness (ID) and extraunit connectedness (EC), have been of main interest in research on cognition in a cross-cultural perspective. For example, ID involves the breaking apart of cognitive information (such as in disembedding a small figure hidden in a larger context, or analyzing features of a complex pattern). In contrast, EC involves discerning and making linkages between cognitive elements in order to build up a more complex understanding of the information presented. In some previous research, these dimensions have been referred to as “differentiation” and “contextualization,” respectively. The findings of various studies provide evidence for a curvilinear relationship of ID with subsistence economy. The tendency to emphasize distinction among parts of a cognitive unit appears to be low among gatherers, high among hunters, low among rudimentary agriculturists, medium among irrigation agriculturists, and high among urban industrial societies (Berry, 1976; Mishra et al., 1996). On the other hand, the relationship of EC with subsistence economy appears to be linear, showing a systematic decrease from gatherers and hunters to industrial society. This conclusion is largely based on studies of syllogistic reasoning (Denny, 1986, Luria, 1976) and mathematical thinking (Denny, 1986). In sum, anthropological research suggests the existence of two dimensions: “societal size” and “social conformity.” Cognitive research also provides evidence for two dimensions: ID and EC. Some crosscultural research on cognition does suggest the possibility of a
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predictable relationship between the two cultural and cognitive dimensions. However, these relationships have not been systematically examined by employing measures of differentiation (ID) and contextualization (EC). In keeping with these observations, ongoing research with Adivasi (“Tribal”) children in India aged 9 to 12 years (Mishra & Berry, 2008) sampled across the ecological and cultural dimensions (from huntinggathering to agricultural to industrial/wage employment). We proposed that societal size would be low in hunting-gathering societies and increase over agricultural societies to a high in industrial societies, and that social conformity would be low in hunting-gathering and industrial samples and higher in rudimentary and irrigation agricultural samples. With respect to cognitive performance, we predicted that ID would be relatively higher in hunting-gathering and industrial samples than in the agricultural samples, and that there would be a decrease in the level of EC from hunting-gathering to agricultural to industrial samples. The group variable of societal size was assessed by a number of indicators (e.g., population size, political stratification). Social conformity was assessed by indicators such as the presence of hereditary social distinctions, socialization for compliance versus assertion, and role obligations. The cognitive tests assessed the processes of differentiation and contextualization. Differentiation was assessed by using the StoryPictorial Embedded Figures Test (SPEFT; Sinha, 1984) in which a small natural object (such as a bird or snake) is embedded in a larger forest scene. A story is told about the scene, and the child is then asked to find the small object. Contextualization was assessed by a syllogistic reasoning test modeled on Luria’s (1976) test. Two of the syllogisms presented problems that were familiar to children; the remaining two posed problems that were unfamiliar to children due to not being in the normal range of their experiences. Each problem consisted of a premise, a factual statement, and a question to which the answer required an inference based on previously provided information. The children were presented with these syllogisms and were asked to answer the questions. The answers were recorded and evaluated as “correct” or “incorrect.” Greater discrepancy in reasoning between familiar and unfamiliar problems (familiar minus unfamiliar) is taken to indicate more contextualization. Results for the two cultural dimensions show relationships with the subsistence strategy as expected: there is a progressive increase from hunting-gathering to wage employment through the two agricultural samples on the measure of societal size, and the relationship of social conformity with subsistence strategies is curvilinear (low in hunting and wage employment, but high in the two agricultural groups). With
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respect to cognitive performance, for ID (differentiation), there were variations on the SPEFT that revealed a significant main effect of subsistence economy. Hunting-gathering and wage employment samples scored higher than the agricultural samples, and males scored higher than females. However, for EC (contextualization), not one of the mean comparisons was significant on the measures of syllogistic reasoning. These findings portray a relatively complex set of results. It is clear that peoples’ subsistence activities do relate in important ways to their cultural features and cognitive characteristics. These results generally support the hypothesis regarding the existence of and links between ecological and cultural dimensions of subsistence practices and societal size and social conformity. However, the expectation about the relationship between subsistence strategies and cognitive dimensions is fulfilled only for differentiation. For contextualization, the findings do not allow us to draw a general conclusion.
CONCLUSIONS This review of research on the relationship between culture and cognition has focused on some specific features of cultural contexts (guided by the ecocultural framework), and the development and display of some specific perceptual and cognitive phenomena. This work has paralleled the contributions of J. P. Das in many ways. First, it has moved away from making broad generalizations about the “intelligence” of populations and individuals within them. Instead, the research has examined linkages between some cognitive performances and some experiences available to individuals within their ecocultural contexts. We have also attempted to elucidate variations in cognition between India and Canada, examining the links between specific features of both societies and their cognitive styles. The parallel has also included an attempt to make inferences from performances, down to some of the processes that may underlie daily cognitive activities. These contributions by my good friend and colleague have provided me with inspiration and food for thought, both of which have their origins in Orissa!
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