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Deindividuation, Psychology of
Deindividuation, Psychology of Tom Postmes and Felicity M Turner, University of Groningen, Groningen, The Netherlands Ó 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. This article is a revision of the previous edition article by T. Postmes, volume 5, pp. 3364–3366, Ó 2001, Elsevier Ltd.
Abstract Deindividuation is a characteristic of the individual in the crowd. It is a psychological state of decreased self-evaluation, causing antinormative and disinhibited behavior. The impact of deindividuation theory in science and society (especially twentieth-century politics) makes it one of social science’s more influential contributions. Deindividuation theory is rooted in some of the earliest social psychological theorizing, more than a century ago. It seeks to explain the apparent transformation of rational individuals into an unruly group or crowd. It posits that the group provides an environment in which the individual – submerged and anonymous – suffers from a loss of self-awareness. Deindividuation hinders reflection about the consequences of actions, rendering social norms impotent while increasing suggestibility to random outside influences. Despite its status and impact, empirical support for deindividuation theory is minimal. Recently, this lack of support has been attributed to the faulty assumption that crowds cause a loss of self. Instead, research suggests that ‘deindividuation’ marks a transition from individual identity to social dimensions of the self. This transition to a social identity may increase responsiveness to social norms particular to the crowd, instead of decreasing responsiveness to generic social norms, as suggested by deindividuation theory.
The Psychology of Deindividuation According to deindividuation theory, the psychological state of deindividuation is aroused when individuals join crowds or large groups. The state is characterized by diminished awareness of self and individuality. This in turn reduces an individual’s self-restraint and normative regulation of behavior. In social psychology, deindividuation is a major theory of group behavior: it provides an explanation of collective behavior of violent crowds, mindless hooligans, and the lynch mob. In addition, deindividuation has been associated with other social phenomena such as genocide, stereotyping, and disinhibition in other settings such as computer-mediated communication (CMC). Later, the theoretical evolution of deindividuation is sketched, followed by a brief impression of the empirical support for this theory. Finally, recent research is discussed, which argues for a reconceptualization of deindividuation: It appears deindividuation is not a loss of individual identity, but may be better construed as a transition to a social identity.
Theoretical Evolution of Deindividuation Deindividuation theory is rooted in the earliest works of social psychology, in particular Gustave Le Bon’s (1895/1995) crowd theory (see Postmes and Spears, 1998; for a review). In his book The Crowd, Le Bon vividly describes how the individual in the crowd is psychologically transformed. He proposes that the psychological mechanisms of anonymity, suggestibility, and contagion transform an assembly into a ‘psychological crowd.’ In the crowd the collective mind takes possession of the individual. As a consequence, a crowd member is reduced to an inferior form of evolution: irrational, fickle, and suggestible. The individual submerged in the crowd loses self-control and becomes a mindless puppet, possibly controlled by the crowd’s leader, and capable of performing any act, however atrocious or heroic.
38
Although Le Bon’s theory has been extensively criticized, the influence of The Crowd in science and society is difficult to underestimate. The sales of this book are among the highest of scientific texts. In science, his analysis has inspired many theories of collective behavior, for example those of Freud, McDougall, Blumer, and Allport. In society, Le Bon’s influence has been especially poignant: His theory also informed numerous politicians including Mussolini and Hitler, whose ideologies resonated with Le Bon’s emphasis on racial factors (Nye, 1975). The field of social psychology revived Le Bon’s ideas in the 1950s. They were couched in more scientific terms as a theory of ‘deindividuation.’ Initially, it was argued that deindividuation occurs when individuals in a group are not paid attention to as individuals (Festinger et al., 1952). Thus, being unaccountable in a crowd or group has the psychological consequence of reducing inner restraints, and increasing behavior that is usually inhibited. The causes of deindividuation were gradually extended from anonymity in groups to other contextual factors, such as reductions of responsibility, arousal, sensory overload, a lack of contextual structure or predictability, and altered consciousness due to drugs or alcohol (Zimbardo, 1969). Thus, although Le Bon’s ideas were the blueprint for the deindividuation concept, the situations that cause deindividuation were gradually expanded to include other settings than the crowd. Deindividuation theory differs from Le Bon’s theory in one further important respect: The consequence of deindividuation is not that the loss of individuality is replaced by a collective mind that guides the individual’s actions. Rather, the loss of individuality leads to a total loss of self-awareness, and this incapacity for introspection releases a person from internalized moral restraints to produce emotional, impulsive, irrational, regressive, and intense behavior. In the 1970s, deindividuation theory became a popular focus of scientific research, encouraged and inspired in part by the collective disorders characteristic of that period. However,
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 6
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.24015-4
Deindividuation, Psychology of
the empirical support for deindividuation theory was inconsistent. In particular, there was contradictory evidence regarding the influence of anonymity in groups, and there was virtually no evidence for the psychological state of deindividuation (Diener, 1980). Indeed, it appeared that this psychological state, which by all accounts appeared to be easily induced, was more elusive than initially conceived. In response to these empirical obstacles, deindividuation theory was gradually modified and specified over the course of the 1980s. In particular, the psychological underpinnings of deindividuation have been narrowed down. In the original version of the theory, deindividuation was closely bound up with a lack of accountability due to submergence in the crowd. Thus, the focus was on anonymity in the group as the most important factor in producing deindividuation. But contemporary formulations of the theory shifted the focus to reduced (private) self-awareness as the central feature of deindividuation (Diener, 1980; Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1982). When one is self-aware, the focus of one’s attention is on the (private) aspects of oneself, such as one’s attitudes and norms. This self-focus is assumed to be required in order for people to selfregulate. But irrespective of whether anonymity or selfawareness is the crux of deindividuation, both classical and contemporary perspectives argue that deindividuation leads to antinormative and disinhibited behavior. In more recent years, the phenomenon of deindividuation has been applied to social behavior on the Internet. Kiesler and colleagues proposed that disinhibited behavior in CMC could be accounted for by anonymity (Kiesler et al., 1984). Based on deindividuation theory, it was argued that visual and auditory anonymity of online interaction partners masked both personality and culture. In a mixture of elements from classical and contemporary deindividuation theory, this was hypothesized to reduce self-awareness and depersonalize one’s audience, causing deregulated and antinormative behavior (Kiesler et al., 1984; Siegel et al., 1986).
39
In one study, for example, isolated individuals displayed more aggression than groups did (see Postmes and Spears, 1998 for a review). In another study, Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1982) induced deindividuation by instructing participants repeatedly to focus attention outward. In addition to attentional focus, participants were seated in a dimly lit room with loud rock music playing, verbal interaction was encouraged, and the groups played exciting video games. In contrast, participants in an internal attention focus condition were told not to interact, performed individual tasks, and played nonarousing games in a well-lit quiet room. Results showed that when attention was focused outward, higher levels of aggression were obtained. More recently, deindividuation research expanded into the realm of CMC. Anecdotal reports of early CMC usage suggested that users were more likely to be disinhibited when they interacted online. Some initial studies appeared to confirm this. Siegel et al. (1986) conducted an experiment studying three-person groups who were presented with a choicedilemma and asked to reach consensus. These decisions were made face to face, via an anonymous CMC system, and via a nonanonymous CMC system. Consistent with deindividuation theory, interactions via a computer exhibited both more polarized opinions (i.e., more extreme shifts away from members’ initial choices) and more disinhibited and aggressive behavior than face-to-face communications. But in CMC there was also conflicting evidence regarding the fundamental processes thought to promote deindividuation. In their empirical investigation of self-awareness in CMC Matheson and Zanna (1988) showed that, relative to face-toface interactions, CMC showed significantly higher levels of private self-awareness – a finding opposite to deindividuation expectations. Thus, there was mixed evidence regarding deindividuation in CMC.
Support for Deindividuation Theory Deindividuation Research Several influential studies were conducted to illustrate the force of deindividuation. For example, Zimbardo (1969) reports a study that inspired much subsequent deindividuation research. In one study, participants were rendered anonymous by clothing them in oversized lab coats and hoods, compared with normal clothes and name tags in the control condition. The participants’ task was to shock a confederate in a situation similar to the classic Milgram studies on obedience. In a first experiment using groups of female students, Zimbardo demonstrated that anonymous participants shocked longer (and therefore more painfully) than identifiable participants, in confirmation of his theory. Aware of the limitations of Zimbardo’s research in terms of external validity, Edward Diener and colleagues devised more naturalistic contexts in which to test the theory. In some studies, groups of participants were required to ‘test’ a so-called pacifist, trained to remain nonresponsive, by hitting the pacifist with foam swords and so forth. The researchers claimed this provided a measure of aggression that was more ecologically valid for crowd behavior. Results were inconsistent, however.
These examples illustrate that empirical investigations of deindividuation theory searched for evidence of deindividuation in ever more exotic social situations. Although several studies show effects that appear to be consistent with deindividuation theory, many studies failed to support it, and many reported contrary results. For example, Zimbardo’s (1969) original paper reports that a replication of the study mentioned earlier obtained the exact opposite results. Also in the case of CMC, evidence was inconsistent. In contrast to some positive findings (Siegel et al., 1986), there are other studies showing that online anonymity can sometimes promote more conservative, cautious decisions and prosocial behavior (e.g., Hiltz et al., 1989). Thus, evidence for deindividuation theory appears to be mixed. A meta-analysis of the deindividuation literature confirms this impression. This study examines 60 tests of deindividuation theory and concludes that there is insufficient support for deindividuation theory (Postmes and Spears, 1998). Disinhibition and antinormative behavior are not more common in large groups and (crowded) anonymous settings. Moreover, there is no evidence that deindividuation is associated with reduced self-awareness, or even that reduced self-awareness increases disinhibition.
40
Deindividuation, Psychology of
Overall, then, deindividuation theory does not receive sufficient empirical support.
Reconceptualizing Deindividuation One likely reason for the lack of support for the deindividuation concept is that the theory is based on Le Bon’s characterization of the crowd, which is fundamentally flawed. According to Le Bon, collective behavior is always irrational: the individual in the crowd loses cognitive control. Deindividuation theory accepts this notion. For example, Diener argued that crowd members are “similar to the stimulus-response organism of early behaviorism, with reduced conscious mediation” (1980: p. 230). This negative and disorderly view of collective behavior stands in stark contrast to historical analyses of the crowd, which stress the crowd’s capacity for restraint and orderly behavior (e.g., Rudé, 1964). Moreover, these historical analyses accentuate that the crowd often acts on the basis of moral principles and popular consensus (see also McPhail, 1991). Thus, a compelling case can be made that collective behavior is not unrestrained (as argued by deindividuation theory) but rather restrained by normative processes. The implication is that collective behavior is under conscious control, and far from irrational and unrestrained. Recent social psychological research supports such a normative analysis of collective behavior. In deindividuation studies, for example, people are more likely to follow local group norms in situations where they are anonymous or where self-awareness is low (Postmes and Spears, 1998). The idea that behavior could be the result of local group norms was considered explicitly by Johnson and Downing (1979) who showed that the effects of anonymity depended on the normative cues in the environment. Participants were made anonymous by means of mask and overalls reminiscent of the Ku Klux Klan (similar to Zimbardo’s uniforms) or by means of nurses’ uniforms. Although compared to the control condition participants shocked somewhat more when dressed in the Ku Klux Klan uniforms, they actually shocked less when dressed as nurses. This finding illustrates that groups are sensitive to normative cues associated with the social context. Similarly, in CMC the phenomenon of online flaming has been interpreted as a locally normative behavior which may be experienced positively within specific subcultures (Postmes et al., 2000). This finding that crowds act normatively, prompted a reinterpretation of the effects found in deindividuation research. The Social Identity Model of ‘Deindividuation’ Effects (SIDE; Reicher et al., 1995) uses social identity processes to explain deindividuation phenomena. Central to SIDE is the idea (derived from self-categorization theory) that there is not one unitary self-concept, but rather that the self is multifaceted. Specifically, the self contains not just one’s personal identity (i.e., the unique part of the self), but is also composed of many different social identities which the individual shares with groups of others (Reicher et al., 1995). SIDE argues that conditions of anonymity (or CMC) do not cause a loss of self, but that they can shift a person from an individual identity to a collective identity, provided that people are members of the same group or crowd. For example, being in a demonstration will accentuate the unity of participants if they rally behind
their cause – seemingly oblivious to strong divisions and disagreements that may exist between them. This common group membership may become accentuated if an opposing group (such as the police) acts upon the crowd as if it were one, for example by blocking its way or attempting to contain it. The strong adherence to this common group membership, which emerges over the course of such events, explains why normative regulation within the crowd may occur (Reicher, 1987). Thus, whereas deindividuation theory argues that the crowd causes a loss of identity, leading to disinhibition, SIDE argues that the crowd causes a shift from a personal identity to a social identity (shared with the crowd) leading to social regulation of behavior. This may explain the normative restraint within the crowd as observed by historians, as well as the normative restraint observed in experimental studies of deindividuation. Although the SIDE model originated as an alternative perspective on crowd behavior, it was also applied to normative regulation online. Processes described in the SIDE model revolve around the psychological rather than physical presence of one’s group. This means that the SIDE model can be applied to contexts in which others are co-present (such as crowds) just as easily as situations where others are not co-present (such as CMC). In order to understand online ‘deindividuation effects’ we need to first understand whether communicators think of themselves as an individual or a group member. Online, there are many contexts in which personal identity is likely to be salient. Under such conditions, when the self is thought of as unique and different, the SIDE model argues that online anonymity provides people with the means to follow personal standards and norms. But there are also many online situations in which a clear social identity is available and salient. Under such conditions, anonymity and the physical absence of others can paradoxically amplify the influence of the group and its norms. This is because individual group members (and their idiosyncrasies) are not visible, so all that remains is the unifying idea of ‘us.’ CMC is therefore an unlikely but fertile forum for the growth and expression of social identities, facilitating increased group cohesion and commitment (and thereby, SIDE foreshadowed the social side of Internet). Thus, according to SIDE, computer-based interactions do not lead to a loss of self, but amplify it. CMC provides the cognitive conditions which allow greater freedom to be true to the personal self, as well as to their group. In sum, there is no consistent empirical evidence that supports deindividuation theory either in real-life groups and crowds or in online behavior. There is no consistent relation between anonymity and disinhibition. It appears to be more productive to think of deindividuation not as a loss of self, but as a shift to a different aspect of the self and the norms associated with it. In the case of the crowd, this means a shift from personal to a shared social identity. Online, in situations where people interact with others of the same group, a similar accentuation or shift toward a shared social identity can be found. The ability of SIDE to explain diverse phenomena – including behavior in the presence and absence of others – attests to its utility. Ultimately, this reconceptualization emphasizes that explaining deindividuation phenomena as a loss of self is too simplistic. Diverse social and cognitive phenomena come together to influence the norms that people respond to in different contexts. There is no evidence of a loss
Deindividuation, Psychology of
of self in the crowd. Rather, the crowd provides individuals with an avenue for the expression of collective identities, directed and inhibited by social norms.
See also: Aggression, Social Psychology of; Collective Action; Collective Behavior, Social Psychology of; Dehumanization; Group Processes, Social Psychology of; Mass Killings and Genocide, Psychology of; Self-Categorization Theory; Social Identity in Social Psychology; Social Movements: A Social Psychological Perspective; Social Psychological Theory, History of; Social Psychology.
Bibliography Diener, Edward, 1980. Deindividuation: the absence of self-awareness and selfregulation in group members. In: Paulus, Paul B. (Ed.), The Psychology of Group Influence. Lawrence Erlbaum, Hillsdale, NJ. Festinger, Leon, Pepitone, Angelica, Newcomb, Theodore, 1952. Some consequences of de-individuation in a group. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 47, 382–389. Hiltz, Starr R., Turoff, Murray, Johnson, Kenneth, 1989. Experiments in group decision making, 3: disinhibition, deindividuation, and group process in pen name and real name computer conferences. Decision Support Systems 5, 217–232. Johnson, R.D., Downing, L.L., 1979. Deindividuation and valence of cues: effects on prosocial and antisocial behavior. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 37, 1532–1538. Kiesler, Sara, Siegel, Jane, McGuire, Timothy W., 1984. Social psychological aspects of computer-mediated communication. American Psychologist 39, 1123–1134.
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Le Bon, Gustave, 1995. The Crowd: A Study of the Popular Mind (Original work published in 1895). Transaction Publishers, London. Matheson, Kimberly, Zanna, Mark P., 1988. The impact of computer-mediated communication on self-awareness. Computers in Human Behavior 4, 221–233. McPhail, Clark, 1991. The Myth of the Madding Crowd. De Gruyter, New York. Nye, Robert A., 1975. The Origins of Crowd Psychology: Gustave Le Bon and the Crisis of Mass Democracy in the Third Republic. Sage, Beverly Hills, CA. Postmes, Tom, Spears, Russell, 1998. Deindividuation and anti-normative behavior: a meta-analysis. Psychological Bulletin 123, 238–259. Postmes, Tom, Spears, Russell, Lea, Martin, 2000. The formation of group norms in computer-mediated communication. Human Communication Research 26, 341–371. Prentice-Dunn, Steve, Rogers, Ronald W., 1982. Effects of public and private selfawareness on deindividuation and aggression. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 43, 503–513. Reicher, Steven D., 1987. Crowd behavior as social action. In: Turner, John C., Hogg, Michael A., Oakes, Penelope J., Reicher, Steven D., Wetherell, Margaret S. (Eds.), Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-categorization Theory. Basil Blackwell, Oxford, England, pp. 171–202. Reicher, Steven D., Spears, Russell, Postmes, Tom, 1995. A social identity model of deindividuation phenomena. European Review of Social Psychology 6, 161–198. Rudé, George, 1964. The Crowd in History: A Study of Popular Disturbances in France and England, 1730–1848. Wiley, New York. Siegel, Jane, Dubrovsky, Vitaly, Kiesler, Sara, McGuire, Timothy W., 1986. Group processes in computer-mediated communication. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Making 37, 157–187. Zimbardo, Philip G., 1969. The human choice: individuation, reason, and order vs. deindividuation, impulse and chaos. In: Arnold, W.J., Levine, D. (Eds.), Nebraska Symposium on Motivation, vol. 17. University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln, NE, pp. 237–307.
Abstract Deindividuation is a characteristic of the individual in the crowd. It is a psychological state of decreased self-evaluation, causing antinormative and disinhibited behavior. The impact of deindividuation theory in science and society (especially twentieth-century politics) makes it one of social science’s more influential contributions. Deindividuation theory is rooted in some of the earliest social psychological theorizing, more than a century ago. It seeks to explain the apparent transformation of rational individuals into an unruly group or crowd. It posits that the group provides an environment in which the individual – submerged and anonymous – suffers from a loss of self-awareness. Deindividuation hinders reflection about the consequences of actions, rendering social norms impotent while increasing suggestibility to random outside influences. Despite its status and impact, empirical support for deindividuation theory is minimal. Recently, this lack of support has been attributed to the faulty assumption that crowds cause a loss of self. Instead, research suggests that ‘deindividuation’ marks a transition from individual identity to social dimensions of the self. This transition to a social identity may increase responsiveness to social norms particular to the crowd, instead of decreasing responsiveness to generic social norms, as suggested by deindividuation theory.
The Psychology of Deindividuation According to deindividuation theory, the psychological state of deindividuation is aroused when individuals join crowds or large groups. The state is characterized by diminished awareness of self and individuality. This in turn reduces an individual’s self-restraint and normative regulation of behavior. In social psychology, deindividuation is a major theory of group behavior: it provides an explanation of collective behavior of violent crowds, mindless hooligans, and the lynch mob. In addition, deindividuation has been associated with other social phenomena such as genocide, stereotyping, and disinhibition in other settings such as computer-mediated communication (CMC). Later, the theoretical evolution of deindividuation is sketched, followed by a brief impression of the empirical support for this theory. Finally, recent research is discussed, which argues for a reconceptualization of deindividuation: It appears deindividuation is not a loss of individual identity, but may be better construed as a transition to a social identity.
Theoretical Evolution of Deindividuation Deindividuation theory is rooted in the earliest works of social psychology, in particular Gustave Le Bon’s (1895/1995) crowd theory (see Postmes and Spears, 1998; for a review). In his book The Crowd, Le Bon vividly describes how the individual in the crowd is psychologically transformed. He proposes that the psychological mechanisms of anonymity, suggestibility, and contagion transform an assembly into a ‘psychological crowd.’ In the crowd the collective mind takes possession of the individual. As a consequence, a crowd member is reduced to an inferior form of evolution: irrational, fickle, and suggestible. The individual submerged in the crowd loses self-control and becomes a mindless puppet, possibly controlled by the crowd’s leader, and capable of performing any act, however atrocious or heroic.
38
Although Le Bon’s theory has been extensively criticized, the influence of The Crowd in science and society is difficult to underestimate. The sales of this book are among the highest of scientific texts. In science, his analysis has inspired many theories of collective behavior, for example those of Freud, McDougall, Blumer, and Allport. In society, Le Bon’s influence has been especially poignant: His theory also informed numerous politicians including Mussolini and Hitler, whose ideologies resonated with Le Bon’s emphasis on racial factors (Nye, 1975). The field of social psychology revived Le Bon’s ideas in the 1950s. They were couched in more scientific terms as a theory of ‘deindividuation.’ Initially, it was argued that deindividuation occurs when individuals in a group are not paid attention to as individuals (Festinger et al., 1952). Thus, being unaccountable in a crowd or group has the psychological consequence of reducing inner restraints, and increasing behavior that is usually inhibited. The causes of deindividuation were gradually extended from anonymity in groups to other contextual factors, such as reductions of responsibility, arousal, sensory overload, a lack of contextual structure or predictability, and altered consciousness due to drugs or alcohol (Zimbardo, 1969). Thus, although Le Bon’s ideas were the blueprint for the deindividuation concept, the situations that cause deindividuation were gradually expanded to include other settings than the crowd. Deindividuation theory differs from Le Bon’s theory in one further important respect: The consequence of deindividuation is not that the loss of individuality is replaced by a collective mind that guides the individual’s actions. Rather, the loss of individuality leads to a total loss of self-awareness, and this incapacity for introspection releases a person from internalized moral restraints to produce emotional, impulsive, irrational, regressive, and intense behavior. In the 1970s, deindividuation theory became a popular focus of scientific research, encouraged and inspired in part by the collective disorders characteristic of that period. However,
International Encyclopedia of the Social & Behavioral Sciences, 2nd edition, Volume 6
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-097086-8.24015-4
Deindividuation, Psychology of
the empirical support for deindividuation theory was inconsistent. In particular, there was contradictory evidence regarding the influence of anonymity in groups, and there was virtually no evidence for the psychological state of deindividuation (Diener, 1980). Indeed, it appeared that this psychological state, which by all accounts appeared to be easily induced, was more elusive than initially conceived. In response to these empirical obstacles, deindividuation theory was gradually modified and specified over the course of the 1980s. In particular, the psychological underpinnings of deindividuation have been narrowed down. In the original version of the theory, deindividuation was closely bound up with a lack of accountability due to submergence in the crowd. Thus, the focus was on anonymity in the group as the most important factor in producing deindividuation. But contemporary formulations of the theory shifted the focus to reduced (private) self-awareness as the central feature of deindividuation (Diener, 1980; Prentice-Dunn and Rogers, 1982). When one is self-aware, the focus of one’s attention is on the (private) aspects of oneself, such as one’s attitudes and norms. This self-focus is assumed to be required in order for people to selfregulate. But irrespective of whether anonymity or selfawareness is the crux of deindividuation, both classical and contemporary perspectives argue that deindividuation leads to antinormative and disinhibited behavior. In more recent years, the phenomenon of deindividuation has been applied to social behavior on the Internet. Kiesler and colleagues proposed that disinhibited behavior in CMC could be accounted for by anonymity (Kiesler et al., 1984). Based on deindividuation theory, it was argued that visual and auditory anonymity of online interaction partners masked both personality and culture. In a mixture of elements from classical and contemporary deindividuation theory, this was hypothesized to reduce self-awareness and depersonalize one’s audience, causing deregulated and antinormative behavior (Kiesler et al., 1984; Siegel et al., 1986).
39
In one study, for example, isolated individuals displayed more aggression than groups did (see Postmes and Spears, 1998 for a review). In another study, Prentice-Dunn and Rogers (1982) induced deindividuation by instructing participants repeatedly to focus attention outward. In addition to attentional focus, participants were seated in a dimly lit room with loud rock music playing, verbal interaction was encouraged, and the groups played exciting video games. In contrast, participants in an internal attention focus condition were told not to interact, performed individual tasks, and played nonarousing games in a well-lit quiet room. Results showed that when attention was focused outward, higher levels of aggression were obtained. More recently, deindividuation research expanded into the realm of CMC. Anecdotal reports of early CMC usage suggested that users were more likely to be disinhibited when they interacted online. Some initial studies appeared to confirm this. Siegel et al. (1986) conducted an experiment studying three-person groups who were presented with a choicedilemma and asked to reach consensus. These decisions were made face to face, via an anonymous CMC system, and via a nonanonymous CMC system. Consistent with deindividuation theory, interactions via a computer exhibited both more polarized opinions (i.e., more extreme shifts away from members’ initial choices) and more disinhibited and aggressive behavior than face-to-face communications. But in CMC there was also conflicting evidence regarding the fundamental processes thought to promote deindividuation. In their empirical investigation of self-awareness in CMC Matheson and Zanna (1988) showed that, relative to face-toface interactions, CMC showed significantly higher levels of private self-awareness – a finding opposite to deindividuation expectations. Thus, there was mixed evidence regarding deindividuation in CMC.
Support for Deindividuation Theory Deindividuation Research Several influential studies were conducted to illustrate the force of deindividuation. For example, Zimbardo (1969) reports a study that inspired much subsequent deindividuation research. In one study, participants were rendered anonymous by clothing them in oversized lab coats and hoods, compared with normal clothes and name tags in the control condition. The participants’ task was to shock a confederate in a situation similar to the classic Milgram studies on obedience. In a first experiment using groups of female students, Zimbardo demonstrated that anonymous participants shocked longer (and therefore more painfully) than identifiable participants, in confirmation of his theory. Aware of the limitations of Zimbardo’s research in terms of external validity, Edward Diener and colleagues devised more naturalistic contexts in which to test the theory. In some studies, groups of participants were required to ‘test’ a so-called pacifist, trained to remain nonresponsive, by hitting the pacifist with foam swords and so forth. The researchers claimed this provided a measure of aggression that was more ecologically valid for crowd behavior. Results were inconsistent, however.
These examples illustrate that empirical investigations of deindividuation theory searched for evidence of deindividuation in ever more exotic social situations. Although several studies show effects that appear to be consistent with deindividuation theory, many studies failed to support it, and many reported contrary results. For example, Zimbardo’s (1969) original paper reports that a replication of the study mentioned earlier obtained the exact opposite results. Also in the case of CMC, evidence was inconsistent. In contrast to some positive findings (Siegel et al., 1986), there are other studies showing that online anonymity can sometimes promote more conservative, cautious decisions and prosocial behavior (e.g., Hiltz et al., 1989). Thus, evidence for deindividuation theory appears to be mixed. A meta-analysis of the deindividuation literature confirms this impression. This study examines 60 tests of deindividuation theory and concludes that there is insufficient support for deindividuation theory (Postmes and Spears, 1998). Disinhibition and antinormative behavior are not more common in large groups and (crowded) anonymous settings. Moreover, there is no evidence that deindividuation is associated with reduced self-awareness, or even that reduced self-awareness increases disinhibition.
40
Deindividuation, Psychology of
Overall, then, deindividuation theory does not receive sufficient empirical support.
Reconceptualizing Deindividuation One likely reason for the lack of support for the deindividuation concept is that the theory is based on Le Bon’s characterization of the crowd, which is fundamentally flawed. According to Le Bon, collective behavior is always irrational: the individual in the crowd loses cognitive control. Deindividuation theory accepts this notion. For example, Diener argued that crowd members are “similar to the stimulus-response organism of early behaviorism, with reduced conscious mediation” (1980: p. 230). This negative and disorderly view of collective behavior stands in stark contrast to historical analyses of the crowd, which stress the crowd’s capacity for restraint and orderly behavior (e.g., Rudé, 1964). Moreover, these historical analyses accentuate that the crowd often acts on the basis of moral principles and popular consensus (see also McPhail, 1991). Thus, a compelling case can be made that collective behavior is not unrestrained (as argued by deindividuation theory) but rather restrained by normative processes. The implication is that collective behavior is under conscious control, and far from irrational and unrestrained. Recent social psychological research supports such a normative analysis of collective behavior. In deindividuation studies, for example, people are more likely to follow local group norms in situations where they are anonymous or where self-awareness is low (Postmes and Spears, 1998). The idea that behavior could be the result of local group norms was considered explicitly by Johnson and Downing (1979) who showed that the effects of anonymity depended on the normative cues in the environment. Participants were made anonymous by means of mask and overalls reminiscent of the Ku Klux Klan (similar to Zimbardo’s uniforms) or by means of nurses’ uniforms. Although compared to the control condition participants shocked somewhat more when dressed in the Ku Klux Klan uniforms, they actually shocked less when dressed as nurses. This finding illustrates that groups are sensitive to normative cues associated with the social context. Similarly, in CMC the phenomenon of online flaming has been interpreted as a locally normative behavior which may be experienced positively within specific subcultures (Postmes et al., 2000). This finding that crowds act normatively, prompted a reinterpretation of the effects found in deindividuation research. The Social Identity Model of ‘Deindividuation’ Effects (SIDE; Reicher et al., 1995) uses social identity processes to explain deindividuation phenomena. Central to SIDE is the idea (derived from self-categorization theory) that there is not one unitary self-concept, but rather that the self is multifaceted. Specifically, the self contains not just one’s personal identity (i.e., the unique part of the self), but is also composed of many different social identities which the individual shares with groups of others (Reicher et al., 1995). SIDE argues that conditions of anonymity (or CMC) do not cause a loss of self, but that they can shift a person from an individual identity to a collective identity, provided that people are members of the same group or crowd. For example, being in a demonstration will accentuate the unity of participants if they rally behind
their cause – seemingly oblivious to strong divisions and disagreements that may exist between them. This common group membership may become accentuated if an opposing group (such as the police) acts upon the crowd as if it were one, for example by blocking its way or attempting to contain it. The strong adherence to this common group membership, which emerges over the course of such events, explains why normative regulation within the crowd may occur (Reicher, 1987). Thus, whereas deindividuation theory argues that the crowd causes a loss of identity, leading to disinhibition, SIDE argues that the crowd causes a shift from a personal identity to a social identity (shared with the crowd) leading to social regulation of behavior. This may explain the normative restraint within the crowd as observed by historians, as well as the normative restraint observed in experimental studies of deindividuation. Although the SIDE model originated as an alternative perspective on crowd behavior, it was also applied to normative regulation online. Processes described in the SIDE model revolve around the psychological rather than physical presence of one’s group. This means that the SIDE model can be applied to contexts in which others are co-present (such as crowds) just as easily as situations where others are not co-present (such as CMC). In order to understand online ‘deindividuation effects’ we need to first understand whether communicators think of themselves as an individual or a group member. Online, there are many contexts in which personal identity is likely to be salient. Under such conditions, when the self is thought of as unique and different, the SIDE model argues that online anonymity provides people with the means to follow personal standards and norms. But there are also many online situations in which a clear social identity is available and salient. Under such conditions, anonymity and the physical absence of others can paradoxically amplify the influence of the group and its norms. This is because individual group members (and their idiosyncrasies) are not visible, so all that remains is the unifying idea of ‘us.’ CMC is therefore an unlikely but fertile forum for the growth and expression of social identities, facilitating increased group cohesion and commitment (and thereby, SIDE foreshadowed the social side of Internet). Thus, according to SIDE, computer-based interactions do not lead to a loss of self, but amplify it. CMC provides the cognitive conditions which allow greater freedom to be true to the personal self, as well as to their group. In sum, there is no consistent empirical evidence that supports deindividuation theory either in real-life groups and crowds or in online behavior. There is no consistent relation between anonymity and disinhibition. It appears to be more productive to think of deindividuation not as a loss of self, but as a shift to a different aspect of the self and the norms associated with it. In the case of the crowd, this means a shift from personal to a shared social identity. Online, in situations where people interact with others of the same group, a similar accentuation or shift toward a shared social identity can be found. The ability of SIDE to explain diverse phenomena – including behavior in the presence and absence of others – attests to its utility. Ultimately, this reconceptualization emphasizes that explaining deindividuation phenomena as a loss of self is too simplistic. Diverse social and cognitive phenomena come together to influence the norms that people respond to in different contexts. There is no evidence of a loss
Deindividuation, Psychology of
of self in the crowd. Rather, the crowd provides individuals with an avenue for the expression of collective identities, directed and inhibited by social norms.
See also: Aggression, Social Psychology of; Collective Action; Collective Behavior, Social Psychology of; Dehumanization; Group Processes, Social Psychology of; Mass Killings and Genocide, Psychology of; Self-Categorization Theory; Social Identity in Social Psychology; Social Movements: A Social Psychological Perspective; Social Psychological Theory, History of; Social Psychology.
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