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Democracies at War
The Social Science Journal 40 (2003) 343–356
Book reviews Democracies at War Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, 283 pages Reiter and Stam have provided international conflict scholars with an excellent empirical analysis of democracies at war. The book consists of eight chapters that deal with related but different aspects of democracies at war. Their chapters address: “Democracies Fourth Virture”—the fact that they win over three quarters of the wars they enter; “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory”; “Democracy and Battlefield Success; Balancers or Bystanders?” “The Lack of Fraternal Democratic Assistance during War; Winning Wars on Factory Floors?” “The Myth of the Democratic Arsenals of Victory”; “Democracy, Consent, and the Path to War”; “The Declining Advantages of Democracy: When Consent Erodes”; and finally, “Why Democracies Win Wars.” Once the authors determine that democracies do indeed win most of the wars they participate in their goal is to find out why they have such a high rate of wins. Of course, one must first set aside the fact that all sides in wars loose and even the winner often looses a great deal in so many ways. This is a major point to have to sideline. The authors use mainstream, accepted datasets such as Polity, Correlates of War (COW), battle data from the 1990 Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO), and the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA), as well as a wide range of literature recognized for its case study value. This reviewer finds the methodological approach taken by the authors to be generally sound, keeping in mind that they are including a large number of cases. They examine 197 cases from 1816 to 1992, each having a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths. They disaggregated World War I, World War II, and the Vietnam War to make the analysis more historically accurate. The authors should be commended for applying different statistical models which are discussed at length in the chapters. Conventional views about democracies at war hold that they are successful in war because they readily aid each other, and they out-produce the enemy. Both of these contentions are shown by Reiter and Stam to be false. Instead, the authors show democracies win wars because they mostly enter wars they can win, and they have political systems that facilitate soldier and leader initiative. They enter wars carefully because there is an important degree of accountability to the voters. Reiter and Stam do not overlook the aggressive wars by democracies such as the U.S. attacks on Native American nations and the Spanish–American War in Cuba and the Philippines. They also point out that covert operations are often launched against democratically elected govern0362-3319/03/$ – see front matter © 2003 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
344
Book reviews / The Social Science Journal 40 (2003) 343–356
ments and officials. Covert operations do not have the same record of success for democracies when compared to overt wars. Democracies do not always initiate wars from the moral high ground, rather, as Reiter and Stam state, “there are a disturbing number of cases of democracies initiating wars to advance national power, to create or expand empire, and to extinguish inconveniently located peoples.” There are a few minor problems with the datasets employed. For example the HERO dataset leaves out of the African campaigns in WWI as well as some other conflicts. The assignment of Libya as “target” in the Ugandan–Tanzanian War (1978–1979) is problematic. The Soviet–Afghan War is left out, and the Italo–Ethiopian War (1935–1936) is more complex than presented. There are a few other problems with the cases, but whether or not they would impact on the authors’ conclusions is very doubtful. Dick Cheney is incorrectly titled the American Secretary of State when he was, in fact, Secretary of Defense; actually James Baker was Secretary of State during the Gulf War. On page 70, Chapter 3 “minority Bathists” is incorrect, as it should be minority Sunnis or even Al-Tikritis. One could argue that the authors’ definition of democracy is too weak, so weak that it really includes Republics and Constitutional Monarchies with limited republicanism or very limited democracy. Along these critical lines, one could also argue that the finding that democracies do not have higher levels of war material needs to be re-examined with focus on the post-WWII wars. Finally, one danger is that some readers will assume the general finding will fit a particular case. Each war has complicated conditions that make military-political difficulties. Just because democracies have won roughly 80% of their wars does not mean that any particular war entered is likely to be included in the 80%. Many complexities still exist in winning a war. These few criticisms aside, the authors have written a fascinating, empirically-based study that will be interesting to scholars and students of international conflict. As such, they provide an excellent contribution to the academy. I would not hesitate to make this book a required text for a graduate level seminar on international conflict. Finally, the authors have written and presented their study in an organized and very readable manner. This reviewer commends Reiter and Stam for their contribution to the study of international conflict. Daniel G. Acheson-Brown Department of Political Science Eastern New Mexico University Portales, NM 88130, USA doi: 10.1016/S0362-3319(03)00015-6 The Anatomy of Racial Inequality Glenn C. Loury; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, 226 pages Are terms such as racial prejudice and discrimination passe with regard to a discourse of racial inequality in America? Loury would argue that there is a need to analyze these issues differently. In his book The Anatomy of Racial Inequality, Loury uses the power of economics, politics, history, and culture, as well as different levels of analysis to help his readers to make a paradigm shift with regard to inequality. That is, how racial prejudice and discrimination are socially constructed. He begins his analysis by using individual and societal levels of analysis
Book reviews Democracies at War Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam; Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002, 283 pages Reiter and Stam have provided international conflict scholars with an excellent empirical analysis of democracies at war. The book consists of eight chapters that deal with related but different aspects of democracies at war. Their chapters address: “Democracies Fourth Virture”—the fact that they win over three quarters of the wars they enter; “Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory”; “Democracy and Battlefield Success; Balancers or Bystanders?” “The Lack of Fraternal Democratic Assistance during War; Winning Wars on Factory Floors?” “The Myth of the Democratic Arsenals of Victory”; “Democracy, Consent, and the Path to War”; “The Declining Advantages of Democracy: When Consent Erodes”; and finally, “Why Democracies Win Wars.” Once the authors determine that democracies do indeed win most of the wars they participate in their goal is to find out why they have such a high rate of wins. Of course, one must first set aside the fact that all sides in wars loose and even the winner often looses a great deal in so many ways. This is a major point to have to sideline. The authors use mainstream, accepted datasets such as Polity, Correlates of War (COW), battle data from the 1990 Historical Evaluation and Research Organization (HERO), and the U.S. Army Concepts Analysis Agency (CAA), as well as a wide range of literature recognized for its case study value. This reviewer finds the methodological approach taken by the authors to be generally sound, keeping in mind that they are including a large number of cases. They examine 197 cases from 1816 to 1992, each having a minimum of 1,000 battle deaths. They disaggregated World War I, World War II, and the Vietnam War to make the analysis more historically accurate. The authors should be commended for applying different statistical models which are discussed at length in the chapters. Conventional views about democracies at war hold that they are successful in war because they readily aid each other, and they out-produce the enemy. Both of these contentions are shown by Reiter and Stam to be false. Instead, the authors show democracies win wars because they mostly enter wars they can win, and they have political systems that facilitate soldier and leader initiative. They enter wars carefully because there is an important degree of accountability to the voters. Reiter and Stam do not overlook the aggressive wars by democracies such as the U.S. attacks on Native American nations and the Spanish–American War in Cuba and the Philippines. They also point out that covert operations are often launched against democratically elected govern0362-3319/03/$ – see front matter © 2003 Elsevier Science Inc. All rights reserved.
344
Book reviews / The Social Science Journal 40 (2003) 343–356
ments and officials. Covert operations do not have the same record of success for democracies when compared to overt wars. Democracies do not always initiate wars from the moral high ground, rather, as Reiter and Stam state, “there are a disturbing number of cases of democracies initiating wars to advance national power, to create or expand empire, and to extinguish inconveniently located peoples.” There are a few minor problems with the datasets employed. For example the HERO dataset leaves out of the African campaigns in WWI as well as some other conflicts. The assignment of Libya as “target” in the Ugandan–Tanzanian War (1978–1979) is problematic. The Soviet–Afghan War is left out, and the Italo–Ethiopian War (1935–1936) is more complex than presented. There are a few other problems with the cases, but whether or not they would impact on the authors’ conclusions is very doubtful. Dick Cheney is incorrectly titled the American Secretary of State when he was, in fact, Secretary of Defense; actually James Baker was Secretary of State during the Gulf War. On page 70, Chapter 3 “minority Bathists” is incorrect, as it should be minority Sunnis or even Al-Tikritis. One could argue that the authors’ definition of democracy is too weak, so weak that it really includes Republics and Constitutional Monarchies with limited republicanism or very limited democracy. Along these critical lines, one could also argue that the finding that democracies do not have higher levels of war material needs to be re-examined with focus on the post-WWII wars. Finally, one danger is that some readers will assume the general finding will fit a particular case. Each war has complicated conditions that make military-political difficulties. Just because democracies have won roughly 80% of their wars does not mean that any particular war entered is likely to be included in the 80%. Many complexities still exist in winning a war. These few criticisms aside, the authors have written a fascinating, empirically-based study that will be interesting to scholars and students of international conflict. As such, they provide an excellent contribution to the academy. I would not hesitate to make this book a required text for a graduate level seminar on international conflict. Finally, the authors have written and presented their study in an organized and very readable manner. This reviewer commends Reiter and Stam for their contribution to the study of international conflict. Daniel G. Acheson-Brown Department of Political Science Eastern New Mexico University Portales, NM 88130, USA doi: 10.1016/S0362-3319(03)00015-6 The Anatomy of Racial Inequality Glenn C. Loury; Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002, 226 pages Are terms such as racial prejudice and discrimination passe with regard to a discourse of racial inequality in America? Loury would argue that there is a need to analyze these issues differently. In his book The Anatomy of Racial Inequality, Loury uses the power of economics, politics, history, and culture, as well as different levels of analysis to help his readers to make a paradigm shift with regard to inequality. That is, how racial prejudice and discrimination are socially constructed. He begins his analysis by using individual and societal levels of analysis