Designerly ways of muddling through

Journal of Business Research 65 (2012) 729–739

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Journal of Business Research

Designerly ways of muddling through Jarmila A. Kopecka a,⁎, Sicco C. Santema b, Jan A. Buijs c a b c

Delft University of Technology, Sicco C. Santema, Delft University of Technology, Jan A. Buijs, Delft University of Technology, The Netherlands Faculty of Aerospace Engineering, Delft University of Technology, Kluyverweg 1, 2600 GB Delft, The Netherlands Faculty of Industrial Design Engineering, Department of Product Innovation Management, Delft University of Technology, Landbergstraat 15, 2628 CE Delft, The Netherlands

a r t i c l e

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Article history: Received 1 April 2010 Received in revised form 1 October 2010 Accepted 1 December 2010 Available online 15 January 2011 Keywords: Disjointed incrementalism Design process Decision making Case vignettes

a b s t r a c t This paper identifies similarities and differences between incrementalism and design problem solving. The discussion consists of two parts: a theoretical part and two case vignettes. In the theoretical part, the paper examines the six components of Lindblom's strategy of disjointed incrementalism in the literature on the design process and product development, and identifies the common themes. The case vignettes provide examples of “muddling through” moments in the practice of design projects. The paper concludes with suggestions for further research. © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction The title of the paper paraphrases the concept of the ‘designerly ways of knowing’ (Cross, 1982, 1996, 2007), and the related concept of ‘reflection in action’ (Argyris and Schön, 1978). The present paper seeks to provide a first insight into the similarities and differences between the strategy of disjointed incrementalism in governmental policy making (Lindblom, 1959, 1968, 1979) and the characteristics of problem solving in the process of design and product development. It is worth recalling that in his later work Charles E. Lindblom (1992, pp. 4-5) describes the term problem solving as a misnomer. "One ought to speak of problem attacking or grappling […]. If one asks for a specification of the necessary steps in problem solving, one actually wants to know what makes it succeed." The authors follow the advice of Weiss and Woodhouse (1992) to return to the spirit rather than the letter of Lindblom's work. Therefore, the paper aims at exploring the role and significance of ‘muddling through’ processes in the context of design. Before proceeding to the body of the paper, a brief review of the definitions of design and product development underlying this paper may be helpful. The definition of design by Heskett (2005) shows the shifts of meaning when using the word ‘design’ in the English language: “Design is to design a design to produce a design.” As Heskett explains, ⁎ Corresponding author. Faculty of Industrial Design Engineering, Department of Product Innovation Management, Delft University of Technology, Landbergstraat 15, 2628 CE Delft, The Netherlands. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (J.A. Kopecka), [email protected] (S.C. Santema), [email protected] (J.A. Buijs). 0148-2963/$ – see front matter © 2010 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jbusres.2010.12.009

every use of the word ‘design’ in this seemingly nonsensical sentence is grammatically correct: The first is a noun indicating a general concept of a field as a whole, as in: ‘Design is important to the national economy’. The second is a verb indicating action or process: ‘She commissioned to design a new kitchen blender.’ The third is also a noun, meaning a concept or a proposal: ‘The design was proposed to a client for approval.’ The final use is again a noun indicating a finished product of some kind, the concept made actual: ‘The new VW Beatle revives a classic design’ (Heskett, 2005, p.3). The notion of design as a noun still predominates. The strategic value of design to product development as a means of differentiating a product or a service from the competitors gets increasing attention (Candi, 2008; Gemser and Leenders, 2001; Ravasi and Lojacono, 2005; Verganti, 2008, 2009). Buchanan (2004, p. 55) describes product development as “an interdisciplinary collaboration between management and design”. In the context of the present paper, the acknowledgement that design can also be a verb indicating an action of processes is of particular importance, for it shifts the attention from design as an artifact to design as a process. Design as a course of action is present in the definition of Simon (1996, p. 111): “Everyone designs who devises courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones.” The definition implies that, for example, an entrepreneur starting a new business, or a policy planner in local government can engage in the process of designing. Interestingly, design activity is also part of the Simon's definition of management decision making. According to Simon (1977), design activity is the second of the four interweaving phases that make

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up the process of management decision making. The other three phases being: intelligence activity (searching the environment for conditions calling for action), choice activity (selecting a particular course of action), and review activity (assessing past choices). Although the phase of design activity (inventing, developing and analyzing possible courses of action) precedes the choice phase, in practice, it is the choice phase (i.e., the decision) which receives most attention (Boland et al., 2008; Boland and Collopy, 2004; Nelson and Stolterman, 2003). The two definitions of Simon underline that design activity is not just about making decisions, but it is also about effectuating change. The following quotation helps illustrate the point. In 1971, Charles Eames, a wellknown American designer, made the following remarks: We wanted a more efficient technology and we got pesticides in the soil. We wanted cars and television sets and appliances and each of us thought he was the only one wanting that. Our dreams have come true at the expense of Lake Michigan. That doesn't mean that the dreams were all wrong. It means that there was an error somewhere in the wish and we have to fix it. (Albrecht, 1997, p.16) Today, some forty years later, statements expressing the desire to fix the damage done to the environment are commonplace, and part of political agendas. It is the policy makers, not the designers, who now speak daily about the environmental issues. At first, the commonality between the wish of a designer or a policy maker to fix a problem would seem to lie in their willingness to take decisions to alleviate the problem. But to what end do designers and policy makers take their decisions? A question like this draws attention to the fact that, most of the time, these decisions concern real world problems. Both managers and designers have to ‘think about the relation between what can be done and what ought to be done’ (Löwgren and Stolterman, 2004, p. 11). Their task and responsibility is to bring about a change to an unsatisfactory situation, to provide service (Nelson and Stolterman, 2003). Here again, a reminder of Charles E. Lindblom (1992, p. 4) is helpful: “Problem solving like ‘betterment’ or ‘guided social change’ often - in many contexts denotes not just action but suitable or successful action”. In optima forma, designers and policy makers are idea generators and form givers who shape artifacts, processes, and organizations. The real world problems have the characteristics of wicked (ill-defined) problems. They are unique, contingent, unpredictable and complex, and have no one good solution (Nelson and Stolterman, 2003). In conclusion, the definitions of design with which this paper begins, view design primarily as a way of bringing about change, where change is a consequence of design cause or intention (Nelson and Stolterman, 2003). By setting side by side the strategy of disjointed incrementalism in policy making and problem solving in the process of design and product development, the paper in effect compares a decision-oriented and design-oriented approach to change. Such comparison helps in understanding how disjointed incrementalism and design facilitate change. The body of the paper contains two parts: a theoretical part and two case vignettes, and draws on a selected literature review. The theoretical part opens with a brief background to Lindblom's research, and identifies the common themes between disjointed incrementalism and design problem solving. The case vignettes give examples of incrementalism in design practice. A discussion and an analysis of the vignettes follow. Suggestions for further research complete the paper. 2. Background The Lindblom's research (1959, 1968, 1979) is about decisionmaking. The term ‘muddle through’ refers to the inability and impossibility to make fully informed decisions in complex problem solving situations (such as the ones in public policy) because it is

difficult to clarify alternative policies in advance. For example, when the lack of time, money, and sources of information overwhelm the capacities of the decision makers involved. In his treatise, Lindblom notes the discrepancy between the theory of rational-comprehensive decision making and the practice of ‘successive limited comparisons’ (Lindblom, 1959, p. 84). In the latter case, policy change comes gradually, step-by-step, through a comparison of policies that differ in small degrees from one another, and from the status quo. To describe this incremental, evolutionary, approach to change, Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) coined the term ‘disjointed incrementalism’. Also known as incrementalism, it is a strategy for analysis. In this strategy, the disjointing of analysis and evaluation means that an analysis of various aspects of any one problem or problem area takes place at various points of time, with no apparent coordination or need for completeness. This process of uncoordinated steps operates by adjusting ends to means. Thus, disjointed incrementalism represents a mutually reinforcing set of adaptations which, when taken together, constitute a systematic and defensible strategy. The following observation points out the difficulty of making the strategy visible: Perhaps because they [adaptations] are often taken for granted and their mutual reinforcement is overlooked, they are not generally identified as a system. (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963, p. 82)

3. Common themes The core components of the strategy of disjointed incrementalism (Lindblom, 1979, p. 517) are: 1. Limitation of analysis to a few somewhat familiar policy alternatives; 2. An intertwining of analysis of policy goals and other values with the empirical aspects of the problem; 3. A greater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied than positive goals to be sought; 4. A sequence of trials, errors, and revised trials; 5. Analysis that explores only some, not all, of the important possible consequences of a considered alternative; 6. Fragmentation of analytical work to many (partisan) participants in policy making. Drawing on a selected literature review, the following section discusses the core components of incrementalism and finds parallels to situations in design activity. Table 1 gives an overview of the consulted literature. 3.1. Common theme no. 1: limitation of analysis to a few somewhat familiar policy alternatives Incrementalism represents a departure from the rational-deductive ideal, and the synoptic (i.e., rational comprehensive) conception of policy-making under which the decision maker is expected to choose an alternative after a complete study of alternatives. In Lindblom's view: The choice between synopsis and disjointed incrementalism, or between synopsis and any form of strategic analysis – is simply between ill-considered, often accidental incompleteness on one hand, and deliberate, designed incompleteness on the other. (Lindblom, 1979, p. 519) The design methodology literature shows a similar pattern: a shift away from prescriptive design process models towards a new generation of descriptive models. While the prescriptive models require extensive analytical work as a precondition to the generating

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Table 1 Disjointed incrementalism and the process of design (publications in chronological order). Components of disjointed incrementalism strategy

Moments of disjointed incrementalism in design activity

Literature

Limitations of analysis

Choice between prescriptive and descriptive models

Jones, 1970; Eekels, 1973; Hubka, 1982; Pahl et al., 1996; Pugh, 1990; Roozenburg and Eekels, 1995; Schön, 1983; Andreasen and Hein, 1987; Cross, 1989; Ulrich and Eppinger, 1995; Dorst, 1997; Buijs, 2003; Reymen et al., 2006; Smulders, 2006; Badke-Schaub, 2008. Darlington and Culley, 2004; Lawson, 2006; Eilouti, 2009; Michlewski, 2008. Cross, 1989; Vicente et al., 1997; Mahdi, 2003; Buijs, 2008; Eilouti, 2009. Simon, 1996; Wulff et al., 2000. Jones, 1970; Archer, 1979; Schön, 1983; Cross, 1989; Christiaans, 1992; Cross et al., 1996; Pahl et al., 1996; Dorst, 1997; Frankenberger and Badke-Schaub, 1998; Valkenburg, 2000; Badke Schaub and Stempfle, 2003; Quinn, 2003; Weas and Campbell, 2004; Darlington and Culley, 2004; Lauche, 2005; Badke-Schaub, 2008; Michlewski, 2008. Cross, 1982, 1990, 1992; Archer, 1979; Boland and Collopy, 2004. Gero, 1990; Schön and Wiggins, 1992; Wall et al., 1992; Robertson, 1994; Purcel and Gero, 1998; Iansiti & MacCormack, 1997; Schrage, 1999; Maher et al., 2000; Lester and Piore, 2004; Michlewski, 2008; Garud et al., 2008; Kopecka et al., 2010. Schön and Wiggins, 1992; Oleson, 1998; Van Hoek, 2001; Heskett, 2002. Bucciarelli, 1984, 1994; Christiaans, 1992; Cross et al., 1996; Buijs, 1998; Frankenberger and Badke-Schaub, 1998; Valkenburg, 2000; Badke-Schaub and Stempfle, 2003; Badke-Schaub, 2008; Lauche, 2005; Kleinsmann, 2006; Smulders, 2006; Boland et al., 2008.

Import of synthesis Incremental design

Intertwining

Satisficing Problem/solution interdependency and co-evolution

Ills to be remedied

Solution oriented

Revised trials

Use of drawings, CAD, prototypes, virtual reality

Exploring consequences (some not all)

Design by postponement

Fragmentation of analytical work

Teamwork, narratives, and social exchange

of solution concepts, the descriptive models focus on integration of different design functions. The models in Figs. 1 and 2 represent just two of the many models currently in existence. The Dubberly (2008) from San Francisco provides an electronically available compendium of some one-hundred descriptions of design and development processes, ranging from architecture, industrial design, mechanical engineering, and quality management, to software development. The prescriptive models (Jones, 1970; Eekels, 1973; Hubka, 1982; Pahl et al., 1996; Pugh, 1990; Roozenburg and Eekels, 1995), of which Fig. 1 is an example, usually depict the design process as a chain of linear design activities, with sequential stages, and with occasional feedback loops. The model in Fig. 1 depicts a basic design cycle (Roozenburg and Eekels, 1995). First, the designer explores the design situation (analysis), then identifies one or more design solutions (synthesis), then judges the possible solutions against the original design situation (simulation), and finally the designer critically evaluates the suggested solution (evaluation). The engineering domain-specific models are as a rule more extensive and include stages of conceptual design, embodiment design and detail design. The prescriptive models aim to support the designer in achieving an optimal solution, and mostly assume that the environment is stable. By comparison, the new generation of design process models is more context-aware. The context includes people, products, and situations in which the design process takes place. The contact with inner and outer environments proceeds through a series of iterative side feedback loops, as an example in Fig. 2 shows. In the model (Buijs, 2003) the context is the company's product innovation. The circles in the model represent design activities and sub-processes (e.g., market introduction). The squares depict the moments of strategic decisions (e.g., the search areas in which to look for new ideas, or the design brief). The iterative loops towards the inner environment of the company (e.g., manufacturing) lie on the inside of the model, whereas the iterative loops towards the outer environment (e.g., distribution, promotion, and sales) lie on the outside of the model. Visualizing the process as a circular model suggests that the product innovation

process has neither a beginning nor an end. This conclusion is true in the sense that introducing a new product on the market will draw a response from the competitors in the form of their improved products, whereby the original innovating company will need to start the next product innovation process in order to regain its competitive advantage (Buijs, 2003). The circularity of the model underlines the temporal completeness of the chosen design decisions, and their incremental character. The new generation of design process models emphasizes the need for reflection as a means of learning from design experience, and of creating moments for the designer to review his work critically. Thought and action go hand in hand. The models depict designing as the activity of transforming both the state of the designed product and the state of the design process (Reymen et al., 2006). Another characteristic of the new generation models is that they typify the designer as someone who works in a teamwork environment (Andreasen and Hein, 1987; Badke-Schaub, 2008; Cross, 1989; Dorst, 1997; Schön, 1983; Smulders, 2006; Ulrich and Eppinger, 1995). A consequence of working in a team is that, unlike in the linear models, different team members work simultaneously. Thus, they share their findings and take decisions jointly (Buijs, 2003) at each step of the successive comparisons of design alternatives. When talking about similarities between disjointed incrementalism and design problem solving, the first that comes into mind is incremental design. The products may be new to the firm, but not to the market. In such situations, as in incrementalism, the analysis rests on a few somewhat familiar choices. In incremental design, too, the analysis relies on making variations on established themes (Cross, 1989, p. 105). The reasons for incremental design are twofold. One is the limited innovation capability of the firm, arising from the firm's technological and financial resources. Mahdi (2003) gives an example of this limitation when he reports on the development of the facsimile machine in two Japanese companies, Ricoh and Matsushita. Ricoh, a firm with scarce resources and little experience, adopted a design process that allowed frequent ‘prototype level’ experimentation. On

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solution that suffices for the moment, is another incremental behavior streak of the designer. 3.2. Common theme no. 2: an intertwining of analysis of policy goals and other values with the empirical aspects of the problem The blurring of cause and effect boundaries characterizes both incremental policy-making and design problem solving. According to Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963), one of the characteristics of the incremental policy strategy is its reconstructive treatment of data: Evaluation under the strategy requires firm and definite starting points, but it is not rigidly bound to treat problems in their original forms. On the contrary, it transforms problems in the course of exploring data. Old possibilities are discarded, and new urgencies appear. Fact-systems are restructured and proposals redesigned, shifts occur in the values deemed relevant to settling the questions in hand. (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963, p. 98) In design, the intertwining of problems and solutions has been a staple truth of all design thinking. Bruce Archer (1979) describes the phenomenon as follows: The first thing to recognize is that ‘the problem’ in a design problem, like any other ill-defined problem, is not the statement of requirements. Nor is ‘the solution’ the means ultimately arrived at to meet those requirements. ‘The problem’ is obscurity about the requirements, the practicability of envisigeable provisions and/or misfit between the requirements and the provisions.

Fig. 1. The basic design cycle (Roozenburg and Eekels, 1995, p. 88).

the other hand, Matsushita, with their wider technological resources and capabilities, approached the development through careful plans to minimize the ‘prototype level’ modifications. The second reason for adopting incremental design is the evolutionary design strategy that designers tend to choose. Exploiting previous designs is often one way to reduce time and effort required when tackling new design problems (Vicente et al., 1997). However, this approach is not always an option. Two case studies (Buijs, 2008) involving eleven design offices in the Netherlands report that the approach to new product development varies with the type of project in hand. The case study evaluates the plan of action that the designers adopt with the help of a quadrant matrix. The two axes of the matrix are product complexity and project familiarity. The matrix quadrants represent four decision modes. It is in the quadrant of familiar projects (the client is an old customer of the firm) and low product complexity (standard technology) that the designers resort to making shortcuts in their plan of action. Another approach to incremental design is “reverse engineering”. Designers dismantle the old product in order to learn from the technological principles behind it. The advantage of this approach is that it brings to light information that is of direct use to the designer. Knowledge recycling, drawing on design precedents, synthesizing previous designs (Eilouti, 2009), as well as falling back on their own experience, being able to frame a new problem: these are the designer's basic skills. They all contain traces of incremental decisionmaking. Lastly, satisficing (Simon, 1996), accepting a satisfactory

‘The solution’ is a requirement/provision match that contains an acceptably small amount of residual misfit and obscurity. Thus the relationship between design problem and design requirements and design provision lies along one axis and the relationship between design problem and design solution lies along another axis. The design activity is commutative, the designer's attention oscillating between the emerging requirement ideas and the developing provision ideas, as he illuminates obscurity on both sides and reduces misfit between them. (Archer, 1979, p. 17) Lawson (2006) reporting on laboratory experiments with architecture students questions whether a meaningful distinction between analysis and synthesis exists, or whether one should instead consider them as simultaneous learning of the nature of the problem and the range of possible solutions. What the experiment protocols revealed was that more experienced final year students consistently used a strategy of analysis through synthesis: they learned about the problem through attempts to create solutions, rather than through deliberate and separate study of the problem self. Michlewski (2008) shares this view when he points out that designers operate in an analytical-synthetical loop. The designers' strength lies in putting things together and taking them apart simultaneously. In his study of professional designers and design managers in design-led companies (IDEO, Nissan Design, Philips Design, and Wolff Olins), Michlewski (2008, p. 377) notes how anxious the designers have been to stress the role of designer as someone who consolidates various meanings and reconciles contradictory objectives. In the words of a general manager at IDEO: […] there are only a few things that designers really bring to the party, and the first is this kind of way of looking at the world that is at the same time analytic and synthetic. (Michlewski, 2008, p. 378) Studies of designers at work (Badke-Schaub and Stempfle, 2003; Badke-Schaub, 2008; Christiaans, 1992; Cross et al., 1996; Dorst, 1997; Frankenberger and Badke-Schaub, 1998; Kleinsmann, 2006;

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Fig. 2. The detailed circular model of the product innovation process (Buijs, 2003, p. 91).

Lauche, 2005; Smulders, 2006; Valkenburg, 2000) have brought evidence of the continual interaction of design problems and design solutions, and the inductive reasoning of the designer. Cross (1989) attributes this interconnectedness to the ‘pernicious’ structure of design problems. For example, a sub-solution that resolves a particular sub-problem may create irreconcilable conflicts with other sub-problems. Cross (1989, pp. 13-14) notes that designers often attempt to avoid 'cycling around the pernicious loops' of design problems by making high-level strategic decisions about solution options. Thus, the reciprocal relationship between ends and means in incrementalism finds its parallel in design activities in an iterative relationship between design problem and design solution. Pahl et al. (1996) point out that the iteration steps ought to be as small as possible

to lessen the risk of oversight and mistakes in the design process. At the same time, reciprocity and iteration provide moments for reflection during which the designer may decide on the next step (Schön, 1983). Similarly, in large-scale organization moves, logical incrementalism (Quinn, 2003) ‘allows organizational actors to modify the ideas behind the reorganization as more is learned’ (Quinn, 2003, p. 185). Interestingly, the interlocking character of design decisions lies at the origin of one of the early design methods, dating from the 60s, the Analysis of Interconnected Decision Areas – AIDA (Jones, 1970). The designer can employ AIDA to explore the problem structure and to understand how one decision affects the options open for other decisions. In other words, AIDA relates the dependencies among specific design choices to define which specific choices are, in fact, available to the decision maker (Weas and Campbell, 2004).

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3.3. Common theme no. 3: a greater analytical preoccupation with ills to be remedied, than positive goals to be sought Both incrementalism and design problem solving are exploratory and focus on solutions. The strategy of disjointed incrementalism encourages the policy maker to identify ills from which to move away rather than goals toward which to move. Whether the move entails small or large steps depends on a trade-off between the costs and short-term achievability of the marginal incrementals (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963, p.102). For designers, moving away from the problem is their method of coming to understand it. As Cross (1990, 1992) explains, since it is difficult to understand the problem in isolation of the solution (see also the earlier quote from Bruce Archer), it is natural to use solution conjectures as a means of helping to explore and understand the problem. The trade-off between the alternative solutions provides a better understanding of the problem. Boland and Collopy (2004) give an example of how stepping back from a problem, that is by adopting a design-oriented approach, can produce a radical solution to a business problem, such as inventory control. In the past thirty years, the decision-oriented approach has modeled the inventory process as a buffer between production, supply chain, and distribution. This approach has resulted in a large number of methods and techniques for the control of timing, quantity, and location of inventory acquisition. However, the techniques carry with them their own closure. Boland and Collopy (2004) argue that when taking a design-oriented approach, it means asking questions, such as: “What are we trying to do? What is the purpose?” In the case of inventory control, stepping back from the problem lead to a realization that the goal was not the management of inventory, but its elimination. By redefining the goal as a purpose, it was possible to broaden out the search for solutions, and to include other means through which to minimize the inventory. The search resulted in finding problem solutions such as the redesign of relationships with suppliers and workforce, and the use of information systems. Boland and Collopy (2004) conclude that given the fact that the decision approach is susceptible to early closure, and the design-oriented approach is susceptible to keep the search going long after it is beneficial, managers need to develop strengths in both approaches. 3.4. Common theme no. 4: a sequence of trials, errors, and revised trials Decision-making through ‘trial and error’ relies on feedback and belongs to both incrementalism and design problem solving. However, there is one major difference. For, in this particular area, the designer has a definite advantage over the policy maker. The designer communicates through models and drawings (Purcel and Gero, 1998; Schön and Wiggins, 1992) that he uses to stimulate thinking, to explore the way the design project could go, and to make ideas tangible (Boland and Collopy, 2004; Kopecka et al., 2010; Michlewski, 2008). In addition, the designer has at his disposal powerful tools for visualization and simulation. Advanced technologies such as CAD, rapid prototyping, and Virtual Reality (Gero, 1990; Iansiti and MacCormack, 1997; Maher et al., 2000; Schrage, 1999; Wall et al., 1992) enable the designer to shorten the time span between revised trials in a way that is both cost effective and informative. The immediate feedback brings an element of rationality into the trial and error method and speeds up the learning experience. Robertson (1994) argues that the use of advanced technology and interactive media brings about a paradigm shift: from 3D design (for the “consumer”) to 4D design (with the consumer as participant). The designer's usage of advanced technologies moves decision making onto a new level of specificity. A design decision, for example, can pertain to what product features to include or (temporarily) leave out from the product prototype. This bears similarity to 'simplification through omission', which Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963, p. 114)

recommend to practitioners of disjointed incrementalism as a way of coping with limited capacities, limited information, and the high costs of analysis. In comparison with design models, the management decisionmaking models are mostly normative, suggesting how managers should proceed in order to reach the desired goals. Management tools such as, for example, the Balance Scorecard (Kaplan and Norton, 1996), come with predefined perspectives and objectives. The simulation games, another tool for policy makers, offer only a retrospective understanding of why decisions went wrong. The focus of simulation games is on learning rather than on action (Dörner, 1996). Another difference between managers and designers is in their attitude to ambiguity. Research by Lester and Piore (2004) describes how in the managers' decisions, problem analysis and closure prevail problem interpretation and tolerance for ambiguity. However, their case study on the innovation of cell phone also shows that ambiguity can actually contribute to the generation of new product ideas. The case study (Lester and Piore, 2004, p. 40) illustrates how the development of cell phone was a result of playing with the ambiguity (a trial and error situation) of design intention: should the future product be a radio or should it be a telephone? Lester and Piore (2004) note that the managers in their case studies “were uncomfortable with the more speculative open-ended part of the innovative process, and wanted to squeeze it back into a problem-solving format, but they also recognized on some level that this was not possible, nor desirable” (Lester and Piore, 2004, p. 42). By contrast, the designers accept the incompleteness of design that they see as a trigger for action (Garud et al., 2008). The designers embrace the open-ended character of the design process and consider ambiguity and uncertain outcomes as a vital part of the design process (Michlewski, 2008). As architect, Frank O. Gehry puts it: “If I knew how a project was going to turn out, I wouldn't do it” (Boland and Collopy, 2004, p. 9). 3.5. Common theme no. 5: analysis that explores some, not all, of the important possible consequences a considered alternative The realization that one cannot oversee all consequences of a decision is central to coping with uncertainty. It is a constant feature in both policy decision-making and design problem solving. However, information uncertainty does not imply that the policy maker, or the designer, cannot bring influence to bear on the outcome of their decisions. Given the fact that both incrementalism and design problem solving are serial activities, the policy maker or designer is therefore at liberty to decide at which point of time he considers the decision's consequences. As Braybrooke and Lindblom (1963) suggest: Anticipated adverse consequences […] can often be more effectively treated as new and separate problems than as aspects of the original problem. Unanticipated adverse consequences can often be better guarded against by waiting for their emergence than by futile attempts to anticipate every contingency as required in synoptic problem solving (Braybrooke and Lindblom, 1963, p. 126). Moreover, the unanticipated consequences need not always be negative. For example, in modular product design, the practice of design for postponement (i.e., delaying product differentiation) creates opportunities for mass customization and agile product development (Oleson, 1998). The postponement strategy of 'making to order' means that the decision about the final features of a product does not take place until the latest information about the customer demand becomes available. Alternatively, as in the case of Dell computers, the customer may write his wishes regarding the product specifications on the company website from where he can follow the design progress

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through to delivery (Heskett, 2002). The favorable consequences of design for postponement for the supply chain are greater control over the diversity and volume of product components, distribution flexibility, and savings in inventory costs (Van Hoek, 2001). Interestingly, Schön and Wiggins (1992) regard the intended and an unintended consequence as central to designers' thinking. Drawing on protocol analyses of expert and novice designers, they describe design as sequences of seeing-moving-seeing, where perceptual reinterpretations are moves, and the judgment of consequences is seeing. Thus, a new perception of the problem under review moves the designer to new domains of knowledge, domains that were not ‘intended’ to be part of the original problem. 3.6. Common theme no. 6: fragmentation of analytical work to many (partisan) participants in policy making In disjointed incrementalism, social fragmentation of policymaking is seen as means to bring about more interaction among the process participants, to curb power, and to raise the level of information and rationality in decision-making (Lindblom, 1979). Involving more parties in decision-making helps compensate the lack of comprehensive search for alternatives, and the limitations in capacities of process participants. In design activities, the benefits of social fragmentation come to fore in the work of multifunctional and multidisciplinary teams (Badke-Schaub and Stempfle, 2003; Badke-Schaub, 2008; Christiaans, 1992; Cross et al., 1996; Dorst, 1997; Frankenberger and BadkeSchaub, 1998; Kleinsmann, 2006; Lauche, 2005; Smulders, 2006; Valkenburg, 2000). Research by Bucciarelli (1984, 1994) shows how design resembles the social process of negotiation and consensus. The design practitioner moves in two worlds: an 'object world' (e.g., performance specifications, milestone charts, quantitative estimates, etc.) and a 'process world' (e.g., narratives, social exchange, etc.). The negotiating takes place between design functions as well as between disciplines (Buijs, 1998). Both disjointed incrementalism and design recognize the strength of interactive problem solving. In the incremental view: “Interaction economizes on precisely the factors on which humans are short, such as time and understanding, while analysis requires their profligate consumption” (Woodhouse and Collingridge, 1993, p. 133). The design practice of architect Frank O. Gehry and Partners strives to achieve the interactive problem solving by continually changing the composition of teams. Experts and artifacts from other disciplines create a ‘bricolage of social and technical spaces’, stimulate interaction, and produce novel ways with which to approach the project at hand (Boland et al., 2008, p. 17).

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data and evaluate how well the present paper captures the patterns of incrementalism? The two selected case vignettes meet these criteria. They address two universal concerns in the design activity: information overload (Case Vignette 1) and design requirement development (Case Vignette 2), and contain elements of incremental decisionmaking. The case vignettes come from two journals (International Journal of Industrial Ergonomics, and Design Studies) to which most academic libraries offer free electronic access. 4.1. Case Vignette 1: information overload (Wulff et al., 2000) Engineering designers in two offshore development projects in the North Sea complain about an increase in project documentation over the years. Of the 42 project participants (engineering designers, procurement, and management) interviewed, 35 participants find the amount of documentation excessive. Both projects are complex, tightly coupled and large scale, involving many organizations (including suppliers) and organizational units. The alleged goal of the distribution of documents is to reduce uncertainty and equivocality, and to serve as the main line of communication. However, the case study shows that the document distribution primarily functions as a defensive mechanism: to make all design participants jointly responsible for design decisions. The indiscriminate circulation of documentation has no regard for the design phase relevancy, thus leaving the designers to 'muddle through' the avalanche of documents on their desks. The experienced designers respond differently than the inexperienced designers. The experienced designers express their views in statements, such as: No, I haven't looked a lot in the document […] I have really relied on my practice and earlier experiences. There is a limit to what you can assimilate […] read things diagonally […]. Some things you only take a quick glance at, and find out that it does not concern you […]. I am sure someone needs it. Whereas the designers who are new on the job try to rationalize it all, saying: There is an intention behind it […].You don't read everything […], you read a very small part, but on the other hand, you have to make certain that you get the information you need […], you have to be restrictive with what you need. The management recognizes and accepts that the project participants cannot read everything and therefore advises the participants to exercise 'appropriate control' on what they choose to read. However, they do not give any guidance on how to execute this discretionary control. In the words of a senior manager:

4. Case vignettes The above review of the literature shows that, in theory, the design activity does contain the six core elements of incremental decisionmaking. The next section uses two case-study vignettes to describe how the moments of ‘muddling through’ work out in the design practice. The units of analysis are the six core elements of incremental decision-making. The objective is to identify in the case vignettes the presence/absence of the six core elements and to narrate how they manifest themselves. Finding suitable and interesting case studies has not been easy for several reasons. First, designers rarely give a written account of tacit knowledge behind their designs. Second, most case studies have a design artifact as their subject of inquiry, and therefore get out of date quite quickly. Most importantly, the case studies need to have a sufficient level of detail to allow a meaningful search for patterns of incrementalism. Another concern is generalizability: can the findings of one selected design episode also occur in another? Lastly, the criteria of validity and reliability: can the reader check the quality of

[…] It might be possible that we are not good enough at encouraging project members to remove themselves from the circulation list, but getting too much is no risk, you can look at it quickly. You easily get an attitude like that, it is better to get too much, then we are safe. However, the design engineers seriously question this feeling of 'being safe': What is worrisome is that you are daily being drowned by information, […] there is not even room for it in your mail [box], some 150-page specification, in heavy language, by some department, and then there is an IDC [inter departmental check] where you are supposed to write that you have no comments or you have comments […]. This is very dangerous for us […], we end up in a situation where we spend more time reading documentation […], where we in most cases do not find the tiny bit that we need.

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Another cause of information overload is time pressure. Rather than taking the time to decide what to send and to whom to send it, the document distributors send the same amount of documentation to all project participants. A member of the purchasing department confirms that the main consideration is to reach all possible receivers, rather than leaving someone out: […] few want to take that responsibility. It is better to make one copy extra than risking that someone misses an important message. The contacts with suppliers also suffer from information overload. However, here the cause of information overload has its roots in the lack of trust. The fear is that in conflict situations, the suppliers will take advantage of ‘loopholes’ in requirement specifications. To produce a detailed requirement specification is therefore a way to protect the firm from possible malpractice. Many informants experience the effects of working under time pressure. For example, all project participants know very well that when preparing a detailed specification for a particular piece of equipment they ought to take into account the suppliers' capability, but they also realize that any such endeavor would cost time. What happens then is that the supplier receives a very general specification to cover a broad range of equipment. In the words of one designer: We talked about this yesterday […]. A supplier had delivered […] identical equipment to two companies. One company had sent him four to five volumes [of requirement specifications], the other had sent him a thin heap of paper. And the equipment was exactly the same quality. Not only the designers, but the purchasers too, believe that the firm should use standard equipment more often, rather than demand from the supplier to produce tailor made equipment each time. Besides the time pressure, the next cause of excessive document production comes from incentive mechanisms that encourage the production of extra paperwork. In the words of a supervisor in the safety department: […] to justify time spending and progress, you measure the produced documentation. How many documents are done compared to the total numbers to be produced, how many hours do you reckon it takes to make a document, then you multiply that with the number of documents, and there is your budget […]. However, of the 42 informants, seven informants do not object to documentation circulation and they do not find it excessive either. These informants belong to Human Factors Specialists and Operations Staff. An important part of their job is to advise designers and engineers on human factors and operations issues, but they do not participate in design themselves. The advice comes mostly in the form of documents, such as written design specifications and drawings. Producing these documents is necessary because in the day-to-day reality of design work the designers and engineers do not actively seek advice on human factors issues. By writing reviews and comments regarding draft drawings and supplier documentation, the Human Factors Specialists are able to open up a dialogue with the designers and engineers. A Human Factors Specialist describes the positive aspect of documentation as follows: I look at what all others do; I do not design at all […]. I am a spy, or, it might sound stupid, but I get all documents, or hopefully as many documents as possible on IDC [inter-departmental check], and then I go through it […], that's the way I get things, and when I walk around, and get in, and participate in something, I hear about other things, so one thing leads to another […] since I use documents and drawings to do my job I depend on things being

circulated […] Those I work closely with get used to it and contact me again and think about it. Interesting here is the fact that in the organogram of the two offshore development projects, Human Factors are a line responsibility. This means that the designers ought to integrate human factors concerns in their work. Therefore, the overview role of Human Factors Specialists should not be necessary. However, the designers and managers do not always recognize the line responsibility. In fact, they acknowledge themselves the need for monitoring in these matters. Consequently, the Human Factors Specialists spend a lot of time reviewing design documents and discussing them with the designers. Theoretically, this dialogue creates an opportunity to free the designers from having to study the documents themselves and facilitates a better coordination of documentation flow. However, the supervisor of the Human Factors Specialists holds a different opinion. According to him, the information exchanges between the Human Factors Specialists and the designers demand too many resources in time and money. Fortunately, as he explains, it is easy to scrap this activity whenever reductions in costs so demand. The supervisor points out that to discontinue the information exchanges is not a big issue because this activity does not involve any documentation. The case study concludes that: “Work that is not associated with producing documentation is invisible and is not appreciated”. The paradox of the situation is that on one hand, the coordination of designers and engineers who work in different departments is crucial to the quality of the final design. On the other hand, the coordination work receives recognition only when it produces documentation, which in turn results in the increase in document circulation.

4.2. Case Vignette 2: design requirement development (Darlington and Culley, 2004) The design requirements in this case study come from three projects of a market leading engineering manufacturer of semicustomized stand-alone electro-mechanical assemblies in the UK. The informants are a senior engineering manager, two mechanical engineers, and an electronics engineer. In addition, the engineering design managers of two more UK engineering companies give supporting information with regard to the development and content of design requirements in their companies. Unfortunately, because of space constraints, the case study includes only a few interview fragments. The case study opens by stating that: There continues to be a disparity between the idealized notions of design requirement capture, as it is prescribed by methodologies, and the reality of its capture in everyday practice. The three projects allow the comparison between the design requirement development for mechanical design and electronics design. The design requirements differ quite substantially in the detail and length of their documentation. The design requirement for the mechanical engineering products is shorter, reflecting the fact that the mechanical engineering design is more holistic, with a formal validation test at the end. The designer is able to conceptualize the design in its entirety. The complexity of electronics design requires the designer to take one-step at a time, with a gradual increase in detail. Each step results in a new series of specification documents, which in turn form the basis for interim tests. Consequently, the design requirement for electronics products is longer and much more explicit than the design requirement for mechanical engineering products. The starting point for the development of a design requirement for all three projects is a ‘wish list’, originating from outside the engineering department (e.g., a sales department's survey of

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customer requirements, or a specific problem of a customer). The response of the engineering department to this wish list is to translate the ‘wishes’ into an initial Technical Requirement Specifications (TRS). From this moment onwards, the design requirement development highly depends on the context and nature of the designed product. The nature of the product does not only lie in product complexity (e.g., mechanical versus electronic), but also in the case-specific nature of the product. For example, if a project from the outset demands economy and short time-to-market, then the project uses components from existing products. The description of the components in the design requirement is less detailed than when the components are new. The context of the designed product depends on two factors: the designer/customer relationship and the type of customer. The guiding principles in the relationship between the designer and the customer are trust and risk. Trust in the ability of the designer and the company to complete the project successfully, and the awareness of the commercial or contractual risk in case the project fails. The case study compares the design requirements of the three projects and notes that in projects in which trust is high and confidence in tacit knowledge of the designer unquestioned, the design requirement is minimal, in both content and length. When trust is low and perceived risks high, the converse is true. The customers are of two kinds: the ‘virtual’ customer and the ‘real’ customer. The virtual customer emerges from the surveys of the sales department (Of the three projects, one project started in response to a wish from the Sales.). The virtual customer represents a class of individuals who might be satisfied by the proposed design. In such cases, the first concept of the requirement comes from the Marketing Director. In the eyes of the project designers, these requirements are incomplete and ‘woolly’. The task of the designer is to translate an incomplete requirement into a technical description of new product conceptual design. The designer uses this document to define the draft product specifications, and to make prototypes. These activities often take place concurrently. Thus, it can happen that partial design precedes the first formal design requirement document. A designer has this to say about the development process: “Things don't happen in any neat order. The realities of complex design mean things get done as needed”. The ‘real’ customer is a concrete individual with a problem that the design aims to solve. In such projects, the specificity of the problem determines the character of the design requirement. The specificity of the problem, or the lack of it, also influences the degree to which the designer actually participates in the drafting of design requirements. Sometimes the designer needs to spend a considerable amount of time on eliciting more information from the customer in order to understand the customer's needs well. This elicitation process may lead to a design requirement that already forms the basis for a contract. However, the designer may also start from a design brief which includes references to solution domains (usually the core activities of the customer), or even suggest specific physical aspects of the solution. The design requirement fulfills two identifiable roles. First, it serves as an agreement between the projects' stakeholders about the criteria that the end product should meet. The second role of the design requirement is to provide a basis upon which the designer can proceed in synthesizing a solution. Less identifiable, but not less important, is the social and political context in which the requirement

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development takes place, namely: the relationships between the stakeholders who participate in drafting the design requirement (e.g., marketing, suppliers, customers, manufacturing, etc.). The case study concludes that: While the design requirement development [in the three companies] appear to be only loosely structured, there is nothing to suggest empirically that they are not broadly successful […] There is no single approach to managing the process of design requirement development that is suitable for all companies.

5. Discussion and analysis One of the fundamental premises of disjointed incrementalism is that decision makers typically fail to deal with information uncertainty. The causes of information uncertainty can lie in inequalities in information, or in the bounded rationality of decision makers, or it can lie in both of these causes. The concept of bounded rationality (Newell and Simon, 1972) holds that people are bounded rational in their decision making. The boundaries lie in the limits of people's analytical ability and the limits of knowledge. Reading the Case Vignettes brings to mind an observation that Herbert A. Simon (1971) makes about the use of information: What information consumes is rather obvious: it consumes the attention of its recipients. Hence, a wealth of information creates a poverty of attention, and a need to allocate the attention efficiently among the overabundance of information sources that might consume it. (Simon, 1971, pp. 40-41) In the Case Vignettes, the attention to information takes different forms. Vignette 1 focuses on an information process (the dissemination of project documentation), whereas Vignette 2 presents information as an ultimate product (the design requirement). As Table 2 shows, and the hindsight discussion of the case vignettes illustrates, the vignettes contain the six core components of disjointed incrementalism to a various degree. In the following discussion, the six components are set in italics for the reader's convenience. 5.1. Case Vignettes in hindsight The Case Vignette 1 (information overload) is particularly interesting because it illustrates the effects that the presence/absence of disjointed incrementalism can produce at different levels of the firm. While incrementalism is totally absent at the level of management, the engineering designers at lower levels embrace it with their own style. The management's mandate to distribute project documentation indiscriminately reflects the unwillingness to accept the limitation of analysis. The management continues to pursue the synoptic ideal of completeness. As a result, the design requirement specifications are complex and voluminous. The firm's incentive schemes keep this practice in place. This way the management wants to preclude at least some consequences of the firm's decisions, such as those arising from mistakes in the selection of suppliers. In response

Table 2 Representation of incremental decision making moments in the case vignettes. Case Vignettes

Information overload Design requirement development

Core components of disjointed incrementalism Limitation of analysis

Intertwining

Ills to be remedied

Revised trials

X X

X X

X X

X

Exploring consequences (some not all)

Fragmentation of analytical work

X X

X X

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to the management mandate, the designers resort to ‘diagonal reading’ of documents, and choose to rely largely on their own experience. An unintended social fragmentation of analytical work occurs: designers and procurement staff discuss among themselves how the firm can improve its relationship with suppliers (the ills to be remedied). The paradoxical role that the Human Factors Specialists play in the documentation circulation shows the intertwining of cause and effect. The Human Factors Specialists are in a position to alleviate the information overload by adopting the role of information intermediaries. However, since streamlined information exchanges would not produce any documentation, the work of an information intermediary has no tangible value, and is likely to be subject to costs cuts whenever the need arises. The Case Vignette 2 (design requirement development) is an example of ‘deliberate, designed incompleteness’ which Lindblom (1979, p. 519) characterizes as typical for disjointed incrementalism. The content of the design requirement, as well as the development process leading up to it, contain all the components of incrementalism. The limitation of analysis appears in the contextual embeddedness of the design event: the circumstances surrounding the design event and the actual product complexity. The co-evolution of design problems and design solutions, and how they relate to each other, is an example of intertwining. However, intertwining comes to fore also in the double role that the design requirement document performs in the design process. On one hand, the design requirement is a quasilegal document stating the common objectives of the design stakeholders. On the other hand, the design requirement is a work in progress, a phase in the design process. The concern with the ills to be remedied, rather than positive goals, is manifest in the starting point of the design requirement: a wish list from the firm's sales department, or the firm's customers. Consequently, each design requirement is unique and not universally applicable to other goals. The need for and frequency of the revised trials depends on the particularities of the design discipline involved (e.g., electrical versus mechanical design). To explore all consequences of the design decisions is not always possible. The chances of anticipating the consequences are better when the project involves a real customer, and the mutual trust is high. In cases where the customer is ‘virtual’, and exists only as a customer category, the design decision consequences are more difficult to envisage. The diversity of stakeholders involved in the design process is a reflection of the fragmentation of analytical work. 6. Conclusion, limitations, suggestions for further research This exploratory paper attempts to offer a deeper appreciation of the common ground between disjointed incrementalism and design problem solving. The case vignettes and the reviewed literature show that, although not consciously thought of, the elements of incrementalism form part of design thinking and design activities. Could it be that Charles E. Lindblom is a design thinker avant la lettre? Charles E. Lindblom wrote his seminal paper on incrementalism in 1959. The origins of incrementalism lie in the dissatisfaction with the discrepancy between the theory and practice of organizational decision-making. The aim of incrementalism is to bridge this gap. Interestingly, a new generation of scholars (Boland and Collopy, 2004; Jelinek et al., 2008; Romme, 2003) has recently started to study the practice of organizational life from a design perspective, describing the research field as organization design science. The scholars of organization design science turn to design methodology in order to close what Romme (2003) refers to as the ‘relevance gap’ between management theory and management practice. No less interesting is the fact that the special issue of Organization Studies (Jelinek et al., 2008) which brings together research on the interface between organization science and design, does not contain one single reference to incrementalism and to Lindblom's work. Yet, the case vignettes in this paper provide evidence of the incremental elements in the design

activity, and the presence of design thinking in incrementalism, and how these two approaches assist in achieving change. Therein lies the contribution of this paper. So what can managers in their role as change agents learn from design and incrementalism? The most salient features of a design mindset that managers could adopt are the following: 1. Combine the step-by-step approach to decision-making advocated by Charles E. Lindblom, with an approach of stepping back from a problem, as practiced by designers, thus allowing time for reflection; 2. Try to arrive at an understanding of a problem by relentlessly questioning the purpose of the sought-after change, rather than accepting a predefined goal and default solutions. 3. Embrace constraints as a source of possible solutions. 4. Emulate the interactive problem solving of interdisciplinary design teams. Such approach can bring novel perspectives on the problem and save time. This paper has, of course, limitations. The theoretical part draws on a selected review of literature. Thus, the references listed in Table 1 barely scratch the surface of the design literature. The two Case Vignettes rely on metadata, and are therefore snapshots only. Repeated cases studies, are necessary to provide an in-depth understanding of the relationship between management and design. In this respect, the present paper has set a first step towards that goal by identifying new (designerly) ways of looking at incrementalism. The role of incrementalism in design represents an exciting area of future research. The design support tools such as CAD, rapid prototyping, or Virtual Reality, have greatly enhanced the design process flexibility by speeding up the feedback function of revised trials. However, the support tools themselves are subject to continual incremental design, to which the tool users often actively contribute. Exploring how the condition of incremental design of support tools affects their usage and how the condition of incremental design affects the designer's problem-solving capacity is another area of challenging research. On a more general level, the future research should address the ways in which incremental decision making contributes to better designer performance. Acknowledgements The authors acknowledge and are grateful for the comments received from Erik Jan Hultink and Petra Badke-Schaub of Delft University of Technology, and Michael Kleinaltenkamp of the Free University of Berlin on an earlier draft that helped to revise this paper. The authors alone are responsible for all limitations and errors that may relate to the study of the paper. References Albrecht D. Introduction. In: Albrecht D, Colomina B, Giovannini J, Lightman A, Lipstadt H, Morrison P, Morrison Ph, editors. The work of Charles and Ray Eames: a legacy of invention. New York, NY: Harry N. Abrams, Inc Publishers; 1997. Andreasen MM, Hein L. Integrated product development. Bedford: IFIS; 1987. Archer B. Design as a discipline. Des Stud 1979;1(1):17–20. Argyris C, Schön DH. Organizational learning: a theory of action perspective. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley; 1978. Badke-Schaub P. Social complexity in design collaboration. In: Poelman W, Keyson D, editors. Design processes: what architects and industrial designers can teach each other about managing the design process. Amsterdam: IOS Press; 2008. p. 60–7. Badke-Schaub P, Stempfle J. Analysis of solution finding processes in design teams. In: Lindemann U, editor. Human behaviour in design: individuals, teams, tools. Berlin: Springer Verlag; 2003. p. 121–31. Boland Jr RJ, Collopy F. Design matters for management. In: Bolland Jr RJ, Collopy F, editors. Managing as designing. Stanford, CA: Stanford Business Books; 2004. p. 3-18. Boland Jr RJ, Collopy F, Lyytinen K, Yoo Y. Managing as designing: lessons for organizational leaders from the design practice of Frank O. Gehry. Des Issues 2008;24(1):10–25. Braybrooke D, Lindblom C. A strategy of decision. New York, NY: Free Press; 1963. Bucciarelli LL. Reflective practice in engineering design. Des Stud 1984;5(3):185–90.

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