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Determinants of information-seeking behavior
JOURNAL
OF
RESEARCH
IN
PERSONALITY
Determinants
13, 161-174 (1979)
of Information-Seeking
Behavior
MIRON ZUCKERMAN, RICHARD H. BROWN, GARY L. FISCHLER, GERI A. Fox, DREW R. LATHIN, AND ARA J. MINASIAN University of Rochester Two studies examined situational determinants of choice among anagram tests that varied both in difficulty and in diagnosticity (the information they provided about one’s own ability). In both studies, subjects worked on a preliminary anagram test before making their choices. Study 1 manipulated level of performance on the preliminary test. Results showed that high performance led to preferring more difficult and more diagnostic tests. In Study 2, subjects were either paid or not paid for their performance on the preliminary test. Results showed that pay led to a preference for more diagnostic tests. Unexpectedly, results of both studies showed that although difficulty and diagnosticity were defined independently of one another, they were not perceived as such. Thus, high diagnostic tests were perceived as more difficult; more difficult tests were perceived as more diagnostic; and the difference between high and low diagnostic tests in perceived diagnosticity and choice of items (high diagnostic tests had higher scores on both measures) were more pronounced among more difficult tests. Motivational as well as cognitive interpretations of the results were discussed.
Recently, Trope and Brickman (1975) and Trope (1975) have used choice among tasks as a measure of information-seeking behavior. Trope and Brickman found that people preferred tasks on which performance outcomes maximized their knowledge of their own ability. Trope found that the magnitude of this preference increased with achievement motivation. The following two studies investigated two further determinants of the tendency to seek information about one’s ability: level of performance (high/low) on a preliminary task, and the magnitude of reward for performing this task. Since information-seeking behavior was defined in terms identical to those used by Trope and Brickman and Trope, it is first necessary to review the rationale and method of their work. The Trope and Brickman experiment was designed to examine the competing views of achievement motivation theory (Atkinson, 1957; AtThe authors would like to thank Harry T. Reis for his comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. Requests for reprints should be sent to Miron Zuckerman, Department of Psychology, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14607. 161 0092-6566/79/020161-14$02.00/O Copyright @ 1979 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
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kinson & Feather, 1966) and attribution theory (Weiner, 1972, 1974) regarding the determinants of choice among tasks. Atkinson argued that people high in achievement motivation select tasks of intermediate difficulty in order to maximize the motivational or affective value of their performance outcomes. Weiner contended that individuals high in achievement motivation prefer intermediate difficulty tasks in order to maximize the informational value of their performance outcomes. In particular, Weiner argued, outcomes of intermediate difficulty tasks yield information about the person’s ability whereas success at an easy task or failure at a difficult task yield information about the difficulty of the task (see also Meyer, Folkes, & Weiner, 1976; and Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer, & Cook, 1972). Trope and Brickman argued that the informational value of a task can be defined independently of its difficulty level so that predictions of achievement motivation theory and attribution theory become unconfounded. Specifically, Trope and Brickman defined the informational or diagnostic value of a task as the extent to which performance outcomes on this task increase the individual’s knowledge of his own ability. According to Bayes’ theorem, this increase in knowledge depends on (a) the probabilities that high and low ability individuals will succeed/fail on the task, and (b) the individual’s prior knowledge of the level of his own ability. In this model P(SIH) and P(SJL) denote the conditional probabilities of success given a high or a low level of ability and P(H)/P(L) denotes the individual’s prior odds that he has high ability relative to low ability. The expected diagnostic (ED) value of a task is then defined in terms of its Bayesian likelihood ration (LR). LR is the quantity by which prior odds are revised in the light of a particular outcome. In the case of success, the individual’s prior odds concerning his ability are revised to yield the posterior odds as follows:
where P(HIS)/P(LjS) are the posterior odds that the individual has high ability relative to low ability given success, P(H)/P(L) are the prior odds, and P(S(H)/P(SIL) is the likelihood ratio of success. The overall expected diagnosticity of a task was defined by Trope and Brickman as the sum of the diagnostic values (likelihood ratios) of all possible outcomes on the task weighted by the probability of these outcomes: ED = P(H) [P(SIH)LR(S) + P(FIH)LR(F)I (2) + P(L) [P(SIL)LR(S) + P(FIL)LR(F)]. As shown by Trope and Brickman, it is possible to vary ED independently of task difficulty. For example, if there are equal numbers of people with high and low ability on a particular task, prior probabilities of high and low abilities, P(H) and P(L), are both equal to .5. Under such condi-
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tions the conditional probability densities of success given high or low abilities, P(SIH) and P(SIL), will be symmetric about the overall difficulty level. The further apart P(SIH) and P(SIL), the higher the diagnostic value of the task. Thus, the diagnostic or informational value is higher if P(SIH) and P(S (L) are .9 and . 1 than if they are 55 and .45. It can also be seen that P(SIH) and P(SIL) can be further apart when the task is moderately difficult than when it is very easy or very difficult. In their work, Trope and Brickman (1975) and Trope (1975) gave subjects a choice among tasks varying in difficulty (easy/moderate/difficult) and expected diagnosticity (low/high). Results showed that subjects, particularly those high in achievement motivation, preferred high diagnostic tasks regardless of level of difficulty. It appears that the concept of diagnosticity may be utilized as a tool in the search for determinants of information-seeking behavior which is the purpose of the present two studies. STUDY 1 The Trope and Brickman (1975) study suggests that people are motivated to obtain information about themselves. Similarly, Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory postulates that people have a drive to compare themselves with others in order to evaluate their opinions and abilities. Recently, however, Brickman and Bulman (1977) proposed that people may try to avoid social comparison information that is likely to be unfavorable to them. Studies by Willerman, Lewitt, and Tellegen (1960) and Friend and Gillbert (1973) provided indirect support for Brickman and Bullman’s proposal. Willerman et al. (1960) found that subjects who were high in fear of failure and were told that they had low ability, preferred working in groups to working by themselves. The group situation made it impossible for the individual to be responsible for the outcome. Friend and Gilbert (1973) reported that subjects who were high in fear of negative evaluation were more likely to compare themselves with worse-off others than with the best-off other. Using the Trope and Brickman paradigm, it is possible to test directly the hypothesis that self-esteem maintenance is one of the determinants of information-seeking behavior. In the present experiment, subjects first worked on a preliminary anagram test similar to anagram tests from which they subsequently had to choose. Difficulty of the preliminary test was manipulated to yield low/high performance. Levels of difficulty and expected diagnosticity of the choice tests were identical to those used by Trope and Brickman, and Trope. The fact that anagrams constitute a novel task for most subjects lended credibility to the manipulation of the preliminary performance and the manipulation of difficulty and expected diagnosticity of the choice tests. It was predicted that high performance on the preliminary test would lead to greater preference for high diagnostic tests than would low per-
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formance. Individuals whose initial performance is poor should avoid highly diagnostic tests because such tests would likely classify them as low in ability, providing further negative information. People whose initial performance is high, on the other hand, should seek highly diagnostic tests since they would likely be classified as high in ability. It was also predicted that high performance on the preliminary test, as opposed to low performance, would lead to preference for more difficult tests. This prediction was based on the assumption that people raise their level of aspiration after success and lower their level of aspiration after failure (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 1944). METHOD Subjects were 64 male undergraduates recruited as volunteers from several large introductory courses. Rates of volunteering in these introductory courses ranged from 10 to 20%. Subjects received no monetary or other compensation for participating. Four subjects were excluded from the analysis because they failed to solve a sufficient number of easy anagrams (designed to produce high performance) or succeeded in solving too many difficult anagrams (designed to produce low performance). The entire study was conducted by five experimenters who randomly varied their partners and roles from session to session. Each experimental session was divided into two parts, a performance session and a choice session, conducted individually by two different experimenters. Experimenters conducting the second part were not aware of how the subject had performed in the first part. All subjects were run individually. Instructions were similar to those used by Trope and Brickman with changes necessary for the purpose of the present study. Subjects were told that the purpose of the experiment was to validate “a new measure of the anagram test, also named the Minnesota Multi-phasic Orientation Test.” The nature of the ability measured by the test was explained in general terms. It was emphasized that half of the students at the university were high in ability and half were low. It was explained that the experiment was divided into two parts conducted by two different experimenters. In the first part, subjects were required to solve 10 anagrams that were considered for adoption for the new test; in the second part, subjects were required to work on the older version of the Minnesota Anagram Test for which the experimenter had exact norms.
Manipulation
of Performance
Subjects were randomly assigned to the low and high performance conditions. They had 45 set to work at each anagram. Anagrams in the low performance condition were difficult but soluble (e.g., TAUCYI-ACUITY, GUTONE-TONGUE); anagrams in the high performance condition were easy (e.g., ZYIDZ-DIZZY, CUIJY-JUICY). If a subject failed to solve an anagram within the 45-set period he was given the right solution. To be included in the study subjects had to solve less than four test anagrams in the low performance condition, and more than six test anagrams in the high performance condition. To avoid 100% failure or success, low performance subjects were given at least two easy anagrams and high performance subjects were given at least two difficult anagrams. It should be mentioned here that prior to working on the IO-item anagram test, subjects worked on four easy or four difficult practice anagrams. Practice performance (low/high) did not affect any of the dependent variables and will not be discussed further. Upon completion of the anagram test, the first experimenter excused himself and left the
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room. A second experimenter entered the room carrying the material necessary for the second part of the experiment.
Manipulation
of Difficulty
and Diagnosticity
The materials used in the second part of the experiment were identical to those used by Trope (1975). There were six tests varying in difficulty and expected diagnosticity. Levels of difficulty (defined by probability of success) were easy, P(S) = .70; moderate, P(S) = .515; and difficult, P(S) = .305. Levels of diagnosticity [see Eq. (2)l were low (ED = 1.1) and high (ED = 2.8). Difficulty and expected diagnosticity were crossed in a 3 x 2 factoral design. It was explained that the Minnesota Orientation Test is comprised of six tests. Information about difficulty and expected diagnosticity was presented in the form of two bars on each of six envelopes containing the tests. One bar showed percentages of success and failure for students high in ability, P@(H) and P(FJH), respectively; the second bar presented percentages of success and failure for students low in ability, P(SIL) and P(FiL), respectively. Overall percentages of success and failure, P(S) and P(F), were also presented. Percentages of success of high and low ability groups, P(SIH) and P(SIL), for each of the six tests are presented in Table 1. The experimenter explained the meaning of the various figures and diagrams until he/she was sure that subjects understood what was presented to them.
Dependent Measures and Data Analysis Subjects were told that they were to choose 25 anagrams to work on and that they could decide how many anagrams would come from each of the six tests. In addition, subjects rated on IO-point scales (a) the strength of their preference for each test, (b) the difficulty of each test, (c) how good each test was for finding whether they were high or low in ability, and (d) how well they did on the anagram test they had completed before. Scales (b) and (c) served as manipulation checks for difficulty and diagnosticity; scale (d) was used to check the manipulation of past performance. Upon completion of the scales, subjects were debriefed, thanked, and excused. Perceived performance was examined in a 2 x 2 analysis of variance with practice (low/high) and performance (low/high) as between subjects factors. The remaining dependent variables were analyzed in a series of 2 x 2 x 3 x 2 repeated measures analyses of variance with practice (low/high) and performance (low/high) as between subjects factors, TABLE PERCENTAGES OF SUCCESSAMONG IN ABILITY ON TESTS VARYING EXPECTED
1 STUDENTS HIGH IN DIFFICULTY
AND AND
Low
DIAGNOSTICITY
DiBiculty Expected diagnosticity and student ability Low diagnosticity PCS1H) PCS) f-J High diagnosticity PCS H) PCS L)
Easy P(S) = .70
Moderate P(S) = .515
Difficult P(S) = .305
73.44 66.56
54.98 48.02
33.44 27.56
90.17 49.83
75.16 27.84
50.85 10.15
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and difficulty (easy/moderate/difficult) and expected diagnosticity (low/high) as within subjects factors (repeated measures). Measures of item selection and preference ratings yielded almost identical results and only the former is presented.
RESULTS Manipulation
Checks on Performance, Difjculty,
and Diagnosticity
The difference in perceived performance between the high and low performance conditions was highly significant, F (1,56) = 208.15, p < .OOl, eta = .89. The analysis of variance of difficulty ratings showed a main effect of difficulty, F (2,112) = 107.25, p < .OOl, eta = .81; mean difficulty ratings for the easy, moderate, and difficult tests were 3.48,5.14, and 7.53, respectively. Unexpectedly, high ED tests were perceived as more difficult than low ED tests, x high ED = 5.62,2 low ED = 5.14, F (1,56) = 4.50, p < .04, eta = .27. The analysis of variance of diagnosticity ratings produced three significant effects. The upper section of Table 2 presents the relevant mean diagnosticity ratings. The main effect of diagnosticity indicated that high ED tests were perceived as more diagnostic than low ED tests, F (1,56) = 96.95, p < .OOl, eta = .80; the main effect for difficulty revealed that difficult tests were perceived as more diagnostic than easier tests, F (2,112) = 3.27, p < .05, eta = .23; and the interaction between diagnosticity and difficulty indicated that the difference in perceived diagnosticity between high and low ED tests was more pronounced for more difficult tests, F (2,112) = 4.13, p < .02, eta = .26. Of the three effects, only the main effect of diagnosticity was expected. Clearly the experimental manipulations produced a number of unintended effects. Their implications are discussed below. Item Selection
Table 3 presents mean number of items selected at each level of difficulty and diagnosticity by subjects’ performance. A main effect of diagnosticity and a Diagnosticity x Performance interaction indicated that subjects preferred items from high ED tests to those from low ED tests and that this preference was more pronounced in the high performance condition, F (1,56) = 23.43,~ < .OOl, eta = .54; F (1,56) = 7.83,~ < .Ol, eta = .35, respectively. As expected, subjects chose more difficult items following high performance and easier items following low performance, F (2,112) = 6.69, p < .Ol, eta = .33. Unexpectedly, a Diagnosticity x Difficulty interaction indicated that there was a greater preference for high ED items over low ED items when they were more difficult, F (2,112) = 3.83,~ < .05, eta = .25. The analysis of perceived difficulty and perceived diagnosticity reported earlier revealed several unexpected effects. In particular, diagnostic tests were perceived as more difficult, difficult tests were perceived as more diagnostic, and the difference in perceived diagnosticity between
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TABLE 2 DIAGNOSTICITY RATINGS OF SIX TESTS VARYING IN DIFFICULTY AND EXPECTED DIAGNOSTICTY Difficulty
Expected
diagnosticity
Easy
Moderate
Difficult
Low High x
3.23 6.07 4.65
3.40 6.85 5.13
3.48 7.13 5.31
3.37 6.68 5.03
Study 2 Low High B
3.52 6.48 5.00
3.85 7.27 5.56
3.98 7.83 5.91
3.78 7.19 5.49
Study
x
1
low and high ED tests was more pronounced for more difficult tests. These unexpected effects might possibly account for the relationships between the independent variables and item selection. To examine this possibility, an analysis of covariance was conducted on item selection with perceived difficulty and perceived diagnosticity as covariates. Again, expectations and performance were the between factors and difficulty and diagnosticity were the within factors. As might be expected with perceived diagnosticity being one of the two covariates, the main effect of ED was eliminated (F < 1). However, the three significant interactions (Diagnosticity x Performance, Difficulty X Performance, and Diagnosticity x Difficulty) remained significant, F (1,56) = 8.66, p < .Ol, eta = .37; F (2,114) = 5.03,~ < .Ol, eta = .28; F (2, 114) = 3.45,~ < .05, eta = .24; respectively.
MEAN
TABLE 3 NUMBER OF ITEMS SELECTED AT EACH LEVEL DIAGNOSTICITY UNDER EACH EXPERIMENTAL
OF DIFFICULTY CONDITION
AND
Difficulty Expected
diagnosticity
Easy
Moderate
Difficult
x
High performance Low ED High ED x
1.93 3.20 2.57
2.20 5.47 3.84
2.86 9.30 6.08
2.33 5.99 4.17
Low performance Low ED High ED x
4.86 5.10 4.98
3.50 4.77 4.13
2.66 4.10 3.38
3.67 4.66 4.17
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DISCUSSION
The effects of performance on choice behavior confirmed the study’s hypotheses. Subjects in the high performance condition showed a stronger preference for high ED items than subjects in the low performance condition; it seems that people who expect to perform well are more likely to seek information about their ability than people who expect to perform poorly. Subjects in the high performance condition also preferred more difficult items than subjects in the low performance condition; evidently people who perform well raise their levels of aspiration. A comparison of our results with those obtained by Trope and Brickman (1975) and Trope (1975) shows both similarities and differences. All three studies have shown that subjects prefer high ED tests to low ED tests, suggesting that information seeking is a major determinant of choice behavior. In addition, effects of perfomance in the present study are consistent with effects of achivement motivation in the Trope study. In fact, it may be argued that either high level of performance or high level of achievement motivation create high expectations for success which, in turn, lead to preference for high diagnostic tasks. Differences between the present study and the Trope and Brickman, and Trope studies concern the relationship between diagnosticity and difficulty. In the present study diagnostic tests were perceived as more difficult and difficult tests were perceived as more diagnostic; in addition, the difference in perceived diagnosticity and item selection between high and low ED tests was more pronounced among more difficult tests. These effects were unexpected because diagnosticity and difficulty were defined independently of one another. Furthermore, none of these effects was found by either Trope and Brickman or Trope. In view of these considerations, it was decided to reexamine all the above effects in Study 2. Further discussion of the differences between the present study and the studies by Trope and Brickman and Trope is postponed until the results of Study 2 are reported. STUDY
2
This experiment examined the effects of monetary reward for performing successfully a preliminary task on subsequent choice of tasks varying in difficulty and expected diagnosticity. A second purpose was to reexamine the unexpected effects of diagnosticity and difficulty reported in Study 1. How does monetary reward affect the tendency to seek information about one’s own ability? Since the reward was made to appear contingent upon ability, level of performance and extent of skill were more salient issues for paid subjects than for those not paid. In other words, the reward provided paid subjects with information about their effectiveness at the rewarded activity, thereby increasing their sense of competence and self-determination. It may be hypothesized that a person who has ac-
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quired more knowledge about his competence is more likely to seek further information regarding his ability than a person whose level of competence was not made salient. The above hypothesis is consistent with Deci’s (1975) cognitive evaluation theory. He suggested that when the informational aspect of the reward is made salient, the rewarded person is made to feel competent and effective. High level of perceived competence is likely to motivate the person to explore and seek optimally challenging situations, in effect, diagnostic situations that test his ability and effectiveness. In the present experiment, the reward appears likely to increase subjects’ awareness of their competence, thereby motivating them to seek further challenging tests. METHOD Subjects were 52 male undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course. Participation in the experiment fulfilled part of the course requirements. Experimenters were the same five persons who had conducted Study I. The procedure was identical to that of Study 1 with the following changes: The distinction between practice items and performance items was abolished-all 14 anagrams were presented as test items; half the subjects were paid 15 cents for each test anagram they solved (pay condition) and the remaining half were not paid (no-pay condition); ditliculty level of the anagrams was manipulated to hold performance constant (between 8 and 11 correct solutions) for all the subjects. It should be emphasized that subjects in the pay condition were told that they would not be paid for solutions of anagrams they chose to work on in the second part, so that the choice situation was identical for the two experimental conditions.
RESULTS Level of Performance, Perceived DifJiculty, and Perceived Diagnosticity
Mean number of anagrams solved was 9.4 in the pay condition and 9.3 in the no-pay condition. Thus, the overall performance in the present experiment was more similar to the high performance than to the low performance in Study 1. The analysis of variance of difficulty ratings showed a main effect of difficulty, F(2,lOO) = 95.85,~ < .OOl, eta = .811; mean difficulty ratings for the easy, moderate, and difficult tests were 3.55, 5.34, and 7.52, respectively. As in Study 1, high ED tests were perceived as more difficult than low ED tests, x high ED = 5.74, x low ED = 5.19, F(1,50) = 5.69, p < .05, eta = .32. The analysis of variance of diagnosticity ratings produced three significant effects. The lower section of Table 2 presents the relevant mean diagnosticity ratings. High ED tests were perceived as more diagnostic than low ED tests, F(1,50) = 101.02, p < ,001, eta = .82; difficult tests were perceived as more diagnostic than easier tests, F(2,lOO) = 10.14, p < .OOl, eta = .41; and the difference in perceived ’ Eta, an estimate of the effect size, was computed from the F ratio, the &associated with the numerator (dfN), and the df associated with the denominator (&a; cf. Friedman, 1968):
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diagnosticity between high and low ED tests was more pronounced among more difficult tests, F(2,lOO) = 5.56, p < .Ol, eta = .32. Generally, the results of the manipulations checks on perceived difficulty and perceived diagnosticity are similar to those obtained in Study 1. Item Selection Table 4 presents mean number of items selected at each level of difficulty and diagnosticity under each experimental condition. Both the main effect of diagnosticity and the Diagnosticity x Pay interaction were significant,F(1,50) = 14.21,~ < .OOl, eta = .47;F(1,50) = 13.18,~ < .OOl, eta = .46, respectively. The mean selection scores in the right hand column of Table 4 indicate that preference for high and low ED tests was obtained only in the pay condition. As in Study 1, a Diagnosticity x Difficulty interaction indicated that preference for high ED tests was more pronounced among more difficult tests, F(2,lOO) = 5.69, p < .Ol, eta = .32. As in Study 1, item selection was treated in an analysis of covariance with pay condition, difficulty and expected diagnosticity as the independent variables and perceived difficulty and perceived diagnosticity as the covariates. As expected, the main effect of ED was eliminated (F < 1); however, the interaction of diagnosticity with pay condition and the interaction of diagnosticity with difficulty remained significant, F( 1,48) = 12.13,~ < .Ol, eta = .45;F(2,98) = 6.43,~ < .Ol, eta = .34, respectively. DISCUSSION
Paying people money for their performance on a task was found to increase their interest in assessing their ability to do well on similar tasks. It seems that ability assessment, as measured by preference of high ED .tests, becomes more important if in the past this ability was made salient through the receipt of monetary rewards. Of course, the effect of pay was TABLE 4 MEAN NUMBER OF ITEMS SELECTED AT EACH LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY AND DIAGNOSTICITY UNDER EACH EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION Difficulty Expected diagnosticity Pay condition Low High B No-pay condition Low High 2
Easy
Moderate
Diicult
B
2.62 4.00 3.31
2.19 5.77 3.98
1.54 8.88 5.21
2.12 6.21 4.17
4.69 3.85 4.27
5.11 4.38 4.75
2.58 4.38 3.48
4.13 4.20 4.17
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obtained under conditions of relatively high performance. Effects of pay under conditions of low performance may be quite different. In fact, when the individual cannot get a promised reward because of his performance, choice of high ED tests may decrease rather than increase. Three issues remain to be discussed: (a) the inconsistency in results obtained in the high performance condition of Study 1 and the no-pay condition of Study 2-although the two conditions were comparable, only the former produced a high preference for diagnostic tasks; (b) the similar but unexpected effects of diagnosticity, difficulty, and diagnosticity by difficulty interaction that were obtained in Studies 1 and 2; and (c) alternative nonmotivational interpretations of the results. The high performance condition in Study 1 is comparable to the no-pay condition in Study 2, since in both conditions performance was high and subjects were not paid. However, while subjects in the high performance condition of Study 1 showed a marked preference for diagnostic tasks, no such preference was found in the no-pay condition of Study 2. The difference in results may be a function of the type of subjects that were used in the two studies. Subjects in Study 1 were volunteeers whereas subjects in Study II were nonvolunteers. A review (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1975) of nine studies relating volunteering to achievement motivation concluded that volunteers are likely to show higher levels of achievement motivation than nonvolunteers. In view of the relationship between achievement motivation and diagnosticity preference (Trope, 1973, it appears likely that the volunteers in Study 1 will show a stronger preference for diagnostic tasks than their nonvolunteer counterparts in Study 2. Similar but unexpected effects of diagnosticity, difficulty, and diagnosticity by difficulty interactions were found in both studies. Briefly, there were three unexpected effects: (a) high ED tests were perceived as more difficult than low ED tests: (b) difficult tests were perceived as more diagnostic than easier tests; and (c) differences in perceived diagnosticity and choice of items between high and low ED tests (high ED tests had higher scores on both measures) were more pronounced among more difficult tests. How are we to account for these results? The effect of diagnosticity on perceived difficulty suggests that subjects may have used the success probabilities of low ability people rather than those of high ability people as an indication of task difficulty. Success probabilities of low ability people are lower in the high diagnosticity condition than they are in the low diagnosticity condition (see Table 1). Subjects may have conceptualized difficulty as an obstacle for only low ability people and consequently defined level of difficulty as a function of the low ability performance level. The main effect of difficulty on perceived diagnosticity suggests that subjects based their diagnosticity judgments on the ratio between success probabilities of the high and low ability groups, P(S (H)/P(S 1L), without
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taking into account other factors that were included in Eq. (2). This ratio increases with difficulty, particularly in the high diagnosticity condition (see Table 1). This also explains the effects of the diagnosticity by difficulty interaction on perceived diagnosticity and item selection. The difference in the ratio P(SIH)/P(SIL) between low and high ED tests increases with difficulty. Consequently, the difference in perceived diagnosticity and item selection between low and high ED tests also increased with difficulty. The possibility that subjects gave more weight to the likelihood ratio of success suggests an alternative interpretation of the effect of initial performance on choice behavior. As was previously shown, initial high performance led to preferring more diagnostic tasks. It seems safe to assume that initial high performance increased subjects’ prior probability of having high ability, that is, P(H) > P(L), whereas initial low performance did the reverse, that is, P(H) < P(L). When more weight is given to the likelihood ratio of success in Eq. (2), the difference in ED between low and high diagnosticity tests is greater for P(H) > P(L) than for P(H) < P(L). This suggests that high performance subjects preferred high diagnostic tasks because they perceived them as more informative than did low performance subjects. Unfortunately, the analysis of variance of perceived diagnosticity did not show that the difference in perceived diagnosticity between high and low ED tests was more pronounced for high performance subjects (F < 1). Nevertheless, the possibility that greater focus on the likelihood of success explains some of the present results warrants further investigation. For example, instead of presenting subjects with the percentages of both success and failure, future investigators may try to present, at least in some experimental conditions, only the percentages of failure. High initial performance also led to preferring more difficult tests-an effect that was previously attributed to an increase in level of aspiration. Again, it may be shown that when P(H) > P(L), Eq. (2) yields higher ED values for higher difficulty levels whereas when P(H) < P(L), Eq. (2) yields higher ED values for lower difficulty levels. Consequently, the choice of more difficult tests by the high performance subjects and of easier tests by the low performance subjects may be attributed to the fact that at these levels of difficulty, diagnosticity was at a maximum for the two groups, respectively. Indeed, a close to significant interaction indicated that for high performance subjects perceived diagnosticity increased with difficulty whereas for low performance subjects perceived diagnosticity decreased with difficulty, F(2,112) = 2.87, p < .07. eta = .22. The question of which process, change in level of aspiration or change in perceived diagnosticity, produced the present results requires further research.
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The differences between the present studies and those of Trope and Brickman (1975) and Trope (1975) can be traced in part to differences in procedure. Unlike the latter two studies, the present experiments allowed subjects to get information about the tests among which they subsequently chose. The information gave rise to a host of expectations and aspirations which, in turn, affected their information seeking behavior. In addition, this information could have contributed to the relationship between difficulty and diagnosticity. Clearly, subjects’ estimates of diagnosticity did not fully agree with the principles of Bayesian inference. Difficulty and diagnosticity became related concepts although they were not defined as such. Other investigators (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Slavic & Lichtenstein, 1971) have also noted that people’s judgments often violate the principles of probability theory including those of Bayes’ theorem. At the same time, the present studies indicate that the Bayesian derived definition of ED did produce the expected effects on perceived diagnosticity. The size of these effects was substantial (eta = .80 in Study 1; eta = .82 in Study 2), indicating that perceived diagnosticity was primarily a function of manipulated diagnosticity. In contrast, the effects of difficulty and diagnosticity by difficulty interaction on perceived diagnosticity were smaller with eta ranging from .23 to .41 (media eta = 29). Similarly, perceived difficulty was primarily a function of manipulated difficulty (eta = .81 in both studies) and only secondarily a function of manipulated diagnosticity (eta = .27 in Study 1; eta = .32 in Study 2). It seems that the use of Bayes’ theorem in formulating the concept of diagnosticity was justified. It also appears that caution should be exercised whenever this theorem serves as a guideline for formulating processes of social judgment. REFERENCES Atkinson, J. W. Motivational determinants of risk-taking behavior. Psychological Review. 1957, 64, 359-372. Atkinson, J. W., & Feather, N. T. (Eds.). A theory of achievement motivation. New York: Wiley, 1966. Brickman, P., & Bulman, R. J. Pleasure and pain in social comparison. In J. Suls & R. L. Miller (Eds.), Social comparison processes: Theoretical and empirical perspectives. Washington, D.C.: Halsted-Wiley, 1977. Deci, E. L. Intrinsic motivation. New York: Plenum., 1975. Festinger, L. A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 1954,7, 117-140. Friedman, H. Magnitude of experimental effect and a table for its rapid estimation. Psychological Bulletin, 1968, 70, 245-251. Friend, R. M., & Gilbert, J. Threat and fear of negative evaluation as determinants of locus of social comparison. Journal of Personality, 1973, 41, 328-340. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review. 1973, 80, 237-251. Lewin, K., Dembo, T., Festinger, L., & Sears, P. S. Level of aspiration. In J. McV. Hunt (Ed.), Personality and the behavior disorders. New York: Ronald Press, 1944. Vol. 1. Meyer, W. V., Folkes, V., & Weiner, B. The perceived informational value and affective
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consequences of choice behavior and intermediate difficulty task selection. Journal of in Personality, 1976, 10, 410-423. Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R. L. The volunteer subject. New York: Wiley, 1975. Slavic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. Comparison of Bayesian and regression approaches to the study of human information processing in judgment. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1971, 6, 649-744. Trope, Y. Seeking information about one’s own ability as a determinant of choice among tasks. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 82, 1004-1013. Trope, Y., & Brickman, P. Difficulty and diagnosticity as determinants of choice among tasks. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 918-925. Weiner, B. Theories of motivation: From mechanism to cognition. Chicago: RandMcNally, 1972. Weiner, B. (Ed.). Achievement motivation and attribution theory. Morristown, New Jersey: General Learning Press, 1974. Weiner, B., Heckhausen, H., Meyer, W. V., & Cook, R. E. Causal ascriptions and achievement behavior: A conceptual analysis of effort and reanalysis of locus of control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 21, 239-248. Willerman, B., Lewit, D., & Tellegen, A. Seeking and avoiding self-evaluation by working individually or in groups. In D. Wilner (Ed.), Decisions, values and groups New York: Pergamon, 1960. Vol. 1. Research
OF
RESEARCH
IN
PERSONALITY
Determinants
13, 161-174 (1979)
of Information-Seeking
Behavior
MIRON ZUCKERMAN, RICHARD H. BROWN, GARY L. FISCHLER, GERI A. Fox, DREW R. LATHIN, AND ARA J. MINASIAN University of Rochester Two studies examined situational determinants of choice among anagram tests that varied both in difficulty and in diagnosticity (the information they provided about one’s own ability). In both studies, subjects worked on a preliminary anagram test before making their choices. Study 1 manipulated level of performance on the preliminary test. Results showed that high performance led to preferring more difficult and more diagnostic tests. In Study 2, subjects were either paid or not paid for their performance on the preliminary test. Results showed that pay led to a preference for more diagnostic tests. Unexpectedly, results of both studies showed that although difficulty and diagnosticity were defined independently of one another, they were not perceived as such. Thus, high diagnostic tests were perceived as more difficult; more difficult tests were perceived as more diagnostic; and the difference between high and low diagnostic tests in perceived diagnosticity and choice of items (high diagnostic tests had higher scores on both measures) were more pronounced among more difficult tests. Motivational as well as cognitive interpretations of the results were discussed.
Recently, Trope and Brickman (1975) and Trope (1975) have used choice among tasks as a measure of information-seeking behavior. Trope and Brickman found that people preferred tasks on which performance outcomes maximized their knowledge of their own ability. Trope found that the magnitude of this preference increased with achievement motivation. The following two studies investigated two further determinants of the tendency to seek information about one’s ability: level of performance (high/low) on a preliminary task, and the magnitude of reward for performing this task. Since information-seeking behavior was defined in terms identical to those used by Trope and Brickman and Trope, it is first necessary to review the rationale and method of their work. The Trope and Brickman experiment was designed to examine the competing views of achievement motivation theory (Atkinson, 1957; AtThe authors would like to thank Harry T. Reis for his comments on an earlier version of this manuscript. Requests for reprints should be sent to Miron Zuckerman, Department of Psychology, University of Rochester, Rochester, NY 14607. 161 0092-6566/79/020161-14$02.00/O Copyright @ 1979 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.
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kinson & Feather, 1966) and attribution theory (Weiner, 1972, 1974) regarding the determinants of choice among tasks. Atkinson argued that people high in achievement motivation select tasks of intermediate difficulty in order to maximize the motivational or affective value of their performance outcomes. Weiner contended that individuals high in achievement motivation prefer intermediate difficulty tasks in order to maximize the informational value of their performance outcomes. In particular, Weiner argued, outcomes of intermediate difficulty tasks yield information about the person’s ability whereas success at an easy task or failure at a difficult task yield information about the difficulty of the task (see also Meyer, Folkes, & Weiner, 1976; and Weiner, Heckhausen, Meyer, & Cook, 1972). Trope and Brickman argued that the informational value of a task can be defined independently of its difficulty level so that predictions of achievement motivation theory and attribution theory become unconfounded. Specifically, Trope and Brickman defined the informational or diagnostic value of a task as the extent to which performance outcomes on this task increase the individual’s knowledge of his own ability. According to Bayes’ theorem, this increase in knowledge depends on (a) the probabilities that high and low ability individuals will succeed/fail on the task, and (b) the individual’s prior knowledge of the level of his own ability. In this model P(SIH) and P(SJL) denote the conditional probabilities of success given a high or a low level of ability and P(H)/P(L) denotes the individual’s prior odds that he has high ability relative to low ability. The expected diagnostic (ED) value of a task is then defined in terms of its Bayesian likelihood ration (LR). LR is the quantity by which prior odds are revised in the light of a particular outcome. In the case of success, the individual’s prior odds concerning his ability are revised to yield the posterior odds as follows:
where P(HIS)/P(LjS) are the posterior odds that the individual has high ability relative to low ability given success, P(H)/P(L) are the prior odds, and P(S(H)/P(SIL) is the likelihood ratio of success. The overall expected diagnosticity of a task was defined by Trope and Brickman as the sum of the diagnostic values (likelihood ratios) of all possible outcomes on the task weighted by the probability of these outcomes: ED = P(H) [P(SIH)LR(S) + P(FIH)LR(F)I (2) + P(L) [P(SIL)LR(S) + P(FIL)LR(F)]. As shown by Trope and Brickman, it is possible to vary ED independently of task difficulty. For example, if there are equal numbers of people with high and low ability on a particular task, prior probabilities of high and low abilities, P(H) and P(L), are both equal to .5. Under such condi-
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tions the conditional probability densities of success given high or low abilities, P(SIH) and P(SIL), will be symmetric about the overall difficulty level. The further apart P(SIH) and P(SIL), the higher the diagnostic value of the task. Thus, the diagnostic or informational value is higher if P(SIH) and P(S (L) are .9 and . 1 than if they are 55 and .45. It can also be seen that P(SIH) and P(SIL) can be further apart when the task is moderately difficult than when it is very easy or very difficult. In their work, Trope and Brickman (1975) and Trope (1975) gave subjects a choice among tasks varying in difficulty (easy/moderate/difficult) and expected diagnosticity (low/high). Results showed that subjects, particularly those high in achievement motivation, preferred high diagnostic tasks regardless of level of difficulty. It appears that the concept of diagnosticity may be utilized as a tool in the search for determinants of information-seeking behavior which is the purpose of the present two studies. STUDY 1 The Trope and Brickman (1975) study suggests that people are motivated to obtain information about themselves. Similarly, Festinger’s (1954) social comparison theory postulates that people have a drive to compare themselves with others in order to evaluate their opinions and abilities. Recently, however, Brickman and Bulman (1977) proposed that people may try to avoid social comparison information that is likely to be unfavorable to them. Studies by Willerman, Lewitt, and Tellegen (1960) and Friend and Gillbert (1973) provided indirect support for Brickman and Bullman’s proposal. Willerman et al. (1960) found that subjects who were high in fear of failure and were told that they had low ability, preferred working in groups to working by themselves. The group situation made it impossible for the individual to be responsible for the outcome. Friend and Gilbert (1973) reported that subjects who were high in fear of negative evaluation were more likely to compare themselves with worse-off others than with the best-off other. Using the Trope and Brickman paradigm, it is possible to test directly the hypothesis that self-esteem maintenance is one of the determinants of information-seeking behavior. In the present experiment, subjects first worked on a preliminary anagram test similar to anagram tests from which they subsequently had to choose. Difficulty of the preliminary test was manipulated to yield low/high performance. Levels of difficulty and expected diagnosticity of the choice tests were identical to those used by Trope and Brickman, and Trope. The fact that anagrams constitute a novel task for most subjects lended credibility to the manipulation of the preliminary performance and the manipulation of difficulty and expected diagnosticity of the choice tests. It was predicted that high performance on the preliminary test would lead to greater preference for high diagnostic tests than would low per-
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formance. Individuals whose initial performance is poor should avoid highly diagnostic tests because such tests would likely classify them as low in ability, providing further negative information. People whose initial performance is high, on the other hand, should seek highly diagnostic tests since they would likely be classified as high in ability. It was also predicted that high performance on the preliminary test, as opposed to low performance, would lead to preference for more difficult tests. This prediction was based on the assumption that people raise their level of aspiration after success and lower their level of aspiration after failure (Lewin, Dembo, Festinger, & Sears, 1944). METHOD Subjects were 64 male undergraduates recruited as volunteers from several large introductory courses. Rates of volunteering in these introductory courses ranged from 10 to 20%. Subjects received no monetary or other compensation for participating. Four subjects were excluded from the analysis because they failed to solve a sufficient number of easy anagrams (designed to produce high performance) or succeeded in solving too many difficult anagrams (designed to produce low performance). The entire study was conducted by five experimenters who randomly varied their partners and roles from session to session. Each experimental session was divided into two parts, a performance session and a choice session, conducted individually by two different experimenters. Experimenters conducting the second part were not aware of how the subject had performed in the first part. All subjects were run individually. Instructions were similar to those used by Trope and Brickman with changes necessary for the purpose of the present study. Subjects were told that the purpose of the experiment was to validate “a new measure of the anagram test, also named the Minnesota Multi-phasic Orientation Test.” The nature of the ability measured by the test was explained in general terms. It was emphasized that half of the students at the university were high in ability and half were low. It was explained that the experiment was divided into two parts conducted by two different experimenters. In the first part, subjects were required to solve 10 anagrams that were considered for adoption for the new test; in the second part, subjects were required to work on the older version of the Minnesota Anagram Test for which the experimenter had exact norms.
Manipulation
of Performance
Subjects were randomly assigned to the low and high performance conditions. They had 45 set to work at each anagram. Anagrams in the low performance condition were difficult but soluble (e.g., TAUCYI-ACUITY, GUTONE-TONGUE); anagrams in the high performance condition were easy (e.g., ZYIDZ-DIZZY, CUIJY-JUICY). If a subject failed to solve an anagram within the 45-set period he was given the right solution. To be included in the study subjects had to solve less than four test anagrams in the low performance condition, and more than six test anagrams in the high performance condition. To avoid 100% failure or success, low performance subjects were given at least two easy anagrams and high performance subjects were given at least two difficult anagrams. It should be mentioned here that prior to working on the IO-item anagram test, subjects worked on four easy or four difficult practice anagrams. Practice performance (low/high) did not affect any of the dependent variables and will not be discussed further. Upon completion of the anagram test, the first experimenter excused himself and left the
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room. A second experimenter entered the room carrying the material necessary for the second part of the experiment.
Manipulation
of Difficulty
and Diagnosticity
The materials used in the second part of the experiment were identical to those used by Trope (1975). There were six tests varying in difficulty and expected diagnosticity. Levels of difficulty (defined by probability of success) were easy, P(S) = .70; moderate, P(S) = .515; and difficult, P(S) = .305. Levels of diagnosticity [see Eq. (2)l were low (ED = 1.1) and high (ED = 2.8). Difficulty and expected diagnosticity were crossed in a 3 x 2 factoral design. It was explained that the Minnesota Orientation Test is comprised of six tests. Information about difficulty and expected diagnosticity was presented in the form of two bars on each of six envelopes containing the tests. One bar showed percentages of success and failure for students high in ability, P@(H) and P(FJH), respectively; the second bar presented percentages of success and failure for students low in ability, P(SIL) and P(FiL), respectively. Overall percentages of success and failure, P(S) and P(F), were also presented. Percentages of success of high and low ability groups, P(SIH) and P(SIL), for each of the six tests are presented in Table 1. The experimenter explained the meaning of the various figures and diagrams until he/she was sure that subjects understood what was presented to them.
Dependent Measures and Data Analysis Subjects were told that they were to choose 25 anagrams to work on and that they could decide how many anagrams would come from each of the six tests. In addition, subjects rated on IO-point scales (a) the strength of their preference for each test, (b) the difficulty of each test, (c) how good each test was for finding whether they were high or low in ability, and (d) how well they did on the anagram test they had completed before. Scales (b) and (c) served as manipulation checks for difficulty and diagnosticity; scale (d) was used to check the manipulation of past performance. Upon completion of the scales, subjects were debriefed, thanked, and excused. Perceived performance was examined in a 2 x 2 analysis of variance with practice (low/high) and performance (low/high) as between subjects factors. The remaining dependent variables were analyzed in a series of 2 x 2 x 3 x 2 repeated measures analyses of variance with practice (low/high) and performance (low/high) as between subjects factors, TABLE PERCENTAGES OF SUCCESSAMONG IN ABILITY ON TESTS VARYING EXPECTED
1 STUDENTS HIGH IN DIFFICULTY
AND AND
Low
DIAGNOSTICITY
DiBiculty Expected diagnosticity and student ability Low diagnosticity PCS1H) PCS) f-J High diagnosticity PCS H) PCS L)
Easy P(S) = .70
Moderate P(S) = .515
Difficult P(S) = .305
73.44 66.56
54.98 48.02
33.44 27.56
90.17 49.83
75.16 27.84
50.85 10.15
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and difficulty (easy/moderate/difficult) and expected diagnosticity (low/high) as within subjects factors (repeated measures). Measures of item selection and preference ratings yielded almost identical results and only the former is presented.
RESULTS Manipulation
Checks on Performance, Difjculty,
and Diagnosticity
The difference in perceived performance between the high and low performance conditions was highly significant, F (1,56) = 208.15, p < .OOl, eta = .89. The analysis of variance of difficulty ratings showed a main effect of difficulty, F (2,112) = 107.25, p < .OOl, eta = .81; mean difficulty ratings for the easy, moderate, and difficult tests were 3.48,5.14, and 7.53, respectively. Unexpectedly, high ED tests were perceived as more difficult than low ED tests, x high ED = 5.62,2 low ED = 5.14, F (1,56) = 4.50, p < .04, eta = .27. The analysis of variance of diagnosticity ratings produced three significant effects. The upper section of Table 2 presents the relevant mean diagnosticity ratings. The main effect of diagnosticity indicated that high ED tests were perceived as more diagnostic than low ED tests, F (1,56) = 96.95, p < .OOl, eta = .80; the main effect for difficulty revealed that difficult tests were perceived as more diagnostic than easier tests, F (2,112) = 3.27, p < .05, eta = .23; and the interaction between diagnosticity and difficulty indicated that the difference in perceived diagnosticity between high and low ED tests was more pronounced for more difficult tests, F (2,112) = 4.13, p < .02, eta = .26. Of the three effects, only the main effect of diagnosticity was expected. Clearly the experimental manipulations produced a number of unintended effects. Their implications are discussed below. Item Selection
Table 3 presents mean number of items selected at each level of difficulty and diagnosticity by subjects’ performance. A main effect of diagnosticity and a Diagnosticity x Performance interaction indicated that subjects preferred items from high ED tests to those from low ED tests and that this preference was more pronounced in the high performance condition, F (1,56) = 23.43,~ < .OOl, eta = .54; F (1,56) = 7.83,~ < .Ol, eta = .35, respectively. As expected, subjects chose more difficult items following high performance and easier items following low performance, F (2,112) = 6.69, p < .Ol, eta = .33. Unexpectedly, a Diagnosticity x Difficulty interaction indicated that there was a greater preference for high ED items over low ED items when they were more difficult, F (2,112) = 3.83,~ < .05, eta = .25. The analysis of perceived difficulty and perceived diagnosticity reported earlier revealed several unexpected effects. In particular, diagnostic tests were perceived as more difficult, difficult tests were perceived as more diagnostic, and the difference in perceived diagnosticity between
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TABLE 2 DIAGNOSTICITY RATINGS OF SIX TESTS VARYING IN DIFFICULTY AND EXPECTED DIAGNOSTICTY Difficulty
Expected
diagnosticity
Easy
Moderate
Difficult
Low High x
3.23 6.07 4.65
3.40 6.85 5.13
3.48 7.13 5.31
3.37 6.68 5.03
Study 2 Low High B
3.52 6.48 5.00
3.85 7.27 5.56
3.98 7.83 5.91
3.78 7.19 5.49
Study
x
1
low and high ED tests was more pronounced for more difficult tests. These unexpected effects might possibly account for the relationships between the independent variables and item selection. To examine this possibility, an analysis of covariance was conducted on item selection with perceived difficulty and perceived diagnosticity as covariates. Again, expectations and performance were the between factors and difficulty and diagnosticity were the within factors. As might be expected with perceived diagnosticity being one of the two covariates, the main effect of ED was eliminated (F < 1). However, the three significant interactions (Diagnosticity x Performance, Difficulty X Performance, and Diagnosticity x Difficulty) remained significant, F (1,56) = 8.66, p < .Ol, eta = .37; F (2,114) = 5.03,~ < .Ol, eta = .28; F (2, 114) = 3.45,~ < .05, eta = .24; respectively.
MEAN
TABLE 3 NUMBER OF ITEMS SELECTED AT EACH LEVEL DIAGNOSTICITY UNDER EACH EXPERIMENTAL
OF DIFFICULTY CONDITION
AND
Difficulty Expected
diagnosticity
Easy
Moderate
Difficult
x
High performance Low ED High ED x
1.93 3.20 2.57
2.20 5.47 3.84
2.86 9.30 6.08
2.33 5.99 4.17
Low performance Low ED High ED x
4.86 5.10 4.98
3.50 4.77 4.13
2.66 4.10 3.38
3.67 4.66 4.17
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DISCUSSION
The effects of performance on choice behavior confirmed the study’s hypotheses. Subjects in the high performance condition showed a stronger preference for high ED items than subjects in the low performance condition; it seems that people who expect to perform well are more likely to seek information about their ability than people who expect to perform poorly. Subjects in the high performance condition also preferred more difficult items than subjects in the low performance condition; evidently people who perform well raise their levels of aspiration. A comparison of our results with those obtained by Trope and Brickman (1975) and Trope (1975) shows both similarities and differences. All three studies have shown that subjects prefer high ED tests to low ED tests, suggesting that information seeking is a major determinant of choice behavior. In addition, effects of perfomance in the present study are consistent with effects of achivement motivation in the Trope study. In fact, it may be argued that either high level of performance or high level of achievement motivation create high expectations for success which, in turn, lead to preference for high diagnostic tasks. Differences between the present study and the Trope and Brickman, and Trope studies concern the relationship between diagnosticity and difficulty. In the present study diagnostic tests were perceived as more difficult and difficult tests were perceived as more diagnostic; in addition, the difference in perceived diagnosticity and item selection between high and low ED tests was more pronounced among more difficult tests. These effects were unexpected because diagnosticity and difficulty were defined independently of one another. Furthermore, none of these effects was found by either Trope and Brickman or Trope. In view of these considerations, it was decided to reexamine all the above effects in Study 2. Further discussion of the differences between the present study and the studies by Trope and Brickman and Trope is postponed until the results of Study 2 are reported. STUDY
2
This experiment examined the effects of monetary reward for performing successfully a preliminary task on subsequent choice of tasks varying in difficulty and expected diagnosticity. A second purpose was to reexamine the unexpected effects of diagnosticity and difficulty reported in Study 1. How does monetary reward affect the tendency to seek information about one’s own ability? Since the reward was made to appear contingent upon ability, level of performance and extent of skill were more salient issues for paid subjects than for those not paid. In other words, the reward provided paid subjects with information about their effectiveness at the rewarded activity, thereby increasing their sense of competence and self-determination. It may be hypothesized that a person who has ac-
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quired more knowledge about his competence is more likely to seek further information regarding his ability than a person whose level of competence was not made salient. The above hypothesis is consistent with Deci’s (1975) cognitive evaluation theory. He suggested that when the informational aspect of the reward is made salient, the rewarded person is made to feel competent and effective. High level of perceived competence is likely to motivate the person to explore and seek optimally challenging situations, in effect, diagnostic situations that test his ability and effectiveness. In the present experiment, the reward appears likely to increase subjects’ awareness of their competence, thereby motivating them to seek further challenging tests. METHOD Subjects were 52 male undergraduates enrolled in an introductory psychology course. Participation in the experiment fulfilled part of the course requirements. Experimenters were the same five persons who had conducted Study I. The procedure was identical to that of Study 1 with the following changes: The distinction between practice items and performance items was abolished-all 14 anagrams were presented as test items; half the subjects were paid 15 cents for each test anagram they solved (pay condition) and the remaining half were not paid (no-pay condition); ditliculty level of the anagrams was manipulated to hold performance constant (between 8 and 11 correct solutions) for all the subjects. It should be emphasized that subjects in the pay condition were told that they would not be paid for solutions of anagrams they chose to work on in the second part, so that the choice situation was identical for the two experimental conditions.
RESULTS Level of Performance, Perceived DifJiculty, and Perceived Diagnosticity
Mean number of anagrams solved was 9.4 in the pay condition and 9.3 in the no-pay condition. Thus, the overall performance in the present experiment was more similar to the high performance than to the low performance in Study 1. The analysis of variance of difficulty ratings showed a main effect of difficulty, F(2,lOO) = 95.85,~ < .OOl, eta = .811; mean difficulty ratings for the easy, moderate, and difficult tests were 3.55, 5.34, and 7.52, respectively. As in Study 1, high ED tests were perceived as more difficult than low ED tests, x high ED = 5.74, x low ED = 5.19, F(1,50) = 5.69, p < .05, eta = .32. The analysis of variance of diagnosticity ratings produced three significant effects. The lower section of Table 2 presents the relevant mean diagnosticity ratings. High ED tests were perceived as more diagnostic than low ED tests, F(1,50) = 101.02, p < ,001, eta = .82; difficult tests were perceived as more diagnostic than easier tests, F(2,lOO) = 10.14, p < .OOl, eta = .41; and the difference in perceived ’ Eta, an estimate of the effect size, was computed from the F ratio, the &associated with the numerator (dfN), and the df associated with the denominator (&a; cf. Friedman, 1968):
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diagnosticity between high and low ED tests was more pronounced among more difficult tests, F(2,lOO) = 5.56, p < .Ol, eta = .32. Generally, the results of the manipulations checks on perceived difficulty and perceived diagnosticity are similar to those obtained in Study 1. Item Selection Table 4 presents mean number of items selected at each level of difficulty and diagnosticity under each experimental condition. Both the main effect of diagnosticity and the Diagnosticity x Pay interaction were significant,F(1,50) = 14.21,~ < .OOl, eta = .47;F(1,50) = 13.18,~ < .OOl, eta = .46, respectively. The mean selection scores in the right hand column of Table 4 indicate that preference for high and low ED tests was obtained only in the pay condition. As in Study 1, a Diagnosticity x Difficulty interaction indicated that preference for high ED tests was more pronounced among more difficult tests, F(2,lOO) = 5.69, p < .Ol, eta = .32. As in Study 1, item selection was treated in an analysis of covariance with pay condition, difficulty and expected diagnosticity as the independent variables and perceived difficulty and perceived diagnosticity as the covariates. As expected, the main effect of ED was eliminated (F < 1); however, the interaction of diagnosticity with pay condition and the interaction of diagnosticity with difficulty remained significant, F( 1,48) = 12.13,~ < .Ol, eta = .45;F(2,98) = 6.43,~ < .Ol, eta = .34, respectively. DISCUSSION
Paying people money for their performance on a task was found to increase their interest in assessing their ability to do well on similar tasks. It seems that ability assessment, as measured by preference of high ED .tests, becomes more important if in the past this ability was made salient through the receipt of monetary rewards. Of course, the effect of pay was TABLE 4 MEAN NUMBER OF ITEMS SELECTED AT EACH LEVEL OF DIFFICULTY AND DIAGNOSTICITY UNDER EACH EXPERIMENTAL CONDITION Difficulty Expected diagnosticity Pay condition Low High B No-pay condition Low High 2
Easy
Moderate
Diicult
B
2.62 4.00 3.31
2.19 5.77 3.98
1.54 8.88 5.21
2.12 6.21 4.17
4.69 3.85 4.27
5.11 4.38 4.75
2.58 4.38 3.48
4.13 4.20 4.17
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171
obtained under conditions of relatively high performance. Effects of pay under conditions of low performance may be quite different. In fact, when the individual cannot get a promised reward because of his performance, choice of high ED tests may decrease rather than increase. Three issues remain to be discussed: (a) the inconsistency in results obtained in the high performance condition of Study 1 and the no-pay condition of Study 2-although the two conditions were comparable, only the former produced a high preference for diagnostic tasks; (b) the similar but unexpected effects of diagnosticity, difficulty, and diagnosticity by difficulty interaction that were obtained in Studies 1 and 2; and (c) alternative nonmotivational interpretations of the results. The high performance condition in Study 1 is comparable to the no-pay condition in Study 2, since in both conditions performance was high and subjects were not paid. However, while subjects in the high performance condition of Study 1 showed a marked preference for diagnostic tasks, no such preference was found in the no-pay condition of Study 2. The difference in results may be a function of the type of subjects that were used in the two studies. Subjects in Study 1 were volunteeers whereas subjects in Study II were nonvolunteers. A review (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1975) of nine studies relating volunteering to achievement motivation concluded that volunteers are likely to show higher levels of achievement motivation than nonvolunteers. In view of the relationship between achievement motivation and diagnosticity preference (Trope, 1973, it appears likely that the volunteers in Study 1 will show a stronger preference for diagnostic tasks than their nonvolunteer counterparts in Study 2. Similar but unexpected effects of diagnosticity, difficulty, and diagnosticity by difficulty interactions were found in both studies. Briefly, there were three unexpected effects: (a) high ED tests were perceived as more difficult than low ED tests: (b) difficult tests were perceived as more diagnostic than easier tests; and (c) differences in perceived diagnosticity and choice of items between high and low ED tests (high ED tests had higher scores on both measures) were more pronounced among more difficult tests. How are we to account for these results? The effect of diagnosticity on perceived difficulty suggests that subjects may have used the success probabilities of low ability people rather than those of high ability people as an indication of task difficulty. Success probabilities of low ability people are lower in the high diagnosticity condition than they are in the low diagnosticity condition (see Table 1). Subjects may have conceptualized difficulty as an obstacle for only low ability people and consequently defined level of difficulty as a function of the low ability performance level. The main effect of difficulty on perceived diagnosticity suggests that subjects based their diagnosticity judgments on the ratio between success probabilities of the high and low ability groups, P(S (H)/P(S 1L), without
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ET
AL.
taking into account other factors that were included in Eq. (2). This ratio increases with difficulty, particularly in the high diagnosticity condition (see Table 1). This also explains the effects of the diagnosticity by difficulty interaction on perceived diagnosticity and item selection. The difference in the ratio P(SIH)/P(SIL) between low and high ED tests increases with difficulty. Consequently, the difference in perceived diagnosticity and item selection between low and high ED tests also increased with difficulty. The possibility that subjects gave more weight to the likelihood ratio of success suggests an alternative interpretation of the effect of initial performance on choice behavior. As was previously shown, initial high performance led to preferring more diagnostic tasks. It seems safe to assume that initial high performance increased subjects’ prior probability of having high ability, that is, P(H) > P(L), whereas initial low performance did the reverse, that is, P(H) < P(L). When more weight is given to the likelihood ratio of success in Eq. (2), the difference in ED between low and high diagnosticity tests is greater for P(H) > P(L) than for P(H) < P(L). This suggests that high performance subjects preferred high diagnostic tasks because they perceived them as more informative than did low performance subjects. Unfortunately, the analysis of variance of perceived diagnosticity did not show that the difference in perceived diagnosticity between high and low ED tests was more pronounced for high performance subjects (F < 1). Nevertheless, the possibility that greater focus on the likelihood of success explains some of the present results warrants further investigation. For example, instead of presenting subjects with the percentages of both success and failure, future investigators may try to present, at least in some experimental conditions, only the percentages of failure. High initial performance also led to preferring more difficult tests-an effect that was previously attributed to an increase in level of aspiration. Again, it may be shown that when P(H) > P(L), Eq. (2) yields higher ED values for higher difficulty levels whereas when P(H) < P(L), Eq. (2) yields higher ED values for lower difficulty levels. Consequently, the choice of more difficult tests by the high performance subjects and of easier tests by the low performance subjects may be attributed to the fact that at these levels of difficulty, diagnosticity was at a maximum for the two groups, respectively. Indeed, a close to significant interaction indicated that for high performance subjects perceived diagnosticity increased with difficulty whereas for low performance subjects perceived diagnosticity decreased with difficulty, F(2,112) = 2.87, p < .07. eta = .22. The question of which process, change in level of aspiration or change in perceived diagnosticity, produced the present results requires further research.
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The differences between the present studies and those of Trope and Brickman (1975) and Trope (1975) can be traced in part to differences in procedure. Unlike the latter two studies, the present experiments allowed subjects to get information about the tests among which they subsequently chose. The information gave rise to a host of expectations and aspirations which, in turn, affected their information seeking behavior. In addition, this information could have contributed to the relationship between difficulty and diagnosticity. Clearly, subjects’ estimates of diagnosticity did not fully agree with the principles of Bayesian inference. Difficulty and diagnosticity became related concepts although they were not defined as such. Other investigators (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1973; Slavic & Lichtenstein, 1971) have also noted that people’s judgments often violate the principles of probability theory including those of Bayes’ theorem. At the same time, the present studies indicate that the Bayesian derived definition of ED did produce the expected effects on perceived diagnosticity. The size of these effects was substantial (eta = .80 in Study 1; eta = .82 in Study 2), indicating that perceived diagnosticity was primarily a function of manipulated diagnosticity. In contrast, the effects of difficulty and diagnosticity by difficulty interaction on perceived diagnosticity were smaller with eta ranging from .23 to .41 (media eta = 29). Similarly, perceived difficulty was primarily a function of manipulated difficulty (eta = .81 in both studies) and only secondarily a function of manipulated diagnosticity (eta = .27 in Study 1; eta = .32 in Study 2). It seems that the use of Bayes’ theorem in formulating the concept of diagnosticity was justified. It also appears that caution should be exercised whenever this theorem serves as a guideline for formulating processes of social judgment. REFERENCES Atkinson, J. W. Motivational determinants of risk-taking behavior. Psychological Review. 1957, 64, 359-372. Atkinson, J. W., & Feather, N. T. (Eds.). A theory of achievement motivation. New York: Wiley, 1966. Brickman, P., & Bulman, R. J. Pleasure and pain in social comparison. In J. Suls & R. L. Miller (Eds.), Social comparison processes: Theoretical and empirical perspectives. Washington, D.C.: Halsted-Wiley, 1977. Deci, E. L. Intrinsic motivation. New York: Plenum., 1975. Festinger, L. A theory of social comparison processes. Human Relations, 1954,7, 117-140. Friedman, H. Magnitude of experimental effect and a table for its rapid estimation. Psychological Bulletin, 1968, 70, 245-251. Friend, R. M., & Gilbert, J. Threat and fear of negative evaluation as determinants of locus of social comparison. Journal of Personality, 1973, 41, 328-340. Kahneman, D., & Tversky, A. On the psychology of prediction. Psychological Review. 1973, 80, 237-251. Lewin, K., Dembo, T., Festinger, L., & Sears, P. S. Level of aspiration. In J. McV. Hunt (Ed.), Personality and the behavior disorders. New York: Ronald Press, 1944. Vol. 1. Meyer, W. V., Folkes, V., & Weiner, B. The perceived informational value and affective
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consequences of choice behavior and intermediate difficulty task selection. Journal of in Personality, 1976, 10, 410-423. Rosenthal, R., & Rosnow, R. L. The volunteer subject. New York: Wiley, 1975. Slavic, P., & Lichtenstein, S. Comparison of Bayesian and regression approaches to the study of human information processing in judgment. Organizational Behavior and Human Performance, 1971, 6, 649-744. Trope, Y. Seeking information about one’s own ability as a determinant of choice among tasks. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 82, 1004-1013. Trope, Y., & Brickman, P. Difficulty and diagnosticity as determinants of choice among tasks. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1975, 31, 918-925. Weiner, B. Theories of motivation: From mechanism to cognition. Chicago: RandMcNally, 1972. Weiner, B. (Ed.). Achievement motivation and attribution theory. Morristown, New Jersey: General Learning Press, 1974. Weiner, B., Heckhausen, H., Meyer, W. V., & Cook, R. E. Causal ascriptions and achievement behavior: A conceptual analysis of effort and reanalysis of locus of control. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1972, 21, 239-248. Willerman, B., Lewit, D., & Tellegen, A. Seeking and avoiding self-evaluation by working individually or in groups. In D. Wilner (Ed.), Decisions, values and groups New York: Pergamon, 1960. Vol. 1. Research