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Differentiating the effects of self-control and self-esteem on reactions to mortality salience
Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007) 894–901 www.elsevier.com/locate/jesp
DiVerentiating the eVects of self-control and self-esteem on reactions to mortality salience Matthew T. Gailliot a,¤, Brandon J. Schmeichel b, Jon K. Maner a a b
Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1270, USA Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1270, USA Received 11 November 2005; revised 30 March 2006 Available online 27 November 2006 Communicated by spencer
Abstract Whereas many previous studies suggest that self-esteem may buVer against the psychological threat of death, recent research has begun to suggest that self-control also may serve as a buVer. Two studies examined the possibility that dispositional self-control uniquely predicts responses to mortality salience, above and beyond self-esteem. In Study 1, an initial exercise in emotion regulation increased subsequent accessibility of death thoughts. In Study 2, mortality salience increased worldview defense. Both of these eVects were moderated by dispositional self-control, such that the eVects occurred among participants with low but not high self-control. More importantly, these moderating eVects were observed over and above the moderating eVects of self-esteem. Findings suggest that self-control may serve as an important and unique buVer against thoughts of death. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Self-control; Ego depletion; Self-regulation; Mortality salience; Thought suppression; Terror Management; Worldview defense; Self-esteem
Introduction The prospect of death is aversive and inevitable, and likewise, the thought of one’s own death can be especially frightening (Becker, 1973). People are thus highly motivated to avoid thinking about death. The current investigation examined the relative contributions of two personality traits that may serve as buVers against death-related thoughts. Past research suggests that high self-esteem counters anxieties about death (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). There is also reason to suspect that self-control (i.e., the capacity to willingly alter one’s behavior, emotions, and thoughts) plays an equally important and perhaps even stronger role in reducing concerns about death (Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2006). The current work therefore examined the roles of
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dispositional self-esteem and dispositional self-control in managing death-related thoughts. Mortality concerns and self-esteem There are at least two means through which one might avoid thinking about and thereby defuse the psychological threat of death. One means is literal immortality beliefs. If a person believes that he or she will exist in some form forever, then the prospect of death should be less frightening. Research has supported this view by showing, for instance, that belief in an afterlife reduces the psychological threat of death (Dechesne et al., 2003). A second means to defuse the threat of death is to seek symbolic immortality by belonging to and upholding a cultural worldview that will persist long after one’s own death (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). Even though the individual will die, a part of the self will exist after death through its association with culture, thereby bestowing a sense of symbolic immortality upon the individual.
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Prior evidence suggests that this sense of symbolic immortality is rooted in self-esteem. Terror Management Theory (TMT) posits that the purpose of self-esteem is to buVer against the threat of death (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Pyszczynski et al., 2004). In this view, self-esteem signiWes the extent to which a person lives up to or fulWlls cultural expectations and values. Compared to people with low self-esteem, people with high self-esteem more successfully fulWll shared cultural standards of meaning and value. High self-esteem therefore entrenches the individual in a meaningful cultural drama that will continue after his or her own death, thereby providing a sense of symbolic immortality that counteracts the threatening nature of death. Several studies support the idea that self-esteem reduces concerns about death. For instance, experimentally increasing self-esteem (e.g., by giving positive performance feedback) has been shown to reduce defensive reactions to mortality salience and preoccupation with death (e.g., Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). People also seem to increase their striving for self-esteem (e.g., by seeking to become more attractive) after thinking about death, suggesting that self-esteem helps protect against mortal concern (Arndt, Schimel, & Goldenberg, 2003; Routledge, Arndt, & Goldenberg, 2004). Additional evidence suggests that chronically high self-esteem may serve as a buVer against death-related thought. One study, for example, found that mortality salience increased defensiveness among people with low self-esteem but not among those with high self-esteem (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Mortality concerns and self-control Though attaining a sense of symbolic immortality (e.g., via self-esteem) is one way to reduce mortal concern, death is ultimately inevitable and so people are bound to think about dying from time to time. Another means of reducing mortal concern therefore is to avoid thinking about death, such as by suppressing death-related thoughts. Much like how other aversive thoughts are suppressed from conscious awareness (WenzlaV & Wegner, 2000), suppressing thoughts about death requires controlled and eVortful processing. For instance, studies show that immediately after death is made salient, people exhibit low levels of death-thought activation, presumably because death thoughts are suppressed from awareness (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). When cognitive resources are diverted following a mortality salience induction, however, people exhibit high levels of death-thought activation (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1997; Greenberg, Arndt, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2001). Suppressing death thoughts also appears to drain or deplete cognitive resources, such that after thinking about death, people perform worse on other tasks requiring controlled processing (e.g., the Stroop task) (Gailliot et al., 2006). The suppression of death thoughts
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appears to require the expenditure of cognitive resources. Therefore, people who excel at self-control may be better able to control death-related thoughts. Empirical support for the idea that self-control is crucial for the eVective suppression of death thoughts was provided by Gailliot et al. (2006), who found that high self-control reduces preoccupation with death. Participants with temporarily or dispositionally high self-control exhibited lower death-thought activation than participants with low self-control, such that they reported less death anxiety and were less likely to perceive death-related themes in ambiguous images. Consistent with research showing that controlled or conscious eVorts to suppress thoughts reduce the implicit activation of those thoughts (Anderson & Green, 2001; McBride & Dosher, 1997; MacLeod, 1989), participants with temporarily or dispositionally high (vs. low) self-control also showed lower levels of implicit death-thought activation, such that they were less likely to solve word puzzles with death-related words. Participants with dispositionally high self-control also were less likely than those low in self-control to respond defensively to mortality salience (by bolstering support for a political Wgurehead). Altogether, this evidence suggests that self-control facilitates the suppression of death thoughts and therefore helps to defuse the threat of death. Self-control, self-esteem, and mortality concerns: an integration Thus, both self-control and self-esteem have been linked to reduced death-thought accessibility and reduced defensiveness in response to reminders of personal mortality. In the current work, we sought to distinguish between the roles of self-esteem and self-control in reactions to mortality salience. We expected that, on their own, both dispositional self-control and self-esteem would moderate reactions to mortality salience. More importantly, we expected that, when considered simultaneously, the moderating eVects of selfcontrol would be observed over and above any moderating eVects of self-esteem. That is, self-control was expected to serve as a unique predictor of responses to mortality salience. Self-control allows people to live up to cultural expectations and values, such as performing well in school, adhering to laws and social norms, entering into and maintaining healthy relationships, and coping eVectively with stress (Gailliot & Baumeister, in press; Gailliot, Gitter, Baker, & Baumeister, submitted for publication; Gordijn, Hindriks, Koomen, Dijksterhuis, & Van Knippenberg, 2004; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003; Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Thus, self-control might provide the basic means necessary for protecting against thoughts of death. Indeed, the self-control of cognitive processes may be an especially strong and unique buVer against troubling thoughts of death. Death appears to be threatening to the extent that death thoughts are activated (Arndt et al., 1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2001; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999) and the
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ability to exert self-control appears to be crucial for reducing death-thought activation (Gailliot et al., 2006; see also Arndt et al., 1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2001; Koole & Van den Berg, 2005). Overview and hypotheses of the current work The current work tested the hypotheses that both trait self-esteem and self-control would moderate the eVects of manipulations designed to increase mortal concern and, moreover, that moderating eVects of self-control would be observed over and above any moderating eVects of selfesteem. Study 1 examined whether activating the thought of death and temporarily impairing the ability to exert self-control would heighten death-thought accessibility, and whether this eVect would be attenuated by high self-esteem and high self-control. Study 2 examined whether the tendency to engage in defensive reactions to mortality salience would be moderated by high self-esteem and high self-control. Study 1 Study 1 examined whether trait self-esteem or self-control would be associated with less death-thought accessibility under conditions that increase awareness of death. Participants read a script containing subtle references to death. While reading the script, some participants exerted self-control by regulating their emotions, whereas other participants read the script without attempting to regulate their emotions. Based on the idea that eVorts at self-control deplete a limited resource and impair subsequent eVorts at self-control (see Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, in press; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), we predicted that participants who regulated their emotions while reading the script would have heightened death-thought accessibility later on, relative to participants who did not regulate their emotions while reading the script. That is, we predicted that temporarily undermining the operation of self-control would result in heightened death-thought accessibility after reading a script that alluded to death. To assess death-thought accessibility, we had participants tell a story about a topic of their choice. The rationale was that participants would have to execute a mental search for possible story topics, and so they may very well consider telling a story about death or at least may use words related to death while telling a story about something else. The number of words related to death mentioned during the story constituted the dependent measure of death-thought accessibility. Insofar as dispositionally high self-control and high selfesteem reduce death-thought activation, subtle reminders of death combined with eVorts at self-control should increase death-thought accessibility, primarily among participants with either low self-control or low self-esteem. Given the link between self-control and death-though accessibility, we anticipated that self-control would moderate responses to mortality salience, even after controlling for self-esteem.
Method Participants Twenty-four college undergraduates (18 women, 1 unreported) participated in exchange for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to an emotion regulation or no emotion regulation condition. Procedure Participants completed measures of trait self-control (the Self-Control Scale; Tangney et al., 2004) and selfesteem (Rosenberg, 1965) during a mass testing session at the start of the semester. We used the brief version of the Self-Control Scale, which contains 13 items (e.g., “I have a hard time breaking bad habits” (reverse scored); “I am good at resisting temptation”) answered on a scale from 1 (not at all like me) to 5 (very much like me) ( D .71; M D 3.31, SD D 0.52). Higher scores on this measure indicate higher self-control. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale contains 10 items (e.g., “On the whole, I am satisWed with myself.”) answered on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) ( D .90; M D 3.80, SD D 0.74). Higher scores on this measure indicate higher self-esteem. Participants completed the main phase of the experiment approximately 6 weeks after mass testing. Participants were run individually and were told that the study was examining how people talk and tell stories about diVerent topics under diVerent conditions. They Wrst completed a task that either did or did not require self-control (adapted from Vohs & Schmeichel, 2003). Participants were instructed to read aloud into a tape recorder for 5 min seven pages from a book called Psychologists in Word and Image (Wade, 1995). Participants in the no emotion regulation condition received no additional instructions. Participants in the emotion regulation condition were further instructed to read the pages as enthusiastically as possible and to act happy, smile, and “get into it”. The pages from which participants read were about deceased psychologists and included subtle reminders of death (e.g., “Karl Pearson (1857–1936)”). These reminders of death should have activated the concept of death, as do other types of subtle or implicit death primes (e.g., Arndt et al., 1997; Landau et al., 2004). After the initial speech task, participants completed the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) as a measure of mood and arousal. For the last task, participants were asked to tell the funniest or most interesting story that came to mind. The story could be true or Wctional, and could be about themselves or others.1 Participants were given 5 min for this task. Participants were then thanked and debriefed. 1 In the pursuit of other interests, participants were also instructed to limit their use of the pronouns I, me, he, she, they, us, we, and you, and to pay attention to how often they said these pronouns. The number of pronouns used and the number of pronouns participants later estimated having used did not diVer by condition; nor were these measures related to the number of death words mentioned by participants.
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Results
Dispositional self-esteem To examine the potential moderating eVects of selfesteem, we regressed the number of death words used upon standardized self-esteem scores, condition, and their centered interaction. The main eVect of emotion regulation condition was signiWcant, D .39, partial r D .46, p < .05, indicating that participants who regulated their emotions while reading the script included more death words in their subsequent stories than did participants who did not regulate their emotions. This is consistent with the idea that regulating emotions depletes self-control and therefore impairs the ability to suppress thoughts about death. The main eVect of self-esteem was also signiWcant, D ¡.45, partial r D ¡.51, p < .05, such that participants low (vs. high) in selfesteem included more death words. However, both main eVects were qualiWed by their signiWcant interaction, D ¡.43, partial r D ¡.51, p < .05. To interpret the interaction, we assessed the simple eVect of the emotion regulation manipulation among participants who were relatively high versus low in selfesteem (1 SD above and below the mean on the self-esteem scale, respectively). Results indicated that the eVect of emotion regulation on death words was signiWcant and robust for participants low in self-esteem, D .84, partial r D .62, p < .01, but was non-signiWcant and negligible for those high in self-esteem, t < 1, ns. Regulating emotions thus increased the number of references to death, but this eVect occurred primarily among participants with dispositionally low selfesteem. High self-esteem therefore seemed to protect against death thoughts. Dispositional self-control An analysis that regressed the number of death words upon standardized self-control scores, emotion regulation condition, and their interaction indicated signiWcant eVects of condition, D .36, partial r D .50, p < .05, and self-control, D ¡.48, partial r D ¡.60, p < .005. As was the case with self-esteem, both main eVects were moderated by their signiWcant interaction, D ¡.47, partial r D ¡.60, p < .01 (see Fig. 1). The eVect of the emotion regulation manipulation on death words was signiWcant and robust for participants low in self-control, D .85, partial r D .69, p < .001, but was non-signiWcant and negligible for those high in self-control, t < 1, ns. Having to regulate one’s emotions increased the use of death words only among those with low trait self-control. Dispositional self-esteem and self-control To test whether the moderating eVect of self-control would be observed over and above the moderating eVect
.20
Emotion Regulation Condition Emotion Regulation
Death Words
The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) computer program (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) was used to identify the number of words related to death (e.g., dead, burial, coYn) participants had used in their stories.
No Emotion Regulation .15
.10
.05
High
Low
Self-Control Fig. 1. Number of words related to death used in participants’ stories as a function of emotion regulation condition and trait self-control (Study 1).
of self-esteem, we conducted another regression analysis that included standardized self-esteem and self-control scores, emotion regulation condition, and all higher order interactions. Of primary importance, the interaction between trait self-control and emotion regulation condition remained signiWcant, D ¡.32, partial r D ¡.55, p D .01. The interaction between trait self-esteem and condition was, in contrast, negligible and non-signiWcant, D .005, partial r D .01, p D .96. Thus, when simultaneously accounting for both self-control and self-esteem, only the moderating eVect of self-control remained. Indeed, the moderating eVect of selfcontrol was larger than the (non-signiWcant) moderating eVect of self-esteem, z D 2.81, p < .01. Mood valence and arousal Mood and arousal did not appear to account for the obtained pattern of results. Regression analyses that included standardized self-control scores, emotion regulation condition, and their interaction indicated that self-control did not interact with condition in predicting mood or arousal, both ts 6 1, ns. Moreover, the interaction between self-control and condition in predicting death words was signiWcant even when controlling for mood and arousal, D ¡.75, partial r D ¡.61, p < .01. Discussion In Study 1, relative to participants who did not regulate their emotions, participants who regulated their emotions while reading a passage containing subtle reminders of death later exhibited greater death-thought accessibility during a storytelling task. For example, one of the participants in the emotion regulation condition said “ƒthe bear can eat us because he’ll think we’re dead,” and another wrote “ƒthey had programmed him to kill.” The initial self-control task presumably depleted the cognitive
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resources needed to suppress any death-related thoughts evoked by the passage (Gailliot et al., 2006). Analyses also indicated that this eVect was moderated by both dispositional self-control and self-esteem. Participants with either high self-control or high self-esteem did not exhibit increased death thought accessibility after regulating their emotions, whereas those low on those measures did exhibit heightened death-thought activation. When simultaneously accounting for both self-control and selfesteem, however, only the moderating eVect of self-control remained. These Wndings thus provide evidence that, over and above any eVects associated with self-esteem, self-control plays a key role in keeping thoughts of death at bay. Study 2 It is possible that in Study 1, self-control was a particularly strong moderator of death-thought activation because the manipulation varied the capacity for self-control. Study 2 therefore improved upon Study 1 by manipulating mortality salience rather than the capacity for self-control. SpeciWcally, participants wrote about either death or an aversive control topic (dental pain). To provide multi-method evidence, Study 2 also used a diVerent dependent measure than Study 1: worldview defense. Research has demonstrated that thinking about death increases worldview defense, such that people derogate those who disagree with their worldviews and praise those who agree with their worldviews when their own mortality is salient (for a review, see Greenberg et al., 1997). Increased worldview defense occurs only when thoughts of death are accessible on the fringes of conscious awareness, however (Arndt et al., 1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2001; Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Previous work suggests that self-control reduces such death-thought accessibility (Gailliot et al., 2006). On this basis, it seems likely that mortality salience would increase worldview defense primarily among participants with dispositionally low self-control. We therefore predicted that those with dispositionally high self-control, who are presumably more eVective at suppressing thoughts of death, would not respond defensively to mortality salience. Selfesteem has also been shown to reduce worldview defense under conditions of mortality salience (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997), so we again expected that dispositional selfesteem would moderate eVects of mortality salience on worldview defense. Most important, we expected that, when considered simultaneously, the moderating role of self-control would be observed over and above any moderating role of self-esteem. Participants Thirty college undergraduates (15 women, 1 unreported) participated in exchange for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to a mortality salience or dental pain condition.
Procedure Participants were run in groups and were told the study was investigating the relationship between people’s attitudes, opinions, and their lexicon. They received a questionnaire packet that contained all materials and instructions, and were allowed to work through the packet at their own pace. First, participants completed a questionnaire that contained the self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965; D .93; M D 4.23, SD D 0.67) and the brief version of the self-control scale (Tangney et al., 2004; D .66; M D 3.25, SD D 0.45), along with other Wller personality measures. Participants then completed the mortality salience manipulation (borrowed from Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). Participants in the mortality salience condition described the emotions that the thought of their own death aroused in them and what would happen to their bodies as they physically die. Participants in the dental pain condition answered parallel questions about dental pain. The mortality salience manipulation we used has been found to increase worldview defense only after a delay or distraction (see Pyszczynski et al., 1999). To provide such a delay, participants next completed some Wller questionnaires that took approximately 5 min. Last, participants completed the measure of worldview defense. SpeciWcally, participants read two handwritten essays about the United States that were ostensibly written by two foreigners (borrowed from Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992). The order of the two essays was counterbalanced across participants. One essay was pro-US and praised Americans, whereas the other essay was anti-US and criticized Americans. Participants evaluated the truth and validity of the essay and the likeability, intelligence, and knowledgeability of each essay’s author on 9-point scales. The summed evaluations of each essay served as the measures of favorability toward worldview-consistent and worldview-inconsistent opinions, respectively. In accordance with past research (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1994), worldview defense was deWned as the diVerence between these two measures ( D .79). Larger diVerences indicated increased worldview defense. Participants were then thanked and fully debriefed. Results and discussion Dispositional self-esteem Worldview defense scores were regressed upon standardized self-esteem scores, mortality salience condition, and their centered interaction. The main eVects of condition and selfesteem were not signiWcant, ts < 1.63, ps > .11. However, the interaction between self-esteem and condition approached signiWcance, D ¡.29, partial r D ¡.30, p D .13, and tests of simple eVects corroborated the results of Study 1. Mortality salience increased worldview defense among participants with low self-esteem, D .55, partial r D .43, p < .05, but not among those with high self-esteem, t < 1, ns. This pattern of
M.T. Gailliot et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007) 894–901
Mortality Salience Condition
15.00
Mortality Salience
Worldview Defense
Dental Pain 12.00
9.00
6.00
3.00
Low
High
Self-Control Fig. 2. Worldview defense scores as a function of mortality salience condition and trait self-control (Study 2).
Wndings replicates the results of Harmon-Jones et al. (1997) in showing that dispositionally high self-esteem attenuates worldview defense after mortality salience. Dispositional self-control An analysis that regressed worldview defense scores upon standardized self-control scores, mortality salience condition, and their interaction indicated a main eVect of mortality salience condition, D .40, partial r D .42, p < .05. The main eVect of trait self-control was not signiWcant, t < 1, ns. The analysis also indicated that the eVect of mortality salience was moderated by dispositional self-control, D ¡.36, partial r D ¡.37, p D .06 (see Fig. 2). Tests of simple eVects indicated that mortality salience increased worldview defense among participants low in self-control, D .85, partial r D .48, p < .05, but not among those high in self-control, t < 1, ns. High self-control thus was associated with less worldview defense following morality salience. Dispositional self-esteem and self-control When including all factors of interest in one regression model, the interaction between self-control and mortality salience condition remained signiWcant, D ¡.82, partial r D ¡.44, p < .05, whereas the interaction between selfesteem and mortality salience condition was not signiWcant, D .45, partial r D .24, p D .26. The moderating eVect of selfcontrol was signiWcantly stronger than that of self-esteem, z D 3.59, p < .001. Only self-control signiWcantly moderated worldview defense following mortality salience. General discussion The results of two studies indicated that high trait selfcontrol inXuences responses to mortality salience over and
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above the eVects of trait self-esteem. In Study 1, impaired self-control coupled with subtle reminders of death resulted in increased accessibility of death-related thought, as evidenced by participants mentioning death more frequently while telling impromptu stories. Consistent with previous work on the link between self-esteem and Terror Management, the death-thought accessibility eVect was moderated by trait self-esteem, such that death-thought accessibility increased only among participants with low self-esteem. Yet the moderating eVect of self-esteem was eliminated when accounting for trait self-control. Study 1 therefore indicated that trait self-control is associated with eVective death-thought suppression over and above the inXuence of self-esteem. Participants with high self-control presumably were able to suppress death thoughts even when their selfcontrol abilities had been temporarily impaired. Dispositional self-esteem, however, was relatively less eVective at reducing death-thought accessibility. Study 2 replicated and extended these Wndings by assessing worldview defense. Mortality salience increased worldview defense but only among individuals with low trait self-control. Dispositional self-esteem produced a similar pattern of results, yet its moderating role was diminished when accounting for self-control. These patterns are consistent with the notion that worldview defense occurs only when thoughts of death exist on the fringes of conscious awareness (Arndt et al., 1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2001; Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Previous work suggests that self-control enables the eVective suppression of both explicit and implicit death-related thoughts (Gailliot et al., 2006). It therefore seems likely that participants with high trait selfcontrol more eVectively suppressed thoughts of death after the mortality salience induction. The reduced activation of death thoughts could have reduced the need for worldview defense (e.g., Pyszczynski et al., 1999). The fact that selfesteem did not moderate the eVect of mortality salience (after accounting for self-control) suggests that self-esteem did not help to suppress thoughts of death or reduce worldview defense to the same degree as self-control did. In sum, the current Wndings suggest that self-control is an eVective means of keeping mortal concerns at bay. These Wndings make sense in light of the fact that thought suppression helps defuse the threat of death (Arndt et al., 1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2001; Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Self-control allows people to suppress aversive and unwanted thoughts (e.g., Gailliot & Baumeister, in press; Gailliot et al., submitted for publication; Tangney et al., 2004), and apparently thoughts of death as well (see also Gailliot et al., 2006). Although some studies have found that a self-esteem boost reduces death thought activation and that high trait self-esteem is associated with less worldview defense after mortality salience (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; for a review, see Pyszczynski et al., 2004), there is no evidence, to our knowledge, that trait self-esteem contributes to the suppression of death thoughts.
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Though self-control may defuse the threat of death by facilitating the suppression of death-related thoughts, another possibility is that self-control reduces death thought accessibility by allowing people to live up to cultural values and expectations. To fulWll the cultural ideal of a successful career, for instance, one must exert self-control by eVectively delaying gratiWcation (e.g., attending graduate school in order to get a better job) and resisting any behaviors that pose a barrier to success (e.g., procrastinating, sleeping in late, abusing alcohol). Rather than reduce mortal terror by facilitating the suppression of death thoughts, high trait selfcontrol may help individuals excel in a culture that will exist after their own death, and this may confer a sense of symbolic immortality that alleviates concerns about death. Though the current data cannot address the possibility that high self-control contributes to a sense of symbolic immortality, experimental evidence based on manipulations of the capacity for self-control has led to the causal conclusion that self-control enhances the suppression of death thoughts (Gailliot et al., 2006). The most parsimonious explanation for the present Wndings, then, seems to be that dispositional self-control alleviates mortal concern by improving the suppression of troublesome thoughts and feelings of death. One limitation to the current research is that we did not examine the role of state self-esteem. Several studies have found that temporarily boosting self-esteem reduces defensiveness and preoccupation with death following mortality salience (Pyszczynski et al., 2004). It seems unlikely that these eVects are attributable to self-control because manipulations that might increase self-esteem do not seem to improve self-control (e.g., Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). Concluding remarks An emerging body of evidence documents the beneWts of good self-control (see Baumeister et al., in press; Tangney et al., 2004). The current work is consistent with this evidence, and indicates that dispositional self-control is an eVective buVer against mortal terror, perhaps more so than dispositional self-esteem. The thought of one’s own death can be frightening, and so people must actively seek to defuse the threatening nature of death. One means of defusing the threatening nature of death is to seek actual or symbolic immortality (Greenberg et al., 1986). If one can exist after death in some shape or form, then there is little need to be scared of death. Although dispositional self-esteem might reXect how entrenched an individual is in a lasting cultural system (Pyszczynski et al., 2004), dispositional self-control accounts for responses to mortality salience above and beyond the inXuence of self-esteem The current work suggests that, relative to immortality, a more simple and direct strategy to defuse the threat of death might be to exert selfcontrol by suppressing death-related thought. If one cannot live forever, then it might be reassuring to avoid thinking about death in the Wrst place.
Acknowledgments Thank you to Henry Kurusz for helping to conduct the studies reported here. This research was supported by National Institute of Health Grant MH 65559. References Anderson, M. C., & Green, C. (2001). Suppressing unwanted memories by executive control. Nature, 6826, 366–369. Arndt, J., & Greenberg, J. (1999). The eVects of a self-esteem boost and mortality salience on responses to boost relevant and irrelevant worldview threats. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25, 1331–1341. Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (1997). Subliminal exposure to death-related stimuli increases defense of the cultural worldview. Psychological Science, 8, 379–385. Arndt, J., Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., Pyszczynski, T., & Simon, L. (1997). Suppression, accessibility of death-related thoughts, and cultural worldview defense: exploring the psychodynamics of terror management. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 73, 5–18. Arndt, J., Schimel, J., & Goldenberg, J. L. (2003). Death can be good for your health: Wtness intentions as a proximal and distal defense against mortality salience. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33, 1726– 1746. Baumeister, R. F., Gailliot, M. T., DeWall, C. N. & Oaten, M. (in press). Self-regulation and personality: Strength-boosting interventions and trait moderators of ego depletion. Journal of Personality. Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York: Academic Press. Dechesne, M., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., Ransom, S., Sheldon, K. M., van Knippenberg, A., et al. (2003). Literal and symbolic immortality: the eVect of evidence of literal immortality on self-esteem striving in response to mortality salience. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 84, 722–737. Gailliot, M. T., & Baumeister, R. F. (in press). Self-regulation and sexual restraint: dispositionally and temporarily poor self-regulatory abilities contribute to failures at restraining sexual behavior. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin. Gailliot, M. T., Gitter, S., Baker, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (submitted for publication). Self-control facilitates adherence to social norms. Gailliot, M. T., Schmeichel, B. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (2006). Self-regulatory processes defend against the threat of death: eVects of self-control depletion and trait self-control on thoughts and fears of dying. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 90, 49–62. Gordijn, E. H., Hindriks, I., Koomen, W., Dijksterhuis, A., & Van Knippenberg, A. (2004). Consequences of stereotype suppression and internal suppression motivation: a self-regulation approach. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 212–224. Gottfredson, M. R., & Hirschi, T. (1990). A general theory of crime. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press. Greenberg, J., Arndt, J., Schimel, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (2001). Clarifying the function of mortality salience-induced worldview defense: renewed suppression or reduced accessibility of death-related thoughts? Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37, 70–76. Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., & Solomon, S. (1986). The causes and consequences of a need for self-esteem: A terror management theory. In R. F. Baumeister (Ed.), Public self and private self (pp. 189–212). New York: Springer. Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., Simon, L., & Breus, M. (1994). Role of consciousness and accessibility of death-related thoughts in mortality salience eVects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67, 627–637. Greenberg, J., Simon, L., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & Chatel, D. (1992). Terror management and tolerance: does mortality salience always intensify negative reactions to others who threaten one’s worldview? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 63, 212–220. Greenberg, J., Solomon, S., & Pyszczynski, T. (1997). Terror management theory of self-esteem and cultural worldviews: Empirical assessments
M.T. Gailliot et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007) 894–901 and conceptual reWnements. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 29, pp. 61–139). Orlando, FL: Academic Press. Harmon-Jones, E., Simon, L., Greenberg, J., Pyszczynski, T., Solomon, S., & McGregor, H. (1997). Terror management theory and self-esteem: evidence that increased self-esteem reduces mortality salience eVects. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 24–36. Koole, S. L., & Van den Berg, A. E. (2005). Lost in the wilderness: terror management, action orientation, and nature evaluation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 88, 1014–1028. Landau, M. J., Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., Cohen, F., Pyszczynski, T., Arndt, J., et al. (2004). Deliver us from evil: the eVects of mortality salience and reminders of 9/11 on support for President George W. Bush. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 1136–1150. MacLeod, C. M. (1989). Directed forgetting aVects both direct and indirect tests of memory. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 15, 13–21. Mayer, J. D., & Gaschke, Y. N. (1988). The experience and meta-experience of mood. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 102– 111. McBride, D. M., & Dosher, B. A. (1997). A comparison of forgetting in an implicit and explicit memory task. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 126, 371–392. Muraven, M., & Baumeister, R. F. (2000). Self-regulation and depletion of limited resources: does self-control resemble a muscle? Psychological Bulletin, 126, 247–259. Pennebaker, J. W., Francis, M. E., & Booth, R. J. (2001). Linguistic inquiry and word count (LIWC): LIWC 2001. Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Pyszczynski, T., Greenberg, J., & Solomon, S. (1999). A dual process model of defense against conscious and unconscious death-related thoughts: an extension of terror management theory. Psychological Review, 106, 835–845.
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DiVerentiating the eVects of self-control and self-esteem on reactions to mortality salience Matthew T. Gailliot a,¤, Brandon J. Schmeichel b, Jon K. Maner a a b
Department of Psychology, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1270, USA Department of Psychology, Texas A&M University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-1270, USA Received 11 November 2005; revised 30 March 2006 Available online 27 November 2006 Communicated by spencer
Abstract Whereas many previous studies suggest that self-esteem may buVer against the psychological threat of death, recent research has begun to suggest that self-control also may serve as a buVer. Two studies examined the possibility that dispositional self-control uniquely predicts responses to mortality salience, above and beyond self-esteem. In Study 1, an initial exercise in emotion regulation increased subsequent accessibility of death thoughts. In Study 2, mortality salience increased worldview defense. Both of these eVects were moderated by dispositional self-control, such that the eVects occurred among participants with low but not high self-control. More importantly, these moderating eVects were observed over and above the moderating eVects of self-esteem. Findings suggest that self-control may serve as an important and unique buVer against thoughts of death. © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. Keywords: Self-control; Ego depletion; Self-regulation; Mortality salience; Thought suppression; Terror Management; Worldview defense; Self-esteem
Introduction The prospect of death is aversive and inevitable, and likewise, the thought of one’s own death can be especially frightening (Becker, 1973). People are thus highly motivated to avoid thinking about death. The current investigation examined the relative contributions of two personality traits that may serve as buVers against death-related thoughts. Past research suggests that high self-esteem counters anxieties about death (Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Schimel, 2004). There is also reason to suspect that self-control (i.e., the capacity to willingly alter one’s behavior, emotions, and thoughts) plays an equally important and perhaps even stronger role in reducing concerns about death (Gailliot, Schmeichel, & Baumeister, 2006). The current work therefore examined the roles of
*
Corresponding author. Fax: +1 850 644 7739. E-mail address: [email protected] (M.T. Gailliot).
0022-1031/$ - see front matter © 2006 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2006.10.011
dispositional self-esteem and dispositional self-control in managing death-related thoughts. Mortality concerns and self-esteem There are at least two means through which one might avoid thinking about and thereby defuse the psychological threat of death. One means is literal immortality beliefs. If a person believes that he or she will exist in some form forever, then the prospect of death should be less frightening. Research has supported this view by showing, for instance, that belief in an afterlife reduces the psychological threat of death (Dechesne et al., 2003). A second means to defuse the threat of death is to seek symbolic immortality by belonging to and upholding a cultural worldview that will persist long after one’s own death (Greenberg, Solomon, & Pyszczynski, 1997). Even though the individual will die, a part of the self will exist after death through its association with culture, thereby bestowing a sense of symbolic immortality upon the individual.
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Prior evidence suggests that this sense of symbolic immortality is rooted in self-esteem. Terror Management Theory (TMT) posits that the purpose of self-esteem is to buVer against the threat of death (Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Pyszczynski et al., 2004). In this view, self-esteem signiWes the extent to which a person lives up to or fulWlls cultural expectations and values. Compared to people with low self-esteem, people with high self-esteem more successfully fulWll shared cultural standards of meaning and value. High self-esteem therefore entrenches the individual in a meaningful cultural drama that will continue after his or her own death, thereby providing a sense of symbolic immortality that counteracts the threatening nature of death. Several studies support the idea that self-esteem reduces concerns about death. For instance, experimentally increasing self-esteem (e.g., by giving positive performance feedback) has been shown to reduce defensive reactions to mortality salience and preoccupation with death (e.g., Arndt & Greenberg, 1999; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). People also seem to increase their striving for self-esteem (e.g., by seeking to become more attractive) after thinking about death, suggesting that self-esteem helps protect against mortal concern (Arndt, Schimel, & Goldenberg, 2003; Routledge, Arndt, & Goldenberg, 2004). Additional evidence suggests that chronically high self-esteem may serve as a buVer against death-related thought. One study, for example, found that mortality salience increased defensiveness among people with low self-esteem but not among those with high self-esteem (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). Mortality concerns and self-control Though attaining a sense of symbolic immortality (e.g., via self-esteem) is one way to reduce mortal concern, death is ultimately inevitable and so people are bound to think about dying from time to time. Another means of reducing mortal concern therefore is to avoid thinking about death, such as by suppressing death-related thoughts. Much like how other aversive thoughts are suppressed from conscious awareness (WenzlaV & Wegner, 2000), suppressing thoughts about death requires controlled and eVortful processing. For instance, studies show that immediately after death is made salient, people exhibit low levels of death-thought activation, presumably because death thoughts are suppressed from awareness (e.g., Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Simon, 1997; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, Solomon, Simon, & Breus, 1994; Harmon-Jones et al., 1997). When cognitive resources are diverted following a mortality salience induction, however, people exhibit high levels of death-thought activation (Arndt, Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1997; Greenberg, Arndt, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2001). Suppressing death thoughts also appears to drain or deplete cognitive resources, such that after thinking about death, people perform worse on other tasks requiring controlled processing (e.g., the Stroop task) (Gailliot et al., 2006). The suppression of death thoughts
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appears to require the expenditure of cognitive resources. Therefore, people who excel at self-control may be better able to control death-related thoughts. Empirical support for the idea that self-control is crucial for the eVective suppression of death thoughts was provided by Gailliot et al. (2006), who found that high self-control reduces preoccupation with death. Participants with temporarily or dispositionally high self-control exhibited lower death-thought activation than participants with low self-control, such that they reported less death anxiety and were less likely to perceive death-related themes in ambiguous images. Consistent with research showing that controlled or conscious eVorts to suppress thoughts reduce the implicit activation of those thoughts (Anderson & Green, 2001; McBride & Dosher, 1997; MacLeod, 1989), participants with temporarily or dispositionally high (vs. low) self-control also showed lower levels of implicit death-thought activation, such that they were less likely to solve word puzzles with death-related words. Participants with dispositionally high self-control also were less likely than those low in self-control to respond defensively to mortality salience (by bolstering support for a political Wgurehead). Altogether, this evidence suggests that self-control facilitates the suppression of death thoughts and therefore helps to defuse the threat of death. Self-control, self-esteem, and mortality concerns: an integration Thus, both self-control and self-esteem have been linked to reduced death-thought accessibility and reduced defensiveness in response to reminders of personal mortality. In the current work, we sought to distinguish between the roles of self-esteem and self-control in reactions to mortality salience. We expected that, on their own, both dispositional self-control and self-esteem would moderate reactions to mortality salience. More importantly, we expected that, when considered simultaneously, the moderating eVects of selfcontrol would be observed over and above any moderating eVects of self-esteem. That is, self-control was expected to serve as a unique predictor of responses to mortality salience. Self-control allows people to live up to cultural expectations and values, such as performing well in school, adhering to laws and social norms, entering into and maintaining healthy relationships, and coping eVectively with stress (Gailliot & Baumeister, in press; Gailliot, Gitter, Baker, & Baumeister, submitted for publication; Gordijn, Hindriks, Koomen, Dijksterhuis, & Van Knippenberg, 2004; Gottfredson & Hirschi, 1990; Schmeichel, Vohs, & Baumeister, 2003; Shoda, Mischel, & Peake, 1990; Tangney, Baumeister, & Boone, 2004). Thus, self-control might provide the basic means necessary for protecting against thoughts of death. Indeed, the self-control of cognitive processes may be an especially strong and unique buVer against troubling thoughts of death. Death appears to be threatening to the extent that death thoughts are activated (Arndt et al., 1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2001; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, & Solomon, 1999) and the
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ability to exert self-control appears to be crucial for reducing death-thought activation (Gailliot et al., 2006; see also Arndt et al., 1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2001; Koole & Van den Berg, 2005). Overview and hypotheses of the current work The current work tested the hypotheses that both trait self-esteem and self-control would moderate the eVects of manipulations designed to increase mortal concern and, moreover, that moderating eVects of self-control would be observed over and above any moderating eVects of selfesteem. Study 1 examined whether activating the thought of death and temporarily impairing the ability to exert self-control would heighten death-thought accessibility, and whether this eVect would be attenuated by high self-esteem and high self-control. Study 2 examined whether the tendency to engage in defensive reactions to mortality salience would be moderated by high self-esteem and high self-control. Study 1 Study 1 examined whether trait self-esteem or self-control would be associated with less death-thought accessibility under conditions that increase awareness of death. Participants read a script containing subtle references to death. While reading the script, some participants exerted self-control by regulating their emotions, whereas other participants read the script without attempting to regulate their emotions. Based on the idea that eVorts at self-control deplete a limited resource and impair subsequent eVorts at self-control (see Baumeister, Gailliot, DeWall, & Oaten, in press; Muraven & Baumeister, 2000), we predicted that participants who regulated their emotions while reading the script would have heightened death-thought accessibility later on, relative to participants who did not regulate their emotions while reading the script. That is, we predicted that temporarily undermining the operation of self-control would result in heightened death-thought accessibility after reading a script that alluded to death. To assess death-thought accessibility, we had participants tell a story about a topic of their choice. The rationale was that participants would have to execute a mental search for possible story topics, and so they may very well consider telling a story about death or at least may use words related to death while telling a story about something else. The number of words related to death mentioned during the story constituted the dependent measure of death-thought accessibility. Insofar as dispositionally high self-control and high selfesteem reduce death-thought activation, subtle reminders of death combined with eVorts at self-control should increase death-thought accessibility, primarily among participants with either low self-control or low self-esteem. Given the link between self-control and death-though accessibility, we anticipated that self-control would moderate responses to mortality salience, even after controlling for self-esteem.
Method Participants Twenty-four college undergraduates (18 women, 1 unreported) participated in exchange for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to an emotion regulation or no emotion regulation condition. Procedure Participants completed measures of trait self-control (the Self-Control Scale; Tangney et al., 2004) and selfesteem (Rosenberg, 1965) during a mass testing session at the start of the semester. We used the brief version of the Self-Control Scale, which contains 13 items (e.g., “I have a hard time breaking bad habits” (reverse scored); “I am good at resisting temptation”) answered on a scale from 1 (not at all like me) to 5 (very much like me) ( D .71; M D 3.31, SD D 0.52). Higher scores on this measure indicate higher self-control. The Rosenberg Self-Esteem Scale contains 10 items (e.g., “On the whole, I am satisWed with myself.”) answered on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree) ( D .90; M D 3.80, SD D 0.74). Higher scores on this measure indicate higher self-esteem. Participants completed the main phase of the experiment approximately 6 weeks after mass testing. Participants were run individually and were told that the study was examining how people talk and tell stories about diVerent topics under diVerent conditions. They Wrst completed a task that either did or did not require self-control (adapted from Vohs & Schmeichel, 2003). Participants were instructed to read aloud into a tape recorder for 5 min seven pages from a book called Psychologists in Word and Image (Wade, 1995). Participants in the no emotion regulation condition received no additional instructions. Participants in the emotion regulation condition were further instructed to read the pages as enthusiastically as possible and to act happy, smile, and “get into it”. The pages from which participants read were about deceased psychologists and included subtle reminders of death (e.g., “Karl Pearson (1857–1936)”). These reminders of death should have activated the concept of death, as do other types of subtle or implicit death primes (e.g., Arndt et al., 1997; Landau et al., 2004). After the initial speech task, participants completed the Brief Mood Introspection Scale (BMIS; Mayer & Gaschke, 1988) as a measure of mood and arousal. For the last task, participants were asked to tell the funniest or most interesting story that came to mind. The story could be true or Wctional, and could be about themselves or others.1 Participants were given 5 min for this task. Participants were then thanked and debriefed. 1 In the pursuit of other interests, participants were also instructed to limit their use of the pronouns I, me, he, she, they, us, we, and you, and to pay attention to how often they said these pronouns. The number of pronouns used and the number of pronouns participants later estimated having used did not diVer by condition; nor were these measures related to the number of death words mentioned by participants.
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Results
Dispositional self-esteem To examine the potential moderating eVects of selfesteem, we regressed the number of death words used upon standardized self-esteem scores, condition, and their centered interaction. The main eVect of emotion regulation condition was signiWcant, D .39, partial r D .46, p < .05, indicating that participants who regulated their emotions while reading the script included more death words in their subsequent stories than did participants who did not regulate their emotions. This is consistent with the idea that regulating emotions depletes self-control and therefore impairs the ability to suppress thoughts about death. The main eVect of self-esteem was also signiWcant, D ¡.45, partial r D ¡.51, p < .05, such that participants low (vs. high) in selfesteem included more death words. However, both main eVects were qualiWed by their signiWcant interaction, D ¡.43, partial r D ¡.51, p < .05. To interpret the interaction, we assessed the simple eVect of the emotion regulation manipulation among participants who were relatively high versus low in selfesteem (1 SD above and below the mean on the self-esteem scale, respectively). Results indicated that the eVect of emotion regulation on death words was signiWcant and robust for participants low in self-esteem, D .84, partial r D .62, p < .01, but was non-signiWcant and negligible for those high in self-esteem, t < 1, ns. Regulating emotions thus increased the number of references to death, but this eVect occurred primarily among participants with dispositionally low selfesteem. High self-esteem therefore seemed to protect against death thoughts. Dispositional self-control An analysis that regressed the number of death words upon standardized self-control scores, emotion regulation condition, and their interaction indicated signiWcant eVects of condition, D .36, partial r D .50, p < .05, and self-control, D ¡.48, partial r D ¡.60, p < .005. As was the case with self-esteem, both main eVects were moderated by their signiWcant interaction, D ¡.47, partial r D ¡.60, p < .01 (see Fig. 1). The eVect of the emotion regulation manipulation on death words was signiWcant and robust for participants low in self-control, D .85, partial r D .69, p < .001, but was non-signiWcant and negligible for those high in self-control, t < 1, ns. Having to regulate one’s emotions increased the use of death words only among those with low trait self-control. Dispositional self-esteem and self-control To test whether the moderating eVect of self-control would be observed over and above the moderating eVect
.20
Emotion Regulation Condition Emotion Regulation
Death Words
The Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count (LIWC) computer program (Pennebaker, Francis, & Booth, 2001) was used to identify the number of words related to death (e.g., dead, burial, coYn) participants had used in their stories.
No Emotion Regulation .15
.10
.05
High
Low
Self-Control Fig. 1. Number of words related to death used in participants’ stories as a function of emotion regulation condition and trait self-control (Study 1).
of self-esteem, we conducted another regression analysis that included standardized self-esteem and self-control scores, emotion regulation condition, and all higher order interactions. Of primary importance, the interaction between trait self-control and emotion regulation condition remained signiWcant, D ¡.32, partial r D ¡.55, p D .01. The interaction between trait self-esteem and condition was, in contrast, negligible and non-signiWcant, D .005, partial r D .01, p D .96. Thus, when simultaneously accounting for both self-control and self-esteem, only the moderating eVect of self-control remained. Indeed, the moderating eVect of selfcontrol was larger than the (non-signiWcant) moderating eVect of self-esteem, z D 2.81, p < .01. Mood valence and arousal Mood and arousal did not appear to account for the obtained pattern of results. Regression analyses that included standardized self-control scores, emotion regulation condition, and their interaction indicated that self-control did not interact with condition in predicting mood or arousal, both ts 6 1, ns. Moreover, the interaction between self-control and condition in predicting death words was signiWcant even when controlling for mood and arousal, D ¡.75, partial r D ¡.61, p < .01. Discussion In Study 1, relative to participants who did not regulate their emotions, participants who regulated their emotions while reading a passage containing subtle reminders of death later exhibited greater death-thought accessibility during a storytelling task. For example, one of the participants in the emotion regulation condition said “ƒthe bear can eat us because he’ll think we’re dead,” and another wrote “ƒthey had programmed him to kill.” The initial self-control task presumably depleted the cognitive
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resources needed to suppress any death-related thoughts evoked by the passage (Gailliot et al., 2006). Analyses also indicated that this eVect was moderated by both dispositional self-control and self-esteem. Participants with either high self-control or high self-esteem did not exhibit increased death thought accessibility after regulating their emotions, whereas those low on those measures did exhibit heightened death-thought activation. When simultaneously accounting for both self-control and selfesteem, however, only the moderating eVect of self-control remained. These Wndings thus provide evidence that, over and above any eVects associated with self-esteem, self-control plays a key role in keeping thoughts of death at bay. Study 2 It is possible that in Study 1, self-control was a particularly strong moderator of death-thought activation because the manipulation varied the capacity for self-control. Study 2 therefore improved upon Study 1 by manipulating mortality salience rather than the capacity for self-control. SpeciWcally, participants wrote about either death or an aversive control topic (dental pain). To provide multi-method evidence, Study 2 also used a diVerent dependent measure than Study 1: worldview defense. Research has demonstrated that thinking about death increases worldview defense, such that people derogate those who disagree with their worldviews and praise those who agree with their worldviews when their own mortality is salient (for a review, see Greenberg et al., 1997). Increased worldview defense occurs only when thoughts of death are accessible on the fringes of conscious awareness, however (Arndt et al., 1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2001; Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Previous work suggests that self-control reduces such death-thought accessibility (Gailliot et al., 2006). On this basis, it seems likely that mortality salience would increase worldview defense primarily among participants with dispositionally low self-control. We therefore predicted that those with dispositionally high self-control, who are presumably more eVective at suppressing thoughts of death, would not respond defensively to mortality salience. Selfesteem has also been shown to reduce worldview defense under conditions of mortality salience (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997), so we again expected that dispositional selfesteem would moderate eVects of mortality salience on worldview defense. Most important, we expected that, when considered simultaneously, the moderating role of self-control would be observed over and above any moderating role of self-esteem. Participants Thirty college undergraduates (15 women, 1 unreported) participated in exchange for course credit. Participants were randomly assigned to a mortality salience or dental pain condition.
Procedure Participants were run in groups and were told the study was investigating the relationship between people’s attitudes, opinions, and their lexicon. They received a questionnaire packet that contained all materials and instructions, and were allowed to work through the packet at their own pace. First, participants completed a questionnaire that contained the self-esteem scale (Rosenberg, 1965; D .93; M D 4.23, SD D 0.67) and the brief version of the self-control scale (Tangney et al., 2004; D .66; M D 3.25, SD D 0.45), along with other Wller personality measures. Participants then completed the mortality salience manipulation (borrowed from Rosenblatt, Greenberg, Solomon, Pyszczynski, & Lyon, 1989). Participants in the mortality salience condition described the emotions that the thought of their own death aroused in them and what would happen to their bodies as they physically die. Participants in the dental pain condition answered parallel questions about dental pain. The mortality salience manipulation we used has been found to increase worldview defense only after a delay or distraction (see Pyszczynski et al., 1999). To provide such a delay, participants next completed some Wller questionnaires that took approximately 5 min. Last, participants completed the measure of worldview defense. SpeciWcally, participants read two handwritten essays about the United States that were ostensibly written by two foreigners (borrowed from Greenberg, Simon, Pyszczynski, Solomon, & Chatel, 1992). The order of the two essays was counterbalanced across participants. One essay was pro-US and praised Americans, whereas the other essay was anti-US and criticized Americans. Participants evaluated the truth and validity of the essay and the likeability, intelligence, and knowledgeability of each essay’s author on 9-point scales. The summed evaluations of each essay served as the measures of favorability toward worldview-consistent and worldview-inconsistent opinions, respectively. In accordance with past research (e.g., Greenberg et al., 1994), worldview defense was deWned as the diVerence between these two measures ( D .79). Larger diVerences indicated increased worldview defense. Participants were then thanked and fully debriefed. Results and discussion Dispositional self-esteem Worldview defense scores were regressed upon standardized self-esteem scores, mortality salience condition, and their centered interaction. The main eVects of condition and selfesteem were not signiWcant, ts < 1.63, ps > .11. However, the interaction between self-esteem and condition approached signiWcance, D ¡.29, partial r D ¡.30, p D .13, and tests of simple eVects corroborated the results of Study 1. Mortality salience increased worldview defense among participants with low self-esteem, D .55, partial r D .43, p < .05, but not among those with high self-esteem, t < 1, ns. This pattern of
M.T. Gailliot et al. / Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 43 (2007) 894–901
Mortality Salience Condition
15.00
Mortality Salience
Worldview Defense
Dental Pain 12.00
9.00
6.00
3.00
Low
High
Self-Control Fig. 2. Worldview defense scores as a function of mortality salience condition and trait self-control (Study 2).
Wndings replicates the results of Harmon-Jones et al. (1997) in showing that dispositionally high self-esteem attenuates worldview defense after mortality salience. Dispositional self-control An analysis that regressed worldview defense scores upon standardized self-control scores, mortality salience condition, and their interaction indicated a main eVect of mortality salience condition, D .40, partial r D .42, p < .05. The main eVect of trait self-control was not signiWcant, t < 1, ns. The analysis also indicated that the eVect of mortality salience was moderated by dispositional self-control, D ¡.36, partial r D ¡.37, p D .06 (see Fig. 2). Tests of simple eVects indicated that mortality salience increased worldview defense among participants low in self-control, D .85, partial r D .48, p < .05, but not among those high in self-control, t < 1, ns. High self-control thus was associated with less worldview defense following morality salience. Dispositional self-esteem and self-control When including all factors of interest in one regression model, the interaction between self-control and mortality salience condition remained signiWcant, D ¡.82, partial r D ¡.44, p < .05, whereas the interaction between selfesteem and mortality salience condition was not signiWcant, D .45, partial r D .24, p D .26. The moderating eVect of selfcontrol was signiWcantly stronger than that of self-esteem, z D 3.59, p < .001. Only self-control signiWcantly moderated worldview defense following mortality salience. General discussion The results of two studies indicated that high trait selfcontrol inXuences responses to mortality salience over and
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above the eVects of trait self-esteem. In Study 1, impaired self-control coupled with subtle reminders of death resulted in increased accessibility of death-related thought, as evidenced by participants mentioning death more frequently while telling impromptu stories. Consistent with previous work on the link between self-esteem and Terror Management, the death-thought accessibility eVect was moderated by trait self-esteem, such that death-thought accessibility increased only among participants with low self-esteem. Yet the moderating eVect of self-esteem was eliminated when accounting for trait self-control. Study 1 therefore indicated that trait self-control is associated with eVective death-thought suppression over and above the inXuence of self-esteem. Participants with high self-control presumably were able to suppress death thoughts even when their selfcontrol abilities had been temporarily impaired. Dispositional self-esteem, however, was relatively less eVective at reducing death-thought accessibility. Study 2 replicated and extended these Wndings by assessing worldview defense. Mortality salience increased worldview defense but only among individuals with low trait self-control. Dispositional self-esteem produced a similar pattern of results, yet its moderating role was diminished when accounting for self-control. These patterns are consistent with the notion that worldview defense occurs only when thoughts of death exist on the fringes of conscious awareness (Arndt et al., 1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2001; Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Previous work suggests that self-control enables the eVective suppression of both explicit and implicit death-related thoughts (Gailliot et al., 2006). It therefore seems likely that participants with high trait selfcontrol more eVectively suppressed thoughts of death after the mortality salience induction. The reduced activation of death thoughts could have reduced the need for worldview defense (e.g., Pyszczynski et al., 1999). The fact that selfesteem did not moderate the eVect of mortality salience (after accounting for self-control) suggests that self-esteem did not help to suppress thoughts of death or reduce worldview defense to the same degree as self-control did. In sum, the current Wndings suggest that self-control is an eVective means of keeping mortal concerns at bay. These Wndings make sense in light of the fact that thought suppression helps defuse the threat of death (Arndt et al., 1997; Arndt, Greenberg, Solomon et al., 1997; Greenberg et al., 2001; Pyszczynski et al., 1999). Self-control allows people to suppress aversive and unwanted thoughts (e.g., Gailliot & Baumeister, in press; Gailliot et al., submitted for publication; Tangney et al., 2004), and apparently thoughts of death as well (see also Gailliot et al., 2006). Although some studies have found that a self-esteem boost reduces death thought activation and that high trait self-esteem is associated with less worldview defense after mortality salience (Harmon-Jones et al., 1997; for a review, see Pyszczynski et al., 2004), there is no evidence, to our knowledge, that trait self-esteem contributes to the suppression of death thoughts.
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Though self-control may defuse the threat of death by facilitating the suppression of death-related thoughts, another possibility is that self-control reduces death thought accessibility by allowing people to live up to cultural values and expectations. To fulWll the cultural ideal of a successful career, for instance, one must exert self-control by eVectively delaying gratiWcation (e.g., attending graduate school in order to get a better job) and resisting any behaviors that pose a barrier to success (e.g., procrastinating, sleeping in late, abusing alcohol). Rather than reduce mortal terror by facilitating the suppression of death thoughts, high trait selfcontrol may help individuals excel in a culture that will exist after their own death, and this may confer a sense of symbolic immortality that alleviates concerns about death. Though the current data cannot address the possibility that high self-control contributes to a sense of symbolic immortality, experimental evidence based on manipulations of the capacity for self-control has led to the causal conclusion that self-control enhances the suppression of death thoughts (Gailliot et al., 2006). The most parsimonious explanation for the present Wndings, then, seems to be that dispositional self-control alleviates mortal concern by improving the suppression of troublesome thoughts and feelings of death. One limitation to the current research is that we did not examine the role of state self-esteem. Several studies have found that temporarily boosting self-esteem reduces defensiveness and preoccupation with death following mortality salience (Pyszczynski et al., 2004). It seems unlikely that these eVects are attributable to self-control because manipulations that might increase self-esteem do not seem to improve self-control (e.g., Wallace & Baumeister, 2002). Concluding remarks An emerging body of evidence documents the beneWts of good self-control (see Baumeister et al., in press; Tangney et al., 2004). The current work is consistent with this evidence, and indicates that dispositional self-control is an eVective buVer against mortal terror, perhaps more so than dispositional self-esteem. The thought of one’s own death can be frightening, and so people must actively seek to defuse the threatening nature of death. One means of defusing the threatening nature of death is to seek actual or symbolic immortality (Greenberg et al., 1986). If one can exist after death in some shape or form, then there is little need to be scared of death. Although dispositional self-esteem might reXect how entrenched an individual is in a lasting cultural system (Pyszczynski et al., 2004), dispositional self-control accounts for responses to mortality salience above and beyond the inXuence of self-esteem The current work suggests that, relative to immortality, a more simple and direct strategy to defuse the threat of death might be to exert selfcontrol by suppressing death-related thought. If one cannot live forever, then it might be reassuring to avoid thinking about death in the Wrst place.
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