Discriminating between memories: Evidence for children's spontaneous elaborations

,OuwAL

OF EXPERIMENTAL

CHILD

PSYCHOLOGY

48, 146-169 (1989)

Discriminating between Memories: Evidence for Children’s Spontaneous Elaborations MARY ANN FOLEY, CHRISTINE SANTINI, Skidmore

AND MARIA

SOPASAKIS

College

Children are more confused than adults about memories for what they said and what they imagined saying. The present studies examine the extent to which this confusion is related to the person subjects imagine. In Experiment 1, subjects (7, 10. and adult) said words and imagined someone (themselves, a parent, or a friend) saying other words. They were then asked to distinguish words they said from words they imagined. Performance varied with age as well as with the person subjects imagined. Further, performance was better for words subjects imagined than for words they said. Metamemory responses indicated subjects of all ages remembered elaborative processing activated spontaneously during imagination when discriminating between memories. When the nature of subjects’ encodings was constrained (i.e.. subjects said and imagined someone saying words as part of a sentence completion task. Experiment 2). performance declined for all age groups. Experiments 3 and 4 suggest that elaborations reported in response to our metamemory questions occurred during imagination and were not solely prompted by our metamemory questions. 0 1989 Academic Pres. Inc.

The assumption that children are more likely than adults to embellish their memories and later confuse these embellishments with reality is quite prevalent (e.g., Ceci, Toglia, & Ross, 1987; Johnson & Foley, 1984). This belief about children, in combination with the common finding that children remember less than adults, helps to perpetuate the assumption that children are more confused than adults about the source of all of their memories (e.g., Johnson & Foley, 1984). Nevertheless, recent research on developmental differences in memory confusions suggests the opposite. In many cases, children are as good as older subjects in discriminating between the sources of their memories This research was supported by NSF Grant BNS 84-18791 as well as grants from the Spencer Foundation and Skidmore College. Preliminary results were reported at the Eastern Psychological Association Meetings, April, 1988. We gratefully acknowledge David Burrows, three anonymous reviewers, and. most especially. Hugh Foley for their careful reading of earlier versions of this manuscript. We also thank Adrienne Statfeld for her help in completing Experiment 3. Requests for reprints should be addressed to Mary Ann Foley, Department of Psychology, Skidmore College, Saratoga Springs, NY 12866 or Bitnet, Foley@Skidmore. 0022-0965189 $3.00 Copyright 0 1989 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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(e.g., Foley, Aman, & Gutch, 1987; Foley & Johnson, 1985; Foley, Johnson, & Raye, 1983; Johnson, Raye, Hasher, & Chromiak, 1979). For example, 6 and 7 year olds are just as good as adults in distinguishing what they said from what they heard someone else say. In fact, when using speech, pictures, and actions as stimuli, there is only one case in which young children are more confused than older subjects. When distinguishing what they said from what they imagined themselves saying, 6 and 7 year olds showed a marked disadvantage. This decrement in performance is quite specific; when discriminating words they heard someone else say from words they imagined themselves saying, young children were no more confused than older subjects (Foley et al., 1983, Experiment 2). More recently, we have shown that this confusion between what young children say and imagine is not a part of a general confusion between any two activities they perform. For example, in studies involving different types of tracing activities, we have shown that young children are not more confused than older subjects about what they traced with a pencil or their finger although they are more confused about what they traced and what they imagined tracing when using their finger. Their difficulty seems to be specific to discriminations in which cues associated with kinesthetic feedback and cues associated with visible consequences following their generations are minimal. These situations include discriminating between memories for speech and imagination. However, what remains to be determined is the extent to which the actor in the imagination is important for discriminations. In all of the earlier developmental studies, children imagined themselves as the actor in the imagination. In Experiment 1, we vary the actor in the imagination by asking subjects (7 year olds, 10 year olds, and college-adults) to say words and to imagine themselves, a friend, or a parent saying words. The Reality Monitoring model guiding this research suggests a reason why confusions might vary with the person the subject imagines (Johnson, Foley, Suengas, & Raye, 1988; Johnson & Raye, 1981). According to this model, elaborations generated by subjects during encoding may later serve as cues for discriminating between memories. For example, meaningful information including personalized and idiosyncratic details may be activated during imagination (Johnson et al., 1988; Raye, Johnson, & Taylor, 1980). In the present studies, when imagining a familiar person saying a word, a subject might activate information associated with that person (e.g., a subject may think about a time the person used that word in conversation or think about the particular way in which the friend pronounces the word). These activations could occur automatically while imagining or subjects may actually produce them as aids in imagining someone speaking. When simply saying words, presumably different information would be activated (Johnson et al., 1988). Later, when

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trying to decide if a word was one they said or imagined, subjects may remember these activations and use them to distinguish between memories. When imagining themselves speaking, subjects may engage in similar elaborations. However, in this case, these elaborative processes would not necessarily facilitate performance. For example, when asked to say the word shovel and to imagine saying the word hammer, subjects may think about their own shovel and hammer, or an occasion in which they said each word. These activations would then be quite similar for words subjects said and imagined saying, decreasing their discriminative potential. Thus, according to the Reality Monitoring model, adults should be more confused when the actor in the imagination is the same as the source of the imagination than when the actor is different. Specifically, when discriminating what they said from what they imagined themselves saying, adults should be more confused than when discriminating what they said from what they imagined a familiar person say. If children are less likely than adults to engage in additional elaborative encoding during imagination, we might also expect developmental differences in memory confusions. The literature on strategy development leads us to expect young children to be less likely than older subjects to activate additional information during encoding because it demonstrates that children younger than 9 do not engage in elaborative processing spontaneously (Beuhring & Kee, 1987; Brown, Bransford, Ferrara, & Campione, 1983; Flavell, 1985; McDaniel & Pressley, 1987; Ornstein, 1978). As a result, it is often assumed that young children cannot initiate elaborative processing spontaneously, at least in situations involving deliberate remembering (e.g., Brainerd & Pressley , 1985; McDaniel & Pressley, 1987). While subjects can be instructed to encode elaboratively, instructions are far less successful with young children, especially when imagery is involved (Carrier, Karbo, Kindem, Legisa, & Newstrom, 1983; Lesgold, McCormick, & Golinkoff, 1975; Pressley, 1977, 1982; Wooldridge et al., 1982). Thus, we might expect young children to be more confused than adults because their memories may be less elaborate, providing fewer cues for memory discriminations. On the other hand, there is an interesting contradiction in the developmental literature. While the research on strategy development creates the impression that young children’s memory performance is poor because of their inadequate elaborative strategies, the developmental literature on memory confusions creates a different picture (e.g., Ceci et al., 1987; Johnson & Foley, 1984; Lindsay & Johnson, 1987; Piaget, 1929, 1959). As we mentioned earlier, this literature suggests that children are quite confused about their memories precisely because they are more likely to embellish, an instance of elaborative encoding. Since there is very little evidence available testing this claim (e.g., Johnson & Foley,

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1984), it is not clear whether children will be more or less likely adults to activate additional information during imagination. OVERVIEW

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OF EXPERIMENTS

In Experiment 1, we asked subjects (7 year olds, 10 year olds, and college-adults) to say words and to imagine someone saying other words in order to examine the effects on memory of the person subjects imagine. Information about subjects’ spontaneous elaborations was obtained by asking subjects how they decided whether a word was one they said or one they imagined. In Experiment 2, subjects from the same age groups repeated words in speech or imagination, but in the context of a sentence completion task. This task was chosen in an attempt to minimize the opportunity for spontaneous elaborations during imagination. Experiment 1, in combination with Experiment 2, emphasizes the importance of spontaneous elaborations for memory discriminations. In Experiments 3 and 4, we asked subjects about the kinds of information activated on a trial-by-trial basis as they imagined (or said) words. These latter two studies address these questions: (1) Do subjects, including young children, engage in spontaneous elaborative processing during imagination, as Experiment 1 suggests; and (2) do these elaborations have any consequences for memory? EXPERIMENT

1

Method Subjects. Subjects were selected from three age levels: 7 years, 10 years, and college-adults. The overall design involved three conditions at each age level with 12 subjects per cell (N = 108). The mean ages of the children were 7.5 (range 7.1-7.9) and 10.4 (range 10.2-10.8). The children were selected randomly from class lists in the Saratoga Springs School district, and adults were undergraduate volunteers from Skidmore College. Subjects in subsequent experiments were selected from the same pools, but no subject participated in more than one of the four experiments reported in this paper. Materials. Thirty-six words were selected from Carrol, Davies, and Richmond’s (1977) Word Frequency Book. They were all high in the frequency with which the youngest age group was likely to encounter them in reading materials. Twelve of the words (six instruments and six opposites) were randomly designated as new items for a subsequent memory test. Of the remaining 24 words, a subject said 12 out loud and imagined someone saying the other 12. An equal number of instrument and opposite words were said and imagined. Finally, across subjects, materials were counterbalanced so that each word was said or imagined an equal number of times. There

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were two presentation orders, with said and imagined items occurring equally often (and in random order) in each quarter of the list of items. Procedure. Each subject was run individually by one of two female experimenters who were represented proportionally across conditions. Children played a “detective game,” a cover story that was used successfully in previous studies (Foley et al., 1987, 1983). Subjects were told that they would say some words out loud and imagine someone saying other words “in their mind.” The subjects either imagined themselves, a parent, or a friend speaking. For example, when imagining themselves speaking, children were told that “good detectives do all sorts of things and look for clues about what they are doing. Sometimes detectives think about things and they don’t let anyone else know what they are thinking about. Now I am going to ask you to say some words out loud. I will also ask you to imagine saying some words so that I cannot hear you say them. When you are imagining yourself saying words, try not to give me any clues about what is on your mind.” Subjects were then given practice trials, imagining themselves speaking. These instructions were modified for adult control groups who were told that they were participating in a communication study. For the parent condition, subjects were first asked to choose a parent and to spend a few moments thinking about the sound of the parent’s voice. Children rarely indicated that they had any difficulty in imagining the sound of the parent’s voice. In fact, their spontaneous remarks indicated otherwise (e.g., “Oh, yeh, I remember what her voice sounds like . . . I can remember her asking me to take my lunch this morning”). After thinking about the sound of the parent’s voice, the subject was given a few practice items, and then the trials began. Similar instructions were used for subjects who imagined a friend. The experimenter referred to the parent or friend by name during the imagination trials to increase the likelihood that subjects imagined the same person from trial to trial. After the subject said and imagined the target words, they engaged in conversation with the experimenter for about 3 min. Subjects were then given a surprise recall test, followed by a discrimination test. For the recall test, subjects were asked to recall as many words as they could remember in any order. For the discrimination test, the experimenter read a list of words which included the 24 original targets plus 12 fillers. Subjects were asked whether each word was one they said, one they imagined saying, or a new word. The discrimination test was constructed such that an equal number of items from the four quarters of the acquisition sequence occurred equally often across quarters of the test sequence. Finally, there were two random orders for the discrimination test. Following the discrimination test, subjects were asked this question:

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“How did you figure out whether each word was one you said, one you imagined, or a new one?” Results

The dependent variables of interest were Recall, Corrected Recognition, Discrimination, and Metamemory Responses. Responses on the discrimination test were scored in two ways to produce measures of word recognition (or occurrence information) and word discrimination (or origin information). Corrected recognition scores (hits minus false positives) provide a measure of occurrence information (i.e., subjects’ ability to recognize the words on the test that occurred during the first phase of the experiment). Discrimination scores provide a measure of origin information (i.e., subjects’ ability to classify old words as ones they said or imagined). In previous research, measures of occurrence and of origin information are often uncorrelated (e.g., Foley et al., 1983; Johnson, 1985), supporting the idea that measures of discrimination are not simply alternative measures of recognition. In addition, in previous work, it has been shown that certain variables have a greater effect on one measure than another (e.g., Johnson, 1985). Since there was the possibility that the person subjects imagined might affect discrimination scores but not recognition, both measures were analyzed in Experiment 1. In analyzing each dependent variable, analyses of variance were computed using age, condition (the person subjects imagined), and type of trial (said vs imagined). For subsequent comparisons, Tukey’s HSD test was used, following the logic and procedures recommended by Keppel (1982) for holding the family-wise error rate at the .05 level of significance. Recall. An analysis of variance including age, condition, and type of trial (said vs imagined) showed that recall varied across the three age groups, F(2, 99) = 34.05, MSe = 1.33, p < .OOl. Tukey’s test showed that adults (M = 6.83) recalled more words than 7 year olds (M = 2.39) and 10 year olds (M = 4.1 I), and 10 year olds recalled more words than 7 year olds. There was also a main effect for type of trial, F(1, 99) = 15.80, MSe = 0.85, p < .OOl. Mean recall was higher for words subjects imagined (M = 2.56) than words they said (M = 1.86). Recall did not vary as a function of the person subjects imagined. Discrimination Scores.’ Responses on the recognition test were scored by computing proportions equal to the number of words whose source ’ The discrimination scores were slightly skewed in a positive direction. Therefore, their arcsin transformations were calculated and the analyses of variance were computed again. The results were the same as those reported for the nontransformed scores. For the purpose of clarity. the discrimination scores themselves are reported.

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the subject correctly identified divided by the total number of words correctly recognized as old. For example, of the 12 words the subject actually said, a subject might report they said 6, imagined saying 4, and claim that 2 were new. Of the 12 words the subject imagined saying, the subject might report saying 4, imagining 7, and claim that 1 was new. Thus, for this subject, the proportion correct would equal (6 + 7)/ ((6 + 4) + (4 + 7)) or .62. Under each condition, these proportions were computed separately for each age group, and they are shown in Table 1. In an analysis of variance including age, condition, and type of trial, there were three main effects. Discrimination performance varied with age, F(2, 99) = 3.61, MSe = 0.03, p < .03. The mean proportions were .74, .82, and .78 for the 7 year olds, 10 year olds, and adults, respectively. Tukey’s test showed that performance was lower for 7 year olds than the two older groups, and it was higher for 9 year olds than adults, findings consistent with previous research (Foley et al., 1983). Discrimination performance was generally higher for words subjects imagined (M = .82) than for words they said (M = .75), F(1. 99) = 4.00, MSe = 0.26, p < .05. Finally, there was also a main effect for condition, F(2, 99) = 3.84, p < .03. Subsequent tests showed discrimination performance was significantly worse when subjects imagined themselves speaking (M = .73) than when subjects imagined a parent (M = .80) or a friend (M = .81). Discrimination performance did not differ for subjects who imagined a parent or a friend. None of the interactions was significant. In previous studies, we typically observed an interaction between age and condition, and this effect was due to the fact that there were developmental differences only under the condition involving memories for speech and imagined speech. In this experiment, it was not at all clear whether we would observe an interaction since all conditions were variations on the one case in which there is a developmental difference. The fact that we did not observe such an interaction here suggests young children’s confusion between memories for what they said and imagined is not specific to instances in which the self is the actor in the imagination. Since the discrimination test followed the recall test, the probability of making a correct discrimination given a word was recalled was calculated and compared with the probability of making a correct discrimination given a word was not recalled. This analysis showed that the data in Table 1 were not contaminated by recall, a finding consistent with previous research (e.g., Foley & Johnson, 1985). Corrected Recognition. The discrimination test was also scored for recognition. The number of words the subject correctly recognized as old minus the number of new words incorrectly labeled as old (“say” or “think”) was calculated. An analysis of variance including age, con-

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dition, and type of trial as factors showed no main effects. The only significant interaction was between age and type of trial (said vs imagined), F(2, 99) = 4.52, p < .02, as summarized in Table 1. Subsequent tests using Tukey’s procedure showed that adults’ corrected recognition scores were significantly higher for words they said than for words they imagined. In contrast, for children, corrected recognition scores did not differ. In fact, there was a tendency in the opposite direction. This pattern for corrected recognition is important in that it differs from that for the discrimination data. The person subjects imagined did not affect corrected recognition scores nor were there any age differences in performance; the reverse was reported for the discrimination data. Metamemory Responses. In our earlier studies, subjects sometimes offered spontaneous remarks when discriminating between memories, suggesting they were doing more than simply repeating words (overtly or covertly). For example, some subjects might spontaneously report remembering they thought of the family pet when imagining themselves saying the word dog, and this activation helped them to later identify dog as a word they imagined. However, to date, we have not collected these reports in a systematic fashion. Metamemory responses were ana-

TABLE 1 MEAN DATA SUMMARIES, EXPERIMENT I

Discrimination score Imagine self Imagine friend Imagine parent Corrected recognition Words said

7 years

10 years

Adult

0.65 (0.34) 0.78 (0.19) 0.79 (0.20)

0.78 (0.21) 0.83 (0.15) 0.84 (0.17)

0.77 (0.28) 0.81 (0.17) 0.77 (0.21)

8.47

(2.96)

8.44 (2.45) 9.25 (2.36)

9.39 (2.49) 8.97 (2.58)

8 14 0 14 36

3 7 7 19 36

4 0 2 30 36

(2.06) Words imagined Responses to metamemory questions Don’t know Memory Sem. elaborations Per. elaborations Totals

8.97

Nofe. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

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lyzed for two reasons: (1) to retrospectively estimate the frequency with which subjects report engaging in spontaneous elaborations during imagination, and (2) to see if the content of these imaginations differs. Therefore, the following coding scheme was developed. Responses to the metamemory question were classified using one of three categories: (I) general remarks suggesting the subject had no idea (e.g., “I don’t know”), (II) general remarks about the way memory worked (e.g., “I just remembered . . . that’s how my memory works”), and (III) remarks indicating subjects activated additional information during encoding. The category referring to elaborative processing can be further separated into two categories: responses indicating subjects activated nonpersonalized, generic information and those indicating subjects activated semantic information that also included a personalized component. Semantic nonpersonalized elaborations included remarks like those that might be generated in a standard memory experiment involving semantic processing. That is, subjects reported thinking of a related word, image, or action. Personalized encodings included associates (“my crayon box”) in response to a cue (crayons) rather than a simple word associate (crayon box), remarks about the way the friend’s voice sounded, remarks about the expression on the friend’s face when they imagined the friend speaking, or remarks about remembering an occasion in which the friend (or parent) used the word in conversation with the subject. Subjects’ response to the question was classified by two independent raters, blind to condition and age. The interrater reliability was quite high (98%); for responses in which there was disagreement (2%), the raters discussed their classifications and came to some agreement together. These frequencies for the 36 subjects in each age group are shown at the bottom of Table 1. First, what is most striking in these data is that many subjects reported remembering information that was activated during imagination when trying to distinguish between memories. For example, 14 of the 36 seven year olds and 32 of the 36 adults reported some type of elaborative information. Also, the types of elaborations subjects reported using during discrimination tended to be those of a personalized and idiosyncratic sort. While this tendency increased with age, it is clear that several of the 7 year olds reported remembering the activation of this sort of information during encoding (see “Per. Elaborations” in Table 1). Further, consistent with the developmental literature on metamemory development (e.g., Kail, 1984; Kreutzer, Leonard, & Flavell, 1973). the frequency of general remarks about memory decreased with age. Finally, these data are summed across conditions because the frequencies did not vary with the person subjects imagined, despite the fact that there were considerable differences in memory confusion across the conditions.

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Discussion The results of Experiment 1 are important in showing that the degree to which subjects are confused about what they said and what they imagined depends upon the agent of the imagination. All subjects were more confused when imagining the self than when imagining another familiar person speaking. Interestingly, this manipulation did not affect recall or recognition. The responses to the metamemory questions are intriguing in their suggestion that subjects engage in spontaneous elaborations during imagination, remember these elaborations, and seem to use them when discriminating between memories. If these elaborations are important for the discrimination process, then constraining subjects’ processing during imagination ought to negatively affect discrimination performance. This possibility is examined in Experiment 2. EXPERIMENT

2

Embedding words in detailed contexts serves to constrain the way in which subjects encode information, and, on occasion, this contextual constraint enhances memory (e.g., Craik & Tulving, 1975). However, imposing semantic constraints can also have negative effects on performance. For example, in sentence completion tasks (e.g., Durso, Reardon, & Jolly, 1985; Reardon, Durso, Foley, & McGahan, 19871, the typical advantage in memory for words subjects generate themselves is considerably reduced. We thought that if subjects were forced to imagine someone saying a word to complete a sentence, the likelihood that they would also activate personalized information would be reduced. If we are correct in our suggestion that these elaborations are important for memory, then discrimination performance should be much worse in Experiment 2 than in Experiment 1. Method Subjects. Twenty-four subjects from each of three age groups (7 year olds, 10 year olds, and college-adults) were randomly assigned to one of two conditions (N = 72). The children’s mean ages were 7.6 (range 7.1-7.9), 10.3 (range 10.2-10.5) and college-adults. Materials and procedures. The materials and general procedures were identical to those used in Experiment 1. There were two conditions: Subjects said some words and imagined themselves saying other words or subjects said some words and imagined a friend saying other words. They were first given practice simply saying or imagining someone saying words, using instructions from Experiment 1. Then subjects were given instructions for the sentence completion exercises. For example, in the Imagine Self condition, on say trials, the

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experimenter said “Use the word shovel to finish this sentence. ‘The workman dug a hole in the ground with a shovel’,” and the subject repeated the word “shovel.” On imagination trials, the experimenter said “Imagine yourself using the word short to finish this sentence. ‘The ‘,” and the subject imagined giant was tall but the midget was saying the word short. Subjects were also given practice trials on the sentence completion task. Following the sentence completion task, and a brief retention interval (3 min), subjects were given one free-recall trial followed by a surprise discrimination test. The experimenter read a list of words (24 original items plus 12 fillers, presented in random order), and the subject indicated whether each was one they said, one they imagined, or a new word. Following these discriminations, subjects were asked how they remembered whether words were ones they said or imagined. Results

The dependent variables of interest were Discrimination Scores, Metamemory Responses, Recall, and Corrected Recognition Scores. Discrimination Scores.= An analysis of variance was performed on discrimination scores including age and condition (self vs friend). Notably, unlike Experiment 1, there was no advantage for words subjects imagined, nor did discrimination performance vary with age or the person subjects imagined (see Table 2). In addition, a comparison of the discrimination scores in Tables 1 and 2 shows that performance was generally lower in Experiment 2 compared with Experiment 1. Overall performance was below 60% in Experiment 2 and about 82% in Experiment 1. Thus, when the nature of subjects’ elaborative processing was constrained, subjects were quite confused about what they said and imagined. MetarrGmory Responses. Interestingly, subjects were not able to articulate how they made their discriminations in this experiment. Children had no information to report. Of the few adults (six) who reported any information, they said they tried to remember what the experimenter asked them to do (i.e., say or imagine). This type of response was never reported in Experiment 1. Recall. The discrimination test was preceded by one free recall trial as in Experiment 1. This recall test did not contaminate the discrimination data since the probability of correct discrimination did not differ for words recalled and not recalled. ’ Discrimination scores were conditionalized on recall, as in Experiment 1. There were no differences in discrimination performance for words recalled and not recalled, and this factor did not interact with any of the other factors included in this study.

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TABLE 2 MEAN DATA SUMMARIES, EXPERIMENT 2

Discrimination score Imagine self Imagine friend Recall Words said Words imagined Corrected recognition Imagine self Words said Words imagined Imagine friend Words said Words imagined

7 years

10 years

Adult

0.54 (0.30) 0.60 (0.25)

0.62 (0.21) 0.63 (0.22)

0.60 (0.24) 0.63 (0.19)

0.83 (1.18) 1.12 (1.22)

1.70 (1.40) 1.33 ( I .09)

2.66 (2.10) 1.66 (1.79)

6.75 (1.77) 7.42 (1.69)

9.50 (1.20) 9.58 (1.32)

9.42 (1.15) 8.00 (1.23)

9.08 (1.28) 8.58 (1.33)

8.58 (1.22) 8.75 (1.19)

8.00 (1.16) 8.17 (1.55)

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses

An analysis of variance on recall, including age, condition, and type of trial as factors, showed recall increased with age, F(2, 66) = 10.32, p < -001. Tukey’s test showed that adults recalled more words than children, and the 10 year olds recalled more words than the 7 year olds (see Table 2). The interaction between age and type of trial was significant, F(2, 66) = 4.52, p < .Ol. Subsequent tests indicated that adults recalled more words they said than imagined whereas children recalled more words they imagined than said. In comparison with Experiment 1, recall was lower overall (compare Table 2 and means reported under Recall in the Results section of Experiment 1) and the striking advantage for imagined items reported in Experiment I was not observed here. Corrected Recognition. As in Experiment 1, there were no differences in recognition performance; subjects’ memory for words was quite good. An analysis of variance on corrected hits including age, condition, type of trial, and type of word as factors showed only one main effect. Corrected hits were higher for instruments than opposites, F(1, 66) = 4.40, MSe = 1.33, p < .03. The only other significant effect was a significant three-way interaction between age, condition, and type of trial, F(2, 66) = 3.58, MSe = .95, p < .03. This pattern is summarized in Table 2.

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Subsequent analyses indicated that none of the comparisons involving type of trial and condition for each age was independently significant. Discussion The results of Experiment 1 suggest that subjects as young as 7 engage in spontaneous elaborations during imagining and later use these elaborations to discriminate between memories. The results of Experiment 2 lend support to this idea by showing that discrimination performance decreases (as does recall) when the opportunities for spontaneous elaborations are minimized. However, it is possible the metamemory data from Experiment 1, which provide the basis for our emphasis on the importance of spontaneous elaborations, may reflect response biases. For example, subjects may have generated these elaborations in response to our metamemory question rather than during imagination. To examine this possibility, we collected data on a trial-by-trial basis on the frequency with which subjects reported such elaborations during imagination. In Experiment 3, subjects (7, 10, and adults) simply imagined someone (themselves or a friend) saying words, and, after each trial, reported “what was on their mind” during imagination. In this study, we only asked subjects to imagine saying words so they would not wonder why they were speaking and imagining and perhaps feel compelled to report different information for speaking and imagining. In Experiment 4, different subjects from the same age groups said words and imagined themselves saying other words, reported what was on their mind, and then identified words they said or imagined. EXPERIMENT

3

Method Subjects. Forty subjects from each of three age levels were randomly assigned to one of two conditions defined in terms of the person subjects imagined (N = 120). The mean ages were 7.4 (range 7.0-7.9) and 10.5 (range lO.l-IO.@, and college-adults. Materials and procedures. The materials were the same as those used in Experiment 1. Twenty-four items were randomly selected as targets for the imagination trials and the remaining 12 served as fillers on a recognition test. On each trial, subjects were asked to imagine themselves or a friend say a word. Then they were asked “what was on their minds” when they imagined the word, and the experimenter recorded their responses. Following the imagination trials, subjects were given one free recall trial.

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Results Coding scheme. The primary purpose of Experiment 3 was to measure the frequency with which subjects reported additional activations during imagination, and to see if these frequencies varied with age. Four different categories were used to code responses: (I) simple repetitions; (II) elaborations of a semantic nonpersonalized sort (e.g., generic word associates, images, actions); (III) elaborations of a semantic sort that included a personalized, idiosyncratic component; and (IV) miscellaneous responses that could not be classified in the other three categories. The subcategories used to define these large categories are detailed in Table 3. TABLE SUMMARY

OF CODING

3

CATEGORIES,

EXPERIMENT

3

I. Simple repetitions A. Subject reports simply repeating word. B. Subject reports repeating word over and over. II. Semantic elaborations A. Generic word associations, images or actions (reference to thinking about word associate related to cue, define word, reference to image or picture of object. reference to performing action using object). B. Elaborative, generic sentences (e.g.. “The boy cut his finger with the scissors” when asked to imagine saying word scissors). III. Personalized elaborations A. Personalized word associations, images or actions referring to the self (e.g., reference to word associate with explicit mention of self (“my” cat), use word to describe self, reference to self using object, reference to seeing self using object, reference to image or picture of “my” (object)). B. Personalized word associations, images or actions referring to significant other (e.g., reference to word associate with explicit mention of friend, use word to describe friend, reference to friend using object, reference to seeing friend using object, reference to image or picture of friend’s object, reference to both self and friend using object). C. Personalized images (Visual and/or Auditory) of the imagined speaker (e.g., reference to seeing what friend looked like when saying a particular word, reference to sound of own voice or voice of friend). D. Elaborative, personalized sentences involving the self (e.g.. “my soup is hot”; “I used my knife yesterday to cut steak at dinner”; “I thought of a time I said I was getting wet because it was raining”; “I think of me saying I am very sad (because my cat died)“). E. Elaborative personalized sentences involving significant other (e.g.. she says “When we go home, we open the door with a key”; “When I went to visit she said she was very sleepy”; “Thought of my friend asking me to get the box of crayons.” Reference to the friend using the word a lot, reference to the friend never saying that word, reference to parent using word in a sentence). IV. Miscellaneous (Subject spells cue word: subject reports “nothing is on my mind”: subject reports “I never say it.“)

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For each of the 24 imagination trials, the frequency with which subjects’ remarks included reference to simple repetitions, personalized elaborations, and generic elaborations was counted. Two experimenters, blind to condition and age, independently coded subjects’ responses. The interrater reliability was quite high (97%). Frequency of elaboration. Table 4 summarizes these frequencies. An analysis of variance on these frequencies (including age and condition as factors) showed frequencies differed across the three age groups, F(2, 108) = 5.82, MSe = 0.19, p < .004, and across response categories, F(2, 216) = 26.50, p < .OOl. More importantly, as shown in Table 4, these two variables interacted, F(4, 216) = 2.97, p < .02. Subsequent tests showed that there were no differences in the frequency with which subjects reported activating personalized information across the age groups. However, older subjects were more likely than younger ones to report activating semantic information during imagination and less likely to report simply repeating items. There was also a significant interaction between response category and condition, F(2, 216) = 16.10, p < .OOl. Subsequent tests showed: (1) For subjects who imagined themselves, the frequencies for the Semantic Category (M = 15.80) were greater than the frequencies for the PerTABLE 4 MEAN DATA SUMMARIES,EXPERIMENT 3 Type of elaboration

Frequencies 7 year olds IO year olds College-adults Conditionalized 7 year olds

Gen

Per

5.02 (8.30) 3.70 (6.45) 0.22 (0.53)

9.90 (10.37) 10.78 (9.35) 15.05 (5.47)

9.10 (9.44) 9.40 (9.03) 8.20 (5.12)

0.85 (I .47) 0.48 (I .08) 0.38 (0.62)

I .08 (1.74) 2.68 (2.44) 6.43 (3.54)

0.98 (1.31) 2.58 (2.44) 3.75 (3.39)

0.40 (0.94) 0.73 (1.17)

4.00 (2.31) 2.98 (2.85)

2.67 (I .95) 3.48 (3.08)

recall

IO year olds College-adults Conditionalized recall Imagine self Imagine friend

Rep

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

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sonalized Category (M = 5.67); (2) for subjects who imagined a friend, the frequencies for the Semantic Category (M = 8.15) were less than the frequencies for the Personalized Category (M = 12.13); and (3) the frequencies for the Repetition Category did not vary with condition 04 = 2.4 and 3.5 for self and for friend, respectively). Recal1.j The recall data were conditionalized on type of elaboration. A 3 (age) x 2 (who subject imagined) x 3 (type of elaboration) analysis of variance showed that recall differed with age, F(2, 108) = 69.90, MSe = 2.69, p < .oOl. Tukey’s test showed that 7 year olds recalled significantly fewer words (M = 2.91) than 10 year olds (M = 5.74) and adults (M = 10.54), and 10 year olds recalled fewer words than adults. There was also a main effect for who subjects imagined; recall was higher when subjects imagined a friend speaking than when subjects imagined themselves, F(1, 108) = 8.37, p < .005. Recall differed across the elaborative categories, F(2, 216) = 37.40, MSe = 7.03, p < .OOl, and this effect interacted with age, F(4, 216) = 12.22, p < .OOl, as well as with who subjects imagined, F(2, 216) = 11.01, p < .OOl. No other effects were significant. The middle portion of Table 4 summarizes the interaction between age and type of elaboration. Subsequent tests showed that recall was comparable across ages for words encoded with simple repetitions or personalized details. However, there were significant differences in recall for words encoded with semantic elaborations. The interaction between type of encoding and the person subjects imagined is also summarized in Table 4. Subsequent tests showed that when imagining the self, recall was higher following generic elaborations than when following more personalized elaborations. When imagining a friend, in contrast, recall was higher following personalized elaborations. Recall did not vary with the person subjects imagined following reports of simple repetitions of items. Discussion The results of this third experiment suggest that both children and adults activate additional information during imagination, and this information often includes personalized and idiosyncratic details. Furthermore, these encodings seem to have consequences for recall, and the effect interacts with age. While all age groups appear to generate ’ The intrusions in Experiment 3 were generally low. However, they were scored separately for those that were related to the elaborations reported following the imaginations and those that were not obviously related to these elaborations or the words that were imagined. There were no differences in the mean number of intrusions (associated vs nonassociated) and this variable did not interact with any of the other major variables.

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personalized elaborations, semantic elaborations are more prevalent in the older age groups. At this point, the evidence that subjects’ personalized processing has consequences for discrimination performance is, at best, indirect. Experiment 1 suggests subjects rely on this sort of information when deciding about the origin of memories, but it is also possible that personalized information is simply more memorable; thus, subjects report it with greater frequency than semantic information. In Experiment 4, we attempt to see if these elaborations have consequences for discrimination by asking subjects what was on their mind while speaking and imagining and by examining discrimination performance for different types of responses. EXPERIMENT

4

Method Subjects. Thirty-six subjects, 12 from each of three age groups (7 year olds, 10 year olds, and college-adults) participated in this study. The children’s mean ages were 7.4 (range 7.2-7.8) and 10.5 (range 10.1-10.8). Materials and procedure. The materials and procedures were identical to those used in Experiment 1, with one change. On each trial, after saying and imagining saying words, subjects reported “what was on their mind.” They were also told that if nothing “popped into their mind” that was fine. Then they were surprised with a discrimination test. Results Frequency coding. Responses to the question “what was on your mind” were classified using the same coding scheme developed for Experiment 3. The top half of Table 5 shows the breakdown of responses for all 24 trials. An analysis of variance showed no main effects for trial type (said vs imagined). Thus, the kinds of elaborations reported for each item type were similar. The frequencies in Table 5 are therefore combined for said and imagined items. While there was no main effect for age, there was a significant interaction between age and elaborative type, F(2, 66) = 26.34, p < .OOl. Young children reported personalized encodings with greater frequency than older subjects whereas older subjects reported generic elaborations with greater frequency. These frequencies are consistent with those observed for Experiment 3. Reports of personalized encodings. The number of subjects who reported thinking about personalized details at least once when saying or imagining words varied with age in that the frequencies were higher for younger subjects. The numbers (out of 12) were 10, 7, and 6 of the 7 year olds, 10 year olds, and college-adults, respectively.

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TABLE 5 MEAN DATA SUMMARIES, EXPERIMENT 4 Type of elaboration

Mean frequencies 7 year olds IO year olds College-adults Discrimination scores for subjects using personalized elaborations 7 year olds 10 year olds College-adults

Rep

Gen

Per

4.59 (4.46) 5.60 (4.10) 4.00 (3.99)

9.75 (6.72) 14.50 (9.92) 17.43 (4.69)

9.58 (7.43) 3.90 (5.06) 2.66 (3.59)

0.30 (0.15) 0.52 (0.29) 0.65 (0.27)

0.53 (0.27) 0.50 (0.19) 0.44 (0. IO)

0.56 (0.19) 0.65 (0.29) 0.81 (0.24)

Note. Standard deviations are in parentheses.

Discrimination scores. The mean discrimination scores were calculated for subjects who reported personalized details on at least one trial with those who never reported thinking about personalized details. Scores were higher for those who reported personalized details (M = .62) than for those who did not (A4 = .55). (This pattern was the same when we compared subjects who reported personalized elaborations on 40% of the trials or more.) In an item-by-item analysis, discrimination scores were computed separately for items on which subjects reported thinking about personalized details, items on which subjects reported semantic elaborations, and items on which subjects reported simple repetitions, These scores are shown in the bottom half of Table 5. When subjects reported thinking about personalized information, discrimination performance was consistently higher on those items compared to performance on items for which subjects did not report thinking about personalized information. Discussion The trial-by-trial analysis of subjects’ encodings suggests that subjects do elaborate while imagining, consistent with Experiment 3. More importantly, this study suggests these elaborations have consequences for memory performance. Discrimination performance was superior for those

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items which were encoded with personalized evident for all age groups. GENERAL

Sources of Memory

details, and this trend was

DISCUSSION

Confusions

The motivation for Experiment 1 was to examine the extent to which confusion between memories for real and imagined speech was related to the person subjects imagined-themselves or a familiar other. The results clearly show that all age groups were affected by the imagination manipulation. In Experiment 1, subjects were generally more confused when they imagined themselves speaking rather than a friend or a parent. There are at least two explanations for why the person subjects imagined affects discrimination performance. First, when imagining the self, the subject is both the source of the imagination and the actor in the imagination. In contrast, when imagining someone else, the subject is the source of the imagination but not the actor. The latter situation could involve an easier discrimination because there is less overlap between the “tags” associated with the source of the imagination and the actor. Alternatively, subjects may be less confused when imagining a familiar person than when imagining the self because of a difference in the specific sorts of elaborations that are activated during imagination. Only additional studies will differentiate between these two explanations for the discrimination data from Experiment 1. However, we are more persuaded by the second one for the following reasons. A simple tagging notion would predict that subjects should be equally confused about what they did and what they imagined themselves doing across a range of activities, since the source of the imagination and the actor are constant. However, recent work is inconsistent with this prediction. We have shown that the degree to which subjects are confused between memories for what they did and what they imagined doing is not constant. Specifically, discrimination performance is better when kinesthetic cues and visible consequences associated with actions are available (Foley et al., 1987), suggesting the content of the memories (not just their source) is important for discriminations. Furthermore, the present studies seem to be more consistent with the second explanation. In Experiment 1, subjects report remembering spontaneous elaborations and using them to discriminate between memories. When these elaborations are constrained, performance drops considerably (Experiment 2). If discrimination performance were based on “tags” associated with words subjects said and imagined, then it is not clear why performance would drop as it did in Experiment 2. Finally, the results of Experiment 4 provide a trial-by-trial analysis of elaborative

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activity, and indicate that discrimination performance is better for those items associated with personalized encodings even though the source and actor in the imagination is always the same (the self). The Reality Monitoring model suggests how these elaborative processes might affect discrimination. When imagining a significant other speaking, subjects seem to activate information associated with that person, and this information later helps them identify words as ones they imagined. For example, subjects reported thinking about a time their friend used a word in conversation (Experiments 1 and 3) and they used this information during discrimination (Experiment 4). If, as seems to be the case, subjects are engaged in elaborative processing when imagining a familiar person, then why is their performance not better than it was in Experiment I? Initially, one might expect that subjects would be able to distinguish words they imagined in the voice of another person from words they said because of the salience of the cues associated with imagination. However, responses to the metamemory questions in Experiments 1 and 4 indicated that when saying words, subjects reported thinking about the person they were imagining, at least on some occasions. For example, when saying the word “toothbrush,” one subject reported remembering thinking about the night her friend (the one she imagined) slept over. Thus, memories for what subjects said and what they imagined a significant other saying shared some similarity in the details that were activated during speech and imagination. If memories for words subjects said and imagined share similar activations of a personalized and interactive type, then this similarity in content of the memories would reduce their discriminability somewhat. When imagining themselves speaking, the discriminability of words subjects said and imagined is reduced further as the overlap between the activations associated with these word types increases. For example, when saying or imagining themselves saying words, subjects may think about related words (semantic associates) or occasions on which they used the words in conversation (personalized elaborations). Thus, neither type of cue would be as discriminative if they were equally likely to occur for words subjects said and imagined saying. The relative importance of the type of elaboration-personalized vs generic-for reality monitoring decisions cannot be assessed from these studies alone. Nevertheless, our studies support the Reality Monitoring model in emphasizing the importance of elaborative processing for discrimination. Developmental Differences in Memory Confusion One question that remains is why young children were more confused than older subjects. It is not because the type of information they activate

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differs from that activated by adults, as mentioned. We suggest the developmental differences in confusion reflect young children’s inability to use information based on internal cues to facilitate remembering. In other research, we have found that the degree to which children are confused about these types of memories depends on the extent to which there are external markers (e.g., visible consequences following their actions) associated with their activities (Foley et al., 1987). If these external cues are unavailable, and subjects are forced to rely on internal cues based on cognitive operations, there are developmental differences in memory confusion (Foley et al., 1987). The Reality Monitoring model suggests that if a memory cannot be classified on the basis of characteristics like sensory detail or cognitive operations information, more extended inferential processes are required. Memories for said and imagined words both include cognitive operations information since they are self-generated (Foley et al., 1983); thus, subjects cannot base their judgments on the presence or absence of this type of cue. The extended reasoning that subjects might engage in involves the applications of beliefs about the way memory works or the use of general knowledge about the world (Johnson & Raye, 1981; Johnson, Raye, Foley, & Foley, 1981). Children certainly have beliefs about the way memory “works” (see Schneider, 1985). However, it is also clear that this information is available long before children draw upon it as a guide for remembering. Thus, young children may be more confused about what they said and imagined because the decision processes require a closer “inspection” of the relative differences between memories. Signijkance

of the Evidence for Childrerl’s

Spontaneous

Elaborations

Most importantly, the results from Experiment 1 were provocative in suggesting that children as young as 7 engaged in elaborative processing during imagination. This finding challenges prevalent ideas about children’s elaborative propensities. However, initially, we were reluctant to emphasize the importance of this evidence since it was derived from metamemory responses alone (Experiment 1). Subjects’ tendency to report personalized elaborations may indicate that personalized information is more memorable “in retrospect” rather than more likely to be activated. Furthermore, subjects responses to the metamemory questions in Experiment 1 may have been generated in response to our questions rather than during encoding. The results of Experiments 3 and 4 eliminate both of these alternative interpretations of the metamemory data. Trial-by-trial analyses of the frequency with which subjects engaged in elaborative processing indicated that all subjects activated personalized information during encoding, and children were just as likely as adults to do so. Consistent with other

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developmental literature, the tendency to activate more generic information (e.g., semantic associates) increased with age (Experiment 3). In Experiment 1, we reported that the tendency to report such personalized elaborations increased with age, although over half of the 7 year olds reported remembering such information. Implications

The most important message from these studies is that young children will engage in elaborative processing spontaneously. This pattern contrasts sharply with the more typical pattern reported in developmental memory studies. In these cases, children younger than 9 or 10 rarely engage in elaborative processing, and, when instructed to do so, they have a great deal of difficulty. Furthermore, the memory performance is not enhanced. In most of these developmental studies, it is important to note the considerable emphasis on goal-directed activities (see Corsale & Ornstein, 1978, for an exception). Thus, children are expected to encode elaboratively for the purpose of remembering. In contrast, in our studies, there was no explicit mention of a memory test, and the imaginations seemed to prompt socially interactive and highly personalized encodings. It is entirely possible that when we ask children to engage in particular kinds of elaborative processing, such as those involved in more typical memory experiments, we are actually inhibiting the activation of more personalized encodings which would ultimately enhance memory performance. Our results suggest that our understanding of the basis of developmental differences in strategy use and decision making may be advanced by the investigation of the role of personalized elaborative encoding in children’s remembering. REFERENCES Beuhring, T., & Kee, D. (1987). Elaborative propensities during adolescence: The relationship among metamemory knowledge, strategic behavior and memory performance. In M. S. McDaniel & M. Pressley (Eds.), Imagery and related mnemonic processes (pp. 257-273). New York: Springer-Verlag. Brainerd, C. J., & Pressley, M. (Eds.). (1985). Basic processes in memory development. New York: Springer-Verlag. Brown, A. L., Bransford, J. D.. Ferrara. R. A., & Campione, J. C. (1983). Learning, remembering, and understanding. In J. H. Flavell & E. M. Markman (Eds.), Handbook of child psychology (Vol. 3. pp. 77-166). New York: Wiley. Carroll, J. B., Davies, P., & Richman, B. (1971). Word frequency book. New York: Houghton MiBlin. Carrier, C., Karbo, D., Kindem, H., Legisa, G., & Newstrom, L. (1983). Use of selfgenerated and supplied visuals as mnemonics in gifted children’s learning. Perceptual and

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Pressley, M. (1982). Elaboration and memory development. Child Development, 53, 296309. Pressley, M., & Brainerd, C. J. (Eds.). (1985). Cognitive Learning and Memory in Children. New York: Springer-Verlag. Raye, C. L., Johnson, M. K., &Taylor, T. (1980). Is there something special about memory for internally-generated information? Memory and Cognition. 8, 141-148. Reardon, R., Durso, F. T., Foley, M. A., & McGahan, J. R. (1987). Expertise and the generation effect. Social Cognition, 5, 336-348. Schneider, W. (1985). Developmental trends in the metamemory-memory behavior relationship: An integrative review. In D. L. Forrest-Pressley, G. E. MacKinnon. & T. G. Wailer (Eds.), Cognition, metacognition, and performance. New York: Academic Press. Wooldridge, P.. Nail, L., Hughes, L., Rauch, T., Stewart, G., & Richman. C. L. (1982). Prose recall in first-grade children using imagery, pictures, and questions. Bulletin of the Psychonomic Society, 20, 249-252. RECEIVED:December 8, 1987;

REVISED:

December 12, 1988.