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Dissonance, self-perception, and the perception of others: A study in Cognitive cognitive dissonance
JOURNAL
OF
Dissonance,
EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
Self-Perception,
A Study A.
( 1970)
and the Perception
in Cognitive JOHN
6, 304-315
Cognitive
ARROWOOD University
AND
LINDA
of Others:
Dissonance1 WOODY
of Toronto AND
LEE Ross Stanford
Utllversity
Subjects were simultaneously involved participants in a dissonance experiment and observers of other participants. As involved subjects, those who expected to expend a great deal of effort preparing for a test which they might not have to take showed high subjective probability that they personally would take the test. As observer subjects answering the same question for the person seated three seats away, they showed no such respons veness to the manipulation of anticipated effort. The apparent demonstration of dissonance reduction by subjects who engaged in no overt behavior from which to infer their beiiefs challanges Rem’s (1965, 19837) self-perception interpretation of what others have regarded as dijsonance reduction. The fai!ure of observer subjects to duplicate the subjective probability responses of involved subjects under identical stimulus condit;ons poses further problems for Bern’s self-perception model. The data suggest the subjective response to an aversive motivationa! state rather than simple selfperception.
Bern (19~65; 1967) h as argued that the self-descriptive statements which provide the dependent variable data in most cognitive dissonance experiments can be understood without reference to dissonance or its reduction. If a person makes inferences about his attitudes or beliefs by observing his own behavior-in the same way that he makes inferences about the beliefs of others by observing their behavior-then it may be, ‘This research was supported by grants from the Ontario Mental Health Foundation (110) and the Defence Research Board of Canada (9465-11). We thank Miss Lorraine Wood for assistance in gathering the data, Drs. Leyla de Toledo and and Donald Dutton and Robert Lake Abraham Ross for aid in recruiting subjects, for a critical analysis of many of the points raised. ‘Now at the University of Michigan.
304
as Bern suggests, “unnecessary to postulate an aversive motivational drive toward consistency to account for the attitude change phenomena observed” (1967, p. 183). Th e “interpersonal replications” or “interpersonal simulations” of several representative dissonance experiments (Bern, 1967, 1968; nes, Linder, Kiesler, Zanna, & Brehm, NSS), rather than resolvi the matter, have instead raised certain qrestions about what one must simulate in order to replicate. That one can infer the attitudes (beliefs, expectations, evaluations) held by other people from their behavior and its snrrounding circumstances is one of the cornerstones of social psychological research. And Bern’s proposal that self-perception may be a special cas in which the perceiver and the perceived are the same vocative and, in the more general context of attribution I967), a parsimonious position. It is not, however, a position that renders the concept of dissonance unnecessary. Festinger’s initial statement of dissonance theory defined cognition. or cognitiz).e element as “any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the environment, about oneself, or about one’s behavior” ( 1957, p. 3)) and then proceeded to define dissonance in terms of a particular kind of relationship between cognitions. The currently disputed “forced compliance” an “‘free choice” experiments have demonstrated &at one’s actions-or, mor properly, one’s cognitions involving those actions-are capable of influencing some of the attitudes, beliefs, and expectations related to those actions. In these experiments, if dissonance has been produced at all, it has been produced because the subject has something-made a choice, argued counterattitudinally, or the like. ugh doing something and thinking about it later falls well witbin omain of Fes tinger’s definition, it is certainly not the only way of generating a cognition (which cou1.d then stand in a dissonant relationship with another cogn‘tion). It is, however, one of the few ways of doing so which woul permit Bern’s self-perception interpretation of what other investigators have regarded as dissonance reduction. Thus, if a subject could be placed in a state of dissonance without his having to do anything, it would be difficult to interpret any changes in belief to simple self-perception. The subject would be bard put to infer his beliefs from his behavior if he had not engaged in any overt behavior.3 Similarly, and contrary to Bern’s analysis of other instances of apparent dissonance reduction, “‘observer” subjects would find it extremely difficult to duplicate the (dissonance reducing) attitude statements of %n~olved’ 3 Bern views an individual’s attitude statements of his own behavior and its accompanying stinmlw added). We shall return to this latter consideration
as “inferences from observations ~akzbles” (1967, p, 1X6, italics below.
306
AFtROWOCq
WOOD,
AND
ROSS
subjects. To ask an observer about the beliefs of another person (stranger) when there is no behavior to observe is almost certain to produce the response “How should I know?” An experimental setting in which dissonance can be produced without overt behavior has been reported by Arrowood and Ross ( 1966). Their study was an extension of earlier work by Yaryan and Festinger ( 1961). Yaryan and Festinger found that subjects who had exerted a great deal of effort (memorizing a set of symbolic definitions) in preparation for a possible future event (an IQ test) believed more strongly in the likelihood of that event (that they would take the test) than did subjects who had engaged in a less effortful preparation. Arrowood and Ross found that it was not necessary for the subject actually to engage in the effortful preparation, and that the mere anticipation of expending effort was sufficient to increase the subject’s belief that he personally would take the test. After hearing descriptions of two high-powered IQ tests, all subjects were told that they would engage in preparation for one of the tests, but that only some of them (randomly selected) would be taking the test for which they would prepare; the others would be writing the second test, for which their preparation would be irrelevant. One group of subjects was led to believe that their preparation would be relatively effortful; the other, that it would be relatively easy. Those subjects who anticipated an effortful preparation believed that they personally would take the test for which their preparation would be relevant, even though they believed that, for their group as a whole, half would take one test and half the other. In the vocabulary of the interpersonal replication argument, all the Arrowood and Ross subjects were involved subjects in that they were asked to indicate their subjective likelihood that they personally would write a given test. It would be possible, however, to convert them into observer subjects simply by asking them to indicate, in addition to the above, the subjective likelihood that some other specific person in the same room would write a given test. Thus, a single subject could be both “involved” (when predicting for himself) and “observer” (when predicting for another person). Since involved and observer subjects would be “under the same skin,” questions as to the salience of initial attitudes and other phenomenological similarities or differences between involved and observer subjects could be avoided (cf. Jones et al., 196S, pp. 26266; Bern, 1968, p. 271). Whatever the salient situational cues might be, they would be identical for both involved and observer subjects. If Bern’s self-perception model is correct, then involved and observer subjects should give identical subjective probability responses under
CO@‘iitifW
COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE
3cu
conditions of high anticipated effort. More specifically, subjects who expect to engage in an effortful preparation for a test which they might or might not have to write (a) will believe themselves relatively likely to write that test,4 and (6) will make the same subjective probabihty prediction for some other specific person in the same circumstances. If (a) is confirmed and (b) is not, then we may reject the self-perception hypothesis that involved subjects have inferred their beliefs from their own behavior and the characteristics of the situation, and not in o to reduce an aversive motivational state-since observable behavior be nil and situational characteristics will be identical for both involved and observer subjects. METHOD With one major addition, the procedures of this study duplicate those of Arrowood and Ross. The experiment was described to subjects as one aimed at assessing further the validity of two newly developed and highly regarded IQ tests, both designed to eliminate the “built-in language bias” and “other important difficulties” in standard IQ tests. All subjects were told that they would prepare for one of the tests, but that only some of them would be taking the prepared-for test; the rest would be taking the other test, for which their preparation would be irrelevant. One group of subjects was l’ed to believe that their preparation would be’ relatively effortful; the other, that it would be relatively effortless. The dependent variable of interest was subjective probability-defined here as the likelihood expressed by a subject that ho (involved subjects) or some other specific person (observer subjects) would be taking the preparation-relevant test rather than the other test. A total of 68 University of Toronto undergraduates, 30 men and 38 women, were assigned at random to the two experimental conditions. Fragmentary data from five g to their failure to comsubjects, one man and four women, were discarded plete the postexperimental questionnaire. Subjects recruited for what was described to them as a “%hour group testing session”’ and participated in the experiment in two large groups, corresponding to the twu values of the manipulated variable, anticipated effortfuhress of preparation, Upon entering the experimental room, subjects were told to sit “anywhere you please” but not to disturb the small index card taped face downward to each lecture desk. They were promised that the reason for this procedure would be explained to them shortly, After delivering a general introduction emphasizing the importance of developing IQ tests which are reasonably free of “language subtleties,” the experimenter explained: “All of you will be writing one of the two IQ tests which I will describe in just ‘This is simply a prediction that the Arrowood and Ross results will replicate and, as such, is not contingent on the adequacy of the self-perception model. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the self-perception model would predict the obtained relationship between anticipated effort and subjective probability for involved subjects, quite apart from what it must predict for observer subjects. ‘In keeping with the experimental “cover story” that the study was concerned with I@ testing, only those subjects who had 2 consecutive free honrs (presumably sufficient time to take a test) were recruited.
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ARROWOOD,
WOOD,
AND
ROSS
a moment. Some of you will be writing the Wisconsin General Intelligence Bat&y or WGIB (experimenter points to a large pile of test booklets on his desk), while others will be writing the Iowa Intelligence Classification Test or IICT (experimenter points to another pile of papers of equal size), Which test you will take has been determined completely by chance. The little white card which you see taped to your lecture desk indicates which of the tests you will take, and when you are asked to turn it over you will find this out. Since you could have sat in any seat YOU wished, you can see that the tests have been assigned in a purely random fashion.” The description of the (fictitious) WGIB was identical for all subjects. The test was purportedly designed to be “just as difficult for individuals who have large vocabularies and extensive familiarities with English as it will for those who lack this language proficiency.” Although the test items themselves would be ask-d in English, none would involve such “verbally biased” techniques as the interpretation of prose passages or the selection of synonyms or antonyms, Instead, the test items would include “such tasks as probability inference and concept integration” (both purposely left undefined). It was in the description of the (equally fictitious) IICT that the manipulation of anticipated effort occurred. Both groups were told that a preparation would be required for the IICT but differed in their instructions regarding the effortfulness of the preparation. In order to estabhsh th- high-anticipated-effort condition, the experimenter said: “The IICT is also an intelligence test which attempts in a markedly different fashion to eliminate the effects that differences in language familiarity and expsrience introduce into standard IQ testing procedures. Testees are provided with a system of symbols, relations, and rules for the manipulation of these symbols, which they must memorize. This process of memorization requires considerable concentration and a willingness to do some work. The memorizing itself is not really difficult but, as I said, requires close concentration. In any case, you will be given ample time to memorize the symbol system and you will not have to attempt the test until you are satisfied that you have memorized the system completely. Most students find it takes them at least 30 or 35 minutes. Once this preparation is completed, you will use this symbol system in solving the problems that comprise the IICT. Let me make it clear that this is not a mathematical system and there is absolutely no mathematics involved in the IICT.” The instructions in the low-anticipated-effort condition were identical to those above in every respect but the following: “Testees are provided with a set of symbols, relations and rules for the manipulation of these symbols. I will give each of you a sheet with the symbol system on it. Read it over once when you get it-but don’t worry about trying to memorize it, since you will have the sheet in front of you duriog the test, The IICT will consist of problems that are to be solved using only these symbols and the rules for their manipulation.” On the grounds that “any meaningful comparison” necessitated that everyone engage in “the same kind of behavior” immediately prior to testing, all subjects would ba required to memorize (high anticipated effort) or read over (low anticipated effort) the IICT symbol system. “Of course,” the experimenter continued, “if you are among those taking the WGIB, this preparation will not have anything to do with your test; on the other hand, it won’t be detrimental to your performance either.”
CO&V&X?
COGNITIVE
309
DISSONANCE
Before receiving the symbol system for study, subjects were asked to HE out a us something about the atbrief and anonymous questionnaire designed to “tell Attention was directed to the anonymity titudes students hold regarding IQ tests.” of the questionnaire. “We do this to encourage frankness, since our interest is in group data. A knowledge of group data aids us in analyzing group performance.“’ The questionnaire inquired into, in turn, subfeec-tiue pro&&&y (“Which of the two IQ tests do you think you will write?“); “obiectiz;e” pwbabili& (“What percentage of the people present will write the WGIB? The IICT?“); preference between and relative difficulty and relative value of the two tests; relative ease or difficulty of the pretest preparation; observer subjective probabililzj (“Pick the person seated three seats away from you in any direction: Which of the two tests do you think he will write?‘); pills a final open-ended request for comments “about the study so far.” With the exception of the question on objective probability, which required a percentage estimate, all questions followed a six-step, forced-choice format. When the questionnaires had been completed, the experiment was over. Subjects were thoroughly debriefed and asked not to talk about the study to other potential partic:pants. Ko subject evidenced either suspicion or prior knowledge of the esperiment, even though a third of them wrote some comment in response to the tipen-ended questionnaire item. RESULTS
Anticipated
Effort
Before considering the data on subjective probability, it would be well to note briefly those data which verify the effectiveness of the manipulation of anticipated effort. After having responded to’ several items about the two IQ tests themselves, subjects were asked “‘Wow easy or difficult do you think the pretest preparation (symbol system) will be?“-the six alternatives for which ranged from “very easy” throug “very difficult.” Of the 32 subjects who received the high-anticipatedeffort instructions, 81% anticipated a preparation that was either “slightly,” “somewhat,” or “very difficult.” For the 31 subjects given the lowanticipated-effort instructions, the comparable figure was 48%. This difference is statistically significant (x2 = 7.48, p < .01)6 and similar to the E-53% difference found by Arrowood and Ross. As expected, then, memorizing a set of symbols was viewed, in antieipation, as more diEicult than merely reading them over.
Subjective
Probability-Involved
Subjects
The first hypothesis under test is that subjects who are led to anti an effortful preparation for the IICT will expect to write this test than the WGIB. Subjects who are led to anticipate a relatively less effortful preparation should display no such tendency. The critical questionnaire item was “which of the two tests do you think you will write?” ‘All
probability
values
reported
are
based
on two-tailed
tests.
310
ARROWOOD,
WOOD,
AND
ROSS
-the six alternatives for which ranged from “IICT fairly certain” through “WGIB fairly certain.” Responses to this item are summarized in Table 1. Of the 32 subjects in the high-anticipated-effort condition, 26 (81%) expected to write the test for which their preparation would be relevant, while only 6 expected the other test. Within the high-anticipated-effort condition, then, significantly more subjects expected to take the test for which they will h’ave to prepare than expected to take the other test for which their preparation would be irrelevant (sign test, p < .OOl ). Among subjects led to anticipate a less effortful preparation, there was virtually no difference in test expectation (sign test, p > .25). A comparison of the two conditions reveals a statistically significant difIerence in subjective probability (x2 = 6.22, p < .02). In other words, high-anticipatedeffort subjects were more likely than were their low-anticipated-effort counterparts to expect to write the IICT. This finding is, if anything, slightly stronger than the effect obtained by Arrowood and ROSS. Objective
Probability
Although these data are consistent with the dissonance position, they do not preclude alternative interpretation. It is possible, for example, that the instructions given in the high-anticipated-effort condition led subjects to believe that the vast majority of those present would be taking the IICT. Thus, for a subject to predict that he, personally, would do so might not reflect dissonance reduction but, rather, an inference based on situational cues-namely “We all must be going to take the IICT because we are all going to prepare for it.” This interpretation, consistent with Bern’s position, is essentially the one which Chapanis and Chapanis (1964) and Johnson and Steiner (1965) make of the original Yaryan and Festinger data. And, since the present instructions were silent on the matter of objective probability, the subjects could have arrived at this conclusion-though the experimenter’s gesture and reference to two equally large piles of “tests” should have suggested to most subjects that the two tests would be distributed in equal numbers.
SUBJECTIVE Two
PROBABILITY-INVOLVED TESTS WERE EXPECTED
TABLE 1 SUBJECTS: FREQUENCIES BY SUBJECTS IN THE Two Exepcted
IICT
Condition High Low
anticipated anticipated
effort effort
(preparation-relevant)
26 (81%) 16 &$6’0)
WITH WHICH CONDITIONS
test WGIB
6 (lQ%‘,) 15 (48%)
THE
Cognitive
COGNITIVE
DXSSONASCE
311
The postexperimental questionnaire provided data relevant to this argument. Subjects were asked to estimate the percentage “of the people present” who would be ‘taking each of the two tests. Of the 32 subjects in the high-anticipated-effort condition, 9 thought the IICT would be written by the majority of their group, 4 thought the WGIB would be written by the majority, and 19 thought each test would be written by exactly half their group. On the average, subjects in this condition thought that 52% of their number would write the IICT and 48% write the WGIB. These percentage estimates do not differ signi from 30% (t < 1). Of the 31 subjects in the low-anticipated-effort condition, 5 thought the majority of their group would write the IICT, 5 thought the majority would write the WGIB, and 21 thought the two tests would be written in equal numbers. On the average, subjects in this condition estimated that the IICT would be written by exactly half and the WGIB by the other half of their number. Thus, although subjects in both conditions believed that their objective chances of writing either test were about the same; those subjects led to anticipate an effort&l preparation for one of the tests nevertheless believed that they, personally, would probably be taking the test for which they will have prepared. Subjective
Probability-Observer
Subjects
The second hypothesis under test is a contingent one. If self-perception is what accounts for the subjective probability predictions of involved subjects, then observer subjects should generate predictions that are indistinguishable from those of their involved counterparts. On the other hand, if the subjective probability predictions of involved subjects reflect dissonance reduction, then observer subjects should not be able to duplicate them. More specifically, under the dissonance hypothesis, observer subjects should not predict that a specified other person (target person) who anticipates an effortful preparation is any more likely to write the preparation-relevant test than the ‘other test. Nor should there be any systematic relationship between the test which subjects predict when they are involved (predicting for themselves) and when they are observers (predicting for the target person). The relevant questionnaire item was “Pick the person seated three seats away from you in any direction: Which of the two tests do you think he will write?-the six alternatives for which were ident those above. Responses to this item are summarized in Table 2. 32 subjects in the high-anticipated-effort condition, 17 (53%) predicted that the target person would write the IICT; the remaining 15 thought that he would write the other test. The corresponding figures for the
312
ARROWOOD,
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY-OBSERVER Two TESTS WERE PREDICTED
WOOD,
AND
TABLE 2 SUBJECTS: FOR A TARGET Two CONDITIONS
ROSS
FREQUENCIES WITH WHICH THE PERSON BY SUBJECTS IN THE
Predicted Condition High Low
IICT
anticipated anticipated
effort effort
Test
(preparation-relevant)
WGIB
17 (53%)
15 (47%) 15 (48%)
16 (52%)
low-anticipated-effort condition are 16 (52%) and 15. None of these estimates differs significantly from 50%. Table 3 displays the same data ca:egorized with respect to whether the test predicted for the target person was the same as or different from the one predicted for oneself. Once aglin, none of the figures differs significantly from 50%. Finally, it may be instructive to juxtapose the responses of involved subjects (Table 1) with those of the same people serving as observer subjects (Table 3’). Of the 26 high-anticipated-effort subjects who expected to write the IICT (Table 1, upper left cell), 14 predicted the same test for the target person and 12 predicted the other test. The 6 high-anticipated-effort subjects who expected to write the WGIB divided 3 and 3 when predicting for the target person. Of the 16 lowanticipated-effort subjects who expected to write the IICT, 9 predicted the same test for the target person and 7 predicted the other test. The 1.5 low-anticipated-effort subjects who expected to write the WGIB divided 8 (same test) and 7 when predicting for the target person. In no case, then, is there any hint of a systematic relationship between what one predicts for oneself and what one predicts for “the other guy.”
Other Measures In addition to providing data on the success of the manipulation the tenability of the hypotheses, the postexperimental questionnaire
RELATION
BETWEEN
SUBJECTIVE
TABLE 3 PROBABILITY FOR ONESELF PERSON Predicted Same
Condition High anticipated Low anticipated
effort effort
li
as self (53%)
17 (55%)
and con-
AND FOR A TARGET
test Different 15 (47%) 14 (45%)
Cognitive
INCITIVE
DISS~~-C.~NCE
313
tamed three items included to increase the p~a~sibil~ty of the questionnaire and to ascertain whether the high- and low~a~tici~~ted-e~o~t conditions differed in other than the predicted respects One question concerned the relative difficulty of the two tests: another their re value, and the third the subjects’ preference between them. In no ease was there a significant difference between conditions in response to these questions; nor did these variables interact either with subjective probability or with each other. DISCUSSION
In replicating the findings reported by Arrowood and Ross, the data presented above provide strong support for the dissonance hypothesis that anticipated effort can affect subjective probability: subjects who anticipated an effortful preparation believed that they personally would take the test for which their preparation would be relevant. That we may call this a dissonance hypothesis derives from two other findings: first, that involved subjects, even though they expected individually to write tie preparation-relevant test; believed that the two tests would be given out in equal numbers to their group; second, that observer subjects, even though they had access to the same behavioral and situational cues did not duplicate the subjective probability predictions of involved subjects. The failure of observer subjects in the high-anticipated-effort condition to make the same (dissonance reducing) response for a target person as they do for themselves suggests that the self-perception model is not a wholly satisfactory explanatory alternative to dissonance reduction. Since subjects did not engage in any overt behavior, they almost certainly did not infer their beliefs by reflecting on behavior that had not occurred. And since the accompanying stimulus variables were identical for subjects in both their involved and observer capacities, inferences drawn from such cues would have to be identical for oneself and a target person. Since there was manifestly no relationship between the subjediv bility predictions of involved and observer subjects, it becomes to attribute what appears to be dissonance reduction to sim perception. It should be noted that the question which observer subjects v~ere asked in this study might not, strictly speaking, be thought to constitute an interpersonal replication. As involved subjects, our subjects were asked “Which of the two tests do you think you will write?" As observer subjects, they were asked “Pick the person seated three seats away from you in any direction: Which of the two tests do you think he will write?” et interpersonal replication, in the sense that Jones et al. and
314
ARROWOOD,
WOOD,
AND
ROSS
have used the term, would have asked “Which of the two’ tests do you think he thinks he will write?” Although it is easy to imagine conditions in which what I think is likely to happen toI another person differs radically from what he thinks is likely to happen to him, it is difficult to imagine those conditions operative in the present experiment. Given that the observer subjects neither know the target person7 nor have observed him do anything from which they might infer his beliefs, under what circumstances could they legitimately say “If you ask me what I think is going to happen to him, I’d say X; but if you ask me what I think he thinks, I’d say Y”? Since prior familiarity with the target person and present observation ‘of his behavior have both been ruled out, the major basis of inference remaining is differential information (i.e., “I know something that he doesn’t”). This possibility, however, has also been eliminated by virtue of the present experimental design. Observer subjects and their respective target persons (who are, by design, observers of someone else) are exposed to the same instructions in the same setting at the same time. Consequently, it is highly improbable that observer subjects could be thought to have, or think themselves to have, information which is unavailable to a target person. Thus, the self-perception position provides no grounds for supposing that observer subjects would have responded any differently to a question about what they think a target person predicts for himself than to the question about what they predict for that target person. Grounds for supposing such a difference, however, are suggested from quite a different quarter. Had our observer subjects been asked which test they thought the target person had predicted for himself, it is possible that they might simply have projected their own beliefs onto the target person-i.e., “I guess he probably feels the same way that I do.” Projection, then, could produce a difference between what the observer subjects in fact said and what they might have said in response to this latter question. But the projection hypothesis gives no clue as to how or why involved subjects would predict as they have been shown to do for themselves or why observer subjects would predict as they did for the target person. Nor does the projection hypothesis give any comfort to the self-perception position. To contend ‘2 infer his b’eliefs from my beliefs,” although it may well be true in some circumstances, is rather distant from Bern’s original point of departure. Finally, we do not wish to deny that there are circumstances in which “an individual’s attitude statements may be viewed as inferences from “This
was
verified
by
an item
on the postexperimental
questionnaire.
COg~itiZX?
COGSITIVE
DI§SOi?JAIS~
315
observations of his own overt behavior and its accompanying stimulus variables” (Bern, 1967, p. 186). Indeed, this latter source of information is precisely what we believe to account for the responses of involved subjects in the low.-anticipated-effort condition and of observer subjects ieting for themin both conditions. Only when the subjects wero selves, and then only under conditions of high a there any tendency to predict the preparation-relevant cases, the random distribution of outcomes, signalled by the external stimulus situation, was reflected in the subjective probability es obtained. This pattern of data strongly suggests that involved s in the high-anticipated effort condition were responding to motivational pressure rather than merely processing information. Bern stipulates a side condition to the effect that one’s attitude statements may be viewed as cited above “to the extent that internal stimu are not controlling” (p, 186). If Bern is willing to include among sue internal stimuli the stimulus consequences of “an aversive motivational drive toward consistency” (p. 183)) then we are in full accord with REFERENCES AmKmXron, A. J., & ROSS, L. Anticipated Effort and subjective probability. Jourrral of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4, 57-64. BEM, D, J. An experimental analysis of self-persuasion. Journal of Experimenti S&d Psychology, 1965, 1, 199L218. BEM, D. j. Self-perception: an alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. Psychological Review, 1967, 14, 183-200. BEM, D. Jo The epistemological status of interpersonal simulations: A reply to Jones, Linder, Kiesler, Zanna, and Brehm. JournaE of Experimental Social Psychology, 1968, 4, 270-274. CHAFANIS, N. P., h CBAPANIS, A. Cognitive dissonance: f&e years later, Psychological Bulletin, 1964, 61, l-22. FWMNGEX, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1957. JOHNSON, H. H., & STEINER, I. D. Effort and subjective probability. Jownai of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 365-368. JONES, R. A., LINDER, D. E., KIESLER, C. A., ZANNA, M,, & BREHM, J. W. Xntemai states or external stimuli: observers’ attitude judgments and the dissonance-theory -self-persnasion controversy. IomxaE of Experimental SGC&~ Psychology, 1968, 4, 247-269. KEZLEY, H. H. Attribution theory in social psychology, In D. Levine (Ed. ), Nebraska symposium on motioation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967, ~1~. 192-238. YARYAN, R. B, & FESTINGER, L. Preparatory action and belief in the probable occurrence of future events. Journal of AbnomnaE arrd Social Psychology, 1961, 63, 603-606. (Received
June
23,
1969)
OF
Dissonance,
EXPERIMENTAL
SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY
Self-Perception,
A Study A.
( 1970)
and the Perception
in Cognitive JOHN
6, 304-315
Cognitive
ARROWOOD University
AND
LINDA
of Others:
Dissonance1 WOODY
of Toronto AND
LEE Ross Stanford
Utllversity
Subjects were simultaneously involved participants in a dissonance experiment and observers of other participants. As involved subjects, those who expected to expend a great deal of effort preparing for a test which they might not have to take showed high subjective probability that they personally would take the test. As observer subjects answering the same question for the person seated three seats away, they showed no such respons veness to the manipulation of anticipated effort. The apparent demonstration of dissonance reduction by subjects who engaged in no overt behavior from which to infer their beiiefs challanges Rem’s (1965, 19837) self-perception interpretation of what others have regarded as dijsonance reduction. The fai!ure of observer subjects to duplicate the subjective probability responses of involved subjects under identical stimulus condit;ons poses further problems for Bern’s self-perception model. The data suggest the subjective response to an aversive motivationa! state rather than simple selfperception.
Bern (19~65; 1967) h as argued that the self-descriptive statements which provide the dependent variable data in most cognitive dissonance experiments can be understood without reference to dissonance or its reduction. If a person makes inferences about his attitudes or beliefs by observing his own behavior-in the same way that he makes inferences about the beliefs of others by observing their behavior-then it may be, ‘This research was supported by grants from the Ontario Mental Health Foundation (110) and the Defence Research Board of Canada (9465-11). We thank Miss Lorraine Wood for assistance in gathering the data, Drs. Leyla de Toledo and and Donald Dutton and Robert Lake Abraham Ross for aid in recruiting subjects, for a critical analysis of many of the points raised. ‘Now at the University of Michigan.
304
as Bern suggests, “unnecessary to postulate an aversive motivational drive toward consistency to account for the attitude change phenomena observed” (1967, p. 183). Th e “interpersonal replications” or “interpersonal simulations” of several representative dissonance experiments (Bern, 1967, 1968; nes, Linder, Kiesler, Zanna, & Brehm, NSS), rather than resolvi the matter, have instead raised certain qrestions about what one must simulate in order to replicate. That one can infer the attitudes (beliefs, expectations, evaluations) held by other people from their behavior and its snrrounding circumstances is one of the cornerstones of social psychological research. And Bern’s proposal that self-perception may be a special cas in which the perceiver and the perceived are the same vocative and, in the more general context of attribution I967), a parsimonious position. It is not, however, a position that renders the concept of dissonance unnecessary. Festinger’s initial statement of dissonance theory defined cognition. or cognitiz).e element as “any knowledge, opinion, or belief about the environment, about oneself, or about one’s behavior” ( 1957, p. 3)) and then proceeded to define dissonance in terms of a particular kind of relationship between cognitions. The currently disputed “forced compliance” an “‘free choice” experiments have demonstrated &at one’s actions-or, mor properly, one’s cognitions involving those actions-are capable of influencing some of the attitudes, beliefs, and expectations related to those actions. In these experiments, if dissonance has been produced at all, it has been produced because the subject has something-made a choice, argued counterattitudinally, or the like. ugh doing something and thinking about it later falls well witbin omain of Fes tinger’s definition, it is certainly not the only way of generating a cognition (which cou1.d then stand in a dissonant relationship with another cogn‘tion). It is, however, one of the few ways of doing so which woul permit Bern’s self-perception interpretation of what other investigators have regarded as dissonance reduction. Thus, if a subject could be placed in a state of dissonance without his having to do anything, it would be difficult to interpret any changes in belief to simple self-perception. The subject would be bard put to infer his beliefs from his behavior if he had not engaged in any overt behavior.3 Similarly, and contrary to Bern’s analysis of other instances of apparent dissonance reduction, “‘observer” subjects would find it extremely difficult to duplicate the (dissonance reducing) attitude statements of %n~olved’ 3 Bern views an individual’s attitude statements of his own behavior and its accompanying stinmlw added). We shall return to this latter consideration
as “inferences from observations ~akzbles” (1967, p, 1X6, italics below.
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subjects. To ask an observer about the beliefs of another person (stranger) when there is no behavior to observe is almost certain to produce the response “How should I know?” An experimental setting in which dissonance can be produced without overt behavior has been reported by Arrowood and Ross ( 1966). Their study was an extension of earlier work by Yaryan and Festinger ( 1961). Yaryan and Festinger found that subjects who had exerted a great deal of effort (memorizing a set of symbolic definitions) in preparation for a possible future event (an IQ test) believed more strongly in the likelihood of that event (that they would take the test) than did subjects who had engaged in a less effortful preparation. Arrowood and Ross found that it was not necessary for the subject actually to engage in the effortful preparation, and that the mere anticipation of expending effort was sufficient to increase the subject’s belief that he personally would take the test. After hearing descriptions of two high-powered IQ tests, all subjects were told that they would engage in preparation for one of the tests, but that only some of them (randomly selected) would be taking the test for which they would prepare; the others would be writing the second test, for which their preparation would be irrelevant. One group of subjects was led to believe that their preparation would be relatively effortful; the other, that it would be relatively easy. Those subjects who anticipated an effortful preparation believed that they personally would take the test for which their preparation would be relevant, even though they believed that, for their group as a whole, half would take one test and half the other. In the vocabulary of the interpersonal replication argument, all the Arrowood and Ross subjects were involved subjects in that they were asked to indicate their subjective likelihood that they personally would write a given test. It would be possible, however, to convert them into observer subjects simply by asking them to indicate, in addition to the above, the subjective likelihood that some other specific person in the same room would write a given test. Thus, a single subject could be both “involved” (when predicting for himself) and “observer” (when predicting for another person). Since involved and observer subjects would be “under the same skin,” questions as to the salience of initial attitudes and other phenomenological similarities or differences between involved and observer subjects could be avoided (cf. Jones et al., 196S, pp. 26266; Bern, 1968, p. 271). Whatever the salient situational cues might be, they would be identical for both involved and observer subjects. If Bern’s self-perception model is correct, then involved and observer subjects should give identical subjective probability responses under
CO@‘iitifW
COGNITIVE
DISSONANCE
3cu
conditions of high anticipated effort. More specifically, subjects who expect to engage in an effortful preparation for a test which they might or might not have to write (a) will believe themselves relatively likely to write that test,4 and (6) will make the same subjective probabihty prediction for some other specific person in the same circumstances. If (a) is confirmed and (b) is not, then we may reject the self-perception hypothesis that involved subjects have inferred their beliefs from their own behavior and the characteristics of the situation, and not in o to reduce an aversive motivational state-since observable behavior be nil and situational characteristics will be identical for both involved and observer subjects. METHOD With one major addition, the procedures of this study duplicate those of Arrowood and Ross. The experiment was described to subjects as one aimed at assessing further the validity of two newly developed and highly regarded IQ tests, both designed to eliminate the “built-in language bias” and “other important difficulties” in standard IQ tests. All subjects were told that they would prepare for one of the tests, but that only some of them would be taking the prepared-for test; the rest would be taking the other test, for which their preparation would be irrelevant. One group of subjects was l’ed to believe that their preparation would be’ relatively effortful; the other, that it would be relatively effortless. The dependent variable of interest was subjective probability-defined here as the likelihood expressed by a subject that ho (involved subjects) or some other specific person (observer subjects) would be taking the preparation-relevant test rather than the other test. A total of 68 University of Toronto undergraduates, 30 men and 38 women, were assigned at random to the two experimental conditions. Fragmentary data from five g to their failure to comsubjects, one man and four women, were discarded plete the postexperimental questionnaire. Subjects recruited for what was described to them as a “%hour group testing session”’ and participated in the experiment in two large groups, corresponding to the twu values of the manipulated variable, anticipated effortfuhress of preparation, Upon entering the experimental room, subjects were told to sit “anywhere you please” but not to disturb the small index card taped face downward to each lecture desk. They were promised that the reason for this procedure would be explained to them shortly, After delivering a general introduction emphasizing the importance of developing IQ tests which are reasonably free of “language subtleties,” the experimenter explained: “All of you will be writing one of the two IQ tests which I will describe in just ‘This is simply a prediction that the Arrowood and Ross results will replicate and, as such, is not contingent on the adequacy of the self-perception model. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the self-perception model would predict the obtained relationship between anticipated effort and subjective probability for involved subjects, quite apart from what it must predict for observer subjects. ‘In keeping with the experimental “cover story” that the study was concerned with I@ testing, only those subjects who had 2 consecutive free honrs (presumably sufficient time to take a test) were recruited.
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a moment. Some of you will be writing the Wisconsin General Intelligence Bat&y or WGIB (experimenter points to a large pile of test booklets on his desk), while others will be writing the Iowa Intelligence Classification Test or IICT (experimenter points to another pile of papers of equal size), Which test you will take has been determined completely by chance. The little white card which you see taped to your lecture desk indicates which of the tests you will take, and when you are asked to turn it over you will find this out. Since you could have sat in any seat YOU wished, you can see that the tests have been assigned in a purely random fashion.” The description of the (fictitious) WGIB was identical for all subjects. The test was purportedly designed to be “just as difficult for individuals who have large vocabularies and extensive familiarities with English as it will for those who lack this language proficiency.” Although the test items themselves would be ask-d in English, none would involve such “verbally biased” techniques as the interpretation of prose passages or the selection of synonyms or antonyms, Instead, the test items would include “such tasks as probability inference and concept integration” (both purposely left undefined). It was in the description of the (equally fictitious) IICT that the manipulation of anticipated effort occurred. Both groups were told that a preparation would be required for the IICT but differed in their instructions regarding the effortfulness of the preparation. In order to estabhsh th- high-anticipated-effort condition, the experimenter said: “The IICT is also an intelligence test which attempts in a markedly different fashion to eliminate the effects that differences in language familiarity and expsrience introduce into standard IQ testing procedures. Testees are provided with a system of symbols, relations, and rules for the manipulation of these symbols, which they must memorize. This process of memorization requires considerable concentration and a willingness to do some work. The memorizing itself is not really difficult but, as I said, requires close concentration. In any case, you will be given ample time to memorize the symbol system and you will not have to attempt the test until you are satisfied that you have memorized the system completely. Most students find it takes them at least 30 or 35 minutes. Once this preparation is completed, you will use this symbol system in solving the problems that comprise the IICT. Let me make it clear that this is not a mathematical system and there is absolutely no mathematics involved in the IICT.” The instructions in the low-anticipated-effort condition were identical to those above in every respect but the following: “Testees are provided with a set of symbols, relations and rules for the manipulation of these symbols. I will give each of you a sheet with the symbol system on it. Read it over once when you get it-but don’t worry about trying to memorize it, since you will have the sheet in front of you duriog the test, The IICT will consist of problems that are to be solved using only these symbols and the rules for their manipulation.” On the grounds that “any meaningful comparison” necessitated that everyone engage in “the same kind of behavior” immediately prior to testing, all subjects would ba required to memorize (high anticipated effort) or read over (low anticipated effort) the IICT symbol system. “Of course,” the experimenter continued, “if you are among those taking the WGIB, this preparation will not have anything to do with your test; on the other hand, it won’t be detrimental to your performance either.”
CO&V&X?
COGNITIVE
309
DISSONANCE
Before receiving the symbol system for study, subjects were asked to HE out a us something about the atbrief and anonymous questionnaire designed to “tell Attention was directed to the anonymity titudes students hold regarding IQ tests.” of the questionnaire. “We do this to encourage frankness, since our interest is in group data. A knowledge of group data aids us in analyzing group performance.“’ The questionnaire inquired into, in turn, subfeec-tiue pro&&&y (“Which of the two IQ tests do you think you will write?“); “obiectiz;e” pwbabili& (“What percentage of the people present will write the WGIB? The IICT?“); preference between and relative difficulty and relative value of the two tests; relative ease or difficulty of the pretest preparation; observer subjective probabililzj (“Pick the person seated three seats away from you in any direction: Which of the two tests do you think he will write?‘); pills a final open-ended request for comments “about the study so far.” With the exception of the question on objective probability, which required a percentage estimate, all questions followed a six-step, forced-choice format. When the questionnaires had been completed, the experiment was over. Subjects were thoroughly debriefed and asked not to talk about the study to other potential partic:pants. Ko subject evidenced either suspicion or prior knowledge of the esperiment, even though a third of them wrote some comment in response to the tipen-ended questionnaire item. RESULTS
Anticipated
Effort
Before considering the data on subjective probability, it would be well to note briefly those data which verify the effectiveness of the manipulation of anticipated effort. After having responded to’ several items about the two IQ tests themselves, subjects were asked “‘Wow easy or difficult do you think the pretest preparation (symbol system) will be?“-the six alternatives for which ranged from “very easy” throug “very difficult.” Of the 32 subjects who received the high-anticipatedeffort instructions, 81% anticipated a preparation that was either “slightly,” “somewhat,” or “very difficult.” For the 31 subjects given the lowanticipated-effort instructions, the comparable figure was 48%. This difference is statistically significant (x2 = 7.48, p < .01)6 and similar to the E-53% difference found by Arrowood and Ross. As expected, then, memorizing a set of symbols was viewed, in antieipation, as more diEicult than merely reading them over.
Subjective
Probability-Involved
Subjects
The first hypothesis under test is that subjects who are led to anti an effortful preparation for the IICT will expect to write this test than the WGIB. Subjects who are led to anticipate a relatively less effortful preparation should display no such tendency. The critical questionnaire item was “which of the two tests do you think you will write?” ‘All
probability
values
reported
are
based
on two-tailed
tests.
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-the six alternatives for which ranged from “IICT fairly certain” through “WGIB fairly certain.” Responses to this item are summarized in Table 1. Of the 32 subjects in the high-anticipated-effort condition, 26 (81%) expected to write the test for which their preparation would be relevant, while only 6 expected the other test. Within the high-anticipated-effort condition, then, significantly more subjects expected to take the test for which they will h’ave to prepare than expected to take the other test for which their preparation would be irrelevant (sign test, p < .OOl ). Among subjects led to anticipate a less effortful preparation, there was virtually no difference in test expectation (sign test, p > .25). A comparison of the two conditions reveals a statistically significant difIerence in subjective probability (x2 = 6.22, p < .02). In other words, high-anticipatedeffort subjects were more likely than were their low-anticipated-effort counterparts to expect to write the IICT. This finding is, if anything, slightly stronger than the effect obtained by Arrowood and ROSS. Objective
Probability
Although these data are consistent with the dissonance position, they do not preclude alternative interpretation. It is possible, for example, that the instructions given in the high-anticipated-effort condition led subjects to believe that the vast majority of those present would be taking the IICT. Thus, for a subject to predict that he, personally, would do so might not reflect dissonance reduction but, rather, an inference based on situational cues-namely “We all must be going to take the IICT because we are all going to prepare for it.” This interpretation, consistent with Bern’s position, is essentially the one which Chapanis and Chapanis (1964) and Johnson and Steiner (1965) make of the original Yaryan and Festinger data. And, since the present instructions were silent on the matter of objective probability, the subjects could have arrived at this conclusion-though the experimenter’s gesture and reference to two equally large piles of “tests” should have suggested to most subjects that the two tests would be distributed in equal numbers.
SUBJECTIVE Two
PROBABILITY-INVOLVED TESTS WERE EXPECTED
TABLE 1 SUBJECTS: FREQUENCIES BY SUBJECTS IN THE Two Exepcted
IICT
Condition High Low
anticipated anticipated
effort effort
(preparation-relevant)
26 (81%) 16 &$6’0)
WITH WHICH CONDITIONS
test WGIB
6 (lQ%‘,) 15 (48%)
THE
Cognitive
COGNITIVE
DXSSONASCE
311
The postexperimental questionnaire provided data relevant to this argument. Subjects were asked to estimate the percentage “of the people present” who would be ‘taking each of the two tests. Of the 32 subjects in the high-anticipated-effort condition, 9 thought the IICT would be written by the majority of their group, 4 thought the WGIB would be written by the majority, and 19 thought each test would be written by exactly half their group. On the average, subjects in this condition thought that 52% of their number would write the IICT and 48% write the WGIB. These percentage estimates do not differ signi from 30% (t < 1). Of the 31 subjects in the low-anticipated-effort condition, 5 thought the majority of their group would write the IICT, 5 thought the majority would write the WGIB, and 21 thought the two tests would be written in equal numbers. On the average, subjects in this condition estimated that the IICT would be written by exactly half and the WGIB by the other half of their number. Thus, although subjects in both conditions believed that their objective chances of writing either test were about the same; those subjects led to anticipate an effort&l preparation for one of the tests nevertheless believed that they, personally, would probably be taking the test for which they will have prepared. Subjective
Probability-Observer
Subjects
The second hypothesis under test is a contingent one. If self-perception is what accounts for the subjective probability predictions of involved subjects, then observer subjects should generate predictions that are indistinguishable from those of their involved counterparts. On the other hand, if the subjective probability predictions of involved subjects reflect dissonance reduction, then observer subjects should not be able to duplicate them. More specifically, under the dissonance hypothesis, observer subjects should not predict that a specified other person (target person) who anticipates an effortful preparation is any more likely to write the preparation-relevant test than the ‘other test. Nor should there be any systematic relationship between the test which subjects predict when they are involved (predicting for themselves) and when they are observers (predicting for the target person). The relevant questionnaire item was “Pick the person seated three seats away from you in any direction: Which of the two tests do you think he will write?-the six alternatives for which were ident those above. Responses to this item are summarized in Table 2. 32 subjects in the high-anticipated-effort condition, 17 (53%) predicted that the target person would write the IICT; the remaining 15 thought that he would write the other test. The corresponding figures for the
312
ARROWOOD,
SUBJECTIVE PROBABILITY-OBSERVER Two TESTS WERE PREDICTED
WOOD,
AND
TABLE 2 SUBJECTS: FOR A TARGET Two CONDITIONS
ROSS
FREQUENCIES WITH WHICH THE PERSON BY SUBJECTS IN THE
Predicted Condition High Low
IICT
anticipated anticipated
effort effort
Test
(preparation-relevant)
WGIB
17 (53%)
15 (47%) 15 (48%)
16 (52%)
low-anticipated-effort condition are 16 (52%) and 15. None of these estimates differs significantly from 50%. Table 3 displays the same data ca:egorized with respect to whether the test predicted for the target person was the same as or different from the one predicted for oneself. Once aglin, none of the figures differs significantly from 50%. Finally, it may be instructive to juxtapose the responses of involved subjects (Table 1) with those of the same people serving as observer subjects (Table 3’). Of the 26 high-anticipated-effort subjects who expected to write the IICT (Table 1, upper left cell), 14 predicted the same test for the target person and 12 predicted the other test. The 6 high-anticipated-effort subjects who expected to write the WGIB divided 3 and 3 when predicting for the target person. Of the 16 lowanticipated-effort subjects who expected to write the IICT, 9 predicted the same test for the target person and 7 predicted the other test. The 1.5 low-anticipated-effort subjects who expected to write the WGIB divided 8 (same test) and 7 when predicting for the target person. In no case, then, is there any hint of a systematic relationship between what one predicts for oneself and what one predicts for “the other guy.”
Other Measures In addition to providing data on the success of the manipulation the tenability of the hypotheses, the postexperimental questionnaire
RELATION
BETWEEN
SUBJECTIVE
TABLE 3 PROBABILITY FOR ONESELF PERSON Predicted Same
Condition High anticipated Low anticipated
effort effort
li
as self (53%)
17 (55%)
and con-
AND FOR A TARGET
test Different 15 (47%) 14 (45%)
Cognitive
INCITIVE
DISS~~-C.~NCE
313
tamed three items included to increase the p~a~sibil~ty of the questionnaire and to ascertain whether the high- and low~a~tici~~ted-e~o~t conditions differed in other than the predicted respects One question concerned the relative difficulty of the two tests: another their re value, and the third the subjects’ preference between them. In no ease was there a significant difference between conditions in response to these questions; nor did these variables interact either with subjective probability or with each other. DISCUSSION
In replicating the findings reported by Arrowood and Ross, the data presented above provide strong support for the dissonance hypothesis that anticipated effort can affect subjective probability: subjects who anticipated an effortful preparation believed that they personally would take the test for which their preparation would be relevant. That we may call this a dissonance hypothesis derives from two other findings: first, that involved subjects, even though they expected individually to write tie preparation-relevant test; believed that the two tests would be given out in equal numbers to their group; second, that observer subjects, even though they had access to the same behavioral and situational cues did not duplicate the subjective probability predictions of involved subjects. The failure of observer subjects in the high-anticipated-effort condition to make the same (dissonance reducing) response for a target person as they do for themselves suggests that the self-perception model is not a wholly satisfactory explanatory alternative to dissonance reduction. Since subjects did not engage in any overt behavior, they almost certainly did not infer their beliefs by reflecting on behavior that had not occurred. And since the accompanying stimulus variables were identical for subjects in both their involved and observer capacities, inferences drawn from such cues would have to be identical for oneself and a target person. Since there was manifestly no relationship between the subjediv bility predictions of involved and observer subjects, it becomes to attribute what appears to be dissonance reduction to sim perception. It should be noted that the question which observer subjects v~ere asked in this study might not, strictly speaking, be thought to constitute an interpersonal replication. As involved subjects, our subjects were asked “Which of the two tests do you think you will write?" As observer subjects, they were asked “Pick the person seated three seats away from you in any direction: Which of the two tests do you think he will write?” et interpersonal replication, in the sense that Jones et al. and
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AND
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have used the term, would have asked “Which of the two’ tests do you think he thinks he will write?” Although it is easy to imagine conditions in which what I think is likely to happen toI another person differs radically from what he thinks is likely to happen to him, it is difficult to imagine those conditions operative in the present experiment. Given that the observer subjects neither know the target person7 nor have observed him do anything from which they might infer his beliefs, under what circumstances could they legitimately say “If you ask me what I think is going to happen to him, I’d say X; but if you ask me what I think he thinks, I’d say Y”? Since prior familiarity with the target person and present observation ‘of his behavior have both been ruled out, the major basis of inference remaining is differential information (i.e., “I know something that he doesn’t”). This possibility, however, has also been eliminated by virtue of the present experimental design. Observer subjects and their respective target persons (who are, by design, observers of someone else) are exposed to the same instructions in the same setting at the same time. Consequently, it is highly improbable that observer subjects could be thought to have, or think themselves to have, information which is unavailable to a target person. Thus, the self-perception position provides no grounds for supposing that observer subjects would have responded any differently to a question about what they think a target person predicts for himself than to the question about what they predict for that target person. Grounds for supposing such a difference, however, are suggested from quite a different quarter. Had our observer subjects been asked which test they thought the target person had predicted for himself, it is possible that they might simply have projected their own beliefs onto the target person-i.e., “I guess he probably feels the same way that I do.” Projection, then, could produce a difference between what the observer subjects in fact said and what they might have said in response to this latter question. But the projection hypothesis gives no clue as to how or why involved subjects would predict as they have been shown to do for themselves or why observer subjects would predict as they did for the target person. Nor does the projection hypothesis give any comfort to the self-perception position. To contend ‘2 infer his b’eliefs from my beliefs,” although it may well be true in some circumstances, is rather distant from Bern’s original point of departure. Finally, we do not wish to deny that there are circumstances in which “an individual’s attitude statements may be viewed as inferences from “This
was
verified
by
an item
on the postexperimental
questionnaire.
COg~itiZX?
COGSITIVE
DI§SOi?JAIS~
315
observations of his own overt behavior and its accompanying stimulus variables” (Bern, 1967, p. 186). Indeed, this latter source of information is precisely what we believe to account for the responses of involved subjects in the low.-anticipated-effort condition and of observer subjects ieting for themin both conditions. Only when the subjects wero selves, and then only under conditions of high a there any tendency to predict the preparation-relevant cases, the random distribution of outcomes, signalled by the external stimulus situation, was reflected in the subjective probability es obtained. This pattern of data strongly suggests that involved s in the high-anticipated effort condition were responding to motivational pressure rather than merely processing information. Bern stipulates a side condition to the effect that one’s attitude statements may be viewed as cited above “to the extent that internal stimu are not controlling” (p, 186). If Bern is willing to include among sue internal stimuli the stimulus consequences of “an aversive motivational drive toward consistency” (p. 183)) then we are in full accord with REFERENCES AmKmXron, A. J., & ROSS, L. Anticipated Effort and subjective probability. Jourrral of Personality and Social Psychology, 1966, 4, 57-64. BEM, D, J. An experimental analysis of self-persuasion. Journal of Experimenti S&d Psychology, 1965, 1, 199L218. BEM, D. j. Self-perception: an alternative interpretation of cognitive dissonance phenomena. Psychological Review, 1967, 14, 183-200. BEM, D. Jo The epistemological status of interpersonal simulations: A reply to Jones, Linder, Kiesler, Zanna, and Brehm. JournaE of Experimental Social Psychology, 1968, 4, 270-274. CHAFANIS, N. P., h CBAPANIS, A. Cognitive dissonance: f&e years later, Psychological Bulletin, 1964, 61, l-22. FWMNGEX, L. A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford: Stanford Univ. Press, 1957. JOHNSON, H. H., & STEINER, I. D. Effort and subjective probability. Jownai of Personality and Social Psychology, 1965, 1, 365-368. JONES, R. A., LINDER, D. E., KIESLER, C. A., ZANNA, M,, & BREHM, J. W. Xntemai states or external stimuli: observers’ attitude judgments and the dissonance-theory -self-persnasion controversy. IomxaE of Experimental SGC&~ Psychology, 1968, 4, 247-269. KEZLEY, H. H. Attribution theory in social psychology, In D. Levine (Ed. ), Nebraska symposium on motioation. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1967, ~1~. 192-238. YARYAN, R. B, & FESTINGER, L. Preparatory action and belief in the probable occurrence of future events. Journal of AbnomnaE arrd Social Psychology, 1961, 63, 603-606. (Received
June
23,
1969)