Divide and conquer—Discursive agency in the politics of illegal logging in the United States

Global Environmental Change 36 (2016) 35–45

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Divide and conquer—Discursive agency in the politics of illegal logging in the United States Sina Leipolda,* , Georg Winkela,b a Forest and Environmental Policy Group, Institute of Environmental Social Sciences and Geography, University of Freiburg, Tennenbacherstr. 4, 79106 Freiburg i. Br., Germany b European Forest Institute, Yliopistokatu 6, 80100 Joensuu, Finland

A R T I C L E I N F O

A B S T R A C T

Article history: Received 10 December 2014 Received in revised form 16 October 2015 Accepted 20 November 2015 Available online 4 December 2015

In 2008 the US amended the century-old US Lacey Act to prohibit the import of illegally harvested or traded timber. Together with similar policies in the EU and Australia, this initialized a paradigm shift in global forest governance towards a legality (verification) regime that could substantially contribute to environmental and social stewardship in the forest sector. The analysis of the formation and implementation of these new policies in the US, Europe and Australia is, however, only just beginning. Based on 31 semi-structured interviews with key stakeholders, 19 informal conversations, more than 100 documents, and participant observation data, we analyze the policy making and implementation of the 2008 US Lacey Act amendment. Our results suggest two essential drivers for this policy change: (1) the deployment of discursive divide-and-conquer strategies and (2) a shift away from sustainability to legality, on both the international level and in the US. Based on the Discursive Agency Approach, we illustrate how carefully deployed discursive and governance strategies were crucial for building a coalition between environmentalists and parts of the wood (products) industry. This coalition was able to create a powerful storyline that muted the opposition and presented a politically attractive amendment proposal. We further show how these strategies have significant effects on the perception of the amended Lacey Act and its implementation. During implementation, coalitions as well as discursive and governance strategies shifted substantially but were still determined by the pre-amendment policy discourse. We conclude by exploring the importance of our findings for what we might expect from the concept of legality in global forest and environmental governance. ã 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Forest policy Lacey act Discursive Agency Approach Implementation Legality verification Forest governance

1. Introduction Global forest policy is portrayed as being in a constant crisis caused by a discrepancy between alarming problems (deforestation, unsustainable management) and (only) weak policies (Humphreys, 2006; Hudson and Weinthal, 2009). This situation is often attributed to the resistance of states with an economically important forest industry sector, such as the United States (US), Brazil or Indonesia, against international legally binding agreements on forests (Davenport, 2005; Dimitrov, 2005; Hudson and Weinthal, 2009). Against this background, the recent evolution in global illegal logging policy is remarkable. In 2008 the US introduced a law prohibiting the import of timber harvested or traded in violation of

* Corresponding author. Fax: +49 7612033705. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S. Leipold), Georg.Winkel@efi.int (G. Winkel). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2015.11.006 0959-3780/ ã 2015 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

domestic laws of any country involved—the Legal Timber Protection Act (LTPA), which amended the US Lacey Act of 1900. With this amendment, the US was the first to institutionalize a paradigm shift in global forest policy from international soft law and voluntary measures towards domestic law that targets a restructuring of global trade flows for environmental and social benefits. Soon after the adoption of the LTPA, the European Union and Australia adopted similar laws (respectively, the 2010 EU Timber Regulation and the 2012 Illegal Logging Prohibition Act). This development triggered an academic debate. Some scholars formulate substantial expectations, including the promotion of “environmental and social stewardship in the forest sector” (Cashore and Stone, 2012: 1), environmental norm-setting that reinforces private governance schemes such as forest certification (Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2013; Kistenkas, 2013; Cashore and Stone, 2012), and the creation of an effective global forest-governance patchwork or global legality regime (Bartley, 2014) to potentially address the lack of a global forest convention (Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2014). Other researchers are more skeptical and point out

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that these policies could possibly reward “countries with lax forestry laws or encourag[e] governments to weaken their laws” (Bartley, 2014: 105) in order to narrow the legal space for illegality or could “negatively impact key dimensions of sustainability” (Lesniewska and McDermott, 2014: 7). Some even expect adverse effects such as “disproportionate burdens on smallholders,” which drive them “deeper into illegality” (McDermott et al., 2014: 8). In their assessments, however, both skeptics and optimists implicitly rely on the assumptions that these new policies (a) are aiming to achieve sustainable forest management at the global level and (b) are effectively implemented. These black-box assumptions are understandable as the focus of most studies is on (other) countries seen as affected by these policies (e.g., Bartley (2014) on China and Indonesia, McDermott et al. (2014) on Brazil, Lesniewska and McDermott (2014) on Ghana and Indonesia, Cashore and Stone (2012) on China, Indonesia and also the US). We believe that by opening up these black boxes and shedding light on the respective policy making and implementation, much can be learned regarding their potential global effects. Given that the US LTPA was the first of these laws, we focus on this case. It has been predominantly legal scholars who have scrutinized the LTPA. They focus on its legal scope and interpretation (e.g., Saltzman, 2010; Tanczos, 2011; Pryce, 2012; Dieterle, 2012) and its legal ramifications in light of international measures against illegal logging (Waite, 2011). In addition, an economic analysis of the LTPA’s trade effects has recently been published (Prestemon, 2015). However, the political science analysis of the formation and implementation of the LTPA (and its equivalents in Europe and Australia) is only just beginning (Cashore and Stone, 2012, 2014; Overdevest and Zeitlin, 2013). Tanczos (2011) was the first to examine the LTPA policy-making process. On the basis of Congressional documents, he hypothesizes that a so-called Baptistbootlegger coalition (cf. Yandle,1983) of environmental and industry groups pushed for the LTPA. Emphasizing the role of the US wood (products) industry in this coalition, Tanczos argues protectionist interests were the major reason for the political support of the LTPA, which he conceives much less to be “intended to stop illegal logging” than “to tie up the competition” (p. 562). Quite differently, Cashore and Stone (2012, 2014) underline the influence of “a leading

environmental group” (Cashore and Stone, 2014: 56). Although they confirm the importance of a Baptist-bootlegger coalition for the LTPA’s passage, they describe the policy change as the result of a “striking development” that led to a “combination of [ . . . ] strategic changes” (p. 56). These development and changes, however, are not further specified, and the dynamics of the policy-making process remain largely unexplored. Specifically, it is unclear (1) how an environmental group and domestic timber producers could jointly nationalize a global policy challenge; (2) how they were able to overcome opposition from the importing industry, the “largest importer [at the time] of secondary tropical hardwood products in the world” (Duery and Vlosky, 2006: 2); and (3) how implementation of the law and its effectiveness are perceived and how this fuels the ongoing policy-making process. In this paper we tackle these questions from a policy-discourse perspective. We first provide an empirical analysis of US policy making related to the adoption of the LTPA, including the (global) agenda setting and the discursive nationalization of the policy issue (Section 4.1). Second, we analyze the politics during implementation in relation to the perceived effects of the law (Section 4.2). We then draw conclusions regarding the research questions and the potential effects on global forest governance (Sections 5 and 6). 2. The Discursive Agency Approach This paper draws upon the tradition of interpretive policy analysis (cf. Fischer and Forester, 1993; Yanow, 2000; Hajer, 1995, 2006; Winkel, 2014), which has recently gained prominence in forest policy research (e.g., Arts and Buizer, 2009; Somorin et al., 2012; Van Heeswijk and Turnhout, 2013). Specifically, we apply the Discursive Agency Approach (DAA; for a detailed discussion of the approach see Leipold and Winkel (2015)). The DAA is an analytical heuristic that shares the basic perspective of interpretive policy analysis, which considers policy making to be a continuous struggle over establishing political truths. In this view, political truths are formed and expressed through policy discourses, which the DAA conceives of in line with Hajer’s (1995) influential definition as a “set of object definitions and associated subject positions that are connected

1.

Coalion building refers to a dynamic process. Coalions are fluid in membership and do not necessarily coordinate acvies beyond sharing a similar storyline (Hajer 1995).

2.

Discursive strategies encompass all language- and symbol-bound acvies that aim to create necessies for (specific) policy intervenon. These include, for example: a.

The producon of storylines: agents constantly interpret social, physical and discursive events in a manner that is consistent with their policy preferences.

b.

Raonalisaon and scienficaon versus emoonalizaon and polarizaon: agents may try to raonalize the debate (e.g. by employing the language of science) or polarize debates by mobilizing available emoonal paerns in a society.

c.

Exclusion strategies encompass the acve foreclosing or passive non-reference to a specific agent, problemazaon or policy soluon.

d.

Delegimaon strategies target a weakening of the opponents’ power by rendering them as illegimate.

e.

Employing normave power means the connecon of certain agents and policies with concepts that have a strong posive or negave connotaon in the overall polical discourse.

f.

Re- and de-issuing encompass the strategic re- (and de-)connecon of a policy issue to/from a specific policy (soluon) (cf. Kingdon 1984).

3.

Governance strategies target a restructuring of the governance arrangement to the advantage of a specific agent.

4.

Organizaonal strategies target the organizaon of the administraon and public management. Fig. 1. Typology of strategic practices in DAA (adapted from Leipold and Winkel, 2015: 14).

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through storylines which ascribe coherent meaning to social and physical phenomena that are considered subject to governance” (Leipold and Winkel, 2015, 13). Furthermore, the DAA specifically emphasizes the role of agency (actors) in discursive policy making. To present their specific political truth, stakeholders need to shape and take up subject positions. They need to define who they are in relation to the policy discourse and justify why they should have a voice. To define their subject position, stakeholders create storylines in which they present their interpretation of the issue and ascribe certain characteristics to agents (themselves and others). Characteristics include individual characteristics such as rhetoric skills, knowledge of an issue, commitment, experience etc. and positional characteristics such as professional position, mandates to act/decide and material resources. Since there are often many stakeholders involved, policy discourses are characterized by multiple storylines communicating competing truths. Accordingly, policy making is essentially about gaining ground as a relevant speaker in a struggle over interpretations. Being perceived as a relevant speaker offering a relevant political truth is what we understand as discursive agency. To achieve discursive agency, political stakeholders strategically ascribe to themselves a relevant subject position in relation to the political issue by defining their own characteristics and subsequently support this position and the connected political truth about the issue with what they say and do. We refer to this latter step as strategic practices. Fig. 1 provides an overview on possible types of strategic practices. 3. Methods Empirically, this paper is based on:  31 in-depth interviews (45–90 min each, recorded and transcribed) with the great majority of stakeholders directly involved in the 2008 Lacey Act amendment and its implementation (Appendix 1);  19 informal conservations with representatives from science, government, industry and NGOs (with notes and postscript, Appendix 1);  103 policy documents on the Lacey Act amendment and its implementation (e.g., testimonies at the US House of Representatives, expert studies, media articles);  Participant observation in a stakeholder meeting in December 2013. The data was gathered between August and December 2013 and was analyzed using deductive coding based on the categories provided by the DAA as well as inductive coding applying MAXQDA1. As several interviewees insisted that no link be made between their statements and names, direct quotes from interviewees are referenced with aggregated stakeholder categories (“I” = industry association/company, “E” = environmental/social NGOs, “G” = governmental institutions and “S” = scientific institutions, see Appendix 1). Statements supported by several interviewees are referenced with the number of interviewees from each category (e.g. “2I and 1E” for two representatives from industry and one from an environmental group). 4. Results 4.1. Policy making towards the Lacey Act amendment 4.1.1. Global agenda setting For a long time the term ‘illegal logging’ was taboo in international negotiations as no government was willing to

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recognize domestic illegal activities (cf. Humphreys, 2006). This changed when the US government officially placed the issue on the agenda of the 1997 G7 meeting. This initiative was furthered by the UK with the launch of the G8 “Action Programme on Forests” (G8, 1998, the G7 now including Russia), which assigned an entire chapter to illegal logging, making it a priority issue. In official communications the G8 portrayed illegal logging as predominantly happening in so-called producer countries, i.e., mostly tropical countries that supply hardwood (products) to socalled consumer countries, i.e., mostly the US or Europe (G8, 1998). This established a discursive divide between producers and consumers that—although implying a certain complicity of the latter—takes the logging practices in “consumer countries” off the agenda because these are not seen as having a problem with legality. One interviewee describes this as an important reason for the US initiative: “the US realized they had an issue that did not hurt them at home because illegal logging was not a big problem in the US [ . . . but] happening elsewhere” (E). Two interviewees even considered the launching of the issue a US strategy to undermine a more comprehensive global forest convention targeting all forests (1E and 1S). In any case, the multi-faceted nature of the problem—linked to deforestation and forest degradation, losses in tax revenue, unfair competition, corruption, conflict and poverty—soon attracted the interest of many states and stakeholder groups (2S, 2E, 2I, 1G). However, the discursive divide between producers and consumers attributed blame to the former for being unable to enforce their own laws. To avoid accepting sole blame for the problem, these countries subsequently framed illegal logging as a shared responsibility of “all countries, exporting and importing,” (Bali Declaration 2001). In this way, they nevertheless recognized the problem and allowed the discursive divide into producers and consumers. Our data and the literature suggest three reasons for this. Firstly, the focus on legality has the “distinct advantage that it is seen by developing countries as reinforcing their national sovereignty” (European Commission, 2012: 49; cf. Cashore and Stone, 2014). Secondly, the evolving global initiatives against illegal logging promised additional revenue for receiving countries (1E and 1G). Thirdly, the focus on legality excluded more farreaching sustainability demands (beyond what is legally required) for their forest sectors. Thus, global agenda-setting succeeded (Humphreys, 2006; Arts et al., 2010). This discursive divide was also essential for the idea to counter illegal logging by closing off importing countries’ markets for illegal timber. As the US Lacey Act was using this mechanism for more than a century to regulate wildlife trade, it became a core reference (Brack et al., 2002). This idea, however, did not reach consensus. One of the reasons for this was the US government, which opposed demand-side actions despite having set the policy issue on the international agenda (Humphreys, 2006). And so, international political initiatives against illegal logging applied the reverse logic: they fostered aid programs and voluntary agreements with “producer countries” to strengthen their forest law enforcement and governance (Bass St. and Guéneau St., 2007; Gulbrandsen and Humphreys, 2006; Singer, 2008). 4.1.2. Domestic discourse agents The international framing of illegal logging, including the idea of closing off consumer markets, initialized the policy-making process in the US. The first to promote the idea of a Lacey-Act type measure in the US against illegal logging was the NGO Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA). The EIA’s policy preference was described as achieving a “first step” (E) towards environmental and social sustainability in the global forestry sector. Throughout the entire policy-making process, the EIA was perceived as the most active

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and well-known agent, being ascribed three major individual characteristics (most interviewees). Firstly, it was seen as having an expert status on the topic, pooling and providing information. Secondly, the EIA’s US director was described as being a committed and well-connected individual. Thirdly, based on these characteristics, the EIA was ascribed the subject position as builder of the Lacey Coalition (see below), which “was driving the bus” (I) towards amending the US Lacey Act (majority of interviewees). Although the EIA was perceived as being most active, the most relevant agent according to most interviewees was the American Forest and Paper Association (AF&PA), which represents the US domestic wood (products) industry. Its importance was mainly attributed to positional characteristics: firstly, the AF&PA provided a politically essential “economic argument” (I, similarly 3I, 5E, 3S, 2G) as its members contribute “approximately 6 percent of the total US manufacturing output” and employ “more than a million people” (Wrobleski, 2007: 1). Secondly, the AF&PA was seen as “an extremely powerful lobby” (E) with close ties to the government. For instance, during the policy-making process the AF&PA’s former vice president was the US Under Secretary of Agriculture for Natural Resources and Environment, supervising the US Forest Service. The AF&PA’s policy preference was described as seeking a protectionist law that would close the US market to (presumably cheaper) illegally produced hardwoods (most interviewees) and make “US exports somewhat more competitive in the world market” (S, cf. The Appalachian Standard, 2004) because international market actors consider the US a “relatively low risk country” (S) regarding illegal logging. Accordingly, one industry representative argued that the AF&PA’s major intention was to “create uncertainty in the market place for tropical timber, I think specifically from China or the Pacific Asian countries” (I). The AF&PA and the EIA formed the so-called Lacey Coalition, supported by other groups such as the Hardwood Federation, the Hardwood, Plywood and Veneer Association, the World Wide Fund for Nature US, Greenpeace and The Nature Conservancy. Interviews and documents portray these organizations each with slightly different policy preferences. For instance, the Hardwood, Plywood and Veneer Association preferred a law that would reduce competition particularly from Chinese plywood producers “because they were having troubles competing with the Chinese” (I, E, see also Tanczos, 2011; Wood Based Panels International, 2005). The Lacey Coalition faced one major opposing subject position (most interviewees), the US wood importing industry as

represented by the International Wood Products Association (IWPA). This opposition was ascribed the positional characteristic of having a “reputational risk” (E, similarly 5I, 4E, 4G, 2S) because “if you are lobbying on Capitol Hill and you represent a Chinese trading company who is using slave labor to harvest trees illegally to outcompete American products, you do not have a very sympathetic case to make” (G). Proponents of the Lacey Act describe the IWPA’s policy preference as motivated by their members wanting to continue to trade illegal wood (products), whereas the IWPA itself describes its policy preference as trying to avoid additional burdens on the import industry and an unfair competitive advantage for domestic producers of wood (products) (Forester, 2007). Table 1 summarizes the agents, their agency and their importance for the policy change. 4.1.3. Discursive and governance strategies 4.1.3.1. Preparing the Lacey coalition: The Environmental Investigation Agency incepting the idea into the US industry. As described above, the EIA was crucial for making the global issue of illegal logging a legitimate topic for US domestic policy making. In order to achieve this, the EIA framed illegal logging not only as an environmental issue but also as an industry and trade issue (EIA, 2000). In this way, they made it attractive to the US domestic wood (products) industry in order to build the Lacey Coalition (3E, 2I, 1G). In addition, the EIA moralized the issue by depicting it as (hidden) crime that is supported by the opportunism of (some) US importers in an “abysmally regulated” (E, cf. Greenpeace, 2006) sector, and connecting demand-side measures with positive values such as responsibility and loyalty (to US producers and US citizens). Accordingly, the EIA testified before Congress: [ . . . W]e understand illegal logging in the context of corruption, criminal trafficking and international trade [ . . . ] we need an appropriate demand-side legal framework that will [ . . . ] level the playing field for companies who want to do things right (Von Bismarck (2007), emphasis added). This framing served the EIA as a basis to approach the AF&PA in the early 2000s, arguing that it would be in the best interest of AF&PA members to combat the import of illegal wood (1I and 1E). The AF&PA was skeptical at first about regulating illegal logging by amending the Lacey Act (1I and 1E). According to one industry

Table 1 Discursive agency in the policy-making process towards the Legal Timber Protection Acta . Agent

Agency

Importance for policy change

Specific organizations/ individuals

Collective role

Involvement

Characteristics

Policy preference

Environmental Investigation Agency (EIA), World Wide Fund for Nature, partly Greenpeace American Forest and Paper Association, Hardwood Federation, Hardwood, Plywood and Veneer Association, United Steel Workers (labor union) International Wood Products Association

Lacey Coalition

Initiator of the Lacey Coalition, motivating domestic industry to support a Lacey Act amendment

EIA and particularly its director perceived as engaged and wellconnected experts

Lacey Coalition

Joined Lacey Coalition after being Industry as crucial stakeholder, motivated by EIA & scientific report perceived as powerful lobby (providing evidence for EIA's arguments)

Aims for the law to “weed out the worst” wood producers, and provide a legal basis to later address sustainability Aims for a protectionist policy to “level the playing field”

Opposition Less visible involvement, mostly suggesting international agreements to tackle illegal logging “at its source”, later arguing against specific requirements of the new Lacey Act

Perceives itself as being put at competitive disadvantage by the LTPA, perceived by Lacey Coalition as mostly muted by the normative imperative of legality

Objects to restriction of free trade and market governance, seen by Lacey Coalition as wanting to continue importing foreign (potentially illegal) timber

Demonstrates strong environmentalist engagement Provides economic arguments suggesting need for political action Opposes the change

a One interviewee argued that a representative in the US Department of State had fostered the idea to amend the Lacey Act before the EIA and the AF&PA and had initiated the policy process towards the LTPA (G). As this view was not supported by documents or other interview statements, it is not included in Table 1.

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representative, the AF&PA issued a position paper on illegal logging in 2001 to avoid such an amendment–framing illegal logging as a problem of Southern countries (I). This framing was related to the fear that a national policy on illegal logging could also affect domestic logging practices (4G and 3E). They “did not want failure to have buffers on streams [in the US] to result in an illegal logging claim” (I) concerning their own members. Despite this initial opposition, the EIA “came back several times to try and convince [the AF&PA] to support their efforts” (I, similarly 1E). This eventually led the AF&PA to commission the study ‘“Illegal” Logging and Global Wood Markets: The Competitive Impacts on the US Wood Products Industry’ (Seneca Creek Associates and Wood Resources International, 2004) (2E, 2S, 2I). 4.1.3.2. Building the Lacey coalition by discursively dividing the US industry. Many interview partners viewed the Seneca Creek Study as “a turning point” (I, similarly 4S, 4E, 2I, 2G) for the AF&PA’s positioning. First, it “documented the competition” (I) by a trusted source that “had realistic numbers” (I), whereas “up until then, the estimates of illegal logging were coming from the environmental groups” which lacked credibility in the eyes of AF&PA (I, similarly 2I, 2S). Second, it provided an opportunity to “refram[e] the question as one that was not an affront to everyone” because “it has got Indonesia, China, Russia, Brazil and not the US and Canada” (I). The distinction between logging in the US and “problematic” other countries is particularly important because up to then the industry perceived a demand-side policy against illegal logging as suggesting a general complicity of the wood (products) industry. The Seneca Creek Study, however, delivered expert arguments to divide the industry into two opposing subject positions: responsible producers who aim to level the playing field (i.e., AF&PA members) versus irresponsible importers who outcompete American producers with cheap illegal logs from abroad (4I, 3E, 3G, 1S). This allowed the AF&PA to depict the issue as “undermin[ing] the economic viability of legally harvested and traded forest products and contribut[ing] to deforestation” (Wrobleski, 2007). Accordingly, the “next time EIA came around” the AF&PA was “more amenable to listening to what the US might be able to do” (I, similarly 1S, 1E) and eventually agreed to build the Lacey Coalition (all interviewees; the coalition chose this name for itself). 4.1.3.3. Manufacturing joint discursive and governance strategies. Once the Lacey Coalition had formed, it skillfully aligned the strategies of its partners. In particular, the AF&PA and the EIA closely coordinated their official communications and jointly engaged in drafting an amendment text. By stressing the criminal nature and the negative environmental and social impacts of illegal logging, the coalition employed normative power to delegitimize any opposition (see Von Bismarck (2007)). Some interviewees portrayed this problematization of illegal logging as excluding uncertainties about the issue because “[ . . . ] one of the premises that people had on the Lacey Act which was never substantiated” is that “the level of deforestation [ . . . ] is a result of illegal logging” and not primarily of “legal logging due to land conversion” (I). The additional emphasis on (unfair) competition between domestic and foreign producers (1) provided an economic rationale for the amendment, (2) drew upon the basic value of fairness, and (3) stressed the domestic relevance of illegal logging (see Wrobleski, 2007). It portrayed the LTPA as aiming to protect both US industry and jobs, connecting it with values of loyalty and patriotism. This framing is best expressed in the name of the law proposed to amend the Lacey Act—Legal Timber Protection Act— protecting US companies and jobs against unfair competition. The portrayal of the LTPA as a law suggested by a coalition of patriotic and fair agents concerned with environmental and social questions, primarily in the US but also taking responsibility for

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the whole planet, can be seen as crucial for the bipartisan support in the US Congress (initialized by a Congressman from Oregon, a Democratic senator from Oregon and a Republican senator from Tennessee; 6G, 4E, 3I, 1S). It combined core values of both political camps in the US—liberals identifying mostly with fairness and conservatives identifying predominantly with loyalty (Graham et al., 2009). The manufacturing of a joint storyline, however, required considerable discursive craftsmanship given the distinct policy preferences of environmental and industry groups in this “unholy coalition” (S, similarly 5E, 4I, 3G). Particularly the environmental groups had to give up ‘discursive territory’ by distancing themselves from any mention of sustainability in official statements, focusing instead on legality (2E and 1I). Industry representatives perceived the topic of sustainability as potentially questioning the AF&PA’s subject position as responsible producer because it was associated with environmentalists’ demand for higher sustainability standards in forestry (3I and 2E). In particular, industry representatives associated sustainability with the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) (5E, 4I, 3G), which “sounded like” (I) additional standards for US producers. This resulted in a consensus among the members of the Lacey Coalition that forest certification was not part of the chosen governance strategy. For the AF&PA and other industry associations joining the Lacey Coalition, the narrow focus on legality guaranteed that environmental groups would not be able to include other requirements later. For the environmental partner, it ensured industry support (2E). Notably, this shift from sustainability to legality resembles the shift outlined for the international level. Once again, the focus on illegal logging diverts attention from sustainable logging. As some members of the US environmental community perceived this as jeopardizing the goal of environmental and social sustainability in the forest sector (4E), the environmental representatives of the Lacey Coalition justified their engagement with the hope that the LTPA might provide leverage for ratcheting up production standards later, e.g., through the use of certification to verify legality (1E, see the similar argument of Cashore and Stone (2014), see Shea (2008)). The skillful discursive alignment allowed the Lacey Coalition to build a storyline that (1) portrayed both groups in a favorable light, (2) delegitimized the opposition, (3) highlighted the pressing importance of the issue, (4) enabled the development of a concrete policy proposal acceptable to both sides by introducing hard law and threatening penalties for non-compliance, particularly affecting timber importers, and (5) was attractive to Republican and Democratic representatives in the US House and Senate. This storyline, however, could only be built at the price of dividing the wood (products) sector into legitimate and illegitimate agents and excluding parts of the environmental community. Moreover, while both sides of the coalition shared this storyline, their respective policy preferences and strategic expectations remained considerably different. 4.1.3.4. The opposition caught between defending itself and signaling pragmatism. The strategic discursive alignment of the Lacey Coalition was described as a major success factor for their storyline. It legitimized this coalition and its policy proposal on multiple grounds and established a powerful moral imperative for the policy that subverted possible agency for opponents of the amendment because it bore major “reputational risk” (E) for anyone challenging it (5I, 4E, 4G, 2S). The opposition consequently “could not show its face” (I) and remained largely invisible to the public (7I, 6E, 5G, 2S). Moreover, the IWPA faced considerable difficulties in establishing support from other industry associations (4I, 4E, 3G) and remained the only vocal opposition (see Testimonies Before Congress, 2007; The Appalachian Standard, 2007).

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Despite these difficulties, the IWPA aimed to build up their own subject position. It portrayed itself as supportive of the aim to end illegal logging but with a different policy or at least a more balanced LTPA. Its storyline (1) deflected responsibility, arguing that the issue of illegal logging needs to be stopped “at its source” (IWPA, 2007), (2) decoupled the problem from the proposed problem solution by denying the adequacy of the LTPA to tackle the issue (de-issuing), and (3) targeted the Lacey Coalition’s agency by portraying it as creating “an illegal logging remedy that is in practice a method to reduce competition from imported goods” (Forester, 2007). Accordingly, their governance strategy focused on both promoting international agreements (IWPA, 2007) and supporting a legal design less threatening to importers (see Testimonies Before Congress, 2007). Remarkably, although this storyline delegitimizes the Lacey Coalition for seeking an unfair competitive advantage, this frame did not figure very prominently. Instead, the IWPA focused on portraying itself as a cooperative party that was interested in drafting an acceptable policy proposal (Forester, 2007). This suggests that the IWPA did not see a possibility to prevent the amendment and as a consequence, tried to establish a subject position allowing them to establish their own policy preferences during the drafting. Several interviewees mentioned that the opposition’s storyline (initially) succeeded in this regard: the IWPA engaged in internal discussions with the Lacey Coalition about including an innocent-owner provision in the LTPA (2I, 1E, 2G). Such a provision would—in the case of a prosecution—“put the burden of proof on the government” (I, Forester, 2007; Testimonies Before Congress, 2007, cf. Dieterle 2012). It was, however, eventually prevented by the Lacey Coalition. In summary, the opposition created a storyline that (1) did not deny the political importance of the issue, (2) only cautiously delegitimized the Lacey Coalition, (3) suggested no clear cut governance solution (preferring international soft laws while also suggesting to re-design the LTPA), and (4) was driven by a cooperative attitude rather than an aggressive opposition. The IWPA’s cautious positioning is seen as a response to the reputational risk connected with opposing the Lacey Coalition’s storyline (5I, 4E, 4G, 2S), which together can be seen as decisive for the failure to build up strong opposition against the LTPA. 4.1.3.5. The Lacey Coalition bringing Lacey home. Given the difficulties of the opposition, the Lacey Coalition’s storyline was tremendously successful, quickly gaining support in both Houses and among the Forest Service, the Department of Justice, and the Fish and Wildlife Service (Sobeck, 2007). Consequently, the LTPA

passed in the “record time” (I, similarly 1G, 1E) of ten months after its introduction. By skillfully re-arranging the international issue of illegal logging into a law from the US for the US—bringing the internationally floated idea of a Lacey-Act type measure (Brack et al., 2002) home—the Lacey Coalition even surprised the US State Department, which up until then still opposed demand-side measures in international negotiations, and “express[ed] interest” in the LTPA only once it realized that “support has been building on Capitol Hill” (Chatham House, 2007). This may complement the thesis that the US government took action “once [it] evaluated impacts on domestic substantive policies as minimal or nonexistent” (Cashore and Stone, 2014: 59). The passage of the LTPA not only had national repercussions. More importantly, several interviewees point out that the “first move” of US legislators was a strong signal to the international community, particularly the EU and Australia where similar laws were under discussion (3G, 2E, 1I). It made it harder for opponents in these countries to argue that it was sufficient to focus on voluntary international initiatives. The adopted policy solution was perfectly in line with the Lacey Coalition’s governance strategy of (1) regulating an international issue with a national hard law, (2) creating a law that potentially discriminates between importers and domestic producers, and (3) introducing threatening penalties. As for (1), the LTPA makes it unlawful to “import, export, transport, sell, receive, acquire, or purchase [ . . . ] trees or their parts taken in violation of the laws of a US State, Tribal Law or any foreign law or to make or submit any false record, account, label, or false identification” (Legal Timber Protection Act of 2008) and requires every business dealing with wood (products) to exercise due care to exclude illegal goods. Hence, the Act holds the “demand side” of global wood products trade liable for ensuring legality on the “supply side”. Certification schemes are not recognized as substitutes for exercising due care. Thus, a close link to sustainability was avoided. As for (2), although the Lacey Act does not de jure discriminate between domestic producers and importers, because it requires all operators placing wood (products) on the US market to undertake due care, the Lacey Act declaration is perceived by several interviewees from government and industry as de facto discriminatory mechanism as this specific declaration is only required for importers (3I and 2G). As for (3), violations can be penalized by forfeiture of goods (which are then contraband) in combination with penalty fines of up to $500,000 or twice the maximum gain from transactions and possibly up to five years in prison. Most interviewees perceive these provisions as a significant threat, even to large companies.

Table 2 Discursive agency during implementation of the Legal Timber Protection Act. Agent Specific organizations/individuals

Agency Collective role

International Wood Products Coalition Association, National Association of of Improvers Music Merchants, Retail Industry Leadership Association and others

Forest Legality Alliance (Environmental Investigation Agency and World Resources Institute) supported by American Forest and Paper Association, Hardwood Federation, Hardwood, Plywood and Veneer Association

Lacey Coalition

Importance for policy stability

Involvement

Characteristics

Portrays prosecution as motivated by particular economic interests, introducing amendment proposals

Victim of unjust prosecution and government overreach (own view) OR villain attacking the LTPA to weaken it (Lacey Coalitions view)

Policy Preference

Aims to change the LTPA because its provisions and penalties are perceived as a threat Aims to Provides a platform for Consensus-oriented coalition exchange and facilitating mutual exchange to make consolidate the consensus, drives implementation workable for all LTPA because it is enforcement through parties (own view) OR villain having effective information introduced a protectionist law (opponents view)

Amendment proposals threaten policy stability

New amendments to the Lacey Act unsuccessful due to “protection efforts” (counter storyline) of the Lacey Coalition in US Congress

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4.2. Implementation politics 4.2.1. Discourse agents Shortly after the LTPA was passed, a “Coalition Working to Improve the Lacey Act” (2012) formed, which appeared in changing compositions and developed a subject position challenging the Lacey Coalition (most interviewees and documents). Prominent agents of this Coalition of Improvers included the IWPA, the National Association of Music Merchants, the Retail Industry Leadership Association, the National Association of Home Builders and some large retailing companies (5E, 3I, 3G, Everill, 2012). This coalition ascribed itself the positional characteristic of being a victim of unjust prosecution by an overreaching government and a rent-seeking Lacey Coalition, turning itself into a legitimate speaker in pursuit of justice. Several interviewees, in contrast, ascribed the Coalition of Improvers the subject position of the (persistent) opposition to the LTPA (6I, 5E, 3G) and the characteristics of still facing reputational risk but acting much more forcefully than before 2008 and building alliances with the emerging Tea Party Movement (5E, 4I, 2G). The Lacey Coalition persisted during implementation and is portrayed by the Coalition of Improvers as illegitimately abusing an environmental law for their protectionist interests (Autor, 2014). The Lacey Coalition, in contrast, ascribes itself the characteristics of a consensus-oriented and pragmatically acting expert who is helpfully facilitating implementation to make it workable for all parties. Table 2 summarizes the agents, their agency and their importance for the policy stability during the implementation stage. 4.2.2. Discursive and governance strategies 4.2.2.1. A rising opposition delegitimizing law enforcement and polarizing for change. In order to develop a new subject position, the Coalition of Improvers produced a new storyline, focusing on the LTPA’s “unintended consequences” (Coalition Working to Improve the Lacey Act, 2012) and re-defining the issue from regulating global illegal logging to implementing a domestic law, thereby strategically exploiting the emerging implementation process (many interviewees). Since 2008 enforcing agencies had prosecuted three cases: (1) the United States vs. Three pallets of tropical hardwood, resulting in the seizure of a shipment of tropical hardwood from Peru declared under an improper tariff code (U.S. Department of the Interior, 2010), (2) the United States vs. Gibson Guitars, concerning the import of ebony from Madagascar and (3) the United States vs. Gibson Guitars, concerning the import of ebony and rosewood from India. The latter two cases triggered a widespread media debate, particularly because it was difficult to prove the illegality of the Indian wood (U.S. Department of Justice, 2012). The violation of Madagasy law and the awareness of Gibson officials, however, could be proven by a report provided by the EIA. Both cases were settled in 2012 with a Criminal Enforcement Agreement requiring Gibson Guitars to pay a 300,000 USD penalty, a 50,000 USD community service payment, cooperate in Lacey Act investigations and prosecutions, and follow a customized Lacey Act Compliance Program (U.S. Department of Justice, 2012). Although the Madagascar case was a clear violation of the Lacey Act, the Coalition of Improvers portrayed the enforcement actions against Gibson as cases of an overreaching Democratic government attacking a company representing core Republican values (being an icon of US Rock’n’Roll) (3I, 2G, 2E). Exploiting the rise of the Republican Tea Party Movement at that time, they thus polarized and emotionalized the implementation discourse (6I, 6E, 2G). Moreover, the Coalition of Improvers was described as “manufactur[ing] examples” (G, similarly 2I) of possible unreasonable

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prosecution cases to exploit the complexity and uncertainty during early implementation, delegitimize law enforcement and thus, the entire LTPA. These polarizing and emotionalizing strategies made law enforcement delicate, and the implementing agencies were “quickly called to the Hill” (G, similarly 2E, 1G) whenever they prosecuted a case. In addition, the Coalition of Improvers’ storyline delegitimized the Lacey Coalition's industry partner as illegitimately pursuing protectionist interests and abusing an environmental law to “overcriminalize” (I) and thus eliminate its competitors (i.e., members of the Coalition of Improvers) (4I, 4E, 3G, Autor, 2014). This storyline (1) draws upon the perception of the Lacey Act as an established environmental law, (2) employs the normative power of opposing protectionism, and (3) connects its own subject position with positive values of individual freedom (opposing government overreach) and fairness (opposing a clientelist policy): Congress passed the Lacey Act to fight criminal activity,not to shift the balance of trade and raise prices by restricting imports in favor of US production. The fact that it is acknowledged that the Lacey Act is having such effect [ . . . ] inappropriately puts Congress in the role of picking winners and losers among American industries . . . (Autor (2014), emphasis added). This storyline prepared the ground for the governance strategy to introduce new Lacey Act amendments in the US Congress (see Supplementary Table 1) that propose to reduce the number of affected parties and/or limit prosecution. These proposals openly call for “FOCUS” or “RELIEF” (the Freedom from Over-criminalization and Unjust Seizures Act and The Retailers and Entertainers Lacey Implementation and Enforcement Fairness Act, both 2012). Together with two other proposals (see Supplementary Table 1), they targeted the same core provisions: (1) an innocent-owner provision (to be included), (2) the import declaration (to be filed only on demand or not to be required for composite products), (3) the scope of penalties (being reduced), (4) the scope of foreign laws and regulations (being reduced to environmental laws), and (5) the time frame of the LTPA (not applying to pre-2008 products). 4.2.2.2. The Lacey Coalition protecting the LTPA and driving implementation through rationalization and consensus orientation. The Lacey Coalition, particularly its environmental partner, shaped implementation by forming the Forest Legality Alliance (FLA, 2015). This joint project of the EIA and the World Resources Institute established a platform that serves to (1) protect the LTPA by de-escalating implementation politics, and (2) control and steer implementation. As for the first, the Lacey Coalition built a rationalizing storyline countering the polarizing strategies of the opposition with the normative power of consensus-orientation. The FLA, as a platform for consensus creation (10E, 7I, 4G, 4S), supported this storyline by providing room to include members of the Coalition of Improvers (participant observation, Consensus Statement, 2009, 2010, 2011). This room for cross-coalitional discussions about improving enforcement provisions, however, was undermined by the Coalition of Improvers’ polarizing strategies: [E]verybody is [ . . . ] engaged in multi-party discussions to try to define due care, right up until the moment that you [members of the Coalition of Improvers] walked away from the table to throw your support behind RELIEF [the RELIEF Act]. Now [ . . . ] if we agree upon a [ . . . ] new definition of due care and we introduce it as an amendment, how can we be sure that you will not try and add things to it [ . . . ] (G, similarly participant observation data, informal talks) ? As a reaction, the Lacey Coalition recently moved towards reproducing its pre-amendment storyline (Talbot 2014)—dividing

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stakeholders into the legitimate, consensus-oriented Lacey Coalition seeking to make a democratically adopted law workable versus illegitimate, polarizing (industry) opponents trying to undermine the rule of law. This builds a powerful counterstoryline, again armed with the risk of reputational loss for anyone challenging it. This double-headed strategy of rationalizing implementation while delegitimizing the opposition with a win-win storyline is paradoxically reinforced by the Coalition of Improver’s storyline. Firstly, the latter’s emphasis on the environmental connotation of the Lacey Act—by arguing that the LTPA should only focus on conservation laws and not “any foreign law” (2G, FOCUS Act, 2012)—has invigorated environmental arguments, which appear in almost all testimonies submitted throughout the past few years (cf. Baxter, 2012; Sobeck, 2012; Autor, 2014; Talbot, 2014; Rey, 2012; Watson, 2014). In contrast to the Lacey Coalition, however, the Coalition of Improvers cannot draw upon this growing source of legitimacy as it lacks an environmental partner. Secondly, the polarizing and emotionalizing win–lose storyline (industry vs. industry) of the Coalition of Improvers not only limits their chances to negotiate consensus solutions for enforcement (see above), but also prevents bipartisan support. As a result, no amendment proposal succeeded and the LTPA is still in effect exactly as introduced in 2008 (by the Lacey Coalition). In addition, the opposition’s emphasis on the harsh effects of the LTPA creates an image of an effective policy—even internationally (several interviewees, see also Prestemon, 2015). One interviewee, for instance, pointed out that “from our reports from industry in China [ . . . ] they were really concerned about the law initially and then there were some reports questioning the seriousness with which the United States was taking the Lacey Act. But the conclusion of the Gibson case, I think really sent a strong signal that the United States was taking enforcing the law seriously” (E, cf. Lu, 2015). This image of effectiveness undermines the rationale for changing the law substantially. The Coalition of Improvers' strategies may hence cement the LTPA’s current form and thus, inadvertently sabotage their claimed aim of improvement. Beyond protecting the LTPA, the FLA process also provided the Lacey Coalition with leverage to further steer implementation. As (il) legality and due care are both difficult to (dis) prove—as the Gibson case demonstrated—the implementation discourse is dominated by how illegality can be determined and proven (on the side of enforcing agencies) and how due care can be demonstrated (on the side of companies) (4I, 3E, 4G, participant observation, cf. Sheikh, 2012). The complexity and uncertainties connected to these questions provide room for new governance strategies. Most importantly, the Lacey Coalition’s environmental partner uses the LTPA’s due care obligation as an access point for bringing sustainability (back) in. As there is no fixed standard for due care, several environmentalists mention the FLA’s risk assessment tool as an opportunity to “creat[e] a higher standard of [ . . . ] what due care is” (E). In response, standardization of due care through (official) guidelines is increasingly discussed (participant observation), and some industry representatives—paradoxically—now support FSC certification as a possibility to demonstrate due care (2E) while “franchising out risks” (I). Again, this strategy might be fueled by the Coalition of Improvers counter-storyline, which created “a chilling effect [ . . . providing] more incentive for [ . . . ] companies to do something” (E). Finally, the EIA is driving law enforcement with its own investigations, uncovering potential prosecution cases (e.g., for the Gibson prosecutions or recent investigations of a potential new prosecution against Lumber Liquidators Holdings, Inc.; Gibson Settlement 2012, Lumber Liquidators Holdings Inc., 2015). Investigating agencies also uncover cases through incorrect tariff codes (first and third

prosecution cases), the information given in Lacey declarations (genus, species, country of harvest, quantity, measure, value of goods), and through hints by close associates (2G). 5. Discussion What can we learn from the analysis? In the following, we discuss our findings with regard to the three research questions we identified at the beginning. (1) How could an environmental group and domestic timber producers nationalize a global policy challenge? A central finding of this analysis is that a discursive strategy of divide and conquer was decisive for establishing agency across different policy levels. This strategy divided legitimate and illegitimate agents so as to establish the legitimate groups’ preferred policy solution. When the US and other G8 countries first placed illegal logging on the global agenda, the global timber (products) market was divided into imaginary categories of consumers in the Global North and producers in the Global South. This division not only attributed legitimate agency to the “consumer countries” (as opposed to “irresponsible” or “incapable producer countries”), it also excluded the consumer’s role as producers (e.g., the US as major wood producing country) and hence as competitors. This put them out of focus for new regulation. The subject position as responsible consumer came with the cost of new responsibility that could be ascribed to the wood (products) industry in so-called consumer countries. As a consequence, the global division into supply and demand sides enabled new discursive agency at the domestic level. It created the reference point to nationalize the issue of illegal logging by portraying (some) US companies as consumers with a demand for illegal wood (products). As this was a significant discursive threat to the image of the US wood (products) industry as a whole, a new (protective) division between responsible domestic producers and irresponsible importers of illegal logs needed to be made. Ascribing these characteristics served to avert the discursive threat from the first group by shifting the blame to importers and delegitimize the other side of the divide in view of establishing a governance arrangement that was favorable for US domestic producers—again a case of divide and conquer. Although the LTPA acknowledges the responsibility of consumers implied by the international divide (demanding due care from all companies placing wood products on the US market), its design is perceived as institutionalizing the domestic divide (e.g., requiring an import declaration only from importers). Irrespective of its domestic framing and particular design, the LTPA’s passage send a strong signal to policy makers in the EU and Australia and provided a strong argument for legislation in these territories. Notably, both divides were closely linked to a discursive shift away from sustainability towards legality. This shift was crucial for placing illegal logging on both the global and US policy agenda. As legality—in contrast to sustainability—was seen as mostly affecting the respective “other”, this particular framing of the issue was essential for gaining the support of both “consumer countries” at the global level and the US wood producing industry at the domestic level. Finally, in both the US as well as on the international level, the delegitimized agents were largely unable to avert the division. At the global level, the countries labeled as producers accommodated to the new position so as to reinforce their sovereignty and gain additional revenue. At the US domestic level, the opposition of timber importers was muted by the strong normative imperative of legality, which denied them discursive agency.

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(2) How could an environmental group and domestic timber producers overcome the opposition from the importing industry? The above-mentioned inability to escape the divide-andconquer strategy was a major reason why the US importing industry failed to develop a legitimate subject position and to mobilize widespread support to prevent the passage of the LTPA. The skillful discursive alignment of the Lacey Coalition’s environmental and industry partners created a win–win storyline that not only delegitimized any opposition but was also compelling to both political parties and enabled the development of a concrete policy proposal. In addition, the opposition did not create an aggressively opposing storyline as this might have undermined its opportunity to pursue its own governance strategies in the drafting of the LTPA. (3) How is implementation of the law and its effectiveness perceived and how does this fuel policy making? Once the LTPA was adopted, new discursive dynamics developed that partially reversed the pre-adoption policy making. It was the newly established Coalition of Improvers that now developed a moralizing storyline, while the Lacey Coalition aimed at deescalating the process through rationalization and consensus orientation. Our analysis of these discursive shifts related to the LTPA’s implementation is striking in regard to the effects of discursive agency on policy processes. In line with the understanding of a dialectic relationship between discourse and agency, the implementation perceptions demonstrate that no particular agent was capable of fully controlling the discursive consequences of specific characterizations and strategic practices. On one hand, the Coalition of Improvers’ counter-storyline—to re-characterize themselves from illegitimate agents into victims of rent-seeking American producers—provides a legitimate subject position and constrains implementing agencies as it portrays any enforcement as problematic intervention in fair competition. On the other hand, it closes down opportunities for achieving compromise and sets a win–lose storyline (industry vs. industry) against a politically more attractive win–win storyline (environmental groups and industry). In addition, by discrediting the Lacey Coalition’s industry partner as misusing an environmental law to seek an unfair protectionist policy, it strengthens the agency of environmentalists as a much needed provider of normative power in the Lacey Coalition’s win– win storyline. Both discursive consequences likely undermine the strategic intentions of the Coalition of Improvers and in this way turn their discursive strategy, at least partially, against them. 6. Conclusions The discursive battles we have analyzed in the US case do not only matter within the US. Just as the global discursive divide informed and enabled policy making in the US, the discursive divides and agency created there are likely to have repercussions across the globe. They may serve as discursive templates for policy making elsewhere. As legality is an increasingly prominent concept in the governance of natural resources—from forest to fishing to mining operations (see Rose, 2014; Moran et al., 2014), our analysis may also inform the understanding of this policy concept beyond the forest sector. The Lacey case has demonstrated that the shift to legality is highly ambiguous, weaving aspects of environmental conservation and global competition into complex governance approaches shaped by discursive policy-making. Our results partly support Mol’s (2014) concern that such “policies of transparency” can function as an instrument of powerful industry factions. Yet it also shows that continuous struggles about discursive agency will shape “where the sites of power are located” (Mol, 2014: 52) in legality policies. This may open up unforeseen windows of

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opportunity. The comeback of sustainability through environmental strategies during the LTPA’s implementation process being inadvertently facilitated by an opposing storyline that underlines the LTPA's threatening effectiveness is a striking example of this. In conclusion, our analysis underlines that it is crucial for any assessment of the effects and future trajectory of the global legality (verification) regime to explore multi-level dynamics of discursive agency. The LTPA case indicates that a shift in the subject position of one industry faction in a single country triggered policy change in several countries and is now likely to re-shape subject positions and strategies across the globe. This suggests that the emergence of an effective legality (verification) regime in global governance in forestry and beyond will depend on (1) the specific (favored) subject position taken on by collective agents (in all countries affected by the regime), (2) their strategies to establish these positions, (3) the resulting political truth(s) and associated governance arrangements, and (4) multiple spillover effects across levels of governance related to all three categories. The discursive consequences of all four, however, can hardly be foreseen or fully controlled by the agents. Therefore, discursive agency within the emerging global legality (verification) regime remains not only a challenge for the involved agents, but an exciting field of analysis, constantly reshaping our understanding of this regime. Future research may explore discursive agency on legality in other regions and for other resources, and also combine a discourse perspective with complimentary analyses, for instance of trade flows, competitiveness, as well as effects on natural resource management. Acknowledgments Firstly, we are deeply grateful to the Yale School of Forestry and Environmental Studies, particularly Ben Cashore and his group, for hosting Sina Leipold during her field research. We also sincerely appreciate the invaluable insights from the interviewees and the financial support of the German Research Foundation in the project ‘Discursive fragmentation of the international forest regime complex’ [PAK 813]. Finally, we also wish to thank the organizers and participants of the “Offene Tagung des AK Umweltpolitik/ Global Change (DVPW)” held at the Free University Berlin, Germany, February 10–11, 2014 and the 9th Interpretive Policy Analysis Conference (IPA) 2014 held in Wageningen, Netherlands, July 3–5, 2014, for commenting on an earlier version of this paper. Appendix 1. Stakeholders interviewed for this research. Code Informal talks (current affiliation if the individual was not directly involved)

Stakeholder group

In-depth interviews (affiliation of the individual at the time of involvement in LTPA passage or implementation)

Industry Association/ Company

American Forest and Paper I Association

American Forest and Paper Association Hardwood Federation Hardwood, Plywood and Veneer Association Home Depot International Wood Products Association Sustainable Forestry Initiative Weyerhaeuser Environmental/ Center for International E social NGOs Environmental Law

2

3

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(Continued) Stakeholder group

Governmental institution

Scientific institutions

Certification 2

In-depth interviews (affiliation of the individual at the time of involvement in LTPA passage or implementation) Environmental Investigation Agency Environmental Investigation Agency Greenpeace US Greenpeace US Rainforest Alliance Rights and Resources Initiative The Nature Conservancy Sierra Club World Wildlife Fund World Wildlife Fund US Department of Agriculture US Department of Agriculture US Department of Agriculture US Department of Justice US Department of State US House of Representatives US House of Representatives US Senate Ford Foundation Resources for the Future Seneca Creek Associates, LLC World Resources Institute organizations

Code Informal talks (current affiliation if the individual was not directly involved)

G

2

S

10

/

/

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