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Drunk drivers in the courts: Legal and extra-legal factors affecting pleas and sentences
Journal of Criminal Justice, Vol. 25, No. 2, pp. 155-163, 1997 Copyright © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in the USA. All rights reserved 0047-2352/97 $17.00 + .00
Pergamon
PII S0047-2352(96)00058-X
DRUNK DRIVERS IN THE COURTS: LEGAL AND EXTRA-LEGAL FACTORS AFFECTING PLEAS AND SENTENCES
JON'A MEYER
Department of Sociology Rutgers University Camden, New Jersey 08102
TARA GRAY
Department of Criminal Justice New Mexico State University Las Cruces, New Mexico 88003-8001
ABSTRACT To what extent are pleas and sentences o f drunk drivers influenced by legal factors such as offense severity and priors versus extralegal factors such as race and gender? It was found that guilty pleas and sentences were based most heavily on offense severity. Pleas also were based on ethnicity, with Caucasians more than twice as likely to plead not guilty. Although judges often fail to impose mandatory sentences, the judges in this sample always imposed mandatory sentences on drunk drivers. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd
INTRODUCTION The impact of drunk driving on Americans is enormous: at some time in their lives, 40 percent of Americans will be involved in an alcohol-related crash (National Center for Statistics and Analysis, 1992:1). In 1994, drunk drivers were involved in 11,772 fatal crashes (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1995:5). In recent years, there have been more arrests for drunk driving than for any other offense, including larceny (Maguire and Pastore, 1994:418).
Nonetheless, attitudes about drunk driving vary greatly. One senator said drank driving laws had "taken all the sport out of drinking and driving" (Perlman, 1994:25). Drunk driving has also been called "the crime most frequently committed by a noncriminal" (Joye, 1986:3). Others refer to the "myth of the 'killer drunk'"(Walker, 1994:110) because over 90 percent of the people killed by drunk drivers are the drivers themselves or one of their own passengers (Goldstein, 1982:48). As the death toll mounts, however, public attitudes are changing and drunk 155
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driving is increasingly viewed as a menace (Klein, 1988:7), or as the most frequent violent crime (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1992:1). As a result, the public is increasingly taking a "get tough" attitude toward drunk driving. Indeed, in a recent Gallup Poll, more than onehalf of the respondents said the penalties for drunk driving were too light (Perlman, 1994:25), and getting drunk drivers off the road has become one of the highest priorities for legislators. One hundred drunk driving laws are enacted every year (Mejeur, 1994:10). Many states are stiffening penalties for driving while impaired, and some states have enacted mandatory sentences (e.g., Robertson, Rich, and Ross, 1973; Mejeur, 1994). California, for example, treats third-time drunk drivers as felons who face presumptive terms of three years in prison.1 Mandatory sentences, and stiffer sentences in general, may impact drunk driving, especially if the severity of the sentence depends on the severity of the offense and the prior record of the offender, rather than on extra-legal factors such as race or gender. This study will examine the extent to which pleas and sentences depend on legitimate legal factors rather than extralegal factors, and the extent to which mandatory sentences are imposed on drunk drivers. Little research has been done on the factors affecting pleas. In the lower courts, pleas of not guilty are rare but are more likely to result from more serious cases, where the stakes are higher (Brickey and Miller, 1975; Mileski, 1971). In felony courts, recidivists and those facing longer terms are less likely to plead guilty (Albonetti, 1990). Therefore, in the more serious cases of drunk driving, one would expect to find that drunk drivers are more likely to plead not guilty. More research has been done on factors affecting sentences. Offense severity and priors are known to increase sentence harshness for felons (e.g., Myers, 1987; Petersilia and Turner, 1985; Spohn, 1990), although this is not necessarily the case for misdemeanants for whom both the offense and sentence severity tend to be low. Some researchers have found that misdemeanor sentences appear related to offense severity (e.g., Lange and Greene, 1990; Meeker, Jesilow, and Aranda, 1992), while others have
found that they are not (e.g., Feeley, 1979; Mileski, 1971). In their study of financial penalties at the lower court level, Gordon and Glaser (1991) report that drunk drivers were jailed (in addition to being fined) more often than those convicted of other crimes (i.e., assault, theft, and drug offenses) and nearly as often as burglars. In one study, judges who sentenced driving under the influence (DUI) offenders were asked how they would sentence four hypothetical drunk drivers, with varying blood alcohol contents (BACs) and prior DUI records (Lange and Greene, 1990). Offenders were sentenced to significantly more days in jail if they had prior records or if their BAC levels were .20 or above as opposed to their counterparts with ,one-half that level (Lange and Greene, 1990). These results may be predictive of actual sentencing practices given findings that sentences imposed by lower court judges on hypothetical offenders are remarkably similar to those imposed on the actual offenders on whom the scenarios were based (e.g., Kapardis and Farrington, 1981). Together, these findings suggest that offense severity and prior DUI records are likely to increase sentence severity. Therefore, one would expect to find that offense severity and prior DUI records would increase the sentence severity for drunk drivers. The so-called "mandatory" sentences sound more certain than they are. Judges and other members of the courtroom work group are likely to circumvent mandated penalties that they feel are too harsh or unfair (Meyer and Jesilow, 1993). As a result, mandatory sentences are not always imposed on drunk drivers or other offenders (Becker, 1991; Krueger, 1995; Ross and Foley, 1987). This phenomenon, where individual members of the system create their own forums of justice, also effects enforcement; some scholars have noted a tendency by police to view drunk driving as nonserious and a low priority (e.g., Mastrofski and Ritti, 1992). As a result, some court watchers have argued that mandatory laws would never be enacted or enforced for drunk drivers (e.g., Ayoob, 1980:28). Public attitudes, however, have changed since that time and, given the changing attitudes, one would expect to find that mandatory sentences are imposed on drunk drivers.
Drunk Drivers in the Courts
DATA AND METHODS This study is based on direct observations of arraignments in municipal courtrooms throughout a metropolitan county in southern California during a seven-month period in 1993. Any information that might identify the county, a judge, or a defendant has been excluded from this report to protect confidentiality. As in other lower courts, arraignments occurred very quickly, averaging two minutes in length, with the longest hearing lasting for nine minutes. To gather accurate data and to help reduce observer bias, two observers alternated between a pair of jobs: one served as primary coder and recorded the study variables, while the other verified the accuracy of the notes. This method of direct courtroom observation allowed for the collection of information that might be lost by the incomplete record-keeping systems in the lower courts (Mileski, 1971:475). For example, in the county under study, public records do not include custody status or fluency in English, two variables that the present study hoped to include. The sample included 200 defendants arraigned for driving under the influence. The vast majority of defendants (87 percent, n = 174) were male. Nearly equal numbers were Caucasian (47 percent, n = 93) or Hispanic (46 percent, n = 92). The remainder were Asian (5 percent, n = 9), African American (2 percent, n = 4), Middle-Eastern (n = 1), or American Indian (n = 1). Only 61 percent (n = 121) spoke English fluently. Only 12 percent (n = 23) appeared at their arraignments in custody, and very few defendants (6 percent, n = 11) were represented by counsel, although some of them probably secured counsel at later stages in the proceedings. 2 Only 8 percent of the defendants (n = 11) had prior DUI records. 3 One-half of the defendants (n = 100), however, faced charges in addition to that of driving under the influence and one-half of those (n = 50) faced more than one additional charge. These charges could be divided into three categories: (1) 76 percent were for offenses that probably were detected as a result of the traffic stop for DUI, including driving without a valid license, on a suspended license, or without insurance; (2) 15 percent were
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charges that may have led to DUI detection, including hit and run accidents, seat belt violations, and so on; and (3) 9 percent were charges that appeared to be unrelated to the DUI, including assault and battery, vandalism, or the violation of a court order. 4
Factors Affecting Pleas of "Not Guilty" One-third (33 percent, n = 65) of the defendants pied not guilty at their arraignments. To determine which variables were most associated with pleading not guilty, a logistic regression analysis was performed. 5 Both legal and extralegal variables were included. Legal variables are those upon which sentences may legally be based, including offense severity and prior convictions. Extralegal factors are those that reflect personal characteristics, such as race and gender. It was found that offense severity was the most important determinant of pleas, and ethnicity also was important. Results are shown in Table 1. As expected, offense severity was the most important determinant of whether defendants pled not guilty. Those defendants facing longer jail terms were more likely to plead not guilty and take their chances at trial (OR = 1.0037, p < .01). Offense severity was operationalized here as the maximum possible sentence in days that a judge could impose for all the instant offenses charged. This definition has several advantages over the approaches employed by some researchers, such as the amount of harm caused by an offense. First, it would be difficult to establish an appropriate quantitative measure that reflects the severity of each of the offenses governed by the lower courts, given that such offenses are of lower gravity or may have unclear victims (e.g., driving on a suspended license). Consider, for example, an offender whose license was suspended at the time of his arrest for drunk driving, and another whose seat belt violation lead to her detection for drunk driving. Although the amount of direct harm caused by both offenders is probably equal, the offenses are viewed quite differently by the courts. The measure used in the present study, then, shows how serious the public and the legislature believe each defendant's acts to be, an
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TABLE 1 LEGAL AND EXTRALEGALFACTORS AFFECTING NOT GUILTY PLEAS (n = 144)
Variable
×2
df
Maximum sentence, in days No prior DUI record At liberty Female offender Caucasian offender Constant
Summary statistics - 2 log likelihood Model x 2 Improvement Goodness of fit
154.035 23.228 23.228 142.060
t~
SE
Probability
.0037 -.6856 -.3086 .9047 .9746 -.2845
.0014 .7382 .8572 .5466 .4108 1.9378
.0066 .3531 .7188 .0979 .0177 .8833
138 5 5 138
Odds Ratio 1.0037 .5038 .7345 2.4712 2.6501
.1660 .0003 .0003 .3889
Note: Percentage of correct dependent variable classification by model is 72.22%.
important consideration in a system that expects its judges to reflect the communities from which they are chosen. The present study's measure also serves as a convenient index of the seriousness of all instant offenses combined. 6 Interestingly, prior DUI convictions did not affect pleas in this model. Perhaps DUI convictions did not affect pleas because of the negligible role that the small number (8 percent) of defendants with known DUI records could play in a multivariate model or because DUI defendants perceive that conviction is inevitable. Indeed, the low number of defendants with prior records may indicate that drunk drivers are less likely than other types of offenders to have been in court before, which may be one reason drunk driving is sometimes referred to as a crime committed by a "noncriminal" (Joye, 1986:3). Or, prior record may not affect pleas because of the perception among defendants that drunk driving cases cannot be won. Indeed, some defendants in traffic court cases do perceive conviction as inevitable (Brickey and Miller, 1975:691), and one study found that 90 percent of those arrested for DUI in Vermont were ultimately convicted even though one-third pied not guilty (Little, 1973). It was expected that those in custody would plead guilty in order to get out of jail. If offenders received a two- or three-day jail sentence, they would be released following their arraignments because of time served. This chance to get out of jail early would seem to motivate offenders to plead guilty. Being in custody, however, did not play a significant role in defen-
dants' decisions to plead guilty, and many offenders waited weeks or even months for their day in court. Gender did not significantly affect the decision to plea, but ethnicity did: Caucasians were 2.7 times more likely than other ethnic groups to plead not guilty (OR = 2.65, p < .05). 7 Whether the blood alcohol levels of Caucasians were lower than those of non-Caucasians, which could lead Caucasians to be less fatalistic about conviction, was considered, but the two variables did not appear to be correlated. Instead, ethnicity may be a proxy for other factors, including fluency in English. Indeed, all the Caucasian defendants in the sample appeared proficient in English, compared to only 26 percent of the non-Caucasians, and fluent English speakers were significantly less likely than their less proficient counterparts to be charged with having a blood alcohol level above .08 (phi = . 18, p < .01). Perhaps English speakers and Caucasians were more knowledgeable about their rights in our criminal justice system or more aware that they could plea bargain at later stages in the system if they pied not guilty at their arraignments. As a result, they seemed less likely to go along with the courtroom work group and to plead guilty. 8
Factors Affecting Sentences Roughly two-thirds (68 percent, n = 135) of the defendants in the sample pied guilty and were sentenced; more than one-third (36 percent, n = 48) were incarcerated. None of the of-
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TABLE 2 LEGAL AND EXTRALEGALFACTORSAFFECTING INCARCERATION(n = 100)
Variable
X2
df
Maximum sentence, in days No prior DUI record At liberty Female offender Caucasian offender
Constant Summary statistics - 2 log likelihood Model ×2 Improvement Goodness of fit
82.136 43.238 43.238 80.655
,6
SE
Probability
.0129 -10.2230 -9.6373 -9.3459 .0788 25.7913
.0037 57.0369 59.2450 49.3635 .5829 131.5025
.0005 .8578 .8708 .8498 .8924 .8445
94 5 5 94
Odds Ratio 1.0130 .0000 .0001 .0001 1.0820
.8038
.0000 .0000 .8350
Note: Percentageof correct dependentvariable classification by model is 83.0 percent.
fenders were incarcerated solely for charges other than those related to drunk driving (i.e., while some offenders received jail terms for, say, failure to appear, at least part of their jail sentence was "earmarked" for their drunk driving offenses). A second logistic regression was run to examine the extent to which the legal and extralegal factors influenced the decision to incarcerate drunk drivers. It was found that offense severity had a significant effect on sentencing, but prior DUI offenses, appearance in custody, gender, and ethnicity did not. Results are shown in Table 2. As expected, offense severity had the most significant effect on sentence severity for drunk drivers; the more serious the charges, the more likely incarceration (OR = 1.013, p < .001). Prior DUI convictions did not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of jail sentences, although those who faced mandatory jail due to priors were incarcerated. 9 Appearance in custody did not significantly impact the decision to incarcerate. The effects due to offender gender and race did not play a significant role in sentence severity, indicating that these extralegal offender characteristics may play a relatively minor role in the sentencing of drunk drivers, at least in this jurisdiction.
The Imposition of Mandatory Sentences In the sample of the present study, all those offenders who faced mandatory jail sentences were incarcerated. This was found to be surpris-
ing, given that sentences designated as mandatory are not always imposed, even when mandated for drunk drivers (Becker, 1991; Krueger, 1995; Meyer and Jesilow, 1993; Ross and Foley, 1987). In order to find out whether the judges in the sample usually imposed mandatory sentences, the other cases in the larger sample of lower court cases from which this sample was drawn were examined, and it was found that only 41 percent of the 292 offenders facing mandatory incarceration received any jail time. Judges in this jurisdiction, however, seem inclined to impose mandatory jail terms on at least one class of offenders, the drunk driver, perhaps because of the perceived seriousness of the offense. Indeed, during interviews, even those judges who disliked mandatory sentences in general saw value in applying them to drunk drivers as a way to inform the public that drinking and driving is unacceptable and will be punished harshly. For the most part, the sentences imposed on the sample of drunk drivers were remarkably uniform. One judge so closely adhered to the state's statutory minimums that she displayed in her courtroom a large hand-stenciled poster showing the sentences she imposed on drunk drivers who pied guilty. In the present study's sample, the offenders received all the mandatory minimums that they faced, including mandatory jail terms. Seventeen sentenced offenders faced mandatory jail terms and all were incarcerated. Five of these offenders had prior DUI convictions; the remaining twelve were
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charged with driving on a suspended license in addition to their DUI charges, an offense with a mandatory ten-day jail sentence. Other offenders faced California's mandatory minimum sentence for a first conviction of driving under the influence. This sentence costs offenders about $1,200 in cash, suspension of their driving privileges for three months, completion of an alcohol education program, and three years of informal probation? ° More than one-half of the sentenced offenders (70 of 135) received this penalty and the others received variations on this sentence. Variations on the mandatory sentence generally involved mandated Alcoholics Anonymous meetings or community service, or the substitution of one penalty for another in order to give the offender a sentence that was somehow more desirable than the original penalty. Roughly 10 percent (n = 13) of the drivers were required to attend ten or more Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, and these offenders usually had blood alcohol levels that were very high (usually .20 or higher)." Sixteen offenders (12 percent) were allowed to perform community service in place of paying fines, and three offenders were ordered to complete community service in addition to their fines.
CONCLUSIONS Intuition and prior studies suggest what the findings show: The seriousness of offense is the greatest determinant of both the plea and sentence severity for drunk drivers. Earlier work in felony courts has found that offense severity is one of the strongest factors affecting sentence severity. At the lower court level this consensus is lacking, but some researchers have noted that misdemeanor sanctions are related to the seriousness of offenders' actions (e.g., Lange and Greene, 1990; Meeker, Jesilow, and Aranda, 1992). Similarly, the findings support the work of researchers who have found that those facing harsher sentences for their crimes are less likely to plead guilty (e.g., Albonetti, 1990). It is indeed possible that drunk drivers feel they face harsh sentences, as well as stigma, 12 increased insurance rates, and "points" added to their
driving records that can result in sanctions for employees who drive professionally and can lead to prosecution as a habitual traffic offender, To find out, future researchers may want to interview defendants charged with DUI. In contrast, differences attributable to prior offenses were not found. While this may be a function of the low number of drunk drivers with prior records in the sample, it also may reflect the perception among defendants that drunk driving cases cannot be won. Indeed, Albonetti (1990) found that defendants were much more likely to plead guilty if the evidence against them was strong. In the county under study, suspected drunk drivers were given Breathalyzer or blood tests to determine their blood alcohol content levels. Seldom is such a "smoking gun" presented in criminal trials and disputing such evidence is difficult and costly in terms of attorney fees and time lost in court. The finding that ethnicity is not a significant factor when judges hand down sentences is consistent with that of Feeley (1979:143). The finding that Caucasians were more than twice as likely to plead not guilty, however, is troubling because it suggests a disparity in the justice system. Mileski (1971:495) found that African American and Hispanic misdemeanants were less likely than Caucasians to plead guilty, even when the seriousness of their charges was held constant. Mileski (l 971:495) offers possible reasons for this, including the possibility that minorities are more often innocent. She concludes that "whatever the source of the race difference in guilty pleas, it remains that blacks make a disproportionate amount of work for the court in their pursuit of justice" (Mileski, 1971:495). In the present study, the opposite was true: Caucasians made a disproportionate amount of work for the courts. Why were Caucasians more likely to plead not guilty? In her study of felony courts, AIbonetti (1990:329) found that African American defendants were more likely than Caucasians to plead not guilty, possibly because Caucasians were offered better deals or because they had more confidence "in a system in which bargains are struck in the dark." As observed at the court proceedings, the court personnel occasionally tried to shepherd both Caucasian and minority
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defendants away from guilty pleas. For example, one judge protested when an Hispanic defendant insisted on pleading guilty and being sentenced immediately. The judge felt the defendant had a good chance for acquittal and told him he should plead not guilty and seek counsel. Although minority defendants may have reason to believe that the deck is sometimes stacked against them in court, it was not immediately evident in this jurisdiction. It is interesting that ethnic differences for pleading, but not for sentencing, were found. Is it possible that such differences are more likely to appear in situations that fall under control of the defendant, rather than other members of the courtroom drama? Indeed, when two defendantcontrolled processes were examined further, Caucasians were more likely than non-Caucasians to be represented by counsel at their arraignments (t = - 2 . 9 3 , p < .01) and to plead not guilty (t = - 2 . 6 2 , p < .01). Likewise, there were not any significant differences between the two groups for processes that are controlled by persons other than the defendant; both ethnic groups were equally likely to appear in custody (t = .76, n.s.) and to be sent to jail for their offenses (t = .44, n.s.). While not conclusive, these results suggest that differences between ethnic groups may be based in part on the choices they make while entangled in the web of justice. In the present study's sample of drunk drivers, mandatory sentences were really mandatory. Is this true in other jurisdictions? Is it true when sentences are imposed after trial? These questions could not be answered because it was impossible to track hearings from one court date to the next, which is unfortunate because research has shown that sentences imposed at arraignments frequently differ from those at trial (Brickey and Miller, 1975; Feeley, 1979; McCall, 1978; Meeker and Pontell, 1985). Researchers should pay particular attention to the imposition of mandatory penalties in such samples because judges may be less likely to impose them on defendants who plea bargain. Researchers also should explore whether judges view mandatory sentences for drunk drivers differently from other mandatory sentences. Do judges view mandatory sentences as truly mandatory for some offenses, but not for others?
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors thank Joan E. Crowley, Gil Geis, and L. Thomas Winfree for offering comments that strengthened this article.
NOTES 1. Many jurisdictions also have developed educational programs and group meetings aimed at reducing recidivism among drunk drivers. These programs are often mandated as a condition of probation, and they last anywhere from a few weeks to more than one year. One New Mexico jurisdiction has a DWI Drug Court, the nation's first drug court aimed exclusively at drunk drivers (Ryan, 1994). This court assigns drunk drivers to a variety of group and individual therapies aimed at changing attitudes and feelings about alcohol. It also monitors clients to try to ensure that relapses do not interfere with the lives of offenders or others. 2. Logistic regression equations including presence of counsel showed that adding the variable did not affect the magnitude or direction of any of the other factors. Due to the low number of subjects with attorneys, the presence of counsel was not included in the final comparisons. 3. Although each judge agreed to announce whether defendants possessed prior records and the nature of any such convictions, they sometimes failed to do this, usually because they forgot. These data were coded as missing for those for whom it was not announced (26 percent, n = 52). When the data were reanalyzed excluding prior records, the direction and magnitude of the individual factors were not noticeably different. 4. The number of instant charges could not be included in the model due to multicollinearity with offense severity (correlation = .83, p < .001). Logistic regression equations that substituted number of instant offenses for maximum possible sentence showed that the two variables had virtually the same impact. 5. Logistic regression allows multiple independent variables to be regressed on a dichotomous dependent variable. Additionally, when the assumption that the dependent variable is normally distributed is violated, logistic regression produces better estimates than ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 6. Although they were permitted to do so, no defendant pied guilty to some charges and not guilty to others. Instead, they either pied guilty to or denied all the charges they faced. One potentially useful indicator of offense severity, BAC level, could not be used due to the inability to gather that intbrmation for but a modest number of offenders in the sample. 7. Some scholars (e.g., Zatz, 1984) have argued that Hispanics are not treated like other minority groups. Because of this possibility, logistic regression equations that compared Caucasians to Hispanics (i.e., that excluded all other minorities) were run. The direction and magnitude of the individual factors remained essentially unchanged for both type of plea and sentence severity. 8. Fluency in English, a variable suggested by Meeker, Jesilow, and Aranda (1992), could not be included in the statistical equations due to multicollinearity with ethnicity (correlation = .75, p < .001). The present study uses eth-
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nicity so that the findings will be more compatible with others in the literature. Logistic regression equations that substituted fluency in English for ethnicity, showed that both variables had virtually the same impact. 9. Of course, the finding may have been due to the very small number of sentenced offenders (n = 5) with known prior DUI convictions. Therefore, another logistic regression equation was run excluding this information, but the direction and magnitude of the individual factors remained essentially the same. 10. Financial costs to drunk drivers included a fine of $390 plus $664 in legislated penalty assessment fees, as well as $50 for the Alcohol Abuse Prevention Fund, a $37 testing fee, a $25 citation fee, and a $25 payment to the state restitution fund. Ostensibly, offenders were able to choose between a ninety-day driver's license suspension or two days in jail, but the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended driver's licenses for at least ninety days through a civil court process (Administrative License Revocation) regardless of whether or not offenders served the two days. During interviews, some of the judges complained that Administrative License Revocation transferred discretion from them to the DMV because the civil court process meant inevitable loss of driving privileges in addition to any criminal penalties imposed by the municipal court. If offenders did not have a license to suspend, they were generally given the two-day sentence. 11. During interviews with the judges, it was learned that assigning ten or more AA meetings to DUI offenders with high BAC levels was a common practice. While every offender's BAC level could not be determined, it is known that one-half of those who received AA meetings had high BAC levels. 12. Stigma may be an especially important deterrent to driving under the influence. One team of scholars found that perceived increases in the shame created by a drunk driving conviction reduced self-reported drunk driving between 1982 and 1990 in Oklahoma City (Grasmick, Bursik, and Arneklev, 1993).
REFERENCES Albonetti, C. A. (1990). Race and the probability of pleading guilty. Journal of Quantitative Criminology 6:315-33. Ayoob, M. (1980). Enhancing DWI enforcement. Police Product News 4(10):26-31. Becker, E. R. (1991). Flexibility and discretion available to the sentencing judge under the guidelines regime. Federal Probation 55(4): 10-15. Brickey, S. L., and Miller, D. E. (1975). Bureaucratic due process: An ethnography of a traffic court. Social Problems 22:688-97. Feeley, M. M. (1979). The Process is the punishment: Handling cases in a lower criminal court. New York: Russell Sage Foundation. Goldstein, H. (1982). The drinking driver in Madison. Report on a project on development of a problem-oriented approach to improving police service. Vol. 2. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Law School. Gordon, M. A., and Glaser, D. (1991). The use and effects of financial penalties in municipal courts. Criminology 29:651-76.
Grasmick, H. G., Bursik, R. J., and Ameklev, B. J. (1993). Reduction in drunk driving as a response to increased threats of shame, embarrassment, and legal sanctions. Criminology 31:41-67. Joye, R. (1986). Drunk driving: Recommendations for safer highways. In Stop DWI: Successful community responses to drunk driving, ed. D. Foley. Lexington, MA: Lexington Books. Kapardis, A., and Farrington, D. P. (1981). An experimental study of sentencing by magistrates. Law and Human Behavior 5:107-22. Klein, A. R. (1988). Alternative sentencing: A practitioner's guide. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson Publishing Co. Krueger, A. (1995). Judges can't sidestep "3 strikes," court rules. San Diego Union-Tribune, 18 January, A1, A12. Lange, T. J., and Greene, E. (1990). How judges sentence DUI offenders: An experimental study. Drug Alcohol Abuse 16(1/2):125-33. Little, J. W. (1973). An empirical description of administration of justice in drunk driving cases. Law and Society Review 7:473-92. Maguire, K., and Pastore, A. L. eds. (1994). Sourcebook of criminal justice statistics, 1993. Washington DC: U.S. Government Printing Office. Mastrofski, S. D., and Ritti, R. R. (1992). You can lead a horse to w a t e r . . . : A case study of a police department's response to stricter drunk driving laws. Justice Quarterly 9:465-91. McCall, G. J. (1978). Observing the law: Field methods in the study of crime and the criminal justice system. New York: Free Press. Meeker, J. W., Jesilow, P., and Aranda, J. (1992). Bias in sentencing: A preliminary analysis of community service sentences. Behavioral Sciences and the Law 10:197-206. Meeker, J. W., and Pontell, H. N. (1985). Court caseloads, plea bargains, and criminal sanctions: The effects of Section 17 P.C. in Califomia. Criminology 23:119-41. Mejeur, J. (1994). Drunk driving: Still a killer. State Legislatures 20(4): 10-11. Meyer, J., and Jesilow, P. (1993). "Doing justice": Judicial attitudes toward community service sentences. The IARCA Journal on Community Corrections 5(5): 10--12. Mileski, M. (1971 ). Courtroom encounters: An observation study of a lower criminal court. Law and Society Review 5:473-538. Myers, M. A. (1987). Economic inequality and discrimination in sentencing. Social Forces 65:746-66. National Center for Statistics and Analysis. (1992). 1991 alcohol fatal crash facts. Washington, DC: National Center for Statistics and Analysis. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (1992). Let's take a stand: Friends don't let friends drive drunk. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation. National Highway Traffic Safety Administration. (1995). Traffic safety facts 1994. Washington, DC: U.S. Department of Transportation. Perlman, E. (1994). Moving toward none for the road. Governing 7(12):25-26. Petersilia, J., and Turner, S. (1985). Guideline-based justice: The implications for racial minorities. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation. Robertson, L. S., Rich, R. F., and Ross, H. L. (1973). Jail sentences for driving while intoxicated in Chicago: A judicial policy that failed. Law and Society Review 8:55-67. Ross, H. L., and Foley, J. P. (1987). Judicial disobedience of the mandate to imprison drunk drivers. Law and Society Review 21 : 315-23.
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Ryan, S. (1994). Las Cruces DWI drug court. Las Cruces Municipal Court, New Mexico. Unpublished manuscript. Spohn, C. (1990). The sentencing decisions of black and white judges: Expected and unexpected similarities. Law and Society Review 24:1197-216.
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Walker, S. (1994). Sense and nonsense about crime and drugs. 3d ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Zatz, M. S. (1984). Race, ethnicity, and determinate sentencing: A new dimension to an old controversy. Criminology 22:147-71.
Pergamon
PII S0047-2352(96)00058-X
DRUNK DRIVERS IN THE COURTS: LEGAL AND EXTRA-LEGAL FACTORS AFFECTING PLEAS AND SENTENCES
JON'A MEYER
Department of Sociology Rutgers University Camden, New Jersey 08102
TARA GRAY
Department of Criminal Justice New Mexico State University Las Cruces, New Mexico 88003-8001
ABSTRACT To what extent are pleas and sentences o f drunk drivers influenced by legal factors such as offense severity and priors versus extralegal factors such as race and gender? It was found that guilty pleas and sentences were based most heavily on offense severity. Pleas also were based on ethnicity, with Caucasians more than twice as likely to plead not guilty. Although judges often fail to impose mandatory sentences, the judges in this sample always imposed mandatory sentences on drunk drivers. © 1997 Elsevier Science Ltd
INTRODUCTION The impact of drunk driving on Americans is enormous: at some time in their lives, 40 percent of Americans will be involved in an alcohol-related crash (National Center for Statistics and Analysis, 1992:1). In 1994, drunk drivers were involved in 11,772 fatal crashes (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1995:5). In recent years, there have been more arrests for drunk driving than for any other offense, including larceny (Maguire and Pastore, 1994:418).
Nonetheless, attitudes about drunk driving vary greatly. One senator said drank driving laws had "taken all the sport out of drinking and driving" (Perlman, 1994:25). Drunk driving has also been called "the crime most frequently committed by a noncriminal" (Joye, 1986:3). Others refer to the "myth of the 'killer drunk'"(Walker, 1994:110) because over 90 percent of the people killed by drunk drivers are the drivers themselves or one of their own passengers (Goldstein, 1982:48). As the death toll mounts, however, public attitudes are changing and drunk 155
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driving is increasingly viewed as a menace (Klein, 1988:7), or as the most frequent violent crime (National Highway Traffic Safety Administration, 1992:1). As a result, the public is increasingly taking a "get tough" attitude toward drunk driving. Indeed, in a recent Gallup Poll, more than onehalf of the respondents said the penalties for drunk driving were too light (Perlman, 1994:25), and getting drunk drivers off the road has become one of the highest priorities for legislators. One hundred drunk driving laws are enacted every year (Mejeur, 1994:10). Many states are stiffening penalties for driving while impaired, and some states have enacted mandatory sentences (e.g., Robertson, Rich, and Ross, 1973; Mejeur, 1994). California, for example, treats third-time drunk drivers as felons who face presumptive terms of three years in prison.1 Mandatory sentences, and stiffer sentences in general, may impact drunk driving, especially if the severity of the sentence depends on the severity of the offense and the prior record of the offender, rather than on extra-legal factors such as race or gender. This study will examine the extent to which pleas and sentences depend on legitimate legal factors rather than extralegal factors, and the extent to which mandatory sentences are imposed on drunk drivers. Little research has been done on the factors affecting pleas. In the lower courts, pleas of not guilty are rare but are more likely to result from more serious cases, where the stakes are higher (Brickey and Miller, 1975; Mileski, 1971). In felony courts, recidivists and those facing longer terms are less likely to plead guilty (Albonetti, 1990). Therefore, in the more serious cases of drunk driving, one would expect to find that drunk drivers are more likely to plead not guilty. More research has been done on factors affecting sentences. Offense severity and priors are known to increase sentence harshness for felons (e.g., Myers, 1987; Petersilia and Turner, 1985; Spohn, 1990), although this is not necessarily the case for misdemeanants for whom both the offense and sentence severity tend to be low. Some researchers have found that misdemeanor sentences appear related to offense severity (e.g., Lange and Greene, 1990; Meeker, Jesilow, and Aranda, 1992), while others have
found that they are not (e.g., Feeley, 1979; Mileski, 1971). In their study of financial penalties at the lower court level, Gordon and Glaser (1991) report that drunk drivers were jailed (in addition to being fined) more often than those convicted of other crimes (i.e., assault, theft, and drug offenses) and nearly as often as burglars. In one study, judges who sentenced driving under the influence (DUI) offenders were asked how they would sentence four hypothetical drunk drivers, with varying blood alcohol contents (BACs) and prior DUI records (Lange and Greene, 1990). Offenders were sentenced to significantly more days in jail if they had prior records or if their BAC levels were .20 or above as opposed to their counterparts with ,one-half that level (Lange and Greene, 1990). These results may be predictive of actual sentencing practices given findings that sentences imposed by lower court judges on hypothetical offenders are remarkably similar to those imposed on the actual offenders on whom the scenarios were based (e.g., Kapardis and Farrington, 1981). Together, these findings suggest that offense severity and prior DUI records are likely to increase sentence severity. Therefore, one would expect to find that offense severity and prior DUI records would increase the sentence severity for drunk drivers. The so-called "mandatory" sentences sound more certain than they are. Judges and other members of the courtroom work group are likely to circumvent mandated penalties that they feel are too harsh or unfair (Meyer and Jesilow, 1993). As a result, mandatory sentences are not always imposed on drunk drivers or other offenders (Becker, 1991; Krueger, 1995; Ross and Foley, 1987). This phenomenon, where individual members of the system create their own forums of justice, also effects enforcement; some scholars have noted a tendency by police to view drunk driving as nonserious and a low priority (e.g., Mastrofski and Ritti, 1992). As a result, some court watchers have argued that mandatory laws would never be enacted or enforced for drunk drivers (e.g., Ayoob, 1980:28). Public attitudes, however, have changed since that time and, given the changing attitudes, one would expect to find that mandatory sentences are imposed on drunk drivers.
Drunk Drivers in the Courts
DATA AND METHODS This study is based on direct observations of arraignments in municipal courtrooms throughout a metropolitan county in southern California during a seven-month period in 1993. Any information that might identify the county, a judge, or a defendant has been excluded from this report to protect confidentiality. As in other lower courts, arraignments occurred very quickly, averaging two minutes in length, with the longest hearing lasting for nine minutes. To gather accurate data and to help reduce observer bias, two observers alternated between a pair of jobs: one served as primary coder and recorded the study variables, while the other verified the accuracy of the notes. This method of direct courtroom observation allowed for the collection of information that might be lost by the incomplete record-keeping systems in the lower courts (Mileski, 1971:475). For example, in the county under study, public records do not include custody status or fluency in English, two variables that the present study hoped to include. The sample included 200 defendants arraigned for driving under the influence. The vast majority of defendants (87 percent, n = 174) were male. Nearly equal numbers were Caucasian (47 percent, n = 93) or Hispanic (46 percent, n = 92). The remainder were Asian (5 percent, n = 9), African American (2 percent, n = 4), Middle-Eastern (n = 1), or American Indian (n = 1). Only 61 percent (n = 121) spoke English fluently. Only 12 percent (n = 23) appeared at their arraignments in custody, and very few defendants (6 percent, n = 11) were represented by counsel, although some of them probably secured counsel at later stages in the proceedings. 2 Only 8 percent of the defendants (n = 11) had prior DUI records. 3 One-half of the defendants (n = 100), however, faced charges in addition to that of driving under the influence and one-half of those (n = 50) faced more than one additional charge. These charges could be divided into three categories: (1) 76 percent were for offenses that probably were detected as a result of the traffic stop for DUI, including driving without a valid license, on a suspended license, or without insurance; (2) 15 percent were
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charges that may have led to DUI detection, including hit and run accidents, seat belt violations, and so on; and (3) 9 percent were charges that appeared to be unrelated to the DUI, including assault and battery, vandalism, or the violation of a court order. 4
Factors Affecting Pleas of "Not Guilty" One-third (33 percent, n = 65) of the defendants pied not guilty at their arraignments. To determine which variables were most associated with pleading not guilty, a logistic regression analysis was performed. 5 Both legal and extralegal variables were included. Legal variables are those upon which sentences may legally be based, including offense severity and prior convictions. Extralegal factors are those that reflect personal characteristics, such as race and gender. It was found that offense severity was the most important determinant of pleas, and ethnicity also was important. Results are shown in Table 1. As expected, offense severity was the most important determinant of whether defendants pled not guilty. Those defendants facing longer jail terms were more likely to plead not guilty and take their chances at trial (OR = 1.0037, p < .01). Offense severity was operationalized here as the maximum possible sentence in days that a judge could impose for all the instant offenses charged. This definition has several advantages over the approaches employed by some researchers, such as the amount of harm caused by an offense. First, it would be difficult to establish an appropriate quantitative measure that reflects the severity of each of the offenses governed by the lower courts, given that such offenses are of lower gravity or may have unclear victims (e.g., driving on a suspended license). Consider, for example, an offender whose license was suspended at the time of his arrest for drunk driving, and another whose seat belt violation lead to her detection for drunk driving. Although the amount of direct harm caused by both offenders is probably equal, the offenses are viewed quite differently by the courts. The measure used in the present study, then, shows how serious the public and the legislature believe each defendant's acts to be, an
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TABLE 1 LEGAL AND EXTRALEGALFACTORS AFFECTING NOT GUILTY PLEAS (n = 144)
Variable
×2
df
Maximum sentence, in days No prior DUI record At liberty Female offender Caucasian offender Constant
Summary statistics - 2 log likelihood Model x 2 Improvement Goodness of fit
154.035 23.228 23.228 142.060
t~
SE
Probability
.0037 -.6856 -.3086 .9047 .9746 -.2845
.0014 .7382 .8572 .5466 .4108 1.9378
.0066 .3531 .7188 .0979 .0177 .8833
138 5 5 138
Odds Ratio 1.0037 .5038 .7345 2.4712 2.6501
.1660 .0003 .0003 .3889
Note: Percentage of correct dependent variable classification by model is 72.22%.
important consideration in a system that expects its judges to reflect the communities from which they are chosen. The present study's measure also serves as a convenient index of the seriousness of all instant offenses combined. 6 Interestingly, prior DUI convictions did not affect pleas in this model. Perhaps DUI convictions did not affect pleas because of the negligible role that the small number (8 percent) of defendants with known DUI records could play in a multivariate model or because DUI defendants perceive that conviction is inevitable. Indeed, the low number of defendants with prior records may indicate that drunk drivers are less likely than other types of offenders to have been in court before, which may be one reason drunk driving is sometimes referred to as a crime committed by a "noncriminal" (Joye, 1986:3). Or, prior record may not affect pleas because of the perception among defendants that drunk driving cases cannot be won. Indeed, some defendants in traffic court cases do perceive conviction as inevitable (Brickey and Miller, 1975:691), and one study found that 90 percent of those arrested for DUI in Vermont were ultimately convicted even though one-third pied not guilty (Little, 1973). It was expected that those in custody would plead guilty in order to get out of jail. If offenders received a two- or three-day jail sentence, they would be released following their arraignments because of time served. This chance to get out of jail early would seem to motivate offenders to plead guilty. Being in custody, however, did not play a significant role in defen-
dants' decisions to plead guilty, and many offenders waited weeks or even months for their day in court. Gender did not significantly affect the decision to plea, but ethnicity did: Caucasians were 2.7 times more likely than other ethnic groups to plead not guilty (OR = 2.65, p < .05). 7 Whether the blood alcohol levels of Caucasians were lower than those of non-Caucasians, which could lead Caucasians to be less fatalistic about conviction, was considered, but the two variables did not appear to be correlated. Instead, ethnicity may be a proxy for other factors, including fluency in English. Indeed, all the Caucasian defendants in the sample appeared proficient in English, compared to only 26 percent of the non-Caucasians, and fluent English speakers were significantly less likely than their less proficient counterparts to be charged with having a blood alcohol level above .08 (phi = . 18, p < .01). Perhaps English speakers and Caucasians were more knowledgeable about their rights in our criminal justice system or more aware that they could plea bargain at later stages in the system if they pied not guilty at their arraignments. As a result, they seemed less likely to go along with the courtroom work group and to plead guilty. 8
Factors Affecting Sentences Roughly two-thirds (68 percent, n = 135) of the defendants in the sample pied guilty and were sentenced; more than one-third (36 percent, n = 48) were incarcerated. None of the of-
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TABLE 2 LEGAL AND EXTRALEGALFACTORSAFFECTING INCARCERATION(n = 100)
Variable
X2
df
Maximum sentence, in days No prior DUI record At liberty Female offender Caucasian offender
Constant Summary statistics - 2 log likelihood Model ×2 Improvement Goodness of fit
82.136 43.238 43.238 80.655
,6
SE
Probability
.0129 -10.2230 -9.6373 -9.3459 .0788 25.7913
.0037 57.0369 59.2450 49.3635 .5829 131.5025
.0005 .8578 .8708 .8498 .8924 .8445
94 5 5 94
Odds Ratio 1.0130 .0000 .0001 .0001 1.0820
.8038
.0000 .0000 .8350
Note: Percentageof correct dependentvariable classification by model is 83.0 percent.
fenders were incarcerated solely for charges other than those related to drunk driving (i.e., while some offenders received jail terms for, say, failure to appear, at least part of their jail sentence was "earmarked" for their drunk driving offenses). A second logistic regression was run to examine the extent to which the legal and extralegal factors influenced the decision to incarcerate drunk drivers. It was found that offense severity had a significant effect on sentencing, but prior DUI offenses, appearance in custody, gender, and ethnicity did not. Results are shown in Table 2. As expected, offense severity had the most significant effect on sentence severity for drunk drivers; the more serious the charges, the more likely incarceration (OR = 1.013, p < .001). Prior DUI convictions did not have a statistically significant effect on the likelihood of jail sentences, although those who faced mandatory jail due to priors were incarcerated. 9 Appearance in custody did not significantly impact the decision to incarcerate. The effects due to offender gender and race did not play a significant role in sentence severity, indicating that these extralegal offender characteristics may play a relatively minor role in the sentencing of drunk drivers, at least in this jurisdiction.
The Imposition of Mandatory Sentences In the sample of the present study, all those offenders who faced mandatory jail sentences were incarcerated. This was found to be surpris-
ing, given that sentences designated as mandatory are not always imposed, even when mandated for drunk drivers (Becker, 1991; Krueger, 1995; Meyer and Jesilow, 1993; Ross and Foley, 1987). In order to find out whether the judges in the sample usually imposed mandatory sentences, the other cases in the larger sample of lower court cases from which this sample was drawn were examined, and it was found that only 41 percent of the 292 offenders facing mandatory incarceration received any jail time. Judges in this jurisdiction, however, seem inclined to impose mandatory jail terms on at least one class of offenders, the drunk driver, perhaps because of the perceived seriousness of the offense. Indeed, during interviews, even those judges who disliked mandatory sentences in general saw value in applying them to drunk drivers as a way to inform the public that drinking and driving is unacceptable and will be punished harshly. For the most part, the sentences imposed on the sample of drunk drivers were remarkably uniform. One judge so closely adhered to the state's statutory minimums that she displayed in her courtroom a large hand-stenciled poster showing the sentences she imposed on drunk drivers who pied guilty. In the present study's sample, the offenders received all the mandatory minimums that they faced, including mandatory jail terms. Seventeen sentenced offenders faced mandatory jail terms and all were incarcerated. Five of these offenders had prior DUI convictions; the remaining twelve were
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charged with driving on a suspended license in addition to their DUI charges, an offense with a mandatory ten-day jail sentence. Other offenders faced California's mandatory minimum sentence for a first conviction of driving under the influence. This sentence costs offenders about $1,200 in cash, suspension of their driving privileges for three months, completion of an alcohol education program, and three years of informal probation? ° More than one-half of the sentenced offenders (70 of 135) received this penalty and the others received variations on this sentence. Variations on the mandatory sentence generally involved mandated Alcoholics Anonymous meetings or community service, or the substitution of one penalty for another in order to give the offender a sentence that was somehow more desirable than the original penalty. Roughly 10 percent (n = 13) of the drivers were required to attend ten or more Alcoholics Anonymous (AA) meetings, and these offenders usually had blood alcohol levels that were very high (usually .20 or higher)." Sixteen offenders (12 percent) were allowed to perform community service in place of paying fines, and three offenders were ordered to complete community service in addition to their fines.
CONCLUSIONS Intuition and prior studies suggest what the findings show: The seriousness of offense is the greatest determinant of both the plea and sentence severity for drunk drivers. Earlier work in felony courts has found that offense severity is one of the strongest factors affecting sentence severity. At the lower court level this consensus is lacking, but some researchers have noted that misdemeanor sanctions are related to the seriousness of offenders' actions (e.g., Lange and Greene, 1990; Meeker, Jesilow, and Aranda, 1992). Similarly, the findings support the work of researchers who have found that those facing harsher sentences for their crimes are less likely to plead guilty (e.g., Albonetti, 1990). It is indeed possible that drunk drivers feel they face harsh sentences, as well as stigma, 12 increased insurance rates, and "points" added to their
driving records that can result in sanctions for employees who drive professionally and can lead to prosecution as a habitual traffic offender, To find out, future researchers may want to interview defendants charged with DUI. In contrast, differences attributable to prior offenses were not found. While this may be a function of the low number of drunk drivers with prior records in the sample, it also may reflect the perception among defendants that drunk driving cases cannot be won. Indeed, Albonetti (1990) found that defendants were much more likely to plead guilty if the evidence against them was strong. In the county under study, suspected drunk drivers were given Breathalyzer or blood tests to determine their blood alcohol content levels. Seldom is such a "smoking gun" presented in criminal trials and disputing such evidence is difficult and costly in terms of attorney fees and time lost in court. The finding that ethnicity is not a significant factor when judges hand down sentences is consistent with that of Feeley (1979:143). The finding that Caucasians were more than twice as likely to plead not guilty, however, is troubling because it suggests a disparity in the justice system. Mileski (1971:495) found that African American and Hispanic misdemeanants were less likely than Caucasians to plead guilty, even when the seriousness of their charges was held constant. Mileski (l 971:495) offers possible reasons for this, including the possibility that minorities are more often innocent. She concludes that "whatever the source of the race difference in guilty pleas, it remains that blacks make a disproportionate amount of work for the court in their pursuit of justice" (Mileski, 1971:495). In the present study, the opposite was true: Caucasians made a disproportionate amount of work for the courts. Why were Caucasians more likely to plead not guilty? In her study of felony courts, AIbonetti (1990:329) found that African American defendants were more likely than Caucasians to plead not guilty, possibly because Caucasians were offered better deals or because they had more confidence "in a system in which bargains are struck in the dark." As observed at the court proceedings, the court personnel occasionally tried to shepherd both Caucasian and minority
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defendants away from guilty pleas. For example, one judge protested when an Hispanic defendant insisted on pleading guilty and being sentenced immediately. The judge felt the defendant had a good chance for acquittal and told him he should plead not guilty and seek counsel. Although minority defendants may have reason to believe that the deck is sometimes stacked against them in court, it was not immediately evident in this jurisdiction. It is interesting that ethnic differences for pleading, but not for sentencing, were found. Is it possible that such differences are more likely to appear in situations that fall under control of the defendant, rather than other members of the courtroom drama? Indeed, when two defendantcontrolled processes were examined further, Caucasians were more likely than non-Caucasians to be represented by counsel at their arraignments (t = - 2 . 9 3 , p < .01) and to plead not guilty (t = - 2 . 6 2 , p < .01). Likewise, there were not any significant differences between the two groups for processes that are controlled by persons other than the defendant; both ethnic groups were equally likely to appear in custody (t = .76, n.s.) and to be sent to jail for their offenses (t = .44, n.s.). While not conclusive, these results suggest that differences between ethnic groups may be based in part on the choices they make while entangled in the web of justice. In the present study's sample of drunk drivers, mandatory sentences were really mandatory. Is this true in other jurisdictions? Is it true when sentences are imposed after trial? These questions could not be answered because it was impossible to track hearings from one court date to the next, which is unfortunate because research has shown that sentences imposed at arraignments frequently differ from those at trial (Brickey and Miller, 1975; Feeley, 1979; McCall, 1978; Meeker and Pontell, 1985). Researchers should pay particular attention to the imposition of mandatory penalties in such samples because judges may be less likely to impose them on defendants who plea bargain. Researchers also should explore whether judges view mandatory sentences for drunk drivers differently from other mandatory sentences. Do judges view mandatory sentences as truly mandatory for some offenses, but not for others?
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The authors thank Joan E. Crowley, Gil Geis, and L. Thomas Winfree for offering comments that strengthened this article.
NOTES 1. Many jurisdictions also have developed educational programs and group meetings aimed at reducing recidivism among drunk drivers. These programs are often mandated as a condition of probation, and they last anywhere from a few weeks to more than one year. One New Mexico jurisdiction has a DWI Drug Court, the nation's first drug court aimed exclusively at drunk drivers (Ryan, 1994). This court assigns drunk drivers to a variety of group and individual therapies aimed at changing attitudes and feelings about alcohol. It also monitors clients to try to ensure that relapses do not interfere with the lives of offenders or others. 2. Logistic regression equations including presence of counsel showed that adding the variable did not affect the magnitude or direction of any of the other factors. Due to the low number of subjects with attorneys, the presence of counsel was not included in the final comparisons. 3. Although each judge agreed to announce whether defendants possessed prior records and the nature of any such convictions, they sometimes failed to do this, usually because they forgot. These data were coded as missing for those for whom it was not announced (26 percent, n = 52). When the data were reanalyzed excluding prior records, the direction and magnitude of the individual factors were not noticeably different. 4. The number of instant charges could not be included in the model due to multicollinearity with offense severity (correlation = .83, p < .001). Logistic regression equations that substituted number of instant offenses for maximum possible sentence showed that the two variables had virtually the same impact. 5. Logistic regression allows multiple independent variables to be regressed on a dichotomous dependent variable. Additionally, when the assumption that the dependent variable is normally distributed is violated, logistic regression produces better estimates than ordinary least squares (OLS) regression. 6. Although they were permitted to do so, no defendant pied guilty to some charges and not guilty to others. Instead, they either pied guilty to or denied all the charges they faced. One potentially useful indicator of offense severity, BAC level, could not be used due to the inability to gather that intbrmation for but a modest number of offenders in the sample. 7. Some scholars (e.g., Zatz, 1984) have argued that Hispanics are not treated like other minority groups. Because of this possibility, logistic regression equations that compared Caucasians to Hispanics (i.e., that excluded all other minorities) were run. The direction and magnitude of the individual factors remained essentially unchanged for both type of plea and sentence severity. 8. Fluency in English, a variable suggested by Meeker, Jesilow, and Aranda (1992), could not be included in the statistical equations due to multicollinearity with ethnicity (correlation = .75, p < .001). The present study uses eth-
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nicity so that the findings will be more compatible with others in the literature. Logistic regression equations that substituted fluency in English for ethnicity, showed that both variables had virtually the same impact. 9. Of course, the finding may have been due to the very small number of sentenced offenders (n = 5) with known prior DUI convictions. Therefore, another logistic regression equation was run excluding this information, but the direction and magnitude of the individual factors remained essentially the same. 10. Financial costs to drunk drivers included a fine of $390 plus $664 in legislated penalty assessment fees, as well as $50 for the Alcohol Abuse Prevention Fund, a $37 testing fee, a $25 citation fee, and a $25 payment to the state restitution fund. Ostensibly, offenders were able to choose between a ninety-day driver's license suspension or two days in jail, but the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) suspended driver's licenses for at least ninety days through a civil court process (Administrative License Revocation) regardless of whether or not offenders served the two days. During interviews, some of the judges complained that Administrative License Revocation transferred discretion from them to the DMV because the civil court process meant inevitable loss of driving privileges in addition to any criminal penalties imposed by the municipal court. If offenders did not have a license to suspend, they were generally given the two-day sentence. 11. During interviews with the judges, it was learned that assigning ten or more AA meetings to DUI offenders with high BAC levels was a common practice. While every offender's BAC level could not be determined, it is known that one-half of those who received AA meetings had high BAC levels. 12. Stigma may be an especially important deterrent to driving under the influence. One team of scholars found that perceived increases in the shame created by a drunk driving conviction reduced self-reported drunk driving between 1982 and 1990 in Oklahoma City (Grasmick, Bursik, and Arneklev, 1993).
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Walker, S. (1994). Sense and nonsense about crime and drugs. 3d ed. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Zatz, M. S. (1984). Race, ethnicity, and determinate sentencing: A new dimension to an old controversy. Criminology 22:147-71.