Early voting, direct democracy, and voter mobilization

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Early voting, direct democracy, and voter mobilization夽 Brian D. Williams Department of Political Science, State University of New York College at Cortland, Old Main, Room 217-C, P.O. Box 2000, Cortland, NY, 13045, USA

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Article history: Received 12 August 2018 Received in revised form 12 August 2019 Accepted 14 August 2019 Available online xxx Keywords: Early voting Absentee voting Direct democracy Voter mobilization Political campaigns

a b s t r a c t This study aims to evaluate whether direct democracy campaign contact can stimulate peripheral voter usage of early voting options, thereby helping to equalize rates of electoral participation between core and peripheral voter groups. Using voter survey data from the 2016 US presidential election in Escambia County, Florida, the analysis shows that while core voters tend to use early voting options, peripheral voters contacted by a direct democracy campaign can be mobilized into voting absentee. This result suggests that direct democracy reforms, and the ballot measure campaigns accompanying them, can help bring about a more representative electorate. © 2019 Western Social Science Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction Liberal democracies are generally characterized by free and fair electoral competition, universal suffrage, and constitutional rights (Diamond, 2008). While some voter turnout is essential to democracy (Downs, 1957, p. 261), high levels are not (Schmitter & Karl, 2013 [1991], p. 209). In the United States (US), for example, although levels of voter turnout have varied widely over time (Burnham, 1982; Kleppner, 1982; but see McDonald & Popkin, 2001), and are low by comparative standards (Piven & Cloward,

夽 I wish to thank the University of West Florida for providing the postdoctoral position where this study began, and Department of Government faculty for valuable feedback on early drafts of the study. I would also like to thank Amy Newburn of the Haas Center for sharing the survey data, and for including the campaign contact question in the survey. Thanks are also owed to the anonymous reviewers for their invaluable suggestions. An early version of this study was presented at the Southern Political Science Association annual meeting in 2017. E-mail address: [email protected]

1988),1 the US is generally not viewed as less democratic because of this. It has even been suggested that lower levels of electoral participation could reflect higher levels of citizen satisfaction with the democratic system (Fatke, 2015, p. 3). While low levels of voter turnout do not necessarily indicate a lack of democracy, high levels of electoral participation are arguably better for modern democratic societies. For instance, the participatory theory of democracy “unconditionally insists on the desirability of maximizing the participation of citizens in the public decision that affects their lives” (Kriesi, 2007, p. 117). It has also been suggested that high levels of voter turnout can enhance the link between citizens and elected representatives (Teixeira, 1992), increase representative responsiveness to public preferences (Lijphart, 1997; Piven & Cloward, 1988; Verba & Nie, 1972, ch. 17), and bolster government legitimacy (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980, p. 104).

1 Desilver, D. (2018, May 21). U.S. trails most developed countries in voter turnout. Retrieved from http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2018/05/21/u-s-voter-turnout-trails-most-developed-countries/.

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2019.08.005 0362-3319/© 2019 Western Social Science Association. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

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Fatke (2015) observes that, “if voters consist of a representative sample of the populace as a whole and non-voting is the result of a voluntary and conscious decision, then low turnout does not seem problematic” (p. 101). However, voters often do not proportionately represent the larger voting age population. For instance, the electorate – those who register and turnout to vote – tend to under-represent groups from a lower socioeconomic status (Calvert & Gilchrist, 1993; Hill & Leighley, 1994; Nagel, 1987, pp. 118–119; Verba & Nie, 1972), a phenomenon referred to as “the democratic dilemma of unequal participation” (Lijphart, 1997). An unrepresentative electorate, in turn, is likely to demand and receive policies which serve their own interests, possibly at the expense of those who participate less frequently (Rosenstone & Hansen, 2003 [1993], pp. 245–248). Thus, while high levels of voter participation are not essential for democracy per se, the persistence of an unrepresentative electorate is arguably problematic for democratic equality. This study focuses on the question of how to achieve a more representative electorate. The following theoretical discussion examines the relationship between early voting and voter participation, as well as contrasting perspectives on whether direct democracy can increase peripheral voter usage of early voting options, thereby increasing overall levels of electoral participation. Using survey data from the 2016 US presidential election, the empirical analysis tests hypotheses using a novel survey question allowing voters to distinguish between representative and ballot measure campaign contact. The results provide additional evidence that early voting tends to be utilized by core voters, but that direct democracy campaigns can nudge peripheral voters to cast a ballot absentee. 2. Theory and hypotheses 2.1. Core and peripheral voters Focusing on the phenomenon of presidential party midterm loss, surge and decline theory distinguished between a set of core voters who consistently turned out to vote even during “low stimulation” midterm elections, and peripheral voters who tended to participate only during “high stimulation” presidential elections (Campbell, 1960). Presidential campaigns tend to stimulate peripheral voters in favor of one of the candidates, generating a partisan division different from the “normal vote” – the baseline partisan divide across the electorate, all else equal (Converse, 1966). Congressional candidates from the favored presidential candidate’s party would also benefit from a “coat tails” effect, temporarily increasing that party’s seat share in congress after the presidential election (Campbell, 1985, 1987). Another relevant theoretical contribution focused on electoral participation from a rational choice perspective, according to which the choice of whether or not to cast a vote was based on a cost/benefit analysis. According to Downs (1957), if the expected utility derived from one candidate’s victory over another was not large enough to outweigh the costs of voting – especially those related to time and information gathering – the voter would abstain.

Riker and Ordeshook (1968), building on Downs’ model, added “expressive benefits” to the equation based on compliance with social norms, support for one’s party, and an affirmation of one’s sense of political efficacy. Thus, an individual would cast a vote when PB + D > C where P indicates the probability that one’s vote will be decisive, B reflects the benefits gained under the preferred vote outcome, D captures the expressive benefits of voting, and C accounts for the costs associated with the act of voting. For core voters, the benefits of voting should consistently outweigh the costs, while for peripheral voters the benefits of voting are more likely to outweigh the costs of voting during presidential elections. To understand why, it will be useful to break down the core and peripheral voter categories into more specific characteristics (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980, p. 16). The literature on voter turnout suggests that core voters tend to have a higher socioeconomic status – typically linked to education, income, and occupational prestige (Nagel, 1987, p. 58) – membership in a major political party, older age, and white ethnicity. Education was relevant, for instance, as it was expected to lower the informational costs of electoral participation (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). 2.2. Institutional reforms and voter turnout In recent decades, another body of research has developed focusing on the “direct costs” of voting associated with electoral system reforms such as early in-person and absentee vote casting options, as well as election day voter registration. A common view is that such reforms will make it more convenient for individuals to participate in the election, increasing voter turnout (Burden, Canon, Meyer, & Moynihan, 2017).2 Indeed, several studies have provided evidence in support of this argument. For example, Richardson and Neeley (1996) found that early in-person voting had a positive and statistically significant effect on voter turnout during the 1994 primary and general elections in Tennessee. Using county-level data from across the US, Fullmer (2015) shows a positive, statistically significant association between the number of early voting stations per capita and voter turnout. Herron and Smith (2014) find that a Republican Party-led effort to reduce early vote days in Florida in 2011 disproportionately lowered turnout among Democratic Party and minority voters, implying a positive relationship between early voting options and turnout among such groups. Meanwhile, Giammo and Brox (2010) show that early voting reforms increase overall turnout in the near term, but that this effect diminishes over subsequent electoral cycles as the novelty of the reform fades. However, other studies have found that early voting options tend to be used by those already likely to vote, thus

2 For example, see Lau, T. (2019, January 24). New York’s democracy just got fairer. Retrieved from https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/ new-yorks-democracy-just-got-fairer.

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making the electorate less representative of the wider population. For example, using survey data from Tennessee, Neeley and Richardson (2001) conclude that, “early voting has not had a strong mobilization effect on the disadvantaged groups for which the law was intended” (p. 387). Comparing early in-person with election day voters using survey data from the 1994 Texas gubernatorial election, Stein (1998) finds that early voters tend to be more conservative, male, interested in politics, and similar to election day voters with regards to race and education level. Some national studies also find that early in-person voting does not make the electorate any more representative of the wider voting-age population. For example, Rigby and Springer’s (2011) model predicts an increase in upper class bias in the electorate after a state adopts early in-person voting. Ashok, Feder, McGrath, and Hersh (2016) find that “high participation” (older and partisan) voters were more likely to cast ballots early during the 2012 US national election. Meanwhile, Burden, Canon, Mayer, and Moynihan (2014) provide evidence that early voting reduces voter turnout (by depressing mobilization efforts), though this tendency can be offset with liberal registration laws. Studies have also found that expanded access to absentee ballots increases turnout among those already likely to vote, such as older and college educated voters (Alvarez, Levin, & Sinclair, 2011; Barreto, Streb, Marks, & Guerra, 2006; Oliver, 1996). Some have reported that ‘vote (only) by mail’ systems tend to retain existing voters rather than stimulate new ones (Berinsky, Burns, & Traugott, 2001; Karp & Banducci, 2000; Magleby, 1987), while others have found a positive relationship between such systems and voter turnout (Gronke, Galanes-Rosenbaum, & Miller, 2007; Richey, 2008), especially during low stimulus special elections (Southwell, 2009). Meanwhile, recent research has found that election day registration reduces the upper-class bias of the electorate (Rigby & Springer, 2011) and increases the vote share of the Democratic Party (Burden et al., 2017). Brians and Grofman (1999) argue that registration reforms have a curvilinear effect, increasing turnout among middle class groups. However, Calvert and Gilchrist (1993) conclude that election day registration in Minnesota provided “further convenience for those already inclined to vote by virtue of their social class position” (p. 699). In addition, Stein and Vonnahme (2008) report that Election Day Vote Centers increased turnout among infrequent voters in Larimer County, Colorado. In sum, this body of research offers mixed results regarding the effect of such institutional reforms on electoral participation. The first hypothesis is drawn from this general conclusion. Hypothesis 1. Early voting options will tend to be utilized by those groups of voters who already vote at high rates. 2.3. Direct democracy campaigns and voter mobilization In the context of the above debate, some scholars have argued that it is also necessary to appeal to the interests of potential voters (Berinsky, 2005; Lyons & Scheb, 1999; Teixeira, 1992). One potential way to achieve this involves campaign mobilization. A seminal contribution by

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Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) [1993] argued that voter turnout was not only a function of individual voter characteristics, but also political factors, especially mobilization – “the process by which candidates, parties, activists, and groups induce other people to participate” (p. 25). According to Rosenstone and Hansen, potential voters must have the resources (personal-level) as well as a reason to participate (political-level). They defined campaigns in broad terms to include direct campaign contact, media effects, as well as informal discussions among friends, family, or colleagues. Rosenstone and Hansen’s study subsequently inspired “a cottage industry of research” (Green & SchwamBaird, 2016, p. 159). Appealing to potential voter interests might also be achieved through direct democracy. Indeed, during the populist era of the US in the late-19th and early-20th centuries, a number of progressive thinkers advocated adoption of the initiative, referendum, and recall on the grounds that such reforms would empower “citizen lawmakers”, motivating them to become more civically engaged (Smith & Tolbert, 2004). Indeed, some studies have found that states with more initiatives on the ballot tend to have higher levels of voter turnout (Smith & Tolbert, 2004; Tolbert, McNeal, & Smith, 2003), especially during midterm elections (Biggers, 2011; Tolbert & Smith, 2005; Tolbert, Grummel, & Smith, 2001). Focusing on the European context, Fatke (2015) as well as Kern and Hooghe (2018) do not find that direct democracy increases voter turnout among lower class citizens in the long-term. Although the educative effects of direct democracy are sometimes described as long-term (Dvoˇrák, Zouhar, & Novák, 2017; Tolbert & Smith, 2005), one might also posit that direct democracy campaigns can have a short-term educational effect, by lowering the cognitive (informational) costs associated with learning about issues relevant to a particular ballot. Indeed, using survey data, Donovan, Tolbert, and Smith (2009) report that direct democracy mobilizes turnout among independent voters. By contrast, candidates’ negative campaign advertising has been found to reduce voter turnout, especially among independents and the poorly informed (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995; Lau & Pomper, 2001). This seems plausible in the case focused on here – the 2016 presidential elections in Escambia County, Florida – in that the 2016 presidential campaigns were among the most negative in US history.3 Also, if it is true that, “[t]he tighter the contest, the meaner the campaign” (Ansolabehere & Iyengar, 1995, p. 108), campaigns in swing states such as Florida should have been especially negative in 2016, making it more likely that peripheral voters would be de-mobilized by them. By contrast, direct democracy is issue-oriented, and should thus involve less of the personal attacks associated with contemporary representative campaigns. Hypothesis 2. Direct democracy campaign contact will mobilize peripheral voters to take advantage of early voting options.

3 Kamarck, E. (2016, October 18). Has a presidential election ever been as negative as this one? Retrieved from https://www.brookings.edu/ blog/fixgov/2016/10/18/the-most-negative-campaign/.

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An alternative theoretical perspective is more pessimistic regarding the potential for direct democracy to mobilize peripheral voters. First, although direct democracy campaigns can provide information about what is on the ballot, representative campaigns do so as well. As Childers and Binder (2012) observe, “there is nothing inherently distinctive about initiatives in general that cause people to vote” (p. 94). Indeed, there is evidence of a positive association between presidential campaigning and voter turnout (Cann & Cole, 2011), and the Barack Obama campaign of 2008 was very effective at mobilizing early voters (Kenski, Hardy, & Jamieson, 2010). It can also be argued that direct democracy increases the informational costs of voting. Campbell (2000) states that, “for those voters who find the choice to be an easy one [especially partisans], there is no reason to delay; the choice can be made early on” (p. 32). However, direct legislation introduces new issues to decide on, potentially cross-pressuring voters with non-partisan cues (Magleby, 1984, p. 96). It is therefore plausible that the non-partisan issues of direct legislation would delay partisans’ voting decisions, even until election day. By contrast, the preferences of partisan voters contacted only by a representative campaign may be reinforced. Reinforcement takes place where, “initial preference for a candidate [. . .] is simply buttressed by the information picked up during the campaign” (Campbell, 2000, p. 194). Consistent with this argument, Kenski et al. (2010), summarizing recent theory on the effects of representative campaigns, note that “campaigns basically provide voters with information that helps them align with the candidate to whom they were predisposed all along” (p. 25). In sum, while representative campaigns could make partisans even more likely to vote early, direct democracy campaigns may delay ballot casting until election day. Hypothesis 3. Partisans contacted by direct democracy campaigns should be more likely to vote on election day than those not contacted by such campaigns. 2.4. The direct costs of voting A limitation of using voter rather than election surveys (as this study does) is that the former does not include a sample of non-voters, preventing us from directly observing changes in voter turnout. In this study, we compare rates of absentee, early in-person, and election day ballot casting across core and peripheral voter groups. This creates an analytical challenge in that the aforementioned theories offer rival explanations of the same empirical result: Both expect that core voters are more likely to vote early than peripheral voters, but that direct democracy campaign contact reverses this pattern. Discussing a similar issue, Kenski et al. (2010) note that, “in a statistical model, there may be shared variance among the campaign messages and political orientation variables” (p. 297). Fortunately, the direct costs of vote casting methods can help distinguish evidence of the aforementioned theoretical perspectives. First, it will be argued that the direct costs of participation can be ordered as follows: absten-

tion < absentee < early in-person < election day. The explanation for this ordering is straight forward. First, early in-person voting provides voters with more potential days on which they can schedule a trip to the polling station, thus rendering early in-person voting less costly than election day voting, ceteris paribus.4 Second, while both absentee and early in-person vote casting allow voters to cast their ballot before election day, absentee voting should be less costly than early in-person voting, in that the former does not require showing up at the polling station at all (Gronke & Toffee, 2008, p. 504).5 Given this direct cost ordering, peripheral voters previously inclined to abstain, but stimulated by a direct democracy campaign (Hypothesis 2), should be nudged into voting absentee rather than early in-person, given the lower direct costs of the former. Thus, evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2 should be most pronounced in the model of absentee voting. Conversely, we should observe the “core voter delay” effect (Hypothesis 3) in the model of early in-person voting, as the direct costs of that method more closely approximate those of election day voting than absentee voting. That is, core voters who otherwise would have cast their ballot early in-person, are expected to delay their vote until election day. We will return to this point in the empirical analysis below. 3. Data and methods 3.1. The Haas Center voter survey This study analyzes voter survey data to assess differences between those voting early and those voting on election day (Alvarez et al., 2011; Gronke, Bishin, Stevens, & Galanes-Rosenbaum, 2005; Neeley & Richardson, 2001; Stein, 1998). Specifically, this study uses data from a 2016 voter survey conducted in West Florida’s Escambia County to test the proposition that institutional reforms – in this case, early in-person, or early by mail (i.e., absentee) voting options – combined with direct democracy campaign contact can stimulate peripheral voter participation, thus

4 One could argue that the lines for early in-person voting are sometimes longer than those on election day, making the former more costly than the later. However, referring to the voter survey data from Escambia County (discussed below), when asked why people chose to vote early in-person, the modal response was “to avoid long lines” (54 percent), and the runner-up reasons were “schedule” and “convenient location” (about 16 percent each). By contrast, when asked why they voted on election day, the vast majority (about 74 percent) said they did so because they “enjoy it”, rather than for convenience-based reasons. These responses suggest that early in-person voting is more convenient than election day voting, at least in Escambia County. 5 One might also question whether the costs of voting absentee are truly less than voting at a polling station. As Oliver (1996) notes, “[m]any voters may also find the initial ‘costs’ of learning to vote absentee higher than their habitual in-person voting behavior” (p. 503). Referring again to the Escambia County survey, a question asking people why they chose to vote absentee, the top response was to “avoid lines” (31 percent). This is corroborated by a 2003 California recall election survey which showed that the biggest reason for absentee ballot casting was the ease and convenience that it provides (37 percent) (Barreto et al., 2006). In response to another Escambia County survey question asking absentee voters how easy it was to use an absentee ballot, about 92 percent said “very easy”.

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making the electorate more representative of the wider voting-age population. The Haas Center, a research organization affiliated with the University of West Florida, conducted a voter survey for the 2016 primary and general elections in Escambia County, located at the western-most side of the Florida panhandle. The main purpose of the survey, commissioned by the Escambia County Supervisor of Elections, was to evaluate voter satisfaction with the vote casting procedures used in the county. The survey also provides some data that can be used to test the aforementioned hypotheses. Specifically, the survey asks respondents what vote casting method was used (the outcome variable), as well as questions measuring several voter characteristics, including race, gender, age, knowledge, education, and partisanship (the explanatory variables).6 The general election survey also includes a novel question asking if the voter was contacted by a campaign for either a representative election or a ballot measure (the moderating variable).7 Voters from throughout Escambia County were sampled for the survey, largely from the City of Pensacola (the county seat), but also from the smaller Town of Century as well as precincts from unincorporated parts of the county. The survey has a balance of about twenty percent of respondents from each of the five county commission districts, ranging from 163 respondents in District 3, to 233 in District 1. The survey team used a combination of exit polling, randomized telephone interviews, and online surveys for those unable to complete the phone interview. A comparison of age, race, and gender data from the Supervisor of Elections office of all registered voters with the voter survey sample indicates that the later was demographically representative of the larger population of registered voters in the county. Voters from all seven early voting locations in Escambia County were eventually sampled by the Haas Center team, although only one or two voting sites per day over the course of the early voting period were sampled.8 This sampling approach precludes a survival analysis of the data, which would require that samples be gathered from each voting site on each voting day. However, the pooled sample of early in-person voters should be representative of the larger population of early in-person voters. Recent studies have argued that peripheral voters are more likely to be stimulated by direct democracy during

6 Although the survey does not ask about voter income level, education tends to correlate strongly with income, and should thus provide a reliable indicator of socio-economic status, an important core voter characteristic. 7 As of the time of this writing, neither the Cooperative Congressional Election Study (CCES) survey, the American National Election Studies (ANES) survey, nor the General Social Survey (GSS) allow respondents to specifically indicate that they were contacted by a campaign for a ballot measure. Related examples include Barabas, Barrilleaux, and Scheller (2010), who used ballot measure contact data from a field experiment to assess if this increased voter turnout in the State of Florida, as well as Bowler and Donovan (2002), who focused on what sources voters in Washington State and California used to learn about initiatives (including campaign mailings), and how important these sources were in determining their position for or against an initiative. 8 In Escambia County, there were eight early vote days for the 2016 primary election and thirteen for the 2016 general election.

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midterm elections, typically characterized by lower levels of information than presidential elections (Donovan et al., 2009). Indeed, Childers and Binder (2012) find that “direct democracy does not increase turnout in presidential races” (p. 101). However, direct democracy has also been found to have a positive effect on aggregate voter turnout during presidential elections, albeit a weaker effect than during midterm elections (Tolbert & Smith, 2005). This suggests that there may still be a stimulation effect to measure during the 2016 presidential election. 3.2. Escambia County in context Florida is one of thirty-nine US states with early voting,9 and is one of thirty-two states without either election day or same day registration.10 Following the 2000 general election, the Florida legislature passed a bill requiring the Supervisors of Elections (SOE) – Florida’s county level election administration office – to offer early in-person voting options to registered voters. The modes of voting used in Florida – early in-person, absentee, and election day inperson – are similar to those used in other states. Florida is also a “no-excuse absentee” and “no-excuse early inperson” voter state (Alvarez et al., 2011), meaning that any registered individual can choose to vote early in one of those two ways. Before proceeding, it will be worth confirming that the core and peripheral voter characteristics emphasized in this study are actually present in Escambia County. Using Escambia County SOE voter files, those who participated only in the 2016 or only in the 2014 general election (peripheral voters), can be compared with those who participated in the 2014 and 2016 general elections (core voters). The data reveal that white voters are more likely to be core voters than non-whites (67 versus 56%), males are only slightly more likely than females to be core voters (66 versus 63%), and that partisans are more likely to be core voters (71% of Republicans, and 62% of Democrats) than independents (59% of minor party members, and 46% of those with no party affiliation). Core voters are also older on average than peripheral voters (58 versus 46 years old). Similar differences between the demographic characteristics of peripheral and core voters are found in national samples as well (Ansolabehere & Schaffner, 2015). Although electorates tend to under-represent citizens from certain peripheral voter demographic groups, the severity of this bias varies across jurisdictions (Rigby & Springer, 2011). To assess if such a bias can be found in Escambia County, statistics from the county’s larger voting age population from the US Census Factfinder11 are compared with statistics on registered voters from

9 National Conference of State Legislatures. (2019, April 3). Absentee and early voting. Retrieved from http://www.ncsl.org/research/ elections-and-campaigns/absentee-and-early-voting.aspx. 10 National Conference of State Legislatures. (2019, April 17). Same day voter registration. Retrieved from http://www.ncsl.org/research/ elections-and-campaigns/same-day-registration.aspx. 11 United States Census Bureau. (2019, June 5). American fact finder. Retrieved from https://factfinder.census.gov/faces/nav/jsf/pages/ index.xhtml.

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the Escambia County SOE voter files.12 Although males are slightly under-represented, other demographic groups with core voter characteristics – whites, older voters, those with a college degree, and Republicans – are overrepresented among the registered, suggesting that the “dilemma of unequal representation” exists in Escambia County as well. 3.3. Core voter characteristics What follows is a brief discussion of the voter characteristics included in the subsequent analysis, including some justifications for including (or excluding) them in the discussion about core and peripheral voter participation. With regards to voter ethnicity, white people are sometimes viewed as more likely to vote than people from minority ethnic groups. For instance, Wolfinger and Rosenstone (1980) observed that, “[p]eople who are white, well educated, well-to-do, middle-aged, married, Northerners, government employees, and residentially stable account for a proportion of voters larger than their share of the population” (p. 105). The 2016 US Census, Current Population Survey (CPS) data13 show that about 64% of voting-age whites in Escambia County cast a ballot, compared to 60% of non-whites. Across the State of Florida, about 56% voting age whites cast ballots compared to about 43% of non-whites. Meanwhile, age has also been found to correlate strongly with propensity to vote. According to Lyons and Scheb (1999), age exerts “an independent effect that may tap generational or aging effects”, as opposed to education and income which reflect socioeconomic status (p. 147). However, age itself may contribute to education, to the extent that “life experience is a substitute for school” (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980, p. 60). In a similar vein, Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) [1993] write that, over peoples’ lifetimes, they may “acquire the knowledge, skills, and attachments that enable them to participate in elections” (p. 141). The 2016 US Census CPS data show that the average age of voting-age Escambia County residents who cast a ballot was about 58, while that of non-voters was about 38 years old. Across the State of Florida, the average age among voters was about 54 years old, while that of non-voters was about 44 years old. Previously, some a priori reasons to expect higher male turnout might include married womens’ reliance on their spouse for electoral stimulation, or old fashioned views that voting is for men. However, some studies have not found a large difference in turnout between men and women once other voter characteristics are controlled for (Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980, p. 42). The 2016 US Census CPS data reveals that, in Escambia County, about 64% of men cast a ballot (with about 21% abstaining) while about 63% of women casting a ballot (with about 26% abstaining). Across

12 Escambia County Supervisor of Elections. (2019, May 31). Voter statistics. Retrieved from https://escambiavotes.com/voter-statistics. 13 Integrated Public Use Microdata Series. (2019, June 5). Current population survey data for social, economic, and health research. Retrieved from https://cps.ipums.org/cps/.

the State of Florida, women turned out at a slightly higher rate than men in 2016. Despite gender’s weak connection to core voter status it will still be included as a key variable in the models below given its broader relevance to discussions about electoral participation. Meanwhile, education has been found to have a robust, positive association with voter turnout (Rosenstone & Hansen, 2003 [1993], p. 136; Wolfinger & Rosenstone, 1980). As Kleppner (1982) observed, “participation is skewed in the direction of the better educated and more affluent. In the absence of factors offsetting that relationship, those groups tend to be overrepresented among the participators” (pp. 6–7). The 2016 US Census CPS data show that, among voting age Escambia County residents with an Associates Degree or higher, about 74% cast a ballot, compared to about 54% of those with a lower level of education. A comparable disparity is found across the State of Florida as well. Studies of voter turnout often view independents as peripheral voters, and members of either major party (“partisans”) as core voters (e.g., Ashok et al., 2016; Donovan et al., 2009). Indeed, studies have shown that independents vote at lower rates than Democrats and Republicans (e.g., Verba & Nie, 1972, ch. 12). DeNardo (1980) has observed that “Democratic identifiers are thought to be poorer, less educated, more ‘ethnic’, and more urban than their Republican opposite numbers, and therefore the more ‘marginal’ or ‘peripheral’ voters” (p. 409). Data from the 2016 Cooperative Congressional Election Study14 shows that, in Florida, about 86% of Republicans voted in 2014, followed by about 81% of Democrats, and about 75% of independents. In this study, independents will be viewed as a peripheral voter group, followed by Democrats and Republicans as core voters. Table 1 presents descriptive statistics of the voting method and voter characteristics variables from the 2016 primary and general election survey data included in the regression models. The sharp increase in early inperson voting during the general election is likely due to SOE efforts to increase voter knowledge about early vote options, the high levels of interest generated by the presidential campaigns, as well as partisan “get out the early vote” efforts. The share of Republican Party members dropped substantially from the primary to the general election, due in part to Florida’s closed primary system which excludes many independent voters.15 In the following empirical analysis, positive correlations between core voter characteristics – especially white, age, knowledge, education, and partisan – and the use of early in-person or absentee voting will be interpreted as evidence that institutional reforms which lower the direct costs of voting make ballot casting more convenient for core voters, rather than increasing peripheral

14 Cooperative Congressional Election Study. (2019, June 5). CCES 2016 data/guide. Retrieved from https://cces.gov.harvard.edu/. 15 Florida voters passed a constitutional amendment in 1998 allowing for open primaries in contests with candidates from only one party. However, a loophole allows write-in candidates to re-close the primary. Thus, for example, only Republicans were able to vote in the primary for the 1st district of the Florida Legislature (including Escambia County) in 2016.

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Table 1 Descriptive statistics of voting method and voter characteristics. Primary election

General election

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

Mean

S.D.

Min

Max

Vote method Early in-person Early by mail Election day

.2518 .2599 .4883

.4342 .4388 .5001

0 0 0

1 1 1

.4205 .2480 .3315

.4938 .4320 .4709

0 0 0

1 1 1

Demographics White Age Male

.8287 57.86 .4526

.3769 16.19 .4980

0 18 0

1 96 1

.7766 51.05 .4555

.4167 17.85 .4982

0 18 0

1 94 1

Knowledge SOE info used College degree

.3425 .5535

.4748 .4974

0 0

1 1

.3800 .5994

.4856 .4902

0 0

1 1

Partisanship Republican Democratic Independent

.6381 .3017 .0601

.4808 .4592 .2379

0 0 0

1 1 1

.5103 .3402 .1494

.5001 .4740 .3567

0 0 0

1 1 1

Notes: N = 981 (primary election), N = 1258 (general election). Independents include those who lean towards a major party, non-leaning independents, as well as minor party members.

voter participation. Conversely, if such reforms do increase participation among peripheral voters, core voter characteristics should be negatively correlated with the use of early in-person or absentee voting. The second analysis includes an interaction between each voter characteristic and a campaign contact variable discussed below. 4. Empirical analysis 4.1. Core voter characteristics and early voting This part of the study tests Hypothesis 1, which expects that early vote casting options will be used primarily by core voter groups. In the models presented below, Vote Casting Method is a three-category outcome variable indicating whether the voter cast their ballot early-in person, absentee, or on election day. Multinomial logistic regression is used to model this choice, with election day voting as the omitted dependent variable category. The demographic variables of interest include WHITE and MALE binary indicators, as well as AGE measured as the number of years since birth. Also included is a proxy variable for voter knowledge, indicating if the voter used SOE INFORMATION prior to the election. In the lead-up to the 2016 elections, the Escambia County SOE website provided information for voters about the vote casting options, precinct locations, registration deadlines, contests on the ballot, and more. The measure used here is based on a survey question asking respondents the following question: “How frequently do you check the Escambia County Supervisor of Elections website, Facebook Posts, and/or Twitter posts? (1) Daily, (2) Once a week, (3) Once a month, (4) Only around election times, (5) Never” Most of the responses were either “never” (63%) or “only around election times” (32%). Therefore, a binary variable indicating whether or not the respondent used SOE information at all is included in the models as a proxy

for voter knowledge. The model also includes a binary variable indicating whether or not the voter obtained a COLLEGE DEGREE,16 as well as a Partisanship variable, indicating Republican, Democratic, or independent voter status. Given important differences between the primary and general elections, separate models estimates are presented in Table 2. Overall the results suggest that early voting tends to be used by core rather than peripheral voters, consistent with Hypothesis 1. This general conclusion is also consistent with national-level studies (e.g., Alvarez et al., 2011; Ashok et al., 2016), suggesting that any external validity issue from focusing on Escambia County may not be too severe.17 There is no evidence of a significant relationship between voter race and early voting during the primary, although the estimates indicate that white voters were more likely to vote absentee during the 2016 general election than non-white voters. Holding the other variables in the model constant, the probability that white voters cast their general election ballot absentee rather than on election day is about ten percent greater than non-whites.18 Meanwhile, age is positively correlated with absentee voting and is statistically significant for both the primary and general elections. For every ten years older the predicted probability of casting a general election vote absentee increases by about five percent. Older voters were also significantly more likely to cast their ballot early inperson than younger voters during the primary election. Three of the four coefficients for male voters are negatively signed and, in the case of early in-person voting during the

16 The models include a two-year rather than four-year college degree indicator due to slight differences in the primary and general election survey questions. 17 Like these results, Ashok et al. (2016) find that older voters were more likely to cast ballots early in the 2012 US national election. However, unlike these results, they find that major party members were also more likely to cast ballots early. 18 Probability changes are calculated using prchange in Stata 14.2.

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8 Table 2 Core voter characteristics and early voting.

Primary election

General election

DV: absentee

DV: early in-person

DV: absentee

DV: early in-person

Constant

−2.29 (.482)***

−1.78 (.494)***

−2.81 (.385)***

.115 (.288)

Demographics White Age Male

.208 (.239) .026 (.005)*** −.134 (.162)

−.286 (.234) .013 (.005)*** −.061 (.161)

.609 (.226)*** .028 (.005)*** .030 (.156)

.043 (.171) .001 (.004) −.234 (.134)*

Knowledge SOE info used College degree

.090 (.171) .446 (.164)***

.294 (.167)* .381 (.164)**

.546 (.161)*** .402 (.159)**

.387 (.139)*** .353 (.134)***

Partisanship Independent Republican Democrat

Omitted −.373 (.330) −.052 (.347)

Omitted .412 (.371) .076 (.393)

Omitted .128 (.241) .080 (.262)

Omitted −.224 (.195) −.191 (.208)

Observations Log likelihood X2 % correctly predicted

981 −1003.13 48.95*** .504

1258 −1304.07 99.31*** .441

Notes: The omitted dependent variable category is voted on election day. Cells contain multinomial logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * p < .1. ** p < .05. *** p < .01, two tailed tests.

general election, statistically significant at the .10 level. In the latter case, the probability of casting a general election ballot early in-person was about six percent lower for males than for females. The most robust results from the model confirm that knowledgeable and educated voters are significantly more likely to utilize early vote casting options. For example, during the general election, the probability of voting early in-person was about five percent greater for voters with a college degree. Meanwhile, voters who used SOE information prior to the election had a roughly four percent higher probability of voting early in-person and about six percent greater probability of voting absentee than voters who did not utilize SOE information. The model provides no evidence of an independent relationship between major party membership and early voting, contrary to the argument that partisans make voting decisions and cast their ballots earlier than independents. In sum, these results corroborate previous studies showing that early voting reforms fail to make the electorate more representative of the larger voting age population. The results also suggest that, regarding voter ethnicity, age, knowledge, and education, such reforms may actually exacerbate this disparity.

first responders and senior citizens, respectively.19 In order for direct democracy to enhance citizen participation, citizens must be aware of the proposed ballot measures, and they must care about the issues at hand (Biggers, 2011). It is therefore useful to focus on the saliency of ballot measures (Dyck & Seabrook, 2010; Smith & Tolbert, 2010). The direct democracy issues on the Florida ballot in 2016 – solar energy, marijuana, and tax exemptions – are arguably salient enough to have a mobilizing effect on the voters.20 The measure of direct democracy campaign contact used here is based on the following question from the Haas Center’s general election survey: “If you were contacted by a campaign before the election, what type of campaign was it? (1) A campaign of a candidate running for office, (2) A campaign for or against a ballot measure, (3) Both, (4) Other” Excluding respondents missing data on the other key variables, 933 voters (about 74%) of the general election sample were not contacted by a campaign. Meanwhile, 150 voters (about 12 percent) indicated that they were contacted only by a representative campaign, while a mere six voters (less than one percent) indicated that they were contacted only by a campaign for a ballot measure. However, 120 respondents (about 10%) indicated that they were con-

4.2. Direct democracy campaign contact and early voting Although Escambia County did not have any municipal or county-level referenda on the ballot during the 2016 general election, there were five state-wide constitutional amendments presented to the voters: Amendments 1 (an initiative) and 4 (a legislative referendum) both focused on solar energy. Amendment 2 was an initiative concerning the legalization of medical marijuana, while Amendments 3 and 5 were legislative referenda on tax exemptions for

19 During the 2016 general election, the Escambia County ballot also included three national elections, three state elections, eight county elections, three local elections, as well as three Supreme Court and six District Court of Appeals retention elections. As the survey is limited to Escambia County, these election counts are largely held constant across the survey respondents. 20 Unfortunately, the survey did not ask which measure (or candidate) voters were contacted about, or how they were contacted (by mail, phone, or in person).

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tacted by both a candidate and a ballot measure campaign. Excluding those who responded “other” or “no response” leaves us with 1209 total observations. In the analysis presented below, another multinomial logistic regression model is used, this time interacting Campaign Contact with each of the voter characteristics. This variable includes the following three categories: “Rep. contact only”, “No contact”, and “DD contact”. The “DD contact” category pools the six respondents contacted only by a direct democracy campaign with those contacted by both a direct democracy and a representative campaign.21 “Rep. contact only” is used as the omitted reference category (rather than “no contact”), as this corresponds more accurately with the contrasting effects of representative and direct democracy campaign contact theorized above. Given this study’s use of observational rather than experimental data, there is some possibility of endogeneity bias in the estimates (Arceneaux, Kousser, & Mullin, 2012, p. 885). As Rosenstone and Hansen (2003) [1993] have emphasized, political campaigns tend to direct their resources towards “people who, like they, come from the upper echelons of American society” (p. 241). Regressing the campaign contact variable (with “rep. contact only” omitted) on the voter characteristics reveals that older and male voters were significantly more likely to be contacted by both types of campaign (z = 2.30 and 2.44, respectively). Thus, the estimates for age and male in particular ought to be interpreted with caution. However, the probability that white voters, more knowledgeable voters, those with a college degree, Republicans, and Democrats were contacted by both types of campaigns is statistically indistinguishable from zero (z = .90, .02, .40, −1.44, and −.87, respectively).22 The first theoretical perspective discussed above views direct democracy campaigns stimulating peripheral voters to cast a ballot early, while the other views such campaigns delaying core voter decisions until election day. Corresponding Hypotheses 2 and 3 thus both anticipate that core voter characteristics (especially partisanship in the later case) will be positively associated with early voting, while their interactions with “DD contact” will be negatively signed and significantly significant. As was argued above, the results for Hypothesis 2 should be most pronounced for absentee voting given the lower direct costs of this mode of participation. Meanwhile, the results for Hypothesis 3 should be more apparent in the model of early in-person voting, as its direct costs are closest to those of election day voting (the omitted category). Model coefficients and standard errors are presented in Table 3 and, for ease of interpretation, net probability changes are presented in Table 4. The results provide some support for the argument that direct democracy can increase peripheral voter usage

21 The small number of observations in the “DD contact only” category, if included separately, yields extremely large standard errors, and in some interactions lacks sufficient observations to produce an estimated effect. 22 Regressing campaign contact on the key variables using “no contact” as the omitted reference category shows that those contacted by both types of campaigns were again significantly more likely to be older and male (z = 3.75 and 1.78, respectively), while the other variables of interest remain statistically insignificant.

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Table 3 Core voter characteristics, campaign contact, and early voting.

Constant Rep. contact only No contact DD contact White White × No contact White × DD contact Age Age × No contact Age × DD contact Male Male × No contact Male × DD contact SOE info SOE info × No contact SOE info × DD contact College degree Coll. degree × No contact Coll. degree × DD contact Partisanship Partisan × No contact Partisan × DD contact Observations Log likelihood X2 % correctly predicted

DV: absentee voting

DV: early in-person

−3.66 (1.11)*** Omitted .986 (1.19) −.329 (1.73) 1.41 (.661)** −.927 (.703) −.633 (.932) .021 (.014) .013 (.015) .016 (.021) −.602 (.500) .713 (.533) .664 (.708) 1.20 (.485)** −.678 (.521) −1.18 (.716)* 1.43 (.539)*** −1.16 (.570)** −1.11 (.745) −.329 (.582) .178 (.623) .840 (.811) 1209 −1230.51 137.57*** .465

−1.39 (.791)* Omitted 1.65 (.848)* .709 (1.27) .479 (.445) −.545 (.480) −.335 (.691) −.004 (.011) .008 (.012) .011 (.017) −.340 (.412) .167 (.441) −.191 (.612) .565 (.414) −.121 (.445) −.075 (.624) .700 (.407)* −.363 (.436) −.512 (.610) 1.06 (.556)* −1.45 (.585)** −1.23 (.733)*

Notes: The omitted dependent variable category is voted on election day. Cells contain multinomial logistic regression coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. * p < .1. ** p < .05. *** p < .01, two-tailed tests of significance. Table 4 Net change in the probability of voting early.

White × No contact White × DD contact Age × No contact Age × DD contact Male × No contact Male × DD contact SOE info × No contact SOE info × DD contact Coll. degree × No contact Coll. degree × DD contact Partisan × No contact Partisan × DD contact

DV: absentee voting

DV: early in-person

.057 .090 .108 .130 .041 .071 .058 .0003 .001 .038 .0001 .088

−.028 −.025 −.043 −.022 −.059 −.126 .040 .065 .065 .001 −.090 −.050

Notes: Probability changes are estimated using prchange in Stata 14.2. Cells contain the probability change associated with a change in the voter characteristic, plus (or minus) that of the corresponding interaction term.

of absentee ballots, consistent with Hypothesis 2. In the model of absentee voting, knowledge and its interaction with “DD contact” are signed in the expected direction, and are statistically significant. The corresponding net effect in Table 4 indicates that direct democracy campaign contact makes less knowledgeable voters about as likely to vote absentee as knowledgeable voters (net effect of .0003). The interaction of college degree with “DD contact” is signed in the expected direction but falls just short of statistical significance. Contact only by a representative campaign appears to increase the share of educated absentee vot-

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ers, consistent with the argument that such campaigns may de-mobilize peripheral (less educated) voters. Consistent with Hypothesis 3, the model of early inperson voting shows that major party members contacted by a direct democracy campaign are significantly less likely to vote early in-person, while those contacted only by a representative campaign are more likely to do so. The net probability change in Table 4 indicate that partisans contacted by a direct democracy campaign were about five percent less likely to vote early in-person than those contacted only by a representative campaign (net effect of −.050). The chi-squared statistic indicates that the entire model is highly significant, and the count-R2 of .465 suggests that the model provides a satisfactory fit to the data. 5. Conclusion High levels of electoral participation can benefit democratic societies by helping voters to develop their preferences on social policy, enhancing the quality of the link between citizens and representatives, and making policy makers more responsive to the public interest. Although the major institutional barriers to voting – limited suffrage, poll taxes, and literacy tests – have been broken down over the course of US history, it is sometimes argued that additional institutional reforms such as early voting options can help achieve a more representative electorate. However, the results from this study provide additional evidence that early voting options tend to be utilized by those groups already inclined to vote, exacerbating the compositional bias of the electorate. This study also assessed whether direct democracy campaign contact, combined with institutional reforms lowering the direct costs of voting, can increase peripheral voter participation. Two theoretical perspectives were discussed, one asserting that such campaigns stimulate peripheral voters who would have otherwise abstained, the other arguing that direct democracy campaigns crosspressure and thus delay core voter participation. While the results suggest that direct democracy campaigns may delay partisan vote casting, there is no reason to believe that such voters will abstain as a result of ballot measure campaign contact. Meanwhile, direct democracy campaigns appear to nudge peripheral voters into casting a ballot absentee, suggesting that direct democracy reforms, and the campaigns which accompany them, can help achieve a more representative electorate. Appendix A. Supplementary data Supplementary material related to this article can be found, in the online version, at doi:https://doi.org/10.1016/ j.soscij.2019.08.005. References Alvarez, M. R., Levin, I., & Sinclair, J. A. (2011). Making voting easier: Convenience voting in the 2008 presidential election. Political Research Quarterly, 65(2), 248–262. Ansolabehere, S., & Iyengar, S. (1995). Going negative: How attack ads shrink and polarize the electorate. New York: The Free Press.

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Please cite this article in press as: Williams, B.D. Early voting, direct democracy, and voter mobilization. The Social Science Journal (2019), https://doi.org/10.1016/j.soscij.2019.08.005