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Eastern Europe in the 1980s
Books
Charting
159
the fire flow
M.R. Brett-Crowther Eastern Europe in the 1980s edited by Stephen FischerGalati 29 1 + xvii pages, E15.95 (London, Crcom Helm,
1981)
Europe between the Superpowers: the Enduring Balance A.W. DePorte 256 + xv pages, E4.90 (Yale University 1980)
Press,
Slave Soldiers and Islam: the Genesis of a Military System Daniel Pipes 246 + xxx pages, X17.50 (Yale University Press, 1981)
Thought in the Nuclear Age edited by Lawrence Martin Strategic
233 + ix pages, E9.95 (London, Heinemann, 1979)
Estimating Foreign Military Power edited by Philip Towle 276 pages, f13.95 (London, Groom Helm, 1981)
The
Internal
Fabric of
Western
edited by Gregory Flynn 250 + xiii pages, E15.95 (London, Croom
Security
Helm,
1981)
The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima, Michael Mandelbaum 283 + xi pages, X5.95 (Cambridge University Press, 1981)
Future Conflict nology, R.V. Jones
and
New
Tech-
96 pages, (Sage, 1982)
The psychic life of individuals is so complicated that the schools of Freud, Jung and Adler have each something pertinent to say. In regard to childrearing and family dynamics there is as much truth in Laing as in Bowlby. Can one expect the psychic life of nations or of their leaders and elites to be any less simple? Can quantitative analyses or predictions formed on the pattern of the Michael Brett-Crowther is assistant editor of Science and Public Policy; his address is 54 Hawthorn Terrace, Durham, Co Durham DH 1 4EQ, UK.
FUTURES April 1983
natural sciences be reliably applied to international relations? There appears to be no marked improvement in the forecasting found in studies. Fischer-Galati’s strategic volume has been overtaken by events in Poland, of which it gave no discernible hint. Can one assume, as Sir John Hackett does, that world war will begin in Poland in 1984? Can one assume with Fischer-Galati that the “1980s in Eastern Europe should be worse than the 1970s but better than the 199os”? Is it not reasonable to presume that the death of Brezhnev must entail change for the better in the Soviet Union, and that a general relaxation in Eastern Europe is imminent? Does it not seem probable that the age of the Communist state and its many problems will cause repressive structures to be discarded, as dissent and objective realities combine to force revisions into political life in Europe? Fischer-Galati’s Eastern volume is as good a study as one can find, and its concern with cultural life suggests that this and economics hypothesis is valid. DePorte, who directs research on Western Europe at the State Departconcludes, however, that the ment, Soviet Union is likely to maintain its dominance over Eastern Europe; that the “overwhelming power presence of the Soviet Union” will continue to be seen by most Western Europeans as a threat; that the Western security Alliance will continue unless Western Europe can balance Soviet power; that common causes will prove stronger than common problems between me Western Allies; that Germany will continue divided for these reasons. Such a crucial role for Germany does not include any anticipation of the revulsion from the economic miracle
Charting
159
the fire flow
M.R. Brett-Crowther Eastern Europe in the 1980s edited by Stephen FischerGalati 29 1 + xvii pages, E15.95 (London, Crcom Helm,
1981)
Europe between the Superpowers: the Enduring Balance A.W. DePorte 256 + xv pages, E4.90 (Yale University 1980)
Press,
Slave Soldiers and Islam: the Genesis of a Military System Daniel Pipes 246 + xxx pages, X17.50 (Yale University Press, 1981)
Thought in the Nuclear Age edited by Lawrence Martin Strategic
233 + ix pages, E9.95 (London, Heinemann, 1979)
Estimating Foreign Military Power edited by Philip Towle 276 pages, f13.95 (London, Groom Helm, 1981)
The
Internal
Fabric of
Western
edited by Gregory Flynn 250 + xiii pages, E15.95 (London, Croom
Security
Helm,
1981)
The Nuclear Revolution: International Politics before and after Hiroshima, Michael Mandelbaum 283 + xi pages, X5.95 (Cambridge University Press, 1981)
Future Conflict nology, R.V. Jones
and
New
Tech-
96 pages, (Sage, 1982)
The psychic life of individuals is so complicated that the schools of Freud, Jung and Adler have each something pertinent to say. In regard to childrearing and family dynamics there is as much truth in Laing as in Bowlby. Can one expect the psychic life of nations or of their leaders and elites to be any less simple? Can quantitative analyses or predictions formed on the pattern of the Michael Brett-Crowther is assistant editor of Science and Public Policy; his address is 54 Hawthorn Terrace, Durham, Co Durham DH 1 4EQ, UK.
FUTURES April 1983
natural sciences be reliably applied to international relations? There appears to be no marked improvement in the forecasting found in studies. Fischer-Galati’s strategic volume has been overtaken by events in Poland, of which it gave no discernible hint. Can one assume, as Sir John Hackett does, that world war will begin in Poland in 1984? Can one assume with Fischer-Galati that the “1980s in Eastern Europe should be worse than the 1970s but better than the 199os”? Is it not reasonable to presume that the death of Brezhnev must entail change for the better in the Soviet Union, and that a general relaxation in Eastern Europe is imminent? Does it not seem probable that the age of the Communist state and its many problems will cause repressive structures to be discarded, as dissent and objective realities combine to force revisions into political life in Europe? Fischer-Galati’s Eastern volume is as good a study as one can find, and its concern with cultural life suggests that this and economics hypothesis is valid. DePorte, who directs research on Western Europe at the State Departconcludes, however, that the ment, Soviet Union is likely to maintain its dominance over Eastern Europe; that the “overwhelming power presence of the Soviet Union” will continue to be seen by most Western Europeans as a threat; that the Western security Alliance will continue unless Western Europe can balance Soviet power; that common causes will prove stronger than common problems between me Western Allies; that Germany will continue divided for these reasons. Such a crucial role for Germany does not include any anticipation of the revulsion from the economic miracle