Economic conditions and political instability in communist countries: Observations on strikes, riots, and other disturbances

J. M. MONTIAS

Economic Conditions and Political Instability in Communist Countries: Observations on Strikes, Riots, and Other Disturbances*

Significant disturbancesin Communist countrieshappenonly rarely. The sample that we have available to analyzetheir incidence is so small, andthe numberof possibleexplanatoryvariablesso large, that statistical analysescannotfruitfully be applied to ascertainthe relative importance of various causative factors. We must rather be content to isolate plausible connections,to develop simple conjecturesrelating observedconditions andtheir presumedeffects, mindful that thesepropositionscannotbe rigorously testedat the present time. A Framework

for Analyzing

Disturbances

The disturbancesthat make up our small sample are these:Plzen (Czechoslovakia),June 1953;Berlin, June 1953; Poznali (Poland), June 1956; Budapest, October 1956; Novocherkassk(U.S.S.R.), June 1961; Warsaw, March 1968;Szczecin-L6di (Poland), December 1970-January1971; Radom-Ursus(Poland),June 1976;Jiu Valley (Romania), August 1977.Of thesenine major disturbances,all but two-Budapest (1956) and Warsaw (1968)-had their origin in economically motivated work stoppages. *I am indebted

to Jan Gross

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on an earlierdraft of this paper. VOL. XIII,

NO. 4, WINTER

1980. 283-299

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The explanatoryvariables that are discussedto a varying extent below may conveniently be divided into two sets. The first set is intended to capture the proximate causesof disturbancesand why they spreador failed to spread;the secondfocuseson the responseof the authorities.The first setincludes:(1) economicpolicies or unanticipated outcomes of policies giving rise to grievances(currency reform, increasesin retail prices, revision of labor productivity norms, conscription of workers to work on weekendsand holidays, food shortages);(2) violations of governmentalpromisesother than thosepertaining to prices and norms (failure to pay promised overtime and bonuses, failure to honor the promise that individuals responsiblefor a disturbancewill not be prosecuted);(3) possibilities of forming effective coalitions to voice grievances(type of work place, facilities availableto strikers or rioters for diffusing information, cohesivenessof groups). Among the explanatoryvariables in the secondset may be listed: (1) political conditions in the ruling Party (divided or united leadership,sympathy or antipathy of individual Party membersfor the aspirationsof strikersor other dissatisfied groups);(2) the attitude of Soviet leadersto a disturbancethat may affect Soviet strategicinterests;(3) constraintson the govemment’s’useof force to reestablishorder(pressureor absenceof other loci of power, suchasachurchhierarchycommandingtheloyalty of a substantialfraction of the population;a free or a collectivized peasantry; a reliable or an unreliable army). One way to articulate the relations among these variables is to model the interaction among participantsas a game played by two sets of players: (1) individuals, dissatisfied with governmental or Party policies, intent on bringing aboutpeacefulor forcible change favorable to their interests;and (2) power-holderswishing to maintain orderly Communist rule. Each set of individuals has strategies availableto it. Dissatisfiedindividuals, for instance,may strike or not strike to bring about the improvement they desire. Power-holders may chooseto repressa strike by force, to extendconcessions,or to do both, to varying extents.If we look at the powerrelationsbetween the two setsof individuals as a game in “extensive form”-a series of moves and countermoves-then it becomesimportant to understand how the history of previous moves may affect the bargaining situation at later moves. Thus, a country’s historical recordof rebellions andupheavals,sometimesgoing backa hundredyearsor more, will affect the choice of strategiesopen to the power-holders. In the next two sections, observations(most of them basedon anecdotalevidence)on the strikes and riots in Communist countries since the deathof Stalin are very loosely organizedand discussedin

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the generalframework presentedin this first section. The second section concentrateson the economic variables that motivate dissenters,and the third section on the problem of forming effective coalitions under conditions wherethe power-holdershave a monopoly of information media. Economic

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Becauseso many variablesinteractto producea single observable action in our complex problem, any attemptto placethe entireburden of causationon any one variable is likely to fail. Take, for example, the relation betweenchangesin living standardsin EasternEurope and the incidence of strikes and riots. The statistical correlation betweenthe two, if other political variablescannotbe held constant, may easily yield a sign oppositeto that which common sensewould lead us to expect. There were no riots in the early 1950swhen real wageswere falling throughoutmost of EasternEurope. They began to crop up, starting in 1953,when consumptionrosein the wake of the New Course(EastBerlin andPlzen in June 1953,Poznafiin June 1956). True, the Szczecin events of late 1970and early 1971 followed upon a period of four or five years of stagnatingor possibly even declining real wages. But then again the Radom-Ursusstrikes and riots of June 1976came aboutafter five yearsof unprecedented improvements.Clearly, a more detailed,disaggregatedanalysisis in order if we wish to isolate the critical factors associatedwith these popular disturbancesand to begin to understandhow certain conjunctions of thesefactors may start a conflagration. The fact that no meaningful statistical correlation can be found betweenchangesin averagereal wagesand the incidenceof strikes and riots should not lead us to underestimatethe importance of populardissatisfactionwith living standardsas a basic moving force in the complex social-political processthat sometimeseventuatesin a riot. We needonly readthe detailed accountsof any riot in Eastern Europe or the Soviet Union to persuadeus that dissatisfactionwith economicconditionsis the prime forcebehindthe populardefianceof governmentalauthority. Strictly political demandscome only after a revolt has gained momentum. One reasonfor the salience of economic demandsin comparisonto political demandsis thatdissatisfied elements in the population can articulate them with less dangerof immediate repression.Another is that the workers who initiate the strikes that in many casestrigger off popular riots are particularly sensitiveto any deteriorationin their living standards(and tend to react to such deteriorationfar more emotionally than they would to

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the suppressionof a newspaperor to the arrestof dissidents,assuming thesepolitical eventsever came to their attention). Workers and the population at large, for good and valid reasons, hold the Party and the governmentresponsiblefor rises in the prices of consumergoods.The natureof the bureaucraticeconomic system is suchthat thesepricestend to stay more or lessat the samelevel for severalyearsuntil the authoritiesfind themselvescompelled to alter them, at which time discontinuousjumps are often unavoidable, given the pursuit of the government’seconomic goals. (The altemative would be to scale down investments and increaseimports of consumergoodsat the expenseof producergoods-a price that the leadershipis not usually willing to pay). Work norms are left unchangedfor severalyears. As a result of the introduction of laborsaving machinery, they get to be overfilled by wide margins. When the authoritiesfinally tighten them up, workers arelikely to suffer a suddenlossin their take-homepay. The discontinuousnatureof these changesconcentratesand sharpensdiscontent,which may thenerupt in theform of strikesandriots in theperiodimmediately following the announcementof an increasein pricesor the revision of work norms. Whetheror not discontentspills over into riots dependson a number of social and political factors which will now be surveyed. As I have alreadyargued,every move in the game pitting powerholdersagainstdissatisfiedelementsin the population(who arelikely to make up a majority) is affectedby the consciousnessin the minds of both sets of players of the history of previous moves. In EasternEurope, the historical sequencebeginsat least asearly as the Hungarianrevolution of 1848and the Polish revolts of 1830 and 1863. It also comprisesthe Warsaw uprising of 1944.’ The memory of eachsuchevent-its successor its failure-affects the consciousnessof participantsin a contemporarysituation, even thoughthe causesandcircumstancesof the earlier eventmay be very different from one more recent. In Poland, both the potential rioters and the governmentknow that many uprisings have occurredin the past and that their repressionis costly and difficult and may be hazardousto thepolitical survival of thosewho mustseeto it that they are put down. The relative successof the January 1971 strike in 1. In the Soviet Union also local traditions of defiance of authority may play a role in incidence of uprisings. Perhaps the most important postwar riots occurred in Novocherkassk, which was founded in 1805 as the capital of the Don Cossack region and served as the capital the ephemeral, anti-Bolshevik Don state during the civil war period (Albert Boiter, “When Kettle Boils Over,” fro&/ems ofComnrunism, XIII, I (January-February 1964). p. 36.) On relevance of historical rebellions for contemporary Poland, see various articles in Robornik “non-censored” Polish publication), especially No. 20 (August 30, 1978). p. 2.

the of the the (a

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Szczecin, which forced the rescissionof the price increasesdecreed in December1970,gaveworkersgreaterconfidencein their potential power and simultaneously lowered the regime’s confidence in its ability to take measuresinimical to workers’ interests.Czechoslovakia (with the anti-Germanuprising of 1944 and the Plzen revolt of 1953)and perhapsevenRomania (with the Great PeasantRevolt of 1907) have some history of political resistance.Though less flamboyant than Poland’s, this tradition probably plays a role in their rulers’ calculations. Bulgaria has no history of major uprisings to encouragethosewho might take arms againsttheir political oppressors. But the consciousnessfactor cuts both ways. The government also knows that, after a revolt hasbeenneatly andquickly repressed and its instigators severelypunished, it may be many years before peoplegatherup the courageto mount a new challenge.The govemment’s promises regardingthe redressof the iniquities that led to previousdisturbancesandthe degreeof fulfillment of thesepromises arealsofactorsin the dynamic interactionbetweenthe governingand the governedthat makeseachnew event a function of all preceding ones. A riot, of course,representsonly oneof severalpossibleoutcomes of the interaction processthat hasjust been mentioned. It may be headedoff or at leastrapidly containedby appeasement,reforms, or even a show of Party unity and force. A crucial variable here is the effect of economic problems, particularly of plan failures, on the cohesivenessof the ruling Party. In 1960- 1961, the economy of Czechoslovakiaunderwenta rapid deterioration,manifestedchiefly in a balance-of-paymentscrisis and a catastrophicdecline in investment. The Party was split by dissensionover the causesof the slowdown, somefunctionariesbeing of the opinion that it was dueto persistentovercentralization(despitethe tentativereforms initiated in 1958- 1959), others arguing that discipline had slackenedand the Partywaslosing the reinsof control overthe economy.Therewereno riots, perhapsmainly by reasonof the decision to shield the population from the effects of the recessionbut also becausethe gradual opening up of public discussionover the causesof the country’s economicdifficulties gavepromise of real reformsthat allayedpopular discontent. Yet dissension in the Party need not produce a period of liberalization-cum-reforms.When dissensionis (weakly) repressed from the top, asat the endof the Gomulka periodin Polandin the late 196Os,andmeaningfulreforms areblocked, intra-Partyfeuding may actuallycreatea climate favorableto riots, especiallyif somefaction, like the Moczar group in Poland at the time, believes it is to its

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advantageto provoke them. The situation in Polandand Hungary in the summer of 1956 was marked by fundamental disunity in the Party, which, given the degreeof popular dissatisfactionwith economic andpolitical conditionsandthe inability of thedivided leadership to launch seriousreforms or evento placatethe population with any improvements in its levels of living, could only result in a dramatic confrontation.In both countriesimportant changesin leadership occurred at the end of the summer that basically altered the situation.(The Polesallowed themselvesto betakenin by Gomulka’s dquipe de rechange which turnedout to be more similar to the team that it replacedthan most peoplehad anticipated,while in Hungary the political changeswere sufficiently profound to provoke a Soviet invasion.) The 1976eventsin Polandmarkedthe only major populardisturbancein postwar EasternEuropethat neither coincidedwith a split in the Party nor provokedone. It was also more brutally repressedthan most. Once the price increaseswere rescinded(or, more precisely, once the proposal to increase prices was withdrawn); the Party leadersfelt no need to make any concessionof a political or of an economic nature.There was no faction vying for power within the Polish Party that was in a position to court popularity by pressingfor placatory measureswithin the leadership. A closer look at what actually happenedin a few instanceswhere the interaction processbetweenrulers and ruled resultedin strikes, riots, or both may be instructive. I shall focuson five major disorders of clearly economic origin: Plzen 1953, Poznad 1956, Novocherkassk 1962, Szczecin-Lodi, December 1970-January 1971,andRadom-Ursus1976.The first of thesebeganas a workers’ protestagainsta currencyreform that in effect confiscateda largepart of the population’s cash holdings. This upheavalclimaxed in the occupationof thetown hall of Plzen by the insurgentswho, for a few days,ran the town.2The seconddisorder(Poznan,1956),beganwith a disputeconcerningovertime wagesbut quickly turnedinto a violent expressionof dissatisfactionover living conditions. The last three disordersweredirectly provokedby announcementsof impending or actual increasesin food prices. The Poznan, Novocherkassk,and Radomaffairsgot startedin metal-processingfactories;3the Szczecin strike wasstagedin thevast shipyardsof thecity. Shipyardsresemble 2. Otto Ulc, “Pilsen: The Unknown Revolt,” Problems ofCommunism, XIV, 3 (May-June 1965) pp. 46-49. 3. On the Novocherkassk riots, seeBoiter. “When the Kettle Boils Over,” pp. 33-43. The best account of the Szczecin strike is contained in Rewoh Szczecinska i jej znaczenie (Paris: Instytut Literacki. 1971), hereinafter Rewolra.

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metal-processingfactoriesin that they make lavish useof skilled and semiskilled workers who, unlike the workers in a more or less automatedsteel mill or fertilizer plant, control the paceof their own operation. Before dwelling on theseinstances,I will only cite in passingthree typesof work situations,thatdo not seemto be conduciveto defiance of authority. It is remarkable,first of all, that no peasantrevolts have occurred in Eastern Europe despite a history of jacqueries in the pre-Communistpast. True, collectivization hasnot beenintroduced in Poland, which has the longest and most persistenttradition of popular uprisings, and farming there remains chiefly in private hands.But if such riots were to occur at all in the countryside, one would have expectedthem to take place during the collectivization period of 1959- 1962in the rest of Europe, when the peasantswere underthe greatestpressure.Peasants’resistance,if it hasoccurredat all, has been passive rather than active, possibly becauseof the logistic problems of bringing togetherlarge numbersof dissatisfied individuals. Second, unskilled workers, with the exception of the politically motivated caseof the East.Berlin revolt of 1953, which beganon constructionsites, have not been conspicuousin starting strike movements,perhapsbecausethey arenewcomersto a workers’ culture, lack any sort of tradeunion history, andfeel their newly won workers’ status is too precariousto risk a confrontation with the authorities.4There is apparently some sociological evidence collected in Poland-so far unpublished-suggesting that unskilled workers are more proneto violence than skilled workers. They may be among the first to go out in the streetandjoin disorderly crowds attackingpublic buildings. But they do not seemto play a major role in organizingthe strike actionsthat trigger off the subsequentdisorders.Finally, almost all recordedcasesof strikesoccurredin factories dominated by men.5 Women may protest againsthigher prices or aboutshortages,asthey did in Polandin early 1975and in Bucharest in the autumn of that year (when meat disappearedfrom butchers’ shops),but their uncoordinated,spontaneousactions do not present the authoritieswith the seriousproblemsthat the strikesof skilled and semiskilled workers do. 4. According to a Trybuna Ludu article of January 30, 1976, managers in the construction and foundry industry actually prefer unskilled, new immigrants to the city as workers because they are harder working and less demanding. 5. In February 1971, textile factories with a majority of female employees struck in Mdt. By this time, of course, the ground had been prepared by the December strikes in the shipyards, and the risk that the strikers incurred was probably a good deal smaller than it had been for those who had initiated the wave of strikes.

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It is remarkablethatpeopledo not rise againstthe authoritiesin the Soviet Union or in EasternEuropewhen food shortagesdevelopbut rather when the governmentintroducesprice increasesdesignedto “ration by the purse,” that is, to eliminate shortagesby forcing consumersto restricttheir purchasesto the amountsthey canafford at thesehigherprices. This is curiousbecause,aseconomistshavelong beentaught, rationing by the price system, by cutting down on waste andon thetime lost in queuing,may leaveconsumersbetteroff thanif the sameamountof sausageor ham had beenformally or informally rationed. One reason why workers may be more upset by price increasesthan by (equivalent)shortagesis that they sensethat they personally are more adversely affected by the former than by the latter. In general,rationing benefitsthe poorerclassesof the population ascomparedwith rationing by the purse.However, the incomes of semiskilled and skilled workers, who havebeenso conspicuousin East Europeanstrikes, are close enoughto the averagethat I should not think they would bemuch worseoff in onecasethanin the other. Another more persuasivereasonmay be that nationwide price increases(or, for that matter, the generaltighteningof work norms)are seenas a violation of an overt or tacit social compact betweenthe ruling Party, which is supposedto representthe working class, and the workers. (Price reductionson less important items of consumption, insteadof mitigating the impact of price increases,are sometimes seenasa mockery, especiallyif they compensateonly to a small extentincreasesin the prices of items that consumersconsiderto be essential, including, of course, meat.) The poor timing of price increasesmay be an additional irritant, as in the case of the price increasesdecreedjust beforeChristmasof 1970,which wereparticularly resentedby the greatmajority of Poles who were preparingto celebratetheir Christmasholiday. Generalprice increasescannotbe blamed, asshortagescan be, on local deficienciesor temporarydifficulties. They result from a consciouspolitical act which the workers regardas disloyal, especially whena public promisehasbeenmadeby governmentauthoritiesthat no such price increaseswould take place (as after the January 1971 strikes in SzczecinandLodi). The sensitivenessof the populationto overt inflation may also be heightenedby the official propaganda which harpsso much on the disastrouseffectsof inflation in the West andattemptsto makepolitical capital (andto derive somemeasureof legitimacy) from the alleged stability of consumergoods prices in socialist countries. Other instancesare known where the violation of promises triggeredoff riots. Thus, just prior to the currencyreform of June l-2,

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1953, in Czechoslovakia,the workers in Plzen had beenassuredby Party authoritiesthat the currencywas “firm.“6 The work stoppage beganshortly after the announcementof the “reform.” This brings me to the natureof workers’ demandsother than the rescissionof the price increasesthat were put forward by the strikers in 1962 in Novocherkasskand in Poland in 1970- 1971 and 1976. Someof the most insistentcomplaints weredirectedat the manipulation of workersby Partyauthoritiesbehinda facadeof tradeunionism and labor participation in decisionmaking. In Novocherkassk, an emulation campaign designed to increaseproductivity and lower labor costsapparentlyirritated workers in the largemetal-processing factorieswhere the campaigntook place shortly before the riots.’ In Szczecinin January1971, similarly, a “voluntary” drive to makeup for time lost in the December strike by Sunday labor, which was falsely publicized by theofficial pressasa workers’ initiative, played an important contributory role in provoking the secondstrike on the Polish littoral. The transcriptof the strikers’ meeting of January24 with Edward Gierek shows that workers’ delegatesplaced an extraordinary weight on this point, demanding-and eventually obtaining-a retraction on the part of the local press of the false information given out about the allegedly spontaneouscharacterof this action. Another point in common in the Soviet and Polish disturbancesof 1962and 1970was the workers’ dissatisfactionwith “their” trade unions, which were powerlessin staying the hand of managementbent on increasingproductivity at any cost.* The Strike Committee of the largestshipyardsin Szczecinheaded its list of demandswith a simultaneouscall for the resignationof the shipyards’ trade union committee, “which never came out in the defenseof the workers” and for the creationof independentunions “subordinate to the working class.“g The rescissionof the price rise of December1970,incidentally, was only the seconddemandon this particular list. Finally, a complaint which transpiresthrough all the accountsof workers’ strikes,althoughit doesnot alwaysappearin the 6 Ulc “Pilsen,” p. 46-47. 7: Boiler, “ When the Kettle Boils 8. Rewolfa. pp. 26,46; and Boiter,

Over,” p. 37. “When the Kettle Boils Over,” p. 37. An anonymous referee for this paper pointed out that complaints about trade unions are “legal,” whereas attacks on the Party are considered de facto illegal. Hence, some workers may lash out against the trade unions as a proxy for the Party apparatus whose actions and policies they are really incensed about. 9. Reaoltu, p. 196. At the meeting of the Central Committee of Trade Unions which took place a month later, the delegates ofthe trade unions ofthe shipyards laid the blame for this state of affairs on the central economic administration, which ignored their demands on behalf of the workers (ibid., pp. 238-246).

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lists of specific demandsaddressedto the Party authorities,is that the managementand the auxiliary bureaucracythat administer production plantsandshipyardsareinflated in numbers,receivetoo much in relation to workers, andobtain disproportionatebenefits in the form of vacations,sick leaves,andotherprivileges.iOOne workers’ representativeat the Szczecinshipyardsput this issuein ideological terms, claiming that the authorities,by creatingdifferent working conditions for blue-collar workers andfor white-collar employeesand management, were artificially segregatingpeople into classes. “Isn’t this class differentiation made from above? Is a white collar worker different from me?” he asked.” Even though some of the striking workers’ demands in 1971 borderedon the political-especially insofar as they dealt with the privileges of the elite-they were not construedas suchby the strike representativeswho claimed, as the twenty-first and last point on their list, that they were eschewingdemonstrationsof a political or antigovernmentalcharacterand that their demands were “exclusively economic.“i2 Howeverthat may be, it is evident bothfrom the formal complaintsand from the points informally raisedat meetings with officials thatjustice and human dignity-including the right to have a say in working conditions andin otherpertinentmatters-are issuesthat are virtually as basic to the interestsof Polish workers as prices, wages, and working hours. The Formation of Coalitions An issuethatcameup at theSzczecinshipyardsmeetingof January 24, 1971, with Poland’s top leadersdeservesattention for what it revealsaboutthe problemsof organizinga strike action in a situation wherestrikes, if not technically illegal, arethoughtto be illegal by the majority of the populationandareat the very leastdiscouragedby the 10. A fairly typical complaint about the excessive salaries of ministers and directors was expressed by the delegates of section W-2 of the Szczecin shipyards at the meeting with Gierek (Rewolra. p. 82). Demand 13 of the Strike Committee stated that the earnings of the employees of the Party and government apparatus should be limited to the average earnings in industry. Demand 14 called for the elimination of the differentials existing between the (privileged) prices charged in (reserved-access) shops of the Army and Security Police and the prices generally prevailing in the country. During the 1976 disturbances in Radom and elsewhere, representatives of the administration were frequently asked why they earned so much more than workers (see, for example, the eyewitness account of the strikes in Radom and Gdansk in Liberation, printed in Aneks, No. 12 (July 1976), pp. 28, 32). 1 I. Rewoh, p. 103. 12. Ibid., p. 197.

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govemment.r3The problem lies in coordinating plans and lists of demandsamong thousandsof workers employed in different workshopsanddepartments,often spreadover a considerablearea,when managementpossessesa monopoly of intercoms, loudspeakers,and all othermeansof communication. A demandvoiced by thechairman of the Workers’ Committee was that the committee should have exclusive use of the yard’s radio network to get in touch with the crews. On this point, the worker’s representativewent on to say: “It is our will, the will of the workers of the shipyard as a whole-we must have a microphone. What is involved is information, which must be in our hands,objective informaton, correctinformation.“‘4 The lack of meansof communication isolatesshops, crews, and working parties from eachother and makes it far harder, given the controls on unauthorizedpersonnelmovement from one part of the shipyard,factory, or mine, to get in touch with one another,to reach the consensusto formulate the demandsfor and to launch a strike. The difficulty of-transmitting more or less subversiveinformation may throw light on a point raisedearlier in this paper.In a steelmill, an automatedchemical factory, a petroleumrefinery, or a conveyorbelt-driven assembly plant, workers often cannot leave their jobs without jeopardizing the entire operationof the factory. There is far more danger of a plant-wide breakdown, which may be termed “sabotage” by the,authorities,in caseworkersgathertogetherto talk over their problems,.thanin a labor-pacedmetal-fabricatingfactory, a coal mine, or a shipyardwheremany workersmay takea breakfrom their jobs without seriously affecting the rate of production of the factory as a whole. (If they work on an individually controlled machineor at a mine face, they may make up latertheshortfall in their output.) It may thenbeeasierto exchangetheinformation requiredto mount a strike operationin the lattersituationthanin the former. This observationon past,disturbancesgives rise to the conjecture that strikes and other defiant actions are likely to arise in large, laborintensive, and labor-paced enterprises where coalitions can be formed without excessiverisk. The problem of communication hasalso a wider aspect.Given the government’s policy of isolating localities where strikes or other disturbancesoccur and of preventingthe rest of the populationfrom 13. Several represent&es of strike committees at the Szczecin meeting of January 24, 1971, seemed unsure whether strikes were or were not illegal, although some of them asserted they were within the law (i.a. ibid., p. 132). The authorities present were careful not to answer the question in unambiguolis terms. 14. Retvolta, p. 129.

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hearingaboutthem, how can strikers make known their demandsto the nation at large? It is remarkable that several disturbancesin Polandhavegottenstartedin placesandundercircumstanceswhereit wasrelatively easyto diffuse the newsaboutthesedevelopmentsurbi et orbi. The Poznar!eventsof June 1956 beganduring the Intemational Fair, at which there were presentthousandsof Polish and foreign visitors who could bring out the news aboutthe riots. Word aboutthe SzczecinandGdariskstrikesof 1970spreadquickly, bothat homeandabroad,carriedby sailorsandothertravelerswho normally move in and out of theselittoral cities. Events in Radom and Ursus provide evenbetterevidenceof the strikers’ concernfor diffusing the news abouttheir actions as quickly and widely as possible. Without any apparentprior coordination, the strikers in both placeshit upon the idea of interruptingrailroad traffic in the vicinity of the factories which they had occupiedin order to signal their action to the rest of the nation. Anotherdemandof theStrike Committeein the Szczecinshipyards with significant ramifications was that members of the committee should be guaranteedpersonal safety, presumably from arrest or harassmentby the police or by other shipyardauthoritiesresponsive to governmentalorders. A similar demandwas put forward by the striking miners in the Jiu Valley in August 1977. In the Romanian case,Ceausescupromisedthe miners that therewould be no retribution and then renegedon his promise, ordering thousandsof dismissalsand a numberof arrests.Thus, workers’ attemptsto organize strikes are met by intimidation on the part of the authoritieswho are able to discourageany but the most resoluteinstigators. In spiteof this potential for intimidation on the part of the authorities, I believe that workersarein a betterposition to organizeactions in oppositionto their rulersthan othergroupsof thepopulation. First, it is ideologically awkward for a workers’ party to bar strikes as illegal. Second,thereis loss of legitimacy whenevera party ruling in the name of the workers is obliged to repressa strike. (It is much easierfor a Party spokesmanto qualify othertypes of civil disobedience as hooliganism than an orderly strike by workers.) Third, repressionof a strike by force when the workers occupy production sites, as has usually been the case in Poland, may cause serious damageto machineryandplant with adverseeffect on future output. It is often wiser, therefore, for the authorities to negotiate with strikers than to resort to force. For these reasons,if there is any institution in Communist countrieswhich hassomeof theearmarksof a sanctuary-like the churchin the Middle Ages or the university in

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certainLatin American countries-it is surelythe factory or mine. 15 Spontaneousmovements of protest often‘&v&p a momentum that carriestheir participantsbeyondthe boundsof safety.They may get their start in the comparative safety of the factory, but they quickly spill over into the streetwherethey canbe moreconveniently repressed.It may seemlike a goodideaat thetime to bum down Party headquarters,to free political prisoners,or to attackthe Ministry of Interior, but it also brings violent repressionby political armed forces, which do not takelong to restoreorder.The regimeis thenin a position to takejudicial action againstparticipantswho areallegedto haveviolated “socialist legality,” asstrikersnormally cannotbe said to have done. Thus, strikes may be more effective in realizing workers’ demandsif they can be self-contained. In Poland, the country where the constellation of the forces of power (including the Catholic Church) is suchthat disturbancesare most frequentand most likely to occur in the future, the creationof the Committee for the Defenseof the Workers (KOR) in September 1976haswidenedthe strategicoptions availableto protestersin their opposition to the authorities. First, KOR now makes it possiblefor newsaboutstrikesandriots to spreadfar more quickly thanbefore,a matter that must be of concernto the governmentintent on isolating theseincidents.r6Second, the Committee, using studentsand other mobile elementsin the populationto make contactwith the workers, can quickly alert strikers to their rights and thus hardentheir will to resist the blandishmentsof the authorities until their demandshave beenmet. Third, KOR is the first effective link betweenthe workers and the intellectuals. The governmentand the Party may now be simultaneouslyconfrontedby the demandsof both groupsand may find it a good deal more difficult to resist them. Finally, KOR may gradually supplythe workerswith the elementsof an ideology-a set of symbolsto which they canrelateandwith the aid of which they can integrate their experience. This ideology is essentially patriotic, legalistic, socialist,‘and democratic. With its emphasison legalism, 15. The authorities often have other means beside force to induce strikers to resume work. In a mine at Jastrzeb(Poland). a work stoppage occurred in June 1978 to protest against mandatory 12-hour shifts on Saturdays. Management stopped all conveyor belts and the means of transportation that would have enabled the miners to ride back from their work place to a central elevator shaft. Nevertheless, 80 percent of the miners were said to have made their way to the surface by walking a kilometer or two to the shaft. (Robornik, No. 18, June 25, 1978). 16. Thus, it was the KOR which reported a strike that occurred in the summer of 1977 at a light-bulb factory at Podjamice near L6di. The strikers, incidentally, were successful in compelling the government to restore some bonuses of which they had been deprived (Infernarional Herald Tribune, September IO- I I, 1977).

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KOR may enableworkersto formulate more abstractsystem-related demands,which would offer strikersand otherinstigatorsof disturbancesbetterguaranteesof permanentgains(e.g., legal guaranteesto protect them against reprisals, in contrast to’ad hoc petitions for safeguardswhich, when granted,can be withdrawn at the discretion of the authorities).The Catholic Church, which&s shifted its ideological groundin recentyearsfrom indiscriminate.anticommunismto more nuanced and sophisticatedantitotalitarianism, is now more willing than in the past to enter into coalitions with Socialists and even with democratically inclined Communists in order to support workers’ demands.The new solidarity betweenthe working classand other influential elementsin the population, including the Catholic Church, may turn strikes into instrumentscapabteof applying graduatedpressureagainstregimeauthoritiesandof extractingfundamental and permanent concessions,perhapswith less danger to the delicate,limited autonomyof PolandunderSoviet aegisthanthe wild outburstsof violence that eruptedin the past. . Conclusions

To sum up very briefly: Poor economic conditions, at least as perceivedby workers, have in the past motivated strikes and other protestactions in Poland, and, more rarely, elsewhere.Most of the disturbanceswere triggered by perceived violations of promises made by the authorities regardingthe conditions of workers (price increases,revision of work norms, and confiscatory currency reform). Protestactionsfrequentlygot their startin factoriesand other work sites employing many skilled and semiskilled workers where the paceof the productionprocessenabledcrewsto meetto exchange information andvoice their complaints.The chancesof occurrenceof such strikes is much greater if the country has a past history of successful civil protests, if the government is’not determined to repressthe strike immediately and at any cost (as it would have throughoutthe Communistbloc in the Stalinist period, or asit would in today’s Albania), and if the regime is unwillihg to make prompt concessionsor reforms aimed at pacifying potential insurgents(asis likely to occur in situations where the Party is divided). While the primary demandsmadeby strikersareeconomic,secondarydemands regardingworkers’ participationandrepresentationplay animportant subsidiary role in the interaction between the authorities and the strikers. Abstract “system demands*‘-such as the institution of full-fledged parliamentarianism or the restoration of capitalismhave so far beenconspicuousby their absence.Nevertheless,the

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violent attackson the headquartersof Party, police, andotherregime institutions that developin the wake of strikes area clear expression of wider populardissatisfactionwith the regime than thosenormally voiced by strikers’ representatives,who areperhapstoo consciousof the needfor prudenceand discretion to achieve lasting results.

Post Scriptum This article was written beforethe Polish workers’ strikes of July andAugust 1980forcedthe governmentto make substantiveconcessions on wagesand working conditions, tradeunion representation, andhumanrights. No partof thearticle hasbeenrevisedin thelight of theserecent events. Most of the tentative observationsthat follow, baseduponnewspaperreports,relatetheeventsto points madein the article. 1. The strikes were againtriggeredoff by the government’sdecision to raisemeatprices(throughthe transparentdeviceof supplying meat in large measure to “commercial shops” selling at higher prices). 2. The authoritiesrepeatedlyattemptedto divide the workers by offering special concessions(on working conditions and food supplies) to limited groups. This strategy was defeatedby the rapid spread of information throughout the country, which prompted workers in factoriesor regionsthat had not receivedconcessionsto demand matching advantages.By the partial concessionsthat it made, the government revealed its weaknessand encouragedthe spreadof strikes. 3. In Lublin, where transportationworkers struck in mid-July, strikers’ demandsincluded a rise in hourly wagesto compensatefor the price increases;a fourfold increasein family allowanceto match the allowances given to members of the police, the security, and armed forces; and the closing of the “special” (restricted-access) butcher shops.12These demands,as in 1970-1971 and 1976, reflected the workers’ angry opposition to politically rooted inequalities. About the sametime, workers in Lublin beganto negotiatefor trade union autonomy. This marked the usual progression from economic to sociopolitical demands. This progression continued after the strikes broke out in the shipyardsof Szczecinand Gdansk 17. Le Figaro,

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when trade union autonomybecamea major subject of negotiations with the Warsaw authorities. 4. The railroad conductors’ strike of mid-July marked the first time that an important work stoppagehad gonebeyondan industrial factory, a mine, or a constructionsite. The spreadof strikes to many towns and to industries where they had not occurred in the past suggeststhat the risks of forming a coalition haddiminished. Almost any group of workers could now organizeto presstheir claims. An estimated347 factories, employing 150,000workers participatedin thestrikesin mid-August andsome300,000in the lastdaysbeforethe settlementin Gdansk.The strikes in the mining districts of southern and western Poland, which began at the end of August and were settledon September2, took in about250,000workers in thirty-one mines and twenty-sevenrelated industries. 5. Workers voiced their demandsin the relative sanctuary of factories and other work places, avoiding street demonstrations which might haveresultedin uncontrolledviolence (asthey did in all previousupheavals).,By maintaining strict order, by disavowing any intent of subvertingthe socialist orderor the ultimate authority of the Party, and by applying graduatedrather than brusque or sudden pressure,the strikersdeniedthe governmentany pretext (or motive) for resortingto force. They also reducedthe risk of Soviet intervention. 6. As in 1970- 1971,communicationamongworkers in plants of the same city and among cities was essentialfor the instigation and spreadof the strikes. The KOR playeda major role in disseminating information throughout the country about the workers’ demands. KOR-gatheredinformation was alsorelayedto the country via Radio Free Europe, which retainedits credibility by the moderatetone and objectivity of its broadcasts.In mid-August the governmenttried to put a stop to the disseminationof news aboutthe strikesin Szczecin andGdanskby cutting off telephonecommunicationswith the restof the country. A few days before the settlementof the strike, under heavy pressurefrom the workers, the government finally restored communications with the Baltic coast. 7. There was no major split in the Party leadershipas therehad beenin 1956and to a lesserextent in 1970.The pressureof events, however, flushed out major differencesamong influential members holding divergentattitudeson economic reforms, the advisability of resortingto force, and the possibility of breakingthe Party’s monopoly of power in the domain of labor relations. Thesepersonaldivergencesmadeit possiblefor Gierek, who was succeededby Stanislaw Kania, to introduce personnelchangesin the government without

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seriousdamageto Party unity. No faction developed,as far as we know at present, which either urged the Soviets to intervene or covertly supportedthe workers against the government. 8. The KOR was remarkablysuccessfulin establishinglinks with the workers, who in turn applied pressureon the government to releasemembersof the group who had beenarrestedin the second week of August. Even thoughlinks betweenworkersandintellectuals are still fragile, definite progresstoward a rapprochement-if not an alliance-has beenmade, which will undercutany attemptsat reimposing the Party’s exclusive domination over social-economicand intellectual life. 9. The Catholic Church, by keeping out of the overt conflict between the workers and the authorities, consolidatedits position with the latter without losing too much prestigewith the former. 10. The questionin everyone’smind now is whetherthe govemment will be ableto emasculatetheagreementsignedon August3 I by whittling away at its individual provisions. While authoritiesmay try to fudge on certain concessions-that “the media will be open to variedopinions” or thatcensorshipwill be limited to theprotectionof “defense, economic, and diplomatic secrets”-the new freedomto engagein independentself-governingunion activity is likely to give the organizedworkers an instrument for maintaining this and other gains. For, as long as the workerscan freely communicatewith each other, acrossministerial jurisdictions and regionalboundaries,in the framework of an organization of their own making, the costs of mounting a coalition to strike, in casethe governmentrescindedits promises, will presumably be much reducedcompared to similar efforts in the past. The threat of such a strike must surely put a restrainton the ability of thePartyto withdraw its concessions.On the other hand, the right to communicatefreely within the organization cannot be abolishedwithout a major struggle. This time around,in my view, the government has run out of moves. Short of Soviet intervention, which doesnot appearto be an attractiveoption either for the Kremlin or for the Polish Party leaders,I do not seehow the statusquo antecan be restoredin the foreseeablefuture. Someof the strikers’ hard-won gains will surely endure.