Economic growth, marine resources and naval arms in east Asia—A deadly triangle?

MarinePolicy,Vol. 22, No. 4-5, pp. 297-306, 1998 © 1998ElsevierScienceLtd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0308-597X/98 $19.00+ 0.00

Pergamon PII: 80308-597X(97)00041-9

Economic growth, marine resources and naval arms in east Asia a deadly triangle?

Sam Bateman

Introduction This article suggests that a serious security situation is emerging in East Asia with high economic growth both increasing the demand for marine resources and facilitating higher expenditure on naval arms. While the region is rich in marine resources, the development of these resources is troubled by major Jurisdictional problems, especially the lack of agreed maritime boundaries. These problems are destabilising for regional security and may become more so, unless new approaches to marine resource management are found which are not based on sovereignty, unilateral rights and agreed boundaries. © 1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved

Key

words -marine resources, maritime boundaries, maritime security

Centre for Maritime Policy, University of

Wollongong, Northfields Avenue, Wollongong, NSW 2500, Australia

...Asia's very growth and affluence itself lie at the heart of the emerging challenges to Pacific Defense. The deadly triangle of growth, energy shortage, and armament, in the context of fluid post-Cold War geostrategic alignments, threatens to destabilize Asia, and indeed the whole Pacific. Energy shortage, the deadly but little-known link in the equation, provokes turbulence by deepening the nuclear bias of Northeast Asia, by provoking new naval rivalries centering on emerging Chinese blue-water capacity, and by deepening tensions over offshore reserves such as those in the South China Sea. Kent Calder [1], p. 200 In his recent book, Asia's Deadly Triangle--How Arms, Energy and Growth Threaten to Destabilize Asia Pacific, Kent Calder describes the increasing energy dependence of Northeast Asia as part of "the deadly triangle of growth, energy shortage, and a r m a m e n t " [1]. This article borrows the theme of a "deadly triangle" and applies it to the problems of marine resources in East Asia. These problems are not so much ones of growing scarcity, although that is certainly the case with fish, but rather pressing ones of jurisdiction, increased demand, and management. Economic growth increases the demand for the resources of the sea. Higher per capita incomes mean higher demand for seafood, while industrial development and rapidly growing manufacturing sectors lead to higher demand for energy and a greater reliance on foreign coal, oil and gas. These energy trends provide strong incentives for higher levels o f offshore exploration for new sources of production, including for natural gas, the demand for which has increased dramatically in the last decade or so, particularly in Japan and South K o r e a [2]. The relationship between economic growth and marine resources becomes " a deadly triangle" because, not only does growth increase the demand for marine resources, but it also facilitates higher levels of defence expenditure, particularly on naval arms. In East Asia at present, justification for expenditure on ships, submarines and maritime aircraft

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is largely based on the need to defend shipping carrying strategic resource imports and to protect offshore resource zones.l The marine environment of East Asia is complex and rich in marine resources, both living and non-living. The waters of Southeast Asia have an abundance of coral reefs, mangroves and seagrass beds which support a rich array of marine animals and plants, probably the most diverse marine flora and fauna in the world [4]. Northeast Asian waters also have an enormous profusion of fish species caused by their particular climatic conditions and ocean currents, making them among the most productive in the world for fishing 2. Unfortunately the fact that offshore resources are either generally believed to be so rich, particularly in the case of hydrocarbons, or have already been subjected to gross over-exploitation (in the case of many species of fish) has led to sovereignty over marine resources becoming a fiercely competitive one with emotive, nationalistic overtones, sometimes quite disproportionate to the proven value of the resources involved.

Living resources Most East Asian countries have a high dependence on fish and related marine products as a source of protein 3. More than half of the world's fish are caught and bred in Asian waters and slightly more than half are consumed in the region [7]. Apart from the importance of subsistence fishing and domestic market supply, many East Asian countries also look to the living resources of their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZs) as an important source of export income, and some are leading distant water fishing nations (DWFNs). Fish and fishing are important political issues in the region and fisheries management and access arrangements are major factors in regional relations. The principal D W F N s of Japan, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand are particularly affected by tighter access controls and international arrangements to control straddling stocks and highly migratory species, including on the high seas. China is an emerging D W F N with the level of Chinese longline fishing activity in the Western and Central Pacific increasing from 34 vessels and a catch of 888 metric tonnes in 1991 to 461 vessels and a catch of 14 149 metric tonnes in 1994 [8]. These are small vessels, about 20 metres long, catching sashimi grade tuna for the Japanese market with transhipment to Tokyo through Guam and other Pacific island ports. It is likely that China will increase its distant water effort through the acquisition of used purse seiners and longliners from Japan, Korea and Taiwan. While shared stocks and fishing grounds create some commonality of interest, they also present a potential source of tension, particularly when jurisdictional problems and resource access issues are present. Numerous incidents have occurred when fishing boats, particularly Thai vessels [9, 10], have been fired upon or even sunk. It is not unusual for fishing vessels to be escorted by naval vessels when undertaking fishing operations in disputed waters and this situation poses the risk of direct confrontation between the naval forces of regional countries. Fisheries are in crisis in most areas of the world [11], and East Asia is no exception. While over-fishing is the major problem, this problem has been exacerbated in Southeast Asia by a "rapid and largely unquantified loss and degradation of coastal habitats" with serious implications for sustainable development, fisheries and their

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management [12]. Fish stocks are affected by ecologically harmful practices such as the clearing of mangroves to provide areas for aquaculture, the exploitation of coral reefs and the destruction of seagrass beds. Other problems include the sedimentation of estuaries, land-based pollution, dynamiting, the use of very fine mesh nets, and other forms of illegal fishing. In Northeast Asia, many important species are overfished; jurisdiction is often uncertain and, in some areas, disputed; maritime incidents are proliferating and becoming more dangerous [[13], p. 267]; and the current fishery regime is "insufficient, fragmented, and antiquated" [[13], p. 262].

Non-living resources Turning now to non-living marine resources, East Asian countries look towards possible oil and gas reserves beneath the sea for future economic prosperity, and to ease the problem of growing energy shortage. The offshore areas of most East Asian countries have some hydrocarbon potential. Southeast Asian waters are underlain by sedimentary basins that are either already producing oil and gas, or possibly contain further major hydrocarbon deposits. In Northeast Asia, the Yellow Sea and East China Sea basins have been identified as particular areas of hydrocarbon potential and good prospectivity [[14], p. 84]. With concern growing for the increased demand for and security of energy supplies, virtually all coastal States in the region are preoccupied to some extent with staking offshore claims and exploring for oil and gas. In addition to hydrocarbons, the Sea of Japan (or East Sea) and the East China Sea are also favourable locations for submarine metallic sulphides including copper, zinc, lead, nickel, cobalt, manganese, iron, gold, and silver associated with geological faults and spreading zones [[14], p. 91]. Kent Calder has noted that an "ominous but crucial.., element in Asia's emerging energy picture is the declining energy surplus of the region's two largest traditional exporters, Indonesia and China" [[1], p. 48]. Indonesia is currently the world's largest natural gas supplier but with the Arun gas field off Sumatra likely to run out by 2005, the Indonesian Government has been marketing the Natuna gas fields strongly, so much so that it may be playing down another new offshore gas development in waters off Irian Jaya [15]. The Natuna fields are about twenty miles on the Indonesian side of the seabed boundary agreed with Malaysia in 1979 but about seventy miles inside the ambit Chinese maritime claim in the South China Sea made in 1992. In January 1995, the Indonesian state-owned oil and gas company, Pertamina, signed an agreement with Exxon, after 14 years of negotiation, for development of the Natuna fields but this may not proceed until the question of China's boundary claim is resolved, and buyers for the gas from the fields have been obtained [16]. Meanwhile, major military exercises conducted by Indonesia in the vicinity of the Natuna islands in 1996 sent a clear message that sovereignty rests firmly with Indonesia [17]. Since the early 1990s, China's energy situation has deteriorated sharply owing to the pressures of high economic growth and the transition to a consumer economy [[1], p. 50]. The energy outlook for

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Economic growth, marine resources and naval arms: S Bateman

China also suffered a serious setback recently when the first well drilled by a foreign oil company in the Tarim Basin, the vast area in the West of China previously regarded as highly prospective, proved to be dry, confirming other pessimistic assessments that the area would be a disappointment [18]. One result of the increased demand for fossil fuel energy, particularly in Northeast Asia, has been the rapid growth in regional seaborne trade with increased numbers of tankers and L N G / L P G carriers plying regional shipping routes, particularly the maritime corridor between Singapore and ports in Northeast Asia. This trade stands to increase dramatically if current energy trends are confirmed. Calder [1] suggests that the current dependency of Northeast Asia on oil imports from the Middle East of 70% could rise to 95% by 2010. He goes on to say that: Should this projected pattern indeed materialize, a growing fleet of heavily laden supertankers will plow east across the Arabian Sea and the Indian Ocean in coming decades, headed for Singapore, Hong Kong, Shanghai, Pusan, and Yokohama. East Asian oil imports from the Middle East could well triple in the next fifteen years alone, to a very substantial share of total world oil consumption. [[1], p. 59] The exploitation of non-living marine resources in the East Asia region is severely hampered by unresolved offshore boundaries which are "an important inhibiting factor" on the availability of multinational capital, technical expertise and equipment [19]. Overlapping concessions are relatively common throughout the marginal seas of East Asia, including in the South China Sea between China and Taiwan, in the East China Sea between Taiwan, South Korea and Taiwan, and in the Sea of Japan (or East Sea) between Japan and South Korea [[14], pp. 92-93]. Also in April 1996, Vietnam leased two exploration blocks in the South China Sea to the American oil company, Conoco, covering more than half of the zone which had been leased by China in 1992 to the smaller U.S. firm, Crestone [20]. The tactic by both countries may be to elicit the support of foreign oil companies in demonstrating sovereign rights in disputed areas of claimed EEZs.

Problems of jurisdiction Despite the rich potential of marine resources in East Asia, the development of these resources is troubled by major jurisdictional problems, and "beggar thy neighbour" attitudes which have led to overfishing 4, and the marked degradation of natural habitats of coral reefs, mangroves and seagrass beds. The preservation and protection of the East Asian marine environment, the conservation of species, and the exploitation of marine resources are seriously complicated by conflicting and overlapping claims to marine jurisdiction and the lack of agreed maritime boundaries. The 1982 U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) sought to provide increased coastal State rights over the resources of adjacent waters while also introducing a code of conduct for exploiting marine resources and preserving and protecting the marine environment. Unfortunately these objectives have not been achieved. As Mark Valencia has claimed, Extension of jurisdiction may.., have opened a Pandora's box of continued uneven growth, volatile mixtures of competition, nationalism and militarization;

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Economic growth, marine resources and naval arms: S Bateman

superpower involvement; environmental degradation; and increased technological and market dependence on the developed world. [[14], p. 94] The geography of East Asia complicates marine environmental management in the region, including the exploitation of the marine resources. As a consequence of the extended jurisdiction allowed by U N C L O S (i.e. a twelve nautical mile territorial sea and 200 nautical mile EEZ, as well as archipelagic waters for Indonesia and the Philippines), a large portion of the ocean environment of East Asia consists o f territorial seas (with some conflicting or overlapping claims to territorial seas), resource-rich EEZs (subject also to conflicting claims), and vital straits and choke points for shipping. Along the eastern coastline of Asia, there is a continuous chain of enclosed or semi-enclosed seas 5 between the mainland and the off-lying archipelagoes and islands, stretching from Sakhalin and the Kamchatka Peninsula through the Japanese archipelago and the Philippines to the Indonesian archipelago and northern Australia. F r o m North to South, these seas are: the Sea of Okhotsk, Sea of Japan (or the East Sea), Yellow Sea, East China Sea, South China Sea, Gulf of Thailand, Java Sea, Sulu Sea, Celebes Sea, and the Timor and Arafura Seas. The situation is further complicated by the number of islands within these seas, such as the Kuril, Senkaku, Paracel and Spratly Islands, which are the subject of sovereignty disputes. Achieving straight line maritime boundaries and clear sovereign jurisdiction over maritime areas and marine resources in such a region is an extraordinarily difficult task. While the conflicting claims to the Spratly Islands have attracted most attention in recent years, the problems of resolving maritime jurisdiction are not unique to the South China Sea but proliferate elsewhere through the marginal seas of East Asia. Despite the old adage that "good fences make good neighbours ''6, sometimes it is physically impossible, for a variety o f reasons, to build good fences, particularly in the sea. This seems to be the situation now with the marginal seas of East Asia because all countries in the region (except China) have unilaterally claimed EEZs but so far, the EEZ boundary between Indonesia and Australia in the Timor and Arafura Seas is the only one which has been delimited between opposite or adjacent countries 7.

Maritime boundaries Table 1 shows a list of maritime boundaries in East Asia 8, with separate columns for the following different types of maritime boundary between two adjacent or opposite countries: • A territorial sea boundary when the countries are adjacent, or opposite and less than 24 nautical miles apart (the maximum width of the territorial sea under international law is now twelve nautical miles) 9. The sovereignty of the coastal State in its territorial sea is absolute with the sole qualification of the obligation to allow the right of innocent passage to ships of all nations. • A continental shelf boundary relating to the seabed and subsoil. The principle of the continental shelf, which provides for sovereign rights (as distinct from sovereignty) over the living and non-living resources o f the seabed and subsoil has a long history. I° Continental shelf boundaries are generally necessary between adjacent states, or between opposite states less than 400 nautical miles apart (and in

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Economic growth, marine resources and naval arms." S Bateman Table 1. Maritime boundaries in East Asia Country

Territorial sea

EEZ

Continental shelf

Remarks

Australia-indonesia Indonesia-Malaysia Indonesia-Singapore Indonesia-Thailand Indonesia-Philippines Indonesia-India Indonesia-Vietnam Indonesia-China Malaysia-Singapore Malaysia-Thailand Malaysia-Philippines Malaysia-Vietnam Burma-India Burma-Thailand Cambodia-Vietnam Thailand-India Thailand-Vietnam China-Vietnam China-Taiwan Philippines-Taiwan Japan-Taiwan China-South Korea China-North Korea South Korea-Japan North Korea-Japan Japan-Russia North Korea-South Korea North Korea-Russia South Korea-Russia

NR Yes Yes NR No NR NR NR No No No NR No No No NR NR No No NR No NR No NR NR No No No NR

Yes No NR No No No No No NR No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No No

Yes Yes NR Yes No Yes No No NR No No No No No No Yes No No No No No No No Yes (part only) No No No No No

Joint zone

Joint zone

Joint zone

Joint zone

Only required if sovereignty upheld over Tok-do/ Takeshima

Notes: NR, boundaries are not required because either the countries are too far apart to have the relevant boundary (i.e. over 24nm in the case of a territorial sea boundary), or so close together that only a territorial sea boundary is required (e.g. as is the case with Malaysia and Singapore). Source: Limits in the Seas-National Claims to Maritime Jurisdiction, No 36, 7th Revision, US Department of State, Bureau of Oceans and International Environmental and Scientific Affairs 1995.

certain circumstances out to a m a x i m u m of 700 nautical miles apart when the states concerned have broad continental margins and certain criteria are met). • An E E Z boundary. U N C L O S introduced the regime of the 200 hundred nautical mile E E Z which provides for sovereign rights over the resources of the water column, and, if there is not a separate continental shelf boundary, over the resources of the seabed and subsoil as well. Such a boundary is necessary when countries are less than 400 nautical miles apart. While it is highly desirable to have coincident seabed and water column boundaries, this is not always possible, and states with overlapping EEZ claims may adopt separate boundaries for the EEZ and the continental shelfl 1. This may be the case when a continental shelf boundary was agreed, largely on the basis of geological considerations, prior to wide acceptance of the EEZ regime in the late 1970s and early 1980s. In most circumstances where this is the case, the seabed boundary is different from that which would likely be judged equitable for the water column boundary. It may also result from the continental shelf extending a minimum of 200 miles 12, while the EEZ extends to a maximum of 200 miles 13. The outcome of this situation is that one State may have jurisdiction over fisheries while another has jurisdiction over oil and minerals. Several disturbing comments are apparent from Table 1. O f the total of 70 different maritime boundaries required in the region, only eight

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Economic growth, marine resources and naval arms: S Bateman

have so far been fully agreed. Few countries appear to have assigned any great priority to the delimitation of maritime boundaries and some (e.g. the Philippines, Russia and North Korea) have no agreed boundaries at all. Indonesia is the one country which has pursued its maritime boundary negotiations assiduously with agreement, wholly or in part, to seven of the seventeen boundaries required. While fourteen of the fifteen countries in this survey have now claimed the maximum jurisdiction to which they are entitled, many of their claims overlap those o f their neighbours. The notable exception is China which so far has not claimed an EEZ. By not doing so, China has avoided escalating an already confused and dangerous situation with regard to offshore claims.

New tension points? While U N C L O S has brought countries together by making them more conscious of their maritime boundaries and the maritime interests they share with their neighbours, it has also introduced new tension points with conflicting claims and disputed boundaries. It is usually preferable for states to refrain from making unilateral claims which overlap those of an adjacent or opposite country. Because countries find it difficult to concede what has already been claimed, negotiation of boundaries may then be more difficult than if the claims had not been made. U N C L O S is of little use in this regard: It provides one overriding factor by describing in detail the maximum limit of the territorial sea and EEZ. Simply providing outer limits, however, is too basic. The flaw in the Convention is that it does not describe any factors to consider when neighbouring countries overlap. It carries no details for determining and weighing the appropriate elements if any two countries are within 400 miles of each other. [[23], p. 110] The delimitation of maritime boundaries has become much more complicated than it was in the past. Not only is there a need now for more boundaries than was the case previously but also the principles involved have become more complex. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) applies "equitable principles" to judgments relating to the determination of maritime boundaries, but has been loath to list or define the factors which will be considered in assessing equity TM. It is not just a matter of equidistance, and consideration may also be given to geographical features, including length of coastline, the shape of the opposite or adjacent coasts (particularly whether they are concave or convex), and the relative weight to be given islands as opposed to mainland, as well as to geological, geomorphological, economic and political factors. For example, in deliberating on maritime boundaries, the ICJ has given consideration to traditional fishing activities ~5, the relative impact on the livelihood and economic well-being of the countries concerned 16, and the political status of the territories involved 17. Overlapping national jurisdictions, with one country having sovereign rights over the resources of the seabed and subsoil, and the other having jurisdiction over the water column, will pose difficult problems of marine environmental management. It is also a relatively new problem of international law with no good experience yet of how the inevitable management difficulties will be resolved. It will become a

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Economic growth, marine resources and naval arms: S Bateman

particularly significant issue for marine resource development in the marginal seas of East Asia where the overlapping jurisdiction situation is likely to be a common outcome of boundary negotiations. It would seem logical to anticipate that, in these situations, the country with the water column jurisdiction is in the stronger position in view of its primary responsibility for the preservation and protection of the marine environment.

The down side of E E Z s The EEZ regime was a major development in international law, the full implications of which are only now being appreciated. Unfortunately, it is becoming apparent that the regime of the EEZ, far from helping to settle down problems of maritime jurisdiction, and to facilitate the sustainable development of marine resources, has in fact produced greater insecurity and lower management standards. This is particularly the case in East Asian waters where some maritime zones (mainly EEZs) are very large (see Table 2) and, as a leading South Korean expert on the law of the sea has argued, the existence of EEZs has been "more divisive than integrating" [25]. The regime has led to an increase in maritime militarisation in East Asia region with the protection of large EEZs and marine resources, along with the existence of conflicting claims to offshore areas, often being used as justification for acquiring maritime capabilities, including missile-armed patrol vessels and maritime strike aircraft. As Andrew Mack has claimed, "In the Pacific, a perceived need to safeguard EEZs has led to a major increase in surface combatants." [[26], p. 412] This is the "downside to the enclosure movement" that "Because states now have 200-mile EEZs to protect, they also have a new naval mission". [[26], p. 412]

Marine resources and security It had been hoped that this increased coastal State jurisdiction and responsibility would improve standards of marine environmental management, enhance the protection and preservation of the marine environment, and reduce any tendency towards the "tragedy of the commons", whereby countries act in their own self-interest and create a situation in which all lose [[26], p. 409]. This has not been the outcome

Table 2. Maritime zones o! East Asia Country

Land area (km =)

Maritime zones (km =)

EEZ/Isnd area

Japan North Korea South Korea C hi na Taiwan Philippines Vietnam Thailand Malaysia Singapore Indonesia Brunet

370370 121730 98400 9600000 32360 300000 332556 414001 332649 588 1904342 5765

3861000 129650 348478 1355800 392381 1891247 722337 324812 475727 343 5409981 24352

10.4 1.1 3.5 0.1 12.1 6.3 2.2 0.6 1.4 0.6 2.8 4.2

Note: Maritime zones comprise territorial sea, archipelagic waters, EEZs and legal continental shelf. Source: based on Ref. [27].

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Economic growth, marine resources and naval arms: S Bateman

and a "beggar thy neighbour" attitude is still apparent. Despite the hortatory principles of UNCLOS, countries are still not recognising that marine resources and environments are better managed on the basis of e c o s y s t e m s ~8 rather than on the basis of national boundaries. East Asian nations relate maritime security to the protection of both their sovereignty over offshore areas and their rights to marine resources. However, the too zealous pursuit of these security interests may be incompatible with other broader security concerns, particularly resource conservation and environment protection, if national interests are put before "the common good". The exploitation of marine resources has problems for both comprehensive and conventional security. Increasing resource scarcities, particularly of energy, and the risk of confrontation between resource protection forces of neighbouring countries are problems of conventional security, while environmental degradation, destruction of habitats, over fishing, the threatened extinction of species, and pollution of regional seas are all issues of comprehensive security. The current system of marine resource exploitation and management in East Asia is based on national rights and obligations. It is ineffective because of the number of overlapping claims to maritime jurisdiction, the lack of agreed maritime boundaries, and countries acting largely in their own self interest. To some extent, maritime disorder now prevails in the region with unregulated pollution of the marine environment, over fishing, marine environmental degradation, widespread illegal activities at sea (ie, unlicensed fishing, piracy and drug smuggling), and countries unable to borrow the funds necessary to develop offshore resources because of uncertainty surrounding their sovereign rights to such resources. The nature of the maritime geography of East Asia means that a system of unilateral EEZs and sovereign resource rights is unlikely to provide an effective system of marine environmental management. These problems will continue, with consequent risks to national security unless new approaches to resource exploitation are found which are not based on sovereignty, unilateral rights, and agreed maritime boundaries. These approaches may include some or all of the following: • a functional approach to resource management whereby sovereignty is set aside and resources are managed and exploited according to their own special demands, conservation needs, and optimal utilisation; • joint development of particular resources (such as the Timor Gap Treaty between Australia and Indonesia for developing the hydrocarbon resources of a disputed area in the Timor Sea); • extension of the joint resource zone to possible joint EEZs which would allow each country to participate in the economic benefits while spreading the costs of environmental management [[23], p. 111]; and • joint patrols and resource protection operations by neighbouring countries in areas of overlapping or adjacent jurisdiction. The development of these approaches needs a very different mind-set to the present one of trying to define boundaries between countries at sea in the same way as they are drawn on land. In many parts of East Asia, straight line maritime boundaries are unlikely. Pressing problems of resource management and exploitation require resolution without the need to reach agreement on the underlying sovereignty and boundary

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issues. Regional cooperation to solve these problems would constitute a significant regional confidence- and security-building measure, and there is an urgent need to start discussing possible alternative approaches. To summarise the main argument of this paper, not only are marine resources an important dimension of Asia Pacific security but all the trends are in the wrong direction. Resources are becoming scarcer and there is increased urgency in the search for new resources offshore. With a large EEZ, increasing energy shortage and a growing offshore fishing fleet, China stands to become a much bigger player in the exploitation and management of marine resources in the region. More generally, the resource self-sufficiency of most countries is declining with increased dependence on imports and greater vulnerability to the disruption of seaborne trade. The dual concerns of securing offshore zones and vital shipping are major factors in the acquisition of naval arms in the region, thereby completing the "deadly triangle of economic growth, marine resources and naval arms".

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12. Fortes, M. D., Marine scientific research in the Philippines: status, problems and prospects. In The Seas Unite: Maritime Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Region, eds S. Bateman and S. Bates. The Australian National University, Canberra, 1996, pp. 112-146. 13. Valencia, M.J., A Maritime Regime for North-East Asia. Oxford University Press, Hong Kong, 1996. 14. Valencia, M.J., Oil and gas. In Arias for Marine Policy in East Asian Seas, eds J. Morgan and M. J. Valencia. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1992. 15. McBeth, J., Deep background. Far Eastern Economic Review, 12th September 1996, 159(37), pp. 54-55 16. Blanche, J. B. and Blanche, J. D. Chinese bureaucrats draw the line in the South China Sea. Petroleum Economist, 1995, 62(7), pp. 16. 17. McBeth, J., Exercising sovereignty-Indonesia sends a message from Natuna. Far Eastern Economic Review, 19th September 1996, 159(38), p. 17. 18. Yatsko, P., Oh, w e l l ~ h i n a ' s Tarim Basin is proving a big disappointment. Far Eastern Economic Review, 19th September 1996, 159(38), p. 68. 19. Valencia, M. J., Oil and gas potential, overlapping claims, and political relations. In Marine Policy in Southeast Asia, eds G. Kent and M. Valencia. University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985, p. 155. 20. Schwarz, A. and Forney, M., Oil on troubled waters. Far Eastern Economic Review, 25th April 1996, 159(17), p. 65.

21. Mansor and Noordin, Zaja Mohammad, The Status of the Marine Fisheries in the South China Sea, Paper presented to the First Meeting of the Working Group on Marine Scientific Research in the South China Sea, Manila, 30 May-3 June 1993. 22. Cohen, J. M. and Cohen, M. J., The Penguin Dictionary of Quotations, 1st ed. Penguin Books, Harmondsworth, 1960, p. 163. 23. Ball, W. S. The old grey mare, the national enclosure of the oceans. Ocean Development and International Law,-2 1996, 27(1), pp. 108-111. 24. Kaye, S., Australia's maritime boundaries. In Wollongong Papers in Maritime Policy, No. 4. Centre for Maritime Policy, University of Wollongong, pp. 11-26. 25. Paik, J.-H., The fisheries regime in northeast Asia. In Ocean Affairs in North-East Asia and Prospects for Korea-China Maritime Cooperation, eds D. Kim, J. Yongke, J.-H. Paik, C. Degong. Institute of East-West Studies, Yonsei University, Seoul, 1994, p. 86. 26. Mack, A., Security regimes for the oceans: the tragedy of the Commons, the security dilemma, and common security. In Freedom for the Seas in the 21st Century--Ocean Governance and Environmental Harmony, eds J. M. Van Dyke, D. Zaelke and G. Hewison. Island Press, Washington DC, 1993, pp. 409-412. 27. Buchholz, H. J., Law of the sea zones in the Pacific Ocean. Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, 1987, table 6.