Effects of Reactance

CHAPTER 5 Effects of Reactance

Reactance is defined as a motivational state and as such is assumed to have energizing and behavior-directing properties. Because the theory stipulates conditions under which there will be behavioral attempts to restore freedom or there will be changes in the subjective evaluation of potential outcomes, it easily lends itself to test by the measurement of behavior or the use of rating scales. Unlike the concept of cognitive dissonance (see Kiesler & Pallak, 1976; Wicklund & Brehm, 1976), reactance has not been examined in regard to its energizing properties. It nevertheless presumably has these qualitites and would produce, for example, physiological evidence of arousal, latent learning, and interactive effects with weak versus strong habits. Studies of such effects would be particularly informative where a freedom has been eliminated with the consequence that direct behavioral effects of reactance are not possible. To the best of our knowledge, however, no attempts have been made to examine these manifestations of the energizing properties of reactance.

Direct Restoration of Freedom As a motivational state directed toward the reestablishment of behavioral freedoms that have been threatened or eliminated, the most obvious manifestation of reactance arousal would be direct behavioral 98

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efforts to restore the freedom. There are, however, a number of factors that might limit direct restoration. First, as we have seen, an irrevocable elimination, though initially it would arouse reactance, would be expected eventually to produce helplessness. In other cases, however, where the person is not certain that the freedom is truly lost, reactance will be aroused, but direct behavioral restoration of freedom may still not be attempted. For example, if one expected to choose between apples and oranges and then learned that the local supermarket was out of apples for the day, it is unlikely that one would perceive the freedom to obtain apples as irrevocably eliminated. One knows that apples are available in other stores, and that this store will have apples in the future. A person's motivation to obtain apples would be increased and one might express this motivation by direct restorative efforts, such as going to another store, but one might not. In cases such as this where the likelihood of direct behavioral attempts at restoration is uncertain, better indicators of the motivational state might be feelings and desires rather than overt behavior. Later in this chapter, we will consider a variety of possible subjective responses that can be generated by reactance arousal. Even in situations in which direct restorative attempts are likely (situations where there is a threat to, but not elimination of, freedom), direct reestablishment of freedom may still be restricted. One restricting factor will be the costs associated with any direct attempt at reestablishment. Even if success is probable, the costs to the person may be sufficiently high to deter direct restoration. Many such costs are possible, depending on the specific situation. For example, if one's freedom is threatened by another person who has control of a number of important outcomes and this other person were to know of any direct restorative attempts, the cost of punishment by this individual for attempting to reestablish one's freedom will act as a deterrent (see Chapter 7 for a further discussion of social power and reactance). Costs can also be internal. A study by Feldman-Summers (1977), for instance, indicates that if freedom restoration would result in one's being responsible for a negative outcome to another person, direct attempts at freedom restoration are reduced. In this case, it is presumed that this kind of perceived responsibility would violate one's view of oneself as a beneficent, not malevolent, person and that the cost of this violation of one's self-image is too high a price to pay. Another factor that should affect direct restoration attempts is the ease and likelihood of some other mode of freedom restoration. As pointed out by Gotz-Marchand, Gotz, and Irle (1974) in regard to dissonance reduction, reduction of reactance arousal may be most likely to occur by means of the first mode presented, even if this mode

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is indirect rather than direct. At other times, however, sequence of presentation of modes of freedom restoration will not determine which mode the person uses. This relative lack of importance for sequence, under some conditions, was demonstrated in a study by Brehm and Cole (1966) on the effects of receiving a favor. Subjects in this experiment expected to provide first-impression ratings for either an important project or a relatively unimportant one. It was thought that the belief that the project was important would create a more important freedom to be objective (and, therefore, accurate) about the person subjects were to rate. This person, presented as another subject but actually an experimental confederate, unexpectedly performed a favor for half of the subjects (i.e., brought cokes and wouldn't accept any offered payment). It is important to note that the confederate was out of the room when the experimenter described the experiment to the subject. Thus, the favor occurred before the confederate had an opportunity to find out that he would be rated by the subject, and, therefore, the favor could not be perceived by subjects as a blatant attempt at ingratiation for an ulterior purpose. Even though, in this experimental design, the favor cannot be seen as an attempt by the confederate to secure favorable ratings, the favor does act to pressure the subject to feel positively toward the confederate and, thus, to rate him favorably on the first impression ratings. This pressure to reciprocate the favor in some way threatens subjects' freedoms to be objective, and this threat should arouse more reactance when the freedom is important than when it is not. The question of interest for the present discussion is how this reactance would be expressed. The first opportunity that subjects had to express reactance was on the first-impression ratings, which followed soon after the experimenter had explained the study to the confederate. It would have been possible for those subjects for whom reactance arousal was high to restore freedom by rating the confederate relatively unfavorably. Restricting the use of this mode of freedom restoration, however, were subjects' desires to be objective and accurate in their ratings—and this desire should have been greatest in the same condition (high importance of freedom) where reactance aroused by the favor was greatest. Apparently, in the present experiment, the desire for accuracy was greater than the need to restore freedom immediately. Experimental conditions had little effect on the first-impression ratings that were obtained (see, however, discussion later in this chapter of a study by Worchel, Andreoli, & Archer, 1976). After the first-impression ratings were completed, subjects were confronted with an unexpected opportunity to help the confederate. This

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opportunity would seem especially appropriate for freedom restoration. Subjects could decide whether or not to reciprocate the favor they had received, and this decision could be made without any restrictions imposed by experimental instructions to be objective and accurate. Not surprisingly, then, rather dramatic effects of reactance arousal were obtained on this measure. When subjects had not received a favor from the confederate, 5 3 % of them helped him. When subjects had received the favor, but the importance of their freedom to be objective was low, 9 3 % helped. For subjects whose importance of freedom to be objective was high, however, receiving a favor resulted in only 1 3 % of them helping the confederate. These data are not cited in order to argue that sequence of mode of presentation of freedom restoration is unimportant. No doubt, there will be times when that sequence is quite important. The Brehm and Cole study does indicate, though, that any mode of freedom restoration may be more or less desirable, and that if an initially presented mode is undesirable, it can be passed over. The complexity of the determinants of direct restorative attempts— and the number of restrictive factors that can inhibit direct restoration—does not mean that empirical documentation of direct restorative action is missing. In fact, there are many such findings. For example, boomerang attitude change has been obtained in the theoretically expected conditions by a number of investigators (e.g., Albert & Dabbs, 1970; Brehm & Mann, 1975; Bushcamp, 1976; Feldman-Summers, 1977; Heller, Pallak & Picek, 1973; Pallak & Heller, 1971; Sensenig & Brehm, 1968). Moreover, such diverse behaviors as decrements in gripping a dynamometer (Aletky & Carlin, 1975), increment in extremity of selfpresentation (Brehm & Bryant, 1976), toy preference (Brehm & Weinraub, 1977), refusals to answer questions (Liberman & Wicklund, reported in Wicklund, 1974) decreased choice of sunglasses (Wicklund, Slattum, & Solomon, 1970), and differential movie preference (Worchel, 1972) have occurred as direct attempts to restore a threatened freedom. (These studies are described in more detail in other sections of this book). In general, then, the empirical evidence for direct restoration as a function of reactance arousal is substantial and compelling. Although the motivational state of reactance is directed toward action that will restore freedom, freedom can be restored without any action on the part of the individual. For example, an external agent can act on behalf of the person whose freedom has been threatened so as to directly restore the threatened freedom. The first of two experiments reported by Worchel and Brehm (1971) demonstrated this type of direct restoration of freedom by another person. Each subject believed him-

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self to be in a three-person group and was told that the group was to decide which of two case studies (A or B) to work on. Unknown to the subject, the other two members were experimental confederates. When, prior to any group discussion of the two cases, one of the confederates demanded that the group work on a particular case, subjects indicated a desire to work on the opposite case, demonstrating the expected reactance effect. However, when the first confederate's demand was followed by the second confederate's protesting that he had not yet made up his mind about which case was better, thus restoring the group's (and subject's) freedom to choose, subjects indicated a preference for the demanded alternative. Thus, when the subject's freedom was restored by the second confederate, no evidence of reactance was found in the subject's preference. A series of experiments by Schwarz (1980) also examined the conditions under which direct restoration of freedom by another individual reduces reactance. Following suggestions by Frey, Kumpf, Ochsmann, Rost-Schaude, and Sauer (1976) and Grabitz-Gniech and Grabitz (1973), Schwarz hypothesized that for a restoration of freedom to reduce reactance, it must be perceived as under the control of (potentially caused by) the person experiencing the reactance. It is not necessary that the person have caused the restoration, only that the restoration lead the person to believe that he or she could have restored the freedom. To test this hypothesis, Schwarz led subjects to believe that they were participating in consumer research about new popular music groups, and that for participation, each would be able to choose one of the four phonograph albums that were being evaluated in the study. Subjects were run one or two at a time, along with a confederate who played the role of a subject. At the beginning of the experimental session, the experimenter explained that his normal experimental room was being used for another study and that they would therefore have to work in a different room. The subjects were given initial information about the four albums and, on that basis, were asked to rate them on attractiveness. The experimenter then "discovered" that the boxes containing two of the four records had been left in the original experimental room, where they were now locked up, and would be unavailable as choices. Subjects were informed which two records were unavailable. This procedure, then, constituted the elimination of freedom. Subjects were then given some additional, promotional-type information about the four albums and asked to rate the albums again. The design involved four different conditions. One was an elimination of freedom without restoration, described above. A second involved no elimination of freedom (all records were available for

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choice). The third and fourth conditions implemented a restoration of freedom after freedom was eliminated. The third condition restored freedom without giving subjects the impression that they had control. This was done by having the experimenter receive a telephone call from the other investigator, saying that the experimenter should come and get the two boxes of records left in the original research room. The fourth condition restored freedom in a way designed to give subjects the impression that they themselves could have done it. When the experimenter announced that two records would not be available because they were locked in the other experimental room, the confederate asked if something could not be done about it. The experimenter then ostensibly called a janitor to have him unlock the room. This procedure had been found in a pilot project to give subjects the impression that they themselves could have restored the freedom. Increased attraction of the eliminated records, compared to change in attraction of the noneliminated records, was used as an index of reactance. Comparisons of the different conditions indicated that the elimination aroused reactance, that restoration of freedom reduced reactance, and that reactance was reduced by the same amount whether or not subjects had the impression that they could have restored the freedom. This latter finding suggests that a feeling of personal control over restoration is not necessary to reduce reactance; what is necessary is simply that the freedom be restored. Unlike earlier research, the restoration of freedom in the above experiment reduced the reactance effect but did not eliminate it. In order to examine why the reactance effect was not eliminated, Schwarz carried out two further studies, only the second of which need be reported here. Schwarz hypothesized two possible reasons for the partial reduction of reactance effects. First, unlike earlier research, the restoration of freedom was delayed a few minutes after the elimination of freedom, and consequently, the measurement of the reactance effect was also delayed relative to the no elimination and no restoration conditions; thus, the time of measurement could account for the partial restoration effect. Second, cognitive processes may follow the arousal of reactance such that what the individual first remembers are the positive characteristics of the eliminated alternatives and the negative characteristics of the noneliminated alternatives. Thus, even if reactance were totally reduced by the restoration of freedom, there might be residual cognitive change that would enhance the relative attractiveness of the alternatives that had been temporarily eliminated. To test these hypotheses, Schwarz used a procedure similar to that of the experiment described earlier. Five conditions were created: (a) No

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5. Effects of R e a c t a n c e

elimination of freedom; (b) elimination and immediate restoration of freedom; (c) elimination and delayed restoration of freedom; (d) elimination of freedom and immediate dependent measure; and (e) elimination of freedom and delayed dependent measure. The latter two condtions, without restoration of freedom, allow one to see if there is some decrement in reactance effects over time (4 min after elimination). The condition of elimination and delayed restoration of freedom allows one to see if there is a replication of the partial reduction of reactance effects. The reactance effects in question, of course, are the relative increases in attractiveness of the eliminated alternatives as compared to changes in the attractiveness of the noneliminated alternatives. In order to examine cognitive processes associated with reactance arousal and restoration of freedom, subjects were asked to list attributes that first came to mind about the four different music groups, and then to indicate whether each attribute was positive or negative. Schwarz constructed an index for each type of alternative (eliminated or not) that consisted of the number of positive attributes listed before any negative attribute was mentioned, relative to the total number of attributes listed. In other words, this index indicates the propensity of subjects to think first of positive attributes, and allows one to see if reactance produces greater accessibility of positive attributes for those alternatives that are eliminated. The results on the ratings of the alternatives indicated that (a) immediate restoration of freedom completely eliminated the reactance effect; (b) delayed restoration of freedom partially reduced the reactance effect; and (c) delay of measurement in nonrestoration conditions had no effect on the magnitude of the reactance effect. Thus, delay of restoration does indeed only partially reduce reactance effects, and this partial reduction cannot be accounted for by the amount of time that passes between the elimination of freedom and the measurement of the effect. This pattern of results is consistent with the idea that some sort of cognitive processing, due to reactance, tends to produce persistence in the evaluational changes of the alternatives. However, all that Schwarz found on the recall of attributes measure was that in the two no-restoration conditions combined compared to the no elimination and delayed restoration conditions, there was significantly less first recall of positive attributes for the noneliminated alternatives. This pattern of attribute recall clearly does not explain why delay of restoration only partially reduces the reactance effect on attractiveness of the eliminated alternatives. What Schwarz had anticipated, and

Indirect Restoration: Restoration by Implication

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what would have provided an explanation of the partial reduction of reactance effects, was increased first recall of positive attributes of the eliminated alternatives in the delayed restoration condition compared to other conditions. Such differential recall of positive attributes could presumably account for why the eliminated alternatives remain relatively attractive even after freedom is restored. Schwarz concluded, and we agree, that there was thus no evidence to support the notion of a cognitively produced persistence effect, even though there were some cognitive effects apparently due to reactance. The significance of such cognitive effects in reactance processes is not clear and can be determined only by further analysis and research. In sum, the following conclusions may be drawn from Schwarz' research. For restoration of freedom to reduce reactance, it is not necessary that the individual believe he or she had control over the restoration. However, delayed restoration only partially reduces reactance effects, and in the present research, there was no evidence that the persistence of reactance effects after delayed restoration was due to biased cognitive processing of information about eliminated and noneliminated alternatives. Why delayed restoration of freedom produces only a partial reduction in reactance effects thus remains a mystery.

Indirect Restoration: Restoration by Implication Just as reactance can be aroused by implication, so can it be reduced. In the Andreoli, Worchel, and Folger (1974) study described in Chapter 4, both the threat and the restoration were by implication. Subjects who overheard the threat to another person and restoration of this other person's freedom did not differ in their ratings of the advocated topic of discussion from subjects who had not heard any threat. Other examples of freedom restoration by implication are provided in studies by Worchel and Brehm (1971) and McGillis and Brehm (1975). In the second of two studies reported by Worchel and Brehm, each subject anticipated making an individual choice between two human relations cases that they would try to solve. Subjects participated in three-person groups, with the other two supposed subjects actually being experimental confederates. Prior to rating the two case studies, subjects either heard no comments from the confederates (no threat condition), heard one say, "Well, I think it's obvious that we'll work on task A/B" (threat condition), or heard the threat followed by a statement from the other confederate, "Wait just a minute. I really

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haven't made up my mind about the two tasks yet" (restoration of freedom condition). These procedures created a direct threat to the subject's freedom (the first confederate's " w e " presumably referring to all three people present) and an indirect restoration of freedom (the second confederate never specifically mentioning the subject and there being no group decision involved. Since only subjects in the threat condition should be in a continuing state of reactance arousal, opposition to the first confederate's influence attempt was expected to be greatest in that condition. The data strongly supported this prediction. Subjects in the no threat condition showed no strong preference for one case over another. In the threat condition, 8 3 % of the subjects preferred the case not advocated by the first confederate, while in the restoration condition, 8 3 % of the subjects preferred the case advocated by the confederate. This latter result provides good evidence of the creation by strong influence attempts of motives both to comply and to resist. Once the person's freedom was restored and the motive to resist influence reduced, the still existing motive to comply had a powerful effect on behavior. The effects of restoration by implication were also explored in a field study by McGillis and Brehm (1975). Using the Regan and Brehm (1972) supermarket study paradigm, McGillis and Brehm provided customers with the amount of money necessary to buy the brand of bread being promoted. Along with the money, customers were given high threat inu D v u structions ( " y ° only . . .") or low threat ("please try . . . " ) . For some customers, freedom to purchase the bread of their choice was restored in the following manner. A middle-aged, casually dressed woman would approach the bread stall as a customer did, and then in front of the customer, she would say, "I don't feel that I have to buy this (brand name being promoted) bread." She then selected a specific alternative kind of bread. The findings from this study were quite similar to those obtained by Regan and Brehm. All shoppers exposed to the promotional campaign bought more of the designated item than shoppers not so exposed. For female shoppers only, however, the low threat promotion produced more purchases of the target item than did the high threat one. The restoration manipulation greatly increased the level of purchases of the designated brand. Although less than 1 % of the shoppers in the baseline conditions purchased this item and (overall) 1 6 % of the shoppers in the threat conditions purchased it, 7 4 % of the shoppers in the restoration condition bought this item. Moreover, restoration effects were obtained for both sexes, suggesting the possibility that the threat conditions had aroused reactance in male shoppers as well as females. The very few subjects in the restoration condition relative to

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threat conditions (35 versus almost 500 in each of the other two) and the possibility that the restoration statement by the supposed other shopper could have itself produced reactance caution against overinterpretation of these data. However, the dramatic increase in compliance obtained through the use of freedom restoration by implication in this applied study is perfectly consistent with similar effects obtained by Worchel and Brehm in their laboratory research. Although there are other viable ways to restore freedom indirectly (e.g., by manifesting reactance on a freedom-relevant behavior other than the one directly threatened), restoration by virtue of other people's behavior has received by far the most attention. This attention may stem from the possible ramifications of this idea. For example, Mugny (1978) suggests that the confederate who restored his own freedom in the Worchel and Brehm study and, thus, reduced subjects' reactance can be viewed as analogous to those few members of a powerless group who are allowed to succeed by those who actually control the society. Restoration of freedom by implication of another person's acts could then serve the purpose of disguising the power of some people over others. Through the use of such "fronts," powerful people could reduce the opposition to their power from less advantaged individuals. After all, Archie Bunker (of TV's "All in the Family") was against "excessive" taxation of the rich because he did not want anyone to take away his freedom to become a millionaire-and he could point to some examples of people "no better" than he who did become millionaires as proof that this freedom did exist. Another possible ramification of freedom restoration by implication from another's behavior is that individuals who are motivationally aroused but feel unable to restore freedom directly might seek out others who do act in a freedom-restoring way. This seeking out could presumably occur in both reality and fantasy. Since restoring freedom may often involve going against the dictates of society, a motive for vicarious freedom restoration might be a factor in the continual fascination that outlaws and desperados have for so many law-abiding citizens.

Subjective R e s p o n s e s Attractiveness

of the Threatened

or Eliminated

Outcome

Regardless of the behavioral consequences that result from reactance arousal, the arousal of psychological reactance always should be accompanied by a host of subjective reactions. The most obvious sub-

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jective reaction involves the individual's evaluation of the threatened outcome. Desire for this outcome should increase, and its attractiveness should be enhanced. This proposition has received strong support in a variety of studies. For example, when a communication is censored (see Chapter 6 for a more detailed discussion), desire to hear that communication increases. Reactance arousal has been found to enhance the attractiveness of items as diverse as records (Brehm, Stires, Sensenig, & Shaban, 1966), toys (Brehm, in press; Hammock & Brehm, 1966), cookies (Worchel, Lee, & Adewole, 1975), Argentinian desserts (Brehm & Rozen, 1971), and members of the opposite sex (Pennebaker, Dyer, Caulkins, Litowitz, Ackreman, Anderson, & McGraw, 1979; Wicklund & Ogden, cited in Wicklund, 1974). It should be noted that this increased attractiveness is not always absolute, that is, relative to no change at all. Various factors such as regression to the mean and the use of items relatively low in attractiveness to avoid frustration (see discussion below) act to make it difficult to obtain absolute increases in attractiveness. However, relative to the appropriate comparison group (such as one in which subjects do not have the freedom of choosing the item, or one in which the freedom exists but is not threatened or eliminated) in which reactance is not aroused, reactance arousal has been shown to produce a clear and consistently documented increment in relative attractiveness. As noted above, many reactance experiments take the precaution of guarding against the alternative explanation of frustration. An example of how this is done is provided in a study by Hammock and Brehm (1966) that has recently been replicated by Brehm (in press). In this experimental paradigm, children were led to expect to either choose or be assigned one gift item from a set of two taken out of a larger array. The items that were chosen for the set were those that were initially ranked third and fourth in subjects' rankings of the entire array. In the first study of two reported by Hammock and Brehm, as well as in Brehm's recent replication, all subjects were given their third-ranked alternative, and none of the subjects was allowed to choose. This procedure guards against frustration in two ways. The items used to create the set did not include the subject's favorites (i.e., those ranked first or second). Moreover, within the set of two, the most preferred (the thirdranked) was given to the child and the least preferred (the fourthranked) was not given. Reactance theory would predict that, relative to children who never expected to have a choice, subjects who did expect to choose but who were not allowed to do so should increase their preference for the eliminated object (fourth-ranked) and decrease their preference for the

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Subjective R e s p o n s e s T A B L E 5.1

Mean Ranking Changes No c h o i c e c o n d i t i o n

Choice condition

Eliminated,

Gift,

Eliminated,

Gift

ranked fourth

r a n k e d third

ranked fourth

r a n k e d third

Hammock & Brehm,

1966"

43

.00

23

1.23

97 13

66 97

08 82

1.50 1.00

B r e h m , in p r e s s ' ' Males Females (1

From Hammock, T. & Brehm, J. W. The attractiveness of choice alternatives when freedom to choose is eliminated by a social agent. Journal of Personality, 1 9 6 6 , 34, 5 4 6 - 5 5 4 , Table 1, p. 5 5 0 . Copyright 1 9 6 6 by the Duke University Press. b From Brehm, S. S. Psychological reactance and the attractiveness of unobtainable objects: Sex differences in children's responses to an elimination of freedom. Sex Roles, in press. Copyright pending by Plenum Publishing Corp.

obtained object (third-ranked). Both studies (see Table 5.1) confirmed this prediction (in Brehm's study, only for male children), but neither study found any indication of absolute, significantly different fromzero, increase in attractiveness of the eliminated object. This methodology, then, makes a trade. Frustration is convincingly ruled out, since highly desired objects are not eliminated. Supporting this contention, when Brehm (in press) gave subjects a chance to choose a gift for themselves from among the entire array, all the children chose either their first- or second-ranked alternative. The price for this theoretical clarity, however, is that reactance effects may be less than dramatic (see Chapter 11 for more details of these studies). Hostility

Another type of subjective reaction brought about by reactance arousal is hostility toward the agent who has threatened the behavioral freedom. This kind of hostility must be distinguished from the hostility that will accompany aggressive instrumental action aimed at restoring freedom. For example, if someone threatens the freedom to have a specific choice alternative by taking it away, a person can act aggressively and grab it back, and probably feel pretty hostile while doing so. On the other hand, what if in the same situation, the person cannot act aggressively to restore freedom? Will the individual still feel hostility even though no instrumental aggressive act is possible? And,

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will this hostility be expressed in behaviors that in no way will serve to restore freedom? These questions were addressed in a study by Worchel (1974). Male subjects were told by the experimenter to expect one of the following three events: that they would have a choice among three items, that they would receive the most attractive of the three items, or that they would be assigned one of the three items. All subjects were then assigned one of the items by an "experimental assistant"; subjects received either their first, second or third most attractive alternative. At this point, subjects were given an unexpected opportunity to display hostility toward the assistant. They were asked to evaluate whether or not the assistant should be hired on a more permanent basis to assist with the experimenter's research. Results from this study (displayed in Table 5.2) strongly supported the hypothesis that reactance arousal could be accompanied by noninstrumental hostility and, furthermore, suggested the major importance of threat to freedom in inducing hostility. Subjects who expected to be assigned an item showed no differences in hostility as a function of item received. Thus, simple frustration (being deprived of one's most attractive alternative) did not increase hostility relative to that experienced by individuals who were deprived of less attractive items. Subjects who expected to receive their most attractive alternative showed an increase in hostility only when they received the least attractive alternative. Frustrated expectations, therefore, do appear to increase hostility, but only when there is a considerable disconfirmation of the expectancy. For subjects who expected to be able to choose, hostility increased as the attractiveness of the alternative they received decreased. Furthermore, choice condition subjects displayed signifiT A B L E 5.2

Mean Hostility S c o r e s Attractiveness Expected of item

alternative received

Second

method assignment

of

Most

attractive h

most

attractive

Least

attractive

Expect choice

13.57

17.07

22.21

Expect most

10.50

10.00

14.36

11.40

9.50

10.50

Expect (I }

attractive

assignment

From Worchel, 1 9 7 1 . Reprinted by permission.

' Ratings made on the question, "Everything considered, do you think this person would make a good experimenter and should be considered for the job of research assistant?" 1 — very definitely yes; 31 = very definitely no.

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111

cantly more hostility than expectancy condition subjects for all choice alternatives. Reactance arousal was the single most powerful determinant of hostility in Worchel's study. Having stated this, we should note that reactance arousal will not necessarily be accompanied by feelings of hostility. The exact characteristics of the threat to freedom will have a strong impact on whether or not hostility toward the agent is felt. There may typically be a feeling of disturbance, or discomfort, when reactance is aroused, but whether these feelings will include hostility to the agent will depend on such factors as the perceived legitimacy of the threat, the freedom the agent had about making the threat, the intent of the agent, etc.

Self-Direction

One further subjective response to reactance arousal should be mentioned. In the original presentation of the theory, it was noted that, "While there is no assumption that a person will necessarily be aware of reactance, it should be true that when he is, he will feel an increased amount of self-direction in regard to his own behavior [Brehm, 1966, p. 9 ] . " This proposal might seem at first glance to be paradoxical. After all, a person experiencing reactance has just had a freedom threatened or eliminated. He or she is in danger of (at least momentarily) or already has lost control over an important behavioral outcome. How could such a person feel more self-direction? Actually, there is no paradox. There is a great deal of difference between self-direction and control. The point being made here is that, as with any motivational state, when reactance is aroused, the organism is propelled toward a goal. Motivational arousal has the virtue of ordering our priorities. It suddenly becomes clear what we want. Whether we will get it is another issue altogether.

Denial of Threat As Worchel and Andreoli (1976) point out, the individual who has had reactance aroused may frequently find himself or herself in a disturbing and uncomfortable position. If, on the one hand, he or she attempts to restore the threatened freedom directly, this may well involve antisocial or counternormative actions. If, on the other hand, the person complies with the freedom-threatening directive, he or she has relinquished an important freedom. Given such a dilemma, it would be expected that in some situations, the best response to reactance arousal

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5 . Effects o f R e a c t a n c e

would be to try to make the threat go away by denying that it ever occurred. Direct denial of reality, however, may be somewhat difficult. How can we pretend that certain words were not spoken or certain actions were not taken? The work by Worchel and his associates suggests more subtle, and probably more likely, ways in which a person can effectively deny the threat without having to grossly distort reality. Two studies by Worchel and his colleagues (Worchel & Andreoli, 1974; Worchel, Andreoli, & Archer, 1976) addressed this issue through their examination of attributional processes. In the Worchel and Andreoli study, female subjects either anticipated interacting with a supposed other subject in an upcoming experimental task, or did not expect to interact. This task was described (out of the hearing of the other supposed subject) as either competitive or cooperative. When the other subject, actually a confederate, arrived, she acted in either a friendly or hostile manner toward the subject. Then, either subjects were told that a supposed personality test had predicted the confederate's behavior or nothing was said about what might have caused the confederate's behavior. The major dependent measure consisted of subjects' responses to a questionnaire asking them to attribute the confederate's behavior to either dispositional or situational causes. Worchel and Andreoli predicted that reactance arousal should be greatest in those conditions in which the anticipated interaction conflicted with the confederate's behavior. Subjects anticipating a cooperative interaction should value their freedom to act cooperatively with the confederate, and this freedom would be threatened by the confederate's hostile behavior. Conversely, subjects anticipating a competitive interaction should value their freedom to behave competitively, and this freedom would be threatened by the confederate's friendly behavior. The subject is thereby caught in the dilemma of either giving up an important freedom or not reciprocating the confederate's behavior. However, this dilemma is present only if the confederate's behavior is perceived as meaningful for the anticipated interpersonal interaction. If the behavior can be viewed as having been caused by the situation and, therefore, as not reflecting anything specific about the confederate, then implications for the upcoming interaction will be reduced and the subject can simply act as she wishes in this interaction without basing her action on reactance or compliance. Worchel and Andreoli, therefore, predicted that subjects who were not told anything by the experimenter about what might have caused the confederate's behavior would be most likely to make situational causal attributions for this behavior when they were in the

113

Denial of Threat

cooperative-hostile and competitive-friendly conditions. This prediction was confirmed as shown in the data displayed in Table 5.3. Subjects who had been told that the confederate's behavior reflected her personality were unable to use this method of denying the threat, and there were no between condition differences in their attributions. For these subjects, reactance arousal presumably was still present. Worchel and Andreoli measured the subjective effects of this arousal by having subjects evaluate the confederate on a number of questions. As expected, the most derogation was obtained for the friendly confederate when subjects anticipated a competitive interaction and for the hostile confederate when subjects anticipated a cooperative interaction. However, this pattern of results was obtained only for subjects who had been forced to make a dispositional attribution. For those subjects who had been allowed to make situational attributions, derogation was considerably lower in these conditions since the threat had been effectively denied. (See Table 5.4) A second study by these investigators (Worchel, Andreoli, & Archer, 1976) further elaborated the use of attributional processes to deny a threat to freedom. Using a modification of the Brehm and Cole (1966) experimental paradigm (described earlier in this chapter), Worchel et al. varied importance of freedom by telling subjects in the high importance condition that their ratings of another person on a supposed "Whitman S c a l e " predicted their "social sensitivity and intelligence," and that accurate ratings could result in a $10 prize. For low importance subjects, the ratings were described as a pretest. This manipulation of the importance of the freedom to be accurate and objective on

TABLE 5 . 3 Means of Attribution Questions" Type of future interaction Locus of causality Free attribution Forced attribution

Confederate's behavior

Cooperative h

None

anticipated

Competitive

Friendly Hostile

11.75

16.42

6.58

7.17

18.25

14.08

Friendly Hostile

25.25

25.42

25.75

25.25

23.25

24.42

a

From Worchel, S. & Andreoli, V. A. Attribution of causality as a means of restoring freedom. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 1 9 7 4 , 2 9 , 2 3 7 - 2 4 5 , Table 1, p. 2 4 0 . Copyright 1 9 7 4 by the American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission. b

1 = situational; 31 = dispositional.

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5. Effects of R e a c t a n c e

TABLE 5 . 4 1 Means of Derogation of the Confederate' Type of future interaction anticipated Locus of causality Free attribution Forced attribution (J b

Confederate's behavior Friendly Hostile Friendly Hostile

Cooperative 43.00 84.42

b

None

Competitive

41.33

50.92

109.33

97.75

63.17

37.67

76.00

124.25

102.33

108.67

See Table 5.3, Footnote a, Table 3, p. 2 4 2 . The lower the number, the more positive the evaluation.

their ratings was conveyed to subjects prior to the time when the experimental confederate (presented as another subject) entered the room, and the experimental procedures were designed to give the clear impression that the confederate did not know the purpose of the ratings. All subjects then received a favor from the confederate, who won some money on an experimental task and spontaneously split it with the subject. After this, the experimenter explained that the sharing behavior of the confederate was related to the Whitman Scale. It was stated that the first part of the scale (self-ratings that had been completed by the subject and the confederate) could sometimes predict an individual's sharing behavior. The experimenter presented one of the following causal explanations for the confederate's behavior: The situation was responsible (all subjects in this situation shared, regardless of their scores on the scale); the recipient was responsible ("she was the type of person that most people would want to share with in any situation"); the favor-doer was responsible ("she was the type of person that would be motivated to share with anyone in any situation"); or the unique interaction between the two was responsible ("there must be something special about the relationship between the two subjects that caused the sharing"). A control condition was also run in which no mention was made of personality test predictions of sharing. After rating each other on the second part of the scale, subjects were given a sorting task. The confederate was given more sheets of paper to sort and sorted so that all subjects had an opportunity to help. Contrary to the Brehm and Cole study where little difference between experimental conditions was produced on the ratings of the confederate, the rating scale data and the help-offered data were quite

115

Preservation off Other Freedoms 1

similar in the Worchel et al. study . Subjects for whom the freedom to be objective (and thus not obligated to the other subject) was important and for whom the attribution of favor-doing was to the unique interaction between themselves and the other subject rated the confederate as least attractive and were least likely to help (see Table 5.5 for helping 2 data.) For our purposes, the most important aspect of these results is the way in which the other types of attributions were able to reduce the amount of reactance aroused. Again, through attributional sleight of hand (though this time by the experimenter rather than by the subjects themselves), what would have been a threat to freedom was defined away (see Chapter 7 for further discussion of the Worchel et al, 1976, study).

Preservation of Other Freedoms There will be occasions, however, when none of the remedies for reactance arousal will work. Neither direct restoration nor indirect restoration will be available, and it will not be possible to deny the threat. What then happens to this arousal? One effect that could occur is that the person could become motivated to preserve future freedoms. This motivation could then act to produce enhanced reactance arousal 1

Although the Worchel et al. study had many elements in common with the Brehm and Cole experiment, there were significant procedural differences, and female subjects rather than males participated. It is not clear what differences between the two studies might have determined the presence versus absence of reactance effects on the firstimpression ratings. 2 This finding appears to contradict that obtained by Worchel and Andreoli (1974). In that study, attribution to the unique character of the confederate (i.e., her personality) created reactance, whereas in the present study reactance arousal was greatest when the causal attribution was to the unique interaction. Worchel et al. (1976) note this apparent discrepancy and point out that while the unique interaction created the most reactance when the freedom was important, attributions to the favor-doer appeared to create the next highest level. Presumably, then, attributions to either the favor-doer or the unique interaction create more of a possibility that future threats will occur and, thus, a greater number of freedoms is threatened by implication. Another apparent contradiction with previous work is Worchel et al.'s (1976) failure to obtain a difference between importance conditions when no attribution was made for the subjects. Since Brehm and Cole (1966) did not give their subjects attributions, these two conditions would appear to be the most direct replication of the earlier research. Worchel et al. discuss this apparent discrepancy and argue that the very unexpected nature of the favor in the Brehm and Cole study may have led subjects to make an attribution either to the unique character of the actor or to the unique interaction. Moreover, they suggest that the more unexpected nature of the favor in the Brehm and Cole study than of the one they used may have created greater overall levels of reactance arousal.

116

5 . Effects of R e a c t a n c e

TABLE 5 . 5

Percentage of S u b j e c t s Helping the Confederate" Attribution

High importance of freedom Low importance of freedom

Situation (%)

Unique recipient (%)

Unique favor-doer (%)

Unique interaction (%)

No attribution (%)

50

50

42

17

58

58

58

67

75

58

0

From Worchel, S., Andreoli, V., & Archer, R. When is a favor a threat to freedom: The effects of attribution and importance of freedom on reciprocity. Journal of Personality, 1 9 7 6 , 44, 2 9 4 - 3 1 0 , Table 2, p. 3 0 6 . Copyright 1 9 7 6 by Duke University Press. Reprinted by permission.

if another freedom were threatened. Such a motive and subsequent increases in reactance could be involved in the possible hydraulic reactance effects discussed previously in Chapter 4. A motive to preserve freedom might also lead the person to avoid potential threats to freedom. Some suggestion of such avoidance has been found in the research on commitment that will be discussed in Chapter 6.

SUMMARY Reactance, as a motivational state, has two direct effects: It impels attempts to regain lost or threatened freedoms, and it magnifies motivation toward the threatened or lost behaviors and/or their intended outcomes, making them subjectively more attractive. A considerable body of experimental evidence illustrating both effects was reviewed. It has also been demonstrated that an external agent (e.g., another person) can restore freedom by acting directly on behalf of the person whose freedom has been threatened. Just as reactance can be aroused by implication, so it can be reduced. Theoretically, there are two ways in which freedom can be restored by implication. First, people whose freedom has been threatened can attempt to restore their freedom, not by directly exercising the threatened freedom, but by exercising another freedom that would imply that they continue to have the one that was threatened. This proposition has not, however, received empirical examination. Second, an individual whose freedom has been threatened can have it restored by an external

Summary

117

agent who, by restoring his or her own freedom, restores the person's freedom by implication. Experimental tests were described supporting this kind of implied restoration of freedom. Because the direct exercise of a threatened freedom would frequently be antisocial or antinormative in nature, an individual might seek to avoid direct restoration. Although indirect restoration of freedom, as noted above, would be one possible way of avoiding antisocial behavior, it is also possible that a person would simply seek to deny that any threat to his or her freedom had occurred. Theoretically, such denial would be most likely to occur where there was some ambiguity about the threat. Studies that were designed to test this line of reasoning have found supportive evidence.