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Electrophysiology in studying empathy in individuals with traits of psychopathic meanness
24
IOP 2016
Empathy refers to the ability to resonate with and understand the affective states of others. Empathy comprises of different dissociable, but interacting components, including affective resonance (i.e. affective sharing or emotional contagion), cognitive perspective taking (i.e. mentalizing), and empathic concern. A fourth component, sensorimotor resonance or motor empathy, is sometimes added, but we will learn during the symposium why the involvement of this component is sometimes debated. Despite extensive research on empathy, the neurobiological underpinnings of empathic processing including its different components is not yet clearly understood. Therefore, during this symposium, participants will not only learn about empathy including its different components, its relation to morality and psychopathic traits, but also about its neurobiological correlates. doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2016.07.075
169 Electrophysiology in studying empathy in individuals with traits of psychopathic meanness Josanne D.M. van Dongen, Ingmar H.A. Franken Department of Psychology, Education and Child Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, Netherlands An important goal of the recent Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative is to incorporate neuroscience findings in the science of psychopathology. One psychopathological condition for which such an approach would be particularly beneficial is psychopathy. According to the Triarchic Model of Psychopathy, traits that are typical to psychopathy can be grouped in a construct known as Meanness. Meanness represents a constellation of traits that include callousness, cruelty, and lack of empathy. Although some aspects of psychopathy (i.e., ‘fearlessness’ and impulsivity) have been studied within the RDoC framework, no study has focused on psychopathic meanness, though a lack of empathy is considered one of the core features of psychopathy. Previous electrophysiological studies on empathy in relation to psychopathic traits mainly focused on empathy for pain. In contrast, less is known about the electrophysiological correlates of empathy in more naturalistic contexts, such as aggressive situations, that are specifically relevant for psychopathic meanness. Recently, different studies in both forensic patients and individuals from the general population were conducted in our lab. In these studies, slow ERP waves and mu suppression in the EEG were examined as indexes of empathic processing during the observation of scenarios in which victims of aggression were depicted. Results showed that persons with elevated levels of psychopathic meanness score lower on empathic traits and displayed reduced P3 and LPP amplitudes and less mu suppression when aggressive interactions were processed. This indicates less emotional processing and less resonating with others when dealing with aggressive events. In sum, our studies are the first to examine the electrophysiological signature of empathy during the processing of scenarios depicting aggressive situations in participants with traits of psychopathic meanness. The decreased electrophysiological response to aggressive pictures seen in those with high levels of meanness may indicate functional differences of particular brain regions (e.g. vmPFC) associated with empathic processing. The current outcomes contributes to advancing our knowledge of the brain mechanisms involved in understanding mental states of others. Therefore, it improves our knowledge of the brain mechanisms involved in understanding other clinical constructs and populations linked to a lack of empathy (i.e. autism and schizophrenia). doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2016.07.076
93 Intentional harm: a proxy for empathy and moral Agustin Ibaneza,b,c, Rodrigo Ortegad,e, Vladimir Lopeze Laboratory of Experimental Psychology and Neuroscience (LPEN), Institute of Translational and Cognitive Neuroscience (INCyT), INECO Foundation, Favaloro University, Buenos Aires, Argentina b Universidad Autónoma del Caribe, Barranquilla, Colombia c School of Psychology, Adolfo Ibanez University, Santiago, Chile d Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile e Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile
a
A decisive element of moral cognition is the detection of harm and its assessment as intentional or unintentional. Moral evaluation engages brain networks supporting mentalizing, intentionality, empathic concern and evaluation. This network relies on the amygdala as a critical hub, likely through frontotemporal connections indexing stimulus salience. We will present relevant evidence from our laboratory, including behavioral studies of neurodegenerative conditions and psychiatric disorders, intracranial recordings, lesion studies, high-density electroencephalography, neuroimaging, and functional connectivity. These studies converge in 3 issues: 1) intentional harms are process at very early stages by coticolimbic networks in terms of stimulus salience; 2) intentional harms involucrate more broad and high-level regions engaged in theory of mind, empathy and moral sensitivity; 3) impairments in the detection of intentional harms are partially dependent on a broad fronto-insulartemporal network (FITN) responsible for (a) on-the-fly context-based prediction making, (b) coordination of the internal (bodily) and external (task-related) milieus, and (c) consolidation of associations between context and target stimuli. Results support the 'many roads' view of the amygdala and its frontotemporal connections, highlighting its role in the rapid encoding of intention and salience –critical components of mentalizing and moral evaluation. Finally, we identify new challenges for this synergistic framework in order to be applied in psychiatric and neurological translational science. This work was partially supported by grants from CONICET, CONICYT/FONDECYT Regular (1130920 & 1150241), CONICYT/FONDECYT Postdoc (3150195), FONDAP 15150012, FONCyTPICT 2012-0412, FONCyT-PICT 2012-1309, and INECO Foundation. doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2016.07.077
95 Is empathy necessary for morality? Jean Decety The University of Chicago, Chicago, United States Empathy, the ability to perceive and be sensitive to the emotional states of others, plays a fundamental role in interpersonal interactions, from bonding between mother and child to patient-doctor relationships. It motivates prosocial and caregiving behaviors, plays a role in inhibiting aggression, and facilitates cooperation between members of a similar social group. Drawing on empirical research and theory, I will argue that our sensitivity to others’ needs has been selected in the context of parental care and group living. One corollary of this evolutionary model is that empathy produces social preferences that can conflict with morality. This claim is supported by a wealth of empirical findings from social neuroscience and behavioral economics documenting a complex and equivocal relation between empathy, morality and justice. doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2016.07.078
IOP 2016
Empathy refers to the ability to resonate with and understand the affective states of others. Empathy comprises of different dissociable, but interacting components, including affective resonance (i.e. affective sharing or emotional contagion), cognitive perspective taking (i.e. mentalizing), and empathic concern. A fourth component, sensorimotor resonance or motor empathy, is sometimes added, but we will learn during the symposium why the involvement of this component is sometimes debated. Despite extensive research on empathy, the neurobiological underpinnings of empathic processing including its different components is not yet clearly understood. Therefore, during this symposium, participants will not only learn about empathy including its different components, its relation to morality and psychopathic traits, but also about its neurobiological correlates. doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2016.07.075
169 Electrophysiology in studying empathy in individuals with traits of psychopathic meanness Josanne D.M. van Dongen, Ingmar H.A. Franken Department of Psychology, Education and Child Studies, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, Netherlands An important goal of the recent Research Domain Criteria (RDoC) initiative is to incorporate neuroscience findings in the science of psychopathology. One psychopathological condition for which such an approach would be particularly beneficial is psychopathy. According to the Triarchic Model of Psychopathy, traits that are typical to psychopathy can be grouped in a construct known as Meanness. Meanness represents a constellation of traits that include callousness, cruelty, and lack of empathy. Although some aspects of psychopathy (i.e., ‘fearlessness’ and impulsivity) have been studied within the RDoC framework, no study has focused on psychopathic meanness, though a lack of empathy is considered one of the core features of psychopathy. Previous electrophysiological studies on empathy in relation to psychopathic traits mainly focused on empathy for pain. In contrast, less is known about the electrophysiological correlates of empathy in more naturalistic contexts, such as aggressive situations, that are specifically relevant for psychopathic meanness. Recently, different studies in both forensic patients and individuals from the general population were conducted in our lab. In these studies, slow ERP waves and mu suppression in the EEG were examined as indexes of empathic processing during the observation of scenarios in which victims of aggression were depicted. Results showed that persons with elevated levels of psychopathic meanness score lower on empathic traits and displayed reduced P3 and LPP amplitudes and less mu suppression when aggressive interactions were processed. This indicates less emotional processing and less resonating with others when dealing with aggressive events. In sum, our studies are the first to examine the electrophysiological signature of empathy during the processing of scenarios depicting aggressive situations in participants with traits of psychopathic meanness. The decreased electrophysiological response to aggressive pictures seen in those with high levels of meanness may indicate functional differences of particular brain regions (e.g. vmPFC) associated with empathic processing. The current outcomes contributes to advancing our knowledge of the brain mechanisms involved in understanding mental states of others. Therefore, it improves our knowledge of the brain mechanisms involved in understanding other clinical constructs and populations linked to a lack of empathy (i.e. autism and schizophrenia). doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2016.07.076
93 Intentional harm: a proxy for empathy and moral Agustin Ibaneza,b,c, Rodrigo Ortegad,e, Vladimir Lopeze Laboratory of Experimental Psychology and Neuroscience (LPEN), Institute of Translational and Cognitive Neuroscience (INCyT), INECO Foundation, Favaloro University, Buenos Aires, Argentina b Universidad Autónoma del Caribe, Barranquilla, Colombia c School of Psychology, Adolfo Ibanez University, Santiago, Chile d Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile, Santiago, Chile e Universidad Diego Portales, Santiago, Chile
a
A decisive element of moral cognition is the detection of harm and its assessment as intentional or unintentional. Moral evaluation engages brain networks supporting mentalizing, intentionality, empathic concern and evaluation. This network relies on the amygdala as a critical hub, likely through frontotemporal connections indexing stimulus salience. We will present relevant evidence from our laboratory, including behavioral studies of neurodegenerative conditions and psychiatric disorders, intracranial recordings, lesion studies, high-density electroencephalography, neuroimaging, and functional connectivity. These studies converge in 3 issues: 1) intentional harms are process at very early stages by coticolimbic networks in terms of stimulus salience; 2) intentional harms involucrate more broad and high-level regions engaged in theory of mind, empathy and moral sensitivity; 3) impairments in the detection of intentional harms are partially dependent on a broad fronto-insulartemporal network (FITN) responsible for (a) on-the-fly context-based prediction making, (b) coordination of the internal (bodily) and external (task-related) milieus, and (c) consolidation of associations between context and target stimuli. Results support the 'many roads' view of the amygdala and its frontotemporal connections, highlighting its role in the rapid encoding of intention and salience –critical components of mentalizing and moral evaluation. Finally, we identify new challenges for this synergistic framework in order to be applied in psychiatric and neurological translational science. This work was partially supported by grants from CONICET, CONICYT/FONDECYT Regular (1130920 & 1150241), CONICYT/FONDECYT Postdoc (3150195), FONDAP 15150012, FONCyTPICT 2012-0412, FONCyT-PICT 2012-1309, and INECO Foundation. doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2016.07.077
95 Is empathy necessary for morality? Jean Decety The University of Chicago, Chicago, United States Empathy, the ability to perceive and be sensitive to the emotional states of others, plays a fundamental role in interpersonal interactions, from bonding between mother and child to patient-doctor relationships. It motivates prosocial and caregiving behaviors, plays a role in inhibiting aggression, and facilitates cooperation between members of a similar social group. Drawing on empirical research and theory, I will argue that our sensitivity to others’ needs has been selected in the context of parental care and group living. One corollary of this evolutionary model is that empathy produces social preferences that can conflict with morality. This claim is supported by a wealth of empirical findings from social neuroscience and behavioral economics documenting a complex and equivocal relation between empathy, morality and justice. doi:10.1016/j.ijpsycho.2016.07.078