Emerging strategies for voluntary urban ecological stewardship on private property

Landscape and Urban Planning 157 (2017) 586–597

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Landscape and Urban Planning journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/landurbplan

Review article

Emerging strategies for voluntary urban ecological stewardship on private property Joshua F. Cerra Cornell University Department of Landscape Architecture, 444 Kennedy Hall, Ithaca, NY 14853, USA

h i g h l i g h t s • • • • •

Private property can contribute important habitat and ecosystem services in cities. I describe four strategies for voluntary urban private stewardship from diverse sources. Private property stewardship is most effective when addressed at multiple scales. Combining actors and approaches enhances potential to improve urban habitat quality. Private property stewardship deserves greater investigation as a tool for cities.

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 19 June 2015 Received in revised form 25 March 2016 Accepted 30 June 2016 Keywords: Private property Urban ecology Habitat stewardship Urban environmental policy Voluntary incentives Ecosystem services

a b s t r a c t As global urban populations grow, green spaces in cities are under increasing pressure to provide urban habitat and perform important ecosystem services. While public natural areas are typically called upon to provide key habitat in cities, green spaces on private property make up large parts of the urban land base and provide important roles for habitat and ecosystem services that support city function. However voluntary strategies for encouraging ecological stewardship on private property in cities are not well studied. This paper accesses available literature, case studies, municipal and organizational reports, and first-person interviews to describe four emerging strategies for catalyzing voluntary private property stewardship in cities: (a) indirect incentives; (b) market-based certifications; (c) community-based initiatives; and (d) payments for ecosystem services. Each offers the potential to combine the individual actions of multiple urban landowners in order to optimize the landscape-scale benefits of these actions in a strategic way. Components, methods and drivers are identified for each strategy and examples are provided to illustrate their application. The challenge of scale in optimizing ecological benefits in cities, and the potential for institutional partnering on multi-parcel, private property stewardship efforts to generate both site-scale and landscape-scale ecological outcomes is discussed. Voluntary, urban ecological stewardship strategies offer a different set of solutions than regulatory models, and open a new land base that would otherwise be inaccessible for improving ecological function as cities change and grow. © 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Contents 1. 2. 3.

4. 5.

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587 Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 587 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 588 3.1. Indirect incentives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 588 3.2. Market-based certifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 588 3.3. Community-based initiatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 591 3.4. Payments for ecosystem services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 592 Discussion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 594 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595

E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected] http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.landurbplan.2016.06.016 0169-2046/© 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

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Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595 References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 595

1. Introduction As urban populations increase, expansion and infill to accommodate growth fundamentally constrain the area for natural systems to reside within the urban fabric, and alter the capacity for natural systems to function. At the same time, green spaces in cities are under increasing pressure to perform important ecosystem services for urban citizens. Amidst these constraints, urban areas continue to provide important habitat for many species of birds and other wildlife. Public urban green spaces are often set aside to provide key terrestrial and aquatic habitat as the backbone for landscape ecological networks in metropolitan areas. However, a large propotion of green space in cities remains privately owned. Domestic gardens are a major component of cities, occupying approximately a quarter of the entire land area in cities studied in the UK (Evans, Newson, & Gaston, 2009; Gaston, Warren, Tompson, & Smith, 2005; Loram, Tratalos, Warren, & Gaston, 2007), and 36% of the total urban area in the city of Dunedin, New Zealand (Mathieu, Freeman, & Aryal, 2007). Private urban green spaces or “patios” comprised 85% of all urban green spaces in terms of surface area in the city of Leon, Nicaragua (González-García and Sal, 2008). In Baltimore, Maryland approximately 55% of the area of block groups studied and approximately 85% of unplanted area with potential for future planting was on private land (Grove et al., 2006; Troy, Grove, Jarlath, Pickett, & Cadenasso, 2007). These private urban spaces can provide valuable benefits for both people and wildlife. Research and modeling suggest that private property contributes to avian habitat quality (Lerman et al., 2014). Modeling also suggests that private property contributes to urban connectivity and dispersal (Rudd, Vala, & Schaefer, 2002) or has the potential to (Parker, Head, Chisholm, & Feneley, 2008; Snep, WallisDeVries, & Opdam, 2011). A review of studies about the potential ecosystem services of gardens as green infrastructure components in the urban landscape included temperature regulation, energy conservation, stormwater runoff and flood attenuation, urban wildlife habitat, and human physical health benefits associated with domestic gardens (Cameron et al., 2012). Due to the proportion of urban gardens in urban areas, there is “substantial potential for them to contribute to city-wide biodiversity potential and ecosystem performance (Tratalos, Fuller, Warren, Davies, & Gaston, 2007, 314).” One of the challenges for private property stewardship in cities is that the private property landbase is composed of many small parcels with many landowners. While it is possible to work on an individual basis with private landowners, ecological planning and management may have the greatest impact when conducted over a large area. One can imagine the potential benefits of coordinated, multi-parcel stewardship efforts guided by landscape-level analysis and planning. The need for new approaches to encourage beneficial habitat improvements on urban private property has been acknowledged for some time (Nassauer, 1997), but strategies to do so are relatively unexplored by planning and design professionals and in the academic literature. Goddard, Dougill, and Benton (2010) discuss ‘topdown’ and ‘bottom-up’ urban habitat conservation strategies on private land. Recent voluntary stewardship initiatives however suggest the potential for greater description and categorization of strategies for encouraging urban habitat stewardship on urban private land so that they can be better understood and implemented.

While voluntary incentive options for habitat stewardship on rural private property are relatively well documented (see for example Defenders of Wildlife, 2006; Doremus, 2003; Mayer & Tikka, 2006), strategies for encouraging voluntary urban stewardship are not well described. The urban environment, by virtue of its relatively small parcels and distributed ownership, poses a unique set of stewardship challenges and opportunities that are fundamentally different from rural areas. Yet surveys of public, non-governmental and private organizations indicate that a significant amount of urban ecological stewardship is being conducted on private property (Fisher, Campbell, & Svendsen, 2012; Svendsen & Campbell, 2008). This paper investigates emerging initiatives and programs that encourage voluntary urban habitat stewardship in the matrix of private properties. It describes four strategies for urban stewardship practice: a) indirect incentives; b) market-based certifications; c) community-based initiatives; and d) payments for ecosystem services. Each strategy has the potential to combine the individual actions of multiple urban landowners in order to optimize the landscape-scale benefits of these actions in a concerted way. Perspective on each of these strategies in practice is provided from the academic literature where available. This paper also incorporates content from municipal and organizational reports and interviews to describe case studies that illustrate these strategies and how they work. In most cases, ecological improvement is either the primary goal of these programs, or an acknowledged secondary benefit. Components, methods and drivers are identified for each strategy to illustrate their application at the project level. Finally, we discuss the challenge of scale in optimizing ecological benefits in cities, and the potential for institutional partnering on multi-parcel, private property stewardship efforts to generate both site-scale and landscape-scale ecological outcomes.

2. Methods Searches for documentation of voluntary cooperative stewardship efforts on private property were conducted with the ProQuest Summon Service. Combinations of search terms were used including: private, stewardship, initiative, cooperative, voluntary, urban, garden, parcel, lot, subdivision, neighborhood, habitat, ecological and ecosystem. Similar searches were also conducted in several topically-related journals (Landscape and Urban Planning, Ecology and Society, and Urban Forestry and Urban Greening). Searches specific to strategy topics and related theory were also conducted. Limited academic literature on voluntary cooperative stewardship efforts on urban private property was found; however as similarly described by Wilkinson, Sendstad, Parnell, and Schewenius (2013) when investigating urban governance of biodiversity and ecosystem services in the scientific literature, there was significant reporting in the “grey literature” outside of academia. While different in their scope, rigor, and perspective, these resources have the potential to contain valuable knowledge about how cities and urban communities are engaged in such stewardship (Wilkinson et al., 2013). We therefore followed up literature searches with webbased searches, news and newsletter readings, and interviews to find program examples of voluntary urban private property stewardship. Programs encountered during professional practice by the author were also incorporated. We sought program reports and documentation for the case studies, and conducted select phone interviews or email inquiries to fill in gaps in information. Phone

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interviews typically consisted of a conversation with a program representative where questions were asked about the program and program delivery. Email correspondence was conducted in similar question-and-answer format. During this process stewardship patterns emerged that could be grouped into four distinct strategies. We then extrapolated a series of steps for each strategy from the literature and case studies. While these steps may not match the exact details of all programs, they provide insight into how each of these voluntary cooperative stewardship strategies is being conducted in practice today. 3. Results The results of this process are composed below in the four strategies described. Table 1 summarizes the ecosystem services sought and any preliminary measures of success for select case studies reviewed in this article. 3.1. Indirect incentives Indirect incentive programs are administered by a municipality or municipal planning organization as part of a policy or ordinance. Essentially, these policies incentivize property owners to avoid conversion of existing urban habitat during development by offering a favorable alternative. These programs may also encourage enhancement, restoration, or creation of urban habitat or green space on properties by providing indirect incentives for participants including tax reduction, fee credit, development rights, or other benefits. They are different than direct incentive mechanisms, which provide compensation in the form of direct payment, subsidy, grants, or financing (Carter & Fowler, 2008). In exchange, landowners or developers may be required to enter into a conservation or enhancement agreement with the municipality in order to define their commitment. In addition to program benefits, participants may also receive implementation or other technical assistance. There may also be a periodic monitoring and reporting requirement following development of the project to check for compliance (Fig. 1). Municipal drivers for developing indirect incentives include an interest in conserving existing urban habitat or biodiversity, or maintaining ecosystem services and environmental performance. Sometimes these programs are driven by pressure to meet regulatory requirements or policy goals. Cities realize the potential for private property to help municipalities comply with these requirements as part of the urban land base, particularly if designed and managed with respect to certain environmental objectives (e.g. to protect sensitive habitat or meet maximum stormwater discharge limits). Cities may also pair indirect incentive programs for private properties with a citywide conservation planning strategy that also includes public property. This approach has the advantage of implementing an overall planning framework that targets key habitats by both protecting and buying pubic land and encouraging private property stewardship with the policy-based incentive program. The Reserva Particular do Patrimônio Natural Municipal (RPPNM) program in Curitiba, Brazil, which is a core component of Curitiba’s comprehensive urban biodiversity program called Biocity, is an example of a voluntary, indirect incentives strategy. The RPPNM is a natural heritage private reserve program established by municipal law which incentivizes landowners owning private property with at least 70% mid-successional or mature forest cover to maintain the tract in exchange for property tax reductions and/or the ability to transfer the building potential of that property to another location (Seraphim, 2012). Program participants must develop management plans that maintain the conservation value of set-aside areas (Prefeitura de Curitiba, 2007). Extension

technicians are available to provide technical support for those operating private reserves under RPPNM. As part of a comprehensive municipal landscape planning strategy combining both public and private stewardship strategies, the city has identified 1000 locations occupying 14 million square meters eligible for the RPPNM private reserve designation which, if fully implemented, could substantially contribute to the city’s habitat conservation land base (D. Seraphim, personal communication, March 18, 2013). As of 2014, there were 15 properties enrolled in the RPPNM program (D. Seraphim, personal communication, November 10, 2014). Other public programs offer indirect incentives for conservation or enhancement on existing developed property. In these cases municipalities or other agencies administer programs that offer incentives to adopt stewardship practices on residential, commercial or otherwise privately owned property, often with a specific set of goals. For example city of Yokohama, concerned about urban heat island effects due to loss of urban vegetation, has launched a tax system as a revenue base to increase green spaces and conserve green space on both public and private facilities (Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, 2012, City of Yokohama, n.d). The program has multiple incentives applicable to both existing properties and newly developed properties. One is an indirect incentive in the form of a real estate tax deduction offered to landowners in exchange for agreement to preserve green space on a property (above the required green coverage ratio) for 10 years (Y. Takagi, personal communication, April 27, 2015, April 28, 2015). As of 2013, 16 districts were working on establishing a Green Plan and 14 districts were conducting implementation based on a Green Plan. Greening activities (primarily establishment of lawn) had been conducted at 46 private nurseries/kindergartens of their targeted 100 within the first five years of the program (City of Yokohama, 2014). Wilkinson et al. (2013) conducted a literature review of many aspects of urban governance of biodiversity and ecosystem services globally, and identified examples of both regulatory and voluntary governance strategies for habitat quality enhancement on private property. Voluntary indirect incentive programs they identified included a property tax reduction program for habitat conservation and management commitments for sensitive habitats in MiamiDade County, Florida (Alonso & Heinen, 2011) and a review of indirect (as well as direct) financial incentives for greenroof development in the United States and Germany to reduce stormwater runoff (Carter and Fowler, 2008). Another example is the Bionet Stewardship program in Capetown, South Africa which offers tax rebates and technical assistance in return for agreements from landowners to maintain their land in perpetuity (Holmes, Rebelo, Dorse, & Wood, 2012). From a collective action standpoint, indirect incentives serve as a type of “selective incentive” to encourage members of large groups to participate in activities that benefit the common or “collective good” (Olson, 1971). These selective incentives are “noncollective goods” delivering private benefits to a participant in addition to the benefits of the collective good enjoyed by all (Olson, 1971). An external entity provides this incentive only to those that contribute to the common good; those who do not contribute do not receive it (Olson, 1971; Ostrom, 2010). In this way, indirect incentive strategies offer rewards that are compatible with certain development mechanisms and existing developed properties which formerly may have been inaccessible for urban ecological stewardship activities. 3.2. Market-based certifications Market-based certifications encourage ecological enhancements during site development in return for formal recognition through certification. These programs either a) promote

Table 1 Table summarizing select case studies reviewed, the ecosystem services sought by each case study, and any preliminary measures of their success. Strategy Type

Case Study

Location

Primary Ecosystem Service

Comparable TEEB Ecosystem Service(s), (TEEB,2011)

Ecosystem Service Type(s) (TEEB,2011)

Preliminary Measures of Success

Reference(s)

Biodiversity

Maintenance of genetic diversity

Habitat or Supporting

15 properties enrolled as of Seraphim, 2012, D. 2014 Seraphim, personal communication, November 10, 2014 City of Yokohama, Greening initiatives on private land and public 2014 facilities in 14 districts

Indirect Incentives Curitiba, Brazil Reserva Particular do Patrimônio Natural Municipal (RPPNM)/Biocity

Yokohama, Japan

Biological diversity, combat urban heat island effect

Maintenance of genetic diversity, local climate and air quality regulation

Habitat or Supporting, Regulating

Salmon-Safe Series of Certification Standards

Pacific Northwest, United States

Habitats for species, Erosion prevention and maintenance

Habitat or Supporting, Regulating

Many certified projects

www.salmonsafe. org, Bahls, 2008

LEED for Neighborhood Development (LEED-ND)

Various locations, United States

Primarily habitat protection, also erosion prevention and sediment control, water quality, others Prerequisite ecosystem service of species and habitat protection

Habitats for species

Habitat or Supporting Services

388 LEED-ND certified projects listed in 2015

Sustainable Sites Initiative (SITES)

Various locations, United States

Habitats for species Prerequisite ecosystem services are species and habitat protection, property value. Numerous others in Credits

Habitat or Supporting Services

46 certified SITES projects listed in 2015

http://www.usgbc. org/projects/ neighborhooddevelopment http://www. sustainablesites. org/certified-sites

Pollinator Pathway

Seattle, Washington, USA

Species habitat, pollination

Habitats for species, pollination

60 sites along the original project corridor in 2014, about 1/3 complete

Pollinator Pathway, 2014

Primarily wildlife habitat and stormwater reduction

Habitats for species

Habitat or Supporting Services, Regulating Habitat or Supporting Services

Over 2700 properties enrolled in Backyard Habitat Program in 2015, over 540 urban acres of participant land base

G. Beatty, personal communication, April 9, 2015

Nagoya, Japan

Combat urban heat island effect

Local climate and air quality regulation

Regulating

N/A

Kohsaka, 2010

Sacramento, California, USA

Ecosystem service is CO2 sequestration

Carbon sequestration and storage

Regulating

Schadler and Danks, 2011

Sacramento, California, USA

Peak load reduction due to shading by trees

Local climate and air quality regulation

Regulating

464 trees planted, offsetting 2132 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) in 2011 23-year successful project relationship in 2014

Market-based Certifications

Community-based Initiatives

Portland Backyard Habitat Program Portland, Oregon, USA

Payments for Ecosystem Services Basic Nagoya Green Plan/Greenification Certificate System Sacramento Tree Foundation and Harbison-Mahony-Higgins Builders Inc. Sacramento Tree Foundation and Sacramento Municipal Utility District

J.F. Cerra / Landscape and Urban Planning 157 (2017) 586–597

City of Yokohama Greenery Promotion Division

A. Fenkner, personal communication, November 20, 2014

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Fig. 1. Indirect incentives strategy diagram.

Fig. 2. Market-based certification strategy diagram.

habitat-based standards as the primary basis for certification, or b) incorporate habitat-based standards into an overall certification program evaluating multiple aspects of sustainable performance. Certification is typically conducted by a non-governmental, third party organization that develops the required standards and/or a credit structure for certification and administers the program. Projects must demonstrate compliance with habitat-based design construction, and/or management standards. The certifier may also require periodic project monitoring or reporting following certification (Fig. 2). The driver for participation is market-based; participating developers anticipate that certification will add a premium to the development product (for example residential units) such that the cost of certification may be recovered by increased sale price,

and/or result in improved marketability relative to other developments. This type of certification program could be considered a type of market friction market-based instrument (MBI) as described by Whitten and Coggan (2012). Market friction MBI’s are designed to improve market function, for example by providing key information, facilitating a marketplace, or reducing impediments to entering markets (Whitten & Coggan, 2012). In this case marketbased certifications can be considered friction-based MBI’s because they send a signal to buyers that the development product has added value due to the certification (Whitten & Coggan, 2012). An example of this strategy is the Salmon-Safe series of certification standards administered by Salmon-Safe Inc. SalmonSafe is an independent, regional certification program based in the Pacific Northwest of the United States. Salmon-Safe has

J.F. Cerra / Landscape and Urban Planning 157 (2017) 586–597

administered multiple certification standards for urban land use types including corporate and university campuses, residential development, construction management, and parks and natural areas (http://salmonsafe.org/getcertified). Each of the standards focuses on opportunities to conserve or enhance key site ecological components either on an existing property or during the project development process that improve habitat for salmonids and other aquatic and terrestrial species. Certification is typically based on six common habitat management categories: instream habitat protection and restoration, riparian and wetland protection and restoration, stormwater management, water use management, erosion and sediment control, and chemical and nutrient containment (Bahls, 2008). Certification is contingent upon meeting a comprehensive list of required conditions combined with ongoing stewardship commitments made between the project applicant and Salmon-Safe following a series of consultations with an expert review team (Bahls, 2008; D. Kent, personal communication, June 8, 2015). A new, comprehensive set of Salmon-Safe Urban Standards was under pilot development in 2015 and will eventually replace several of the individual, urban-oriented standards listed above (D. Kent, personal communication, June 4, 2015). It is comprised of the same six categories as the existing certification standards, and adds a seventh category titled “Enhancement of Urban Ecological Function” (Salmon-Safe, 2014). This category focuses on also maintaining and enhancing habitat quality for terrestrial species like birds, pollinators and bats present in the urban environment. Unique standards in this category include landscape ecological analysis and enhancement where possible (Standard U.5.1), coordination with local jurisdictions and other property owners to cooperatively improve habitat quality (Standard U.5.3), enhancement of buildings to limit impacts to wildlife like window treatments that reduce bird strikes and considerations for built-in habitat elements like living walls (Standard U.5.5) (Salmon-Safe, 2014). Development of these standards was informed by a largescale pilot program in Seattle, Washington where Salmon-Safe is working with Vulcan Inc. to certify a new neighborhood-scale, mixed-use redevelopment over multiple blocks in the South Lake Union area (D. Kent, personal communication, June 4, 2015, June 8, 2015). In this project and others, Salmon-Safe certification is being actively coordinated within broader state and federal initiatives for salmon recovery under the Endangered Species Act such as the Puget Sound Partnership (D. Kent, personal communication, June 8, 2015). Other development certification programs include habitatbased criteria within a broader sustainability program. For example, LEED for Neighborhood Developments (LEED-ND) by the United States Green Building Council (USGBC) has prerequisite requirements for protecting imperiled species and their habitat, limiting the amount and type of development within a certain distance from wetlands and water bodies, and avoiding development in a floodplain to the greatest extent practicable (USGBC, 2014). It also offers credit options for conserving, restoring and/or managing significant habitat or wetland and water bodies as defined by the standards, avoiding or limiting disturbance of undeveloped land and associated vegetation, and reducing light pollution within the project (USGBC, 2014). These habitat-based options offer a total of five points out of a minimum required 40 points necessary for certification (USGBC, 2014). The Sustainable Sites Initiative (SITES) provides a certification program for sustainable land design and development. SITES v2 has prerequisite requirements for conservation of aquatic ecosystems (wetlands, estuaries, rivers, and lakes), avoiding development in areas that contain habitat for threatened or endangered species, and control and management of invasive plants (Prerequisites 1.3, 1.4, 4.2) (Sustainable Sites Initiative, 2014). It also offers credit options for restoration

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of aquatic ecosystems, conservation of ‘appropriate’ and special status vegetation, conservation and use of native plants, conservation and restoration of native plant communities, optimization of biomass consistent with the regional biome, reduction of light pollution, and minimization of pesticide and fertilizer use, (Credits 3.6, 4.4, 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, 4.8, 6.8, 8.4, respectively) (Sustainable Sites Initiative, 2014). Credit for these habitat-based options can total 28–43 points out of a minimum of 70 points required for certification (Sustainable Sites Initiative, 2014). Both of these programs also include prerequisites and credit options that likely provide indirect benefits to urban habitat (e.g. for stormwater management). Similar to the policy-based indirect incentive strategy, marketbased certifications also provide selective incentives; however they are not in the form of an incentive administered by an authority but by provision of value-added product, or “green” good, denoted by a certification. Green goods attach a public good onto a private good for a premium (Kotchen, 2006; Pecorino, 2015). This type of “byproduct” mechanism was originally described by Olson (Olson, 1971; Pecorino, 2015) and has been shown to serve as a consumer incentive; consumers are willing to pay more for such “eco-labeled” private goods that also contribute an environmental public good (see for example Casadesus-Masanell, Crooke, Reinhardt, & Vasishth, 2009; Fuerst & McAllister, 2011; Teisl, Roe, & Hicks, 2002). Market-based certifications have the potential to create a new type of conservation steward in certain markets. In the case of new developments, certification programs are typically designed to work with the development process, not against it. Larger development projects that achieve these certifications may result in a significant land base with consistently applied, habitat-based planning benefits. However they may or may not be linked to a broader landscape ecological or ecological network strategy. 3.3. Community-based initiatives Community-based initiatives are driven less by market forces and more by private landowner interest in an environmental goal that is shared by an organizing entity. Typically the organizing entity coordinates landowner recruitment and participation, which is often centered around a geographic location. Of the four strategies identified in this paper, community-based initiatives are closest to the “bottom up” type of approach described by Goddard et al. (2010). The initiative program typically conducts outreach to organize landowners around a particular environmental issue, may provide technical and implementation assistance, and may also follow up with long-term monitoring, adaptive management, technical assistance, and organizational tools (Fig. 3). The Pollinator Pathway project is a community-based initiative that envisions a connected network of greenspaces in cities that are “designed to ecological standards.” (Pollinator Pathway, n.d). The original project seeks to develop a mile-long, 12-foot wide pollinator corridor between Seattle University Campus and Norah’s Woods natural area in Seattle, Washington. The program works with landowners to construct the corridor in their street boulevards between these two locations for pollinators and other wildlife. Pollinator-friendly plants are selected from a list approved by the Seattle Department of Transportation to accommodate height restrictions and other constraints to planting near streets. The director of the project, Sarah Bergmann, originally envisioned the project as an art installation. She now coordinates a full-scale program conducting property owner outreach, garden design, pollinator surveys, and installation by volunteers (Seattle Art Museum, 2012). This original project included 60 sites along the corridor and was about a third complete in 2014 (Pollinator Pathway, n.d). In Summer 2014 the program initiated a second project in the Capitol Hill District area in Seattle, and also added a new certification

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Fig. 3. Community-based initiative strategy diagram.

option for pollinator-based habitat establishment. The program has broader plans for establishing pollinator-based projects at multiple scales across North America (Pollinator Pathway, n.d). Another successful example of a community-based initiative is the Portland Backyard Habitat Certification Program organized by Audubon Society of Portland and the Columbia Land Trust in Portland, Oregon. The certification program is not market-based, but instead designed to appeal to landowners who are personally interested in improving habitat in their yards. Participants are rewarded for achieving a certain level of habitat stewardship via a tier system (silver, gold, platinum), with escalating requirements for improving habitat quality in their yards. Tiers include benchmarks requiring minimum levels of invasive plant removal, native plant and vegetative structure establishment, reduced use of pesticides, stormwater management techniques, incorporation of habitat features and management techniques, and recruitment and continuing education efforts (Backyard Habitat Certification Program, n.d.). In addition to a yard sign, participants also receive discounts and other benefits provided by participating partners (Backyard Habitat Certification Program, n.d.). The program had over 2700 properties enrolled in 2015 and over 540 urban acres of participant land base (G. Beatty, personal communication, April 9, 2015). In some cases the Portland Backyard Habitat Certification Program may guide landowners toward certain habitat enhancement strategies based on their parcel’s geographic location. For example, the program encourages “meadowscaping” or installation of native grasses and other herbaceous species associated with regional prairie and oak habitats for properties where oak habitat is present or historically existed (G. Beatty, personal communication, April 9, 2015). Other community-based initiatives include the Kaipatiki Project’s North-west Wild Link Assistance Programme in Auckland, New Zealand, and the Vineyard Habitat Network in Martha’s Vineyard, (Kaipatiki Project, n.d; The Nature Conservancy, n.d). Local stream initiatives or municipal watershed groups provide other examples of urban community-based initiatives.

Community-based initiatives typically have no formal direct or indirect incentive or governmental regulation, and their success may appear to run counter to conventional collective action theory. It’s possible however that the “warm glow” effect, the private psychological benefits enjoyed by those contributing to the public good, may serve as a type of incentive (Andreoni, 1989). Other social incentives in the form of “a desire to win prestige, respect, friendship, and other social and psychological objectives” can also act as selective incentives, particularly for small groups (Olson, 1971, 61). Collective efficacy, the “social cohesion among neighbors combined with their willingness to intervene on behalf of the common good” may also play a role (Foster, 2011; Sampson, Raudenbusch, & Earls, 1997, 918). Related collective action examples in non-urban resource management scenarios have been described by Ostrom, and identified in case studies involving urban public spaces or common resources by Foster (Foster, 2011; Ostrom, 1990). Foster observed that such urban collective management (in the form of park “friends” groups for example) seems most effective in small, tight-knit groups sharing common norms. Significantly, as the size of the resource, participant base, and/or participant diversity increases, these programs tend to benefit from governmental facilitation or “collective action enabling” (Foster, 2011). By encouraging collaboration between neighbors and other landowners, community-based initiatives on private property can compound the ecological value of individual projects by coordinating similar design and management strategies across parcel boundaries. Community-building and landowner relationships are possible additional benefits of these strategies. In practice these programs may or may not be linked to municipal-scale landscape network planning goals or objectives.

3.4. Payments for ecosystem services Turner et al. define ecosystem services as “the aspects of ecosystems consumed and/or utilized to produce human well-being

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Fig. 4. Payments for ecosystem services strategy diagram.

(Turner, Georgiou, & Fisher, 2008, 8).” Hassan et al. (2005, 27) offer this definition: “ Ecosystem services are the benefits people obtain from ecosystems. These include provisioning services such as food and water; regulating services such as regulation of floods, drought, land degradation, and disease; supporting services such as soil formation and nutrient cycling; and cultural services such as recreational, spiritual, religious and other nonmaterial benefits.” Brown and Mooney add, “ultimately, to preserve the continuing flow of services and benefits, one must preserve or restore the natural ecosystems (Brown & Mooney, 2013, 14).” Payments for Ecosystem Services (PES) “is an incentive-based approach to protect ecosystem services by compensating landowners or managers who adopt practices that are favorable to an ecosystem (Gundimeda, Watzold, & Forester, 2012, 225).” PES programs facilitate a market for certain ecosystem services so that they may be exchanged for compensation. Payments are typically made in cash, in kind, or a combination of the two. In kind payments can take different forms including loan waivers, access to finances or microcredit, or provision of key inputs or services (Gundimeda et al., 2012). PES’s can be broken into two categories- direct public and government payments and direct private payments (Gundimeda et al., 2012). In direct public and government payments schemes the government pays service providers on behalf of their constituents to secure ecosystem services when a) many benefit (in the ‘public good’); b) it is difficult to identify those who benefit; or c) government action must be taken or a resource will be lost (Gundimeda et al., 2012). Direct private payments are “transactions that take place between private service providers and users” where the buyer is interested in retaining an ecosystem service (Gundimeda et al., 2012, 226). Globally, PES examples include those that involve payment for services like watershed services for water quality or flow control, carbon markets for carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation services, and landscape services to protect landscape beauty and access to wildlife (Gundimeda et al., 2012; Wunder, 2005).

PES schemes can be complicated and may involve multiple actors and mechanisms in their design. Agencies may assist with the design, implementation, enforcement, and fundraising for a PES scheme, and other intermediaries may be involved to facilitate exchanges (Gundimeda et al., 2012). Generally however a buyer pays a seller for providing an ecosystem service, and the seller provides the service via conservation or restoration of an ecosystem or ecosystem component. There may also be periodic follow-up surveys and reporting to check for compliance. Fig. 4 provides a process diagram example for PES. In a direct public and government payment PES scheme the government is the buyer, and may also serve organizing and facilitating roles. In a direct private payments PES scheme, sellers and buyers are private entities, but agencies may also serve in organizing and facilitating roles (Gundimeda et al., 2012). While there are numerous international examples of PES programs in rural areas, PES programs are still emerging in urban contexts. One example is the voluntary component of a program in Nagoya, Japan that encourages urban greening on private property (Kohsaka, 2010). After a period of decreasing urban green space, Nagoya embarked on a new program in 2008 to increase “’green area’ (or ‘green space’) as defined in the Basic Nagoya Green Plan, namely ‘an area covered by trees, lawns, agricultural or wetland”’ (Kohsaka, 2010, 598). While the primary program driver was to combat the heat-island effect in the city, “an increase in green areas is considered to be a means of conserving or enhancing biological diversity and combatting the urban heat island effect. (Kohsaka, 2010, 598).” Two private property policies, one regulatory and one voluntary, are paired to increase green area in the city. The first, the “System of Greening Area,” is a regulatory requirement. It mandates that certain types of development projects and projects over a certain size maintain a minimum amount of landscaped ‘green area’ within the project (Kohsaka, 2010). A voluntary program called the Greenification Certificate System, which possesses characteristics of a direct public and government payments PES scheme, complements this regulatory requirement. This voluntary program evaluates development projects based on specific criteria such as the amount of green space provided beyond the minimum, degree of existing tree retention and areal coverage by

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tall trees, street openness to green space, degree of use of green walls and green roofs, and participation in a voluntary management program. Projects that meet a scoring threshold are eligible for lower interest rate loans from local and regional banks participating in the program (Kohsaka, 2010). The banks, which are motivated by social pressures to demonstrate that they are operating responsibly in the community, essentially absorb all or part of the cost of the landscape improvements (Kohsaka, 2010). As the Greenification Certificate System developed, issues remained including the need for greater clarity in terms of guidelines and instruction, compliance and liability, and whether the costs of making the design improvements exceed savings from the lower cost of the loan, as well as the need for greater outreach to improve program awareness (Kohsaka, 2010). At the time of his writing (2010), Kohsaka stated that three applications had been submitted to the program, and that “although they are likely to be temporary, the current global economic conditions are not helpful to the success (especially in the short term) of these emerging schemes (Kohsaka, 2010, 605).” However Kohsaka also stated that “given its geographic size and potential, collaboration with private landowners is critical for the protection and restoration of urban biodiversity in Nagoya (Kohsaka, 2010, 605).” While not explicitly developed to improve urban habitat per se, an arrangement between Sacramento Tree Foundation (STF) and Harbison-Mahony-Higgins Builders Inc. (HMH) is an example of a direct private payment PES transaction. In 2008 HMH, a Sacramento-based building contractor business, entered into a five-year voluntary agreement with STF to offset HMH’s vehicle fleet emissions (Schadler & Danks, 2011). Through this arrangement, STF calculated the vehicle emissions of HMH’s 66-vehicle fleet, and HMH paid STF to offset these emissions by planting trees on private property. STF, whose mission is “building healthy, livable communities in the Sacramento region by growing the best urban forest in the nation” (http://www.sactree.com/pages/420), coordinated all aspects of tree planting including purchase of trees and materials, marketing, oversight, outreach, evaluation, site selection, education, stewardship and monitoring (Schadler & Danks, 2011). Funds for carbon offset from HMH were strategically applied toward planting on private properties that were not eligible for other tree planting programs managed by STF or the City, addressing a gap in funding for Sacramento residents interested in planting trees (Schadler & Danks, 2011). By the end of the fourth-year, 464 trees were projected to be planted on private property under this arrangement, offsetting 2132 tons of carbon dioxide equivalent (tCO2e) over the life of the trees (Schadler & Danks, 2011). STF also participates in an arrangement that is an example of a direct public and government payments PES transaction. Sacramento Municipal Utility District (SMUD) is a publicly-owned electrical utility serving Sacramento County and neighboring communities in California, USA (Sacramento Municipal Utility District, n.d). Peak loads in Sacramento can stress the electric grid during periods of high energy use, particularly during hotter parts of the summer. In response the utility district has developed a contractual relationship with STF to administer a shade tree program that works with private landowner ratepayers to place trees on their properties (A. Fenkner, personal communication, November 20, 2014). Private landowner ratepayers are eligible for installation of up to 10 shade trees on their property under the program. Trees are sited to shade houses, thereby lowering peak load, using a strategic siting formula that optimizes placement for shading based on tree proximity to the house and aspect. STF manages the entire process from participant recruitment, agreements, communication, procurement, siting, administration, and tree inventory management (A. Fenkner, personal communication, November 20, 2014). STF incentivizes private landowner ratepayers to participate by providing free tree installation and future lower HVAC energy

consumption costs associated with the shade provided by the trees. SMUD compensates STF for administering the program, and planting the trees is consistent with STF’s tree-planting mission. As of 2015 this successful PES relationship is in its 23rd year (A. Fenkner, personal communication, November 20, 2014). Both types of PES provide a relatively new strategy for ecological conservation and restoration (Gundimeda et al., 2012), particularly in urban private property environments. PES programs have their own challenges, and each needs to be specifically designed and structured so that goals can be met while avoiding pitfalls (Gundimeda et al., 2012). For example, PES programs should provide additionality, meaning that the intended ecosystem benefits derived from a PES program would not have otherwise occurred if the program were not developed (Gundimeda et al., 2012). As with all MBI’s, a key feature of a PES program is a suitable metric for what is actually being traded so that it can be measured (Whitten & Coggan, 2012). Other concerns about the basis for the PES approach should also be navigated, including a concern that itemization of a specific ecosystem service in the market may lead to unexpected tradeoffs where projects are optimized for the valued service at the expense of the ecosystem or other ecosystem elements (Kosoy & Corbera, 2010). Other concerns that may need to be navigated include questions of fairness and equity between buyers, sellers, and stakeholders when setting market values and negotiating transactions (Kosoy & Corbera, 2010).

4. Discussion Urban examples of voluntary collective action and collective action enabling (Foster, 2011), urban environmental stewardship (Svendsen & Campbell, 2008; Fisher et al., 2012) and civic ecology (Krasny & Tidball, 2015) in public urban spaces have recently become more prevalent in the literature. Practical examples of voluntary stewardship on private urban property are considerably less commonly described. This paper provides a cross section of emerging strategies for voluntary stewardship on urban private property, and shares case studies that illustrate their function. It is important to note that while there may be overlap between strategies in terms of certain characteristics (for example three of the strategies have a market-based component) or definitions (for example the premium paid for a certification could be considered a type of PES (Wunder, 2005)), the mechanisms for executing each of the strategies described remain significantly different. This distinction is important, particularly when considering future application of these strategies in practice. Urban ecological stewardship on multiple private properties can be a challenging undertaking, in urban areas where there are many landowners on many properties. The case studies indicate that the strategies described in this paper can still work within these constraints to improve ecological conditions site-by-site. Yet there may be potential for even greater ecological benefit. While a review of studies indicates that local habitat factors are more important for determining species richness of urban birds (Evans et al., 2009), other research indicates both local (onsite) habitat characteristics and contextual landscape features may influence urban bird communities (Lerman & Warren, 2011). Another study found that the cumulative effect of habitat characteristics on nearby residential properties was strongly linked to species richness of native birds (Belaire & Whelan, 2014). The potential for private property to contribute to connectivity and dispersal has also been discussed (Parker et al., 2008; Rudd et al., 2002; Snep et al., 2011). While research is ongoing, it seems that there is significant potential to compound the benefits of voluntary private property stewardship programs via a more coordinated habitat enhancement approach across these site, neighborhood, and landscape scales.

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Yet the interconnectedness of ecological resources (Galaz, Olsson, Hahn, Folke, & Svedin, 2008) raises a multi-scalar program management issue; from a practical standpoint, a given program that may be effective at enhancing habitat at the site-scale may not have the landscape network planning resources to spatially target and coordinate larger scale recruitment, or vice-versa. Such cross-scale mismatches between social processes and ecological processes have been identified as key challenges in social-ecological systems (See for example Folke, 2006; Galaz et al., 2008; Redman, Grove, & Kuby, 2004). While well-equipped institutions such as Curitiba’s RPPNM program may be able to administer complementary site-based habitat conservation programs and spatial, landscape-scale planning programs on their own, not all can. This presents a critical opportunity for programs to link with other complementary institutions to transcend scale mismatches and address the interconnectedness of ecological resources (Berkes & Folke, 1998; Galaz et al., 2008; Guerrero, Bodin, McAllister, & Wilson, 2015). The long-term PES relationship between SMUD and STF, which combines SMUD’s citywide program database of property owners with STF’s landowner engagement and tree planting capacity, is an example of a publicprivate partnership (Hilvert & Swindell, 2013; National Bank, 2012) that collaborates to combine site-scale actions with landscapescale interests. Other coordination between institutions to meet ecological goals may not be spatially targeted per se, but can “scale up” program impact by combining two or more strategies to expand the participant base and improve saturation of greening activities, thereby improving the likelihood that participant parcel combinations will have synergistic environmental benefits. For example the City of Bellevue, Washington incentivizes developers to undergo Salmon-Safe certification of their urban projects by offering a density bonus in return, and Thurston County, Washington offers discounts on stormwater fees countywide for properties certified as Salmon-Safe (D. Kent, personal communication, 6/03/2015). By associating its market-based certification program with indirect incentive policies, Salmon-Safe benefits from greater property owner exposure to their programs, and should more properties participate in certification the City and County may receive watershed benefits in support of their environmental initiatives. Such arrangements hint at the potential discussed by Colding, Lundberg, and Folke (2006) for greater urban “comanagement” by more actively incorporating green areas managed by “civic led” groups into biodiversity management schemes across multiple land uses. As stated by Wilkinson et al. (2013; 561), “coordinating all the actors and tasks necessary to respond to fragmented, heterogeneous and dynamic ecosystems in cities involves significant cooperation. Partnership is a cornerstone of urban ecosystem integrity.” The multi-institutional examples above indicate the potential for two-way, cross-scale linkages between organizations that can lead to effective, social-ecological governance (Kofinas, 2009). Greater collaborative governance may ultimately lead to greater “fit” of these initiatives within their operating social and ecological context, thereby improving capacity to enhance the resilience of urban ecosystems and their ability to deliver ecosystem services (Berkes & Folke, 1998; Galaz et al., 2008; Guerrero et al., 2015).

5. Conclusion As urban areas grow, cities are demanding more from the urban land base. Voluntary strategies for urban ecological enhancement on private property provide largely under-investigated opportunities to meet some of these needs. Goddard et al. state, “the emerging literature on the role of gardens for enhancing native biodiversity has somewhat overlooked the need to coordinate garden

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management within the surrounding landscape (Goddard et al., 2010, 93),” and that “collectively, the sustainable management of private gardens has huge potential to build ecological resilience in cities (Goddard, Dougill, & Benton, 2013, 266).” Recent years have given rise to new, coordinated urban ecological stewardship examples on private property, perhaps due to the growth of the science of urban ecology and a greater awareness of the environmental, social, and economic importance of urban ecosystems. Wilkinson et al. suggest “a key opportunity in tapping into the grey literature is to access more examples of initiatives to govern urban biodiversity and ecosystem services that have been assessed to some degree” as an accompaniment to the scientific literature (Wilkinson et al., 2013, 575). This paper reviews literature and case study documentation to describe strategies for facilitating voluntary urban private property stewardship to conserve or enhance the ecological function and ecosystem services of private properties in cities. As these strategies mature and others emerge, we will continue to learn about the practical challenges and benefits of these strategies in urban environments. Voluntary urban ecological stewardship strategies offer a different set of solutions than regulatory strategies, and open a land base for improving ecological function that is often inaccessible to regulatory frameworks. As cities grow, urban planners, designers and continue to seek ways to optimize urban environmental performance. Considering the proportion of private property and private green space in cities, strategies such as those discussed in this paper provide new opportunities for metropolitan areas to meet these needs while maintaining quality of life for their citizens. Acknowledgements The author would like to thank the anonymous manuscript reviewers who provided valuable comments, and session participants in the 2014 Environmental Design Research Association conference, and the 2013 Council of Educators in Landscape Architecture conference for providing comments when presenting earlier iterations of this paper. The author would also like to thank the organization and agency professionals who agreed to be interviewed for this article. References Alonso, J., & Heinen, J. T. (2011). Miami Dade County’s environmentally endangered lands program: local efforts for a global cause. Natural Areas Journal, 31, 183–189. Andreoni, J. (1989). Giving with impure altruism: applications to charity and ricardian equivalence. Journal of Political Economy, 97(6), 1447–1458. Backyard Habitat Certification Program. (n.d.). Certification criteria. Retrieved April 23, 2015 from: http://backyardhabitats.org/certification-criteria/. Bahls, P. (2008). Salmon-Safe certification standards for corporate and university campuses. Salmon-Safe Inc. http://salmonsafe.org/getcertified/corporate-anduniversity Belaire, J. A., & Whelan, C. J. (2014). Having our yards and sharing them too: the collective effects of yards on native bird species in an urban landscape. Ecological Applications, 24(8), 2132–2143. Berkes, F., & Folke, C. (1998). Linking social and ecological systems for resilience and sustainability. In F. C. Berkes Folke (Ed.), Linking social and ecological systems (pp. 1–26). Cambridge University Press: Cambridge. Brown, G., & Mooney, P. (2013). Ecosystem services, natural capital, and nature’s benefits in the urban region: information for professionals and citizens. Vancouver, BC: School of Architecture and Landscape Architecture, University of British Columbia. http://www.bcsla.org/sites/default/files/documents/ Sent%20Final%20Ecosystem%20Services%20Natural%20Capital%20 %20Natures%20Benefits%20%20In%20the%20Urban%20Region %20Information%20for%20Professionals%20%20Citizens.pdf Cameron, R. W. F., Blanuˇsa, T., Taylor, J. E., Salisbury, A., Halstead, A. J., Henricot, B., & Thompson, K. (2012). The domestic garden-Its contribution to urban green infrastructure. Urban Forestry & Urban Greening, 11(2), 129–137. Carter, T., & Fowler, L. (2008). Establishing green roof infrastructure through environmental policy instruments. Environmental Management, 42, 151–164. Casadesus-Masanell, R., Crooke, M., Reinhardt, F., & Vasishth, V. (2009). Households’ Willingness to pay for green goods: evidence from Patagonia’s

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Wunder, S. (2005). Payments for environmental services: some nuts and bolts. CIFOR Occasional Paper, 42(42), 32. i-25. Joshua F. Cerra (M.L.A., B.A. Biology) is an Assistant Professor and Director of Undergraduate Studies at Cornell University Department of Landscape Architecture in Ithaca, New York. Prior to joining Cornell, Cerra practiced as a designer and an ecologist on projects in the Pacific Northwest and China. His academic and professional work addresses relationships between urban ecosystems, communities and site development processes, and their implications for urban ecological design and climate adaptation. He was the recipient of the Cornell CALS Young Faculty Teaching Excellence Award in 2014 and the CELA Excellence in Design Studio Teaching Junior Level Award in 2015.