Energy infrastructure as a target of terrorist attacks from the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria

international journal of critical infrastructure protection 25 (2019) 1–13

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/IJCIP

Energy infrastructure as a target of terrorist attacks from the Islamic state in Iraq and Syria Lukáš Tichý Research Fellow at the Institute of International Relations Prague, Nerudova 3, 118 50 Praha 1, Malá Strana, Czech Republic

a r t i c l e

i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history:

Attacks on energy sectors and transport infrastructure are an important part of the strat-

Received 20 November 2017

egy of Islamist militant and terrorist organizations, such as Al Qaeda and its offshoots or

Revised 14 November 2018

the Taliban. The article focuses on the attitude of the global Salafi-jihadist Islamist terrorist

Accepted 28 January 2019

and militant group the Islamic State (IS) toward terrorism specifically targeting transport

Available online 1 February 2019

infrastructure and energy sectors, since it makes use of such terrorism as a political instrument of its strategy in the Middle East. The main aim of this article is to analyse the strategic

Keywords:

importance of terrorist attacks on transport infrastructure and the energy industry for the

Islamic State

IS against the background of the influence of Sunni Islam. The second goal of the article is

terrorism

to describe and analyse examples, goals and motives of the terrorist attacks on energy sec-

attacks on the energy sector

tors and the accompanying criminal activities conducted by the IS in two selected Middle

Middle East

Eastern countries, Iraq and Syria, and the possible impact of the attacks on energy security. © 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

Iraq Syria transport infrastructure

1.

Introduction

Just a few years after the military overthrow of Saddam Hussein’s dictatorship in Iraq, the Islamic State (IS) became an important actor in international security relations in the highly explosive area of the Middle East. Sometime later, this selfproclaimed state spread to Syria, and thus it controlled more energy resources. This brutal expansion gave it a new access to vast funds, which it could use to wage its war against the West, organize new terrorist attacks and disseminate its ideology of intolerance and hate. The aggressive behaviour of the IS has been the subject of many articles and monographs [see 22,24,51,53,59,71,74,76], and it is hard to find an aspect of this security threat which has not been sufficiently studied. Nevertheless, it is still possible to make further contributions to this field of research. E-mail address: [email protected] https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ijcip.2019.01.003 1874-5482/© 2019 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.

This article offers a profound analysis of IS terrorist attacks specifically targeting the energy sector in the Middle East [see 17,34,45,47,49,50,69,70] as a strategic and political instrument in the years 2014–2017. The main focus will be on IS energyrelated terrorist attacks in Iraq and Syria, where the IS controlled large parts of the territory. Although the IS suffered a number of territorial losses in both of these countries in 2016– 2017 – especially Mosul, its largest city in Iraq, and the Syrian town of Raqqa as the “capital” of the IS – and has been severely weakened, the IS fighters retained their military strength and are ready to conduct further terrorist attacks on the energy sectors of Iraq and Syria, which can cause serious damage to and jeopardize the countries’ energy security1 .

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One example of (former) IS fighters preparing themselves for further action could be the terrorist and militant organization called the “White Flags” or the “White Banners”, which started in November 2017. The White Flags group is an alliance of former Islamic State militants, disgruntled Kurdish mafia members and

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international journal of critical infrastructure protection 25 (2019) 1–13

In connection with this topic, the article has two main goals. The first is to analyse the importance that the Islamic State attributes to terrorist attacks targeting the energy industry and infrastructure within its strategy in the context of the influence of Sunni Islam. The second aim is to describe and analyse examples, goals, and motives of the energy-related terrorist attacks conducted by the IS in Iraq and Syria and the possible impact of the attacks on energy security. This article will contribute to the general understanding of the issue of terrorist attacks on the energy sector in the Middle East and North Africa (MENA) countries, and detail the energy-related strategy and fighting methods of the IS in the countries where it is or was active. On the methodological level, the article is based on the case study method, which is understood to mean a detailed analysis of the case that was chosen as the subject of research. Its aim is to provide a profound comprehension or causal explanation of the case [16,80]. Its advantages are its depth of analysis and its relatively large scope of facts, which it endeavours to evaluate completely. In this treatise a “case” of an energy-related terrorist attack is understood to mean a specific type and form of terrorist activity aimed at an energy sector. The case study then frames the overall IS terrorist attacks targeting the energy industry and infrastructure together with the related criminal activities of the IS in Iraq and Syria. The structure of the article is as follows. After the introduction, the second and third section briefly describe and define the problem of terrorist attacks targeting the energy industry and the importance of the energy sector in Islam. This definition and description will serve as the main theoretical framework of the article. The fourth part briefly characterizes the IS before delving into a deeper analysis of the importance of the energy issue and energy-focused terrorist activities in the strategy of the IS. Part five then provides some characteristics of the IS attacks on the energy sector in the Middle East, and also some specific examples of such attacks and their possible impact on energy security.

2. Terrorism and terrorist attacks targeting the energy sector In the early 1990s, when the world was full of great expectations for the development of the international security relations and cooperation in an increasingly non-confrontational direction, terrorism was not considered a security threat but merely a risk. However, this opinion was replaced by a different view in the second half of the 1990s, as it was the period after the first terrorist strikes against the West with scores of fatalities and hundreds of injured people. The terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 were a fundamental turning point. Since the events of that day, terrorism has been re-

independent local Kurdish militias. They are not from the Peshmerga or any official Kurdish security forces. The White Flags militants currently occupy the mountains behind Tuz Khurmatu in Iraq’s Salah-al-Din Governorate. The main aim of the White Flags is to regain control of the oil facilities in Kirkuk so that they could continue in what they claim had been lucrative oil thefts [see 5].

garded as a grave and pressing security threat, with the related discussion focusing on the means of protecting people, countries and objects against it. There are also endless debates about the types of behaviour that may be included under the term “terrorism” and those that do not belong under the concept [41,58,60]. In our article, we consider terrorism, in full accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 1566 (2004) [72], as premeditated, politically motivated violence which is perpetrated specifically against non-combatant targets with the aim to influence a local or international audience. According to Eichler [31], terrorism as a security relations phenomenon is an extreme form of communication with the public which has four main elements: (1) the transmitter of the message, which is always the individual terrorist or terrorist group; (2) the target, which is the dead and wounded people who had the bad fortune to be in the wrong place at the wrong time; (3) the message, which is always addressed to the policy makers of the afflicted states; and (4) the feedback of the terror target, which is the result of a political evaluation. The relations between these four elements are guided by one basic principle: the addressee of the message, that is, the subject of the extortion and terror, is not the victim of the terrorist attack [40]. Meanwhile, the damage deliberately caused by the terrorists is never self-serving but always instrumental. Every dead or crippled person, and every financial loss caused by the attack is a message and an instrument of indirect pressure on leading political representatives, who are expected to either do what the terrorists want or stop doing what the terrorists do not like [40]. The communicational aspect of terror represents a major tool for analysing the goals and motives of an individual energy-sector attack or the threat thereof by the IS. Every terrorist attack on an energy sector has a goal and a motive, and its implementation sends a clear message from the given terrorist organization to both the political functionaries of the afflicted state, and the political representatives of Western countries in general. According to Koknar [47], the concept of terrorism targeting an energy sector is not limited to armed attacks on power plants, oil and gas infrastructure, or refineries. The concept also includes illegal activities aimed at such facilities, such as the theft of oil or gas from pipelines, extortion, or the funding and support of groups that conduct the aforementioned attacks. In general, it may be said that energy terrorism is a criminal activity aimed at energy facilities that causes significant losses. In connection with this definition, Makarenko [50] divides terrorist attacks targeting energy sectors into seven categories of different degrees of threat to various parties in the industry. The first, most common form of attack by virtue of its immediate effect and the instability it causes, is bomb attacks on fuel pipelines, which can also cause major damage to the national economy and threaten lives. This type of attack is part of the tactics used by various guerilla groups in civil wars, especially in Latin America, but also by terrorist organizations in the area of the MENA. The second form, which is an inseparable part of these pipeline attacks, consists of sabotaging oil and gas lines. Their primary purpose is causing losses to the national economy. Although sabotages are not very common

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from a historical perspective, there is reason to presume that this type of operation is becoming more popular with terrorist groups. Sabotages of pipelines are conducted for three main reasons: (1) to steal oil and subsequently sell it on the black market; (2) to distract attention without loss of life; and (3) to exert subliminal political pressure or provoke corporate concessions [50]. The third form consists of attacks on the offices of oil companies. In the past, such attacks used various tactics. The offices, often located in city centres, are relatively easy targets. Yet until recently such attacks were rather limited both in scope and in the number human casualties they caused. Such attacks were mostly symbolic, as they were committed for reasons of propaganda. The fourth form – attacks on oil depots, petrol pumps, or refineries – is even less frequent than the bomb attacks on offices and management. Considering the security level of oil depots and refineries (though petrol pumps have a lower security level), such targets are extremely difficult to penetrate and attacks against them offer only a minimal chance of success. Nonetheless, it would be naive to think that such attacks do not take place at all, as in extreme cases, such assaults have been conducted by both various separatist groups and frustrated national armies (which usually carried out such attacks as last-ditch solutions) [47]. The fifth form consists of raiding or hijacking energy facilities and taking hostages. Such operations are not a common tactic of terrorist groups due to the relatively high level of security present in the facilities. Although such attacks tend to be connected to local groups, they are conducted by both leftwing and right-wing terrorist organizations, which are usually motivated by the promise of both ransom money and publicity. The sixth and most lethal form of attack on an energy sector, as far as potential civilian casualties are concerned, is a direct military assault on the staff of oil facilities or gas processing plants. In this case, violence is a fundamental part of the attack, and human casualties are its direct goal. The last form of energy terrorism, which is increasingly frequent, is the kidnapping of employees of oil and gas companies. Considering the ease of execution of such kidnappings, kidnapping employees for ransom money is a frequent tactic for three main reasons: (1) it is used as a source of funds; (2) it can serve as a protest against the corporate tactics of energy companies; and (3) it can serve to hamper and/or prevent the surveying and development of oil fields – thus causing considerable damage to the given country’s finances. Historical experience also shows that kidnapping operations are most common in areas with active guerrilla organizations, such as Latin America. Also, various ethnic separatist groups that use kidnapping are active in South Asia [50]. Terrorist attacks targeting energy sectors present a great threat to energy security in any location that is or could be subject to such attacks, and the economic consequences are potentially devastating with regard to the targets of these attacks, such as pipelines, depots, tankers, staff, refineries, LNG and oil terminals, etc. The vulnerability of this transport infrastructure means that any stoppage of supply or production can have a severe impact on economies that are dependent on energy resources. Protecting key energy infrastructure against terrorist attacks is undoubtedly one of the top priorities of those who

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try to maintain the state’s security and prosperity. In this respect, many countries focus primarily on protecting oil and gas pipelines, refineries and their tankers. Other countries focus on protecting water resources and water pipes. All countries, however, need supplies of strategic raw materials, which are not inexhaustible. It is becoming harder to get oil and other raw materials from inaccessible places and harsher environments to the end user or to a safe area. In addition, terrorists have always been very conscious of the importance of oil and gas as there is a great political and economic need for them, so terrorist attacks on energy targets are a very tempting course of action [47]. In other words, energy terrorism is based on attacks on energy infrastructure and industries but it also includes other illegal activities connected to these attacks, which aim to destabilize the government or the region [see 34]. Apart from actually contributing to political and economic instability, attacks on energy sectors may be intended as a show of resistance to national governments and, last but not least, also as a means of putting pressure on foreign powers and international corporations that have a strategic interest in countries producing oil and gas. That is, terrorist attacks on energy sectors may in some cases be an important part of a terrorist organization’s strategy for fighting foreign powers [see 69,70]. Furthermore, it is becoming increasingly frequent for terrorists to attack pipelines as a means of obtaining economic resources for financing further terrorist operations, or as a means of increasing their influence among other groups vying for control of the given area [50]. In connection with this, it is necessary to consider the relation between energy and Sunni Islam, which is a major factor that must be accounted for when analysing the attitudes of the IS to energy affairs in general and, more specifically, its attitudes toward terrorist attacks targeting energy sectors that are backed by criminal activity.

3.

Islam and energy

The relation between Sunni Islam and energy cannot be easily defined in this article. One reason for this is the limited scope of the following analysis, which can only briefly provide the views of a limited number of prominent Sunni scholars with a significant impact on Islam’s approach to energy, and thus it cannot claim to give an exhaustive summary of all the relevant Sunni views of energy. Another problem is the fact that every Islamist terrorist organization, including the IS, can justify its energy-related decisions and actions, including attacks against energy sectors, with its own interpretation of Islam and its relation to the energy issue [45]. Although the Quran does not speak of energy issues in general, according to the famous Hadith of Abu Dawud, “[t]he Muslims are partners in three [things], water, green pastures, and fire” [45]. Islamic scholars then interpret the Arabic word for fire, al-Naar, to also mean hydrocarbon, but it can additionally be understood as referring to sources of energy. Nonetheless, the various branches of Islam differ in their interpretations of the principle. In Sunni Islam, for example, the Maliki school claims that minerals, including oil, cannot be privately owned, whereas the Hanafi school says that energy resources

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may be privately owned, but taxes must be paid to the state for them [45]. Apart from that, the importance of oil and gas for the economies of many Muslim countries forced Islamic scholars to search for answers to questions of energy issues. For instance, in The Economic System in Islam from 1953, Taqiuddin an-Nabhani, the founder of the Sunni group Hizb ut-Tahrir, expressed his conviction that public property, such as water, oil, iron, etc., must be used to achieve economic growth for the ummah because these things belong to the community of believers, and the state is merely charged with their administration and development. At the same time, if the state provides funds and cares for the needs of the people, and if every able person receives property, enough riches will be available to satisfy the basic needs of the ummah [12]. Furthermore, an-Nabhani [12] proposes that the facilities which process the minerals should be public property due to the source materials that the factories use in their production, be they gold, silver, iron, oil, or diesel. At the same time, however, these facilities should be owned by the state because the state is obliged to produce mineral resources on behalf of Muslims and in their interests. an-Nabhani [12] also explained his vision of the way in which a future Islamic state should conduct oil business with foreign companies: “The Islamic lands possess commodities which all other countries need, for example oil. The Islamic State could restrict the sale of such commodities unless they are paid for by gold.” Contrary to this, one of the most influential Sunni religious leaders of current times, Yusuf al-Qaradawi, defended the use of oil as a political weapon, claiming that Arab and Muslim countries should put pressure on the West in the matter of Palestine by stopping or reducing their production of oil [45]. Al-Qaradawi also claimed that “it is imperative to spend [all the oil money] in the interests of Muslims, including the interests of the poor and other needy groups.” [45] He also thinks that both natural persons and legal entities using oil and gas are obliged to pay a zakat of one fifth of the value of the oil and/or gas because these minerals are rikaz – namely, they were buried in the ground at the time of Jahiliyyah (the preIslamic period) [45]. Another perspective on the origin and use of energy resources has been offered by the Sunni scholar Ibrahim AbdulMatin, an African-American intellectual who converted to Islam. According to Abdul-Matin [1], it is necessary to distinguish between “energy from heaven” (solar energy and the wind), which is ecologically friendly and safe, and “energy from hell” (coal, oil, and gas), which is dangerous and harmful to the environment. In his opinion, Islam requires that ecologically-friendly energy be used. Sunni religious leaders then see energy resources as property of the ummah, which has yet to provide their full meaning and service. They also have a tendency to politicize the use of energy resources, both internally and externally. From this point of view, an analysis of the role of energy in Islam is important for the subsequent exploration of the issue of IS terrorist attacks targeting energy sectors, as it can uncover certain ideological motives or highlight the (in)consistency and ambivalence in the activities of the IS, which justifies its actions with the doctrines of Islam.

4. The IS and the importance of terrorist attacks on energy sectors The Islamic State (also known as the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant [ISIL], the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria [ISIS] or Daesh) is a militant jihadist group that originated in Iraq and has been led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi since 2010. On 29 June 2014, al-Baghdadi declared the establishment of a caliphate, or Islamic state, on the territories it controlled in Iraq and Syria [53]. However, the IS territory has shrunk considerably since the group made international headlines by invading Iraq from Syria in June 2014. In 2017 the IS’s caliphate spanned an estimated 36,200 km2 . This marks a 40% reduction in its territory since the start of 2017, and a 60% reduction overall since the first estimate in January 2015, when the jihadist group controlled 90,800 km2 in Iraq and Syria. By the end of 2017, the IS occupied only a small enclave in the desert – the sparselyinhabited border territories between Iraq and Syria [42]. The political goal of the IS is to establish a caliphate on the territory of Iraq and the Levant (a historical geographical term for an area roughly comprising Syria, Palestine, Jordan, and Lebanon) or other countries that were ruled by Muslims at some point in the past. The Islamic State detailed its plans for the creation of a caliphate in the first issue of its Englishlanguage propaganda magazine Dabiq on 5 July 2014; the practical tasks in relation to the renewal of the caliphate are to establish, build up, or maintain and protect the community of believers in countries or territories that it conquered by military means [26]. In other words, the IS wants to realize the political vision of an Islamic caliphate by gaining control of the desired territory and creating a functioning government there, which would then legitimize its religious authority. At the same time, the IS thinks that the caliphate should continue to expand its territory. To fulfil this vision, the IS published its “remaining and expanding” strategy, which consists of two concurrent goals, in the fifth issue of Dabiq in November 2014 [25]. Whereas the first goal is to defend its positions in Iraq and Syria, the second goal is to expand the caliphate, while the IS frames its strategy as applying to three geographic areas: (a) the inner circle in Iraq and Syria; (b) the nearby countries, including those in the broader concept of the MENA area; and (c) the overseas countries in Europe and Asia, and the USA. This strategic framework corresponds to an IS campaign with three overarching goals: (a) to defend Iraq and Syria on the domestic level, (b) to expand its regional operations, and (c) to disrupt the status quo and recruit new members on a global scale [54]. Energy and attacks on energy sectors have a special place in this strategy, as the energy interests of the IS are, first, the effective use of currently existing oil and gas fields within Syria and Iraq and their expansion (for example, into Libya); second, increasing oil and gas production to provide funding for the organization through sales of these resources; and third, taking control of new oil and gas fields and attacking the fuel transport infrastructure to punish and economically damage the West and other enemies of the IS. In other words, the jihadists’ energy strategy sees oil and, to a limited degree, also natural gas as the main pillars for their vision of the IS. At the same time, the IS’s shura (council) identified oil (and gas)

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as a key instrument for the survival of the uprising and, more importantly, as an instrument for financing its ambitions of creating and expanding the caliphate [54]. Although oil and gas do not have a significant presence in the few public speeches and sermons of al-Baghdadi, these speeches do contain indirect references to the importance of (energy) resources for the IS. For example, in a message from May 2015, al-Baghdadi [8] clearly stressed that it is “necessary to drive out the Jews and Crusaders [who …] plunder the goods of your lands” [including oil and gas], which belong to the people and should be used by them, and he stated that for that reason “[w]e defend you, your honor, and your wealth.” al-Baghdadi [7] had confirmed this stance earlier in his Message to the Mujahidin and the Islamic Ummah in the Month of Ramadan on 1 July 2014, in which he listed the injustices perpetrated by Western states when they plundered the wealth and the resources of the Muslims; he thus called for terrorist activity that “[would show] the justification of Allah’s laws, and this idea also forms the basis for the IS’s strategy of terrorist attacks on the energy industry.” Conversely, in a more recent message titled This Is What Allah and His Messenger Had Promised Us from 2 November 2016, al-Baghdadi [9] warned of the dangers of the West’s use of (mineral) wealth against Muslims, when the “enemies of Allah – Jews, Christians, atheists […] renegades of faith […] – donated their wealth [namely oil acquired in the Islamic world], [and] army vehicles to wag[ing] war against Muslims […].” Similar words were spoken on several occasions by alAdnani [2], a former spokesman of the IS, when he pointed out the West’s weakness in the form of its dependence on oil: “Crusader planes […] are financed by your wealth, and are fueled by your oil.” al-Adnani [3] thus indirectly called for attacks on supply lines and infrastructure that transports oil to the West and for putting a stop to Muslim oil shipments to Western countries “so that the Americans and their allies swiftly collapse, for it is […] by your oil that they are financed,” and “[they] will pay the price when [their] economies collapse” [4]. After the death of al-Adnani2 , the new spokesman of the IS al-Hassan [10], in his message entitled And You Will Remember What I Say to You from December 2016, called for jihad and also for “promot[ing] Allah’s warriors [with] all sources”, including by using oil as a political weapon against the West. The main interest of the energy strategy of the IS, which is trying to launch its own oil industry that would be similar to national and international oil corporations, is the endeavour to make the greatest possible use of the wealth of energy resources in its territories, which represent a stable and reliable source of income. This strategic vision was clear from the very start, when (initially) ISIS and later the IS were taking control of parts of Iraq and Syria and consequently gained access to a number of Syrian and Iraqi oil deposits and gas fields. Over the course of 2014 the IS took control of more than 60% of the Syrian oil production and slightly less than 10% of the Iraqi oil production. This amounted to approximately 20 oil fields with a total production capacity of about 56,000–80,000 barrels of oil per day (bpd), according to some estimates, up to 120,000

2 al-Adnani was killed in the Syrian city of Aleppo in late August 2016.

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bpd [see 39]. American government estimates claim that the oil transactions in that period generated an annual profit of $730 –$1460 m for the IS [19]. Nonetheless, in 2015 air strikes by the US, Russia, and their allies on the energy industry of the captured territories, resulted in the recapture of some of the oil and gas fields held by the IS and a slowing of the production of oil and gas there [35]. However, the Islamic State still retained a number of gas and oil fields in both Iraq and Syria in 2015–2016, chiefly in eastern Syria and north-eastern Iraq [see 64,65,67,75]. In the second half of 2016, the IS controlled less than 10 oil fields with a total production capacity of about 16,000–20,000 bpd, and the financial revenues from their oil sales decreased to $150–200 m per year [23,55]. The IS oil production also fell sharply in the first half of 2017 [14] and according to the IHS Conflict Monitor [see 57,42], the IS’s average monthly oil revenue in Iraq and Syria at the time was down some 88% from the 2015 figure in the first half of 2017, which meant that it was less than $4 m per month [81]. Table 1 lists the numbers of IS oil fields, their production capacities, the prices for the oil obtained from them, and the revenues from the oil sales for each year between 2014 and 2017. In 2014–17 the Islamic State sold most of its oil directly to independent traders at the oil fields. In this highly organized system, Syrian and Iraqi buyers drove straight to the oil fields with their trucks to buy unprocessed oil. As soon as the oil was refined, it was bought or procured by sellers on markets all over Syria and Iraq. In those two countries, the Islamic State sold its gas and oil to the Syrian regime and Turkey during the past three years [see 68,66]. The remaining part of the terrorist organization’s oil income consisted of mediated sales via smugglers. The smugglers transported trucks that individually carried around 150 barrels of illegal oil and oil products with a price of approximately $60–$100 per barrel to end users in territories controlled by the Islamic State or the surrounding areas [see 67,68]. These income flows could also include re-pumped IS oil for exports or imports of oil products to/from Iraq and Syria. After their initial transportation, these products were then usually smuggled further to the surrounding countries, such as Turkey, Jordan, and Iran - mainly via the northern Kurdish region of Iraq and the north-western borders of Syria [see 66]. For example, until July 2016 the oil from the Qayyara oil field near Mosul in northern Iraq was often smuggled into Turkey, and numerous estimates suggest that from there, it was transported to Western energy markets in Europe and even to those in the US. The smugglers are independent contractors without any affiliation with the IS. The oil smuggling network goes back to the period of Hussein’s reign, when the UN imposed oil export sanctions on Iraq – thus the IS did not create its own smuggling network but merely made use of a system that had already been in existence [see 27,15]. The energy strategy of the IS, influenced by Sunni Islam, shows a certain ambivalence in its implementation. On the one hand, energy is a key strategic area for the Islamic State as a global terrorist, militant, political, and religious organization rooted in Islam. First, the IS believes that religion must dictate every aspect of private and public life. The Islamic State thus relies strongly on Islamic sources to provide legitimacy for its campaigns and interests – including its right to use energy re-

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Table 1 – A year-by-year comparison of the figures for IS oil fields, oil production, oil prices and revenues from oil sales for the period 2014-2017. Criteria

Years 2014

2015

2016

2017

The number of IS oil fields

20–25 oil fields

10–11 oil fields

Less than 10 oil fields

The IS oil production capacity in bpd

56,000–80,000 (120,000) bpd

30,000–35,000 (40,000) bpd

16,000–20,000 (25,000) bpd

The price for a barrel of oil sold by the IS / the world price per barrel of oil The IS oil revenues per day/month/ year in US dollars

$25–50 per barrel / $60 – 80 per barrel

$20–45 per barrel / $44 per barrel

$2–4 m per day /$42 m per month/$730m–1460 m per year

$0.8–1 (1.5)m per day / $26 – 30 (45)m per month/ $400 – 500 m per year

$20–25 per barrel / approx. $50 per barrel Approx. $0,5 m per day / $12 - 15 m per month/ $150 – 250 m per year

Initially approx. 8 oil fields/ several smaller with dozens of oil wells at the end of year Initially 5000–10,000 bpd /only hundreds bpd at the end of year N/A

Approx. $0,13 m per day/$4 m per month/ $48 m per year

Source: compiled by the author from the following sources: [11,13,19,23,33,39,42,52,55,56,67,68,73,75,81].

sources, namely oil, in the territories it controls – and these are therefore often supported by verses from the Quran and the Hadith (reports of the words and deeds of Muhammad), which are the main source of Sunnah (traditional teachings). At the same time, the Islamic State believes that it has a sacred mission to promote, develop, and propose political reactions to energy problems, which is more than just a religious duty. Second, the development and support of the IS energy agenda serves as a valuable political weapon against the West and its main allies in the Middle East, namely Israel. The vast consumption of energy resources in Western economies is interpreted by the Islamic State as a mere consequence of their greed and irresponsibility. The situation is also used as an argument for the idea that the West’s need for oil brought about the neo-imperialist policies that threaten the Muslim world, and thus the Middle Eastern energy resources must remain in the hands of Muslims at all costs [see more 45]. On the other hand, the IS acts in contradiction to Sunni Islam in its energy strategy. First, by owning oil and gas fields in occupied territories, and using them and the money gained from them for their own benefit, the IS is in conflict with Sunni Islam as interpreted by al-Qaradawi, who requires that all income from the sale of oil be used in the interests of poor Muslims and other impoverished groups. At the same time, although the Hanafi school allows for energy sources to be privately owned, in its view, they must be taxed by the state. The IS does not pay taxes on its energy resources. Similarly, according to the Maliki school, minerals, including oil and gas, cannot be privately owned, which is contrary to how the IS is using them. Second, the IS terrorist attacks on energy targets are in themselves contrary to Islam, as the IS thus damages public property, which should serve the good of the ummah, as stated by an-Nabhani. Third, even though IS representatives justify the seizures of some of the oil and gas fields in Syria and Iraq by saying they are in the interest of the ummah, in actual fact they use them solely for their own benefit. This contradicts the opinion of an-Nabhani, who states that mineral riches belong to the community of believers and that the state should only be responsible for administering and developing

them. And fourth, by using oil and gas, the IS gives preference to “energies from hell” instead of “energies from heaven”, despite Abdul-Matin’s claim that Islam rather requires the use of the latter, i.e. ecologically-friendly energy [see 45]. The energy strategy of the Islamic State, which focuses on attacks on energy sectors, has three directions. First, IS fighters assault oil and gas fields, pipelines, and energy facilities in order to try to take control of them, with the main aim of acquiring these resources being to help fund the terrorist organization. Second, jihadists of the IS attack energy targets with the aim of damaging the energy industry of the given country, and their main motives for these activities can be (1) to stop the supply of oil and gas to Western countries, thereby damaging their economies; (2) to limit the supply of these resources, thereby increasing the price of oil; and even (3) to use their burning of some oil and/or gas fields as a delay tactic to cover their retreat. Third, IS fighters attack energy sectors, take hostages and/or kidnap employees of Western companies with the aim to destabilize and weaken their enemies’ economy and punish them, obtain ransom money or bring attention to themselves or their organization, but the main motive is usually to damage the credibility of a specific state, as such attacks might show that it is not able to ensure its internal security.

5. Characteristics of the IS attacks on the energy sectors in the Middle East Following up on the previous analysis of the strategy of the IS, the next few sections will provide specific examples of its energy-related terrorist attacks and their accompanying criminal activities and it will also discuss the main goals and motives of the IS in carrying out such attacks. The energy terrorism conducted by the IS in the Middle East, particularly in Iraq and Syria, is influenced by several factors. First, the IS operates or controls a small part of the territory of each of the states. Second, Iraq is a very rich oil and gas country. Iraq has 9.0% of the world oil reserves and 2.0% of the global gas reserves.

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Conversely, the Syrian oil and gas reserves are rather limited. Syria has about 0.2% of the world’s total oil reserves and 0.1% of the world’s natural gas reserves [see 20]. Third, both countries are in complicated situations: Syria is facing an on-going civil war, and Iraq is still recovering from the consequences of a military intervention. This allows the IS to carry out terrorist attacks targeting energy sectors more easily. The main sources for the article’s analysis of IS terrorist attacks on energy sectors are the Global Terrorism Database (GTD), the Global Incident Map (GIM), and the relevant set of research literature prepared by the Institute of International Relations Prague, which comprises approximately 230 pages with descriptions of attacks by the IS in Iraq and Syria. Nevertheless, the various forms of terrorist attacks targeting the energy industry and the related illegal activities perpetrated by the IS described in the following text only represent a sample of all the relevant cases. The aim of this section is to help the reader understand the goals and motives of the terrorist activities of the IS in Iraq and Syria. At the same time, when we describe individual forms and types of IS terrorist attacks, and their goals and motives, this information is derived from specific examples of IS attacks targeting energy sectors.

5.1.

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in order to oust the remainder of the radicals from the twomillion city of Mosul and recapture the northern Iraqi town of Qayyara along with the two surrounding oilfields – Qayyara and Najma. This operation reached its desired goals at the end of July 2016. The loss of Qayyara certainly dealt a blow to the IS, which had extracted oil from some 60 wells and sold it to help finance its activities. The IS had previously shipped at least 50 truckloads of oil a day from Qayyara and the nearby Najma oilfields to neighbouring Syria [63]. Individual IS attempts to capture Iraqi oil fields continued in early 2017. For example, at the end of February 2017, IS fighters launched two synchronous attacks on areas near Tikrit; one of the attacks was on the Ajil oil field (50 km northeast of Tikrit) and the other was on al-Mobaded, which is located east of Tikrit [44,43]. Conversely, in December 2017 Iraqi security forces cleared booby-traps placed by IS militants along a section of the Iraq-Turkey oil pipeline, which stretches from the Kirkuk Governorate to Turkey while passing by al-Riyad, Baiji and Mosul. According to the Iraqi Ministry of Interior, after several months of work, the energy security directorate managed to clear the section from Kirkuk to Baiji and lift and dismantle more than 900 explosive devices along the line [43].

Iraq

In 2014–17 the IS attacked Iraq’s energy infrastructure for at least two motivations. First, the IS attempted to gain control of Iraq’s energy sector. Second, it attempted to damage the energy sector and destabilize its enemy. In addition, IS fighters ignited Iraqi oil wells as a cover manoeuvre when they were retreating before the advancing Iraqi army.

5.1.1. Terrorist attacks with the aim of taking control of the energy sector Whereas in 2014 the IS succeeded in gaining control of approximately thirty oil fields in the vicinity of Nineveh, Anbar, Saladin, and Kirkuk with an overall capacity of about 60,000 barrels per day, in the first half of 2016 the IS only controlled two oil fields: the Qayyara oil field in northern Iraq with a total capacity of 8000–10,000 bpd and Najma with a total capacity of 5000 bpd [61]. In an attempt to regain control of some of the other Iraqi oil fields, IS fighters staged an unsuccessful assault on the Alas and Ogail fields in the Saladin Governorate in early February 2016. In mid-March 2016 a group of 150 IS jihadists attacked the Ajil and Alas oil fields but they were repelled. Later in the same month the IS attacked Kurdish and Iraqi forces in the town of Makhmur, which lies just 120 km from the oil-rich Kirkuk. However, with the help of US Marines stationed in Iraq, the Iraqi army managed to resist such assaults from the IS and successfully protect the country’s energy infrastructure [14]. The Iraqi army also fought heated battles with the IS throughout the 2014–15 period for the oil refinery in Baiji with a production of c. 300,000 barrels of refined oil products per day, which satisfies 50% of the country’s oil consumption. The IS assaulted the Baiji refinery on 18 June 2014 and gained control of most of it some two days later. The Iraqi army then retook Baiji and its oil refinery in a series of battles that culminated on 16 October 2015 [36]. Additionally, in late March 2016, the Iraqi army’s Operation Fatah was launched against the IS

5.1.2. Terrorist attacks that aim to damage the energy sector and destabilize the enemy In early March 2015, just before the start of Operation Fatah, IS fighters set fire to the Ajil oil field. Their intention was to create a smoke wall that would block the Iraqi helicopter forces’ attacks against IS positions around Tikrit. In the end, however, Ajil was destroyed by allied air strikes, and Tikrit was later retaken by Iraqi forces. The IS’s decision to burn the field had almost no strategic impact [62]. Similarly, first in April and then in early May 2016, IS jihadists used improvised explosive devices (IED) to blow up three oil wells and damage one other well in the Khabaz oil field, which lies about 20 km south-west of Kirkuk in northern Iraq and comprises approximately 41 oil wells with a total capacity of around 10,000–15,000 bpd [21]. On 12 May 2016, IS fighters conducted another attack on the Khabaz oil field and destroyed two oil wells, causing a drop in production of 4000 bpd [21]. A month later, in an effort to stop the Iraqi army in its advance on Mosul, IS radicals set fire to five oil wells near Qayyara in the province of Ninive [see 23]. Last but not least, “at the end of July 2016, the IS militants marched into two energy facilities in northern Iraq and killed at least five people. The first attack took place at an AB2 gas compressor station, located about 15 km northwest of Kirkuk in [the] Bajwan area. Four gunmen with hand grenades attacked the station leaving two guards in a serious condition. The militants then shot dead four workers in a control room” [28]. The militants then allegedly went to the Bai Hassan oil station, located some 25 km further north-west, where they mounted a similar attack. One of them detonated his explosive vest at an outside gate so that the others could enter the facility. Once inside, two more men detonated their explosiveladen vests, thus destroying an oil storage tank. The Bai Hassan oil station, which had been producing 55,000 barrels of oil per day, was forced to suspend all activity following the attack [28].

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5.1.3. Mosul

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IS oil-burning tactics and the Iraqi offensive to capture

With the loss of their last two oil fields in Iraq in July 2016 and the Iraqi offensive on Mosul in October of the same year, the IS resorted to drastic measures. Namely IS fighters retreating before the Iraqi army set fire to vast swathes of oil fields, and this time, the extent of this practice was greater than ever before. The same tactic had already been used by Saddam Hussein during the Persian Gulf War. The fires would destroy several oil wells, and the resulting clouds of smoke would make it difficult to bomb the retreating Islamists with precision. To give some examples of such attacks, retreating IS fighters torched several oil fields and oil wells near Mosul on 26 October 2016 [35], and then in early November, IS militants torched another 19 wells to stop the progress of the Iraqi army. By mid-June 2017 the Iraqi army had taken control of all parts of Mosul and almost reached the An-Nuri Mosque, from which the IS leader al-Baghdadi had proclaimed a caliphate in the conquered territories of Iraq and Syria in 2014.IS radicals then demolished the ancient mosque with explosives on 21 June 2017. Iraqi anti-terrorist forces conquered the ruins of the An-Nuri Mosque a week later, on 29 June, and the Iraqi Prime Minister Haider al-Abadi announced the overthrow of Mosul as the seat of the IS’s power in July 2017.

5.1.4. Consequences of the terrorist attacks in Iraq on energy security Attacks carried out in order to either dominate or damage the energy sector in Iraq have a negative impact on the Iraqi economy, which loses revenue from gas production and oil exports because of the attacks. They also necessitate an allocation of funds to provide security to the energy industry and repair infrastructure damaged by both the allies’ air raids and the IS. In the case of Iraq, crude oil export accounts for 93% of the total revenue of its government. However, it should be noted that while the IS dominated northern Iraq (excluding the Kurdistan Region of Iraq), impacting the oil production and refinery operations there, this did not affect the southern Iraqi oil production and exports. The IS also did not significantly affect the production in the Kurdistan Region in northern Iraq, although the fighting between it and the Iraqi army came very close to the fields operated by the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) – Khurmala Dome and Shaikan [30,29]. Accordingly, OPEC’s Annual Statistical Bulletin 2016 mentions that Iraq’s output of petroleum products dropped from around 613,000 bpd in 2011 to around 444,000 bpd in 2015. This slashed the government’s total revenues, which are generated mainly from crude exports [29]. “The decreasing trends show that the seizure of key oil fields by ISIS has had a significant negative effect on Iraq’s petroleum industry value in the international market compared to other countries.” [28, see also 29]. The partial interruptions in the production and supply of crude oil and natural gas in the country therefore had a negative impact on the energy security of Iraq itself. Meanwhile the unstable domestic political, ethnic, and religious situation inside Iraq led the IS to focus far more on terrorist attacks in recent times, with the main aim being to deepen the country’s continuing instability, and these terrorist attacks will likely dominate the larger part of the IS’s activities in the foresee-

able future. These events could cause a panic in world markets, bringing about an increase in oil prices, which is what the IS needs. By contrast, for the EU, the energy security impacts of IS attacks targeting energy sectors are rather minimal since Iraqi oil exports account for only 4.6% of EU oil imports, and the EU does not import LNG from Iraq. Even if the situation in Iraq deteriorated and its oil exports ceased, the consequences for EU energy security would be limited as EU member states have diversified oil imports [20].

5.2.

Syria

Similarly to the case of Iraq, in Syria the IS attacks on oil and gas fields, oil refineries, gas processing plants, power plants and energy infrastructure had at least two motivations. First, the IS wanted to dominate the Syrian energy sector. Second, the IS tried to harm Syria’s energy sector and politically and economically destabilize the regime of President Bashar alAssad. Even so, however, the Syrian regime cooperated with IS fighters in the energy sector in some cases.

5.2.1. Terrorist attacks with the aim of taking control of the energy sector The IS planned to seize Syria’s local oil resources, and it did so through numerous offensives on Syrian oil fields in 2013–15. For example, in July 2014 the IS took control of the high-quality Omar oil field with a capacity of 6000–9000 bpd, and by the end of 2015 it succeeded in capturing the main Syrian oil fields, which are concentrated around Dayr al-Zawr, Hasaka, Raqqa, and eastern Homs, and have a daily production of 90,000 barrels. These fields accounted for 80% of all the oil production in Syria, while the Syrian regime had only 8% of the oil production on its territory under its control, and the remaining 12% was dominated by the Kurdish forces in 2015 [see 65,67,68, and 79]. Nonetheless, the IS oil production in Syria, focused around Deir ez-Zor, was hit hard by a number of factors. US and Russian air strikes targeting IS transport routes, and the IS’s ineffective and inadequate extraction technology caused the overall oil production of the IS in Syria to drop to 20,000–30,000 bpd in the first half of 2016 [67]. The IS then lost a number of oil fields in Syria during 2017. With support from Russian airstrikes and Iran-backed militias, Syrian troops retook control of several oil fields, including al Daylaa, Wahab, al Fahd, Dbaysan, al-Qseer, Abu al Qatat and Abu Qatash, in the desert area in the south-west of Raqqa Province in June and July 2017 [11]. In October 2017, the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), backed by US air and artillery strikes, conquered Raqqa, which was then considered the “capital” of the IS, and also captured Syria’s largest oil field, Omar, from the IS [57]. One month later, the Syrian regime liberated from the IS the eastern Syrian city of Deir ez-Zor, an important source of oil revenue for the extremist group and one of its last urban holdouts [77]. With regard to natural gas, the IS undertook a series of attacks on Syrian gas fields in 2014 and 2015. For example, in May 2015 the IS decided to attack the town of Palmyra and the nearby gas fields, which provide 45% of Syria’s natural gas production and play a major part in supplying Syria with electricity. By occupying Palmyra and the surrounding area, the

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IS gained control of gas fields with an overall production of about 9 m cubic metres of unprocessed gas per day. However, in late March 2016 the Syrian army retook Palmyra with the help of Russian air forces and forced the IS to retreat from the area [67]. The first territorial expansion in this area was undertaken by IS fighters on 6 May 2016, when they took the Shaer gas field. After the Syrian army took the gas field back a week later, on 17 May 2016, the IS blew up a major section of it and the nearby petrol stations, sparking an earthquake of 4.4 degrees on the Richter scale around Palmyra [6]. The IS then retook Palmyra in December 2016 only to lose it again in March 2017. The IS also lost several other gas fields in the first seven months of 2017. For example, the Zamla gas field in Raqqa province and the Hail and Arak fields, which lie northeast of Palmyra in the central province of Homs, were retaken by Syrian government forces from the hands of IS jihadists in July 2017 [68].

5.2.2. Terrorist attacks that aim to damage the energy sector and destabilize the enemy In the examined period 2014-2017, the IS carried out several attacks with the purpose of damaging the regime of President al-Assad. For example, in June 2014, IS terrorists attacked the gas line between the Shaer station and a gas processing plant, which caused several days of power outages all over Syria before the pipes were repaired again. A similar purpose led fighters from the IS to blow up a pipeline near the town of Furqlus on 31 March 2015, in the vicinity of the Ebla processing plant, and a nearby gas-fuelled power generator was also damaged in another IS attack in March 2016 [see 18]. Besides its attacks on gas lines, throughout 2014 the IS also repeatedly attacked power lines. In these attacks it cut the power supplies to military airfields, residential areas in Deir ez-Zor, and other places [see 68]. Finally, the Islamic State managed to capture at least eight power plants by the end of 2015, including three hydroelectric plants in northern Syria [see 64]. The IS attacks on the energy sector with the aim to harm the al-Assad regime continued in the early months of 2017. For example, on 2 February 2017, IS fighters blew up gas pipelines to the north, east and west of the Hayan gas field in the central province of Homs and caused a huge fire. The IS had stormed the facility when it overran Palmyra for the second time in December 2016. In January 2017 the IS’s news agency Amaq posted photos of what it claimed was a bombing of the Hayan gas field; at the time, some sources in the Syrian Oil Ministry said that the photos seemed real, although the bombing had not yet been confirmed [77]. Three weeks later, IS fighters blew up some gas wells in the Jazal Mountains in the eastern parts of Homs [67]. Subsequently, on 25 February 2017 IS radicals fired several rockets from the mountains near Palmyra, striking the Ebla gas factory and the al-Janub factory in the Furqlus area in the eastern region of Homs. The attack rendered the al-Janub plant out of service and the Ebla gas factory suffered property losses and damages to its machines [32,78].

5.2.3. Cooperation between the Syrian regime and the IS in the energy sector Although the main goal of the terrorist attacks carried out by the IS in Syria was to seize or damage Syria’s energy sector,

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there existed a collusion of sorts between the Syrian regime and the leaders of the IS in 2014–17 with regard to both oil fields and the gas sector, which is used to generate 90% of Syrian electricity. One example of a secret agreement between the Syrian regime and the leaders of the IS was a joint venture concerning the Tuweinan gas processing plant, which supplies gas to the Aleppo thermal power plant, which was under the control of the IS at the time. The agreement concluded between the two sides contained a clause under which 50 MW of electricity from the power plant were to be supplied to the Syrian regime per day, while the IS was to receive 70 MW of electricity from it each day [46].

5.2.4. Consequences of the terrorist attacks in Syria on energy security As a result of these events, there was a dramatic drop in oil and gas production in Syria. Prior to the outbreak of the civil war in 2011 and the occupation of most of the oil fields by the IS, Syria produced around 383,000 bpd in 2010, which accounted for around 0.48% of the global oil production. Yet in 2016, the oil production in Syria was only around 25,000 bpd. Similarly, in 2010 Syria’s natural gas production was around 8bn cubic meters (bcm), while in 2016 it fell to less than half of this figure - about 3.6 bcm [20]. In fact, the IMF reported that Syria’s oil and gas GDP decreased by an average of twenty-eight percent from 2010 to 2015 [48]. Seeing that Syria is not a major global producer and exporter of gas and oil, especially when compared to its neighbouring countries, terrorist attacks on Syria’s energy infrastructure will have a negative impact primarily on its energy security. This negative impact will mainly be connected to the loss of its oil and gas fields, refineries, and gas and power plants, but it will also be related to the interruption or suspension of oil, gas and electricity supplies to households and industrial enterprises. Considering this, given that Syria does not currently export oil (in 2010 Syrian oil exports to the EU amounted to c. 100,000 bpd) or gas in the form of LNG to the EU, attacks on the Syrian energy sector have almost no impact on or implications for EU energy security (except that the unstable situation in Syria hampers the construction of alternative gas transport routes through this region) [67].

6.

Conclusion

The concept of terrorism targeting an energy sector is not strictly limited to armed attacks against energy infrastructure. The concept also includes illegal activities aimed at such facilities, such as the theft of oil or gas from pipelines, extortion, or the funding and support of groups that conduct the aforementioned attacks. In this respect, the IS focuses on the utilization and expansion of its existing oil and natural gas production capacity as an important source of funding for its operations. The IS also uses energy to punish Western countries and their allies. Furthermore, the IS’s energy strategy is strongly determined by Sunni Islam. It uses Islamic doctrines to justify its actions toward energy sectors, including its use of captured oil and gas fields, despite the fact that private use of energy sources is

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Table 2 – The numbers of the IS energy-related attacks in Iraq and Syria in 2014–2017. Country

Iraq Syria Total

Year

Total

2014

2015

2016

2017

32 4 36

24 5 29

23 11 34

17 12 29

96 32 128

Source: compiled by the author from the following sources: [37,38 and the Global Incident Map].

Table 3 – Goals, motives and examples of the IS terrorist attacks on the energy sectors in Iraq and Syria. Country

The goals of the terrorist attacks

The motives of the terrorist attacks

Examples of terrorist attacks or cooperation

Iraq

(1) To conquer and dominate Iraq’s oil and gas fields, oil refineries and other energy facilities;

(1) To achieve maximum outputs from the controlled oil fields and use the subsequent sale of the oil to finance the IS’s own activities; (2) To achieve dominance over the rest of the territory by

(1) The battle for the Baiji refinery, and the gained and later lost oil fields in Iraq;

(a) suspending the production of oil and its export to the West and raising the price of oil; (b) damaging the credibility of Iraq as an oil supplier; (c) discrediting the government by showing that it is unable to ensure security on its own territory. (1) To maximize the energy potential; sales of oil could finance IS operations, and supplies of electricity and gas could ensure the operations of strategic buildings in the controlled area; (2) To politically and economically weaken the ruling regime of President Bashar al-Assad, and facilitate the capture of the remaining Syrian territory that is still controlled by the regime; (3) The exception: the “energy cooperation” between the IS and the Syrian regime for economic and possibly strategic benefits.

(2) The IS setting fire to the Ajil oil field in Iraq as a cover manoeuvre during its retreat; Two attacks on the Bai Hassan station and oil field.

(2) To damage the energy sector and destabilize the government of Iraq.

Syria

(1) To control Syrian oil and gas fields, power plants and gas processing plants;

(2) To damage Syria’s energy sector and destabilize the IS’s opponents;

(3) Exceptions: the “energy cooperation” agreements between the Syrian regime and the IS.

The unsuccessful attack on the Alas and Ogail oil fields;

(1) The capture of several power plants and oil and gas fields in Syria, some of which were later lost;

(2) Attacks on gas and oil pipelines and power lines;

(3) An exception: the secret agreement between the Syrian regime of Bashar al-Assad and IS leaders about a joint venture for the Tuweinan gas processing plant.

Source: compiled by the author.

considered contrary to the principles of Sunni Islam. In its energy strategy the IS relies on the method of “use or threat of violence,” which is also a fundamental pillar of energy-focused terrorism. Firstly, this method is used in specific IS attacks on oil and gas fields, energy infrastructure, and energy facilities with the aim to either take control of the energy sector, or destroy the energy sector in an attempt to disrupt exports, raise oil prices, and/or politically and economically weaken, destabilize and discredit the enemy. The attacks could even be carried out as military maneuvers. Secondly, the method is also used when IS fighters kidnap workers and employees of Western companies or take them hostage in order to obtain a ransom, draw attention to themselves, or damage the credibility of the state, as a successful kidnapping or hostage-taking could be seen as proof that the state is incapable of ensuring the safety of its people. It should also be mentioned that the IS does not limit its operations to attacks on energy sectors, but it

also takes part in other illegal criminal activities, particularly in Iraq and Syria. According to the Global Terrorism Database [37], in Iraq the ISIS/IS carried out a total of 259 attacks on the business and utilities sector, and this figure includes more than a third of the country’s terrorist attacks on energy infrastructure, oil and gas fields, refineries, security guards protecting pipelines and gas plants in the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December 2017.3 Similarly, in Syria, according to the GTD [38], IS fighters carried out a total of 42 attacks on the business and utilities sector, more than two-thirds of which were on the energy sector, during the period from 1 January 2014 to 31 December

3 These numbers are based on both monitoring of the Global Incident Map and research literature on IS attacks on the energy sector in Iraq in 2017; we left the task of the preparation of this literature to the Institute of International Relations Prague.

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Table 4 – Implications of IS terrorist attacks for energy security. Country

The forms of the terrorist attacks

Implications for energy security

Iraq

Terrorist attacks with the aim of taking control of the energy sector.

– The attacks have a negative impact on the Iraqi economy because of the associated loss of revenue from gas production and oil exports, and the necessity to allocate funds to secure the energy industry and repair infrastructure; partial interruptions in the production and supply of crude oil and natural gas in the country then have a negative impact on the energy security of Iraq itself. – They could have a negative impact on global (Asian and, partly, Western) energy security as a result of the disruptions of Iraqi oil supplies.

Syria

Terrorist attacks that aim to damage the energy sector and destabilize the enemy. Terrorist attacks with the aim of taking control of the energy sector.

Terrorist attacks that aim to damage the energy sector and destabilize the enemy

– The attacks have a negative impact on the economy and energy security of Syria, particularly as a result of the loss of oil and gas fields, refineries, and gas and power plants, but also as a result of the interruption or suspension of oil, gas and electricity supplies to local households and industrial enterprises. – Syria currently does not export oil or gas in the form of LNG to the European Union; hence attacks on the Syrian energy sector have almost no impact on or implications for EU energy security; the unstable situation in Syria hampers the construction of alternative gas transport routes from the region.

Source: compiled by the author.

20174 . The numbers of attacks by the IS on the energy sectors in Iraq and Syria for the examined years are summarized in Table 2. Table 2 also leads to several conclusions. Firstly, in 2014– 2017, in Iraq and Syria, the Islamic State and its affiliated groups carried out more than one hundred and twenty (128) attacks on the countries’ respective energy sectors. This can be explained by the growing importance of the energy sectors for the IS, which uses mineral resources to implement its terrorist and military activities. Secondly, Iraq, where there are huge oil and gas reserves, faced three times as many IS terrorist attacks during the examined period (96) as Syria (32), which is a rather limited energy producer. Thirdly, the number of attacks per year in Iraq has been decreasing continuously from 2014 to 2017 due to the IS’s gradual loss of oil and gas fields, refineries, power equipment and parts of the territory controlled by it. Fourthly, in contrast to Iraq, in the case of Syria, there were slight increases in the yearly numbers of IS attacks on the energy sector due to the efforts of the IS to maintain its existing oil and gas fields there. The terrorist attacks conducted by the IS on the energy sectors of Iraq and Syria sometimes have the same goals and motives, but sometimes the IS’s goals and motives in the two countries are different. Table 3 shows the main goals, motives and examples of IS energy-related terrorist attacks in Iraq and Syria. Attacks on the energy industry and infrastructure by the IS mainly have a negative impact on the countries directly affected – in this case, Iraq and Syria – namely on their economies and energy security. But in the case of Iraq, terrorist attacks on its energy sector could also partly have a negative impact on global (Asian and, partly, Western) energy security as a result of the related disruptions of oil supplies from Iraq. Table 4 compares the energy-security implications of the IS terrorist attacks in Iraq and Syria.

Energy-related terrorism is an essential part of IS strategy and operations. Far from being haphazard, its attacks on pipelines, oil fields, transport routes and various facilities pursue a dual core objective, namely, to secure funding for IS operations while destabilizing the region and crippling their opponents’ access to resources. However, the previous IS success in this area may have expedited the national and international retaliation in defence of a valuable commodity and the assets of multinational energy firms. Thus essentially, the primary financial means of the IS’s existence may also be the primary motivator for its destruction. As the IS has been losing the territories it captured in Syria and Iraq, its capacity to generate revenue has declined drastically. In Iraq, the group has lost all the oil and gas fields it previously controlled, but it still controls dozens of oil wells; in Syria, the IS controls only several oil and gas fields.While the IS’s oil revenue could continue to decline in the near future, it is still likely benefiting from its taxing of fuel consumption on the local level and charging fees for tanker trucks transiting IS-controlled areas. It can therefore be expected that the IS terrorist attacks on the Iraqi and Syrian energy sector will continue. While the IS wishes to control oil and gas fields in order to generate revenues from illegal sales of oil and gas, the main motivation of these attacks on the energy sectors will be the Islamic State’s efforts to damage the energy industry and infrastructure of both countries, thereby gradually destabilizing them. In other words, the IS adopts guerrilla tactics when it can no longer hold a territory, and the Iraqi and Syrian oil and gas industries continue to be potential targets for IS terrorist attacks.

4 These numbers are based on both monitoring of the Global Incident Map and research literature on IS attacks on the energy sec-

tor in Syria in 2017; we left the task of the preparation of this literature to the Institute of International Relations Prague.

Funding This work was supported by the Technical Agency of the Czech ˇ Republic [TACR-ÉTA number: TL01000432] in the context of a

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project entitled “Migration from the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa and Asia: Geopolitical and Security Contexts, Implications and Recommendations for the Czech Republic”.

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