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Energy options to 2030
76
Long Range Planning, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 76 to 85, 1982 Printed in Great Britain
Ian Fells,
University
of Newcastle
0024-6301/82/040076-10$03.00/O Pergamon Press Ltd.
upon Tyne, England
Society and its technology are in a crucial state of transition. This paper describes the energy options available into the early part of the twenty-first century and some solutions to the problematic energy equation. Energy demand willgrow as the world population and its economic growth increases. lf the shortcomings of the system are not tackled and overcome there will be real energy shortages within the next 20 years.
Introduction The 1950s and 1960s were two decades in which technological advance was more rapid than at any previous time. Associated with this advance both economic growth and energy demand increased. Nuclear power was seen as a long term clean, attractive, high-technology solution to the world’s energy supply problem. Oil was at that time plentifully available and cheap and the Seven Sisters, the major international oil companies, were confident that they could ensure continuing supplies of oil at low cost. In the United Kingdom the 1967 White Paper on ‘Fuel Policy’ predicted that in real terms the price of crude oil was not likely to rise in the foreseeable future. Coal, with its attendant pollution problems and hazardous mining component, was gradually being displaced from the world’s energy markets and replaced by oil, gas and nuclear power. By the end of the decade, however, the nuclear power industry was beginning to falter. The 1960s had seen a remarkable increase in public awareness of the problems of environmental pollution. Legislation was gradually introduced to control industrial and domestic emissions. Power stations, whether fossil-fuelled or nuclear, came under scrutiny and increased regulation. Nuclear power, with its antecedents in weaponry, possibility of accident and long-term radioactive wastedisposal problems, became a particular target for
The author is Professor of Energy Conversion in the Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Merz Court, Claremont Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU.
both informed and uninformed criticism. Antinuclear pressure groups grew up on both sides of the Atlantic, dedicated to opposing the growth of nuclear power. The apothesis of the environmental movement was probably the publishing in 1972 of The Limits to Growth by Meadows and his co-workers for the Club of Rome as part of its project on the predicament of mankind. The world models used in the study showed that several resources, including some metals and energy, would start to run out over the next few decades, that a rising wave of pollution would engulf the world and industrial output would decline rapidly. Only by limiting population growth and carefully structuring and confining industrial growth could a stabilized world model be achieved, even if increased resources, including energy from nuclear power Unfortunately this stations, were included. thoughtful report was overtaken by events. In the autumn of 1973 the Yom Kippur war triggered off a series of crude oil price rises which now (1981) amount to a twenty-fold increase over 1972 prices (though rather less in real terms). Problems of environmental pollution have to some extent receded into the background as industrialized and Third-World countries alike struggle to obtain and pay for oil supplies crucial to their economic survival. A series of national and international studies concluded that coal and nuclear energy provide the only large-scale viable substitute for oil and gas; renewable energy sources can only make a modest contribution over the next 30 years. As oil currently supplies some 50 per cent of the world of the substitution energy needs, the enormity problem is only now being fully appreciated. It requires a massive trebling or more of the world as the World Coal Study coal supply industry, (1979) indicated, and an even greater increase in nuclear power to 10 times the present output, to provide around 1500 GWe or 25 per cent of the by 2000 (World Energy world’s electricity Conference, 1980). Unfortunately a number of factors combine to frustrate this logical route to reducing dependence on oil. The environmental lobby is slowing both coal and nuclear pro-
Energy Options grammes. A more overt anti-nuclear power lobby, assisted by events such as the accident at Three Mile Island, has reduced the nuclear programme to such an extent that worldwide the number of new orders for nuclear reactors is at its lowest point since the early 1960s and in the U.S. in 1979 there were no new orders and 13 cancellations. The vulnerability of the world’s economy to oil shortages and price rises had been anticipated by Warman, King Hubbard and others around 1965 although their anxiety had been triggered by the realization that new oil discoveries were not keeping pace with the increased rate of extraction. They foresaw a resource problem rather than a politically inspired economic problem as far as oil is concerned. In some ways the unanticipated massive increase in the oil price forced on the world by OPEC can be looked upon as a mixed blessing, as governments have been obliged to cut back oil consumption a decade or so earlier than they would otherwise have done. The last decade has seen tremendous research and development effort put into new or improved energy supply technologies and, more recently, more efficient ways of using energy. Two conclusions can already be drawn from this work; methods for producing synthetic crude oil from coal, oil shale and so on are expensive in both financial and energy terms; the development of new technologies has a time scale at least an order of magnitude greater than political time scales. These conclusions taken with an improved understanding of the linkages between economic growth and energy demand growth and the disparities between world geographical groups at different stages of development have led to more realistic energy demand projections as far ahead as the year 2030.
Three Recent Forecasts
Table 1. Potential world primary energy production, exajoules (1 EJ = lo’* J) Resource
1972
1985
2000
2020
Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Hydraulic Unconventional
66 115 46 2 14
115 216 77 23 24
170 195 143 88 34
259 106 125 314 56
0
0
4
40
26 269
33 488
56 690
100 1000
oil
gas Renewable, solar, thermal, biomass Total
Energy from renewable resources, hydro, biomass (fuel wood) and solar provides 15 per cent of the world’s annual energy supply today. Hydro power should increase but will only provide 5 per cent of total energy by 2020. Solar and biomass could treble by 2020 but still remain at a level of 7-8 per cent. The pattern of renewable energy supplies will have changed, however; in place of combustion of wood and animal wastes and simple domestic solar heating there will be a transformation of biomass to synthetic fuels and fertilizers, and solar-electric as well as large solar heating systems. Geothermal resources, though not renewable are extensive and could provide 2-3 per cent of world energy requirements. If the maximum world energy production is likely to be around 1000 EJ by 2020 what will be the energy demand? If historical projections are made based on percentage growth rates one can anticipate very high demand by 2020. The extrapolations are shown in Table 2. Table 2. World primary-energy demand projection based on different historical periods
Historical
(1) World Energy Conference In a study published in 1977 a team ofexperts drawn from the industrialized, centrally planned and developing nations looked to possible world energy production in the year 2020. Their findings are shown in Table 1.
and geo-
77
Coal and nuclear power are expected to be the major suppliers of energy, over 55 per cent of the total. Coal will treble its production and nuclear power increase some fifteen-fold. The combined supply of conventional oil and gas is expected to peak at about one third of total energy supply by the year 2000. Nonconventional oil .and gas resources might supply a further 3 or 4 per cent. Overall non-renewable resources will provide 80 per cent of the world’s energy supply by 2020.
Annual
Energy Demand
to 2030
1860-l 1925-I 1933-I 1960-l
period
975 975 975 975
rate of growth over period % per annum
2.0 3.3 4.1 4.3
Primary energy demand by extrapolation to the year 2020 (exajoules)
700 1306 1918 2111
If, however, a more realistic extrapolation is made based on high price response, constraints on oil use and vigorous energy conservation measures different scenarios emerge. If in addition, energy/income elasticity decreases with time in all regions the energy supply/demand equation might balance. The WEC analysis is shown in Table 3. It should be emphasized that this scenario anticipates very considerable saving as a result of energy conservation with 30 per cent saving through technological development and a further 17 per cent through structural ch:rnges in mature economies such as saturation in demand for car transport.
78 Table
Long
Range
3. Demand
Planning
projections
Vol.
15
based on constraint
Primary energy demand,
1972 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Note: only commercial
OECD
Developing nations
150 178 212 242 262 278
66 86 120 167 233 325
27 46 86 152 253 397
is shown
World
243 310 418 561 748 1000
in the projections,
1 EJ=10’8J.
The supply and demand equation balances in 2020 making these assumptions.
miraculously just rather optimistic
(2) Exxon--December 1980 This ‘outlook’ projects energy supply and demand through the year 2000. It is therefore less adventurous than the W.E.C. projection but possibly more realistic as company industrial strategy is based upon it. Economic growth is expected to be significantly lower than in the 1965-1973 period and slightly lower than the 1973-1979 experience. Adjusted for inflation, the world economy as a whole is expected to grow about 3 per cent annually between 1979 and 2000 compared to over 5 per cent between 1965 and 1973. World energy demand is expected to grow at around 2; per cent per year which is less than world economic growth and less than half the 1965-1973 energy growth rate. Nevertheless world energy demand will still increase by 65 per cent between 1980 and 2000. This growth will not be evenly spread and Table 4 shows the projected demand growth rate for different areas. Table
4. Energy
demand
growth,
19651973 United States Canada Europe Japan
Industrial
countries
4.3 5.9 5.1 11.4
per cent per year 1973-l
0.8 3.3 1.5 1.4
979
1982 Table
5. Energy
exajoules
Centrally planned economics
energy
August
1979-2000
0.8 2.1 1.5 2.1
5.2
1.2
1.2
Other CPE
6.9 5.1
5.3 5.6
4.9 2.6
Total
5.3
2.9
2.4
It is anticipated that energy supply growth will be very different in the various sectors and Table 5 shows the various projections.
This means that there will only be a modest increase in world production of oil with producer countries increasing their home consumption which will
supply
growth,
1965-l
Oil Synthetics and VHO Gas Coal Nuclear Hydro and other
7.7 7.3. 1 ,o 27.8 3.9
Total
5.3
973
per cent per year 1973-l
2.2
979
1979-2000
3.6 2.4 20.9 4.6
0.4 13.8 2.6 2.8 10.0 3.5
2.9
2.4
result in a net decline in internationally traded oil. Growth in the industrial, residential and commercial sectors of oil importing countries will come from coal and nuclear energy. Oil use will be concentrated in specific application such as transport and lubrication where substitution of other fuels will be difficult before 2000. (3) International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Projection to 2030, 1981 This is the most recent analysis of the world energy supply problem. The period studied is from 1980 to 2030; this period was chosen as it was anticipated that such an extended period might provide the possibility of transition from a global energy system based on consuming depletable fossil fuels to a sustainable system based on non-depletable fuels. It is clear that this transition must occur sometime; even at slowed down consumption rates the world fossil fuel resources will have been totally consumed in an orgy of combustion during a period of 250 years or so, with oil the most vulnerable and paradoxically the most used. In some ways this study is more sophisticated than the other studies cited. The world is divided into seven geographical regions chosen on the basis of national energy resources and economic structure. The WEC study and the Exxon study were more their limited in geographical distinction. Anticipated economic growth and population growth (by 2030 the world population will have doubled from 4 billion in 1975 to 8 billion) together with technological, social and market inertia were all considered in making forward projections. The now accepted ‘scenario’ approach led to a high energy growth demand/growth scenario in which total global energy demand in 2030 is 36 TWyr/yr (=1116 EJ), th e 1ow scenario gives a figure of 22 TWyr/yr (=682 EJ). These compare with a consumption of 8.2 TWyr/yr in 1975. Thus between 1975 and 2030 the demand for primary energy increases by a factor of 4.4 or 2.7 respectively for the high and low scenarios. On a per capita basis there is a 2.2 of 1.35 fold increase respectively. The breakdown by geographical regions is shown in Table 6. These projections in energy use
point with
to continuing inequalities the ‘developed’ world
Energy Table 6. Two supply scenarios, (TWyr/yr) region, 1975-2030
primary
energy
by
High scenario
Low scenario
Base year 1975
1975
2000
2030
2000
2030
Primary source’
1. North America 2. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 3. W. Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, S. Africa and Israel 4. Latin America 5. Africa (except N&S Africa). S&SE Asia 6. Middle East and North Africa 7. China and Centrally Planned Asian Economies
2.65
3.89
6.02
3.31
4.37
1.84
3.69
7.33
3.31
5.00
3.83 1.51 2.26 0.12
2.26 0.34
4.29 I.34
7.14 3.68
3.39 0.97
4.54 2.31
Oil Gas Coal Light water reactor Fast breeder reactor Hydroelectricity Solart Other*
0.33
I.43
4.65
1.07
2.66
Total§
8.21
0.13
0.77
2.38
0.56
I.23
0.46
I.44
4.45
0.98
2.29
Total’
8.2lt
16.84
35.65
13.59
22.39
continuing to consume around 90 per cent of annual energy production. It would only be realistic to expect growth of energy demand to continue past 2030, at least in the developing world with both population and economic growth still increasing; this could well amount to an additional 2-3 TWyr/yr. An extreme ‘energy conservation scenario is also considered in which a simple doubling of the 1975 energy use figure of 8 TWyr/yr to 16 TWyr/yr in 2030 is proposed. As the world population would double during the period this would lead to a constant global average primary use per capita, although energy use between regions would change with growth for the developing world and decrease for other regions. m
Table 7 shows a ‘prodigious consumption of resources, particularly fossil fuels’ and a strong nuclear component as well as solar, hydro and fossil fuel inputs. It is not dissimilar to the WEC study. The two most important conclusions are that it will not be possible in the 50 years considered to change over to a global energy system based on renewable resources. In 2030 the world will still be dependent to 68 per cent on fossil fuels and what is more ‘dirty’ fossil fuels compared with the largely clean fossil fuels used in 1980.
Are These Studies Convincing and Can the Projection be Realized in Practice? briefly
two
High scenario 2000 2030
Low scenario 2000 2030
5.89 3.11 4.94 1.70 0.04 0.83 0.10 0.22
6.83 5.97 II.98 3.21 4.88 I.46 0.49 0.81
4.75 2.53 3.92 I.27 0.02 0.83 0.09 0.17
5.02 3.47 6.45 1.89 3.28 I.46 0.30 0.52
16.84
35.65
13.59
22.39
*Primary fuels production or primary fuels as inputs to conversion or refining processes-for example, coal used to make synthetic liquid fuel is counted in coal figures. tlncludes mostly ‘soft’ solar-individual rooftop collectors-and also small amounts of centralized solar electricity. *‘Other’ includes biogas, geothermal and commercial wood use. SColumns may not sum to totals because of rounding.
*Columns may not sum totals because of rounding. tlncludes 0.21 TWyr/yr of bunkers.
The three studies presented
0.50
79
to 2030
Table 7. Global primary energy by source, supply scenarios, 1975-2030 (TWyr/yr)
Region
A typical disaggregated supply picture is given Table 7 for the high and low growth scenarios.
Options
here are in two
cases (WEC and IIASA) the work of widely spread international groups of experts, the third has been produced by the largest oil company in the world with very extensive international trade. All come to the conclusion that world energy demand will increase through the next 50 years, perhaps multiplying three times and that fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) will continue to play the major role in providing the energy. There are other commentators who maintain that renewable resources, in particular solar energy will play a dominant role quite soon and that nuclear energy, which is seen as particularly dangerous, can be abandoned. Typical of such an approach is Lovins’ book Soft Energy Paths (Pelican Books, 1977, A. Lovins). He points first to savings which can be effected employing under-used technologies such as co-generation and refers to an American Institute of Physics Conference in 1975 which maintained that the U.S. could improve energy efficiencies by a factor of3 or 4. However, he abandons these ‘hard paths’ in favour of ‘soft’ decentralized techniques for solar heating and cooling of houses, production of alcohol from biomass and so on maintaining that together with a less ‘aggressive’ lifestyle world energy demand could decrease post 2000. There is no doubt that many people would like to see world energy provided by renewable sources. The IIASA study was deliberately organized over a 50 year span to 2030 to determine if the transition to a ‘clean’ and renewable energy supply would have taken place by then. It turned out to be engineeringly and economically impossible in the time available. It is this inertia in the system which frustrates idealists like Lovins and others who would like to change the world more quickly than it can be changed. More importantly it is necessary to examine the constraints operating within the world energy system to see if the WEC and IIASA projections are themselves attainable.
80
Long Range
Planning
August
Vol. 15
1982
Constraints Slowing Down Technological Progress in Energy
powerful inhibitor ofaction Mile Island has indicated.
SUPPlY
(‘j) Planning Delay and Inlpoteme. Over democratization of the planning process has so slowed down energy planning procedures that perfectly proper initiatives never get off the ground.
(a) A Lack of Trained Manpower. An expanding nuclear programme finds itself in competition with and chemical the oil industry for mechanical engineers. (b) Finance. A new North Sea oil field costs $2000m to develop, a nuclear power station perhaps two thirds of this. OPEC surpluses are enormous but decreasing, the problem of recycling petro dollars has turned out to be too big for the world banking system. (c) Etgirleeriq Lead Times. A new deep coal ten years from inception to full production, power station perhaps twenty years. A power programme producing 1 per cent world’s energy needs is 50 years away.
mine is a tidal fusion of the
(d) Management Expertise. Energy projects tend to be very large, a nuclear power station is a gigantic which requires exceptional managerial exercise management skills in its construction and these are in short supply. (e) Political time scale, take at least to fruition. intractable
Will. Political initiatives have a short rarely as long as 2 years; energy plans 10 years and often much more to come This makes the ‘chronic energy crisis’ and unattractive in political terms.
(f) The Etzvironrnental Lobby. A very proper concern to protect the environment has fostered pressure groups who oppose the construction of nuclear power stations, coal mines, windmills and hydroelectric schemes. If not successful in actually down stopping them, they can slow construction by several years and in doing so escalate costs. (g) Over-optimism about Technolo‘qy. The belief that ‘something will turn up’ is often the excuse for inaction and shows a touching faith in the ability of technologists to perform miracles. Alternatively when a technique like underground gasification of coal emerges it is assumed that it will be generally available in a few years’ time rather than in the several decades necessary for its proper development. Similarly when a solar powered aeroplane flies across the channel many believe the technology is mature and worse, economic. (h) Shortage OfR aw bfaterials. As well as anticipated oil and uranium are particularly fuel shortages, vulnerable; the special alloys required for nuclear power station construction for example or for clean car exhaust systems stretch world metal supplies. (i) Emotion. The fear of a nuclear possible consequences, however
accident and the unlikely, is a
as the accident
at Three
Taken individually, or worse, collectively, this assembly of constraints makes the implementation of an energy policy difficult and sometimes impossible. But the WEC, Exxon and IIASA projections rely upon growth in the coal supply, a massive increase in nuclear power, unrestricted world trade in fuels and minimal interruption as a result of wars such as the Iran-Iraq confrontation. A shortage of energy, causing anticipated economic growth not being realized, has profound political implications. The developing world is, at the present time, severely disadvantaged because of the high price of. imported oil. The 1980 oil bill of the LDCs (lesser developed countries) is $50 billion, which means that a number ofdeveloping countries will have spent over 40 per cent of their total export earnings on energy imports. To cover the increased cost of oil and the reduced growth of exports the developing world has turned to large scale borrowing in order to maintain economic growth. Their overall foreign debts exceed S500 billion this year, five times the debt levels of 1973. Servicing this debt is an almost insurmountable problem, with serious implications for the stability of the world banking system. It is not surprising therefore that Third World delegates at the World Energy Conference held in Munich last year made a plea for nuclear power technology to be made available to them as the various threats posed by having civil nuclear power programmes were in their view dwarfed by the risks associated with energy shortages.
Will Nuclear Power and Coal Supplies Increase Fast Enough to Provide a Substitute for Oil? A trebling of the coal supply and a fifteen-fold increase in nuclear power is forecast over the next 50 years. The various constraints already mentioned will limit these programmes; can they achieve the targets set? The world nuclear programme is in the doldrums after a period of stable growth through the 1960s. The nuclear generating capacity of the world at September 1980, excluding centrally planned economies, was 186 installations in 18 countries based on five main reactor types, over 80 per cent of which are light water reactors. These stations provide largely base load electricity in seven industrialized western countries and account for around 10 per cent of the electricity generated. The cost of nuclear generated electricity is only half the
Energy price of electricity generated by burning oil; the price advantage over coal is rather less. Despite this price advantage, orders for new nuclear power stations are at their lowest point for 10 years. Over the last 3 years, within OECD, 36 new stations were ordered but 48 were cancelled, 32 of them in the U.S. The nuclear construction industry in the U.S. and W. Germany faces bankruptcy and in the U.K. six construction consortia have been reduced to one. Only in France is the power station building programme on target, with at least one new station coming on stream each year. The EEC plan to introduce 150,000 MW of nuclear power by 1985 has been reduced to a probable 78,000 MW. In the Eastern Block nuclear power is seen as an essential ingredient in the energy supply and progress is steady, based on Russian technology. With continuing problems in the Middle East, particularly the Iraq-Iran war, why is it the politicians in the U.S. and West Germany particularly have been forced by public opinion to halt nuclear power station construction? Part of the problem is the deep emotional response that links nuclear power with nuclear weapons, together with a profound unease, compounded by some ignorance of the hazards introduced by radiation. The accident record of the civil nuclear industry is extremely good; there have been 42 major reactor accidents worldwide. The SLI reactor accident in Idaho in 1961 when three workers were killed was probably the most serious followed by accidents in Czechoslovakia and Russia. The most recent and most traumatic disaster was that at Three Mile Island (TMI). No one was killed and the release of radioactive gases was so low that the increased number of deaths from cancer over the next 20 years is estimated as between one and two by the Kemeny Commission. Nevertheless, it created an enormous amount of confusion amongst the population, amplified by the media who were not properly briefed by responsible officials. Public apprehension was judged to be the most serious aftermath of the accident, but the consequences have yet to be properly appreciated. Financially the loss is appalling with Metropolitan Edison, the plant’s owner, forced to buy electricity from as far afield as Canada to supply customers and facing a repair bill of J2bn. The industry has responded with determination to improve what it admits was a management failure to train the station operators to deal with a dangerous excursion. At the same time design faults in the engineering and control room layout will be corrected. But TM1 has become part of the armoury of the anti-nuclear lobby. Questions of safety, licencing, the transport and storage of spent fuel, reliability in operation and, of course, costs have powerful effects on nuclear programmes. Plant size is a case in point, the economies of scale achieved by building large
Options
to 2030
81
reactors and arranging them in nuclear parks result in an industry geared to produce such units. If, however, the unit size is greater than 10 per cent of the total grid capacity it cannot be accommodated. This has led to a reconsideration of smaller units (250 MWe) in anticipation of a flow of orders from the developing world, although the ability and expertise of the necessary infra structure to support a nuclear programme is, in many cases in doubt.
Nuclear Power in Developing Countries The choice and viability of nuclear power in LDCs raises much besides system size and cost. Problems of fuel reprocessing and waste disposal, scarcity of long term finance and the not negligible risk of countries misapplying civil nuclear technology to the construction of nuclear weapons all affect the situation. The investment of the developed world in nuclear power and a continuing programme reduces demand on world oil supplies by between 4 and 8 million barrels of oil per day and so blunts to some extent Third World desire for nuclear power. The desire is nevertheless there and as oil prices continue to rise the price advantage of nuclear generated electricity may well become overriding.
Uranium
Supplies
The present world nuclear programme, whether truncated or not, is based on thermal reactors which use uranium extremely wastefully. The programme can only be seen therefore as an interim arrangement although uranium supplies are not likely to constrain even the projected nuclear programme until past 2010 at the earliest. Maximum production capability at the present time according to the IAEA is 44,000 tonnes/year and could increase to 119,000 tonnes/year by 1990 if necessary. World enrichment capacity is also adequate to cope until post 2000. After 2010 or so, however, a steady change to breeder reactors will be necessary. The development of the French liquid metal commercial fast breeder reactor Super PhPnix with inputs from W. Germany, U.K. and elsewhere is an important step towards the ultimate implementation of such a programme.
Nuclear Heat Some 60 per cent of world energy demand is to provide heat for processes of various kinds and simple heating of buildings, Nuclear reactors can be used to provide heat direct without converting it into electricity. In particular the High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor can provide process heat at temperatures up to 950°C; the West German AVR reactor has operated successfully as has the OECD Dragon Project and the General Atomics reactor in the U.S. If coal is to be converted into synthetic
82
Long
Range
Planning
Vol.
15
August
liquid fuels economically via the allothermal rather than the much less efficient autothermal process then nuclear process heat will become extremely important. At lower temperatures nuclear district heating stations of the kind proposed by Dr. Leine in Sweden could play an important role in providing ‘clean’ lowgrade heat. The so called ‘SECURE’ (Safe and Environmentally Clean Nuclear Reactor) produces 400 MW of heat at 110°C and 7 atmos. This would be sufficient for a community of 50,000. The design incorporates an intrinsically safe shut down system which floods the reactor core with a boron solution. Such small safe reactors could be important for developing countries.
The Future Nuclear Programme All the projections considered in this paper stress the importance of an expanding nuclear programme. The IIASA clean environmental future programme is based on solar and nuclear energy inputs. Yet the nuclear programme is the most vulnerable and fragile of all the future energy supply systems. Politicians view nuclear power with very mixed feelings. To be short of energy is industrially and therefore politically disastrous. This may happen in W. Germany later this decade because of the slowing down of the nuclear programme. But it was slowed down in W. Germany, the U.S. and elsewhere because public confidence in nuclear power is waning. The concept of nuclear risk in the mind of the general public is badly correlated to actual risk or experience of reactor operation. People react emotionally in an exaggerated way to risk of both low radiation doses and the extremely small risk of major accidents with wide ranging consequences. The problem is to educate the public and politicians alike in such a way that a balanced critical approach to the risk and benefits of nuclear power replaces uninformed emotional response. Only then can politicians develop acceptable energy strategies. If those strategies do not include a nuclear power input, the public and politicians alike must appreciate what the implications would be for economic growth, the environment and the third world, and accept them. On the other hand if nuclear power is to go ahead the industry must demonstrate its competence to operate with a high degree of safety, to learn from its mistakes and to thrive rather than languish in a limbo ofdistrust and inaction. The long lead times in nuclear engineering and the short political horizon do not give confidence that the world wide nuclear power programme will be revived and one must view the forward projection cited here with some scepticism. It would be only prudent to do so; to what extent can ‘insurance’ be
1982 provided therefore capability?
Expansion
against
a shortfall
in nuclear
of the Coal Industry
Coal is seen as the other major. alternative to oil besides nuclear power. A trebling of world coal production is seen as essential if world reliance on the politically vulnerable and in some cases volatile oil supplies is to be reduced. What would such an expansion entail? World wide there is plenty of coal, fortunately not distributed in the same way as oil. In terms of reserves there is an order of magnitude, more coal than oil or gas. Consumers show a marked reluctance to change from oil to coal though there are now signs that the price mechanism is beginning to work. In several industrialized countries coal is less than half the price of oil on a heat to weight basis; if this differential is maintained change to coal is inevitable. What are the implications for a massive increase in trade is world coal supplies. 7 Total international expected to quadruple with the steam coal trade multiplying by 15 times. This requires a massive building of coal carriers, as many as a thousand, over the next 20 years, each costing around $4Om. It also means new ports, terminals and rail facilities in the U.S., S. Africa and Canada. The expansion of the American coal industry alone, according to figures presented at the World Energy Conference in 1980, requires 10,000 miles of slurry pipeline to be built, 8000 railway engines (perhaps coal fired), 16,000 lorries and 300 barges. Also the opening of 700 new pits with a total cost of over $100 billion. With the constraints operating on such an energy investment, a temporary world glut of oil as a result of Saudia Arabian production policies and world recession reducing energy demand in industrialized nations, the necessary impetus to sustain such a problem seems unlikely to be either initiated or maintained. It would seem therefore that the logical change from oil to coal and nuclear power is not likely to be achieved as quickly as the forecasters anticipated. Can renewable resources supply any shortfalls?
Renewable
Resources
The advantages of solar energy and the associated technologies of hydropower, wave power, wind power and biomass are enormously attractive. Of these, hydroelectric power is much the best developed, providing as it does 5 per cent of the world’s energy supply in the form of very cheap electricity (between l/2 and l/10 of the cost of nuclear and fossil fuel generated electricity). With a possible three-fold expansion hydropower will still only provide 5 per cent of world energy demand by
Energy Options 2030. Of the other technologies the best developed is the growing and harvesting of fuel wood which provides 10 per cent of the world’s energy. Any extension of this total supply would be extremely difficult to achieve and there is the added hazard of the ‘greenhouse effect’ whereby the concentration of carbon dioxide in the upper atmosphere steadily increases as a result of burning fossil fuels. The problem is compounded by the gradual cutting down of forests (by 1 per cent per annum) thus reducing the capacity of forests to ‘fix’ carbon dioxide and thus accelerating the carbon dioxide build up. Of course any additional burning of fossil fuel exacerbates the problem which can only be reduced by increased dependence on solar heat and electricity and nuclear power. Unfortunately the technologies of solar-electric conversion, wave power and wind power are not engineeringly developed on a large scale and are expected to be expensive compared with other energy supplies, though this will change over the next 50 years. Biomass or crops for fuel suffers from nature’s prodigal inefficiency in converting solar energy by photosynthesis with only 3 per cent efficiency, though this will be improved by man’s ingenuity. Table 8 gives some recent cost comparison. Table 8. Comparative
energy costs
1980 dollars per barrel of oil equivalent on a thermal basis’ Middle East oil (existing fields) North Sea oil (existing fields) Liquids from oil sands/shale (N. America) Indigenous’coal (U.S.) Imported coal (N.W. Europe) Indigenous coal (N.W. Europe) Nuclear input break-even valuet Liquefied natural gas imports, high Btu (Europe, Japan, U.S.) Synthetic natural gas (high Btu) from indigenous coal (U.S.) Liquids from imported coal (N.W. Europe) Biomass (crops grown for fuel) Solar heat Electricity (based on conventional fossil fuel and nuclear generation) Electricity (based on solar/wind/tidal)
Technical production costs l-3 5-20 15-35 4-8 IO-14 S-20 7-20 25-35 3550 45-65 45-80 + 120+ 60-l 30 12o+t
*These estimates do not include refining, storage, transmission and distribution costs to final consumers. tThe fuel input cost required for fossil-fuelled plants to produce electricity at the same cost as nuclear stations. SPossibly on-site 1990s.
The other major problem associated with renewable resources is our inability to store large quantities of energy either in the form of heat or more particularly as electricity. Conversion to hydrogen is a possibility as it is with nuclear generated electricity and proponents of the hydrogen economy are enthusiastic about this route, with hydrogen being used in fuel cells for transport and so on; but it is a very expensive technology and wasteful in energy terms. The diffuse or dilute
to 2030
83
nature of renewable resources means that large tracts of land or, better, ocean will be necessary to accommodate solar collectors, 25 miles square for a solar power station or 1000 windmills with 90 m blades set 300 m apart to replace a nuclear power station on a 1 square mile site. The use of renewable resources can only come slowly; the biggest use in the short term will be in redesigned solar gain buildings but development of these technologies has a very long time scale. For comparison one should look at nuclear power, which was technically feasible in 1945 and has taken 30 years of enormous expenditure on development to produce today 3 per cent of the world’s energy demand. A figure of 10 per cent for renewables by 2030 can only be seen as fairly optimistic rather than far too low as commentators maintain.
Important Energy Technologies the Future
for
Tertiary recovery of oil, coal and gas must be developed quickly. We can no longer afford to leave 60 per cent of these resources unrecovered under the ground. Better use of fossil fuels through improved fuel technology, fluidized bed combustion systems with environmental clean up, more sophisticated and effective control systems to optimize efficient combustion can all play a part in the next decade, particularly as much dirtier fuels such as lignites, shales, waste materials and so on must be burnt. This also means improved ash handling and disposal. As coal becomes more readily available coal conversion processes to provide gas and synthetic liquid fuels must be improved. The route to methanol looks increasingly sensible. Alcohol fuels for transport, either from coal or biomass are very attractive and do not require much by way of new technology; electric traction will also steadily increase in importance based on new batteries and fuel cells. The further development of more efficient and safer nuclear power reactors burning uranium more efficiently must develop. The breeder reactor and also the high and low temperature heat producing nuclear reactors for process heat and district heating will develop, smaller (250 MW) units will be developed for some developing countries. There will be a steady electrification of society with improvements in the generation efficiency via combined cycles and MHD power generation. Heat pumps will play a very important part in domestic and commercial buildings as well as for heat recovery in industry. Co-generation should improve efficiency of energy usage commercially and industrially. Substantial improvements in efficiency of energy use by better control and instrumentation as well as new processes should achieve savings of around 30 per cent.
84
Long Range
Planning
Vol. 15
August
Continuing research into renewable resources, aimed at reducing costs must be maintained and storage systems developed; a strong thrust on solarelectric conversion efficiency and cost could make solar much more attractive, particularly in developing countries. Larger scale solar generation via solar ponds looks particularly attractive in favourable solar climates.
Centrally
Planned Economies
These countries have been to some extent ignored in this analysis. It should never be forgotten that Russia is the largest oil producer in the world and Russia and China rate two and three in world coal production. They are, nevertheless, self contained in that they consume what they produce. The most important question is whether Russia, to fuel its economic growth, will become a net importer of oil in the next two decades. This would put enormous pressure on its reserves of hard currency. It is more likely that arrangements will be made to import Western technology to improve recovery of oil and gas in remote regions of the country and to continue joint projects, as now, on improved electricity generation efficiency via MHD. Otherwise even greater stress will be put on the Middle East oil producers.
Middle East Oil Producers and Others It is clear that world trade in oil must continue at least at present levels. The high price demanded by most producers is having the effect of accelerating the switch away from oil to alternatives, but progress is slow and the alternatives are proving expensive. The enormous revenues of the oil producers (around J270bn) particularly Saudi Arabia ($104bn) are presenting enormous difficulties for the world banking system which cannot recycle the so-called ‘petrodollars’ in any straightforward way. Several of the oil producers have large industrialization programmes which absorb their revenues and ensure that crude oil prices will remain high. If these programmes are successful it also means that they will absorb rather more of their own oil production and that there will be less to export.
The effect that high and ever increasing oil prices have on developing countries without indigenous fuel supplies is giving cause for very considerable alarm.
Developing
Countries
The price developing countries must imported oil is paralysing their economies. constraints which affect these countries the lack of hard currency and lack of The sharp deterioration manpower.
pay for The two most are trained in their
1982 condition is exemplified by Costa Rica. Its biggest export is bananas. In 1973 it had to export 28 kg of bananas to buy one barrel of oil, in 1979 it had to export 420 kg bananas to import one barrel of oil! In searching for solutions to their energy supply problem these countries are often persuaded to buy inappropriate technology. For example large (500 MW) power stations, whether fossil fuel or nuclear fired, present extreme distribution problems. Often imported units, such as solar irrigation pumps, could be manufactured ‘at home’. A search for indigenous fuels has often not been rigorously undertaken; appropriate solar technology, for example drying rice, should be developed. Small hydroelectric schemes down to a few 100 kW are often the best solution and it is here that Western technology can be particularly helpful. Politically an effective trilogue between industrialized countries, oil producers and developing countries must be set up. In the long term it will be necessary to come to terms with nuclear power in developing countries.
Conclusion The best available evidence suggests that world energy demand will continue to grow, perhaps by as much as three times through the next 50 years. This is compounded by population increase and economic growth, particularly in developing countries where growth of 1 per cent in the economy requires energy supply growth of between 1.2 and l-5 per cent. In the mature industrial economies the figure is nearer 0.5 per cent energy growth for 1 per cent economic growth. Despite our best endeavours the world will still be dependent to around 70 per cent on fossil fuels and they will be ‘dirtier’ fuels than we are accustomed to now which means the environment must be protected. Nuclear energy will be an essential input. Renewable resources, although they will ultimately play a dominant role in world energy supply will not have achieved more than 10 per cent input by 2030. If the ‘inertia in the system’ is not overcome there will be real energy shortages within 20 years; there is very little spare capacity in the system and governments seem reluctant to provide insurance cover as it is expensive, although there is the ever present danger of cut backs in oil supply by the politically volatile Middle East producers. It is essential to intrude a note of realism into the indulgent discussions of the anti-nuclear pro-sunshine lobby. It is all too easy to philosophize knowing that
Energy when the switch is turned the power comes on. Fifty per cent of the world’s population do not have a switch, and their future, and ours, depends on exploiting every source of power available to us it as efficiently and wisely as using possible. Bibliography (1)
World Energy, Looking Ahead to 2030, published Energy Conference, by IPC, London (1978).
for the World
Outlook,
Options
Exxon Corporation
to 2030
85
(2)
World Energy
(3)
Anderer, Hafele et al., Energy in a Finite Wodd, Paths to a Sustainable Future, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Ballinger (1981).
(4)
A. B. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths,
(5)
Energyin (1981).
Penguin
(1981).
(1977).
Profile, Shell briefing service. Royal Dutch/Shell
Group
Long Range Planning, Vol. 15, No. 4, pp. 76 to 85, 1982 Printed in Great Britain
Ian Fells,
University
of Newcastle
0024-6301/82/040076-10$03.00/O Pergamon Press Ltd.
upon Tyne, England
Society and its technology are in a crucial state of transition. This paper describes the energy options available into the early part of the twenty-first century and some solutions to the problematic energy equation. Energy demand willgrow as the world population and its economic growth increases. lf the shortcomings of the system are not tackled and overcome there will be real energy shortages within the next 20 years.
Introduction The 1950s and 1960s were two decades in which technological advance was more rapid than at any previous time. Associated with this advance both economic growth and energy demand increased. Nuclear power was seen as a long term clean, attractive, high-technology solution to the world’s energy supply problem. Oil was at that time plentifully available and cheap and the Seven Sisters, the major international oil companies, were confident that they could ensure continuing supplies of oil at low cost. In the United Kingdom the 1967 White Paper on ‘Fuel Policy’ predicted that in real terms the price of crude oil was not likely to rise in the foreseeable future. Coal, with its attendant pollution problems and hazardous mining component, was gradually being displaced from the world’s energy markets and replaced by oil, gas and nuclear power. By the end of the decade, however, the nuclear power industry was beginning to falter. The 1960s had seen a remarkable increase in public awareness of the problems of environmental pollution. Legislation was gradually introduced to control industrial and domestic emissions. Power stations, whether fossil-fuelled or nuclear, came under scrutiny and increased regulation. Nuclear power, with its antecedents in weaponry, possibility of accident and long-term radioactive wastedisposal problems, became a particular target for
The author is Professor of Energy Conversion in the Department of Chemical Engineering, University of Newcastle upon Tyne, Merz Court, Claremont Road, Newcastle upon Tyne, NE1 7RU.
both informed and uninformed criticism. Antinuclear pressure groups grew up on both sides of the Atlantic, dedicated to opposing the growth of nuclear power. The apothesis of the environmental movement was probably the publishing in 1972 of The Limits to Growth by Meadows and his co-workers for the Club of Rome as part of its project on the predicament of mankind. The world models used in the study showed that several resources, including some metals and energy, would start to run out over the next few decades, that a rising wave of pollution would engulf the world and industrial output would decline rapidly. Only by limiting population growth and carefully structuring and confining industrial growth could a stabilized world model be achieved, even if increased resources, including energy from nuclear power Unfortunately this stations, were included. thoughtful report was overtaken by events. In the autumn of 1973 the Yom Kippur war triggered off a series of crude oil price rises which now (1981) amount to a twenty-fold increase over 1972 prices (though rather less in real terms). Problems of environmental pollution have to some extent receded into the background as industrialized and Third-World countries alike struggle to obtain and pay for oil supplies crucial to their economic survival. A series of national and international studies concluded that coal and nuclear energy provide the only large-scale viable substitute for oil and gas; renewable energy sources can only make a modest contribution over the next 30 years. As oil currently supplies some 50 per cent of the world of the substitution energy needs, the enormity problem is only now being fully appreciated. It requires a massive trebling or more of the world as the World Coal Study coal supply industry, (1979) indicated, and an even greater increase in nuclear power to 10 times the present output, to provide around 1500 GWe or 25 per cent of the by 2000 (World Energy world’s electricity Conference, 1980). Unfortunately a number of factors combine to frustrate this logical route to reducing dependence on oil. The environmental lobby is slowing both coal and nuclear pro-
Energy Options grammes. A more overt anti-nuclear power lobby, assisted by events such as the accident at Three Mile Island, has reduced the nuclear programme to such an extent that worldwide the number of new orders for nuclear reactors is at its lowest point since the early 1960s and in the U.S. in 1979 there were no new orders and 13 cancellations. The vulnerability of the world’s economy to oil shortages and price rises had been anticipated by Warman, King Hubbard and others around 1965 although their anxiety had been triggered by the realization that new oil discoveries were not keeping pace with the increased rate of extraction. They foresaw a resource problem rather than a politically inspired economic problem as far as oil is concerned. In some ways the unanticipated massive increase in the oil price forced on the world by OPEC can be looked upon as a mixed blessing, as governments have been obliged to cut back oil consumption a decade or so earlier than they would otherwise have done. The last decade has seen tremendous research and development effort put into new or improved energy supply technologies and, more recently, more efficient ways of using energy. Two conclusions can already be drawn from this work; methods for producing synthetic crude oil from coal, oil shale and so on are expensive in both financial and energy terms; the development of new technologies has a time scale at least an order of magnitude greater than political time scales. These conclusions taken with an improved understanding of the linkages between economic growth and energy demand growth and the disparities between world geographical groups at different stages of development have led to more realistic energy demand projections as far ahead as the year 2030.
Three Recent Forecasts
Table 1. Potential world primary energy production, exajoules (1 EJ = lo’* J) Resource
1972
1985
2000
2020
Coal Oil Gas Nuclear Hydraulic Unconventional
66 115 46 2 14
115 216 77 23 24
170 195 143 88 34
259 106 125 314 56
0
0
4
40
26 269
33 488
56 690
100 1000
oil
gas Renewable, solar, thermal, biomass Total
Energy from renewable resources, hydro, biomass (fuel wood) and solar provides 15 per cent of the world’s annual energy supply today. Hydro power should increase but will only provide 5 per cent of total energy by 2020. Solar and biomass could treble by 2020 but still remain at a level of 7-8 per cent. The pattern of renewable energy supplies will have changed, however; in place of combustion of wood and animal wastes and simple domestic solar heating there will be a transformation of biomass to synthetic fuels and fertilizers, and solar-electric as well as large solar heating systems. Geothermal resources, though not renewable are extensive and could provide 2-3 per cent of world energy requirements. If the maximum world energy production is likely to be around 1000 EJ by 2020 what will be the energy demand? If historical projections are made based on percentage growth rates one can anticipate very high demand by 2020. The extrapolations are shown in Table 2. Table 2. World primary-energy demand projection based on different historical periods
Historical
(1) World Energy Conference In a study published in 1977 a team ofexperts drawn from the industrialized, centrally planned and developing nations looked to possible world energy production in the year 2020. Their findings are shown in Table 1.
and geo-
77
Coal and nuclear power are expected to be the major suppliers of energy, over 55 per cent of the total. Coal will treble its production and nuclear power increase some fifteen-fold. The combined supply of conventional oil and gas is expected to peak at about one third of total energy supply by the year 2000. Nonconventional oil .and gas resources might supply a further 3 or 4 per cent. Overall non-renewable resources will provide 80 per cent of the world’s energy supply by 2020.
Annual
Energy Demand
to 2030
1860-l 1925-I 1933-I 1960-l
period
975 975 975 975
rate of growth over period % per annum
2.0 3.3 4.1 4.3
Primary energy demand by extrapolation to the year 2020 (exajoules)
700 1306 1918 2111
If, however, a more realistic extrapolation is made based on high price response, constraints on oil use and vigorous energy conservation measures different scenarios emerge. If in addition, energy/income elasticity decreases with time in all regions the energy supply/demand equation might balance. The WEC analysis is shown in Table 3. It should be emphasized that this scenario anticipates very considerable saving as a result of energy conservation with 30 per cent saving through technological development and a further 17 per cent through structural ch:rnges in mature economies such as saturation in demand for car transport.
78 Table
Long
Range
3. Demand
Planning
projections
Vol.
15
based on constraint
Primary energy demand,
1972 1980 1990 2000 2010 2020
Note: only commercial
OECD
Developing nations
150 178 212 242 262 278
66 86 120 167 233 325
27 46 86 152 253 397
is shown
World
243 310 418 561 748 1000
in the projections,
1 EJ=10’8J.
The supply and demand equation balances in 2020 making these assumptions.
miraculously just rather optimistic
(2) Exxon--December 1980 This ‘outlook’ projects energy supply and demand through the year 2000. It is therefore less adventurous than the W.E.C. projection but possibly more realistic as company industrial strategy is based upon it. Economic growth is expected to be significantly lower than in the 1965-1973 period and slightly lower than the 1973-1979 experience. Adjusted for inflation, the world economy as a whole is expected to grow about 3 per cent annually between 1979 and 2000 compared to over 5 per cent between 1965 and 1973. World energy demand is expected to grow at around 2; per cent per year which is less than world economic growth and less than half the 1965-1973 energy growth rate. Nevertheless world energy demand will still increase by 65 per cent between 1980 and 2000. This growth will not be evenly spread and Table 4 shows the projected demand growth rate for different areas. Table
4. Energy
demand
growth,
19651973 United States Canada Europe Japan
Industrial
countries
4.3 5.9 5.1 11.4
per cent per year 1973-l
0.8 3.3 1.5 1.4
979
1982 Table
5. Energy
exajoules
Centrally planned economics
energy
August
1979-2000
0.8 2.1 1.5 2.1
5.2
1.2
1.2
Other CPE
6.9 5.1
5.3 5.6
4.9 2.6
Total
5.3
2.9
2.4
It is anticipated that energy supply growth will be very different in the various sectors and Table 5 shows the various projections.
This means that there will only be a modest increase in world production of oil with producer countries increasing their home consumption which will
supply
growth,
1965-l
Oil Synthetics and VHO Gas Coal Nuclear Hydro and other
7.7 7.3. 1 ,o 27.8 3.9
Total
5.3
973
per cent per year 1973-l
2.2
979
1979-2000
3.6 2.4 20.9 4.6
0.4 13.8 2.6 2.8 10.0 3.5
2.9
2.4
result in a net decline in internationally traded oil. Growth in the industrial, residential and commercial sectors of oil importing countries will come from coal and nuclear energy. Oil use will be concentrated in specific application such as transport and lubrication where substitution of other fuels will be difficult before 2000. (3) International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis Projection to 2030, 1981 This is the most recent analysis of the world energy supply problem. The period studied is from 1980 to 2030; this period was chosen as it was anticipated that such an extended period might provide the possibility of transition from a global energy system based on consuming depletable fossil fuels to a sustainable system based on non-depletable fuels. It is clear that this transition must occur sometime; even at slowed down consumption rates the world fossil fuel resources will have been totally consumed in an orgy of combustion during a period of 250 years or so, with oil the most vulnerable and paradoxically the most used. In some ways this study is more sophisticated than the other studies cited. The world is divided into seven geographical regions chosen on the basis of national energy resources and economic structure. The WEC study and the Exxon study were more their limited in geographical distinction. Anticipated economic growth and population growth (by 2030 the world population will have doubled from 4 billion in 1975 to 8 billion) together with technological, social and market inertia were all considered in making forward projections. The now accepted ‘scenario’ approach led to a high energy growth demand/growth scenario in which total global energy demand in 2030 is 36 TWyr/yr (=1116 EJ), th e 1ow scenario gives a figure of 22 TWyr/yr (=682 EJ). These compare with a consumption of 8.2 TWyr/yr in 1975. Thus between 1975 and 2030 the demand for primary energy increases by a factor of 4.4 or 2.7 respectively for the high and low scenarios. On a per capita basis there is a 2.2 of 1.35 fold increase respectively. The breakdown by geographical regions is shown in Table 6. These projections in energy use
point with
to continuing inequalities the ‘developed’ world
Energy Table 6. Two supply scenarios, (TWyr/yr) region, 1975-2030
primary
energy
by
High scenario
Low scenario
Base year 1975
1975
2000
2030
2000
2030
Primary source’
1. North America 2. Soviet Union and Eastern Europe 3. W. Europe, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, S. Africa and Israel 4. Latin America 5. Africa (except N&S Africa). S&SE Asia 6. Middle East and North Africa 7. China and Centrally Planned Asian Economies
2.65
3.89
6.02
3.31
4.37
1.84
3.69
7.33
3.31
5.00
3.83 1.51 2.26 0.12
2.26 0.34
4.29 I.34
7.14 3.68
3.39 0.97
4.54 2.31
Oil Gas Coal Light water reactor Fast breeder reactor Hydroelectricity Solart Other*
0.33
I.43
4.65
1.07
2.66
Total§
8.21
0.13
0.77
2.38
0.56
I.23
0.46
I.44
4.45
0.98
2.29
Total’
8.2lt
16.84
35.65
13.59
22.39
continuing to consume around 90 per cent of annual energy production. It would only be realistic to expect growth of energy demand to continue past 2030, at least in the developing world with both population and economic growth still increasing; this could well amount to an additional 2-3 TWyr/yr. An extreme ‘energy conservation scenario is also considered in which a simple doubling of the 1975 energy use figure of 8 TWyr/yr to 16 TWyr/yr in 2030 is proposed. As the world population would double during the period this would lead to a constant global average primary use per capita, although energy use between regions would change with growth for the developing world and decrease for other regions. m
Table 7 shows a ‘prodigious consumption of resources, particularly fossil fuels’ and a strong nuclear component as well as solar, hydro and fossil fuel inputs. It is not dissimilar to the WEC study. The two most important conclusions are that it will not be possible in the 50 years considered to change over to a global energy system based on renewable resources. In 2030 the world will still be dependent to 68 per cent on fossil fuels and what is more ‘dirty’ fossil fuels compared with the largely clean fossil fuels used in 1980.
Are These Studies Convincing and Can the Projection be Realized in Practice? briefly
two
High scenario 2000 2030
Low scenario 2000 2030
5.89 3.11 4.94 1.70 0.04 0.83 0.10 0.22
6.83 5.97 II.98 3.21 4.88 I.46 0.49 0.81
4.75 2.53 3.92 I.27 0.02 0.83 0.09 0.17
5.02 3.47 6.45 1.89 3.28 I.46 0.30 0.52
16.84
35.65
13.59
22.39
*Primary fuels production or primary fuels as inputs to conversion or refining processes-for example, coal used to make synthetic liquid fuel is counted in coal figures. tlncludes mostly ‘soft’ solar-individual rooftop collectors-and also small amounts of centralized solar electricity. *‘Other’ includes biogas, geothermal and commercial wood use. SColumns may not sum to totals because of rounding.
*Columns may not sum totals because of rounding. tlncludes 0.21 TWyr/yr of bunkers.
The three studies presented
0.50
79
to 2030
Table 7. Global primary energy by source, supply scenarios, 1975-2030 (TWyr/yr)
Region
A typical disaggregated supply picture is given Table 7 for the high and low growth scenarios.
Options
here are in two
cases (WEC and IIASA) the work of widely spread international groups of experts, the third has been produced by the largest oil company in the world with very extensive international trade. All come to the conclusion that world energy demand will increase through the next 50 years, perhaps multiplying three times and that fossil fuels (coal, oil and gas) will continue to play the major role in providing the energy. There are other commentators who maintain that renewable resources, in particular solar energy will play a dominant role quite soon and that nuclear energy, which is seen as particularly dangerous, can be abandoned. Typical of such an approach is Lovins’ book Soft Energy Paths (Pelican Books, 1977, A. Lovins). He points first to savings which can be effected employing under-used technologies such as co-generation and refers to an American Institute of Physics Conference in 1975 which maintained that the U.S. could improve energy efficiencies by a factor of3 or 4. However, he abandons these ‘hard paths’ in favour of ‘soft’ decentralized techniques for solar heating and cooling of houses, production of alcohol from biomass and so on maintaining that together with a less ‘aggressive’ lifestyle world energy demand could decrease post 2000. There is no doubt that many people would like to see world energy provided by renewable sources. The IIASA study was deliberately organized over a 50 year span to 2030 to determine if the transition to a ‘clean’ and renewable energy supply would have taken place by then. It turned out to be engineeringly and economically impossible in the time available. It is this inertia in the system which frustrates idealists like Lovins and others who would like to change the world more quickly than it can be changed. More importantly it is necessary to examine the constraints operating within the world energy system to see if the WEC and IIASA projections are themselves attainable.
80
Long Range
Planning
August
Vol. 15
1982
Constraints Slowing Down Technological Progress in Energy
powerful inhibitor ofaction Mile Island has indicated.
SUPPlY
(‘j) Planning Delay and Inlpoteme. Over democratization of the planning process has so slowed down energy planning procedures that perfectly proper initiatives never get off the ground.
(a) A Lack of Trained Manpower. An expanding nuclear programme finds itself in competition with and chemical the oil industry for mechanical engineers. (b) Finance. A new North Sea oil field costs $2000m to develop, a nuclear power station perhaps two thirds of this. OPEC surpluses are enormous but decreasing, the problem of recycling petro dollars has turned out to be too big for the world banking system. (c) Etgirleeriq Lead Times. A new deep coal ten years from inception to full production, power station perhaps twenty years. A power programme producing 1 per cent world’s energy needs is 50 years away.
mine is a tidal fusion of the
(d) Management Expertise. Energy projects tend to be very large, a nuclear power station is a gigantic which requires exceptional managerial exercise management skills in its construction and these are in short supply. (e) Political time scale, take at least to fruition. intractable
Will. Political initiatives have a short rarely as long as 2 years; energy plans 10 years and often much more to come This makes the ‘chronic energy crisis’ and unattractive in political terms.
(f) The Etzvironrnental Lobby. A very proper concern to protect the environment has fostered pressure groups who oppose the construction of nuclear power stations, coal mines, windmills and hydroelectric schemes. If not successful in actually down stopping them, they can slow construction by several years and in doing so escalate costs. (g) Over-optimism about Technolo‘qy. The belief that ‘something will turn up’ is often the excuse for inaction and shows a touching faith in the ability of technologists to perform miracles. Alternatively when a technique like underground gasification of coal emerges it is assumed that it will be generally available in a few years’ time rather than in the several decades necessary for its proper development. Similarly when a solar powered aeroplane flies across the channel many believe the technology is mature and worse, economic. (h) Shortage OfR aw bfaterials. As well as anticipated oil and uranium are particularly fuel shortages, vulnerable; the special alloys required for nuclear power station construction for example or for clean car exhaust systems stretch world metal supplies. (i) Emotion. The fear of a nuclear possible consequences, however
accident and the unlikely, is a
as the accident
at Three
Taken individually, or worse, collectively, this assembly of constraints makes the implementation of an energy policy difficult and sometimes impossible. But the WEC, Exxon and IIASA projections rely upon growth in the coal supply, a massive increase in nuclear power, unrestricted world trade in fuels and minimal interruption as a result of wars such as the Iran-Iraq confrontation. A shortage of energy, causing anticipated economic growth not being realized, has profound political implications. The developing world is, at the present time, severely disadvantaged because of the high price of. imported oil. The 1980 oil bill of the LDCs (lesser developed countries) is $50 billion, which means that a number ofdeveloping countries will have spent over 40 per cent of their total export earnings on energy imports. To cover the increased cost of oil and the reduced growth of exports the developing world has turned to large scale borrowing in order to maintain economic growth. Their overall foreign debts exceed S500 billion this year, five times the debt levels of 1973. Servicing this debt is an almost insurmountable problem, with serious implications for the stability of the world banking system. It is not surprising therefore that Third World delegates at the World Energy Conference held in Munich last year made a plea for nuclear power technology to be made available to them as the various threats posed by having civil nuclear power programmes were in their view dwarfed by the risks associated with energy shortages.
Will Nuclear Power and Coal Supplies Increase Fast Enough to Provide a Substitute for Oil? A trebling of the coal supply and a fifteen-fold increase in nuclear power is forecast over the next 50 years. The various constraints already mentioned will limit these programmes; can they achieve the targets set? The world nuclear programme is in the doldrums after a period of stable growth through the 1960s. The nuclear generating capacity of the world at September 1980, excluding centrally planned economies, was 186 installations in 18 countries based on five main reactor types, over 80 per cent of which are light water reactors. These stations provide largely base load electricity in seven industrialized western countries and account for around 10 per cent of the electricity generated. The cost of nuclear generated electricity is only half the
Energy price of electricity generated by burning oil; the price advantage over coal is rather less. Despite this price advantage, orders for new nuclear power stations are at their lowest point for 10 years. Over the last 3 years, within OECD, 36 new stations were ordered but 48 were cancelled, 32 of them in the U.S. The nuclear construction industry in the U.S. and W. Germany faces bankruptcy and in the U.K. six construction consortia have been reduced to one. Only in France is the power station building programme on target, with at least one new station coming on stream each year. The EEC plan to introduce 150,000 MW of nuclear power by 1985 has been reduced to a probable 78,000 MW. In the Eastern Block nuclear power is seen as an essential ingredient in the energy supply and progress is steady, based on Russian technology. With continuing problems in the Middle East, particularly the Iraq-Iran war, why is it the politicians in the U.S. and West Germany particularly have been forced by public opinion to halt nuclear power station construction? Part of the problem is the deep emotional response that links nuclear power with nuclear weapons, together with a profound unease, compounded by some ignorance of the hazards introduced by radiation. The accident record of the civil nuclear industry is extremely good; there have been 42 major reactor accidents worldwide. The SLI reactor accident in Idaho in 1961 when three workers were killed was probably the most serious followed by accidents in Czechoslovakia and Russia. The most recent and most traumatic disaster was that at Three Mile Island (TMI). No one was killed and the release of radioactive gases was so low that the increased number of deaths from cancer over the next 20 years is estimated as between one and two by the Kemeny Commission. Nevertheless, it created an enormous amount of confusion amongst the population, amplified by the media who were not properly briefed by responsible officials. Public apprehension was judged to be the most serious aftermath of the accident, but the consequences have yet to be properly appreciated. Financially the loss is appalling with Metropolitan Edison, the plant’s owner, forced to buy electricity from as far afield as Canada to supply customers and facing a repair bill of J2bn. The industry has responded with determination to improve what it admits was a management failure to train the station operators to deal with a dangerous excursion. At the same time design faults in the engineering and control room layout will be corrected. But TM1 has become part of the armoury of the anti-nuclear lobby. Questions of safety, licencing, the transport and storage of spent fuel, reliability in operation and, of course, costs have powerful effects on nuclear programmes. Plant size is a case in point, the economies of scale achieved by building large
Options
to 2030
81
reactors and arranging them in nuclear parks result in an industry geared to produce such units. If, however, the unit size is greater than 10 per cent of the total grid capacity it cannot be accommodated. This has led to a reconsideration of smaller units (250 MWe) in anticipation of a flow of orders from the developing world, although the ability and expertise of the necessary infra structure to support a nuclear programme is, in many cases in doubt.
Nuclear Power in Developing Countries The choice and viability of nuclear power in LDCs raises much besides system size and cost. Problems of fuel reprocessing and waste disposal, scarcity of long term finance and the not negligible risk of countries misapplying civil nuclear technology to the construction of nuclear weapons all affect the situation. The investment of the developed world in nuclear power and a continuing programme reduces demand on world oil supplies by between 4 and 8 million barrels of oil per day and so blunts to some extent Third World desire for nuclear power. The desire is nevertheless there and as oil prices continue to rise the price advantage of nuclear generated electricity may well become overriding.
Uranium
Supplies
The present world nuclear programme, whether truncated or not, is based on thermal reactors which use uranium extremely wastefully. The programme can only be seen therefore as an interim arrangement although uranium supplies are not likely to constrain even the projected nuclear programme until past 2010 at the earliest. Maximum production capability at the present time according to the IAEA is 44,000 tonnes/year and could increase to 119,000 tonnes/year by 1990 if necessary. World enrichment capacity is also adequate to cope until post 2000. After 2010 or so, however, a steady change to breeder reactors will be necessary. The development of the French liquid metal commercial fast breeder reactor Super PhPnix with inputs from W. Germany, U.K. and elsewhere is an important step towards the ultimate implementation of such a programme.
Nuclear Heat Some 60 per cent of world energy demand is to provide heat for processes of various kinds and simple heating of buildings, Nuclear reactors can be used to provide heat direct without converting it into electricity. In particular the High Temperature Gas Cooled Reactor can provide process heat at temperatures up to 950°C; the West German AVR reactor has operated successfully as has the OECD Dragon Project and the General Atomics reactor in the U.S. If coal is to be converted into synthetic
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liquid fuels economically via the allothermal rather than the much less efficient autothermal process then nuclear process heat will become extremely important. At lower temperatures nuclear district heating stations of the kind proposed by Dr. Leine in Sweden could play an important role in providing ‘clean’ lowgrade heat. The so called ‘SECURE’ (Safe and Environmentally Clean Nuclear Reactor) produces 400 MW of heat at 110°C and 7 atmos. This would be sufficient for a community of 50,000. The design incorporates an intrinsically safe shut down system which floods the reactor core with a boron solution. Such small safe reactors could be important for developing countries.
The Future Nuclear Programme All the projections considered in this paper stress the importance of an expanding nuclear programme. The IIASA clean environmental future programme is based on solar and nuclear energy inputs. Yet the nuclear programme is the most vulnerable and fragile of all the future energy supply systems. Politicians view nuclear power with very mixed feelings. To be short of energy is industrially and therefore politically disastrous. This may happen in W. Germany later this decade because of the slowing down of the nuclear programme. But it was slowed down in W. Germany, the U.S. and elsewhere because public confidence in nuclear power is waning. The concept of nuclear risk in the mind of the general public is badly correlated to actual risk or experience of reactor operation. People react emotionally in an exaggerated way to risk of both low radiation doses and the extremely small risk of major accidents with wide ranging consequences. The problem is to educate the public and politicians alike in such a way that a balanced critical approach to the risk and benefits of nuclear power replaces uninformed emotional response. Only then can politicians develop acceptable energy strategies. If those strategies do not include a nuclear power input, the public and politicians alike must appreciate what the implications would be for economic growth, the environment and the third world, and accept them. On the other hand if nuclear power is to go ahead the industry must demonstrate its competence to operate with a high degree of safety, to learn from its mistakes and to thrive rather than languish in a limbo ofdistrust and inaction. The long lead times in nuclear engineering and the short political horizon do not give confidence that the world wide nuclear power programme will be revived and one must view the forward projection cited here with some scepticism. It would be only prudent to do so; to what extent can ‘insurance’ be
1982 provided therefore capability?
Expansion
against
a shortfall
in nuclear
of the Coal Industry
Coal is seen as the other major. alternative to oil besides nuclear power. A trebling of world coal production is seen as essential if world reliance on the politically vulnerable and in some cases volatile oil supplies is to be reduced. What would such an expansion entail? World wide there is plenty of coal, fortunately not distributed in the same way as oil. In terms of reserves there is an order of magnitude, more coal than oil or gas. Consumers show a marked reluctance to change from oil to coal though there are now signs that the price mechanism is beginning to work. In several industrialized countries coal is less than half the price of oil on a heat to weight basis; if this differential is maintained change to coal is inevitable. What are the implications for a massive increase in trade is world coal supplies. 7 Total international expected to quadruple with the steam coal trade multiplying by 15 times. This requires a massive building of coal carriers, as many as a thousand, over the next 20 years, each costing around $4Om. It also means new ports, terminals and rail facilities in the U.S., S. Africa and Canada. The expansion of the American coal industry alone, according to figures presented at the World Energy Conference in 1980, requires 10,000 miles of slurry pipeline to be built, 8000 railway engines (perhaps coal fired), 16,000 lorries and 300 barges. Also the opening of 700 new pits with a total cost of over $100 billion. With the constraints operating on such an energy investment, a temporary world glut of oil as a result of Saudia Arabian production policies and world recession reducing energy demand in industrialized nations, the necessary impetus to sustain such a problem seems unlikely to be either initiated or maintained. It would seem therefore that the logical change from oil to coal and nuclear power is not likely to be achieved as quickly as the forecasters anticipated. Can renewable resources supply any shortfalls?
Renewable
Resources
The advantages of solar energy and the associated technologies of hydropower, wave power, wind power and biomass are enormously attractive. Of these, hydroelectric power is much the best developed, providing as it does 5 per cent of the world’s energy supply in the form of very cheap electricity (between l/2 and l/10 of the cost of nuclear and fossil fuel generated electricity). With a possible three-fold expansion hydropower will still only provide 5 per cent of world energy demand by
Energy Options 2030. Of the other technologies the best developed is the growing and harvesting of fuel wood which provides 10 per cent of the world’s energy. Any extension of this total supply would be extremely difficult to achieve and there is the added hazard of the ‘greenhouse effect’ whereby the concentration of carbon dioxide in the upper atmosphere steadily increases as a result of burning fossil fuels. The problem is compounded by the gradual cutting down of forests (by 1 per cent per annum) thus reducing the capacity of forests to ‘fix’ carbon dioxide and thus accelerating the carbon dioxide build up. Of course any additional burning of fossil fuel exacerbates the problem which can only be reduced by increased dependence on solar heat and electricity and nuclear power. Unfortunately the technologies of solar-electric conversion, wave power and wind power are not engineeringly developed on a large scale and are expected to be expensive compared with other energy supplies, though this will change over the next 50 years. Biomass or crops for fuel suffers from nature’s prodigal inefficiency in converting solar energy by photosynthesis with only 3 per cent efficiency, though this will be improved by man’s ingenuity. Table 8 gives some recent cost comparison. Table 8. Comparative
energy costs
1980 dollars per barrel of oil equivalent on a thermal basis’ Middle East oil (existing fields) North Sea oil (existing fields) Liquids from oil sands/shale (N. America) Indigenous’coal (U.S.) Imported coal (N.W. Europe) Indigenous coal (N.W. Europe) Nuclear input break-even valuet Liquefied natural gas imports, high Btu (Europe, Japan, U.S.) Synthetic natural gas (high Btu) from indigenous coal (U.S.) Liquids from imported coal (N.W. Europe) Biomass (crops grown for fuel) Solar heat Electricity (based on conventional fossil fuel and nuclear generation) Electricity (based on solar/wind/tidal)
Technical production costs l-3 5-20 15-35 4-8 IO-14 S-20 7-20 25-35 3550 45-65 45-80 + 120+ 60-l 30 12o+t
*These estimates do not include refining, storage, transmission and distribution costs to final consumers. tThe fuel input cost required for fossil-fuelled plants to produce electricity at the same cost as nuclear stations. SPossibly on-site 1990s.
The other major problem associated with renewable resources is our inability to store large quantities of energy either in the form of heat or more particularly as electricity. Conversion to hydrogen is a possibility as it is with nuclear generated electricity and proponents of the hydrogen economy are enthusiastic about this route, with hydrogen being used in fuel cells for transport and so on; but it is a very expensive technology and wasteful in energy terms. The diffuse or dilute
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nature of renewable resources means that large tracts of land or, better, ocean will be necessary to accommodate solar collectors, 25 miles square for a solar power station or 1000 windmills with 90 m blades set 300 m apart to replace a nuclear power station on a 1 square mile site. The use of renewable resources can only come slowly; the biggest use in the short term will be in redesigned solar gain buildings but development of these technologies has a very long time scale. For comparison one should look at nuclear power, which was technically feasible in 1945 and has taken 30 years of enormous expenditure on development to produce today 3 per cent of the world’s energy demand. A figure of 10 per cent for renewables by 2030 can only be seen as fairly optimistic rather than far too low as commentators maintain.
Important Energy Technologies the Future
for
Tertiary recovery of oil, coal and gas must be developed quickly. We can no longer afford to leave 60 per cent of these resources unrecovered under the ground. Better use of fossil fuels through improved fuel technology, fluidized bed combustion systems with environmental clean up, more sophisticated and effective control systems to optimize efficient combustion can all play a part in the next decade, particularly as much dirtier fuels such as lignites, shales, waste materials and so on must be burnt. This also means improved ash handling and disposal. As coal becomes more readily available coal conversion processes to provide gas and synthetic liquid fuels must be improved. The route to methanol looks increasingly sensible. Alcohol fuels for transport, either from coal or biomass are very attractive and do not require much by way of new technology; electric traction will also steadily increase in importance based on new batteries and fuel cells. The further development of more efficient and safer nuclear power reactors burning uranium more efficiently must develop. The breeder reactor and also the high and low temperature heat producing nuclear reactors for process heat and district heating will develop, smaller (250 MW) units will be developed for some developing countries. There will be a steady electrification of society with improvements in the generation efficiency via combined cycles and MHD power generation. Heat pumps will play a very important part in domestic and commercial buildings as well as for heat recovery in industry. Co-generation should improve efficiency of energy usage commercially and industrially. Substantial improvements in efficiency of energy use by better control and instrumentation as well as new processes should achieve savings of around 30 per cent.
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Continuing research into renewable resources, aimed at reducing costs must be maintained and storage systems developed; a strong thrust on solarelectric conversion efficiency and cost could make solar much more attractive, particularly in developing countries. Larger scale solar generation via solar ponds looks particularly attractive in favourable solar climates.
Centrally
Planned Economies
These countries have been to some extent ignored in this analysis. It should never be forgotten that Russia is the largest oil producer in the world and Russia and China rate two and three in world coal production. They are, nevertheless, self contained in that they consume what they produce. The most important question is whether Russia, to fuel its economic growth, will become a net importer of oil in the next two decades. This would put enormous pressure on its reserves of hard currency. It is more likely that arrangements will be made to import Western technology to improve recovery of oil and gas in remote regions of the country and to continue joint projects, as now, on improved electricity generation efficiency via MHD. Otherwise even greater stress will be put on the Middle East oil producers.
Middle East Oil Producers and Others It is clear that world trade in oil must continue at least at present levels. The high price demanded by most producers is having the effect of accelerating the switch away from oil to alternatives, but progress is slow and the alternatives are proving expensive. The enormous revenues of the oil producers (around J270bn) particularly Saudi Arabia ($104bn) are presenting enormous difficulties for the world banking system which cannot recycle the so-called ‘petrodollars’ in any straightforward way. Several of the oil producers have large industrialization programmes which absorb their revenues and ensure that crude oil prices will remain high. If these programmes are successful it also means that they will absorb rather more of their own oil production and that there will be less to export.
The effect that high and ever increasing oil prices have on developing countries without indigenous fuel supplies is giving cause for very considerable alarm.
Developing
Countries
The price developing countries must imported oil is paralysing their economies. constraints which affect these countries the lack of hard currency and lack of The sharp deterioration manpower.
pay for The two most are trained in their
1982 condition is exemplified by Costa Rica. Its biggest export is bananas. In 1973 it had to export 28 kg of bananas to buy one barrel of oil, in 1979 it had to export 420 kg bananas to import one barrel of oil! In searching for solutions to their energy supply problem these countries are often persuaded to buy inappropriate technology. For example large (500 MW) power stations, whether fossil fuel or nuclear fired, present extreme distribution problems. Often imported units, such as solar irrigation pumps, could be manufactured ‘at home’. A search for indigenous fuels has often not been rigorously undertaken; appropriate solar technology, for example drying rice, should be developed. Small hydroelectric schemes down to a few 100 kW are often the best solution and it is here that Western technology can be particularly helpful. Politically an effective trilogue between industrialized countries, oil producers and developing countries must be set up. In the long term it will be necessary to come to terms with nuclear power in developing countries.
Conclusion The best available evidence suggests that world energy demand will continue to grow, perhaps by as much as three times through the next 50 years. This is compounded by population increase and economic growth, particularly in developing countries where growth of 1 per cent in the economy requires energy supply growth of between 1.2 and l-5 per cent. In the mature industrial economies the figure is nearer 0.5 per cent energy growth for 1 per cent economic growth. Despite our best endeavours the world will still be dependent to around 70 per cent on fossil fuels and they will be ‘dirtier’ fuels than we are accustomed to now which means the environment must be protected. Nuclear energy will be an essential input. Renewable resources, although they will ultimately play a dominant role in world energy supply will not have achieved more than 10 per cent input by 2030. If the ‘inertia in the system’ is not overcome there will be real energy shortages within 20 years; there is very little spare capacity in the system and governments seem reluctant to provide insurance cover as it is expensive, although there is the ever present danger of cut backs in oil supply by the politically volatile Middle East producers. It is essential to intrude a note of realism into the indulgent discussions of the anti-nuclear pro-sunshine lobby. It is all too easy to philosophize knowing that
Energy when the switch is turned the power comes on. Fifty per cent of the world’s population do not have a switch, and their future, and ours, depends on exploiting every source of power available to us it as efficiently and wisely as using possible. Bibliography (1)
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Anderer, Hafele et al., Energy in a Finite Wodd, Paths to a Sustainable Future, International Institute for Applied Systems Analysis. Ballinger (1981).
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A. B. Lovins, Soft Energy Paths,
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Energyin (1981).
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