Energy security, transnational politics, and renewable electricity exports in Australia and Southeast Asia

Energy Research & Social Science 49 (2019) 233–240

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Energy Research & Social Science journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/erss

Original research article

Energy security, transnational politics, and renewable electricity exports in Australia and South east Asia

T

Natalie Ralph , Linda Hancock ⁎

ARC (Australian Research Council) Centre of Excellence for Electromaterials Science, and Alfred Deakin Institute for Citizenship and Globalization, Faculty of Arts and Education, Deakin University, 221 Burwood Highway, Melbourne, Victoria, 3125, Australia

ARTICLE INFO

ABSTRACT

Keywords: Electricity Energy security Renewable energy Australia Indonesia ASEAN

This paper seeks to identify potential energy security risks and opportunities of new renewable energy (RE) export projects such as transnational solar generated electricity. An energy security framework/index is sought, to facilitate analysis; and which shows promise for application to other electricity/RE export projects. A review of energy security literature identifies Sovacool and Mukherjee's (2011) [1] comprehensive index as most suitable to apply to a case study project (in its early feasibility stage). The project proposes to export solar-generated electricity from the Pilbara, Western Australia to Java, Indonesia. Additions to the chosen index are proposed, strengthening its scope regarding human security, geopolitical/foreign policy, and materials risks. Analysis identifies key potential risks and opportunities, and gaps in the project’s currently scarce analysis. The project’s primary risks may arise in the regulation and governance dimension. These include Australia’s stalled energy politics; required new business and regulatory frameworks; and the under-developed Australia-Indonesia trade relationship, partly due to historical cultural differences. Questions arise regarding price stability, affordability, access and equity for Indonesians; reliability and resilience risks; and environmental impacts. While potentially positive outcomes may arise for local (Indigenous) Australian communities, more analysis is needed on whether Australian investment in exports should prioritize (or equalize) large-scale electricity grid infrastructure and/or distributed energy systems, when considering impacts on Indonesian communities. Ultimately, the expanded index can inform development of new transnational renewable energy and electricity projects, and improve forward-thinking on risk management.

1. Introduction Internationally, carbon dioxide emissions from fossil fuel energy sources are increasing, contributing to global warming and climate change [2]. Signatory countries to the 2015 ‘Paris Agreement’ within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change committed to reducing emissions levels to limit global warming to below 2 °C above pre-industrial levels [3]. This will be difficult without transitions to low-carbon and renewable energy (RE) generation that can assist in cutting the rate of emissions growth [4,5]. Transitions to RE are becoming more achievable in the context of technological advances in RE and new energy import/export partnerships. Concurrently, there have been increasing examples internationally of electricity grid transnationalization and regionalization1,

including electricity generated from wind, hydro and solar energy [6,7]. A renewables-led low carbon economy will favour countries naturally endowed with RE resource potential, paired with policies supportive of RE research and development. With the likely rise in RE exports internationally, including electricity generated from RE, it is timely to explore issues related to these exports. RE trade will lead to new interdependencies, risks and opportunities [8]. This paper’s primary research questions ask: what are the potential impacts on energy security (and related national security issues) of new or proposed renewable energy exports such as transnational solarelectricity, primarily for the exporting country but also for importing countries? Is there an energy security framework that facilitates a preliminary but broad identification of potential risks, vulnerabilities and opportunities of a case study exploring a RE export project? A

Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (N. Ralph), [email protected] (L. Hancock). 1 Existing or planned electricity regionalization projects include for example, the ASEAN Power Grid, the Southern African Power Pool (12 countries in southern Africa), the Gulf Cooperation Council Interconnection Authority linking six Gulf countries, and Nord Pool (Nordic and Baltic countries, Germany and United Kingdom) [7]. ⁎

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.erss.2018.10.023 Received 1 February 2018; Received in revised form 23 September 2018; Accepted 25 October 2018 2214-6296/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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secondary question asks if this tool could show promise for application to similar energy security research on diverse RE export projects, to account for impacts from increasing use of RE and RE technology advancement? The paper first provides a literature review on energy security assessment frameworks. From a broad search of these frameworks, Sovacool and Mukherjee's [1] energy security index is identified as a comprehensive framework with which to gain insights into energy security risks and opportunities of RE exports. This framework is applied to a case study, a proposed project to export solar-generated electricity from the Pilbara, Western Australia (WA) to Java, Indonesia via a subsea cable; and potentially over time, into the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) power grid. The project is in its prefeasibility phase, with little available research currently undertaken. Applying the framework’s five dimensions of energy security to the case study, enables a preliminary identification of key risks and opportunities. It also reveals gaps in the available information on this case study which can alert relevant actors to weaknesses in the project’s proposal and analysis. This paper proposes additions to the framework which strengthen its scope in relation to human security, geopolitical/foreign policy and emerging materials risks in the development of RE systems. This paper takes an exploratory, qualitative approach, but notes that a quantification of energy security related to the case study and Australia could be undertaken in future research. The claim to provide a conclusive assessment of the project is not made, given the primary objective of identifying a fit for purpose tool and to undertake a preliminary assessment when analysis on this early-stage project is lacking. The Australian perspective is analyzed, but where potential Indonesian energy security issues may arise, these are explored; although Indonesian perspectives are not assessed at this stage. Finally, key areas for future research are identified. Such analysis can reveal issues of relevance to similar proposed projects, and encourage improved risk assessment of new RE export-import projects by exploring the application of a comprehensive, yet expanded energy security framework. The Pilbara-Java case study is important due to its electricity being solely generated by RE and its electricity exports to a country and region that has exponentially increasing energy demands. It has the potential to reduce Australia’s reliance on coal exports, and to support a solar industry within a country experiencing political upheaval, as some political and corporate interests fight to prioritize fossil fuels and dismiss RE. Countries like China are leading the development of RE industries, creating new ‘market power’ [9]. Projects like the case study can assist Australia to ‘stay in the game’ in RE technology development, exports, innovation and employment [9]. The primary document providing information on the project is a prefeasibility study [10] which openly promotes the project; and is detailed yet limited in some information. The study was funded by Pilbara Development Commission [11], Yamatji Marpla Aboriginal Corporation, Basslink, Solar Choice, Ecoenviro and Downer2 [10]. The Pilbara native title body, Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation views the Pilbara-Java project as a potential major employer of Aboriginal people and thus holds a 25 per cent stake in a new company, Pilbara Solar in trust for multiple traditional owner groups. Importantly, some authors3 of the prefeasibility

report (Geoff James, Samantha Mella) are also shareholders in Pilbara Solar [12]. Pilbara Solar aims to develop commercial pilot projects to build export capacity and sell solar energy to mining companies in Pilbara [12,13]. Beyond the prefeasibility study, online articles and commentaries were analyzed. Broader research for this paper included a review of over 50 articles on energy security and energy security frameworks from 2010 to 2018, plus monographs and to a narrower extent, industry reports and intergovernmental organizations’ reports such as from the World Bank. The main journals were Energy, Energy Policy, Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Energy Research & Social Science, Ecological Economics, and Energy Strategy Reviews. 2. Literature review: energy security and assessment frameworks There is no consensus on the definition or dimensions of energy security [14–19]. Energy security is polysemic, multidimensional, dynamic and contextualized [15,17]. This results in varied energy security priorities and policies within and across countries [20,21]. Many studies apply quantification, creating indicators/metrics to measure energy security risks and resilience capacity [22,23]. There is extensive variation in indicators and how composite indices are framed and constructed [20,24]. This leads to hidden underlying assumptions [15] and challenges in for example, identifying trade-offs between energy security dimensions, and energy sources and technologies [20]. ‘Vital energy systems’ and their vulnerabilities are prioritized for their characteristics, but are also political constructs defined by social/ political actors manoeuvring to influence national politics on energy security [21,25]. Comprehensive, multidimensional energy security indices can help counter underlying assumptions or political agendas by encouraging attention to a wider range of risks, opportunities and energy sources. Indices that acknowledge energy sources and technologies likely to expand in application (e.g. solar electricity, hydrogen), and include their exports/imports, can encourage flexibility for temporal changes, future energy systems and long-term policy [19,20]. Detractors of utilising numerous indicators/metrics argue they are overly data-intensive for generic quantitative evaluations in current or future energy systems [26]. For the purpose of this paper’s preliminary identification of risks and opportunities of a case study, comprehensiveness is valuable in guiding the research. To assess this paper’s case study, an energy security index provided by Sovacool and Mukherjee's [1] is proposed. This index is more comprehensive across dimensions, sectors and technologies than most indices, and incorporates 320 simple and 52 complex indicators/metrics, some of which relate to electricity imports/exports and various RE technologies including solar. While this paper does not apply the indicators/metrics for measuring energy security in Australia or the case study, they are a valuable guide for identifying risks and opportunities related to RE and electricity exports. Of note, an exploration of energy security frameworks specifically addressing the security of either electricity systems (e.g. [27–29]) or renewable energy systems (e.g. [8,26,30]) did not identify a more suitable framework for assessing the case study. They tend to lack comprehensiveness across energy security dimensions, RE technologies, or sectors. Sovacool and Mukherjee's [1] framework does have weaknesses and additions are proposed. Under Social Sustainability, human security risks related to human rights, individual security and sustainable development are rarely incorporated in frameworks. They include for example, growing community impacts from large RE installations, or mining for the materials required for RE technologies (e.g. ‘critical materials’ such as lithium for batteries storage [31,32]). Other risks

2 Pilbara Development Commission is a Pilbara-based economic development agency. Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation (YMAC) is the native title representative body for the Traditional Owners of the Pilbara, Murchison and Gascoyne regions of WA. Basslink Interconnector provides energy between Tasmania and Australia across the Bass Strait. It was the longest HVDC cable of its type worldwide when constructed. Ecoenviro is an environmental equipment company in WA. Solar Choice, an Australian solar power installations company. The Australian/New Zealand company, Downer provides energy, mining and transport services and infrastructure. 3 Samantha Mella is a project leader, consultant and focuses on communications in science and technology. Dr Geoff James is a consultant in clean energy, works with Reposit Power commercializing residential energy storage, and is a

(footnote continued) Research Principal for Institute for Sustainable Futures. Kylie Chalmers is a native title lawyer, and works with Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation [10]. 234

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Table 1 Sovacool and Mukherjee's [1] energy security index, with proposed additions. Adapted from Sovacool and Mukherjee's [1]. Dimension

Underlying values

Components

Availability

Self sufficiency, resource availability, security of supply, independence, imports, variety, balance, disparity Include focus on security of supply and/or domestic production of ‘critical materials’ for RE technologies e.g. lithium, cobalt

Affordability

Cost, stability, predictability, equity, justice, reducing energy poverty

Technology Development and Efficiency

Investment, employment, technology development and diffusion, energy efficiency, stockholding, safety and quality

Environmental and Social Sustainability

Stewardship, aesthetics, natural habitat conservation, water quality and availability, human health, climate change mitigation, climate change adaptation. Social sustainability, human rights, human (individual) security, Sustainable Development, positive outcomes for communities

Regulation and Governance

Transparency, accountability, legitimacy, integrity, stability, resource curse, geopolitics, free trade, competition, profitability, interconnectedness, security of demand, exports Foreign policy, international relations, international treaties

-Security of Supply and Production -Dependency -Diversification -Price Stability -Access and Equity -Decentralization -Affordability -Innovation and Research -Safety and Reliability -Resilience -Efficiency and Energy Intensity -Investment and Employment -Land Use -Water -Climate Change -Pollution -Human Security -Governance -Trade and Regional Interconnectivity -Competition and markets -Knowledge and Access to Information - Geopolitics/ foreign policy

include community resettlement plans, and the need for community engagement and community development [33]. Security of supply and production (e.g. dependency risks) should also merge a focus on ‘critical materials’ in a context of increasing development of RE technologies [8,30]. Under Regulation and Governance, a geopolitics/foreign policy component is proposed. Analyses often assess exporting countries’ stability, governance and corruption risks but sparse analysis is applied to geopolitical risks from dynamic international relations, impacts of treaties (e.g. on climate change) and foreign policies which influence energy relations between importer/exporter countries (noteworthy exceptions are [8,30]). These additions are in bold in Table 1.

3.2. Regional ASEAN energy and electricity demand In addition to Indonesia’s dramatically increasing demand for energy and electricity, there is soaring demand from other ASEAN members. Indonesia and nine other countries (Brunei, Cambodia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam) comprise the ASEAN Economic Community; comprising a market of US $2.6 trillion and 622 million people [40]. The International Energy Agency (IEA) estimates that ASEAN countries could potentially need to increase capacity from 240 G W of electricity in 2016, to 565 G W in 2040 [41]. Indonesia is the highest population and largest energy consumer in the ASEAN comprising 36 per cent of ASEAN energy demand ([35], 1421). ASEAN has abundant RE potential. However between 2015–2040, ASEAN primary energy demand will increase 65 per cent, with 79 per cent of this in 2040 generated from fossil fuels ([35], 1422). As a secondary energy source, electricity generation currently uses 52 per cent of primary energy ([35], 1423). The ASEAN seeks to develop multilateral electricity trade via the ASEAN Power Grid (APG) to achieve energy security and sustainability, applying the ASEAN Plan of Action for Energy Cooperation 2016-2025. This includes developing the APG and a RE component of 23 per cent by 2025 ([42,43], 25). Ahmed et al. [35] argue that ASEAN countries’ RE targets in electricity generation are inadequate compared to rising electricity demand. Indonesia supports the APG’s development. However, due to policy, regulatory and fiscal obstacles, progress is slow “and the outlook for developing an integrated regional power market in ASEAN does not appear to be promising” ([10,44,51,52). ASEAN RE is limited by the geographical distribution of sources, high capital investment costs, lack of financial ability, different levels of economic development, and lowlevel knowledge transfer ([35], 1421–1422).

3. The case study: electricity exports to Indonesia, and potentially the ASEAN 3.1. Indonesia’s energy and electricity demand Indonesia, Australia’s closest neighbor, is predicted to become the world’s fourth largest economy by 2050 [34]. The country has large resources of natural gas, coal and RE (geothermal, hydro, biomass and wind power) ([35], 1422). It is a significant exporter of coal now and into the future. By 2040, Indonesia is projected to export 28 percent (and Australia 37 percent) of global coal exports ([36], 74). Indonesia’s domestic energy generating capacity per capita is low (around 30 GW for 260 million people). In 2015, Indonesia announced plans to build by 2019, 35 GW of additional electricity generation capacity but progress is slower than hoped [37]. This is to be powered mostly by Indonesian coal, but also 25 per cent by renewables and 25 per cent gas-fired generation [38,39]. Indonesia is facing multiple challenges including regional devolution of some key land-use policies and management of land-use conflicts. Indonesia has indicated it is open to innovative proposals from national and foreign businesses for increasing its electricity capacity. By 2025, Indonesia aims for a total of 80.5 GW of new capacity with 14.4 GW of RE. Importing renewably-generated electricity could assist in reaching targets [10,37].

3.3. The proposed Pilbara-Java solar electricity project In terms of supply suitable for solar generation of electricity, 235

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Western Australia has an average 11 daylight hours and high solar radiation levels [11]. A prefeasibility study was conducted for the Pilbara Development Commission, WA to assess the feasibility of a land and undersea cable between Pilbara/Kimberley in northern WA and Java in Indonesia for exporting solar-generated electricity [10]. The PilbaraJava project will include a $9.5 billion, 1500 km subsea cable and three 1 GW solar installations [45]. Planned in four phases, the total investment is estimated at AU$20 billion, with the majority spent within Australia “comparable to such major national projects as North West Shelf Gas” ([10], 80). At the time of writing, the ‘AREH’ consortium has added 6 GW of wind and solar between Broom and Port Hedland, to the Pilbara 3 GW project, to create an ‘Asian Renewable Energy Hub’ generating 33 TWh of wind/solar a year, and where the domestic component will target large energy users in the Pilbara currently reliant on gas and diesel. The AREH consortium includes global wind turbine manufacturer Vestas, Australia’s CWP Renewables, and Intercontinental Energy [46]. For the purpose of this analysis, the research primarily focuses on the 3 GW solar Pilbara-Java project.

case study appear positive, particularly with energy storage capacity built. 4.2. Dimension: affordability Looking at the supply cost side of the Pilbara-Java project, the prefeasibility study states the project is feasible given the decline in solar PV, storage and HVDC costs. “Solar is already at least as cheap as coal in Germany, Australia, the U.S., Spain and Italy. The levelized cost of electricity from solar is set to drop another 66% by 2040” [54]. Lazard’s [91] Levelized Cost of Energy Analysis shows the levelized cost of electricity from utility scale solar (US$50) and wind (US$45) is now less than for coal (US$102). The levelized cost of delivering Pilbara solar energy to Java is estimated at “18-25 c/kWh (Australian) over its lifecycle, including all equipment at end of life” ([10], 6). Costings include a 40 per cent remote mark-up on construction costs to account for the need to build local solar supply chains and expertise in WA ([10], 7). To enhance the levelized cost of electricity, large-scale energy storage should be built, and during construction, the first 200 MW of the 3 G W could earn income from Renewable Energy Certificates and Power Purchase Agreements agreed with the Pilbara-based mining industry which currently has 1400 GW of installed off-grid gas and diesel capacity ([10], 7 [55]). From the Indonesian demand side, the project was assessed as “competitive in the Indonesian market in the near future” under a solar feed-in tariff in Java of 19.3 c/kWh ([10], 6). It is unclear as to how the project will ensure price stability, or Indonesians’ energy access and equity. Further, it may be that some communities are better suited to off-grid Distributed Energy Systems (DES). DES can complement large-scale grids, boosting system reliability with lower costs ([56], 229–42). Smaller, nimble and potentially cheaper DES4 provide electricity, heating and/or cooling, and energy for cooking (replacing kerosene) or reducing diesel use [57]. DES can be cheaper and quicker to build, scalable to meet any demand, assist energy efficiency, security of supply, use of intermittent renewables, have fewer regulatory constraints, can accommodate diverse needs and contexts and provide smaller targets for (terror) attack ([56] 229-242 [57]). DES projects still pose ethical risks such as environmental, social and conflict-causing impacts across their supply chains from mining, production and waste [33,56]. The types of technology and the decisions on which technologies are promoted, should be thought through with a priority on community engagement and assessing end-user needs, affordability, access and equity [58,59]. The Australia-Indonesia Centre’s Energy Cluster has worked closely with Indonesian energy stakeholders to assess large-scale energy projects such as a potential Indonesia-Australia RE Super Grid alongside multiple DES projects [60,61]. In sum, questions remain regarding the Pilbara-Java project’s ability to ensure price stability, affordability, access and equity for Indonesians, since for example, although much of Indonesia’s population is located in Java, many without electricity are on remote islands5. The project also requires future Indonesian feed-in tariffs.

4. Theoretical analysis of empirical material 4.1. Dimension: availability The IEA estimated that up to 30 TW of large-scale solar photovoltaic (PV) installations deployed in the north-west of Western Australia could produce 49,000 TW h of electricity annually [47,48]. The Pilbara region’s solar energy is well suited to current solar PV technology. The prefeasibility study assessed a 3 GW pilot project “with a single bipole HVDC link, using the latest existing technology, and enough utility scale solar PV generation to justify capacity” ([10], 6). Subsequently, the enlarged 9 GW Pilbara-Java project will combine solar and wind, and potentially build battery storage and hydrogen facilities [46]. The study notes that the “proposed interconnector would be the longest and deepest to date and would traverse complex subsea terrain. The GWscale solar farms would be larger than any presently existing”, but similar in ambitions to projects in North Asia, China, South America, Europe, Africa and Iceland ([10], 7). The study argues building a gigawatt scale PV solar plant and deploying High Voltage Direct Current (HVDC) technology “is technically feasible” ([10], 6 [49]). Falling solar energy costs mean the business case may be feasible in five to 10 years ([10], 6 [50]). With approximately fifty percent of Indonesia’s 260 million people in Java, and seventy-seven percent of electricity consumed in the Java-Bali region, additional solar generated electricity from Pilbara would key into high demand and reduce reliance on coalgenerated electricity ([51], 17, 33). Risks include variable electricity from RE which increases difficulties in balancing supply and demand. In the Pilbara-Java project, development of methodologies for predicting electricity production and demand will be important along with energy storage capacity [8]. The prefeasibility study notes that storage will be preferable [10] and the expanded 6 GW plan could include batteries and hydrogen facilities [46]. Security drivers of RE deployment include environmental sustainability, but also diversification of energy sources and reduced dependency [52,53]. Australia’s provision of electricity to Indonesia could support Indonesia’s geographical and supplier diversity of (RE) power. Diversity is important to cope with disruptions. For both countries overtime, a balance between RE sources, suppliers and their geographical location will be key [8]. Further, Australia is a stable political system and society, enhancing supply security for Indonesia. Dependency risks regarding security of supply or domestic production by foreign companies of ‘critical materials’ for RE technologies are worth considering in Australia, to support technology manufacturing and avoid international tensions. Will Western Australia’s new RE industry manufacture RE technologies that require critical materials, and will R&D aim at substitutes and recycling? [8,30]. Overall, the outlook on Availability components of energy security related to the

4.3. Dimension: technology development and efficiency The merits of new, competing RE technologies and proposed projects need to be assessed within a specified timeframe according to criteria including cost, availability and scale. For example, whether R& D and investment funds should be applied to large projects or DES research and construction. When analyzing energy ‘megaprojects’ 4 DES encompass generation (such as solar, wind, fuel cell, biomass), storage (e.g. batteries, hydrogen, thermal) and energy monitoring and control (e.g. microgrids, demand-response, energy conservation measures, and virtual power plants) [57]. 5 Indonesia is an archipelago state with five main islands, two major archipelagos and about 17,000 minor islands [51].

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including RE initiatives such as large solar infrastructure, Sovacool and Cooper ([56], 207–45) found that “Bigger is Blunder”. Megaprojects can inherently fail in some aspect of energy security whether environmental, social, economic or technological due to their scale and tradeoffs to cope with competing stakeholder interests. The Pilbara-Java project could however, build Australian innovation, investment, solar resources supply, and expertise in RE sourced energy for export. It can bring export income and leadership on a solar transition for the Pilbara region by reducing mining industry diesel consumption and qualifying for large-scale RE generation certificates. The latter are a mechanism to encourage Australian large-scale RE production, providing financial incentives via certificates which have a market value of over AU$80/MWh ([10], 7 [62,63]). The project is estimated to provide 766 temporary jobs during construction and an additional maintenance workforce of 2,019 ([10], 80). Subject to negotiations, partnerships with Indigenous Traditional Owners could provide Aboriginal communities with income from exports and potentially, Power Purchase Agreements with local industry ([10], 8). To summarise, the project faces various uncertainties and it will be economically and technically necessary for a local cost-competitive solar industry with R&D, scale, experience and investment in infrastructure to be established initially ([10], 28). The prefeasibility study found that an “interconnection with the east-coast market [of Australia] is unlikely to be commercially viable as a standalone proposition” ([10], 31). The project will require private sector investment, and has no direct investment from the WA Government [64]. However, in late 2017, Pilbara Solar, part owned by the Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation, applied to the Northern Australian Infrastructure Facility for development funding for the project from the Australian Government [12]. Of note, Indonesian economic opportunities could emerge at the least, from production of the subsea cable and its maintenance ([10], 7). Further analysis is required on the project’s reliability aspects such as grid stability, power quality or technical safety [30], and its systemic resilience capacity against threats such as terrorism and natural disasters [23]. For example, additional redundant transmission capacity might be built.

regarding such impacts. Internationally, there are increasing reports of RE projects negatively impacting on communities, notably including land use and resettlement issues, and poor implementation of the international standard of free, prior and informed consent [71]. The desire of communities to connect to electricity power grids is rarely questioned, even for remote communities. Cultural, environmental, socio-political transformations, increased central government control over remote communities, and community disempowerment can follow uniform large-scale electrification roll-outs ([59,72,73], 573–574). Many of Indonesia’s thousands of islands are without electricity. The Indonesian Government is targeting 90 per cent electricity coverage by 2020 [74]. Attention to socio-political village structure, equity and lifestyle transformations is needed. Tools to understand each community’s aspirations for electricity provision, levels and management systems could empower communities ([59], 219, citing Suraya Afiff). Opportunities should be sought to leapfrog destructive outcomes from large-scale grid electrification (e.g using DES, RE and community consultation) ([59], 220, citing [72]), while avoiding the “local trap”, assuming localized approaches are preeminent for sustainability [75]. Land access is important for solar development in Australia and there are currently 19 Native Title claims and determinations in the Pilbara. Partnerships and socio-economic benefits for Traditional Owners will be essential [10,13] to avoid poor community engagement practice and conflict [76]. The Yamatji Marlpa Aboriginal Corporation promotes the Pilbara-Java project, and is part owner in the new company, Pilbara Solar (see above) [12,13]. There is a proposal for Pilbara Solar to enter an agreement with Pilbara Minerals greenfields mine to provide a hybrid solar power plant. Summarising, the human security aspects of the project appear potentially positive in Australia, but far greater attention is needed on specific environmental sustainability risks which could be significant, and continual community engagement in Indonesia to evaluate and compare risks and benefits from large-scale electricity infrastructure versus DES. 4.5. Dimension: regulation and governance 4.5.1. National level energy governance and politics Australia’s development of renewable technologies has been constrained by the dominance of the fossil fuel lobby led by the Minerals Council of Australia, comparatively low global fossil fuel prices [95] and Australian fossil fuel subsidies (estimated at $1.8 billion per year) ([97], citing the IEEFA). A stalemate on national government energy policy has meant that Australia remains highly reliant on coal-fired electricity [94]. Political ‘energy wars’ between major political parties have prevented credible climate change policy emerging and have stalled the full potential of renewables investment [93,96,98]. A lack of transparency, accountability and legitimacy on energy policy by the current government was evident in the backroom political battles over the proposed National Energy Guarantee (now officially withdrawn by new Prime Minister Scott Morrison) which was partly to blame for the ousting of Prime Minister Turnbull in August 2018. In this hostile policy environment with a policy vacuum as of September 2018 at the time of writing, rising electricity and gas prices may have spurred domestic and business take-up of RE and its development as a viable industry, but policy uncertainty has also dampened RE investment. Indonesia is a net exporter of coal globally (the largest globally in 2015), and the largest exporter of gas and liquid biofuels regionally, but the IEA identifies Indonesia’s energy subsidies as one of the most challenging issues for Indonesian politics across all policy sectors ([51], 29). Institutional capacity and energy policy integration and coordination and infrastructure management are seen as inefficient ([51], 10). Indonesia has only recently reformed energy policy: the 2007 Law on Energy, 2009 Law on Electricity, 2009 Law on Mineral and Coal Mining, and 2014 National Energy Policy (NEP) ([51], 9). Under the NEP, “[u]se of gas is to more than double, use of coal is to more than triple, and renewables are to grow more than eleven-fold by 2025” from

4.4. Dimension: environmental and social sustainability The Pilbara-Java project could aid in increasing RE in Indonesia’s energy mix, enhancing Environmental Sustainability (a challenge considering balancing Indonesia’s rising energy demand and carbon abatement obligations ([51], 9)). Australia’s per capita emissions (related to coal dependent electricity energy) are among the highest globally [65]. Establishing solar electricity exports could help Australia meet its Paris Agreement commitment to reduce emissions to 26–28 per cent below 2005 levels by 2030 [66]. There is little available research on specific environmental impacts from the Pilbara-Java project apart from the environmental impact statement required under planning regulations. Environmental analysis would benefit from assessment of local impacts of infrastructure building, including comparison with for example, construction of DES. As discussed, for remote communities, smaller DES may be better environmentally. Detailed lifecycle assessments for the Pilbara-Java project versus the lifecycle of key DES for Java/Indonesia and WA would be valuable tools for analysis. DES and their components, and transfer of related innovation and learning, could nevertheless be prioritized in Australian RE exports [56,67,68]. Technology transfer between countries is important, particularly between developed and developing countries, to facilitate low-carbon transitions [69,31]. 4.4.1. Human security Community impacts from large RE installations and mining for the materials essential to RE technology can be significant, and often threaten Indigenous sovereignty [31–33,70]. The types of technology prioritized, and their supply chain impacts, need to be thought through 237

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the current low base where hydro, wind and solar are 0.5 per cent of production; and where wind power generation began in 2009 and solar in 2010 ([51], 20, 25). Indonesia undertook the ambitious stretch target of 23 percent renewables by 2025, subsequently reduced to 19.6 per cent ([10], 30). In a complex and changing policy environment, “Indonesia has strong renewable energy targets but low implementation” ([10], 36). While the NEP aspires to energy independence [51], importing Pilbara solar electricity could become attractive with its contribution to the RE transition.

and Australia reflect an historical lack of mutual understanding and affinity between two culturally divergent countries [88]. More recently, global affairs have led to stronger Indonesian-Australian cooperation including on economic and counter-terrorism issues, despite occasional diplomatic clashes [89]. Both countries have hedged against ‘great power’ rivalry in Asia, and Indonesia has supported Australia’s inclusion in the East Asia Summit and Australia’s diplomacy through the ASEAN [88]. In March 2018, the ASEAN-Australia Special Summit was the first Australian hosted Summit with ASEAN leaders in Australia, reflecting deepening relations [90]. In sum, joint import-export RE projects have strong potential to further strengthen understanding, trust and cooperation to mutual benefit. The inclusion of significant RE technology partnerships can support the relationship into the future.

4.5.2. Trade and regional interconnectivity Taking a broad perspective on demand security, growing international pressures to retire fossil fuel energy over coming decades suggest fossil fuel exporters like Australia should consider diversifying exports via RE trade ([77], 161). While coal demand is rising in developing economies [78], the IEA has argued that investment in new coal power internationally has peaked and will go into decline [79]. In terms of Indonesian-Australian trade and investment relations, proponents of the Pilbara-Java project argue the major challenge is the under-developed Australia-Indonesia trade relationship and the need for new business models and regulatory frameworks to ensure success [49]. Benefits for Indonesia must be attractive, as economic self-reliance is a priority for Indonesia and an Australia-Indonesia electricity interconnection will need special regulatory arrangements ([10], 105). Historically, Indonesia has distrusted Australian neo-liberal economic policies; preferring self-sufficiency. Australia has been weary of Indonesia’s protectionist political climate. Economic cooperation is limited by trade, technical and foreign direct investment regulations and restrictions, and barriers to the movement of people [38,39]. Indonesia has however, expanded economic relations with Australia via the ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (negotiations in progress) and the two countries are negotiating an Indonesia-Australia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement [38,80,81].

5. Future research The potential for the Pilbara-Java project to provide RE beyond Indonesia to other ASEAN countries and its potential links to the APG can be further researched, along with the geopolitical implications across Australia, ASEAN and wider Asia including China. A more detailed focus on the Indonesian perspective, potentially undertaking empirical research, could also be undertaken. This paper is an initial assessment of the Pilbara case study, and a means of assessing the usefulness of the expanded Sovacool and Mukherjee [1] index. Further research could apply this index’ indicators/metrics to national energy security assessments which include potential RE export projects. Changes or additions to the indicators/metrics could be assessed, to address new RE technologies as well as their import/export, and to reveal any interdependencies or tradeoffs between them. For example, indicators could be added related to hydrogen exports generated by various RE sources. New indicators/metrics could be added to the two proposed new components. 6. Conclusion

4.5.3. Geopolitics/foreign policy Due to the cross-border nature of electricity transnationalization, it is important to include a geopolitical dimension, which considers foreign policy impacts [8,30,82,83]. There is recent commentary on foreign policy analysis related to electricity regionalization and the threat from countries wielding electricity to achieve either cooperative or coercive foreign policy goals [7,82–86]. In parallel, Hancock and Vivoda [87] call for a broader understanding of International Political Economy (IPE) issues surrounding electricity regionalization; IPE research is dominated by analysis of oil and the ‘resource curse’. On electricity regionalization, Moore ([7], 25–26) argues that countries can face greater difficulties without parallel political integration and mutual interdependence. Without these, there are fewer disincentives to cut off supply during political disputes, and dependence of one country on another’s electricity supply can lead to coercive foreign policy. The export of electricity is more likely if based on a sound political foundation ([7], 26). Assessing when and how foreign policy goals, dynamic international relations and other political factors influence electricity cooperation strengthens early risk management and cost-benefit analysis of a potential project, its design and implementation ([82], 541). Fischhendler, Herman and Anderman ([82], 541) recommend that modelling geopolitical uncertainties and their impacts on cross-border electricity grids “requires an estimation of the frequency, magnitude and costs of likely deliberate energy disruptions in the event of geopolitical adverse developments”. While the authors focused on the highly volatile region of Israel and its neighbors, this approach can strengthen risk management in other regions. The Australia-Indonesia relationship has been volatile in the past, with cultural, social and political differences sometimes hampering cooperation. Arguably, some interests in Indonesia may not wish to be (even partially) reliant on Australian electricity generation. Indonesia

From a review of energy security frameworks, Sovacool and Mukherjee's [1] energy security index was identified as a comprehensive framework to gain preliminary insights into energy security risks and opportunities of a proposed RE export project. This project proposes to export solar-generated electricity from the Pilbara, Western Australia to Java, Indonesia. Applying Sovacool and Mukherjee’s five dimensions (Availability, Affordability, Technology development and Efficiency, Environmental and Social Sustainability, and Regulation and Governance) revealed key risks and opportunities, and gaps in the available information on this case study which alerts relevant actors to potential weaknesses in the project’s proposal and analysis. This paper also proposed additions to the index which strengthened its scope relating to human security, geopolitical/foreign policy, and emerging materials risks in the development of RE systems. The expanded index can be used to inform development of other new transnational renewable energy and electricity projects, in line with increasing use of RE and RE technology advancement. It can assist the prioritization of technologies, and improved forward-thinking on risk management. The risks and opportunities identified for the Pilbara-Java project illustrate that the likely key risks arise in the Regulation and Governance dimension. Risks include Australia’s stalled energy politics and governance context, and possibly, Indonesian sudden policy shifts and RE policy implementation. In the trade, and geopolitics/foreign policy domains, a major challenge is the Australia-Indonesia underdeveloped trade relationship and the need for new business models and regulatory frameworks. Despite this, joint import-export RE projects between Australia and Indonesia have strong potential to further strengthen understanding, trust and cooperation to mutual benefit. Positive assessment is indicated in the Availability dimension, particularly with energy storage capacity. The Affordability dimension raises questions on the Pilbara-Java project’s ability to ensure price stability, 238

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affordability, access and equity for Indonesians. The project also potentially relies on Indonesian feed-in tariffs. In the Technology Development and Efficiency dimension, the project could enhance Australian innovation, investment and expertise for RE use domestically and for export. More analysis on reliability and resilience is called for. In the Environmental and Social Sustainability dimension, further information on the specific environmental impacts is needed. The human security elements of the project are potentially positive for Australia. Yet, more analysis would be beneficial on whether Australian investment in exports should prioritize (or equalize) large-scale electricity grid infrastructure or distributed energy systems, and how each will impact on Indonesian communities. Future research could take a detailed focus on Indonesian community perspectives.

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