- Email: [email protected]
Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas
C H A P T E R
25 Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible Robert W.E. Clarkb, John Humphreysa, b a
Institute of Marine Sciences, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, United Kingdom; b Southern Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority, Poole, United Kingdom
Abstract In 2018 56% of English inshore waters (to 6 nm baselines) are within a Marine Protected Area (MPA). In these coastal waters commercial fishing is extensive and widespread and, in many instances, predates the designation of the MPAs. MPA management in English MPAs has occurred post designation. In English MPAs certain fishing activities are now restricted. The scope and complexity of the MPA regulation and compliance task in English inshore waters is, as a consequence, significant. Enforcement alone cannot provide protection to English MPAs, but is a necessary part of a coherent compliance programme, in particular where there are powerful economic incentives for non-compliance. Effective compliance necessitates effective systems, process and resources as well as a holistic strategy which genuinely integrates the economic factors in the planning process so as to significantly reduce or wherever possible reverse (counter) the incentives to non-compliance. Community engagement and participation in compliance is essential. This chapter reviews the current compliance and enforcement components of management of inshore fisheries in MPAs in England and concludes that there are opportunities for further integration of compliance management into MPA management, and that this shift is essential if the UK is to achieve its ambition of a well-managed network of MPAs.
Keywords: Blue Belt; Compliance; Enforcement; Fisheries; IFCA; Marine Protected Area.
Marine Protected Areas https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-102698-4.00025-3
489
Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
490
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
Introduction Fisheries enforcement is an essential component in the management of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) (Causey, 1995). Despite this, compliance monitoring and enforcement considerations are relatively neglected in the study of fishery management (Coelho et al., 2008) and receive less attention and research than the scientific and regulatory components of management. To a lesser or greater extent this can be ascribed to the primary preoccupation of governments and other agents in reaching the various national and international targets for the designation of MPAs, as a response to ecological and scientific problems in our seas. Furthermore, there is a general separation amongst practitioners of the theory and practice of compliance management from that of biological conservation disciplines associated with MPA management. Where an area of sea is designated as an MPA attention is drawn to the regulation of activities within such sites, but generally speaking aspects of compliance and enforcement are considered only after designation. For practical purposes compliance and enforcement are an integral aspect of MPA management. The study of fisheries compliance and enforcement in MPAs is an important area of research because i) investment in enforcement efforts provides the greatest return on maintaining the benefits of the reserve to the fishery (Byers and Noonburg, 2007), ii) MPAs often fail to reach their full potential as a consequence of factors such as illegal harvesting (Edgar et al., 2014) and iii) properly enforced MPAs can promote recovery of local stocks (Maliao et al., 2004). Even strongly enforced fishery management may be insufficient if the short-term economic or social incentives for fishers’ favour increased exploitation (Costello et al., 2008), but enforcement in so far as it provides a disincentive for non-compliance is an important route to realising the benefits of an MPA. This chapter describes the English system of fisheries enforcement in MPAs. It explores the implications for compliance in the context of the development of a network of English coastal MPAs and critically analyses the systems for enforcing MPAs in this region. Aspects of the theory of compliance are applied, in the English inshore context, to the challenge of achieving compliance with the objectives of MPAs. As part of this analysis the systems, structures and processes to deliver compliance and enforcement in English MPAs are considered.
Inshore MPAs in England There are three main types of MPA in England, these are Marine Conservation Zones (MCZs), Special Protection Areas (SPAs), and Special Areas of Conservation (SAC). In 2019 17.4% of UK waters and 56% of English inshore waters within 6 nm of the coast lie within an MPA. There are 38 Marine Conservation Zones, 39 Special Areas of Conservation and 44 Special Protected Areas (AIFCA, 2019a). Since the introduction of the Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009, the number, extent and management of both new and pre-existing MPAs in English coastal waters have risen sharply. This can be attributed to: the UK’s wider international commitments to introduce
Management in MPAs
491
a network of MPAs; the introduction of a new form of MPA the MCZ; the UK Governments ‘revised approach to the management of commercial fisheries in European Marine Sites’ (Defra, 2012; Clark et al., 2017); and the UK Government’s ongoing commitment to create a ‘Blue Belt’ of protection around the UK coastline (The Conservative Party, 2015). From a governance perspective, the development of the MPA network in England’s inshore waters can be characterised as exclusively top-down with regards to the designation of SPAs and SACs and ‘blended’ top-down and bottom up approaches in MCZs (Jones, 2012). It is argued that a degree of top-down government control is required if strategic wider-scale and longer-term MPA objectives are to be met (Jones and Burgess, 2005) because without such an approach it is unlikely that the UK would have met its commitment to an ecologically coherent network of MPAs according to agreed timescales. Such a process of site location in the absence of defined management at the point of designation, has implications for management of ongoing activities, in particular for fisheries; which in England are widespread and significant. In 2017, the UK fishing fleet was made up of 6,148 registered vessels. Just under 80% of the UK fleet are 10 m and under vessels (u-10 m). There are some 3,078 registered fishing vessels registered to ports in England. Only 327 of these vessels are currently being tracked using Vessel Monitoring Systems (in line with European Union (EU) legislation requirements for vessels over 12 m in length). England has the largest number of u-10 m fishing vessels n ¼ 2,512 (Ares and White, 2018). Consequently, inshore areas are busy places for commercial fishing and data on the patterns and use of coastal fishing grounds, other than in qualitative form, is not generally available and the spatial extent of fishing activity inshore and the intensity of activity is less well developed than in the offshore area occupied mainly by larger vessels (Breen et al., 2015).
Management in MPAs In England the management regimes for fisheries in MPAs, is developed post designation and follows an assessment of the compatibility of fishing activities with the conservation objectives of the MPA. Such an ‘MPA assessment’ is essentially a risk assessment which looks at the vulnerability of features for which a site is designated and the impact of fishing activity on these features. Site-level assessments are carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of Article 6(3) of the EU Habitats Directive for European Marine Sites (EMS: a collective term for marine SPAs and SACs) and the requirements of section 126 of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 for MCZs. For EMSs the assessments will determine whether, in light of the site’s conservation objectives, fishing activities are having an adverse effect on the integrity of the site (MMO, 2016). If the MPA assessment finds that a method of commercial fishing activity may have a significant effect, the next step is to identify how to avoid or mitigate the impacts. It is the UK’s current policy that management of fishing activity within an MPA will be only applied to the affected area of an MPA, rather than the entire site, if the evidence is available (Defra, 2012). Not all MPA sites need permanent management measures for fishing activity.
492
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
If the assessment finds that the fishing activity does not have a significant impact on the MPA features, management measures will not be implemented. However, to ensure any changes in site activities are captured, the site may be monitored. It can therefore be seen that the management of fishing in MPAs is complex as different spatial and temporal management regimes can exist within single MPAs. This complexity requires systems, structures and processes available to managers to respond to needs that differ across time and space and affect different stakeholders at different times within an MPA. As a consequence of this approach most MPAs (>99% by area) in UK waters allow for selected fishing activities to continue but damaging activities are being restricted.
The responsibility for management of inshore MPAs in England In England, The Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 sets the roles and responsibilities of fisheries regulators in MPAs. Regulators have duties to develop management and implement compliance measures including enforcement. Responsibility for fisheries enforcement is divided between the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) with a national role, and ten Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities (IFCAs) with regional responsibilities (Fig. 25.1). Overall responsibility for the management of fisheries management in MPAs rests
FIG. 25.1
MPAs which fall within (or partially within) the IFCA Districts.
Examples of management in English inshore MPAs
493
with the national government’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). Management measures to reduce the impact of fishing activities within MPAs in the inshore (0e12 nm) are introduced through byelaws. This form of legislation sets out the affected area within an MPA and the fishing activity restrictions. All permanent byelaws are subject to public consultation before they are introduced.
Regulation to manage MPAs IFCAs have a wide range of powers available to them to manage MPAs and consideration should be given to both voluntary and legislative measures. Using powers granted by the Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009, IFCA byelaws, relevant to MPAs may regulate fishing activity, by way of: a) prohibiting or restricting the exploitation of sea fisheries resources in specified areas or periods or limiting the amount of resources that may be exploited or the amount of time a person or vessel may spend exploiting fisheries resources in a specified period. b) prohibiting or restricting the exploitation of sea fisheries resources without a permit. c) prohibiting or restricting the use of vessels of specified descriptions and any method of exploiting sea fisheries resources. The possession, use and transportation of specified items or types of items used in the exploitation of sea fisheries resources may also be prohibited or restricted. d) making provision for monitoring the exploitation of sea fisheries resources. This includes requirements as to the fitting of particular equipment, the carriage of onboard observers and the marking or tagging of items used in the exploitation of sea fisheries resources. Source: s. 155 Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009.
Examples of management in English inshore MPAs Following an assessment of the compatibility of differing fishery activities with the conservation objectives of English MPAs fisheries managers have a wide range of tools to ensure that the conservation objectives can be met. The boundary of an MPA is therefore the area in which management may be applied. Within that area, according to current government policy, different management regimes can and do exist. This is illustrated by the following two examples.
Kingmere marine conservation zone Kingmere MCZ was designated in 2013. The site is 5e10 km south of Littlehampton and Worthing on the South Coast of England and covers an area of 47km2. It is designated by way of statutory instrument, The Kingmere Marine Conservation Zone Designation Order 2013, with conservation objectives for chalk, rock covered in a thin layer of gravel and
494
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
FIG. 25.2
TABLE 25.1
Management zone map for Kingmere MCZ
Management or activities within Kingmere MCZ ‘zones’.
Towed gear
Netting gear
Potting & trap gear
Lining
Angling
Dive gathering
1st Aprile30th June Bream Season Management Zone 1
X
X
X
X
X
X
Zone 2
X
X
X
X
U4
X
Zone 3
X
X
U0
U0
U4
U0
Zone 4
X
X
U0
U0
U4
U0
1st Julye31st March Management Zone 1
X
U
U
U
U4
U
Zone 2
X
U
U
U
U4
U
Zone 3
U
U
U
U
U4
U
Zone 4
X
U
U
U
U4
U
Bottom towed gear restriction in Dorset MPAs
495
sand, and black seabream (Spondyliosoma cantharus). The implementation of management by the relevant IFCA is by way of byelaw. Fig. 25.2 and Table 25.1 show the resulting restrictions and zones with the MPA. including both spatial and temporal restrictions applied to a range of fisheries participants and activities, including both recreational and commercial fishing operators. The management is designed to protect nesting black bream and their habitats, as well as the nearby chalk habitats.
Bottom towed gear restriction in Dorset MPAs The coastal waters of the County of Dorset on the south coast of England contain a number of MPAs, designated under both domestic (MCZ) and European legislation (Habitats Directive and Birds Directives). These various MPA designations protect numerous features of conservation importance, including Habitats Directive Annex I ‘reef’ communities, seagrass beds as well as ‘features’ and habitats of MCZs, such as high energy infralittoral rock and species such the pink sea-fan (Eunicella verrucosa). Following an assessment of the compatibility of ‘bottom towed fishing gear’ (which includes a range of benthic fishing operations including demersal trawling, scallop dredging and beam trawling), with the conservation objectives of the various MPAs, these fishing methods were prohibited by an IFCA ‘byelaw’ in 2016. The prohibition states that ‘no person shall use any bottom towed fishing gear within a prohibited area’. In this example the
FIG. 25.3 Bottom towed fishing gear byelaw, 2016 restrictions in Dorset’s MPAs.
496
FIG. 25.4
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
Areas within English Inshore Waters where bottom towed fishing gear is permanently restricted.
prohibited areas are defined by the presence of the features within the MPAs for which the areas are designated and which are sensitive to that form of fishing (Fig. 25.3).
MPA fisheries byelaws in English MPAs The two examples above cover only 7 of the 122 MPAs in English coastal waters and therefore give an indication of the complexity of fisheries management in English MPAs, by virtue
MPA fisheries byelaws in English MPAs
497
of the number, spatial extent of byelaws and the different types of regulations within MPAs which must not only be developed but also, to be effective, must be enforced. In total in English coastal waters (up to 6 nm from territorial baselines), there are as of 2019 43 IFCA MPA byelaws, which amongst other things, prohibit bottom towed fishing from 4% of coastal areas (or 3900 km2 of the 16,000 km2, AIFCA, 2019a). As a consequence (though not evenly distributed), MPA management in certain coastal areas is extensive and, given that the majority of the English fishing fleet operates in the inshore area, the MPAs require systematic approaches to achieve compliance (Fig. 25.4). The top-down designation of sites vs. bottom up management by the IFCA’s (a function of their structure and byelaw making process) enables, where there are options for designing locally tailored management, aspects of community led local co-management to be introduced; this approach introduces decentralised and polycentric governance which is shown to be useful not just in fisheries management but for natural resources in general (Ostrom, 2015). The development of fisheries management in MPAs post designation however creates a tension which MPA managers must reconcile; on the one hand those protagonists who have a worldview categorised as ‘eco-centric’ demand extensive protections (often through well organised non-government organisations (NGOs)), whilst ‘industry’ (albeit more fragmented than this generalised term implies) often challenge the available evidence of impact of activities, which on a site by site basis is often lacking. This context makes seeking consensus around management options challenging (whilst noting that it is bounded by a legal process, including the right of challenge). To compound this tension further, in the case of MPAs pre-dating the governments revised approach to the management of commercial fisheries in European Marine Sites (Defra, 2012) it was assumed that ongoing fishing activities in SACs and SPAs could continue, unless damage to sites was proven (Clark et al., 2017). In the case of MCZs any arrangements considered for management of sites developed during the process of recommending sites has no statutory basis. The implication of management, after the event of designation by IFCAs, means that the legitimacy of the management can be questioned, and this becomes the focus of challenges which in turn have implications for compliance. None the less the role of IFCAs in engagement with local communities is important from a compliance perspective as it introduces aspects of participation into decision making. Participation increases legitimacy of the decision process, thus enhancing compliance with legislation (Jentoft et al., 1998). Compliance and involvement are interrelated and greater participation in decision-making contributes to compliance (Tolbert and Hall, 2009). However, many MPAs fail to achieve their management objectives because of shortfalls in understanding the level of legitimacy stakeholders afford to an MPA (Dahens and Fanning, 2018). Mayntz (2011) describes legitimacy as a belief, an empirical phenomenon to be established as other socially relevant subjective phenomena, and not something to be inferred from compliant behaviour nor deduced from the presence or absence of its presumable determinants. Notwithstanding the role of participation in fisheries management in MPAs through the IFCA processes the tensions inherent with a top-down system of MPA designation can remain where the opportunities to adapt local management are limited by conservation objectives set nationally, to the extent that legitimacy of management is eroded particularly where management is highly restrictive.
498
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
Assets to implement MPA compliance The capacity and capability to implement effective compliance and enforcement in English MPAs is in part defined by the resources, strategy, and assets of the IFCAs as the inshore fisheries managers. The IFCAs inherited the resources of ‘Sea Fisheries Committees’ (Symes and Phillipson, 1997) they replaced in 2011; a key consideration of the reorganisation of the management of inshore fisheries in England by the newly formed IFCAs was the intention to integrate conservation into inshore fisheries management. The 10 IFCAs in England are each governed by committee, and there are 224 Committee members in total. Roughly half (111) of the members (known as general members) are appointed on merit from the local community for their knowledge of marine matters, be that as commercial or recreational fishermen, aquaculturalists or marine scientists & etc. The remaining membership is composed of officers from other regulatory bodies (29 members from the Marine Management Organisation, the Environment Agency and Natural England). The remaining 84 IFCA members are elected local government Councillors nominated by coastal Local Authorities with jurisdictions relevant to the IFCA sea areas. This provides important local democratic legitimacy to IFCAs. In fact the IFCAs are also funded by these Local Authorities and collectively they receive approximately £8.8 m per annum through this funding stream. This total is distributed to the 10 IFCAs according to a funding formula, which was intended to, amongst other things, recognise the increased cost of MPA management. Together the ten IFCAs have established an Association of IFCAs, as an umbrella organisation which represents their common views and interests. This Association has calculated that between a third and two-thirds of total IFCA funding has been dedicated to implementation of the network of English MPAs (AIFCA, 2017), including both the regulatory and compliance as well as enforcement costs. To cover some of these new responsibilities central government (Defra) indirectly provide approximately a third of the total funding by way of grants to the Local Authorities. Despite the extent and scope of their responsibilities IFCAs are relatively small organisations. The number of employees varies between two (Isles of Scilly IFCA) and 24 (Eastern IFCA). Each IFCA employs both professional service staff and warranted Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Officers (IFCOs). IFCOs have powers to enforce byelaws made by the IFCA as well certain national and European legislation. Consequently the IFCAs rely heavily on a risk-based approach and this can be traced to the guidance provided by Defra. Most conduct strategic assessments of risks and have a risk register for their MPAs. An IFCA’s enforcement activities are normally planned through a Tactical Coordination Group (TCG). The tactical assets available to IFCAs include patrol vessels. For example, altogether the IFCAs maintain and operate a fleet of fisheries patrol vessels which vary in size from 27 m inshore patrol craft to 6 m Rigid Inflatable Boats (RIBs). There are c.30 Fisheries Patrol vessels in England operated by IFCAs, although many of these undertake a dual enforcement and scientific function. IFCA, Royal Navy and other government surface patrol assets are increasingly jointly deployed through coordination via a recently established Joint Maritime Operations
Current levels of enforcement in English inshore MPAs
499
Coordination Centre (JMOCC) with the objective to co-ordinate sea-based patrol activity across marine agencies. Further tactical assets at the IFCAs disposal are their Intelligence systems. Following the first government report into the conduct and operations of the IFCAs (Defra, 2015) Defra developed a plan for closer integration of the MMO and IFCAs. One important outcome of the plan was the development of a shared intelligence system. IFCA’s have statutory powers to prosecute fisheries offences in the criminal courts with unlimited fines. Offences, for which the IFCA may prosecute include byelaw infringements and certain national legislation. IFCAs offences also include intentional obstruction of an officer in the performance of any of their duties (maximum fine £20,000). Where a person or business is found guilty of an offence, the Authority will ask the court that its prosecution costs are met by the defendant(s). This could amount to many thousands of pounds where a not guilty plea is made and in a defended case, although the court is at liberty to refuse or limit costs awarded. Prosecution is not the only sanction available to IFCAs. An IFCA can in most cases decide the way in which it takes action for a suspected fisheries offence. Options range from a verbal warning issued when a minor infringement of fisheries legislation is detected, to Fixed Administrative Penalties which may be up to £10,000, as an alternative to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances. A prosecution will only commence if there is a realistic prospect of conviction given the available evidence. If a case does not pass this test it will not go ahead regardless of how important or serious it may be. Moreover, a prosecution must also be in the public interest (CPS, 2018). In order to prosecute a case in court an IFCA must have established a body of formal evidence including witness statements, exhibits etc as would be expected from any prosecuting authority to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
Current levels of enforcement in English inshore MPAs The English inshore marine area managed by IFCAs covers a combined area of approximately 16,000 km2 (AIFCA, 2019a) which is roughly twice the land area of Wales. The patrol area of the IFCAs surface assets (patrol boats) are inevitably limited as is their patrol capacity; they are tasked not just with the protection of MPAs but with the multitude of other fisheries management controls as well. Whilst the number and complexity of MPA management measures is increasing, sea-based fisheries enforcement patrols in inshore waters, according to the best available data (AIFCA, 2019b), has been relatively stable over the last 8 years with around 781 patrols being conducted in 2017/18 resulting in 7693 boarding’s of fishing vessels: The number of inspections in the time period being around twice the number of fishing vessels in the fleet. This picture of regional enforcement is in contrast to nationally coordinated enforcement, which can be seen to be decreasing: in both inshore and offshore areas. The Royal Navy Fisheries Protection Squadron (FPS) boarded 278 vessels within British fishery limits in 2016/17. This is a fall in boarding’s of 40% compared to the previous financial year. 278 is the lowest annual number of boarding’s in at least 18 years, and represents a decrease of 84% since 1999/00. This overall downward trend averages an 8% fall each financial year
500
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
(MOD, 2017). Moreover aerial capacity is now virtually absent, the UK MMO, across all the UK Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has reduced surveillance flights by 97.5% from historic levels of 1000 h a year (2000/01e2010/11) to just 25 h in 2015/16 (Enevera et al., 2017). No systematic assessment of fisheries enforcement has been conducted in England since 2003 (before the MPA network was implemented). Even in 2003, when there were a significantly greater number of seaborne fisheries inspections there was ‘less than 1% chance that a vessel will be inspected at sea on any one day of fishing’ (NAO, 2003). What do the levels of inspections and patrols tell us about the effectiveness of inshore MPA enforcement? In short, very little, other than that assets are being deployed in these areas and to a lesser or greater extent this will act as a deterrent to non-compliance. Non-compliance is nonetheless, by its very nature, difficult to quantify. The clandestine nature of the activity is not well suited to quantitative analysis. Furthermore, in the absence of reporting of crime (or suitable methods for recording such data), indications of success of enforcement are limited. The details of fisheries patrol activity do not describe the outcomes of the mission of the patrol. Fisheries patrol assets are deployed for numerous tasks and there is no indication or assessment of the deployment of surface assets to marine MPAs. Notwithstanding the above assessment, two additional externalities have occurred which must be considered when interpreting the information presented here. Firstly, in offshore areas the introduction of Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) data has significantly improved the intelligence available for directing patrols effectively and secondly, both IFCAs and FPS (via MMO taskings) have adopted an ‘intelligence led risk-based approach’ which will, if successful improve effectiveness. With regards to MPA management and the use of VMS however, it is of note that there are currently no examples of courts accepting evidence of fishing illegal activity ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ based on VMS data alone and in the absence of other corroborating evidence. Currently VMS alone therefore does not remove the need for other forms of evidence to secure evidence of a breach of fishing regulations in areas where fishing is prohibited. This is challenging because infringements against MPA legislation do not involve crimes against a person or individual’s property, therefore there is an increased risk that the crime will go undetected or unreported. This risk is compounded by the fact that even in inshore waters there are a limited number of potential witnesses to any infringement and a poor understanding in the wider community of highly complex rules within MPAs. Consequently, the assertion that a risk-based approach reduces the need for inspections requires challenge, particularly in the context of an increase in the need for protection of MPAs.
MPA infringements in English inshore MPAs e unknown In the past 8 years there have been 229 prosecutions brought by the IFCAs, 1289 verbal warnings, 798 written warnings and 174 fixed administrative penalties issued (AIFCA, 2019b); no indication of whether these prosecutions relate to MPAs are available. Druel and Veitch’s (2016) research gives an indication of the level of detection of illegal fishing in UK waters as a whole, and they found that for fisheries infringement, in 2009 there were 64 prosecutions with 64 guilty verdicts obtained in local Magistrates Courts. In 2010 there
Incentives and compliance in the management of inshore MPAs
501
were 49 prosecutions with 44 guilty verdicts and in 2011 there were 39 prosecutions resulting in 27 guilty verdicts. In 2013 there were only 12 prosecutions, in 2014 there were 49 prosecutions, in 2015 there were 53 prosecutions, and in 2016 there were only 8 prosecutions. Prior to the implementation of the UK’s MPA network in 2003, the UK’s National Audit Office found that ‘from a sample of court cases from 2000 to 2001 . fine imposed would be about 1.7 times the value of the infringement detected and prosecuted.’ (NAO, 2003).
Incentives and compliance in the management of inshore MPAs According to general deterrence theory, compliance is expected to be most heavily influenced by three key factors: 1) the potential economic gains from the illegal activity; 2) the perceived risk of detection; and 3) the severity of sanctions (Becker, 1968; Sutinen et al.,1990; Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998; Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2000). Given available evidence it is possible to consider these compliance factors in the context of the development of the inshore MPA network in England.
The potential economic gain from the activity Incentives to fish illegally are increased where higher fish densities are found inside MPA boundaries (Jennings, 2000). Despite the best efforts of managers and those charged with enforcement, fishing contrary to MPA regulations can result because the immediate economic incentive to fish remains strong. An example of such an incentive is provided by the case of bottom towed fishing gear restrictions in MPAs in areas where king scallops (Pecten maximus) are found. There is a coincidence of scallops within MPAs designated and managed to protect ‘reef’ communities, in particular in unconsolidated reefs, or the interstitial habitats within and between reefs. Certain of these habitats are favoured by scallop dredgers using the Newhaven type scallop dredge. The conservation impact of scallop dredging is high; ‘of all the fishing gears, scallop dredges are considered to be the most damaging to non-target benthic communities and seafloor habitats’ (Howarth and Stewart, 2014) but their catches are valuable. Official landing statistics show that an under 15 m scallop dredger made, on average, a gross income of £145,000 in 2017 (Seafish, 2018) and was on average fishing for 95 days a year. Therefore, in a purely hypothetical context, the scallop catch per day, was on average £1500 (Seafish, 2018) equating to 0.55 tonnes of scallops per day (MMO, 2018). Scallops can respond well to spatial closures and there is evidence that the biomass of such sessile benthic organisms can increase substantially within an MPA. For example, in the Port Erin Closed Area, Isle of Man, a small 2 km2 area closed to towed gears has yielded an exploitable scallop biomass 20 times higher than that outside of the reserve (BeukersStewart et al., 2005). Similarly, in the Lamlash Bay No-Take Zone (NTZ), Isle of Arran, Scotland, the reproductive biomass has been shown to be 185% higher in the NTZ than outside (Axelsson et al., 2009). These figures are indicative of the potential for economic gain from illegal scallop dredging in an MPA with suitable habitat, where bottom towed fishing gear is restricted. The financial
502
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
incentive for non-compliance in certain instances is therefore high and the ecological consequences of non-compliance significant. Such data and analysis provide the basis of an assessment of a risk factor associated with likelihood and impact.
The perceived risk of detection Based on conventional economic theory and models of deterrence (Becker, 1968), fishermen can be expected to make decisions to comply or not with a fishing regulation by comparing the expected penalty, adjusted by the likelihood that they will be detected, cited, and prosecuted, with the expected illegal gain (reviewed in Ref. Kuperan and Suitenen, 1998). If the total number of English IFCA fisheries patrol vessels is divided by the total inshore sea area, then on average each vessel has a patrol area of 640 km2 (an area by way of comparison greater than The New Forest National Park). Add to this the remote nature of MPAs (out of sight of the majority of population), coupled with the complexity of the regulations, (designed as they are to be proportionate to the protection of MPA features, rather than necessarily optimised for a simplified task of detection), and the scale of the enforcement challenge is elucidated.
Level of fines In their review of fisheries offences more generally, Druel and Veitch (2016), concluded that the overall number of fisheries prosecutions in England in recent years is low, and furthermore that even where successful prosecutions are brought, fines appear to be set at a low rate. There is no central database of fisheries infringements, and by extension no database of infringements in MPAs. A search of local newspapers and IFCA websites reveal certain details, for example as a result of a joint MMO and IFCA investigation, in October 2014 a vessel owner and master were ordered to pay respectively £5620 (of which £3000 fine, £2500 costs and £120 victim surcharge) and £6620 (of which £4000 fine, £2500 costs and £120 victim surcharge), for illegally fishing for scallops in Lyme Bay MPA. Considering these figures in relation to the daily and annual value of scallop dredging indicated above suggests a considerable incentive for non-compliance: To the extent that prosecution for non-compliance could rationally be considered a relatively trivial business expense, which in any event may well not be incurred. Studies of US fisheries have determined that expected penalties are generally small relative to illegal gains (King et al., 2009) and although a similar analysis is not possible in England as suitable records are not available, it is clear that there is a pressing need to establish a national record of compliance monitoring and crime detection in English inshore MPAs. Non-compliance is nonetheless, by its very nature, difficult to quantify. The clandestine nature of the activity is not well suited to quantitative analysis. Furthermore, in the absence of reporting of crime (or suitable methods for recording such data), indications of success of enforcement are limited.
Conclusions In conclusion, the extent of the area designated as an MPA and the number and type of fishing operators active in English inshore waters creates an enforcement and compliance challenge. Whilst the timing and process of designation of MPAs and their various origins,
Conclusions
503
has been necessary to meet conservation targets, the variety and extent of the MPAs raises compliance issues which have been subject to limited critical assessment, but these components of management will be critical to the success of the MPAs meeting their objectives. With regards to inshore fisheries, the most widespread of ongoing commercial activity in inshore waters, the implications for compliance created by the process of implementing management are only now emerging through practice. The lessons emerging from the English MPA management process can be used to inform ongoing and future MPA management strategies elsewhere. The separation of fisheries management of MPAs from the designation of sites introduces challenges for managers and these can be understood from a compliance perspective in the context of the perceived legitimacy of the regulatory system. Because of the truncated process of designation of certain MPAs, communities effected by subsequent management (both positively and negatively) are separated from the policy origins of that management. Where this is problematic for cultural or economic reasons at a local scale, because for example of the loss of key fishing grounds to certain communities, this can act as a disincentive to compliance which may be significant. Where such challenges exist, reliance on traditional enforcement techniques alone; detection and fines, are unlikely to act as sufficient disincentives. In the examples presented here it can be seen that the management within MPAs is complex as is the variety of types and the policy origins of the MPAs. At a site level, so far as compliance and enforcement relates, the policy origins of the MPAs become less important than the regulatory systems which have been developed to support the objectives of the MPA. Given the challenge now facing site managers in England the preoccupation of governments and their agents should shift (both through communication strategies and resource) to support and aid community led compliance; this will require further integration of the disciplines of MPA management to include compliance and enforcement monitoring. Whilst the strategic systems for compliance and enforcement being developed by the IFCAs have the potential to support the management of MPAs and realise the benefits of a well-managed network of MPAs in English coastal waters further work is needed to integrate MPA compliance and management into a holistic MPA management process. Significant improvements in the coordination of assets has occurred since the IFCAs were created in 2011 and when compared to the current levels of offshore enforcement the inshore waters are subject to greater levels of compliance effort by surface assets. There remain significant deficiencies however, such as systems for recording detection from which the effectiveness of compliance can be monitored. Finally, the analysis presented here makes a case for the development of site level MPA compliance and enforcement strategies. Site level MPA management plans could usefully be informed by stakeholder analysis of the likelihood and severity of breaches to MPA regulations. Such an approach would build upon the existing process of risk management deployed by the IFCAs and be integrated into overall management plans for sites so as to establish a sense of place and pride in local MPAs. The process of developing such plans can increase community participation and brings with it the associated benefits of community orientated policing.
504
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
Conflict of Interest Statement The first author is employed as a Chief Officer of an Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority and therefore has an interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript insofar as having responsibility for the development of management of English Inshore Marine Protected Areas. The second author is Chairman of an Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority.
References AIFCA, 2017. Written Evidence Submitted by Dr Stephen Bolt, Chief Executive, the Association of Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities, on Behalf of the Ten Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities (IFCAs) to Environmental Audit committee enquiry; MPAs Revisited. MPA0006. Available online: http:// data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Environmental%20Audit /Marine%20Protection%20Areas%20Revisited/written/39917.html. AIFCA, 2019a. Management of Inshore MPAs by the IFCAs. Association of Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities, Kings Lynn, UK. Available online: http://www.association-ifca.org.uk/Upload/MPA/AIFCA%20Leaflet-2019%20v15-hires.pdf. AIFCA, 2019b. IFCAs Update. Coastal Futures Conference, 23e24 January, 2019. Royal Geographical Society, London. Available online: http://coastal-futures.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Bolt-IFCAs-Update.pdf. Ares, E., White, C., 2018. Fisheries Management in the UK. House of Commons Library, Commons Library Briefing. Available online: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8457/CBP-8457.pdf. Axelsson, M., Dewey, S., Plastow, L., Doran, J., 2009. Mapping of Marine Habitats and Species within the Community Marine Conservation Area at Lamlash Bay. Aberdeen. Becker, G.S., 1968. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 76, 169e217. Beukers-Stewart, B.D., Vause, B.J., Mosley, M.W.J., Rossetti, H., Brand, A.R., 2005. Benefits of closed area protection for a population of scallops. Marine Ecology Progress Series 298, 189e204. Breen, P., Vanstaen, K., Clark, R.W.E., 2015. Mapping inshore fishing activity using aerial, land, and vesselbased sighting information. ICES Journal of Marine Science 72 (2), 467e479. https://doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/ fsu115. Byers, J.E., Noonburg, E.G., 2007. Poaching enforcement and the efficacy of marine reserves. Ecological Applications 17, 7. Ecological Society of America. https://doi.org/10.1890/07-0067.1. Causey, B.D., 1995. Enforcement in MPAs in MPAs Volume 5 of the Series Conservation Biology, pp. 119e148. Clark, R.W.E., Humphreys, J.H., Solandt, J.-L., Weller, C., 2017. Dialectics of nature: the emergence of policy on the management of commercial fisheries in english European marine sites. Marine Policy 78, 11e17. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.marpol.2016.12.021. Costello, C., Gaines, S.D., Lynham, J., 2008. Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse? Science 321 (5896), 1678e1681. Coelho, P., Filipe, J., Ferreira, M., Pedro, M., 2008. Illegal fishing and economic analysis. Journal of Applied Mathematics 1. CPS, 2018. The Code for Crown Prosecutors. Criminal Prosecution Service. HMSO. Available online. www.cps.gov. uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/Code-for-Crown-Prosecutors-October-2018.pdf. Dahens, L.A., Fanning, L.M., 2018. What counts in making marine protected areas (MPAs) count? The role of legitimacy in MPA success in Canada. Ecological Indicators 86, 45e57. Defra, 2012. Revised Approach to the Management of Commercial Fisheries in European Marine Sites: Overarching Policy and Delivery. Defra, London. Available online. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/revisedapproach-to-the-management-of-commercial-fisheries-in-european-marine-sites-overarching-policy-and-delivery. Defra, 2015. Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities Conduct and Operation 2010 e 2014. Presented to Parliament Pursuant to Section 183 (1) of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009. Defra, London. Available online. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 413425/ifca-review-2010-2014.pdf. Druel, E., Veitch, L., 2016. The Control and Enforcement of Fisheries in England. Client Earth. http://www. documents.clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2016-12-02-the-control-and-enforcement-of-fisheries-inengland-ce-en.pdf.
References
505
Edgar, G.J., Stuart-Smith, R.D., Willis, T.J., Kininmonth, S., Baker, S.C., Banks, S., Barrett, N.S., Becerro, M.A., Bernard, A.T.F., Berkhout, J., Buxton, C.D., Campbell, S.J., Cooper, A.T., Davey, M., Edgar, S.C., Försterra, G., Galvan, D.E., Irigoyen, A.J., Kushner, D.J., Moura, R., Parnell, P.E., Shears, N.T., Soler, G.A., Strain, E.M.A., Thomson, R.J., 2014. Global conservation outcomes depend on marine protected areas with five key features. Nature 506 (7487), 216e220. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature13022. Enevera, R., Lewinb, S., Reesec, A., Hooperd, T., 2017. Mapping fishing effort: combining fishermen’s knowledge with satellite monitoring data in English waters. Fisheries Research 189, 67e76. Howarth, L.M., Stewart, B.D., 2014. The Dredge Fishery for Scallops in the United Kingdom (UK): Effects on Marine Ecosystems and Proposals for Future Management. Report to the Sustainable Inshore Fisheries Trust. Marine Ecosystem Management Report No. 5. University of York, 54 pp. Jennings, S., 2000. Patterns and prediction of population recovery in marine reserves. Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 10, 209e231. Jentoft, S., McCay, B.J., Wilson, D.C., 1998. Social theory and fisheries co-management. Marine Policy 22 (4e5), 423e436. Jones, PJS., Burgess, J., 2005. Building partnership capacity for the collaborative management of marine protected areas in the UK: a preliminary analysis. Journal of Environmental Management 77 (3), 227e243. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2005.04.004. Jones, P.S., 2012. Marine protected areas in the UK: challenges in combining top-down and bottom-up approaches to governance. Environmental Conservation 39 (3), 248e258. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0376892912000136. King, D.M., Porter, R.D., Price, E.W., 2009. Reassessing the Value of U.S. Coast Guard At-Sea Fishery Enforcement. Ocean Development & International Law 40, 350e372. https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320903285414. Kuperan, K., Sutinen, J.G., 1998. Blue water crime: deterrence, legitimacy, and compliance in fisheries. Law & Society Review 32, 309e338. Maliao, R.J., Webb, E.L., Jensen, K.R., 2004. A survey of stock of the donkey’s ear abalone, Haliotis asinina L. in Sagay Marine Reserve, Philippines: evaluating the effectiveness of marine protected area (MPA) enforcement. Fisheries Research 66, 343e353. Mayntz, R., 2011. Legality, legitimacy and compliance. In: Bandelow, N., Hegelich, S. (Eds.), Pluralismus e Strategien e Entscheidungen. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. MOD, 2017. Military Aid to Civil Authorities 2016/17 MOD. Available online. https://www.gov.uk/government/ statistics/military-aid-to-civil-authorities-financial-year-201617. MMO, 2016. Managing Fisheries in Marine Protected Areas: Approach and Process Overview. Available onlines. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 538394/Approach_and_Process_overview_-_Managing_Fisheries_in_MPAs.pdf. MMO, 2018. UK Sea Fisheries Statistics (2017). Marine Management Organisation, Newcastle. NAO, 2003. Fisheries Enforcement in England. HMSO, London. Available online. https://www.nao.org.uk/report/ fisheries-enforcement-in-england/. Nielsen, J.R., Mathiesen, C., 2000. Important factors influencing rule compliance in fisheries: lessons from Danish fisheries. In: Proceedings of the IIFET 2000 Conference, Portland, OR. July 10-14, 2000. Ostrom, E., 2015. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. UK. Seafish, 2018. Economics of the UK Fishing Fleet. Seafish, UK. Available online. https://www.seafish.org/media/ 1812992/economics_of_the_uk_fishing_fleet_2017.pdf. Sutinen, J.G., Rieser, A., Gauvin, J.R., 1990. Measuring and explaining noncompliance in federally managed fisheries. Ocean Development & International Law 21, 335e372. Symes, D., Phillipson, J., 1997. Inshore fisheries management in the UK: sea fisheries committees and the challenge of marine environmental management. Marine Policy 21 (3), 207e224. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(97) 00002-X. The Conservative Party, 2015. The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015. Available Online. https://www. conservatives.com/manifesto2015. Tolbert, P.S., Hall, R.H., 2009. Organizations: Structures, Processes and Outcomes. Prentice Hall, UK.
25 Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible Robert W.E. Clarkb, John Humphreysa, b a
Institute of Marine Sciences, University of Portsmouth, Portsmouth, United Kingdom; b Southern Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority, Poole, United Kingdom
Abstract In 2018 56% of English inshore waters (to 6 nm baselines) are within a Marine Protected Area (MPA). In these coastal waters commercial fishing is extensive and widespread and, in many instances, predates the designation of the MPAs. MPA management in English MPAs has occurred post designation. In English MPAs certain fishing activities are now restricted. The scope and complexity of the MPA regulation and compliance task in English inshore waters is, as a consequence, significant. Enforcement alone cannot provide protection to English MPAs, but is a necessary part of a coherent compliance programme, in particular where there are powerful economic incentives for non-compliance. Effective compliance necessitates effective systems, process and resources as well as a holistic strategy which genuinely integrates the economic factors in the planning process so as to significantly reduce or wherever possible reverse (counter) the incentives to non-compliance. Community engagement and participation in compliance is essential. This chapter reviews the current compliance and enforcement components of management of inshore fisheries in MPAs in England and concludes that there are opportunities for further integration of compliance management into MPA management, and that this shift is essential if the UK is to achieve its ambition of a well-managed network of MPAs.
Keywords: Blue Belt; Compliance; Enforcement; Fisheries; IFCA; Marine Protected Area.
Marine Protected Areas https://doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-08-102698-4.00025-3
489
Copyright © 2020 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
490
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
Introduction Fisheries enforcement is an essential component in the management of Marine Protected Areas (MPAs) (Causey, 1995). Despite this, compliance monitoring and enforcement considerations are relatively neglected in the study of fishery management (Coelho et al., 2008) and receive less attention and research than the scientific and regulatory components of management. To a lesser or greater extent this can be ascribed to the primary preoccupation of governments and other agents in reaching the various national and international targets for the designation of MPAs, as a response to ecological and scientific problems in our seas. Furthermore, there is a general separation amongst practitioners of the theory and practice of compliance management from that of biological conservation disciplines associated with MPA management. Where an area of sea is designated as an MPA attention is drawn to the regulation of activities within such sites, but generally speaking aspects of compliance and enforcement are considered only after designation. For practical purposes compliance and enforcement are an integral aspect of MPA management. The study of fisheries compliance and enforcement in MPAs is an important area of research because i) investment in enforcement efforts provides the greatest return on maintaining the benefits of the reserve to the fishery (Byers and Noonburg, 2007), ii) MPAs often fail to reach their full potential as a consequence of factors such as illegal harvesting (Edgar et al., 2014) and iii) properly enforced MPAs can promote recovery of local stocks (Maliao et al., 2004). Even strongly enforced fishery management may be insufficient if the short-term economic or social incentives for fishers’ favour increased exploitation (Costello et al., 2008), but enforcement in so far as it provides a disincentive for non-compliance is an important route to realising the benefits of an MPA. This chapter describes the English system of fisheries enforcement in MPAs. It explores the implications for compliance in the context of the development of a network of English coastal MPAs and critically analyses the systems for enforcing MPAs in this region. Aspects of the theory of compliance are applied, in the English inshore context, to the challenge of achieving compliance with the objectives of MPAs. As part of this analysis the systems, structures and processes to deliver compliance and enforcement in English MPAs are considered.
Inshore MPAs in England There are three main types of MPA in England, these are Marine Conservation Zones (MCZs), Special Protection Areas (SPAs), and Special Areas of Conservation (SAC). In 2019 17.4% of UK waters and 56% of English inshore waters within 6 nm of the coast lie within an MPA. There are 38 Marine Conservation Zones, 39 Special Areas of Conservation and 44 Special Protected Areas (AIFCA, 2019a). Since the introduction of the Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009, the number, extent and management of both new and pre-existing MPAs in English coastal waters have risen sharply. This can be attributed to: the UK’s wider international commitments to introduce
Management in MPAs
491
a network of MPAs; the introduction of a new form of MPA the MCZ; the UK Governments ‘revised approach to the management of commercial fisheries in European Marine Sites’ (Defra, 2012; Clark et al., 2017); and the UK Government’s ongoing commitment to create a ‘Blue Belt’ of protection around the UK coastline (The Conservative Party, 2015). From a governance perspective, the development of the MPA network in England’s inshore waters can be characterised as exclusively top-down with regards to the designation of SPAs and SACs and ‘blended’ top-down and bottom up approaches in MCZs (Jones, 2012). It is argued that a degree of top-down government control is required if strategic wider-scale and longer-term MPA objectives are to be met (Jones and Burgess, 2005) because without such an approach it is unlikely that the UK would have met its commitment to an ecologically coherent network of MPAs according to agreed timescales. Such a process of site location in the absence of defined management at the point of designation, has implications for management of ongoing activities, in particular for fisheries; which in England are widespread and significant. In 2017, the UK fishing fleet was made up of 6,148 registered vessels. Just under 80% of the UK fleet are 10 m and under vessels (u-10 m). There are some 3,078 registered fishing vessels registered to ports in England. Only 327 of these vessels are currently being tracked using Vessel Monitoring Systems (in line with European Union (EU) legislation requirements for vessels over 12 m in length). England has the largest number of u-10 m fishing vessels n ¼ 2,512 (Ares and White, 2018). Consequently, inshore areas are busy places for commercial fishing and data on the patterns and use of coastal fishing grounds, other than in qualitative form, is not generally available and the spatial extent of fishing activity inshore and the intensity of activity is less well developed than in the offshore area occupied mainly by larger vessels (Breen et al., 2015).
Management in MPAs In England the management regimes for fisheries in MPAs, is developed post designation and follows an assessment of the compatibility of fishing activities with the conservation objectives of the MPA. Such an ‘MPA assessment’ is essentially a risk assessment which looks at the vulnerability of features for which a site is designated and the impact of fishing activity on these features. Site-level assessments are carried out in a manner consistent with the requirements of Article 6(3) of the EU Habitats Directive for European Marine Sites (EMS: a collective term for marine SPAs and SACs) and the requirements of section 126 of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 for MCZs. For EMSs the assessments will determine whether, in light of the site’s conservation objectives, fishing activities are having an adverse effect on the integrity of the site (MMO, 2016). If the MPA assessment finds that a method of commercial fishing activity may have a significant effect, the next step is to identify how to avoid or mitigate the impacts. It is the UK’s current policy that management of fishing activity within an MPA will be only applied to the affected area of an MPA, rather than the entire site, if the evidence is available (Defra, 2012). Not all MPA sites need permanent management measures for fishing activity.
492
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
If the assessment finds that the fishing activity does not have a significant impact on the MPA features, management measures will not be implemented. However, to ensure any changes in site activities are captured, the site may be monitored. It can therefore be seen that the management of fishing in MPAs is complex as different spatial and temporal management regimes can exist within single MPAs. This complexity requires systems, structures and processes available to managers to respond to needs that differ across time and space and affect different stakeholders at different times within an MPA. As a consequence of this approach most MPAs (>99% by area) in UK waters allow for selected fishing activities to continue but damaging activities are being restricted.
The responsibility for management of inshore MPAs in England In England, The Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009 sets the roles and responsibilities of fisheries regulators in MPAs. Regulators have duties to develop management and implement compliance measures including enforcement. Responsibility for fisheries enforcement is divided between the Marine Management Organisation (MMO) with a national role, and ten Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities (IFCAs) with regional responsibilities (Fig. 25.1). Overall responsibility for the management of fisheries management in MPAs rests
FIG. 25.1
MPAs which fall within (or partially within) the IFCA Districts.
Examples of management in English inshore MPAs
493
with the national government’s Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (Defra). Management measures to reduce the impact of fishing activities within MPAs in the inshore (0e12 nm) are introduced through byelaws. This form of legislation sets out the affected area within an MPA and the fishing activity restrictions. All permanent byelaws are subject to public consultation before they are introduced.
Regulation to manage MPAs IFCAs have a wide range of powers available to them to manage MPAs and consideration should be given to both voluntary and legislative measures. Using powers granted by the Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009, IFCA byelaws, relevant to MPAs may regulate fishing activity, by way of: a) prohibiting or restricting the exploitation of sea fisheries resources in specified areas or periods or limiting the amount of resources that may be exploited or the amount of time a person or vessel may spend exploiting fisheries resources in a specified period. b) prohibiting or restricting the exploitation of sea fisheries resources without a permit. c) prohibiting or restricting the use of vessels of specified descriptions and any method of exploiting sea fisheries resources. The possession, use and transportation of specified items or types of items used in the exploitation of sea fisheries resources may also be prohibited or restricted. d) making provision for monitoring the exploitation of sea fisheries resources. This includes requirements as to the fitting of particular equipment, the carriage of onboard observers and the marking or tagging of items used in the exploitation of sea fisheries resources. Source: s. 155 Marine and Coastal Access Act, 2009.
Examples of management in English inshore MPAs Following an assessment of the compatibility of differing fishery activities with the conservation objectives of English MPAs fisheries managers have a wide range of tools to ensure that the conservation objectives can be met. The boundary of an MPA is therefore the area in which management may be applied. Within that area, according to current government policy, different management regimes can and do exist. This is illustrated by the following two examples.
Kingmere marine conservation zone Kingmere MCZ was designated in 2013. The site is 5e10 km south of Littlehampton and Worthing on the South Coast of England and covers an area of 47km2. It is designated by way of statutory instrument, The Kingmere Marine Conservation Zone Designation Order 2013, with conservation objectives for chalk, rock covered in a thin layer of gravel and
494
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
FIG. 25.2
TABLE 25.1
Management zone map for Kingmere MCZ
Management or activities within Kingmere MCZ ‘zones’.
Towed gear
Netting gear
Potting & trap gear
Lining
Angling
Dive gathering
1st Aprile30th June Bream Season Management Zone 1
X
X
X
X
X
X
Zone 2
X
X
X
X
U4
X
Zone 3
X
X
U0
U0
U4
U0
Zone 4
X
X
U0
U0
U4
U0
1st Julye31st March Management Zone 1
X
U
U
U
U4
U
Zone 2
X
U
U
U
U4
U
Zone 3
U
U
U
U
U4
U
Zone 4
X
U
U
U
U4
U
Bottom towed gear restriction in Dorset MPAs
495
sand, and black seabream (Spondyliosoma cantharus). The implementation of management by the relevant IFCA is by way of byelaw. Fig. 25.2 and Table 25.1 show the resulting restrictions and zones with the MPA. including both spatial and temporal restrictions applied to a range of fisheries participants and activities, including both recreational and commercial fishing operators. The management is designed to protect nesting black bream and their habitats, as well as the nearby chalk habitats.
Bottom towed gear restriction in Dorset MPAs The coastal waters of the County of Dorset on the south coast of England contain a number of MPAs, designated under both domestic (MCZ) and European legislation (Habitats Directive and Birds Directives). These various MPA designations protect numerous features of conservation importance, including Habitats Directive Annex I ‘reef’ communities, seagrass beds as well as ‘features’ and habitats of MCZs, such as high energy infralittoral rock and species such the pink sea-fan (Eunicella verrucosa). Following an assessment of the compatibility of ‘bottom towed fishing gear’ (which includes a range of benthic fishing operations including demersal trawling, scallop dredging and beam trawling), with the conservation objectives of the various MPAs, these fishing methods were prohibited by an IFCA ‘byelaw’ in 2016. The prohibition states that ‘no person shall use any bottom towed fishing gear within a prohibited area’. In this example the
FIG. 25.3 Bottom towed fishing gear byelaw, 2016 restrictions in Dorset’s MPAs.
496
FIG. 25.4
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
Areas within English Inshore Waters where bottom towed fishing gear is permanently restricted.
prohibited areas are defined by the presence of the features within the MPAs for which the areas are designated and which are sensitive to that form of fishing (Fig. 25.3).
MPA fisheries byelaws in English MPAs The two examples above cover only 7 of the 122 MPAs in English coastal waters and therefore give an indication of the complexity of fisheries management in English MPAs, by virtue
MPA fisheries byelaws in English MPAs
497
of the number, spatial extent of byelaws and the different types of regulations within MPAs which must not only be developed but also, to be effective, must be enforced. In total in English coastal waters (up to 6 nm from territorial baselines), there are as of 2019 43 IFCA MPA byelaws, which amongst other things, prohibit bottom towed fishing from 4% of coastal areas (or 3900 km2 of the 16,000 km2, AIFCA, 2019a). As a consequence (though not evenly distributed), MPA management in certain coastal areas is extensive and, given that the majority of the English fishing fleet operates in the inshore area, the MPAs require systematic approaches to achieve compliance (Fig. 25.4). The top-down designation of sites vs. bottom up management by the IFCA’s (a function of their structure and byelaw making process) enables, where there are options for designing locally tailored management, aspects of community led local co-management to be introduced; this approach introduces decentralised and polycentric governance which is shown to be useful not just in fisheries management but for natural resources in general (Ostrom, 2015). The development of fisheries management in MPAs post designation however creates a tension which MPA managers must reconcile; on the one hand those protagonists who have a worldview categorised as ‘eco-centric’ demand extensive protections (often through well organised non-government organisations (NGOs)), whilst ‘industry’ (albeit more fragmented than this generalised term implies) often challenge the available evidence of impact of activities, which on a site by site basis is often lacking. This context makes seeking consensus around management options challenging (whilst noting that it is bounded by a legal process, including the right of challenge). To compound this tension further, in the case of MPAs pre-dating the governments revised approach to the management of commercial fisheries in European Marine Sites (Defra, 2012) it was assumed that ongoing fishing activities in SACs and SPAs could continue, unless damage to sites was proven (Clark et al., 2017). In the case of MCZs any arrangements considered for management of sites developed during the process of recommending sites has no statutory basis. The implication of management, after the event of designation by IFCAs, means that the legitimacy of the management can be questioned, and this becomes the focus of challenges which in turn have implications for compliance. None the less the role of IFCAs in engagement with local communities is important from a compliance perspective as it introduces aspects of participation into decision making. Participation increases legitimacy of the decision process, thus enhancing compliance with legislation (Jentoft et al., 1998). Compliance and involvement are interrelated and greater participation in decision-making contributes to compliance (Tolbert and Hall, 2009). However, many MPAs fail to achieve their management objectives because of shortfalls in understanding the level of legitimacy stakeholders afford to an MPA (Dahens and Fanning, 2018). Mayntz (2011) describes legitimacy as a belief, an empirical phenomenon to be established as other socially relevant subjective phenomena, and not something to be inferred from compliant behaviour nor deduced from the presence or absence of its presumable determinants. Notwithstanding the role of participation in fisheries management in MPAs through the IFCA processes the tensions inherent with a top-down system of MPA designation can remain where the opportunities to adapt local management are limited by conservation objectives set nationally, to the extent that legitimacy of management is eroded particularly where management is highly restrictive.
498
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
Assets to implement MPA compliance The capacity and capability to implement effective compliance and enforcement in English MPAs is in part defined by the resources, strategy, and assets of the IFCAs as the inshore fisheries managers. The IFCAs inherited the resources of ‘Sea Fisheries Committees’ (Symes and Phillipson, 1997) they replaced in 2011; a key consideration of the reorganisation of the management of inshore fisheries in England by the newly formed IFCAs was the intention to integrate conservation into inshore fisheries management. The 10 IFCAs in England are each governed by committee, and there are 224 Committee members in total. Roughly half (111) of the members (known as general members) are appointed on merit from the local community for their knowledge of marine matters, be that as commercial or recreational fishermen, aquaculturalists or marine scientists & etc. The remaining membership is composed of officers from other regulatory bodies (29 members from the Marine Management Organisation, the Environment Agency and Natural England). The remaining 84 IFCA members are elected local government Councillors nominated by coastal Local Authorities with jurisdictions relevant to the IFCA sea areas. This provides important local democratic legitimacy to IFCAs. In fact the IFCAs are also funded by these Local Authorities and collectively they receive approximately £8.8 m per annum through this funding stream. This total is distributed to the 10 IFCAs according to a funding formula, which was intended to, amongst other things, recognise the increased cost of MPA management. Together the ten IFCAs have established an Association of IFCAs, as an umbrella organisation which represents their common views and interests. This Association has calculated that between a third and two-thirds of total IFCA funding has been dedicated to implementation of the network of English MPAs (AIFCA, 2017), including both the regulatory and compliance as well as enforcement costs. To cover some of these new responsibilities central government (Defra) indirectly provide approximately a third of the total funding by way of grants to the Local Authorities. Despite the extent and scope of their responsibilities IFCAs are relatively small organisations. The number of employees varies between two (Isles of Scilly IFCA) and 24 (Eastern IFCA). Each IFCA employs both professional service staff and warranted Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Officers (IFCOs). IFCOs have powers to enforce byelaws made by the IFCA as well certain national and European legislation. Consequently the IFCAs rely heavily on a risk-based approach and this can be traced to the guidance provided by Defra. Most conduct strategic assessments of risks and have a risk register for their MPAs. An IFCA’s enforcement activities are normally planned through a Tactical Coordination Group (TCG). The tactical assets available to IFCAs include patrol vessels. For example, altogether the IFCAs maintain and operate a fleet of fisheries patrol vessels which vary in size from 27 m inshore patrol craft to 6 m Rigid Inflatable Boats (RIBs). There are c.30 Fisheries Patrol vessels in England operated by IFCAs, although many of these undertake a dual enforcement and scientific function. IFCA, Royal Navy and other government surface patrol assets are increasingly jointly deployed through coordination via a recently established Joint Maritime Operations
Current levels of enforcement in English inshore MPAs
499
Coordination Centre (JMOCC) with the objective to co-ordinate sea-based patrol activity across marine agencies. Further tactical assets at the IFCAs disposal are their Intelligence systems. Following the first government report into the conduct and operations of the IFCAs (Defra, 2015) Defra developed a plan for closer integration of the MMO and IFCAs. One important outcome of the plan was the development of a shared intelligence system. IFCA’s have statutory powers to prosecute fisheries offences in the criminal courts with unlimited fines. Offences, for which the IFCA may prosecute include byelaw infringements and certain national legislation. IFCAs offences also include intentional obstruction of an officer in the performance of any of their duties (maximum fine £20,000). Where a person or business is found guilty of an offence, the Authority will ask the court that its prosecution costs are met by the defendant(s). This could amount to many thousands of pounds where a not guilty plea is made and in a defended case, although the court is at liberty to refuse or limit costs awarded. Prosecution is not the only sanction available to IFCAs. An IFCA can in most cases decide the way in which it takes action for a suspected fisheries offence. Options range from a verbal warning issued when a minor infringement of fisheries legislation is detected, to Fixed Administrative Penalties which may be up to £10,000, as an alternative to criminal prosecution in certain circumstances. A prosecution will only commence if there is a realistic prospect of conviction given the available evidence. If a case does not pass this test it will not go ahead regardless of how important or serious it may be. Moreover, a prosecution must also be in the public interest (CPS, 2018). In order to prosecute a case in court an IFCA must have established a body of formal evidence including witness statements, exhibits etc as would be expected from any prosecuting authority to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.
Current levels of enforcement in English inshore MPAs The English inshore marine area managed by IFCAs covers a combined area of approximately 16,000 km2 (AIFCA, 2019a) which is roughly twice the land area of Wales. The patrol area of the IFCAs surface assets (patrol boats) are inevitably limited as is their patrol capacity; they are tasked not just with the protection of MPAs but with the multitude of other fisheries management controls as well. Whilst the number and complexity of MPA management measures is increasing, sea-based fisheries enforcement patrols in inshore waters, according to the best available data (AIFCA, 2019b), has been relatively stable over the last 8 years with around 781 patrols being conducted in 2017/18 resulting in 7693 boarding’s of fishing vessels: The number of inspections in the time period being around twice the number of fishing vessels in the fleet. This picture of regional enforcement is in contrast to nationally coordinated enforcement, which can be seen to be decreasing: in both inshore and offshore areas. The Royal Navy Fisheries Protection Squadron (FPS) boarded 278 vessels within British fishery limits in 2016/17. This is a fall in boarding’s of 40% compared to the previous financial year. 278 is the lowest annual number of boarding’s in at least 18 years, and represents a decrease of 84% since 1999/00. This overall downward trend averages an 8% fall each financial year
500
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
(MOD, 2017). Moreover aerial capacity is now virtually absent, the UK MMO, across all the UK Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) has reduced surveillance flights by 97.5% from historic levels of 1000 h a year (2000/01e2010/11) to just 25 h in 2015/16 (Enevera et al., 2017). No systematic assessment of fisheries enforcement has been conducted in England since 2003 (before the MPA network was implemented). Even in 2003, when there were a significantly greater number of seaborne fisheries inspections there was ‘less than 1% chance that a vessel will be inspected at sea on any one day of fishing’ (NAO, 2003). What do the levels of inspections and patrols tell us about the effectiveness of inshore MPA enforcement? In short, very little, other than that assets are being deployed in these areas and to a lesser or greater extent this will act as a deterrent to non-compliance. Non-compliance is nonetheless, by its very nature, difficult to quantify. The clandestine nature of the activity is not well suited to quantitative analysis. Furthermore, in the absence of reporting of crime (or suitable methods for recording such data), indications of success of enforcement are limited. The details of fisheries patrol activity do not describe the outcomes of the mission of the patrol. Fisheries patrol assets are deployed for numerous tasks and there is no indication or assessment of the deployment of surface assets to marine MPAs. Notwithstanding the above assessment, two additional externalities have occurred which must be considered when interpreting the information presented here. Firstly, in offshore areas the introduction of Vessel Monitoring System (VMS) data has significantly improved the intelligence available for directing patrols effectively and secondly, both IFCAs and FPS (via MMO taskings) have adopted an ‘intelligence led risk-based approach’ which will, if successful improve effectiveness. With regards to MPA management and the use of VMS however, it is of note that there are currently no examples of courts accepting evidence of fishing illegal activity ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ based on VMS data alone and in the absence of other corroborating evidence. Currently VMS alone therefore does not remove the need for other forms of evidence to secure evidence of a breach of fishing regulations in areas where fishing is prohibited. This is challenging because infringements against MPA legislation do not involve crimes against a person or individual’s property, therefore there is an increased risk that the crime will go undetected or unreported. This risk is compounded by the fact that even in inshore waters there are a limited number of potential witnesses to any infringement and a poor understanding in the wider community of highly complex rules within MPAs. Consequently, the assertion that a risk-based approach reduces the need for inspections requires challenge, particularly in the context of an increase in the need for protection of MPAs.
MPA infringements in English inshore MPAs e unknown In the past 8 years there have been 229 prosecutions brought by the IFCAs, 1289 verbal warnings, 798 written warnings and 174 fixed administrative penalties issued (AIFCA, 2019b); no indication of whether these prosecutions relate to MPAs are available. Druel and Veitch’s (2016) research gives an indication of the level of detection of illegal fishing in UK waters as a whole, and they found that for fisheries infringement, in 2009 there were 64 prosecutions with 64 guilty verdicts obtained in local Magistrates Courts. In 2010 there
Incentives and compliance in the management of inshore MPAs
501
were 49 prosecutions with 44 guilty verdicts and in 2011 there were 39 prosecutions resulting in 27 guilty verdicts. In 2013 there were only 12 prosecutions, in 2014 there were 49 prosecutions, in 2015 there were 53 prosecutions, and in 2016 there were only 8 prosecutions. Prior to the implementation of the UK’s MPA network in 2003, the UK’s National Audit Office found that ‘from a sample of court cases from 2000 to 2001 . fine imposed would be about 1.7 times the value of the infringement detected and prosecuted.’ (NAO, 2003).
Incentives and compliance in the management of inshore MPAs According to general deterrence theory, compliance is expected to be most heavily influenced by three key factors: 1) the potential economic gains from the illegal activity; 2) the perceived risk of detection; and 3) the severity of sanctions (Becker, 1968; Sutinen et al.,1990; Kuperan and Sutinen, 1998; Nielsen and Mathiesen, 2000). Given available evidence it is possible to consider these compliance factors in the context of the development of the inshore MPA network in England.
The potential economic gain from the activity Incentives to fish illegally are increased where higher fish densities are found inside MPA boundaries (Jennings, 2000). Despite the best efforts of managers and those charged with enforcement, fishing contrary to MPA regulations can result because the immediate economic incentive to fish remains strong. An example of such an incentive is provided by the case of bottom towed fishing gear restrictions in MPAs in areas where king scallops (Pecten maximus) are found. There is a coincidence of scallops within MPAs designated and managed to protect ‘reef’ communities, in particular in unconsolidated reefs, or the interstitial habitats within and between reefs. Certain of these habitats are favoured by scallop dredgers using the Newhaven type scallop dredge. The conservation impact of scallop dredging is high; ‘of all the fishing gears, scallop dredges are considered to be the most damaging to non-target benthic communities and seafloor habitats’ (Howarth and Stewart, 2014) but their catches are valuable. Official landing statistics show that an under 15 m scallop dredger made, on average, a gross income of £145,000 in 2017 (Seafish, 2018) and was on average fishing for 95 days a year. Therefore, in a purely hypothetical context, the scallop catch per day, was on average £1500 (Seafish, 2018) equating to 0.55 tonnes of scallops per day (MMO, 2018). Scallops can respond well to spatial closures and there is evidence that the biomass of such sessile benthic organisms can increase substantially within an MPA. For example, in the Port Erin Closed Area, Isle of Man, a small 2 km2 area closed to towed gears has yielded an exploitable scallop biomass 20 times higher than that outside of the reserve (BeukersStewart et al., 2005). Similarly, in the Lamlash Bay No-Take Zone (NTZ), Isle of Arran, Scotland, the reproductive biomass has been shown to be 185% higher in the NTZ than outside (Axelsson et al., 2009). These figures are indicative of the potential for economic gain from illegal scallop dredging in an MPA with suitable habitat, where bottom towed fishing gear is restricted. The financial
502
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
incentive for non-compliance in certain instances is therefore high and the ecological consequences of non-compliance significant. Such data and analysis provide the basis of an assessment of a risk factor associated with likelihood and impact.
The perceived risk of detection Based on conventional economic theory and models of deterrence (Becker, 1968), fishermen can be expected to make decisions to comply or not with a fishing regulation by comparing the expected penalty, adjusted by the likelihood that they will be detected, cited, and prosecuted, with the expected illegal gain (reviewed in Ref. Kuperan and Suitenen, 1998). If the total number of English IFCA fisheries patrol vessels is divided by the total inshore sea area, then on average each vessel has a patrol area of 640 km2 (an area by way of comparison greater than The New Forest National Park). Add to this the remote nature of MPAs (out of sight of the majority of population), coupled with the complexity of the regulations, (designed as they are to be proportionate to the protection of MPA features, rather than necessarily optimised for a simplified task of detection), and the scale of the enforcement challenge is elucidated.
Level of fines In their review of fisheries offences more generally, Druel and Veitch (2016), concluded that the overall number of fisheries prosecutions in England in recent years is low, and furthermore that even where successful prosecutions are brought, fines appear to be set at a low rate. There is no central database of fisheries infringements, and by extension no database of infringements in MPAs. A search of local newspapers and IFCA websites reveal certain details, for example as a result of a joint MMO and IFCA investigation, in October 2014 a vessel owner and master were ordered to pay respectively £5620 (of which £3000 fine, £2500 costs and £120 victim surcharge) and £6620 (of which £4000 fine, £2500 costs and £120 victim surcharge), for illegally fishing for scallops in Lyme Bay MPA. Considering these figures in relation to the daily and annual value of scallop dredging indicated above suggests a considerable incentive for non-compliance: To the extent that prosecution for non-compliance could rationally be considered a relatively trivial business expense, which in any event may well not be incurred. Studies of US fisheries have determined that expected penalties are generally small relative to illegal gains (King et al., 2009) and although a similar analysis is not possible in England as suitable records are not available, it is clear that there is a pressing need to establish a national record of compliance monitoring and crime detection in English inshore MPAs. Non-compliance is nonetheless, by its very nature, difficult to quantify. The clandestine nature of the activity is not well suited to quantitative analysis. Furthermore, in the absence of reporting of crime (or suitable methods for recording such data), indications of success of enforcement are limited.
Conclusions In conclusion, the extent of the area designated as an MPA and the number and type of fishing operators active in English inshore waters creates an enforcement and compliance challenge. Whilst the timing and process of designation of MPAs and their various origins,
Conclusions
503
has been necessary to meet conservation targets, the variety and extent of the MPAs raises compliance issues which have been subject to limited critical assessment, but these components of management will be critical to the success of the MPAs meeting their objectives. With regards to inshore fisheries, the most widespread of ongoing commercial activity in inshore waters, the implications for compliance created by the process of implementing management are only now emerging through practice. The lessons emerging from the English MPA management process can be used to inform ongoing and future MPA management strategies elsewhere. The separation of fisheries management of MPAs from the designation of sites introduces challenges for managers and these can be understood from a compliance perspective in the context of the perceived legitimacy of the regulatory system. Because of the truncated process of designation of certain MPAs, communities effected by subsequent management (both positively and negatively) are separated from the policy origins of that management. Where this is problematic for cultural or economic reasons at a local scale, because for example of the loss of key fishing grounds to certain communities, this can act as a disincentive to compliance which may be significant. Where such challenges exist, reliance on traditional enforcement techniques alone; detection and fines, are unlikely to act as sufficient disincentives. In the examples presented here it can be seen that the management within MPAs is complex as is the variety of types and the policy origins of the MPAs. At a site level, so far as compliance and enforcement relates, the policy origins of the MPAs become less important than the regulatory systems which have been developed to support the objectives of the MPA. Given the challenge now facing site managers in England the preoccupation of governments and their agents should shift (both through communication strategies and resource) to support and aid community led compliance; this will require further integration of the disciplines of MPA management to include compliance and enforcement monitoring. Whilst the strategic systems for compliance and enforcement being developed by the IFCAs have the potential to support the management of MPAs and realise the benefits of a well-managed network of MPAs in English coastal waters further work is needed to integrate MPA compliance and management into a holistic MPA management process. Significant improvements in the coordination of assets has occurred since the IFCAs were created in 2011 and when compared to the current levels of offshore enforcement the inshore waters are subject to greater levels of compliance effort by surface assets. There remain significant deficiencies however, such as systems for recording detection from which the effectiveness of compliance can be monitored. Finally, the analysis presented here makes a case for the development of site level MPA compliance and enforcement strategies. Site level MPA management plans could usefully be informed by stakeholder analysis of the likelihood and severity of breaches to MPA regulations. Such an approach would build upon the existing process of risk management deployed by the IFCAs and be integrated into overall management plans for sites so as to establish a sense of place and pride in local MPAs. The process of developing such plans can increase community participation and brings with it the associated benefits of community orientated policing.
504
25. Enforcement capabilities and compliance in English Marine Protected Areas: the art of the possible
Conflict of Interest Statement The first author is employed as a Chief Officer of an Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority and therefore has an interest in the subject matter or materials discussed in this manuscript insofar as having responsibility for the development of management of English Inshore Marine Protected Areas. The second author is Chairman of an Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authority.
References AIFCA, 2017. Written Evidence Submitted by Dr Stephen Bolt, Chief Executive, the Association of Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities, on Behalf of the Ten Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities (IFCAs) to Environmental Audit committee enquiry; MPAs Revisited. MPA0006. Available online: http:// data.parliament.uk/WrittenEvidence/CommitteeEvidence.svc/EvidenceDocument/Environmental%20Audit /Marine%20Protection%20Areas%20Revisited/written/39917.html. AIFCA, 2019a. Management of Inshore MPAs by the IFCAs. Association of Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities, Kings Lynn, UK. Available online: http://www.association-ifca.org.uk/Upload/MPA/AIFCA%20Leaflet-2019%20v15-hires.pdf. AIFCA, 2019b. IFCAs Update. Coastal Futures Conference, 23e24 January, 2019. Royal Geographical Society, London. Available online: http://coastal-futures.net/wp-content/uploads/2019/01/Bolt-IFCAs-Update.pdf. Ares, E., White, C., 2018. Fisheries Management in the UK. House of Commons Library, Commons Library Briefing. Available online: http://researchbriefings.files.parliament.uk/documents/CBP-8457/CBP-8457.pdf. Axelsson, M., Dewey, S., Plastow, L., Doran, J., 2009. Mapping of Marine Habitats and Species within the Community Marine Conservation Area at Lamlash Bay. Aberdeen. Becker, G.S., 1968. Crime and punishment: an economic approach. Journal of Political Economy 76, 169e217. Beukers-Stewart, B.D., Vause, B.J., Mosley, M.W.J., Rossetti, H., Brand, A.R., 2005. Benefits of closed area protection for a population of scallops. Marine Ecology Progress Series 298, 189e204. Breen, P., Vanstaen, K., Clark, R.W.E., 2015. Mapping inshore fishing activity using aerial, land, and vesselbased sighting information. ICES Journal of Marine Science 72 (2), 467e479. https://doi.org/10.1093/icesjms/ fsu115. Byers, J.E., Noonburg, E.G., 2007. Poaching enforcement and the efficacy of marine reserves. Ecological Applications 17, 7. Ecological Society of America. https://doi.org/10.1890/07-0067.1. Causey, B.D., 1995. Enforcement in MPAs in MPAs Volume 5 of the Series Conservation Biology, pp. 119e148. Clark, R.W.E., Humphreys, J.H., Solandt, J.-L., Weller, C., 2017. Dialectics of nature: the emergence of policy on the management of commercial fisheries in english European marine sites. Marine Policy 78, 11e17. https://doi.org/ 10.1016/j.marpol.2016.12.021. Costello, C., Gaines, S.D., Lynham, J., 2008. Can catch shares prevent fisheries collapse? Science 321 (5896), 1678e1681. Coelho, P., Filipe, J., Ferreira, M., Pedro, M., 2008. Illegal fishing and economic analysis. Journal of Applied Mathematics 1. CPS, 2018. The Code for Crown Prosecutors. Criminal Prosecution Service. HMSO. Available online. www.cps.gov. uk/sites/default/files/documents/publications/Code-for-Crown-Prosecutors-October-2018.pdf. Dahens, L.A., Fanning, L.M., 2018. What counts in making marine protected areas (MPAs) count? The role of legitimacy in MPA success in Canada. Ecological Indicators 86, 45e57. Defra, 2012. Revised Approach to the Management of Commercial Fisheries in European Marine Sites: Overarching Policy and Delivery. Defra, London. Available online. https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/revisedapproach-to-the-management-of-commercial-fisheries-in-european-marine-sites-overarching-policy-and-delivery. Defra, 2015. Inshore Fisheries and Conservation Authorities Conduct and Operation 2010 e 2014. Presented to Parliament Pursuant to Section 183 (1) of the Marine and Coastal Access Act 2009. Defra, London. Available online. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 413425/ifca-review-2010-2014.pdf. Druel, E., Veitch, L., 2016. The Control and Enforcement of Fisheries in England. Client Earth. http://www. documents.clientearth.org/wp-content/uploads/library/2016-12-02-the-control-and-enforcement-of-fisheries-inengland-ce-en.pdf.
References
505
Edgar, G.J., Stuart-Smith, R.D., Willis, T.J., Kininmonth, S., Baker, S.C., Banks, S., Barrett, N.S., Becerro, M.A., Bernard, A.T.F., Berkhout, J., Buxton, C.D., Campbell, S.J., Cooper, A.T., Davey, M., Edgar, S.C., Försterra, G., Galvan, D.E., Irigoyen, A.J., Kushner, D.J., Moura, R., Parnell, P.E., Shears, N.T., Soler, G.A., Strain, E.M.A., Thomson, R.J., 2014. Global conservation outcomes depend on marine protected areas with five key features. Nature 506 (7487), 216e220. https://doi.org/10.1038/nature13022. Enevera, R., Lewinb, S., Reesec, A., Hooperd, T., 2017. Mapping fishing effort: combining fishermen’s knowledge with satellite monitoring data in English waters. Fisheries Research 189, 67e76. Howarth, L.M., Stewart, B.D., 2014. The Dredge Fishery for Scallops in the United Kingdom (UK): Effects on Marine Ecosystems and Proposals for Future Management. Report to the Sustainable Inshore Fisheries Trust. Marine Ecosystem Management Report No. 5. University of York, 54 pp. Jennings, S., 2000. Patterns and prediction of population recovery in marine reserves. Reviews in Fish Biology and Fisheries 10, 209e231. Jentoft, S., McCay, B.J., Wilson, D.C., 1998. Social theory and fisheries co-management. Marine Policy 22 (4e5), 423e436. Jones, PJS., Burgess, J., 2005. Building partnership capacity for the collaborative management of marine protected areas in the UK: a preliminary analysis. Journal of Environmental Management 77 (3), 227e243. https:// doi.org/10.1016/j.jenvman.2005.04.004. Jones, P.S., 2012. Marine protected areas in the UK: challenges in combining top-down and bottom-up approaches to governance. Environmental Conservation 39 (3), 248e258. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0376892912000136. King, D.M., Porter, R.D., Price, E.W., 2009. Reassessing the Value of U.S. Coast Guard At-Sea Fishery Enforcement. Ocean Development & International Law 40, 350e372. https://doi.org/10.1080/00908320903285414. Kuperan, K., Sutinen, J.G., 1998. Blue water crime: deterrence, legitimacy, and compliance in fisheries. Law & Society Review 32, 309e338. Maliao, R.J., Webb, E.L., Jensen, K.R., 2004. A survey of stock of the donkey’s ear abalone, Haliotis asinina L. in Sagay Marine Reserve, Philippines: evaluating the effectiveness of marine protected area (MPA) enforcement. Fisheries Research 66, 343e353. Mayntz, R., 2011. Legality, legitimacy and compliance. In: Bandelow, N., Hegelich, S. (Eds.), Pluralismus e Strategien e Entscheidungen. VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden. MOD, 2017. Military Aid to Civil Authorities 2016/17 MOD. Available online. https://www.gov.uk/government/ statistics/military-aid-to-civil-authorities-financial-year-201617. MMO, 2016. Managing Fisheries in Marine Protected Areas: Approach and Process Overview. Available onlines. https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/ 538394/Approach_and_Process_overview_-_Managing_Fisheries_in_MPAs.pdf. MMO, 2018. UK Sea Fisheries Statistics (2017). Marine Management Organisation, Newcastle. NAO, 2003. Fisheries Enforcement in England. HMSO, London. Available online. https://www.nao.org.uk/report/ fisheries-enforcement-in-england/. Nielsen, J.R., Mathiesen, C., 2000. Important factors influencing rule compliance in fisheries: lessons from Danish fisheries. In: Proceedings of the IIFET 2000 Conference, Portland, OR. July 10-14, 2000. Ostrom, E., 2015. Governing the Commons. The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge. UK. Seafish, 2018. Economics of the UK Fishing Fleet. Seafish, UK. Available online. https://www.seafish.org/media/ 1812992/economics_of_the_uk_fishing_fleet_2017.pdf. Sutinen, J.G., Rieser, A., Gauvin, J.R., 1990. Measuring and explaining noncompliance in federally managed fisheries. Ocean Development & International Law 21, 335e372. Symes, D., Phillipson, J., 1997. Inshore fisheries management in the UK: sea fisheries committees and the challenge of marine environmental management. Marine Policy 21 (3), 207e224. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(97) 00002-X. The Conservative Party, 2015. The Conservative Party Manifesto 2015. Available Online. https://www. conservatives.com/manifesto2015. Tolbert, P.S., Hall, R.H., 2009. Organizations: Structures, Processes and Outcomes. Prentice Hall, UK.