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Equality of recruitment: Gender parity in French National Assembly elections
The Social Science Journal 44 (2007) 83–90
Equality of recruitment: Gender parity in French National Assembly elections Priscilla L. Southwell ∗ , Courtney P. Smith Department of Political Science, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, United States
Abstract This research centers on the effects of the newly mandated gender parity on French electoral politics. We examine the results from the 2002 National Assembly elections. Our findings suggest that this Parity Law contributed to the modest increase in the number of female deputies elected to the National Assembly, but that the electoral success rate for female candidates declined from the previous elections in 1997. This result appears to have been affected by two factors: (1) a greater-than-average number of female candidates were affiliated with the Socialist party—the party that lost control of the government in this election and (2) many female candidates were running against male incumbents. Multivariate analysis suggests that, after these two factors are controlled for, female candidates were more likely to be elected in open seat contests than were male candidates. Preliminary analysis of roll call votes in the two most recent (1997–2004) legislative sessions suggests that party, not gender, is the main determinant of voting behavior. © 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction In the 2000 Session of the French National Assembly, a “Parit´e” Law was passed, requiring all parties to present an equal number of female and male candidates in the party lists for upcoming elections. By doing so, the French transformed a previously informal norm with the parties to a mandate for French elections. The goal of this research is assess the impact of this Parity Law on French politics—to determine if parity increased the number of female candidates, if it affected the success rate of female candidates, whether there was any variation among the political parties, and what impact it may have had on subsequent roll call voting behavior within the National Assembly. ∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 541 346 3950. E-mail address: [email protected] (P.L. Southwell).
0362-3319/$ – see front matter © 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc. doi:10.1016/j.soscij.2006.12.007
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2. Underrepresentation The push for increased representation among women had been building for several decades in French politics. This drive was spurred, in part, by France’s relative low numbers of female politicians compared to most of its European neighbors.1 The percentage of female and minority representatives in legislative bodies is deemed important to many in France, and elsewhere, who argue that the absence of these demographic groups in a legislative body can have significant consequences for subsequent government policies (Jones, 1998; Thomas & Welsh, 1991). If members of a group are underrepresented grossly in terms of their population strength, then important issues may receive little or no consideration during the policy-making process (Reingold, 1992; Rule & Zimmerman, 1994) The assumption is that women legislators will be more likely to be aware of and responsive to issues that directly affect women—more extensive research on breast cancer, child care issues, better pay for nurses, etc. (Saint-Germain, 1989; Thomas, 1994). We approach this subject by focusing on the implementation of party list quotas for women, building on the previous research that has shown that such quotas do enhance women’s representation in these countries.2 Recent work by Jones (1996, 1998) analyzes Argentina’s “Law of Quotas,” a National Law requiring all political parties to place a minimum quota of women on their party lists for the election of national deputies. These studies conclude that the Argentine Law has been extremely successful in its initial goal of increasing the number of women deputies in the Argentine Chamber. (In 1995, post-Ley de Cupos, 25.7% of the Chamber was female.) In addition, initial evidence from Jones’s studies points to an increased emphasis on laws that will affect women and an increase in the number of legislative projects related to women, children, and families.
3. The political context of French parity Although French Parity Movement emerged in the early 1990s,3 it was not until after the National Assembly elections of 1997 that the government agreed to revise the Constitution and adopt parity legislation. The Gender Parity Law was first implemented in the municipal elections of March 11 and 18, 2001, which resulted in the proportion of women town councilors more than doubling from 21.9 to 47.5% in municipalities with more than 3500 residents (Dauphin, 2002). Similarly, in the elections to the French Senate in September of 2001, those 74 races in which the Parity Law was applicable (those using proportional representation) resulted in an increase from 5 to 20 female senators. In those 28 remaining Senate contests where parity was not applicable (those using single member districts), the number of women stayed the same, at two (Document de Travail, 2003). Immediately prior to the National Assembly elections, in May 2002, France conducted its presidential election. This election initially sent shockwaves across the world, as far-right candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen of the National Front party ousted the incumbent Socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, in the first round of voting. The second round of the balloting, however, illustrated a very different dynamic. Chastened voters, in fear of Le Pen’s power,
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overwhelmingly rejected Le Pen’s brand of right-wing extremism, electing Jacques Chirac 82.15–17.85% (Roger, 2002; “The Center Holds in France,” 2002). This fear-induced push to the center in the second round of the Presidential election was seen by many as having extended to the legislative elections in June 2002. Apprehensive of inadvertently electing extreme candidates, many French voters, particularly Socialists and Communist ones, turned to more moderate parties or coalitions such as the L’Union pour un Mouvement Populaire or Union for a Popular Movement (UMP). As a result, the UMP captured ´ a majority (352) of the 577 seats in the National Assembly (L’Ann´ee Politique: Economique et Sociale, 2002).
4. Parity and the 2002 National Assembly elections From the standpoint of gender parity, the 2002 elections were a modest success. The number of female deputies increased 63 (10.9%) in 1997 to 71 (12.3%) in 2002. Table 1 compares gender differences between the 2002 and 2004 National Assembly. It reveals that 19.4% of the first-time (nonincumbent) deputies in 2002 were women. Although only about 10% of all deputies are elected on the first ballot (which requires a simple majority of the votes), very few of these women were elected this easily. Of the 58 deputies elected on the first ballot, only three of them (or 5.2%) were women. The lower portion of Table 2 shows the distribution of women among the various party groupings with the current National Assembly.4 The Socialist Party and the Communist/Republican Group included a higher proportion of women, 15.6 and 18.2%, respectively, as compared to the UMP and UDF party Groups, which included only 10.5 and 3.3%, respectively. This finding is not surprising, given that both the Socialist and Communist parties made pre-electoral commitments in 1997 to adopt a 30% quota for women, so these parties had already become this process before the National Parity Law was passed (Allwood & Wadia, 2000). Table 2 provides an analysis of female candidates in the 2002 National Assembly election as compared to the 1997 elections. Table 1 Electoral status and party groups of deputies in the 2002–2004 National Assembly a
Percent of all deputies (n = 577) Percent of newly elected deputiesa (n = 175) Percent of deputies elected on first ballota (n = 58) Percent of Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)a (n = 362) Percent of Socialist (PS)a (n = 147) Percent of Union for French Democracy (UDF)a (n = 30) Communist and Republicans (PC)a (n = 22) Indeterminate (n = 13)a,b
Men (n)
Women (n)
87.7 (506) 80.6 (141) 94.8 (55) 89.5 (324) 84.4 (124) 96.7 (29) 81.8 (18) 84.6 (11)
12.3 (71) 19.4 (34) 5.2 (3) 10.5 (38) 15.6 (23) 3.3 (1) 18.2 (4) 15.4 (2)
Source: French National Assembly (2003). http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/tribun/comm6.asp. a Figures are row percentages. b Does not include three vacant seats.
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Table 2 Electoral success of candidates in the 1997 and 2002 National Assembly elections a
All candidates in 1997 election (6359) All candidates in 2002 electiona (8456) Success rate of all candidatesb in 1997 election Success rate of all candidatesb in 2002 election
Men (n)
Women (n)
77% (4895) 61.1% (5168) 10.5% 9.8%
23% (1464) 38.9 (3288) 4.3% 2.2%
Source: French National Assembly (2003). a Figures are row percentages. b Figures are column percentages.
As expected, the Parity Law resulted in larger number of female candidates in 2002. In 1997, female candidates made up 23% of all candidates on the first round of these elections, while in 2002, this figure rose to 38.1%. Clearly, more female candidates were being recruited to run for office. However, these female candidates in 2002 were not as successful as they had been in 1997, and much less successful than male candidates in both elections. Only 2.2% of all female candidates in 2002 were elected, as compared to the 4.3% figure for female candidates in 1997. Male candidates were more likely to be elected than female candidates in both 1997 and 2002 (10.5 and 9.8%, respectively), but the gap between the success rates of men and women widened in the 2002 election. Although female candidates fared better in second round candidates, the gap between the male and female candidates persisted. These results could have resulted from several factors: (1) women were more likely to run under a Socialist label—the party that experienced the greatest losses in this particular election or (2) these newly recruited women were often running against male incumbents. Addressing this first possible explanation, we analyzed the partisan affiliation of the female candidates in the second round of these elections (where both candidates can be deemed viable). Table 3 analyzes all second round candidates that included a female candidate (220 out of 519 contests). This table confirms that a substantial proportion (41.4%) of female candidates in 2002 were from the Socialist party, but due to their party’s losses, made up only 33.8% of all female candidates who were actually elected. The opposite occurred for female candidates who were part of the Union for a Presidential Majority (UMP); such female candidates enjoyed a success rate of 42.1%, topped only by the much smaller UDF and Communist parties. Table 3 Party affiliation of female candidates in second round contestsa 2002 National Assembly elections Percent of total female candidatesb (n = 222) Percent of total female candidates electedb (n = 71) Success rate of female candidatesc (average = 30.6) a b c
UMP
PS
Verts
34.2 (76)
41.4 (92)
4.5 (10)
5.9 (13)
2.3 (5)
1.8 (4)
9.9 (18)
47.1 (32)
33.8 (23)
1.5 (1)
0
7.4 (5)
4.4 (3)
5.8 (4)
42.1
25
10
FN
0
Note: Only 222 of 519 second round contests included a female candidate. Figures are row percentages. Figures are column percentages.
PC
100
UDF
75
Other
22.2
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Table 4 Average margin of victory: female and male candidates in second round contestsa 2002 National Assembly elections Female challenger vs. 40.1% N = 111
Male incumbent 59.3%
Female open seat candidate vs. 46.3% N = 50
Male open seat candidate 51.2%
Female incumbent vs. 52.6% N = 38
Male challenger 45.9%
a Note: Dependent variable is 1 if a female candidate was the winner; 0 if a male candidate was the winner. Only 222 of 519 second round contests included a female candidate; This analysis excludes the 12 second round contests with two female candidates; percentages do not total to 100% due to some races that included three candidates on second ballot.
Table 4 suggests that female candidates fare better when they were running as incumbents, but even when they were running against a male candidate in an open seat, they were likely to receive a smaller percentage of the vote than their male opponent. This table also underscores a major obstacle for female candidate in this election—the most common configuration is a male incumbent running against a female challenger. Of the 222 second round contests involving at least one female candidate, exactly one-half of them (111) pitted a female challenger against a male incumbent—not a scenario that was likely to result in a greater number of female candidates being elected. Were these female challengers being recruited by the parties primarily in those contests where the odds were stacked against them?5 However, when we simultaneously control for both the factor of incumbency and party membership, the bivariate results of Table 4 are transformed somewhat. The following multivariate analysis in Table 5 controls for incumbency, open seat, and party membership as factors in affecting whether or not a female candidate was victorious. The results suggest that female candidate were more likely to be elected in open seat contests, after controlling for party membership. Female incumbents are actually more likely than male incumbents to be re-elected to office. These results suggest that electability of female candidates is affected more by the fortunes of their own party than by considerations of gender. Table 5 Effect of party, incumbency, and open seat on female winnera 2002 National Assembly elections Variable
Model
UMP candidate Female incumbent Female open seat Intercept
1.85*** (.41) 4.51*** (.87) 3.54*** (.82) −4.35 (.85)
N = 199. Source: French National Assembly (2003). http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/resultats/carte/ index.htm. a Entries are probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p > .01.
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5. Gender and National Assembly voting patterns If the increased representation for women matters, it should have identifiable consequences for the policy process, as discussed above. Do women vote differently than men? We did a preliminary analysis of voting in the Fifth Republic’s 12th legislature (July 3, 2002–July 27, 2004). During this period there were only 40 roll call votes (scrutins publics), and almost all of these votes were along party lines. Only 201 votes, out of a total 18,078 recorded votes, or less than 2%, were those in which a deputy voted against the majority of his or her party. Of these 201 votes, 34 (16.9%) were cast by women. This figure is only slightly above the percentage of female deputies in the National Assembly. Looking at a larger data set, the 66 roll call votes during the previous 11th legislature (October 1997–January 2002), a similar pattern emerges. Out of a total of 31,839 recorded votes, only 887 were nonparty votes. Female deputies only made up 10.9% of the Assembly during this time, and they cast only 83 (9.4%) of these nonparty votes. However, these figures only reveal aggregate voting patterns, and, on a few roll call votes, female deputies were more likely to deviate from the party line than male deputies. Two of these bills (propositions) involve social policy and the other two involve issues related to the European Union, as shown in Table 6 below. In all of these examples, these female deputies, although from different parties, voted in a similar direction. These women voted for gender parity and the “Civil Pact” that would allow gays and lesbians to enter into formal unions, and were opposed to the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU resolution establishing a single currency, and the most recent laws regulating religious attire in schools. These nonparty votes were largely symbolic gestures on the part of these female deputies, as all of these bills passed overwhelmingly. Yet, in many of these examples, these women were the sole dissenting vote within their party. Nonetheless, these findings suggest that party allegiance, rather than gender or any other consideration, was the main determinant of roll call voting behavior in these two legislative sessions. An unexamined, and perhaps crucial, aspect of legislative behavior is what role female deputies may have played in determining which bills were drafted, whether they had any impact in the amending process, or what contribution that may have made to the political debate on proposed legislation. Table 6 Analysis of selected roll call votes, National Assembly, 11th and 12th legislatures (1997–2004) Legislation
Total votesa
Nonparty votes
Female % of nonparty votes
Laity Law for public schools Gender parity for overseas territories Ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam Solidarity Pact Ratification of EU common currency
561 341 522 564 383
67 4 50 8 26
21.9 50 14 37.5 19.2
a
577 total possible votes.
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6. Conclusions This preliminary analysis of France’s new Electoral Law suggests that the parity requirement has resulted, after one election, in a slight increase in the number of female deputies elected to the French National Assembly. A greater number of female candidates were aligned with the Socialist party than with other parties, so the Socialist setbacks in this election reduced the number of successful female candidates. Many female candidates also faced the obstacle of running against male incumbents. However, after controlling for these two factors, female candidates appear to fare much better then their male counterparts in open seat elections, and their incumbency advantage was stronger than that of male incumbents. These findings suggest that changing party fortunes or an increase in the number of female incumbents will be the main factors that influence the number of female deputies in future elections in France. Notes 1. In 2001, with only 10.9% female legislators, France was ranked second to the last among EU members. 2. See also Dahlerop, 1988; Kolinsky, 1991; Phillips, 1991. 3. For an excellent analysis of the history of the French parity movement, see Mazur (2001). 4. Deputies who become government ministers must relinquish their seats to a substitute (suppl´eant). Gaspard, Servan-Schreiber, and Le Gall (1997) note that these substitutes are more often male, and the number of female deputies in the National Assembly often decreases once these ministerial appointment are made. 5. Allwood and Wadia (2000) argue that an additional reason why female candidates are less likely to be placed in winnable elections is due to the widespread use in France of multiple mandates (cumul des mandats) that allow candidates for the National Assembly to also hold a local office such a deputy-mayor. References Allwood, G., & Wadia, K. (2000). Women and politics in France 1958–2000. London: Routledge. ´ L’Ann´ee Politique: Economie et Sociale (2002). Paris: Editions Evenements & Tendances. The Center Holds in France. (2002, May 6). The New York Times, p. A1. Dahlerop, D. (1988). From a small to a large minority: women in Scandinavian politics. Scandinavian Political Studies, 11(4), 275–298. ´ ´ Dauphin, S. (2002). La Parit´e a` l’Epreuve des Elections Municipales de Mars 2001. Modern and Contemporary France, 10(1), 59–73. Document de Travail. (2003, January 10). Application de la loi du 6 juin 2000 dite sur la parit´e aux e´ lections legislatives de juin 2002. http://www.observatiore-parite.gouv.fr/dossier/investiture.html. French National Assembly. (2003). http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/resultats/carte/index.htm. Gaspard, F., Servan-Schreiber, C., & Le Gall, A. (1997). Au pouvoir citoyennes! Libert´e, Egalit´e, Parit´e. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1992. Jones, M. P. (1996). Increasing women’s representation via gender quotas: The Argentine Ley de Cupos. Women & Politics, 16(1), 75–99.
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Jones, M. P. (1998). Gender quotas, electoral laws, and the election of women: Lessons from the Argentine provinces. Comparative Political Studies, 31(1), 3–21. Kolinsky, E. (1991). Women’s quotas in West Germany. Western European Politics, 14(1), 56–72. Mazur, A. G. (2001). Drawing lessons from the French Parity movement. Contemporary French Civilization, 25(Part 2), 201–220. Phillips, A. (1991). Engineering democracy. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University. Reingold, B. (1992). Concepts of representation among female and male state legislators. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17(4), 509–537. Roger, P. (2002, June 2). Le FN au second tour dans plus de 300 circonscriptions? Le Monde, 1. Rule, W., & Zimmerman, J. F. (1994). United States electoral systems: Their impact on women and minorities. New York: Praeger. Saint-Germain, M.S. (1989). Does their difference make a difference? The impact of women on public policy in Arizona legislature. eric.ed.gov. Thomas, S., & Welsh, S. (1991). The Impact of Gender on Activities and Priorities of State Legislators. Western Political Quarterly, 44, 445–456.
Equality of recruitment: Gender parity in French National Assembly elections Priscilla L. Southwell ∗ , Courtney P. Smith Department of Political Science, University of Oregon, Eugene, OR 97403, United States
Abstract This research centers on the effects of the newly mandated gender parity on French electoral politics. We examine the results from the 2002 National Assembly elections. Our findings suggest that this Parity Law contributed to the modest increase in the number of female deputies elected to the National Assembly, but that the electoral success rate for female candidates declined from the previous elections in 1997. This result appears to have been affected by two factors: (1) a greater-than-average number of female candidates were affiliated with the Socialist party—the party that lost control of the government in this election and (2) many female candidates were running against male incumbents. Multivariate analysis suggests that, after these two factors are controlled for, female candidates were more likely to be elected in open seat contests than were male candidates. Preliminary analysis of roll call votes in the two most recent (1997–2004) legislative sessions suggests that party, not gender, is the main determinant of voting behavior. © 2007 Published by Elsevier Inc.
1. Introduction In the 2000 Session of the French National Assembly, a “Parit´e” Law was passed, requiring all parties to present an equal number of female and male candidates in the party lists for upcoming elections. By doing so, the French transformed a previously informal norm with the parties to a mandate for French elections. The goal of this research is assess the impact of this Parity Law on French politics—to determine if parity increased the number of female candidates, if it affected the success rate of female candidates, whether there was any variation among the political parties, and what impact it may have had on subsequent roll call voting behavior within the National Assembly. ∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +1 541 346 3950. E-mail address: [email protected] (P.L. Southwell).
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2. Underrepresentation The push for increased representation among women had been building for several decades in French politics. This drive was spurred, in part, by France’s relative low numbers of female politicians compared to most of its European neighbors.1 The percentage of female and minority representatives in legislative bodies is deemed important to many in France, and elsewhere, who argue that the absence of these demographic groups in a legislative body can have significant consequences for subsequent government policies (Jones, 1998; Thomas & Welsh, 1991). If members of a group are underrepresented grossly in terms of their population strength, then important issues may receive little or no consideration during the policy-making process (Reingold, 1992; Rule & Zimmerman, 1994) The assumption is that women legislators will be more likely to be aware of and responsive to issues that directly affect women—more extensive research on breast cancer, child care issues, better pay for nurses, etc. (Saint-Germain, 1989; Thomas, 1994). We approach this subject by focusing on the implementation of party list quotas for women, building on the previous research that has shown that such quotas do enhance women’s representation in these countries.2 Recent work by Jones (1996, 1998) analyzes Argentina’s “Law of Quotas,” a National Law requiring all political parties to place a minimum quota of women on their party lists for the election of national deputies. These studies conclude that the Argentine Law has been extremely successful in its initial goal of increasing the number of women deputies in the Argentine Chamber. (In 1995, post-Ley de Cupos, 25.7% of the Chamber was female.) In addition, initial evidence from Jones’s studies points to an increased emphasis on laws that will affect women and an increase in the number of legislative projects related to women, children, and families.
3. The political context of French parity Although French Parity Movement emerged in the early 1990s,3 it was not until after the National Assembly elections of 1997 that the government agreed to revise the Constitution and adopt parity legislation. The Gender Parity Law was first implemented in the municipal elections of March 11 and 18, 2001, which resulted in the proportion of women town councilors more than doubling from 21.9 to 47.5% in municipalities with more than 3500 residents (Dauphin, 2002). Similarly, in the elections to the French Senate in September of 2001, those 74 races in which the Parity Law was applicable (those using proportional representation) resulted in an increase from 5 to 20 female senators. In those 28 remaining Senate contests where parity was not applicable (those using single member districts), the number of women stayed the same, at two (Document de Travail, 2003). Immediately prior to the National Assembly elections, in May 2002, France conducted its presidential election. This election initially sent shockwaves across the world, as far-right candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen of the National Front party ousted the incumbent Socialist Prime Minister, Lionel Jospin, in the first round of voting. The second round of the balloting, however, illustrated a very different dynamic. Chastened voters, in fear of Le Pen’s power,
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overwhelmingly rejected Le Pen’s brand of right-wing extremism, electing Jacques Chirac 82.15–17.85% (Roger, 2002; “The Center Holds in France,” 2002). This fear-induced push to the center in the second round of the Presidential election was seen by many as having extended to the legislative elections in June 2002. Apprehensive of inadvertently electing extreme candidates, many French voters, particularly Socialists and Communist ones, turned to more moderate parties or coalitions such as the L’Union pour un Mouvement Populaire or Union for a Popular Movement (UMP). As a result, the UMP captured ´ a majority (352) of the 577 seats in the National Assembly (L’Ann´ee Politique: Economique et Sociale, 2002).
4. Parity and the 2002 National Assembly elections From the standpoint of gender parity, the 2002 elections were a modest success. The number of female deputies increased 63 (10.9%) in 1997 to 71 (12.3%) in 2002. Table 1 compares gender differences between the 2002 and 2004 National Assembly. It reveals that 19.4% of the first-time (nonincumbent) deputies in 2002 were women. Although only about 10% of all deputies are elected on the first ballot (which requires a simple majority of the votes), very few of these women were elected this easily. Of the 58 deputies elected on the first ballot, only three of them (or 5.2%) were women. The lower portion of Table 2 shows the distribution of women among the various party groupings with the current National Assembly.4 The Socialist Party and the Communist/Republican Group included a higher proportion of women, 15.6 and 18.2%, respectively, as compared to the UMP and UDF party Groups, which included only 10.5 and 3.3%, respectively. This finding is not surprising, given that both the Socialist and Communist parties made pre-electoral commitments in 1997 to adopt a 30% quota for women, so these parties had already become this process before the National Parity Law was passed (Allwood & Wadia, 2000). Table 2 provides an analysis of female candidates in the 2002 National Assembly election as compared to the 1997 elections. Table 1 Electoral status and party groups of deputies in the 2002–2004 National Assembly a
Percent of all deputies (n = 577) Percent of newly elected deputiesa (n = 175) Percent of deputies elected on first ballota (n = 58) Percent of Union for a Popular Movement (UMP)a (n = 362) Percent of Socialist (PS)a (n = 147) Percent of Union for French Democracy (UDF)a (n = 30) Communist and Republicans (PC)a (n = 22) Indeterminate (n = 13)a,b
Men (n)
Women (n)
87.7 (506) 80.6 (141) 94.8 (55) 89.5 (324) 84.4 (124) 96.7 (29) 81.8 (18) 84.6 (11)
12.3 (71) 19.4 (34) 5.2 (3) 10.5 (38) 15.6 (23) 3.3 (1) 18.2 (4) 15.4 (2)
Source: French National Assembly (2003). http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/tribun/comm6.asp. a Figures are row percentages. b Does not include three vacant seats.
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Table 2 Electoral success of candidates in the 1997 and 2002 National Assembly elections a
All candidates in 1997 election (6359) All candidates in 2002 electiona (8456) Success rate of all candidatesb in 1997 election Success rate of all candidatesb in 2002 election
Men (n)
Women (n)
77% (4895) 61.1% (5168) 10.5% 9.8%
23% (1464) 38.9 (3288) 4.3% 2.2%
Source: French National Assembly (2003). a Figures are row percentages. b Figures are column percentages.
As expected, the Parity Law resulted in larger number of female candidates in 2002. In 1997, female candidates made up 23% of all candidates on the first round of these elections, while in 2002, this figure rose to 38.1%. Clearly, more female candidates were being recruited to run for office. However, these female candidates in 2002 were not as successful as they had been in 1997, and much less successful than male candidates in both elections. Only 2.2% of all female candidates in 2002 were elected, as compared to the 4.3% figure for female candidates in 1997. Male candidates were more likely to be elected than female candidates in both 1997 and 2002 (10.5 and 9.8%, respectively), but the gap between the success rates of men and women widened in the 2002 election. Although female candidates fared better in second round candidates, the gap between the male and female candidates persisted. These results could have resulted from several factors: (1) women were more likely to run under a Socialist label—the party that experienced the greatest losses in this particular election or (2) these newly recruited women were often running against male incumbents. Addressing this first possible explanation, we analyzed the partisan affiliation of the female candidates in the second round of these elections (where both candidates can be deemed viable). Table 3 analyzes all second round candidates that included a female candidate (220 out of 519 contests). This table confirms that a substantial proportion (41.4%) of female candidates in 2002 were from the Socialist party, but due to their party’s losses, made up only 33.8% of all female candidates who were actually elected. The opposite occurred for female candidates who were part of the Union for a Presidential Majority (UMP); such female candidates enjoyed a success rate of 42.1%, topped only by the much smaller UDF and Communist parties. Table 3 Party affiliation of female candidates in second round contestsa 2002 National Assembly elections Percent of total female candidatesb (n = 222) Percent of total female candidates electedb (n = 71) Success rate of female candidatesc (average = 30.6) a b c
UMP
PS
Verts
34.2 (76)
41.4 (92)
4.5 (10)
5.9 (13)
2.3 (5)
1.8 (4)
9.9 (18)
47.1 (32)
33.8 (23)
1.5 (1)
0
7.4 (5)
4.4 (3)
5.8 (4)
42.1
25
10
FN
0
Note: Only 222 of 519 second round contests included a female candidate. Figures are row percentages. Figures are column percentages.
PC
100
UDF
75
Other
22.2
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Table 4 Average margin of victory: female and male candidates in second round contestsa 2002 National Assembly elections Female challenger vs. 40.1% N = 111
Male incumbent 59.3%
Female open seat candidate vs. 46.3% N = 50
Male open seat candidate 51.2%
Female incumbent vs. 52.6% N = 38
Male challenger 45.9%
a Note: Dependent variable is 1 if a female candidate was the winner; 0 if a male candidate was the winner. Only 222 of 519 second round contests included a female candidate; This analysis excludes the 12 second round contests with two female candidates; percentages do not total to 100% due to some races that included three candidates on second ballot.
Table 4 suggests that female candidates fare better when they were running as incumbents, but even when they were running against a male candidate in an open seat, they were likely to receive a smaller percentage of the vote than their male opponent. This table also underscores a major obstacle for female candidate in this election—the most common configuration is a male incumbent running against a female challenger. Of the 222 second round contests involving at least one female candidate, exactly one-half of them (111) pitted a female challenger against a male incumbent—not a scenario that was likely to result in a greater number of female candidates being elected. Were these female challengers being recruited by the parties primarily in those contests where the odds were stacked against them?5 However, when we simultaneously control for both the factor of incumbency and party membership, the bivariate results of Table 4 are transformed somewhat. The following multivariate analysis in Table 5 controls for incumbency, open seat, and party membership as factors in affecting whether or not a female candidate was victorious. The results suggest that female candidate were more likely to be elected in open seat contests, after controlling for party membership. Female incumbents are actually more likely than male incumbents to be re-elected to office. These results suggest that electability of female candidates is affected more by the fortunes of their own party than by considerations of gender. Table 5 Effect of party, incumbency, and open seat on female winnera 2002 National Assembly elections Variable
Model
UMP candidate Female incumbent Female open seat Intercept
1.85*** (.41) 4.51*** (.87) 3.54*** (.82) −4.35 (.85)
N = 199. Source: French National Assembly (2003). http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/resultats/carte/ index.htm. a Entries are probit coefficients with standard errors in parentheses. ∗∗∗ p > .01.
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5. Gender and National Assembly voting patterns If the increased representation for women matters, it should have identifiable consequences for the policy process, as discussed above. Do women vote differently than men? We did a preliminary analysis of voting in the Fifth Republic’s 12th legislature (July 3, 2002–July 27, 2004). During this period there were only 40 roll call votes (scrutins publics), and almost all of these votes were along party lines. Only 201 votes, out of a total 18,078 recorded votes, or less than 2%, were those in which a deputy voted against the majority of his or her party. Of these 201 votes, 34 (16.9%) were cast by women. This figure is only slightly above the percentage of female deputies in the National Assembly. Looking at a larger data set, the 66 roll call votes during the previous 11th legislature (October 1997–January 2002), a similar pattern emerges. Out of a total of 31,839 recorded votes, only 887 were nonparty votes. Female deputies only made up 10.9% of the Assembly during this time, and they cast only 83 (9.4%) of these nonparty votes. However, these figures only reveal aggregate voting patterns, and, on a few roll call votes, female deputies were more likely to deviate from the party line than male deputies. Two of these bills (propositions) involve social policy and the other two involve issues related to the European Union, as shown in Table 6 below. In all of these examples, these female deputies, although from different parties, voted in a similar direction. These women voted for gender parity and the “Civil Pact” that would allow gays and lesbians to enter into formal unions, and were opposed to the Amsterdam Treaty, the EU resolution establishing a single currency, and the most recent laws regulating religious attire in schools. These nonparty votes were largely symbolic gestures on the part of these female deputies, as all of these bills passed overwhelmingly. Yet, in many of these examples, these women were the sole dissenting vote within their party. Nonetheless, these findings suggest that party allegiance, rather than gender or any other consideration, was the main determinant of roll call voting behavior in these two legislative sessions. An unexamined, and perhaps crucial, aspect of legislative behavior is what role female deputies may have played in determining which bills were drafted, whether they had any impact in the amending process, or what contribution that may have made to the political debate on proposed legislation. Table 6 Analysis of selected roll call votes, National Assembly, 11th and 12th legislatures (1997–2004) Legislation
Total votesa
Nonparty votes
Female % of nonparty votes
Laity Law for public schools Gender parity for overseas territories Ratification of the Treaty of Amsterdam Solidarity Pact Ratification of EU common currency
561 341 522 564 383
67 4 50 8 26
21.9 50 14 37.5 19.2
a
577 total possible votes.
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6. Conclusions This preliminary analysis of France’s new Electoral Law suggests that the parity requirement has resulted, after one election, in a slight increase in the number of female deputies elected to the French National Assembly. A greater number of female candidates were aligned with the Socialist party than with other parties, so the Socialist setbacks in this election reduced the number of successful female candidates. Many female candidates also faced the obstacle of running against male incumbents. However, after controlling for these two factors, female candidates appear to fare much better then their male counterparts in open seat elections, and their incumbency advantage was stronger than that of male incumbents. These findings suggest that changing party fortunes or an increase in the number of female incumbents will be the main factors that influence the number of female deputies in future elections in France. Notes 1. In 2001, with only 10.9% female legislators, France was ranked second to the last among EU members. 2. See also Dahlerop, 1988; Kolinsky, 1991; Phillips, 1991. 3. For an excellent analysis of the history of the French parity movement, see Mazur (2001). 4. Deputies who become government ministers must relinquish their seats to a substitute (suppl´eant). Gaspard, Servan-Schreiber, and Le Gall (1997) note that these substitutes are more often male, and the number of female deputies in the National Assembly often decreases once these ministerial appointment are made. 5. Allwood and Wadia (2000) argue that an additional reason why female candidates are less likely to be placed in winnable elections is due to the widespread use in France of multiple mandates (cumul des mandats) that allow candidates for the National Assembly to also hold a local office such a deputy-mayor. References Allwood, G., & Wadia, K. (2000). Women and politics in France 1958–2000. London: Routledge. ´ L’Ann´ee Politique: Economie et Sociale (2002). Paris: Editions Evenements & Tendances. The Center Holds in France. (2002, May 6). The New York Times, p. A1. Dahlerop, D. (1988). From a small to a large minority: women in Scandinavian politics. Scandinavian Political Studies, 11(4), 275–298. ´ ´ Dauphin, S. (2002). La Parit´e a` l’Epreuve des Elections Municipales de Mars 2001. Modern and Contemporary France, 10(1), 59–73. Document de Travail. (2003, January 10). Application de la loi du 6 juin 2000 dite sur la parit´e aux e´ lections legislatives de juin 2002. http://www.observatiore-parite.gouv.fr/dossier/investiture.html. French National Assembly. (2003). http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/elections/resultats/carte/index.htm. Gaspard, F., Servan-Schreiber, C., & Le Gall, A. (1997). Au pouvoir citoyennes! Libert´e, Egalit´e, Parit´e. Paris: Editions du Seuil, 1992. Jones, M. P. (1996). Increasing women’s representation via gender quotas: The Argentine Ley de Cupos. Women & Politics, 16(1), 75–99.
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Jones, M. P. (1998). Gender quotas, electoral laws, and the election of women: Lessons from the Argentine provinces. Comparative Political Studies, 31(1), 3–21. Kolinsky, E. (1991). Women’s quotas in West Germany. Western European Politics, 14(1), 56–72. Mazur, A. G. (2001). Drawing lessons from the French Parity movement. Contemporary French Civilization, 25(Part 2), 201–220. Phillips, A. (1991). Engineering democracy. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University. Reingold, B. (1992). Concepts of representation among female and male state legislators. Legislative Studies Quarterly, 17(4), 509–537. Roger, P. (2002, June 2). Le FN au second tour dans plus de 300 circonscriptions? Le Monde, 1. Rule, W., & Zimmerman, J. F. (1994). United States electoral systems: Their impact on women and minorities. New York: Praeger. Saint-Germain, M.S. (1989). Does their difference make a difference? The impact of women on public policy in Arizona legislature. eric.ed.gov. Thomas, S., & Welsh, S. (1991). The Impact of Gender on Activities and Priorities of State Legislators. Western Political Quarterly, 44, 445–456.