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Equity and electric power generation facility location in California
EIXTR? Vol. 10. No. 6. pp. 749-760. Printed in Great Bntain.
I985
0360-5442185 53.00 + .I0 0 1985 Pergamon Press Ltd.
EQUITY AND ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION FACILITY LOCATION IN CALIFORNIA E. H. WARREN, JR.~ and J. R. HUNING Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 4800 Oak Grove Drive, Pasadena, CA 91103, U.S.A. and C. F. HUTCHINSON Office of Arid Land Studies, University of Arizona, 845 No. Park Avenue, Tucson, AZ 85719, U.S.A.
Abstract-An alternative to cost/benefit analysis for anaiyzing the equity of electric power generation facility location, utilizing the potential for air quality degradation, is developed and applied to California. Siting issues motivating disagreement on facility location are reviewed. Equity concepts are introduced, and their implementation is discussed. Several measures for assessing the equity of facility location are proposed, and the equities of existing facility locations in California are analyzed for each measure. Equity considerations for future siting decisions are examined. 1. INTRODUCTION
facilities are not generally regarded as desirable neighbors. They are unsightly and often noisy. They employ fewer people than their size would seem to warrant. Frequently they degrade air quality. In the West they often compete for scarce water. Thus, wherever a new plant is sited, that locality is usually viewed as the loser in the siting battle. There is a persistent attitude in the sparsely populated areas of the western United States that their resources of open space and clean air are being exploited by large population centers. The fact that a number of large electric power generating facilities can be found scattered throu~out li~tly populated regions of the West gives some support to this notion. As more facilities are proposed for these regions, the notion becomes a self-evident truth. If viewed from the urban perspective, the use of rural sites is eminently reasonable. Contrasted with sites within the urban regions, land is inexpensive. Zoning, local ordinances, and public opposition are problems of lesser magnitude. The already poor quality of urban air resources is not further degraded. And finally, there is the feeling that everyone should share equally in bearing the costs of our way of life. Each side of the argument has its points. Hence, in recent years considerable public discussion has centered on the social issues of siting electric power generating facilities. Many of these arguments revolve about questions of equity to assure that everyone bears a fair share of the environmental costs of electrical energy. However, the reality of the equity issues that have been raised has not been demonstrated; therefore, the debate is vacuous. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate an approach for evaluating the equity of existing electric power generating facilities. It will not, however, provide a definitive answer to the question of historical equity. Its intent is only to provide a first examination of the equity issue, using air quality degradation as a surrogate for environmen~l impact. To this end, Section 2 will provide a brief discussion of the social issues involved in siting electric power generation facilities. Equity concepts and their implementation are introduced in Section 3. In Section 4 the equity of facility locations in California is examined on the Electric
power
generation
t Present address: 69 1 Clarion Place, Claremont, CA 9 1711,U.S.A. 749
750
basis of several proposed measures pertinent to future site location.
E. H. WARREN, JR. et al.
of equity.
2.
SITING
Finally,
Section
5 considers
the equity issues
ISSUES
Traditionally, equity considerations have played virtually no explicit role in siting decisions.? Rather, the selection of new generating sites by electric utilities has been a straightforward process using a limited number of criteria that could be easily quantified and expressed in monetary terms.+ There are, however, significant externalities, costs not borne by the productive activity, associated with electric power generation. These externalities, which include air, water, noise, and visual pollution, are incurred primarily by those in the vicinity of the facility. The classic solution to equalize the incidence of externalities is to require those enjoying the benefits of a producitve activity to compensate those bearing the external costs. However, because of significant problems in measuring the external costs of electric generation, such compensation schemes are not implemented. Rather, recent strategy seems to have been to locate electric power generation facilities in isolated areas, thereby hopefully reducing external costs. This strategy has lead to a burgeoning controversy in California, exemplified by the preliminary siting hearings for the Sundesert nuclear and Fossil I and II coal-tired electric power generation facilities. Environmentalists have argued that locating a facility in a nonurban, ecologically delicate area could result in significant environmental damage and that such facilities ought to be located in or near the urban areas that use most of the electricity. On the other hand, those favoring isolated locations argue that, because of historical siting criteria, most potentially environmentally degrading facilities are presently located within a close proximity of the load centers. Nonurban areas traditionally have not borne their fair share of the externalities associated with electric power generation. Thus, it is argued that it is only fair that new sites should be located in rural areas. The state of California was chosen as a study site for several reasons. First, there are several major population centers in the state. Second, there is a diversity of physical regions in which electricity is generated. Figure 1 shows the sites of all electric power generation facilities in the state. Third, the topic of power plant siting is of considerable interest in California due to the prospects of increased coal use and much debated coastal siting alternatives.5 Finally, the Warren-Alquist State Energy Resource Conservation and Development Act (Public Resources Code $0 25000, et seq.) directs that the California Energy Commission take into account statewide interests beyond those traditionally relied on by electric utilities in siting new facilities [@ 25309(b)]. Presumably, this would include equity.
3.
EQUITY
ISSUES
Before the question of the equity of the present distribution of electric power generation facility location can be addressed, the abstract concept of equity must be operationalized. One very appealing way of characterizing equity is in terms of equality; the more equally distributed is the burden of the external costs of electric power generation among those consuming electrical power, the more equitable it is. However, as pointed out by Rae,5 applying the concept of equality is not without its own difficulties. Several issues relevant to characterizing the equity of the distribution of electric power generation facility location are discussed in this section. A final issue, relevant to future facility location, is discussed in Section 5. t For a discussion of the relevance of equity considerations in environmental quality planning, see Freeman’ and the references cited therein. $ See, for example, California Energy Commission,z Hamilton3 or Messing.4 0 It should be noted that coastal sites in California are favored whenever possible because of the availability of cooling water. Coastal locations are now essentially eliminated as potential sites, due to coastal zone regulation. However, most of the fossil and nuclear facilities in California were constructed (or at least begun) prior to regulation and represent a distinct coastal bias. Thus, recent tendencies toward locating facilities at remote inland sites are somewhat obscured.
Electric power generation
Fig.
I. Electric power generating
facility
751
0
Hydroelectric Facilltles
n
Oil and Gas Facilities
*
Nuclear Facilities
+
Geothermal Facllitm
*
Coal Facilities
facility location
in California.
A. Who are equals? Equality is a relational concept; there must be classes of equals or none at all. Therefore, the first issue that must be settled in applying the concept of equality is the characterization of the classes of equals. When considering the external costs associated with electric power generation facility location in California, the classes of equals can be considered to be the consumers of electric power located in California. However, this is only an approximation. All of the electric power consumed in California is not generated within the state, nor is all of the electric power generated in California consumed within the state. California both imports and exports electric power. In particular, California had net imports of about 6% of its electricity consumption in 1977.t Since the sets of those bearing the external costs of generating the electric power consumed in California and those consuming electric power in California are not coincident, California is not a large enough region to precisely define classes of equals. Nor may countries or continents be large enough. Recognizing t California had only a net import of 2% of its electricity consumption generated at the Mohave facility, located virtually on the California-Nevada in Fig. I. is considered to be generated in California.
if California’s share of the electricity state line and shown as a star (*)
752
E. H. WARREN,JR. et al.
this to be a problem, we will assume that consumers of electric power located in California adequately define the classes of equals. There are several other possibilities for defining the individual equality classes in California. Because equity considerations are, by nature, entirely the responsibility of government, it is appropriate to define equality classes by governmental boundaries. County boundaries would seem to be a convenient demarcation between equality classes; those consuming electricity within a county are a class of equals. However, implementation of this definition in California results in anomalies. Both the Los Angeles and San Francisco metropolitan areas extend beyond their respective county borders. Further, if air quality is used as a surrogate for environmental impact (as it will be), then county boundaries are inappropriate because of the flow of air across those boundaries. For California purposes, air basins (shown in Fig. 2) allow a more logical delineation of classes of equals because they correlate physically with atmospheric factors, whereas, in most cases, county boundaries do not. Air basins are designated by a governmental unit, the California Air Resources Board, and are based on similar meteorological and geographical conditions, with consideration given to county boundary lines whenever practical. In addition, on a daily basis there is relatively little exchange of population between air basins. Therefore, the air-basin concept internalizes air and population
Fig. 2. Counties
and air basins of California.
Electric power generation facility
753
movements and will be used to delineate the classes of equals for electricity consumption and generation. B. Simple equity versus distributed equity Defining air basins to be equality classes should not be interpreted to mean that all entities consuming electricity bear an equal share of the external costs of its generation. This is obviously not the case; those in closer proximity to generation facilities and those downwind of fossil or geothermal facilities bear a disproportionate share of the external costs. This then begs the question, “In what sense do equality classes define equality?’ To answer this it is necessary to distinguish between simple and distributed equality. As it relates to the topic at hand, the concept of simple equality means that everyone in an equality class bears an equal share of the externalities associated with electric power generation. Thus, simple equality is a point concept. Distributed equality, on the other hand, equalizes the incidence of inequality across equality classes. This concept assumes that everyone in an equality class is not equal with the inequality (externalities) distributed within the equality class. However, the distribution of inequality is the same between equality cfasses. Besides the transparent distinctions between simple and distributed equality, there is a more subtle difference. Simple equality embodies the idea of equality within an equality class, but implies nothing about equality between equality classes. Distributed equality embodies the concepts of inequality within an equality class and equality between equality classes. For obvious reasons the concept of distributed equality will be used in this paper. C.
Assessing eqzi~ty
The generation of electricity produces both a good (electricity) and several externalities (air, noise, visual, and water pollution, etc.). In order to assess the equity of the distribution of electric power generating facilities, it is necessary to either measure or make assumptions concerning both the good and the externalities associated with it. It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt to measure the externalities associated with electric power generation. The environmental degradation associated with electric power generation is generally so intermixed with the environmental degradation from other sources that it may be impossible to distinguish it. Thus, without attempting to measure it, it is assumed that electric power generation capacity, either the total installed capacity or that portion actually utilized, measures the environmental burden of an air basin from electric power generation. Complicating the valuation of electricity is the fact that, within any air basin, it is consumed both privately (by individuals, businesses, etc.) and collectively (by governmental units). It would obscure the assessment of equity between air basins to value electricity by consumption sector. Both average demand and population suggest themselves as measures of the impo~ance of electricity to an air basint Each measure will be used in assessing the equity of electric power generation facility location. To the extent that the distribution of electric power generating facilities is equitably distributed between air basins, one should expect the ratio of capacity to average demand, or capacity to population, to be equal between air basins. Thus the extent to which these ratios diverge from the statewide ratio is an indication of the inequity of the distribution: those below the statewide ratio bear less than their fair share of the environmental degradation associated with electric power generation; those above, bear more. 4. EQUITY
ASSESSMENT
A. Assumptions The equity assessments developed in this section are based on the assumption that air quality degradation due to electric power generation is a surrogate for environmental impact. There are a number of impacts associated with electric power generation, but many of these are of a local nature (e.g. noise and visual pollution). Both air and water t Because people generally live and work in the same air basin and have the opportunity to share in public consumption, this does not appear to be an unreasonable assumption.
754
E. H. WARREN, JR. et al.
quality degradation are nonlocal impacts. Air quality degradation is generally the more important in terms of public perception. Therefore it is used as the surrogate for environmental impact. Because air quality degradation from electric power generation is used as the surrogate for environmental impacts, generation facilities can be classified as clean or dirty according to their air quality impacts. The implication of this distinction is that those generating facilities classified as clean have few external costs, but the external costs of dirty facilities are significantly larger. It is assumed that all hydro- and nuclear electric generating facilities do little to degrade air quality and are therefore equally clean. Although this assumption may be debated (often acrimoniously) for other environmental impacts, it is generally true in terms of air pollution. By elimination it is therefore assumed that fossil-fired and geothermal generating facilities are dirty. They are considered to degrade air quality equally. This is obviously not true in a strict sense. However, since most fossil-fired facilities can accommodate most types of fossil fuels, perhaps with minor modifications, the potential for air pollution is inherent in all of these facilities. Other arguments are less easily discarded. Clearly, the types of air pollution generated by fossil fuels and geothermal energy differ. So, too, does the quantity and quality of pollution generated by new and old facilities as a consequence of environmental control technologies incorporated into the facilities. The fact that these discrepancies exist is acknowledged but not accommodated. B. Data Data for this study are for 1977 and were obtained primarily from Refs. 6-8. Approximately 300 generating facilities, often with more than one facility located at a particular site, were included. Of these, 11 were geothermal facilities (all contiguous) with a total installed capacity of 502 megawatts, and three were nuclear facilities with a total installed capacity of 1408 megawatts.? There were no coal-fired facilities located in California, although the Mohave coal-fired facility is located virtually on the CaliforniaNevada border. Thus, the overwhelming majority of the installed capacity is composed of oil-fired steam, gas turbine, and hydroelectric facilities. Capacity and demand data for California’s 14 air basins are presented in Table 1. Installed capacity was determined from the nameplate rating for each facility. Average capacity utilized was derived by dividing the total megawatt hours generated by a facility in 1977 by the hours in a year (8760).$ Average demand was found by dividing the total megawatt hours demanded in 1977 in an air basin by the hours in a year. Finally, dirty average demand was found by subtracting the clean (hydro and nuclear) average capacity utilized in an air basin from the average demand for the basin.5 Two potential distortions in facility locations are noted in Table 1. Although the San Onofre nuclear facility is located in the San Diego Air Basin, it is virtually on its border with the South Coast Air Basin. Furthermore, this facility is 80% owned by Southern California Edison, which supplies electricity to large portions of the South Coast Air Basin, and 20% owned by San Diego Gas and Electric. Hence, 80% of its installed capacity and average utilized capacity was assigned to the South Coast Air Basin and 20% was assigned to the San Diego Air Basin. The Mohave coal facility is located in Nevada, but is almost on the California state line. It is also located in a valley extending into California, so that portions of the Southeast Desert Air Basin’s air quality is degraded by its electric power generation. Finally, electric utilities whose demand is located exclusively in California own 76% of the facility. Nevertheless, the facility falls outside California’s political jurisdiction, so that
i The nuclear facilities are Humboldt Bay (63 megawatts), Ranch0 Seco (913 megawatts), and San Onofre I (432 megawatts). $ It should be noted that 1977 was the first year following a severe drought in many parts of California. Therefore, the average hydroelectric capacity utilized may be somewhat less than normal. Q Dirty average demand is that portion of an air basin’s average demand that is not met by the basin’s clean average utilized capacity. It therefore represents the air quality degradation demanded by an air basin.
,,
.
was considered
3,029.4
44.5 0.0 0.0 477.3 0.0 70.6 120.1 1,624.5 53.0 0.0 243.0 0.0 318.3 78.1
(MW)
-17.4 23.2 28.9 -222.0 300.1 89.0 -36.9 -308.9 820.6 3,955.4 1,922.0 545.4 6,945.7 319.7
14,364.a
17,394.2
Dirty
Demand
27.1 23.2 28.9 255.3 300.1 159.6 83.2 1,315.6 873.6 3,955.4 2,165.0 545.4 7,264.0 397.8
Total
Average
to he 80% in the South Coast Air Basin and
13,346.5 (14,077.a)
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 1,481.6 444.0 0.0 0.0 1,019.l 2,614.4 127.9 1,850.o 5,596.? 212.6 (943.9) --
(MN)
Hydro & Nuclear
Utilized
Fossil & Geothermal
Capacity
.,
1
_
_,
“_
.
_, “” ,,.
.,, ..,
in parentheses include Southern California Edison's and Los Angeles Department of Water share (76%) of the Mohave fossil generating facility in the Southeast Desert Air Basin.
The numbers and Power's
facility
16,375.9 (17,107.2)
10,688.2 24,704.5 (25,905.3')
6.0 2,060.O 607.0 0.0 0.0 2,018.O 4,346.0 180.0 3,107.o 11,898.0 466.0 (1,666.8)
Total
Hydro & Nuclear 44.5 0.0 0.2 477.3 1,481.6 514.6 120.1 1,624.5 1,072.I 2,614.4 370.9 1,850.O 5,915.0 290.7 (1,022.O)
Average
(Mw)
180.3 0.0 0.0 2,833.3 0.0 178.6 211.0 3,844.8 88.7 0.0 1,647.4 0.0 1,510.5 193.6
b.
(36,593.5)
2,839.3 2,060-O 785.6 211.0 3,844.8 2,106.7 4,346.0 1,827.4 3,107-o 13,408.5 659.6 (1,806.4)
Capacity
The San Onofre nuclear generating 20% in the San Diego Air Rasin.
r
Installed
a.
State Totals
Lake Country Lake Tahoe Mountain Counties North Central Coast North Coast Northeast Plateau Sacramento Valley San Diego S. F. Bay Area San Joaquin Valley South Central Coast South Coast Southeast Desert
Great Basin Valley
Air Basin
t
Table I.California electric demand and generationby airbasin(1977).
,. I,
E. H. WARREN,JR. et al.
756
it could not be included in the capacity of the Southeast Desert Air Basin. California’s share of the installed and average utilized capacities was therefore included in Table 1 in parentheses. C. Analysis Four different capacity demand ratios are presented in Table 2. Each of these ratios measures an air basin’s ability to internalize its externality from electric power generation needs. The extent to which they diverge from the statewide ratio is a measure of the inequity of facility location. Note that a statewide ratio of dirty average capacity utilized to dirty average demand is not given, because four air basins have negative dirty demand. For each of the four capacity demand ratios given in Table 2, six of the 14 air basins are always below the statewide ratio: Lake County, Lake Tahoe, San Francisco Bay Area, San Joaquin Valley, South Coast, and Southeast Desert. Lake County and Lake Tahoe are anomalies; they have virtually no capacity and very small demands. Further, if California’s share of the Mohave facility is considered to be in the Southeast Desert Air Basin, its capcity demand ratios become significantly higher than the statewide ratio. Finally, the ratios of dirty installed capacity to average demand for the Great Basin Valley, Mountain Counties, Northeast Plateau, and Sacramento Valley air basins are below the statewide average. This also is an anomaly, since these counties have virtually no dirty capacity. Therefore, it should be concluded from Table 2 that the Lake County, Lake Tahoe, San Francisco Bay Area, San Joaquin Valley, South Coast, and Southeast Desert air basins are not bearing their fair share of the environmental degradation due to electric power generation demanded in their air basins. In view of the above comments, the San Francisco Bay Area and San Joaquin Valley air basins, are clearly the most inequitable. The South Coast Air Basin is generally much closer to the statewide average, and above it in terms of the ratio of dirty installed capacity to average demand. These results are shown in Fig. 3. Table 3 exhibits four different types of capacity figures per capita. Estimated population and two types of demand per capita are shown as well. The extent to which an air basin’s per capita capacity diverges from the statewide ratio is the second way of measuring the inequities of electric generation facility location. As was the case with capacity demand ratios, the Lake County, Lake Tahoe, San Francisco Bay Area, and San Joaquin Valley air basins are below the statewide figure for
Table 2. Capacity
Inst. Air
Basin
Great
Basin
Ave.
Valley
demand
cap.
ratios for California
Dirty
Inst. Ave.
Dem.
6.65
Cap.
air basins (1977).
Ave.
Dem.
Cap. Ave.
Util. Dem.
Dirty Ave. Cap. Util. Dirty Ave. Dem.
0.0
1.64
b
0.0 0.57 11.12
0.0 0.57 0.02
0.0 0.01 1.75
0.0 0.01 h
North Central Coast North Coast Northeast Plateau Sacramento Valley
6.86 4.92 2.54 2.92
6.86 3.80 0.0 0.0
4.94 3.22 1.44 1.23
4.94 4.99 h b
San Diego S. F. Bay
2.41 1.10
2.31 1.10
1.23 0.66
1.24 0.66
San Joaquin Valley South Central Coast South Coast Southeast Desert
0.84 5.70 1.85 1.66 (4.68ja -
0.08 5.70 1.64 1.17 c4.191= -
0.17 3.39 0.81 0.73 (2.57ja -
0.07 3.39 0.81 0.6h (2.95ja -
State
2.03 (2.ln)a
1.42 <1.49ja
0.94 (0.98)a
Lake County Lake Tahoe Mcantain Counties
a.
b.
Area
Ratios
Ratios in parentheses include Southern California Department of Water and Power’s share (76%) of facility in the Southeast Desert Air Basin. Indicates
negative
dirty
demand
and
hence
the
a negative
Edison’s Mohave
ratio.
and fossil
Los Angeles generating
Electric power generation facility
Air basins with capacity per
Air basins with some capacity per capita measures above state measures Air basms with capacity per capita measures below state
Fig. 3. Air basins below California capacity demand ratios.
each type of per capita capacity. As before, the Great Basin Valley, Mountain Counties, Northeast Plateau, and Sacramento Valley air basins are below the statewide figure for dirty installed capacity per capita or dirty average capacity utilized per capita, because they have virtually no dirty capacity. Again, the Lake County and Lake Tahoe air basins should be considered anomalies because of small populations and lack of significant capacity of any type. It is interesting to note that when considering capacity per capita, the San Diego Air Basin is now below the statewide figures for two of the four measures. Notably, the South Coast Air Basin is above the statewide average for dirty installed capacity per capita. Finally, the Southeast Desert Air Basin is above the statewide figures for installed capacity per capita and dirty installed capacity per capita without including California’s share of the Mohave facility in its capacity figures. (With that portion of the Mohave plant included, it is, of course, above the statewide figures for all measures.) The implications of Table 3 are that the Lake County, Lake Tahoe, San Francisco Bay Area, and San Joaquin Valley air basins are clearly not bearing their fair share of the environmental degradation from per capita electric power generation. Again, the San Francisco Bay Area and San Joaquin Valley are clearly the most obviously inequitable. The South Coast Air Basin is probably not bearing its fair share, whereas the situation
a.
21,891,OOO
25,900 28,700 33,100 264,000 465,500 212,000 74,500 1,260,OOO 1,672,300 4,883,800 1,803,500 894,700 9,873,100 399,900
!
1.62 (1.67ja
6.96 0.0 0.50 10.75 4.43 3.71 2.03 3.05 1.26 0.89 1.01 3.47 1.36 1.65 (4.52)a
Inst. Cap.(KW) Population
Dirty
1.13 (1.18)a
0.0 0.0 0.50 0.02 4.43 2.86 0.0 0.0 1.21 0.89 0.10 3.47 1.21 1.17 (4.17)a
Inst. Cap.(KW) Population
0.75 (0.78ja
1.72 0.0 0.01 1.81 3.18 2.43 1.62 1.29 0.64 0.54 0.21 2.07 0.60 0.73 (2.56ja
Ave. Cap. Util.(KW) Population
and Power's
0.61 (0.64)a
0.0 0.0 0.01 0.0 3.18 2.09 0.0 0.0 0.61 0.54 0.07 2.07 0.57 0.53 (2.36)a
Dirty Ave. Cap. Util.(KW) Population
Ratios in parentheses include Southern California Edison's and Los Angeles Department of Water share (76%) of the Mohave fossil generating facility in the Southeast Desert Air Basin.
State Ratio
Great Basin Valley Lake County Lake Tahoe Mountain Counties North Central Coast North Coast Northeast Plateau Sacramento Valley San Diego S. F. Bay Area San Joaquin Valley South Central Coast South Coast Southeast Desert
Air Basin
Estimated Population (7/l/77)
Table 3. Per capita capacity and demand for California air basins (1977).
Electric power generation
facility
759
for the San Diego and Southeast Desert air basins is open to interpretation. However, the Southeast Desert Air Basin would be bearing more than its fair share if California’s share of the Mohave facility was included in its capacity. Their results are shown in Fig. 4. 5.
EQUITY
AND
SITING
NEW
FACILITIES
As more use is made of potentially dirty fuels, the notion of distributing the externalities produced by an electric power generating facility will be of increasing importance. However, if equity is to be considered in siting additional electric power generating facilities, then it must be done by the government, since the distribution of facilities in an unencumbered market economy is based solely on the criterion of economic efficiency. Thus, historically, sites for electric power generation facilities were chosen to minimize the costs of meeting a given demand for electricity without consideration being given to the equity of the distribution. If California, or any governmental body, should want to incorporate equity into the process for siting electric generation facilities, they would need to consider several issues relating to the scope of that equity. First, the type of equity to be achieved must be determined. They could take a marginal view of equity, ignore past inequities and divide new facilities equally among air basins. Alternatively, they could take a global perspective
Fig. 4. Air basins below California
capacity
per capita.
760
E. H. WARREN,JR. et al.
of equity and site new facilities in air basins currently bearing the least equitable share of environmental degradation due to electric power generation and thus enhance the equality between air basins. Second, the externalities to be equitably distributed must be determined. This paper has focused only on air quality. Obviously, inequities exist in other areas of impact, such as water. Also, in a more extensive analysis, it is quite possible that other sources of environmental degradation (e.g. petroleum refining, resource extraction, agriculture) should be considered and possible environmental trade-offs assessed. What has been discussed is not a model for siting electric generating facilities. Rather, it is a suggestion of how equity issues might be considered in the siting process. In view of the present situation, economics will, and must, continue to play the central role in dete~ining where facilities will be sited. However, the growing awareness of adverse impacts associated with many plants would suggest that some balance be introduced in selecting sites. Acknowledgement-This paper has benefited from discussions between the authors and M. Goldsmith, L. Omen, and R. O’Toole. We are indebted to them, but absolve them from all responsibility for the views expressed herein. The responsibility for the contents of the paper is ours alone and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, the University of Arizona, or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. REFERENCES 1. A. M. Freeman III, Distribution of environmental quality, in Environmental Quality Anai,vsis: Theory and Measurement in the Social Sciences (A. V. Kresse and B. Bower, eds.). Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (1972). 2. California Energy Commission, Power Plant Siting Policy Paper. Sacramento, California (1978). 3. M. S. Hamilton, Power plant siting: a literature review. Natur. Res. J. 75, 19 (1979). 4. M. Messing, Electric generation: issues of scale and political authority, in Energy Use Management, Vol. III (R. A. Fazzolare and C. B. Smith, eds.). Pergamon Press, New York (I 977). 5. D. Rae, The egalitarian state: notes on a system of contradictory ideals. Daedalus 37, 108 (1979). 6. Catifomia Energy Commission, Biennial Report, Vol. 7 (Summary). Sacramento, California (1977). 7. State of California, Calt~rn~a Statistical Abstract, 1978. Sacramento, California (1978). 8. Electrical World, ~~rectary ofElectric Utilities, 87th edn, M~raw-Hill, New York (1978).
I985
0360-5442185 53.00 + .I0 0 1985 Pergamon Press Ltd.
EQUITY AND ELECTRIC POWER GENERATION FACILITY LOCATION IN CALIFORNIA E. H. WARREN, JR.~ and J. R. HUNING Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, 4800 Oak Grove Drive, Pasadena, CA 91103, U.S.A. and C. F. HUTCHINSON Office of Arid Land Studies, University of Arizona, 845 No. Park Avenue, Tucson, AZ 85719, U.S.A.
Abstract-An alternative to cost/benefit analysis for anaiyzing the equity of electric power generation facility location, utilizing the potential for air quality degradation, is developed and applied to California. Siting issues motivating disagreement on facility location are reviewed. Equity concepts are introduced, and their implementation is discussed. Several measures for assessing the equity of facility location are proposed, and the equities of existing facility locations in California are analyzed for each measure. Equity considerations for future siting decisions are examined. 1. INTRODUCTION
facilities are not generally regarded as desirable neighbors. They are unsightly and often noisy. They employ fewer people than their size would seem to warrant. Frequently they degrade air quality. In the West they often compete for scarce water. Thus, wherever a new plant is sited, that locality is usually viewed as the loser in the siting battle. There is a persistent attitude in the sparsely populated areas of the western United States that their resources of open space and clean air are being exploited by large population centers. The fact that a number of large electric power generating facilities can be found scattered throu~out li~tly populated regions of the West gives some support to this notion. As more facilities are proposed for these regions, the notion becomes a self-evident truth. If viewed from the urban perspective, the use of rural sites is eminently reasonable. Contrasted with sites within the urban regions, land is inexpensive. Zoning, local ordinances, and public opposition are problems of lesser magnitude. The already poor quality of urban air resources is not further degraded. And finally, there is the feeling that everyone should share equally in bearing the costs of our way of life. Each side of the argument has its points. Hence, in recent years considerable public discussion has centered on the social issues of siting electric power generating facilities. Many of these arguments revolve about questions of equity to assure that everyone bears a fair share of the environmental costs of electrical energy. However, the reality of the equity issues that have been raised has not been demonstrated; therefore, the debate is vacuous. The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate an approach for evaluating the equity of existing electric power generating facilities. It will not, however, provide a definitive answer to the question of historical equity. Its intent is only to provide a first examination of the equity issue, using air quality degradation as a surrogate for environmen~l impact. To this end, Section 2 will provide a brief discussion of the social issues involved in siting electric power generation facilities. Equity concepts and their implementation are introduced in Section 3. In Section 4 the equity of facility locations in California is examined on the Electric
power
generation
t Present address: 69 1 Clarion Place, Claremont, CA 9 1711,U.S.A. 749
750
basis of several proposed measures pertinent to future site location.
E. H. WARREN, JR. et al.
of equity.
2.
SITING
Finally,
Section
5 considers
the equity issues
ISSUES
Traditionally, equity considerations have played virtually no explicit role in siting decisions.? Rather, the selection of new generating sites by electric utilities has been a straightforward process using a limited number of criteria that could be easily quantified and expressed in monetary terms.+ There are, however, significant externalities, costs not borne by the productive activity, associated with electric power generation. These externalities, which include air, water, noise, and visual pollution, are incurred primarily by those in the vicinity of the facility. The classic solution to equalize the incidence of externalities is to require those enjoying the benefits of a producitve activity to compensate those bearing the external costs. However, because of significant problems in measuring the external costs of electric generation, such compensation schemes are not implemented. Rather, recent strategy seems to have been to locate electric power generation facilities in isolated areas, thereby hopefully reducing external costs. This strategy has lead to a burgeoning controversy in California, exemplified by the preliminary siting hearings for the Sundesert nuclear and Fossil I and II coal-tired electric power generation facilities. Environmentalists have argued that locating a facility in a nonurban, ecologically delicate area could result in significant environmental damage and that such facilities ought to be located in or near the urban areas that use most of the electricity. On the other hand, those favoring isolated locations argue that, because of historical siting criteria, most potentially environmentally degrading facilities are presently located within a close proximity of the load centers. Nonurban areas traditionally have not borne their fair share of the externalities associated with electric power generation. Thus, it is argued that it is only fair that new sites should be located in rural areas. The state of California was chosen as a study site for several reasons. First, there are several major population centers in the state. Second, there is a diversity of physical regions in which electricity is generated. Figure 1 shows the sites of all electric power generation facilities in the state. Third, the topic of power plant siting is of considerable interest in California due to the prospects of increased coal use and much debated coastal siting alternatives.5 Finally, the Warren-Alquist State Energy Resource Conservation and Development Act (Public Resources Code $0 25000, et seq.) directs that the California Energy Commission take into account statewide interests beyond those traditionally relied on by electric utilities in siting new facilities [@ 25309(b)]. Presumably, this would include equity.
3.
EQUITY
ISSUES
Before the question of the equity of the present distribution of electric power generation facility location can be addressed, the abstract concept of equity must be operationalized. One very appealing way of characterizing equity is in terms of equality; the more equally distributed is the burden of the external costs of electric power generation among those consuming electrical power, the more equitable it is. However, as pointed out by Rae,5 applying the concept of equality is not without its own difficulties. Several issues relevant to characterizing the equity of the distribution of electric power generation facility location are discussed in this section. A final issue, relevant to future facility location, is discussed in Section 5. t For a discussion of the relevance of equity considerations in environmental quality planning, see Freeman’ and the references cited therein. $ See, for example, California Energy Commission,z Hamilton3 or Messing.4 0 It should be noted that coastal sites in California are favored whenever possible because of the availability of cooling water. Coastal locations are now essentially eliminated as potential sites, due to coastal zone regulation. However, most of the fossil and nuclear facilities in California were constructed (or at least begun) prior to regulation and represent a distinct coastal bias. Thus, recent tendencies toward locating facilities at remote inland sites are somewhat obscured.
Electric power generation
Fig.
I. Electric power generating
facility
751
0
Hydroelectric Facilltles
n
Oil and Gas Facilities
*
Nuclear Facilities
+
Geothermal Facllitm
*
Coal Facilities
facility location
in California.
A. Who are equals? Equality is a relational concept; there must be classes of equals or none at all. Therefore, the first issue that must be settled in applying the concept of equality is the characterization of the classes of equals. When considering the external costs associated with electric power generation facility location in California, the classes of equals can be considered to be the consumers of electric power located in California. However, this is only an approximation. All of the electric power consumed in California is not generated within the state, nor is all of the electric power generated in California consumed within the state. California both imports and exports electric power. In particular, California had net imports of about 6% of its electricity consumption in 1977.t Since the sets of those bearing the external costs of generating the electric power consumed in California and those consuming electric power in California are not coincident, California is not a large enough region to precisely define classes of equals. Nor may countries or continents be large enough. Recognizing t California had only a net import of 2% of its electricity consumption generated at the Mohave facility, located virtually on the California-Nevada in Fig. I. is considered to be generated in California.
if California’s share of the electricity state line and shown as a star (*)
752
E. H. WARREN,JR. et al.
this to be a problem, we will assume that consumers of electric power located in California adequately define the classes of equals. There are several other possibilities for defining the individual equality classes in California. Because equity considerations are, by nature, entirely the responsibility of government, it is appropriate to define equality classes by governmental boundaries. County boundaries would seem to be a convenient demarcation between equality classes; those consuming electricity within a county are a class of equals. However, implementation of this definition in California results in anomalies. Both the Los Angeles and San Francisco metropolitan areas extend beyond their respective county borders. Further, if air quality is used as a surrogate for environmental impact (as it will be), then county boundaries are inappropriate because of the flow of air across those boundaries. For California purposes, air basins (shown in Fig. 2) allow a more logical delineation of classes of equals because they correlate physically with atmospheric factors, whereas, in most cases, county boundaries do not. Air basins are designated by a governmental unit, the California Air Resources Board, and are based on similar meteorological and geographical conditions, with consideration given to county boundary lines whenever practical. In addition, on a daily basis there is relatively little exchange of population between air basins. Therefore, the air-basin concept internalizes air and population
Fig. 2. Counties
and air basins of California.
Electric power generation facility
753
movements and will be used to delineate the classes of equals for electricity consumption and generation. B. Simple equity versus distributed equity Defining air basins to be equality classes should not be interpreted to mean that all entities consuming electricity bear an equal share of the external costs of its generation. This is obviously not the case; those in closer proximity to generation facilities and those downwind of fossil or geothermal facilities bear a disproportionate share of the external costs. This then begs the question, “In what sense do equality classes define equality?’ To answer this it is necessary to distinguish between simple and distributed equality. As it relates to the topic at hand, the concept of simple equality means that everyone in an equality class bears an equal share of the externalities associated with electric power generation. Thus, simple equality is a point concept. Distributed equality, on the other hand, equalizes the incidence of inequality across equality classes. This concept assumes that everyone in an equality class is not equal with the inequality (externalities) distributed within the equality class. However, the distribution of inequality is the same between equality cfasses. Besides the transparent distinctions between simple and distributed equality, there is a more subtle difference. Simple equality embodies the idea of equality within an equality class, but implies nothing about equality between equality classes. Distributed equality embodies the concepts of inequality within an equality class and equality between equality classes. For obvious reasons the concept of distributed equality will be used in this paper. C.
Assessing eqzi~ty
The generation of electricity produces both a good (electricity) and several externalities (air, noise, visual, and water pollution, etc.). In order to assess the equity of the distribution of electric power generating facilities, it is necessary to either measure or make assumptions concerning both the good and the externalities associated with it. It is not the purpose of this paper to attempt to measure the externalities associated with electric power generation. The environmental degradation associated with electric power generation is generally so intermixed with the environmental degradation from other sources that it may be impossible to distinguish it. Thus, without attempting to measure it, it is assumed that electric power generation capacity, either the total installed capacity or that portion actually utilized, measures the environmental burden of an air basin from electric power generation. Complicating the valuation of electricity is the fact that, within any air basin, it is consumed both privately (by individuals, businesses, etc.) and collectively (by governmental units). It would obscure the assessment of equity between air basins to value electricity by consumption sector. Both average demand and population suggest themselves as measures of the impo~ance of electricity to an air basint Each measure will be used in assessing the equity of electric power generation facility location. To the extent that the distribution of electric power generating facilities is equitably distributed between air basins, one should expect the ratio of capacity to average demand, or capacity to population, to be equal between air basins. Thus the extent to which these ratios diverge from the statewide ratio is an indication of the inequity of the distribution: those below the statewide ratio bear less than their fair share of the environmental degradation associated with electric power generation; those above, bear more. 4. EQUITY
ASSESSMENT
A. Assumptions The equity assessments developed in this section are based on the assumption that air quality degradation due to electric power generation is a surrogate for environmental impact. There are a number of impacts associated with electric power generation, but many of these are of a local nature (e.g. noise and visual pollution). Both air and water t Because people generally live and work in the same air basin and have the opportunity to share in public consumption, this does not appear to be an unreasonable assumption.
754
E. H. WARREN, JR. et al.
quality degradation are nonlocal impacts. Air quality degradation is generally the more important in terms of public perception. Therefore it is used as the surrogate for environmental impact. Because air quality degradation from electric power generation is used as the surrogate for environmental impacts, generation facilities can be classified as clean or dirty according to their air quality impacts. The implication of this distinction is that those generating facilities classified as clean have few external costs, but the external costs of dirty facilities are significantly larger. It is assumed that all hydro- and nuclear electric generating facilities do little to degrade air quality and are therefore equally clean. Although this assumption may be debated (often acrimoniously) for other environmental impacts, it is generally true in terms of air pollution. By elimination it is therefore assumed that fossil-fired and geothermal generating facilities are dirty. They are considered to degrade air quality equally. This is obviously not true in a strict sense. However, since most fossil-fired facilities can accommodate most types of fossil fuels, perhaps with minor modifications, the potential for air pollution is inherent in all of these facilities. Other arguments are less easily discarded. Clearly, the types of air pollution generated by fossil fuels and geothermal energy differ. So, too, does the quantity and quality of pollution generated by new and old facilities as a consequence of environmental control technologies incorporated into the facilities. The fact that these discrepancies exist is acknowledged but not accommodated. B. Data Data for this study are for 1977 and were obtained primarily from Refs. 6-8. Approximately 300 generating facilities, often with more than one facility located at a particular site, were included. Of these, 11 were geothermal facilities (all contiguous) with a total installed capacity of 502 megawatts, and three were nuclear facilities with a total installed capacity of 1408 megawatts.? There were no coal-fired facilities located in California, although the Mohave coal-fired facility is located virtually on the CaliforniaNevada border. Thus, the overwhelming majority of the installed capacity is composed of oil-fired steam, gas turbine, and hydroelectric facilities. Capacity and demand data for California’s 14 air basins are presented in Table 1. Installed capacity was determined from the nameplate rating for each facility. Average capacity utilized was derived by dividing the total megawatt hours generated by a facility in 1977 by the hours in a year (8760).$ Average demand was found by dividing the total megawatt hours demanded in 1977 in an air basin by the hours in a year. Finally, dirty average demand was found by subtracting the clean (hydro and nuclear) average capacity utilized in an air basin from the average demand for the basin.5 Two potential distortions in facility locations are noted in Table 1. Although the San Onofre nuclear facility is located in the San Diego Air Basin, it is virtually on its border with the South Coast Air Basin. Furthermore, this facility is 80% owned by Southern California Edison, which supplies electricity to large portions of the South Coast Air Basin, and 20% owned by San Diego Gas and Electric. Hence, 80% of its installed capacity and average utilized capacity was assigned to the South Coast Air Basin and 20% was assigned to the San Diego Air Basin. The Mohave coal facility is located in Nevada, but is almost on the California state line. It is also located in a valley extending into California, so that portions of the Southeast Desert Air Basin’s air quality is degraded by its electric power generation. Finally, electric utilities whose demand is located exclusively in California own 76% of the facility. Nevertheless, the facility falls outside California’s political jurisdiction, so that
i The nuclear facilities are Humboldt Bay (63 megawatts), Ranch0 Seco (913 megawatts), and San Onofre I (432 megawatts). $ It should be noted that 1977 was the first year following a severe drought in many parts of California. Therefore, the average hydroelectric capacity utilized may be somewhat less than normal. Q Dirty average demand is that portion of an air basin’s average demand that is not met by the basin’s clean average utilized capacity. It therefore represents the air quality degradation demanded by an air basin.
,,
.
was considered
3,029.4
44.5 0.0 0.0 477.3 0.0 70.6 120.1 1,624.5 53.0 0.0 243.0 0.0 318.3 78.1
(MW)
-17.4 23.2 28.9 -222.0 300.1 89.0 -36.9 -308.9 820.6 3,955.4 1,922.0 545.4 6,945.7 319.7
14,364.a
17,394.2
Dirty
Demand
27.1 23.2 28.9 255.3 300.1 159.6 83.2 1,315.6 873.6 3,955.4 2,165.0 545.4 7,264.0 397.8
Total
Average
to he 80% in the South Coast Air Basin and
13,346.5 (14,077.a)
0.0 0.0 0.2 0.0 1,481.6 444.0 0.0 0.0 1,019.l 2,614.4 127.9 1,850.o 5,596.? 212.6 (943.9) --
(MN)
Hydro & Nuclear
Utilized
Fossil & Geothermal
Capacity
.,
1
_
_,
“_
.
_, “” ,,.
.,, ..,
in parentheses include Southern California Edison's and Los Angeles Department of Water share (76%) of the Mohave fossil generating facility in the Southeast Desert Air Basin.
The numbers and Power's
facility
16,375.9 (17,107.2)
10,688.2 24,704.5 (25,905.3')
6.0 2,060.O 607.0 0.0 0.0 2,018.O 4,346.0 180.0 3,107.o 11,898.0 466.0 (1,666.8)
Total
Hydro & Nuclear 44.5 0.0 0.2 477.3 1,481.6 514.6 120.1 1,624.5 1,072.I 2,614.4 370.9 1,850.O 5,915.0 290.7 (1,022.O)
Average
(Mw)
180.3 0.0 0.0 2,833.3 0.0 178.6 211.0 3,844.8 88.7 0.0 1,647.4 0.0 1,510.5 193.6
b.
(36,593.5)
2,839.3 2,060-O 785.6 211.0 3,844.8 2,106.7 4,346.0 1,827.4 3,107-o 13,408.5 659.6 (1,806.4)
Capacity
The San Onofre nuclear generating 20% in the San Diego Air Rasin.
r
Installed
a.
State Totals
Lake Country Lake Tahoe Mountain Counties North Central Coast North Coast Northeast Plateau Sacramento Valley San Diego S. F. Bay Area San Joaquin Valley South Central Coast South Coast Southeast Desert
Great Basin Valley
Air Basin
t
Table I.California electric demand and generationby airbasin(1977).
,. I,
E. H. WARREN,JR. et al.
756
it could not be included in the capacity of the Southeast Desert Air Basin. California’s share of the installed and average utilized capacities was therefore included in Table 1 in parentheses. C. Analysis Four different capacity demand ratios are presented in Table 2. Each of these ratios measures an air basin’s ability to internalize its externality from electric power generation needs. The extent to which they diverge from the statewide ratio is a measure of the inequity of facility location. Note that a statewide ratio of dirty average capacity utilized to dirty average demand is not given, because four air basins have negative dirty demand. For each of the four capacity demand ratios given in Table 2, six of the 14 air basins are always below the statewide ratio: Lake County, Lake Tahoe, San Francisco Bay Area, San Joaquin Valley, South Coast, and Southeast Desert. Lake County and Lake Tahoe are anomalies; they have virtually no capacity and very small demands. Further, if California’s share of the Mohave facility is considered to be in the Southeast Desert Air Basin, its capcity demand ratios become significantly higher than the statewide ratio. Finally, the ratios of dirty installed capacity to average demand for the Great Basin Valley, Mountain Counties, Northeast Plateau, and Sacramento Valley air basins are below the statewide average. This also is an anomaly, since these counties have virtually no dirty capacity. Therefore, it should be concluded from Table 2 that the Lake County, Lake Tahoe, San Francisco Bay Area, San Joaquin Valley, South Coast, and Southeast Desert air basins are not bearing their fair share of the environmental degradation due to electric power generation demanded in their air basins. In view of the above comments, the San Francisco Bay Area and San Joaquin Valley air basins, are clearly the most inequitable. The South Coast Air Basin is generally much closer to the statewide average, and above it in terms of the ratio of dirty installed capacity to average demand. These results are shown in Fig. 3. Table 3 exhibits four different types of capacity figures per capita. Estimated population and two types of demand per capita are shown as well. The extent to which an air basin’s per capita capacity diverges from the statewide ratio is the second way of measuring the inequities of electric generation facility location. As was the case with capacity demand ratios, the Lake County, Lake Tahoe, San Francisco Bay Area, and San Joaquin Valley air basins are below the statewide figure for
Table 2. Capacity
Inst. Air
Basin
Great
Basin
Ave.
Valley
demand
cap.
ratios for California
Dirty
Inst. Ave.
Dem.
6.65
Cap.
air basins (1977).
Ave.
Dem.
Cap. Ave.
Util. Dem.
Dirty Ave. Cap. Util. Dirty Ave. Dem.
0.0
1.64
b
0.0 0.57 11.12
0.0 0.57 0.02
0.0 0.01 1.75
0.0 0.01 h
North Central Coast North Coast Northeast Plateau Sacramento Valley
6.86 4.92 2.54 2.92
6.86 3.80 0.0 0.0
4.94 3.22 1.44 1.23
4.94 4.99 h b
San Diego S. F. Bay
2.41 1.10
2.31 1.10
1.23 0.66
1.24 0.66
San Joaquin Valley South Central Coast South Coast Southeast Desert
0.84 5.70 1.85 1.66 (4.68ja -
0.08 5.70 1.64 1.17 c4.191= -
0.17 3.39 0.81 0.73 (2.57ja -
0.07 3.39 0.81 0.6h (2.95ja -
State
2.03 (2.ln)a
1.42 <1.49ja
0.94 (0.98)a
Lake County Lake Tahoe Mcantain Counties
a.
b.
Area
Ratios
Ratios in parentheses include Southern California Department of Water and Power’s share (76%) of facility in the Southeast Desert Air Basin. Indicates
negative
dirty
demand
and
hence
the
a negative
Edison’s Mohave
ratio.
and fossil
Los Angeles generating
Electric power generation facility
Air basins with capacity per
Air basins with some capacity per capita measures above state measures Air basms with capacity per capita measures below state
Fig. 3. Air basins below California capacity demand ratios.
each type of per capita capacity. As before, the Great Basin Valley, Mountain Counties, Northeast Plateau, and Sacramento Valley air basins are below the statewide figure for dirty installed capacity per capita or dirty average capacity utilized per capita, because they have virtually no dirty capacity. Again, the Lake County and Lake Tahoe air basins should be considered anomalies because of small populations and lack of significant capacity of any type. It is interesting to note that when considering capacity per capita, the San Diego Air Basin is now below the statewide figures for two of the four measures. Notably, the South Coast Air Basin is above the statewide average for dirty installed capacity per capita. Finally, the Southeast Desert Air Basin is above the statewide figures for installed capacity per capita and dirty installed capacity per capita without including California’s share of the Mohave facility in its capacity figures. (With that portion of the Mohave plant included, it is, of course, above the statewide figures for all measures.) The implications of Table 3 are that the Lake County, Lake Tahoe, San Francisco Bay Area, and San Joaquin Valley air basins are clearly not bearing their fair share of the environmental degradation from per capita electric power generation. Again, the San Francisco Bay Area and San Joaquin Valley are clearly the most obviously inequitable. The South Coast Air Basin is probably not bearing its fair share, whereas the situation
a.
21,891,OOO
25,900 28,700 33,100 264,000 465,500 212,000 74,500 1,260,OOO 1,672,300 4,883,800 1,803,500 894,700 9,873,100 399,900
!
1.62 (1.67ja
6.96 0.0 0.50 10.75 4.43 3.71 2.03 3.05 1.26 0.89 1.01 3.47 1.36 1.65 (4.52)a
Inst. Cap.(KW) Population
Dirty
1.13 (1.18)a
0.0 0.0 0.50 0.02 4.43 2.86 0.0 0.0 1.21 0.89 0.10 3.47 1.21 1.17 (4.17)a
Inst. Cap.(KW) Population
0.75 (0.78ja
1.72 0.0 0.01 1.81 3.18 2.43 1.62 1.29 0.64 0.54 0.21 2.07 0.60 0.73 (2.56ja
Ave. Cap. Util.(KW) Population
and Power's
0.61 (0.64)a
0.0 0.0 0.01 0.0 3.18 2.09 0.0 0.0 0.61 0.54 0.07 2.07 0.57 0.53 (2.36)a
Dirty Ave. Cap. Util.(KW) Population
Ratios in parentheses include Southern California Edison's and Los Angeles Department of Water share (76%) of the Mohave fossil generating facility in the Southeast Desert Air Basin.
State Ratio
Great Basin Valley Lake County Lake Tahoe Mountain Counties North Central Coast North Coast Northeast Plateau Sacramento Valley San Diego S. F. Bay Area San Joaquin Valley South Central Coast South Coast Southeast Desert
Air Basin
Estimated Population (7/l/77)
Table 3. Per capita capacity and demand for California air basins (1977).
Electric power generation
facility
759
for the San Diego and Southeast Desert air basins is open to interpretation. However, the Southeast Desert Air Basin would be bearing more than its fair share if California’s share of the Mohave facility was included in its capacity. Their results are shown in Fig. 4. 5.
EQUITY
AND
SITING
NEW
FACILITIES
As more use is made of potentially dirty fuels, the notion of distributing the externalities produced by an electric power generating facility will be of increasing importance. However, if equity is to be considered in siting additional electric power generating facilities, then it must be done by the government, since the distribution of facilities in an unencumbered market economy is based solely on the criterion of economic efficiency. Thus, historically, sites for electric power generation facilities were chosen to minimize the costs of meeting a given demand for electricity without consideration being given to the equity of the distribution. If California, or any governmental body, should want to incorporate equity into the process for siting electric generation facilities, they would need to consider several issues relating to the scope of that equity. First, the type of equity to be achieved must be determined. They could take a marginal view of equity, ignore past inequities and divide new facilities equally among air basins. Alternatively, they could take a global perspective
Fig. 4. Air basins below California
capacity
per capita.
760
E. H. WARREN,JR. et al.
of equity and site new facilities in air basins currently bearing the least equitable share of environmental degradation due to electric power generation and thus enhance the equality between air basins. Second, the externalities to be equitably distributed must be determined. This paper has focused only on air quality. Obviously, inequities exist in other areas of impact, such as water. Also, in a more extensive analysis, it is quite possible that other sources of environmental degradation (e.g. petroleum refining, resource extraction, agriculture) should be considered and possible environmental trade-offs assessed. What has been discussed is not a model for siting electric generating facilities. Rather, it is a suggestion of how equity issues might be considered in the siting process. In view of the present situation, economics will, and must, continue to play the central role in dete~ining where facilities will be sited. However, the growing awareness of adverse impacts associated with many plants would suggest that some balance be introduced in selecting sites. Acknowledgement-This paper has benefited from discussions between the authors and M. Goldsmith, L. Omen, and R. O’Toole. We are indebted to them, but absolve them from all responsibility for the views expressed herein. The responsibility for the contents of the paper is ours alone and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology, the University of Arizona, or the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. REFERENCES 1. A. M. Freeman III, Distribution of environmental quality, in Environmental Quality Anai,vsis: Theory and Measurement in the Social Sciences (A. V. Kresse and B. Bower, eds.). Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore (1972). 2. California Energy Commission, Power Plant Siting Policy Paper. Sacramento, California (1978). 3. M. S. Hamilton, Power plant siting: a literature review. Natur. Res. J. 75, 19 (1979). 4. M. Messing, Electric generation: issues of scale and political authority, in Energy Use Management, Vol. III (R. A. Fazzolare and C. B. Smith, eds.). Pergamon Press, New York (I 977). 5. D. Rae, The egalitarian state: notes on a system of contradictory ideals. Daedalus 37, 108 (1979). 6. Catifomia Energy Commission, Biennial Report, Vol. 7 (Summary). Sacramento, California (1977). 7. State of California, Calt~rn~a Statistical Abstract, 1978. Sacramento, California (1978). 8. Electrical World, ~~rectary ofElectric Utilities, 87th edn, M~raw-Hill, New York (1978).