ESSAY

Futures, Vol. 30, No. 1, pp. 83–90, 1998  1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Printed in Great Britain 0016–3287/98 $19.00 + 0.00

Pergamon

PII: S0016–3287(98)00008-1

ESSAY How actual are democratic virtues? ˇ ´ Matko Mestrovic

In 1990 approximately two-thirds of countries in the world did not have democratic regimes, according to Huntington. The obstacles to and forces for democratisation in these countries he divides into three categories: political, cultural, and economic. He gives no importance to technology. The anonimity of MUDs offers to some people the chance to express multiple and often unexplored aspects of the self. But we still do not understand enough the dynamics of virtual experience. Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology probably concerns us more today than forty years ago.  1998 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved Prospects A twentieth century political system is defined as democratic to the extent that its most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections. It is supposed that candidates freely compete for votes and virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote. In 1990 approximately two-thirds of countries in the world did not have democratic regimes, according to Huntington.1 He divides the obstacles to and forces for democratization in these countries into three categories: political, cultural, and economic. He gives no importance to technology. In contrast, the Al Gore inspired Democratic administration has established a major objective in developing the National Information Infrastructure: to extend the Uniˇ ´ Prof Dr Matko Mestrovic may be contacted at the Ekonomski Institut Zagreb, 10000 Zagreb, Trg J F Kennedya 7, Croatia (Tel: + 385 1 23 35 700; fax: +ˇ 385 1 23 35 16; e-mail: matko.mestrovic Zekist.eizg.hr).

versal Service concept to the information needs of the American people.2

Historical phenomenon The procedural concept of democracy in the Schumpetarian mode, to which Huntington adheres, is a method for selecting political leaders. It is a form without any definite substance in the way of social or political ends. This permitted Schumpeter to exclude any consideration of democracy as a historical phenomenon, and within his scheme of ideas there seems to be no way of examining the question of whether a society is more or less democratic. For the effective working of a thoroughly democratic society at least two other things are essential: first, that as many citizens as possible should share in making decisions, and second, that there should exist a considerable variety of relatively autonomous associations which provide a basis for the permanent, unimpeded criticism and reform of social arrangements, says Tom Bottomore in his Introduction to Schumpeter’s famous book.3

83

ˇ ´ Essay: M Mestrovic

But Schumpeter himself in a later paper which was added to the third edition has been more prophetic than even Marx: the vast productive possibilities of the capitalist engine promise indefinitely higher standards of life, supplemented by gratis services without the complete ‘expropriation of the expropriators’. Although he considered that capitalism as a scheme of values, as an attitude toward life, is a civilization of inequality that is rapidly passing away.4

Hegemonic formation That men should be eternally unequal among themselves in one single respect and equal in others for Tocqueville was something inconceivable, and an argument for his belief that they will one day attain equality in all respects. Chantal Mouffe5 puts forward the same argument in her questioning the totality of social relationships today. She is referring to Tocqueville because he was the first to grasp the importance of the democratic revolution on the symbolic level. As long as equality has not yet acquired its place of central significance in the social imagination of Western societies, struggles for this equality cannot exist. As soon as the principle of equality is admitted in one domain, the eventual questioning of all possible forms of inequality is an ineluctable consequence. Today, it is not only through the sale of their labor power that individuals are submitted to the domination of capital but also through their participation in many other social relations, Chantal Mouffe rightly points out. Western society has been transformed into a big marketplace where all the products of human labor have become commodities, where more and more needs must go through market to be satisfied. Culture, leisure, death, sex, everything is now a field of profit for capital. Capitalism as a way of life is, in fact, responsible for numerous forms of subordination and inequality. In its history we can see the rhythm of successive hegemonic formations which imply a set of practices that are not merely economic but political and cultural as well.6

Unsupported assumption The imposition of a homogenized way of life, of a uniform cultural pattern, was and is being

84

challenged by different groups that affirm their right to their difference. Many new social movements are expressions of resistance against the progressive commodification of social life. One called the Cultural Environment Movement (CEM) had its Founding Convention last year, March 15–17, in St. Louis. There important documents of universal significance such as a People’s Communication Charter and Viewers’ Declaration of Independence were proposed and accepted. And many proposals for immediate action were presented. One of them is directly answering the challenge: Damage Control on the Information Superhighway. The recent Telecommunications Act of 1996 threatens to reduce the diversity and availability of information and communication by promoting the increased concentration of media power. Under the Communications Act of 1934, sixty two years ago, the nation’s telecom networks were operated as government sanctioned monopolies regulated in the public interest. The newly enacted legislation abandons government regulation in favor of competitive market forces. The legislation is premised on the unsupported assumption that effective competition will emerge rapidly for all classes of users and across all services.

Cultural representations Ecology, technology, consumerism, and inequality present interrelated issues—is a synthesized cognition ready to encourage grassroots participation as well as organizational involvement. Although simplifying the complex socioeconomic relations and sociohistoric realities, it is not a simplistic thesis to say that cultural representations of technology shape their applications. Although being of utmost political relevance, it is not a politically determined position to perceive that equitable opportunities and sustainable societies require the full recognition of patterns of technology that are detrimental to physical, social and cultural environments, worldwide. And from that position it is not difficult to conclude how the combination of corporation sponsored media and weakened public regulation prevents such recognition. It is the structure that provides the superindividual source of causality in sociological reasoning whether it is experienced by members, or constituted by theorists, as economic, political, moral, cognitive or even physical in

ˇ ´ Essay: M Mestrovic

its orientation. From these various conceptions stem the dynamics of the process from which the idea of culture emerges. It is in the way of re-producing and, as with all social processes, it provides the ground for and context of social action itself.7

not just about profitability, it is about cynical power.

Cognitive mobilization

We can not speed up the ‘basal metabolism’ of our society indefinitely without running the risk of homeostatic collapse and profound cultural shock. We are already faced with the problem of regulating not only the direction of change but also its fundamental rate. In the absence of such control we invite social chaos, warned Harold Sackman, one of the creators of the first computer-supported system of air defence in the mid-sixties.12 He believed that great qualitative changes may occur in society through computer catalyzed intelligence. The form itself of democracy and its technique may be transformed and may spread through all levels of society. The ultimate purpose of information power is not merely to enable us to wallow around in a growing pool of information but to open new avenues of socially useful action that will increase our mastery over our environment. A more highly intelligent human community is more likely to encourage and protect individual integrity and provide pluralistic checks and balances in society—bringing to bear the kind of social forces that are less likely to permit conditions to develop to that could result in computers being used to exploit and degrade mankind. Sackman strongly criticized American technical leadership for hiding many unsolved problems most of which center on human element. The fundamental challenge lies in long-range development of social intelligence adequate to the cultural transformation, not merely in immediate machine optimization. Computer science and technology, as currently developed, are unwittingly serving to amplify global problems. The basic reason for this is that the most advanced nations are the ones almost exclusively enjoying the growing fruits of automation. The great evolutionary potential of computers for humanity demands a pooling of international knowledge with growing dissemination and use of computer science and technology for all societies. That requires a universal and far-seeking evolutionary point of view new to humanity.13

During the same two decades in which Samuel Huntington has observed a worldwide trend he calls the ‘third wave of democratization’, Ronald Inglehart8 had predicted that value priorities in advanced industrial societies would have tend to shift from ‘Materialist’ to ‘Postmaterialist’. Two processes that gradually transformed the values of Western publics are highly correlated: a greater emphasis on freedom, self-expression, and the quality of life coincides with a movement toward higher level of cognitive mobilization that resulted partly from rising levels of education and partly from changes in the nature of work. This value change is not a uniquely Western phenomenon. It is closely linked with prosperity and seems to occur wherever a society has experienced enough economic growth that the younger birth cohorts have experienced significantly greater economic security during their formative years. But Inglehart is cautious: there is no guarantee that the trend will continue.9 Ambiguities Fifteen years ago, most computer users were limited to typing commands. Today they use off-the-shelf products to manipulate simulated desktops, draw with simulated paints and brushes, and fly in simulated airplane cockpits. The anonymity of MUDs gives people the chance to express multiple and often unexplored aspects of the self, to play with their identity and to try out new ones. We must understand the dynamics of virtual experience both to foresee who might be in danger and to put these experiences to best use, says optimistically the author of an brilliant essay in Wired of January 1996.10 There is no place for optimism in Ziauddin Sardar’s article, published recently in Futures.11 The occupation of cyberspace he directly parallels with the colonization of non-Western cultures. Cyberdemocracy is lynch law. Virtual capitalism is

Fundamental challenge

85

ˇ ´ Essay: M Mestrovic

Perceptual consequences There is no simple correspondence between the emergence of new technologies and the emergence of new cultural forms. For most American today ‘franchise’ means both the right to vote in public elections, regardless of race, gender, class and property ownership, and a privileged and exclusive corporate entity, implying the right to regulate trade or hold sway over territory toward the end not of public interest, but of maximum corporate profit.14 Our insertion in an increasingly electronic and digitized lifeworld occurs in modalities that are both technologically ‘transparent’ and ‘hermeneutic’. A transparent ‘embodiment relation’ with technology does not necessarily lead to less progressive political thought or activity on the part of its user, nor does a more reflective and reflexive ‘hermeneutic relation’ with technology necessarily lead to more progressive political thought and action. What is needed—along with reflection on the political context in which new technologies emerged—is a phenomenological description of their perceptual consequences. While our capacity to roam in cognitive space and to understand our relations to others and to our artifacts as non-linear, reversible and non-hierarchical has been greatly amplified, our valuation of our physical embodiment and embeddedness in the world has been greatly reduced.15

Form of life But already there are more and more American voices capable of speaking very clearly about the real economic and political context of ‘democratical competitiveness’ within which the electronic transformation of perception is occurring. In our great desire to free the individual for happiness, we Americans have tried to make a social world that would serve the self, say the authors of The Good Society.16 But things have not gone quite according to plan. We have made instead a world that dwarfs the self it was meant to serve. Under the pressure of market forces there is no other response than submission. This is the ironic result of trying to live by the Lockean language of individualism in an institutional world it can no longer describe. Yet that same language still seduces us at every turn. The way of life of

86

affluent members of our society is so oriented to outcomes and achievements that the very question of a good form of life is occluded. Our enhanced freedom should allow us to choose whatever form of life we feel would be most fulfilling. But draconian conditions for its attainment empty out the very notion of a form of life. Such an insight inevitably leads to more radical conclusion. The challenge is to devise ways to make civic equality really real: the possibility of meaningful work and genuine participation in public life for all members of society.

Diagnosis The most elementary prerequisite for that request to be fulfilled is increasingly missing. Inequality of access and impoverished content of information are deepening the already pervasive national social crisis, says Herbert Schiller in the first sentence of his latest book.17 The ability to understand critical national problems is prevented by a growing flood of trivialities and by an absence of basic, contexualized social information. Schiller’s diagnosis is sociologically precise, morally profound and historically objective. The voices that reach national audiences are those that secure the support and the financing of the moneyed crowd. For that reason the social ailments are conveniently explained by pointing to individual weakness to remove malfunctioning institutions from scrutiny. The disappearance from the world scene of a structured opposition to the global market economy reinforces the antisocial impulses. The belief is cultivated that there can be no alternative to what exists. In the drive for private gain, functions that require the support of the full community are being stripped of their social character. There is no quantifiably useful way of estimating the social benefit of publicly administered services. The character and quality of the message and image flow, therefore, is a crucial terrain of contention in the time ahead. Withstanding the fact that freedom of speech in America increasingly has come to mean the de facto dominance of corporate speech and corporate perspectives.

Shifts The shift, in advanced capitalist society, from material production to information-processing

ˇ ´ Essay: M Mestrovic

activities, the profound transformation in the organization of production to vertical disintegration and horizontal networks between economic units, decentralization and flexibility of large corporation in their internal structure—all that made possible the new global economy in which the national economy can no longer be the unit of economic accounting. Competition is played out globally and the national economy now works as a unit at the world level in real time.18 These transformations take place in the midst of one of the most significant technological revolutions of human history. Information technology has been stimulated in its application by the same economic and organizational transformations to which it constitutes the indispensable material base. The enhancement of telecommunications has created the infrastructure for the formation of the global economy. The informational economy develops on a planetary scale, but its expansion is uneven. It is creating a new international division of labor between countries and economic macroregions, one that will shape the evolution of the world economy in the coming decades. Its transformation into a dynamic, highly integrated system could bypass entire countries or the majority of their populations. A significant part of the world population is already shifting from a structural position of exploitation to a structural position of irrelevance. The incapacity of the number of countries to adapt to the new conditions of economic growth, leads to a plurality of collective reactions, all of them having high destructive potential. Scope Where we are now and what destiny are we approaching? Does Heidegger’s The Question Concerning Technology19 concern us more today than forty years ago? Are we ready to read it more carefully and understand better the philosophical concepts by which he tried to explain this ‘enframed’ situation?! Suffice it to mention just his warning. Technology, whose essence is Being itself, will never allow itself to be overcome by men. That would mean, after all, that man was the master of the Being. In order that man become attentive to the essence of technology, and in order that there may be founded an essential relationship between technology and man in respect to their essence, modern man must first and

above all find his way back to the full breadth of the space proper to his essence.

Leadership The country that can best lead the information revolution will be more powerful than any other. Thanks to Cold War investments and its open society, America dominates important communications and information processing technologies and has an unparalleled ability to integrate complex information systems. Today America is able to achieve desired outcomes in international affairs through attraction rather than coercion, convincing others to follow the norms and institutions that produce the desired behavior. The ability to set agenda in ways that shape the preferences of others is called ‘soft power’.20 But outmoded thinking still clouds the appreciation of that power and it is not easy at all to capture the implications of still growing information capabilities. Information power is hard to categorize because it cuts across all other military, economic, social, and political power resources. The technologies that provide the ability to gather, sort, process, transfer, and display information about highly complex events that occur in wide geographic areas are important for more than fighting the wars. But what they actually serve or could serve for? Whether seeking to engage or isolate undemocratic regimes, in every case the United States should engage the people, keeping them informed on world events and helping them prepare to build democratic market societies when the opportunity arises—answer the authors of this article in the prominent review Foreign Affairs. Although they know that not all aspects of American culture are attractive, they are persuaded that American leadership in the information revolution has generally increased global awareness of American ideas and values. And, most interesting, they conclude: information is often a public good, but it is not a free one; constraints on the sharing of the system-of-systems capabilities and the selective transfer of intelligence and imagery should be loosened.21

Values and purposes It is impossible to apply only one outlook to the new international society and the lifestyles

87

ˇ ´ Essay: M Mestrovic

that will evolve with the networks linking computers throughout the world. While the Internet in America is essentially grounded on principles of individualism, the Internet in Europe and Asia has been influenced by knowledge and information systems that have evolved on the basis of strong authority and control, and thus carries a significantly different meaning. In Japan, Murai suggests,22 the Internet will likely provide a great opportunity for individuals to consider how they should lead responsible lives. As a medium, Internet can create a new type of human relationships, if it does not become disengaged from human society. For that not to happen, we must first establish conditions that will help our current democratic political system work more effectively. A prerequisite for this effort is that people recognize a common set of social problems. The sharing of information will be essential to the establishment of such a foundation. Since dynamic information, yielded by mutual interaction involving a networking process, has no value if monopolized or hidden from others, it must be disclosed, considers Kaneko,23 persuaded that the coming information society should be based on a ‘voluntary economy’ to ensure not to be overwhelmed by technology. New technology, many Japanese authors believe, is closely connected to the values and consciousness that support human behavior in society. Twenty five years ago Masuda24 spoke about synergetic economy and voluntary civil society aiming for the realization of time value for each human being. The social actions of citizens will become goal-means relationships that operate as cause-effect relationships. Man and nature have began to act together in a new ecological sense, reaching the awareness that scientific technology is simply the application of scientific principles. And that these cannot be changed by man, nor can he create new principles to work and live by—thought Masuda in his visionary Computopia. The views based on a prospective assessment of the form human activities could take as a result of the changing technological profile of society often fail to acknowledge not only the unequal distribution of resources and knowledge, but also the fact that ‘informatization’ is the consequence of development and not its cause, although the technology can be used for development purposes—was one of

88

the most realistic opinions in the early 1980s.25

Concerns The transition to the 21st century is witnessing the emergence of a fractured global order—an order that puts most of the world’s people in contact with one another, but simultaneously maintains deep fissures between different groups of countries and between peoples within countries. In 1991 the ratio of income shares of the richest to the poorest 20% was about 61 to 1. This fracture between poverty and affluence has proved to be one of the most enduring and alarming features.26 Developing countries face the difficult challenge of raising labor productivity, in order to increase standards of living and improve competitiveness. At the same, time they have to absorb the growing number of entrants into the labor force. Ageing in industrialized nations will have important consequences for the direction of technical progress, which is likely to move further in the direction of labor saving. The general population imbalance could pose the problem of uncontrolled mass migration from developing to industrialized countries, threatening social cohesion and international solidarity. The emergence of the truly global environmental problems such as depletion of the ozone layer and global warming, and the divergence of perspective between industrialized and developing nations on approaches to sustainable development, require major changes in lifestyles in both groups of countries. There are many signs of that. The revival of religious and spiritual concerns, the desire to reassert individuality and preserve cultural identity, moral and ethical questions regarding the right of futures generations and a variety of other issues suggest that humanity is in the midst of a bewildering and paradoxical transition towards something that cannot as yet be clearly visualized. Development patterns that perpetuate today’s inequities are neither sustainable nor worth sustaining, Sagasti concludes, still arguing that science and technology will provide the means for bridging multiple fractures that characterize the emerging global order.27

ˇ ´ Essay: M Mestrovic

Knowledge Recent work in both philosophy and the social sciences has emphasized the non-reflexive nature of contemporary scientific practice and the useful role that reflexive methods could play in illuminating the broader cultural and contextual content of scientific work. A sociotechnical system subsumes the technical and societal aspects of a technology into a single concept in which distinctions between these various aspects disappear. The ’system builders’ play a central role and the cognitive framework within which they operate assumes a primary importance.28 The origins of the stupendous growth which is exhibited by science and technology systems can be explicated by the increasing density of communication between science and society, among scientific practitioners, and with the entities of physical and social world, and through the interlinkages of all these three levels. The clustering and configuration of knowledge which is brought together on a temporary basis in specific contexts of application does not necessarily aim to establish itself as a new, transdisciplinary discipline, nor is it inspired by restoring cognitive unity. Knowledge production became part of a larger process in which discovery, application and use are closely integrated thanks only to the extension of the market for knowledge and increased marketability of science.29 But the knowledge-based economy does not behave the same way existing theory assumes an economy to behave. Initial advantages gained through early application and exploitation of knowledge become permanent and irreversible. And there is no evidence that increased consumption in economy leads immediately to greater production of knowledge or that the greater investment in the economy does it. It is not possible to quantify knowledge. We can estimate how much it costs to produce and distribute knowledge, but what we might even mean by ‘return of knowledge’—we cannot yet say, put the authors of The New Production of Knowledge. Contradictory pressures of social accountability have reached the humanities too, although in a specific form. The humanities draw their intellectual energy from ceaseless interrogation relinking past and present. It is in this respect that a key dilemma is encountered. Reflexivity requires rootedness, a context in which one can act. Contextualisation is essential for the humanities. They do not only exhi-

bit reflexivity in a more continuous and radical manner than the natural sciences. Their reflexivity is expected to carry meaning for the entire human experience.30

Destining Technology is at the same time a means to an end and a human activity. Heidegger brings these two aspects together because technology is fundamentally a means of the achievement of the end of dwelling in the world. Building and dwelling are the essential truth of what it means and involves to live.31 Modern technology orders the meaning and the potential of nature by confining it within bounds. Enframing is the essence of modern technology, through it meanings are imposed upon things. Enframing requires and encourages a revelation of nature as a standing reserve. Through enframing, futurity is opened up and the social world is harnessed to a destiny. Destining is the essence of history. The supposed goal of the revealing defines the path which has to be taken. Enframing is a problem precisely because it defines the meaning of the future and, eventually, leads to the forgetting of humanity. In that consists the danger of technology. Heidegger is trying to rescue the chance for a self-defining humanity from out of the imposed destinies associated with technology. His hermeneutic assault on the essence of technology Tester considers only partially successful. Technology itself remains rather untouched by all of this. But thanks to his deep desire to make the human at home in the modern world, Martin Heidegger succeeds in making us even more decisively homeless.32

Epilogue Modern-day consciousness has been formed in a period that is now moving to a close. The confidence natural to a society sustained by belief in an impersonal momentum of progress is less likely to emerge in a society uncertain as to the availability of economic solutions. At stake is not only capitalism’s most powerful history-shaping characteristic—its subordination of behavior to economic imperatives— but our own notion of human nature itself.33

89

ˇ ´ Essay: M Mestrovic

Notes and references 1.

2. 3. 4. 5.

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12.

13. 14. 15. 16. 17.

18.

90

Huntington, Samuel P. The Third Wave: Democratization in The Late Twentieth Century, Oklahoma University Press, Norman and London, 1991, pp. 7;294–295. Ray, T., Access and Inequalities. In Heap, N. et al. (eds.) Information Technology and Society, Sage Publications, London, 1995, p. 98. Schumpeter, J. A. Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy, Harper and Row, Publishers, New York, 1976, pp. xii–xiii. Ibid, p. 419. Mouffe, Ch. Hegemony and New Political Subjects: Toward a New Concept of Democracy. In Nelson C. and L. Grossberg (eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture, University od Illinois Press, Urbana and Chicago, 1988, pp. 89, 94. Ibid, pp. 92, 99, 91. Jenks, Chris Culture, Routledge, London and New York, 1993, p. 119. Abramson, P.R. and Inglehard, R. Value Change in Global Perspective, The University of Michigan Presss, Ann Arbor, 1995, pp. 1–5. Ibid, p. 144. Turkles, S., Who Am We, Wired, Editor/Publisher Louis Rossetto, New York-San Francisco, 1996, January. Sardar, Z., Cyberspace as the Darker Side of the West, Futures, 1995, 27(7). Sackman, H. Computer, System Science and Evolving Society, John Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York-London-Sydney, 1967, pp. 4, 37, 365, 529–530. Ibid, pp. 553, 555, 583, 584, 589. Sobchack, V., Democratic franchise and the electronic frontier. Futures,, 1995, 27(7), 725–727. Ibid, pp. 728, 729. Bellah, R. N. et al. The Good Society, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 1992, pp. 85–86, 90, 109 Schiller, H.I. Information Inequality: The Deepening Social Crisis in America, Routledge, New York-London, 1996, pp. xi;xiv– xvi, 139. Castells, M. The Informational Economy and the New International Division of Labor. In

19. 20. 21. 22. 23.

24.

25.

26. 27. 28. 29.

30. 31. 32. 33.

Carnoy, Martin et al. (eds.) The New Global Economy in the Information Age: Reflections on our Changing World, The Pennsylvania State University Press, 1993, pp. 17-19, 21, 37–38. Heidegger, M. The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays, Harper and Row, Publishers, Inc., New York, 1977, pp. 38–39. Nye, J. and Owens W. A. America’s Information Edge, Foreign Affairs, 1996, 75(2), New York, pp. 20–21. Ibid, pp. 30, 29, 35. Murai, J. The Internet, 1995, (reviewed by Keiko Kiyohara in The Japan Foundation Newsletter Vol. 23 No. 6, 1996) Kaneko, I. Volunteers: Another Information Society, 1992, and Kaneko I. Internet Strategies: Nomadic Economic Block, 1995, (reviewed by Keiko Kiyohara in The Japan Foundation Newsletter Vol. 23 No. 6, 1996) Masuda, Y., Computopia. In Forester, T. (ed.) The Information Technology Revolution, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985, pp. 620–625, 632– 633. Rada, J. Information Technology and the Third World. In Forester, T. (ed.) The Information Technology Revolution, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1985, pp. 572, 588. Sagasti, F. R., Knowledge and Development in a Fractured Global Order, Futures, 1995, 27(6), pp. 591, 596–597. Ibid, pp. 589–599, 605–606. Healy, S. A., Science, Technology and Future Sustainability, Futures, 1995, 27(6), pp. 614, 616. Gibbons, M. et al. The New Production of Knowledge: The Dynamics of Science and Research in Contemporary Societies, Sage Publications London–Thousand Oaks–New Delhi, 1994, pp. 18, 22, 46. Ibid, pp. 57–58, 91–92. Tester, K. The Life and Times of Post-Modernity, Routledge, London–New York, 1993, p. 91. Ibid, pp. 94-98, 100. Heilbroner, R. 21st Century Capitalism, W.W. Norton and Company, New York–London, 1993, 150–151.