Ethical negotiation values of Chinese negotiators

JBR-08475; No of Pages 8 Journal of Business Research xxx (2015) xxx–xxx

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Journal of Business Research

Ethical negotiation values of Chinese negotiators Chan Sow Hup a,⁎, Ng Tsz Shing b a b

Faculty of Business Administration, University of Macau, Macau, PR China The Venetian Macau, Macau, PR China

a r t i c l e

i n f o

Article history: Received 20 March 2013 Received in revised form 6 July 2015 Accepted 9 July 2015 Available online xxxx Keywords: Chinese Deception Emotion Ethical values Negotiation Tactics

a b s t r a c t This study explores tactics that violate standards of truth-telling in the Eastern context using the quantitative approach. Based on data collected from 173 respondents, the findings revealed that Chinese negotiators judge the use of emotion management tactics as more ethically appropriate than cognitive deception tactics. Chinese negotiators are also more confident in their ability to successfully deploy emotion management tactics than cognitive deception tactics. In addition, women are less likely to view the deceptive tactics as appropriate, and they are less confident to deploy deceptive tactics than men. Certain differences regarding the appropriateness and ability to deploy the tactics were apparent. The limitations of the study and areas for further research are presented. © 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction As managers are increasingly engaging in international business negotiation (Reynolds, Simintras, & Vlachou, 2003), they need not only to better understand the values of cultures other than their own but also to understand the mentality of the corresponding person to cultivate successful relationships (Bagozzi, 1995). The intensifying business activities and negotiations taking place across national borders also makes it vital to examine ethical decision-making and behavior of other cultures (Wood, 1995) because negotiation styles, behaviors, and expectations in other cultures might be quite different. A deeper understanding of ethical negotiation values, for example, can minimize conflict between parties involved. While there is a higher degree of trust and formation of relationship in integrative bargaining than distributive bargaining (e.g., Lewicki et al., 2006), and some common ethical values among cultures, there are many dissimilarities among national cultures regarding ethical practices and beliefs (Buller et al., 2000). Some scholars have observed that attitudes regarding various negotiation tactics will be nuanced and diverse even within high-context cultures (Lee, Brett, & Park, 2012). For example, Chinese negotiators tend to employ emotional-appeal distributive tactics, while their Japanese counterparts tend to approve the use of integrative and distributive tactics (Lee et al., 2012). Other scholars noted that there are few empirical researches regarding the negotiation values of the Chinese (Sardy, Munoz, Sun, & Alon, 2010), hence making

⁎ Corresponding author. Tel: +853-83974749; fax: +28838320. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (S.H. Chan), [email protected] (T.S. Ng).

it challenging to understand how the Chinese perceive ethical negotiation concerns. Since what is considered ethically appropriate influence tactics or not remain ambiguous (Adler, 2007; Robinson et al., 2000; Volkema, 1999), and since our understanding of how the Chinese distinguish between the appropriateness of various maneuvers remains formative (Rivers, 2009), it is important to understand how the Chinese perceive ethical negotiation concerns to effectively and efficiently handle the negotiation process. Thus, this study sets out to explore the ethically ambiguous negotiation tactics of the Chinese. Specifically, this study investigates whether certain negotiation tactics are appropriate, and whether there are gender differences in the negotiation tactics. In doing so, the study contributes to a better understanding of the ethical negotiation mindset, behavior, styles, and strategies of Chinese negotiators. The next section presents the theoretical background and hypotheses being tested. The methodology section is followed by the presentation of results and discussion of the main findings. Finally, the conclusions, implications, limitations, and guidelines for further research are presented. 2. Literature review 2.1. Lying in negotiation Negotiation is “a process of potentially opportunistic interaction by which two or more parties, with some apparent conflict, seek to do better through jointly decided action than they could otherwise” (Lax & Sebenius, 1986, p. 11). Whether it is an opportunistic or integrative process, the parties involved inevitably bring along their assumptions, prejudices, or attitudes into the negotiation situation (Gulbro &

http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.07.007 0148-2963/© 2015 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

Please cite this article as: Chan, S.H., & Ng, T.S., Ethical negotiation values of Chinese negotiators, Journal of Business Research (2015), http:// dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.07.007

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Herbig, 1996). The process is “littered with ethical dilemmas” (Malshe et al., 2010, p. 176), and the parties involved consistently approach it anticipating the interests of the counterpart to be entirely opposite to their own (Thompson & Hastie, 1990). In doing so, they may be motivated to violate contemporary ethical standards by using influence tactics such as lying to maximize their outcomes. A lie is “a deliberate false statement which is either intended to deceive others or foreseen to be likely to deceive others” (Carson et al., 1982, p. 17). Lying includes “all means by which one might attempt to create in some audience a belief at variance with one's own” through intentional communicative acts, concealments, and omissions (Wetlaufer, 1990, p. 1223). Individuals would lie to benefit themselves (Grover & Hui, 2005) or to secure a higher payment (Gneezy, 2005). Although lying is costly (Gneezy, 2005), pure “white” lies are thought to be harmless and have no distributive effect between the parties (Wetlaufer, 1990); and people are likely to lie to help save face (DePaulo & Bell, 1996; Wetlaufer, 1990). For example, since “face” (mianzi) is important to the Chinese, face-saving actions become “the rites that protect the individual's role in the guanxi network, preserving individual identity and social status” (Ting-Toomey, 1988, p. 215). Thus, one might “lie” to either give or save face, and that lie is not considered a lie since the meta-communication was not intended to deceive but to preserve social relationships. Given that “white lies” are often appropriate and may even be essential in managing social relationships (DePaulo & Bell, 1996; Lewicki & Stark, 1996; Wetlaufer, 1990) while lies such as grand deceptions, or lies with highly considerable consequences may trigger more guilt and hesitation, and more reasoning to justify their appropriateness (Lewicki & Stark, 1996), in this study, we used the term “white lies” to refer to emotion management tactics and “lies” to refer to cognitive tactics. According to Lewicki (1983), the main reason for lying is to enhance the liar's influence via manipulating information. Lies can mislead the adversary (Lewicki & Stark, 1996), influence the apparent benefits and costs of certain choices open to the adversary, or conceal the adversary's selection of options (Lewicki & Stark, 1996). Lies that fail may cause damage to the established relationship between the negotiators, create a temporary swing in bargaining power away from the liar, or provoke defensive or retaliatory lying; and imminent opportunities may be lost (Reitz, Wall, & Love, 1998; Wetlaufer, 1990). Even a successful lie can cause damage to both parties if leading to an agreement that is less beneficial than it might otherwise have been (Wetlaufer, 1990). More importantly, negotiation scholars suggest that lies could dissolve a possibly valuable business relationship, infuriate other individuals, and wear away trust (Lewicki et al., 2006; Shapiro & Bies, 1994). The literature shows that endorsement of deceptiveness can forecast a negotiator's performance in a mockup negotiation and overall reputation as a negotiator (Fulmer et al., 2009). There is also evidence that negotiators using deceiving tactics may have better results. For example, Aquino (1998) shows that negotiators who use deceptive tactics, particularly when the negotiation involves distributive issues, may have better outcomes. O'Connor and Carnevale (1997) provide similar results with deception about common-value issues and omission of information, while Barry et al. (2000) found that various forms of deceptiveness generate distinct results; that is, attitudes concerning using cognitive tactics of deceptiveness differ from attitudes toward emotion management tactics, and tactics classified as false promises are viewed as more harsh than misrepresentation. The perception regarding whether tactics such as deception, misrepresentation, and other tactics are ethical depends on who is asked (Anton, 1990). Carr (1968) argues that bluffing, deception, and lying are all ethically valid approaches for enhancing one's welfare in a business deal; while Carson et al. (1982) argues that bluffing is usually morally acceptable. Specifically, bluffing in employment discussions is permissible and reasonably advantageous (Carson et al., 1982). Carr (1968), also defends bluffing and other dubious commercial practices as simply a way of doing business. Lee et al. (2012), however, suggests

that the “use of distributive tactics focused on claiming value and defeating the other party could interfere with the process of giving and saving face for the Chinese” (p. 437). 2.2. Ethically marginal negotiation tactics As discussed earlier, there is vagueness regarding what is considered ethically appropriate in negotiations (Adler, 2007; Robinson, Lewicki, & Donahue, 2000; Volkema, 1999). In the adversarial collective bargaining process, influence tactics used to achieve success include lying, deception, and the abandonment of truth as a moral value (Post, 1990). Examples of lies include false promises, false threats, false predictions, and misrepresentation of reserve price (Wetlaufer, 1990). Influence tactics in negotiation include inappropriate information collecting, false promises, attacking an opponent's network, misrepresentation, and traditional competitive bargaining (Robinson et al., 2000). These tactics are considered cognitive in that they relate to management and manipulation of information (Barry et al., 2000) and information processing maneuvers and strategies (Putnam & Jones, 1982). Since emotion is an important aspect of interpersonal negotiation, based on Barry's (1999) effort to capture the tactical use of emotion management in a bargaining context, Barry et al. (2000) later classified the deceptive tactics into “cognitive” and “emotional” categories. Specifically, the cognitive tactics covers misrepresentation, inappropriate information gathering, false promises, attacking opponent's network, and traditional competitive bargaining while the emotional tactics cover strategic manipulation of negative emotion and strategic manipulation of positive emotion. It is the judgments regarding the appropriateness and efficacy of ethically marginal tactics following Barry's et al. (2000) work that this study is based on. Individuals are more tolerant of traditional competitive bargaining maneuvers such as acting patiently in arriving to a settlement, and overstating demands; while other more serious strategies, which include gathering inappropriate material, making false promises, attacking the opponent's network, and misrepresenting information, can be regarded as immoral or less acceptable (Al-Khatib, Rawwas, Swaidan, & Rexeisen, 2005; Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Robinson et al., 2000). In Anton's (1990) research, misrepresentation of one's position to an adversary was considered generally ethical, while bluffing was considered ethically neutral. Tension lowers trust in negotiation (Lee et al., 2006). Specifically, high tension in the Chinese will likely lead to the convergence of an agreement, while with the Americans, it tends to have the opposite outcome (Lee et al., 2006). Factors that caused tension include “misrepresentation” and “aggressive behaviors” (Lee et al., 2006). While misrepresentation is regarded as one of the cognitive deceptive factors in Robinson et al.'s (2000) study, aggressive behaviors are similar to the emotional negative deceptive factor in Barry's (1998) study. For example, instead of exaggerating position, the Chinese would spend more time building trustful relationship because mutually valuable relations with trustworthy favor-exchange allies are important (Lee et al., 2012). If the counterpart is not an associate of their guanxi network, the Chinese may use emotional appeal, since face is not an issue (Lee et al., 2012). When such tactics are used, it can lower the interpersonal trust and lead to different negotiation outcomes. 2.3. Emotions in negotiation Few studies of negotiation have placed emphasis on the role of emotion (Barry & Oliver, 1996). Emotion management in negotiation is defined as the purposeful use of false emotion to influence negotiation processes and outcomes (Barry, 1999). Examples include replying with eagerness when one is unenthusiastic, pretending to be angry when one is not, pretending to be unemotional, and acting surprised when one is not (Barry et al., 2000).

Please cite this article as: Chan, S.H., & Ng, T.S., Ethical negotiation values of Chinese negotiators, Journal of Business Research (2015), http:// dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.07.007

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Emotions can influence the capability of reaching negotiation goals (Shapiro, 2002). Positive emotions improve the possibility of attaining instrumental goals, promote empathy with the perspective of other parties, and encourage creative evaluation of ideas and problemsolving (Isen, 2000; Shapiro, 2002). Negotiators with positive emotions accomplish more optimally integrative results and use less hostile strategies (Isen, 2000) while negative emotions can lead negotiators to disregard instrumental goals (Bazerman, Curhan, & Moore, 2000). Nevertheless, controlling emotions for unfair benefit can have harmful consequences on the long-term association (Axelrod, 1984); for example, being caught in bluffing could lead to loss of credibility and tarnished reputation (Shapiro, 2002). In examining the strategic role that emotion can play in a negotiation encounter, Barry (1998) and Barry et al. (2000) suggest that people are more accepting of and confident in their ability to use emotion management tactics than other forms of deliberate deception. Additionally, Fulmer, Barry, and Long (2009) found that people perceived emotionally deceptive tactics as more ethically suitable for negotiation than informational dishonesty. We anticipated that Chinese negotiators would judge using emotion management as more ethically appropriate than cognitive deception tactics and that they would be more confident to pull off emotion management tactics compared to cognitive deception tactics. Thus we proposed the following hypotheses: H1. Chinese individuals perceive the use of emotion management tactics as more ethically appropriate than cognitive deception tactics. H2. Chinese individuals are more confident in their ability to successfully deploy emotion management tactics than cognitive deception tactics.

2.4. Gender and negotiation tactics Men and women have different ratings of acceptability of specific negotiation tactics (Barry, 1999; Robinson et al., 2000). Women tend to behave more ethically than men and find bluffing less ethical than men (Anton, 1990). Although there were no differences between men and women in traditional competitive haggling (Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Robinson et al., 2000), women were more conservative and less tolerant of the unethical misleading strategies than men (e.g., Lewicki & Robinson, 1998; Robinson et al., 2000). Robinson et al. (2000) suggests that women have higher thresholds (less willingness) than men in endorsing and choosing morally marginal negotiation maneuvers. Although the literature implies that women are generally more likely to act ethically than men (Ferrell & Skinner, 1988; Martin, 1981; Volkema, 2004), the research findings have been contradictory, and therefore inconclusive. For example, Ford and Richardson (1994) identified seven studies that revealed women to act more ethically than men in at least some situations, and another seven studies showing no gender impact on ethical beliefs. Other studies show women displaying the same negotiation behavior as men (Stuhlmacher & Walters, 1999; Walters et al., 1998). Based on earlier research, we argue that Chinese women negotiators are less likely to perceive the usage of deceptive tactics as appropriate than men. We also argue that Chinese women negotiators are less confident to engage in deceptive tactics. Thus, the following hypotheses were proposed. H3. Chinese women are less likely to perceive using deceptive tactics as appropriate than Chinese men. H4. Chinese women are less confident in their ability to use deceptive tactics than Chinese men. Men and women differ in judging the acceptability of “negative” emotional deception, and also in their own ability to engage in deception (Barry, 1999). There is, however, no difference regarding the “positive” emotion management between men and women (Barry, 1999).

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Men may also be more likely to distinguish positive from negative emotional deception than women (Barry, 1999). Based on the gender stereotype theory, females are considered more emotional than males (Stoppard & Gruchy, 1993). Since negative emotions are more acceptable to men than women (Barry, 1999), and it is unclear if negative emotions are acceptable to Chinese men, we proposed that Chinese women may find it more acceptable to use emotional tactics and that Chinese women may not likely break their gender roles to engage in negative emotions such as anger or aggression but are likely to engage in positive emotions instead. H5. Chinese women perceive the use of emotional tactics as more appropriate than men. H6. Chinese women are more confident in their ability to successfully deploy emotional negotiation tactics than men.

3. Methodology 3.1. Measurement tools 3.1.1. Measures of appropriateness The modified SINS II scale was used to gather information from respondents about their views of the appropriateness of ethically marginal negotiation strategies. Several previous studies have validated the scales separately (e.g., Volkema, 2004). The scale covers five dubious negotiation factors: (1) inappropriate information gathering (IIG), (2) misrepresentation of information (MI), (3) attacking the negotiating opponent's network (AON), (4) making false promises (MFP), and (5) traditional competitive bargaining (TCB), as mentioned in the preceding sections; and two tactical use of emotion management tactics, namely, (1) strategic misrepresentation of positive emotion (SMPE), and (2) strategic misrepresentation of negative emotion (SMNE). The alpha reliabilities for TCB, AON, MFP, MI, IIG, SMPE, and SMNE were 0.76, 0.70, 0.65, 0.72, 0.74, 0.84, and 0.87, respectively (Barry, 1998). Based on Lewicki and Robinson's (1998) study, participants were asked to evaluate the tactics based on the viewpoint that they were considering entering into a discussion for something very important to them or their company, to indicate how appropriate the negotiation tactics would be and to assign a rating to each tactic. The 7-point Likert scale was used (1 = not at all appropriate, and 7 = very appropriate). Respondents were requested to be frank about what they consider was acceptable and appropriate to do, as their responses were completely anonymous. A sample item was “Pretend to be very angry to the opponent.” 3.1.2. Measures on ability to pull off In order to determine whether respondents would engage in the questionable negotiation tactics, they were asked to rate their perceived ability to pull off (APO) each tactic in the negotiation situation and to assign an ability rating to each tactic as described in the appropriateness scale. This scale covered seven factors that measured the respondents' perceptions of their ability to pull off the ethically marginal negotiation tactics during a negotiation. These factors' respective tactics were (1) inappropriate information gathering (APO_IIG), (2) misrepresentation of information (APO_MI), (3) attacking the negotiating opponent's network (APO_AON), (4) making false promises (APO_MFP), (5) traditional competitive bargaining (APO_TCB), (6) strategic manipulation of negative emotion (APO_SMNE), and (7) strategic manipulation of positive emotion (APO_SMPE). The alpha reliabilities for APO_TCB, APO_MFP/ APO_MI, APO_IIG, APO_SMPE, and APO_SMNE were 0.70, 0.89, 0.78, 0.88, and 0.86 respectively (Barry et al., 2000). Again, a 7-point Likert scale was used (1 = not at all able to make it work, and 7 = able to do it very effectively).

Please cite this article as: Chan, S.H., & Ng, T.S., Ethical negotiation values of Chinese negotiators, Journal of Business Research (2015), http:// dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.07.007

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3.1.3. Demographic information Four closed-ended demographic questions asked for age, gender, nationality, and the areas of study that respondents were enrolled in. Ample space was provided for respondents who wished to further express their opinions on any specific question in the questionnaire. 3.2. Translation and pilot study Since the original version of the scale was in English, back-to-back translation into Chinese was done by two professional translators who graduated with English Translation as their major. Comparisons of the expressed meaning of each statement were made to ensure equivalence of the items. Two rounds of pilot study were held before the questionnaire was deemed usable. Seven respondents took part in the first pilot study to help determine the estimated duration for completion and whether there was any flaw in the questionnaire. The respondents took 20 minutes to complete the black-and-white bilingual questionnaire. Based on the comments received, the questionnaire was then printed in color, and an “introductive” presentation was made before the respondents started completing the questionnaire during the second pilot study involving nine respondents. The respondents completed the questionnaire in a shorter period (within 15 minutes), and there were no adverse comments, indicating that the questionnaire was suitable for mass distribution. The final questionnaire was a bilingual color-printed questionnaire. 3.3. Respondents Data were collected from student samples. A major reason involved concerns that students are not intensively involved in the business world, and with little or no work experience, their data are pure (i.e., there is little bias). In other words, it was assumed that they judge deception based on their traditional culture developed from a young age. Respondents from different educational backgrounds were included because educational background “offered some surprises” (Robinson et al., 2000), as some majors tend to approve certain strategies compared to others. Permission was obtained from various course instructors approximately 1 week before the distribution of the bilingual questionnaire. Respondents were informed about the objective of the study, and their consent to participate in the survey was obtained before the questionnaire was distributed to them in class. Respondents were also ensured anonymity of responses, and informed that their responses would be analyzed as an aggregate. The questionnaires were returned before the students left the classroom. The students were not given extra credit in their course for their participation. Out of 250 questionnaires distributed, 173 usable responses were received. Thus the valid response rate was 69%. 3.4. Data analysis After checking the questionnaires for complete items, the data collected were grouped into 7 separate sections identified by Barry et al. (2000), then coded and entered into the data sheet of Statistical Package for Social Science (SPSS) version 19.0. Descriptive statistics and other corresponding statistical measures (including mean comparison, intercorrelations, and ANOVA) were used to test the hypotheses. 4. Results 4.1. Characteristics of respondents All the respondents were of Chinese origin who were brought up and resided in China. A majority of respondents were female (61%), aged between 18 and 23 (98.8%), and from Macau (77.9%). Although

the respondents appear rather young, samples of similar demographics have commonly been used in other ethics-related research. 4.2. Descriptive statistics Tables 1a and 1b show the reliability of the scales, mean scores, and the zero-order correlations for the measures. From Table 1a, the highest mean scores for the perceived appropriateness of tactics to use in negotiation is SMPE (mean = 4.75, SD = 1.28), followed by TCB (mean = 4.31, SD = 1.15). In other words, the negotiation tactics seen as most appropriate or ethical to the Chinese were SMPE. From Table 1b, the highest mean scores were for APO_SMPE (mean = 4.69, SD = 1.17), followed by APO_TCB (mean = 4.04, SD = 1.09). The tactic the Chinese can pull off most successfully was APO_SMPE. This result clearly shows that the ranking of appropriateness of various tactics is not the same as in other countries (e.g., US, Brazil, Chile, India, Mexico, Norway, and Spain). 4.3. Appropriateness and ability of using deceptive tactics Hypothesis 1 was proposed to determine if Chinese individuals judge the usage of emotion management strategies as more ethically appropriate than cognitive deception tactics. Table 2 shows the results of the mean ratings for the emotional tactics with cognitive tactics. The mean score and comparison tests show that the positive emotion tactics were rated higher than the cognitive tactics, with all significant values (p b 0.01), while the mean score and comparison tests for the negative emotion tactics were higher than for four cognitive tactics, all with significant values (p b 0.01) except for TCB. The respondents also rated the TCB tactics to be more appropriate (higher) than negative emotion management (p b 0.01). This result shows that the respondents considered emotion management as more acceptable than other ethically marginal tactics. Thus, H1 is supported. Hypothesis 2 was proposed to determine if Chinese individuals are more confident in their ability to successfully deploy emotion management tactics than cognitive deception tactics. From the results in Table 3, the mean scores and comparison tests show that the ratings for the positive emotion tactics were higher than for the cognitive tactics (p b 0.01). In general, the respondents were more confident in deploying emotion management than other ethically marginal tactics. Thus, H2 is supported. 4.4. Relationship between gender and negotiation tactical ratings Hypotheses 3 and 4 were formulated to determine whether women are less likely to perceive the usage of deceptive strategies as appropriate than men and whether women are less confident to engage in deceptive tactics than men. To determine the relationship between gender and negotiation tactical ratings, Table 4 shows the mean values for every deceptive tactic in the appropriateness aspect. The mean rating by males was higher than the rating for females for all items except SMPE, suggesting that males regard the use of deceptive tactics as more appropriate than females. The values from the t-test for gender and the appropriateness of using the deceptive tactics show that female and male respondents had significantly different mindsets regarding the appropriateness of using specific tactics. The deceptive tactics considered to be significant were false promises (p b 0.05), inappropriate information gathering (p b 0.05), and strategic misrepresentation of negative emotion (p b 0.05). Overall, women (mean = 3.70, SD = 0.84) were less likely to perceive the use of deceptive tactics than men (mean = 4.03, SD = 0.92) (t = − 2.457, p b 0.05). Thus, H3 is supported. In order to determine which gender is more likely to employ certain deceptive tactics, the mean values for every deceptive tactic based on gender difference in the ability aspect were compared. Male respondents rated all the tactics higher than females did. This result shows

Please cite this article as: Chan, S.H., & Ng, T.S., Ethical negotiation values of Chinese negotiators, Journal of Business Research (2015), http:// dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.07.007

S.H. Chan, T.S. Ng / Journal of Business Research xxx (2015) xxx–xxx

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Table 1a Zero-order correlation, reliability and means for appropriateness for tactics. Zero-order correlation Variable

Alpha

X

SD

1

1.Gender 2.Age 3. Traditional competitive bargaining 4. Attack opponent's network 5. False promise 6. Misrepresentation of information 7. Inappropriate info gathering 8. Strategic misrepresentation of positive emotion 9. Strategic misrepresentation of negative emotion

– – .51 .52 .60 .73 .58 .59 .76

.39 1.41 4.31 3.53 3.27 3.47 3.58 4.75 3.91

.49 .52 1.15 1.20 1.25 1.27 1.40 1.28 1.08

1 –.22⁎⁎ .11 .14 .20⁎⁎ .14 .19⁎ −.01 .16⁎

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

1 −.12 −.19⁎ −.13 −.07 −.09 .07 −.12

1 .34⁎⁎ .38⁎⁎ .40⁎⁎ .29⁎⁎ .35⁎⁎ .58⁎⁎

1 .51⁎⁎ .59⁎⁎ .46⁎⁎ .28⁎⁎ .52⁎⁎

1 .57⁎⁎ .51⁎⁎ .30⁎⁎ .45⁎⁎

1 .55⁎⁎ .34⁎⁎ .55⁎⁎

1 .40⁎⁎ .46⁎⁎

1 .34⁎⁎

1

⁎ p b 0.05. ⁎⁎ p b 0.01.

that male negotiators are more confident to deploy deceptive tactics than female negotiators. The t-test results show significant differences for four deceptive tactics, namely, attacking opponent's network (p b 0.01), misrepresentation of information (p b 0.05), inappropriate information gathering (p b 0.01), and strategic misrepresentation of negative emotion (p b 0.05). Only the deceptive tactic “strategic misrepresentation of positive emotion” was not significant between the two genders. In other words, there is no difference in the mindset between females and males regarding APO_SMPE. Overall, women (mean = 3.70, SD = 0.85) are less confident to engage in deceptive tactics than men (mean = 4.10, SD = 0.82) (t = − 0.303; p b 0.01). Thus, H4 is supported. The results clearly show that both male and female respondents rated “positive emotion,” “traditional competitive bargaining,” and “negative emotion” as the top three tactics in terms of appropriateness, while they rated “positive emotion” and “negative emotion” as the top two tactics in terms of ability. Male and female respondents rated the “positive emotion” tactic similarly. However, male respondents rated “negative emotion” tactics higher than females did. Hypotheses 5 and 6 were proposed to determine whether Chinese women judge the use of emotional tactics as more appropriate than men, and whether Chinese women are more confident in their ability to successfully deploy emotional negotiation tactics than men. When comparing only the two emotional tactics by gender difference, the score for emotional tactics for male respondents (mean = 4.43, SD = 0.99) was higher than female respondents for tactical appropriateness (mean = 4.27, SD = 0.96); but it was not significant (t = − 1.11, p N 0.1). In other words, female respondents in China do not consider the use of emotional tactics as more appropriate than males do. Hence, H5 is not supported. The score for using emotional tactics by female respondents (mean = 4.26, SD = 0.89) was lower for tactical ability than the score given by male respondents (mean = 4.45, SD = 0.94), but it was not significant (t = −1.27, p N 0.1). In other words, female respondents in China do not consider they are more capable than males to deploy such tactics. Hence, H6 is not supported.

5. Discussion and conclusions 5.1. Discussion This study examined whether Chinese respondents considered it appropriate to engage in a set of negotiation tactics and whether they were confident to pull off the tactics during a negotiation. The respondents in the study judged the usage of emotional strategies as more morally appropriate than cognitive deception strategies, and they were more confident in their ability to successfully deploy emotion management tactics than cognitive deception maneuvers, such as attacking the adversary's network or collecting inappropriate information. This finding is consistent with Barry (1998) and Barry et al. (2000) where the American respondents regarded premeditated emotional deception to be more ethically acceptable and have more confidence in their ability to successfully deploy emotional deception (negative and positive) than other forms of deliberate deception or misrepresentation. There are certain differences regarding the appropriateness of using deceptive tactics for the Chinese. The respondents in this study seemed to have a mindset of somewhat being “in the middle” for all the tactics, and rated the emotional tactics a little bit lower than did the respondents in Barry et al.'s (2000) study, implying that Chinese respondents were more conservative in using strategic misrepresentation. Similar to Barry et al.'s (2000) results, Chinese respondents rated “emotional negotiation tactics” higher than “cognitive negotiation tactics,” which suggests that they regarded the premeditated misrepresentation of both positive and negative emotions as less of an ethical transgression than the misrepresentation of beliefs or facts, or the making of false promises. The differences, regarding the appropriateness of using and confidence in deploying deceptive tactics noted here, may be due to the different philosophic roles in China (the Maoist bureaucrat, Confucian gentleman, Sun Tzu-like strategist, and so on) and cultural values that guide behaviors. For instance, to maintain harmony and to preserve face, negotiators may display politeness (Shenkar & Ronen, 1987), not

Table 1b Zero-order correlation, reliability and means for ability for tactics. Zero-order correlation Variable

Alpha

X

SD

1

1.Gender 2.Age 3. Attack opponent's Network 4. Misrepresentation of information 5. Inappropriate info gathering 6. Strategic misrepresentation of positive emotion 7. Strategic misrepresentation of negative emotion

– – .62 .70 .59 .60 .72

.39 1.41 3.43 3.65 3.68 4.69 3.97

.49 .52 1.22 1.13 1.33 1.17 1.02

1 −.22⁎⁎ .20⁎⁎ .16⁎ .21⁎⁎ .01 .17⁎

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

1 −.14 −.010 −.17⁎ .01 −.07

.34⁎⁎ .41⁎⁎ .40⁎⁎ .38⁎⁎ .61⁎⁎

1 .65⁎⁎ .58⁎⁎ .29⁎⁎ .55⁎⁎

.60⁎⁎ 57⁎⁎ .43⁎⁎ .55⁎⁎

1 .60⁎⁎ .50⁎⁎ .57⁎⁎

1 .35⁎⁎ .47⁎⁎

1

9

.40⁎⁎

1

⁎ p b 0.05. ⁎⁎ p b 0.01.

Please cite this article as: Chan, S.H., & Ng, T.S., Ethical negotiation values of Chinese negotiators, Journal of Business Research (2015), http:// dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.07.007

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S.H. Chan, T.S. Ng / Journal of Business Research xxx (2015) xxx–xxx

Table 2 Means comparison between individual cognitive and emotion tactics for appropriateness. Cognitive tactic

1. Traditional competitive bargaining 2. Attacking opponent's network 3. False promises 4. Misrepresentation 5. Inappropriate information gathering Overall cognitive tactics

Mean

4.31 3.53 3.27 3.47 3.58 3.62

Comparison with positive emotion management (X = 4.75)

Comparison with negative emotion management (X = 3.91)

t

Sig

t

Sig

4.19 10.77 12.91 11.49 10.49 12.22

.000 .000 .000 .000 .000 .000

−.503 4.48 6.88 5.20 3.37 4.65

.000 .000 .000 .000 .001 .000

display negative emotions (Graham & Lam, 2003), and use fewer threats and warnings (Adler et al., 1992). Another difference among the tactics used was also observed. Pye (1982) mentions that Chinese tended to deploy the tactic of “normal prolonged periods of no movement” and “exaggerated expectations,” which Robinson et al. (2000) regard as a “traditional competitive bargaining” tactic, a cognitive deceptive tactic. In this study, SMPE and APO_SMPE gained the highest and second highest ratings in overall mean, implying that Chinese individuals regard strategic misrepresentation of positive emotion as appropriate and they are able to deploy the tactic. Although we cannot evaluate the Chinese individuals' ability to pull-off TCB, their mean score for the appropriateness of using TCB was ranked second highest, after SMPE. This result contradicts the findings of Volkema (2001), who notes TCB behaviors as the most likely and appropriate in the nine countries they examined. This result clearly shows that the ranking of appropriateness of various tactics is not the same for China as for other countries. Chinese individuals judge emotional deceptive tactics as more appropriate and are more capable to deploy them than cognitive deceptive tactics. One reason could be the difficulty of being easily charged with violating ethical standards, hence they are unafraid to deploy emotional deceptive tactics. While “catching the counterpart in a lie can cause them to lose face” (Lee et al., 2012, p. 439), another important reason could be the fact that Chinese individuals pay attention to saving face and they avoid doing anything that could risk their own reputation. Hence, they will judge which tactics help them to gain advantage without affecting their reputations. For instance, if they use a cognitive tactic such as misrepresentation or making false promises during a negotiation and their counterpart knows about it, it may lead to a court case and their reputations will be damaged. On the other hand, it is hard to measure “emotion.” The results did not show evidence that Chinese women were more confident to deploy positive emotional tactics than men, suggesting that Chinese women and men display similar negotiation behavior regarding positive emotion management tactics. Moreover, both the appropriateness and ability ratings of using positive emotional tactics in this study were higher than for the negative emotion tactics. The respondents considered it more appropriate to use positive emotion tactics and they felt more confident to pull off positive emotions (such as sympathy, care, and liking) than negative emotions (such as fury, disgust, and anger). This is unsurprising because positive emotions can encourage problem solving and creative exploration of ideas, accomplish affective and instrumental goals, and facilitate feeling

compassion with the adversary's standpoint (Isen, 2000; Shapiro, 2002). The use of positive emotions is also one way of allowing the opponent to save face. The result suggests that women are more reluctant to deploy deceptive tactics. This result is similar to Robinson et al.'s (2000) finding that showed women rated lower than men for the other cognitive tactics except “traditional competitive bargaining.” One possible reason is that women are believed to be more emotional and more emotionally expressive than men (Brody & Hall, 2000; Stoppard & Gruchy, 1993). The result also suggests that women may be more trustworthy, as they showed lower acceptance than men of deceptive tactics. With the worsening of values of honesty and ethical behavior overall (Lewicki & Starks, 1996), the results offer some insights into ethical tactics and mindset of Chinese individuals. In sum, this study validated the SINSII scales. The findings contributed to the literature by providing further evidence not to generalize ethical standards to other cultures, as what seems appropriate behavior in one culture might not be in another. 5.2. Conclusions This study investigated the ethically marginal negotiation tactics of Chinese negotiators and their ability to pull off such tactics during a negotiation. Chinese negotiators judge the use of emotion management tactics as more ethically appropriate than cognitive deception tactics. They are more confident in their ability to successfully deploy emotion management tactics than cognitive deception tactics. Additionally, Chinese female negotiators are unlikely to perceive the use of deceptive tactics as appropriate, and are less confident to deploy the tactics during negotiation than male negotiators. Our result provides insights for negotiating with the Chinese. 5.3. Theoretical contribution Although some cultures consider it appropriate to use ethically marginal negotiation tactics, our results illuminate the need to understand differences in culture to avoid creating negative impressions, and feelings of mistrust, by avoiding tactics such as inappropriate information gathering that might provoke anger, or disgust that can lead to loss of face. Given the apparently few empirical researches regarding the negotiation values of the Chinese (Sardy, Munoz, Sun, & Alon, 2010), the insights can enhance negotiators' ability to effectively and efficiently handle the negotiation process. For example, we found support for the

Table 3 Means comparison between individual cognitive and emotion tactics for ability. Cognitive tactic

Mean

1. Attacking opponent's network 2. Misrepresentation 3. Inappropriate information gathering Overall cognitive tactics

3.43 3.65 3.68 3.67

Comparison with positive emotion management (X = 4.69)

Comparison with negative emotion management (X = 3.97)

t

Sig

t

Sig

11.61 11.86 9.32 12.59

.000 .000 .000 .000

6.60 4.13 3.09 5.16

.000 .000 .002 .000

Please cite this article as: Chan, S.H., & Ng, T.S., Ethical negotiation values of Chinese negotiators, Journal of Business Research (2015), http:// dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jbusres.2015.07.007

S.H. Chan, T.S. Ng / Journal of Business Research xxx (2015) xxx–xxx

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Table 4 Appropriateness and ability ratings by gender for tactics. Appropriateness ratings

Ability ratings

Tactic name

Tactic type

Female

Male

t-test 2-tail sig.

Female

Male

t-test 2-tail sig.

Traditional competitive bargaining Attack opponent's network False promises Misrepresentation of information Inappropriate info gathering Positive emotion tactic Negative emotion tactic

Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive Cognitive Emotional Emotional

4.20 3.39 3.07 3.32 3.37 4.76 3.78

4.46 3.74 3.58 3.69 3.90 4.74 4.13

.138 .062 .012 .075 .019 .943 .034

– 3.24 – 3.51 3.46 4.69 3.83

– 3.74 – 3.88 4.02 4.70 4.18

– .007 – .030 .007 .932 .023

use of positive emotions, a tactic to allow the counterpart to save face. The study is among the first to link ethically marginal negotiation tactics with gender in the Eastern context. Given that Chinese women are less likely to find it appropriate and to use both the cognitive tactics (i.e., misrepresentation of information, attacking the opponent's network, gather information inappropriately) and negative emotional tactics than men, future research may want to investigate how Chinese men and women are perceived by others when they use deceptive negotiation tactics. It is possible that women are viewed in a more negative light than men when using deception. Additionally, the study contributes to negotiation theory by demonstrating that Chinese women do not perceive the use of positive emotional tactics as more appropriate than men, and Chinese women are not more confident in their ability to successfully deploy positive emotional negotiation tactics than men. These views are essential for managing the negotiation process, which may have implications for cross-cultural and intra-cultural negotiation. The findings may lead to further research on the ethical mindset of the Chinese, since our knowledge about ethical business negotiation remains fragmented. 5.4. Practical implications The findings can help international negotiators to prepare, manage, and handle negotiations more effectively when doing business in China or when negotiating with a Chinese. Negotiators faced with their Chinese counterparts may be more alert if their counterparts are using deceptive tactics and react accordingly. By being aware that a Chinese is more accepting and more confident to deploy “emotional” deceptive tactics can also help them to prepare for such tactics, and hence to become unaffected by it during the negotiation. Since women have a higher threshold than men in the judgment of acceptability and ability to deploy deceptive tactics, negotiators may be more cautious when dealing with a male counterpart who would be more likely to deploy deceptive tactics. Given that the kind of relationship that exists with the other party can impact the choice of tactics used by the Chinese (Lee et al., 2012; Rivers, 2009), and since more people would use deceptive tactics with a stranger than with a friend (Rivers, 2009; Schweitzer & Croson, 1999), it would be prudent to spend time developing and strengthening a friendly trusting personal relationship with the Chinese counterpart. Because the Chinese have much concern about saving one's own and another's face, negotiators need to avoid face-losing situations including showing anger, openly calling out someone on a lie, openly disagreeing, and saying something sensitive outright. Finally, a negotiator needs to develop personal integrity, preserve reputation, develop cultural sensitivity, and remember the Chinese proverb, “Touch black paint and you will have black fingers.” 5.5. Limitations and Future Research This study has some limitations. First, this cross-sectional investigation using purposive sampling ensured all the respondents have limited work or negotiation experience. However, the small sampling frame and the disproportional distribution of more females in the sample may have biased or limited the overall result. To overcome the

mythological matter due to the disproportionate sample and to generate more comprehensive results, a larger sampling frame and using a more balanced sample of experienced Chinese respondents whose job function involves aspects of negotiation should be considered to confirm the results. Given that values and ideologies can vary across regions within China (Goodman, 1997), more research is necessary to gain further insights and knowledge into the preferences and dislikes of Chinese negotiators. Second, in investigating sensitive issues such as ethical tactics, the participants may exhibit social-desirability bias in their answers, even though they were assured of anonymity. Third, the scales developed by Western researchers were used to understand the mindset of the Chinese negotiators. We recognize that Chinese culture and the display of emotions can be quite different compared to Westerners. While the findings provide preliminary information regarding the Chinese mindset, further theory development may benefit from qualitative data collected from practitioners in the field. A starting point is to conduct in-depth personal interviews with Chinese negotiators to provide insights not captured in this study, and a basis to develop a specific scale to measure what is considered unethical for negotiation tactics in Asian or Eastern collectivistic culture. Another area of future research is to investigate if appropriateness and ability to use the influence tactics varies according to same-gender and mixed-gender dyads. Such knowledge can illuminate our understanding of negotiation behavior and practices. Lastly, future researchers should observe actual negotiation taking place to note negotiation behaviors, rather than simply asking respondents to evaluate their likely behavior during a negotiation, and to find out whether women are less likely to show negative emotions during negotiation. Despite the limitations, the findings contribute to the growing literature involving Chinese business negotiation ethics, provide guidance for conducting negotiation with the Chinese, and represent a small step toward understanding their negotiation behaviors.

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