- Email: [email protected]
Ethical obligations and futures studies
Futures 38 (2006) 367–369 www.elsevier.com/locate/futures
Reflections
Ethical obligations and futures studies Jordi Serra Sardenya, 476, 5, 3, 08025 Barcelona, Spain
A debate periodically recurs in Futures Studies circles which concerns the ethical commitment of futurists to a better future. The question is generally posed along two lines of arguments, or more accurately, assumptions. First, futurists have an obligation to work for a better future. Second, this duty implies some degree of effective achievement. I will argue that these are two incorrectly based assumptions. I set aside that it is indeed questionable whether futurists have a greater commitment to the future than any other professional, academic or cultural community. I propose in this essay to postulate that, as a general rule, is better to opt for an ethical low profile approach to the future. What are we to make of the first argument that futurists have a particular ‘obligation’ towards the future? Those who advocate the view that futurists should work for a better future are implying a particularly binding obligation, a greater accountability than other people individually or collectively considered. Why is this so? Why should futurists have a stronger duty than politicians, farmers, teachers, plumbers or cooks or anyone else? It could be argued that it is because of an implicit ‘discipline-centrism’. Arguments that favour the futurists’ superior commitment are really advancing the wish to be acknowledged as the higher authority in future matters. This is an alembicated way of saying that futurists should be consulted on any future question because they are the chief experts. This is perhaps some unconfessed nostalgia for the time when prophets, oracles and shamans were the unchallenged advisers on future affairs. The question should instead be: are futurists truly the major authority on future themes? Any realistic analysis should give the answer, no. And there are two reasons to support this position. The first is this. Some people operate under the mistaken assumption that Futures Studies aim to predict the future. The truth is that Futures Studies are not about foreseeing the future. They have never been about that and even deem such an endeavour impossible1 Futures Studies’ real objective is to proportion information about future events in order to ground present decisions, which is not coincident with prediction. There is a fundamental distinction in terms of scope. If
1
E-mail address: [email protected]. For authors who have expressed this impossibility, particularly Jim Dator, see Richard Slaughter [2].
0016-3287/$ - see front matter q 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2005.12.001
368
J. Serra / Futures 38 (2006) 367–369
predicting implies knowing all the future possibilities and being certain of what will happen, futures settles for much less. In accordance with the principle that it is unfeasible to foretell the future, Futures Studies do not expect to uncover all the future alternatives. The aim is to select that portion of the future relevant to the decision under scrutiny and then try to understand what may occur there. In applying Futures Studies to understanding the future is very like using a flashlight in a dark space. Its bundle of light can be pointed in the desired direction and will probably give a clear enough image to advance with reasonable confidence. However, the image can be distorted by shadows in angle to the light or, if aimed at the ground, is likely to miss a high obstacle and vice-versa. In short, even with a powerful lantern, it is advisable to proceed with caution. Such is the case with Futures. Futures also cast a fragmented and deformed image of the future. But if that image is helpful enough to ground present decisions (to move on), it is viable to work with it. Of course, it may be objected that if Futures Studies were be able to foretell the future in all its diversity, it would be far more useful to assess current decisions. Refuting this objection has to do with the second reason. The future’s unpredictability is not a mere dogma of faith in this discipline. It derives from an epistemological standpoint enunciated by Bertrand de Jouvenel in his founding work The Art of Conjecture [1]. He stated that if the future is predetermined, then it is possible for us to know it; but if we know the future, we can change it, and then we no longer know it. Jouvenel refers to a future that is essentially fluid, constantly affected and influenced by our actions, values and preferences, and is thus in flux until it becomes fixed as present. The only feasible pretension to which Futures Studies can aspire is being in a dynamic dialectic with the future, incessantly trying to unveil its mechanism and permanently responding to its ceaseless alterations in a feedback loop. It is therefore an utterly futile enterprise to try to master the future, given that the object of our research will keep mutating because, among other things, of our own efforts to understand it. A fundamental question has been raised. Why should a futurist know the future better than anyone else? Such a pretension can only be sustained by a biased, ‘discipline-centred’ standpoint according to which only the knowledge that comes internally from the discipline orthodoxy is acceptable. But since Futures Studies is not really attempting to know the future, it should accept that inputs from other disciplines, traditions or practices could be equally, if not sometimes more, valuable. The second initial argument or assumption imposes the obligation to achieve tangible results. Two kinds of objections can be made to this. The first has to do with a simplistic perception that ‘thinking’ is not really doing anything. It is of course ridiculous to negate the undeniable evidence that reflecting, analysing, considering, and other intellectual practices are indeed forms of activity. The second counter-argument deserves more space. The first point to consider is why there should be such a need to attain effective results? The question is relevant if we take account of the duty to improve the future. The stress on getting some ‘real’ work done boils down to two kinds of justification. One is a striving to get some proof down ‘for the record’; the second is the wish to obtain recognition for the work done. Both justifications are questionable. Take first the emphasis on tangible results. This is a coherent aspiration in a discipline that claims to follow scientific method. However, when harnessed to ethical questions, such as the betterment of the future, we must acknowledge that quantitative indicators which relate to subjective preferences are, at best, contingent. What may be granted as a legitimate approach to normative subjects might also at heart denote an empiricist bias in the standpoint from which an ‘improvement’ of the future is considered. If the fluidity of the future is an accepted reality, then
J. Serra / Futures 38 (2006) 367–369
369
it would seem more advisable to focus on the process rather than on the results. A result implies a sense of completion, of success, which can prove counterproductive when chances are that you will have to keep reassessing your conclusions time after time. That is why so many futurists insist that the main value of Futures Studies lies in the fact of engaging in a continued process of inquiry about the future, more that in the outputs of that process. It is understandable that a futurist may be interested in attaining results in order to get credit for them. The wish for recognition is an all-too-human aspiration. But if this aspiration is embedded within a duty to better the future, then it has to be strongly opposed. First of all, there is profound uncertainty about what may constitute a ‘better future’. Good intentions are no guarantee of anything. Human history is littered with misdeeds originally conceived as ‘improvements’ for humanity. Eugenics is a glaring example of paving the road to hell with ‘good intentions’. The only recognition we can really expect to get is that of our contemporaries. Work celebrated in its own time would suggest that it deals more with the present than with the future. Chances are that the more recognition a work gets from its contemporary peers, the less relevant it is likely to be for the future. Finally, and from a strictly ethical point of view, there is a severe objection to be made. Any moral obligation is absolute. It cannot be conditioned by anything or fulfilled to generate either gratitude or appreciation. You do it because you must. I do not suggest that Futures Studies should be approached in an amoral way. On the contrary! Normativity is a central aspect of Futures and ethics are intermingled with our values and preferences. We cannot ignore this, but must also to strip Futures Studies of any messianic inclination. Hence, I advocate The Ethical Low Profile Approach to the Future, which consists of three principles. First: be humble, for despite the best efforts and intentions, there can be no guarantee that you could get to know what is best for the future. Therefore, and in the second place, always direct your intervention so as to cause minimum harm to the future. Third and finally: accept that failure is always a possibility, but learn from mistakes and try not to repeat them. Some may think that this is not enough, that we cannot settle for such low expectations. It may be good to keep in mind that frequently, less is more.
References [1] B. de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture, Widenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1967. [2] R. Slaughter (Ed.), The Knowledge Base of Futures Studies, DDM, Brisbane, 1996.
Reflections
Ethical obligations and futures studies Jordi Serra Sardenya, 476, 5, 3, 08025 Barcelona, Spain
A debate periodically recurs in Futures Studies circles which concerns the ethical commitment of futurists to a better future. The question is generally posed along two lines of arguments, or more accurately, assumptions. First, futurists have an obligation to work for a better future. Second, this duty implies some degree of effective achievement. I will argue that these are two incorrectly based assumptions. I set aside that it is indeed questionable whether futurists have a greater commitment to the future than any other professional, academic or cultural community. I propose in this essay to postulate that, as a general rule, is better to opt for an ethical low profile approach to the future. What are we to make of the first argument that futurists have a particular ‘obligation’ towards the future? Those who advocate the view that futurists should work for a better future are implying a particularly binding obligation, a greater accountability than other people individually or collectively considered. Why is this so? Why should futurists have a stronger duty than politicians, farmers, teachers, plumbers or cooks or anyone else? It could be argued that it is because of an implicit ‘discipline-centrism’. Arguments that favour the futurists’ superior commitment are really advancing the wish to be acknowledged as the higher authority in future matters. This is an alembicated way of saying that futurists should be consulted on any future question because they are the chief experts. This is perhaps some unconfessed nostalgia for the time when prophets, oracles and shamans were the unchallenged advisers on future affairs. The question should instead be: are futurists truly the major authority on future themes? Any realistic analysis should give the answer, no. And there are two reasons to support this position. The first is this. Some people operate under the mistaken assumption that Futures Studies aim to predict the future. The truth is that Futures Studies are not about foreseeing the future. They have never been about that and even deem such an endeavour impossible1 Futures Studies’ real objective is to proportion information about future events in order to ground present decisions, which is not coincident with prediction. There is a fundamental distinction in terms of scope. If
1
E-mail address: [email protected]. For authors who have expressed this impossibility, particularly Jim Dator, see Richard Slaughter [2].
0016-3287/$ - see front matter q 2005 Published by Elsevier Ltd. doi:10.1016/j.futures.2005.12.001
368
J. Serra / Futures 38 (2006) 367–369
predicting implies knowing all the future possibilities and being certain of what will happen, futures settles for much less. In accordance with the principle that it is unfeasible to foretell the future, Futures Studies do not expect to uncover all the future alternatives. The aim is to select that portion of the future relevant to the decision under scrutiny and then try to understand what may occur there. In applying Futures Studies to understanding the future is very like using a flashlight in a dark space. Its bundle of light can be pointed in the desired direction and will probably give a clear enough image to advance with reasonable confidence. However, the image can be distorted by shadows in angle to the light or, if aimed at the ground, is likely to miss a high obstacle and vice-versa. In short, even with a powerful lantern, it is advisable to proceed with caution. Such is the case with Futures. Futures also cast a fragmented and deformed image of the future. But if that image is helpful enough to ground present decisions (to move on), it is viable to work with it. Of course, it may be objected that if Futures Studies were be able to foretell the future in all its diversity, it would be far more useful to assess current decisions. Refuting this objection has to do with the second reason. The future’s unpredictability is not a mere dogma of faith in this discipline. It derives from an epistemological standpoint enunciated by Bertrand de Jouvenel in his founding work The Art of Conjecture [1]. He stated that if the future is predetermined, then it is possible for us to know it; but if we know the future, we can change it, and then we no longer know it. Jouvenel refers to a future that is essentially fluid, constantly affected and influenced by our actions, values and preferences, and is thus in flux until it becomes fixed as present. The only feasible pretension to which Futures Studies can aspire is being in a dynamic dialectic with the future, incessantly trying to unveil its mechanism and permanently responding to its ceaseless alterations in a feedback loop. It is therefore an utterly futile enterprise to try to master the future, given that the object of our research will keep mutating because, among other things, of our own efforts to understand it. A fundamental question has been raised. Why should a futurist know the future better than anyone else? Such a pretension can only be sustained by a biased, ‘discipline-centred’ standpoint according to which only the knowledge that comes internally from the discipline orthodoxy is acceptable. But since Futures Studies is not really attempting to know the future, it should accept that inputs from other disciplines, traditions or practices could be equally, if not sometimes more, valuable. The second initial argument or assumption imposes the obligation to achieve tangible results. Two kinds of objections can be made to this. The first has to do with a simplistic perception that ‘thinking’ is not really doing anything. It is of course ridiculous to negate the undeniable evidence that reflecting, analysing, considering, and other intellectual practices are indeed forms of activity. The second counter-argument deserves more space. The first point to consider is why there should be such a need to attain effective results? The question is relevant if we take account of the duty to improve the future. The stress on getting some ‘real’ work done boils down to two kinds of justification. One is a striving to get some proof down ‘for the record’; the second is the wish to obtain recognition for the work done. Both justifications are questionable. Take first the emphasis on tangible results. This is a coherent aspiration in a discipline that claims to follow scientific method. However, when harnessed to ethical questions, such as the betterment of the future, we must acknowledge that quantitative indicators which relate to subjective preferences are, at best, contingent. What may be granted as a legitimate approach to normative subjects might also at heart denote an empiricist bias in the standpoint from which an ‘improvement’ of the future is considered. If the fluidity of the future is an accepted reality, then
J. Serra / Futures 38 (2006) 367–369
369
it would seem more advisable to focus on the process rather than on the results. A result implies a sense of completion, of success, which can prove counterproductive when chances are that you will have to keep reassessing your conclusions time after time. That is why so many futurists insist that the main value of Futures Studies lies in the fact of engaging in a continued process of inquiry about the future, more that in the outputs of that process. It is understandable that a futurist may be interested in attaining results in order to get credit for them. The wish for recognition is an all-too-human aspiration. But if this aspiration is embedded within a duty to better the future, then it has to be strongly opposed. First of all, there is profound uncertainty about what may constitute a ‘better future’. Good intentions are no guarantee of anything. Human history is littered with misdeeds originally conceived as ‘improvements’ for humanity. Eugenics is a glaring example of paving the road to hell with ‘good intentions’. The only recognition we can really expect to get is that of our contemporaries. Work celebrated in its own time would suggest that it deals more with the present than with the future. Chances are that the more recognition a work gets from its contemporary peers, the less relevant it is likely to be for the future. Finally, and from a strictly ethical point of view, there is a severe objection to be made. Any moral obligation is absolute. It cannot be conditioned by anything or fulfilled to generate either gratitude or appreciation. You do it because you must. I do not suggest that Futures Studies should be approached in an amoral way. On the contrary! Normativity is a central aspect of Futures and ethics are intermingled with our values and preferences. We cannot ignore this, but must also to strip Futures Studies of any messianic inclination. Hence, I advocate The Ethical Low Profile Approach to the Future, which consists of three principles. First: be humble, for despite the best efforts and intentions, there can be no guarantee that you could get to know what is best for the future. Therefore, and in the second place, always direct your intervention so as to cause minimum harm to the future. Third and finally: accept that failure is always a possibility, but learn from mistakes and try not to repeat them. Some may think that this is not enough, that we cannot settle for such low expectations. It may be good to keep in mind that frequently, less is more.
References [1] B. de Jouvenel, The Art of Conjecture, Widenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1967. [2] R. Slaughter (Ed.), The Knowledge Base of Futures Studies, DDM, Brisbane, 1996.