European interest groups and the CAP

European interest groups and the CAP Susan Senior Nello

From a description of the main European federations of interest groups dealing with the CAP various reasons for the greater strength of the food and farm lobbies vis-&vis their consumer counterparts emerge. In part these explanations relate to organizational factors such as the size of budgets and personnel, the incentives to lobby, the similarity of members’ preferences and so on, but the closer, more intricate relationship between the farm lobby and the EC decisionmaking institutions is also important. Susan Senior Nello is with the Dipartimento di Economia Politica, Siena University, Piazza San Francesco, 17-53100 Siena, Italy.

‘Terkel

T. Neilsen,

Aspects

of the /XC

Influence of European Groups in the Decision-Making Processes: The Common Agricultural Policy, Government and Opposition, 1968, p 543. ‘1 would like to use this opportunity to thank all the people who gave me interviews, and especially those at COPA, the CIAA and BEUC, as well as the various people who commented on an earlier version of what is written here, in particular Pierre Salmon, Second0 Tarditi, Michael Tracy and Helen Wallace, though the usual disclaimer about responsibility of course applies. 3E. Haas, The Uniting of Europe, Stanford University Press, Stanford, CA, 1958, p 16. 4For a list of these members see COPA/ COGECA Document No 63.08/JB/MR of 5 December 1988.

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The European farm lobby is often blamed for many of the problems associated with the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), and especially for imposing upward pressure on levels of price support and so contributing to agricultural surpluses. In this article the main federations of interest groups which are concerned with the CAP will be examined to assess whether there is any justification for these accusations. These federations are those representing farmers, consumers and the food industry at the European level. Ideally the role of national groups concerned with the CAP should also be taken into account, but this is beyond the scope of the analysis here. this concentration on However, Eurogroups is to some extent exonerated in that they are the principal interest groups dealing with the Community, and they contain members of many of the main national groups affected by the CAP. Moreover, as Nielsen describes, although national groups continue to use direct links with Community authorities, and especially the Council, since the late 1960s they have tended ‘to put more emphasis on the route through the European groups’. ’ This article is based on the available literature and statistics and on a series of interviews.2 First the various Eurogroups concerned with the CAP will be described, and then their relationships with the main EC institu-

tions will be discussed in an attempt to draw some conclusions about the relative strength of the different groups. The farm lobby There are numerous Eurogroups covering particular agricultural product groups such as Unecolait for the dairy trade, but by far the most important organization representing farmers at the EC level is COPA/ COGECA. COPA, or the Comite des Organisations Professionelles Agricoles de la CEE, dates from 1958 when it was founded at the request of the Commission. This official sponsorship of COPA in part reflects the literature on European integration at that time which envisaged a coalition of the Commission and Eurogroups against the Council as becoming the major force in the integration process.’ More importantly perhaps from a practical point of view was the ready access to decision-making channels which Commission backing of COPA ensured. COGECA, or the General Committee for Agricultural Cooperation in the European Community, dates from 1959 and its secretariat has been merged with that of COPA since 1962. As Table 1 shows, together COPA/ COGECA represented over 5 million of the total 7 million farmers in 1984 and were composed of 29 member organizations’ from the then 10 EC countries. As is also evident from Table 1, the

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%ee for instance the papers presented as the Second Siena Workshop on European Integration, Siena, 20-21 May 1985, in a forthcoming publication edited by E. Croci Angelini, P. Pierani, S. Tarditi and K. J. Thomson. %ee for example K. Haase, Die Politische dkonomie der Agrarpolitik, Agrarwirtschaft 98, Sonderheft, 1983; K. Hagendorn, Methodologicai Problems of Agricultural Policy Research, Working Paper No 8313, Institute of Structural Research, Federal Research Centre of BraunschweigVolkenrode, FR Germany, 1983; and M. Petit, M. De Benedictus, D. Britton, M. De Groot, W. Henrichsmeyer and F. Lechi, Agricultural Policy Formation in the European Community: The Birth of Milk Quotas and CAP Reform’, Elsevier, Amsterdam, 1987; S.M. Senior Nello, ‘An application of public choice theory to the question of CAP reform’, European Review of Agricultural Economics, Vol 11, 1984, pp 261-283; A. Burrell, The Role of Agricultural Policy Models in the Reform of the Common Agricultural Policy, Discussion Paper in Agricultural Policy 87/l, Wye College, University of London, 1987. 7EC-ESC, Directory of European Agricultural Organizations, Luxembourg Office for Official Publications of the EC, 1984, p 53. ‘Ibid. ’ Neilsen, op tit, Ref 1, p 544.

budget and personnel of COPA are far larger than those of other European federations concerned with the CAP. This is partly because, as various studies show,5 the per capita impact of the CAP is much greater for producers than for consumers or taxpayers, a fact which is likely to be reflected in more active lobbying by farm interests. In addition, there is by now a fairly extensive literature dealing specifically with the CAP which accounts for the greater strength of farm groups in terms of the lower costs of organizing interest groups and carrying out lobbying activities for producers rather than consumers or taxpayers.’ One of the main reasons given is that farm groups are better able to overcome the problem of individual members ‘free riding’ on the lobbying activities of others. The general policy guidelines of COPA are decided by a general assembly composed of representatives of the member organizations which meets once a year or more often if necessary. There is also a presidium consisting of one representative of each member organization whose purpose is to take all the necessary decisions within the guidelines set by the assembly. Although in principal COPA seeks unanimity, in 1973 the possibility of majority decision-making was introduced, reinforcing what has been called its ‘relatively high degree of integration overall as an organization.‘7 In an official EC document one of the sources of COPA strength was said to

Table 1. The main interest group federations

be that: ‘Membership in COPA consists exclusively of EC agricultural organizations. Aims and objectives can be more uniformly pursued among affiliates, not least because the affiliates benefit equally from EC legislative and executive action in the agricultural field.” As Nielsen describes, though dissension among members does create problems, in general compromises are met.” COPA agreed that the extent of their bargaining power depended very much on how far they were able to reach a common decision. The consumer federations The main umbrella organizations of consumer groups at the EC level are the BEUC (European Bureau of Consumers’ Unions) and COFACE (Committee of Family Organizations in the EC). The budget, membership and number of personnel of each of these is shown in Table 1. In many cases the budgets of these consumer groups are inflated by subsidies from EC and national governments. It is important to stress that, in contrast with COPA, the CAP represents just one of the many fields of interest of these federations. The BEUC is alone among the consumer federations in publishing an annual statement on the farm price proposals. Kirchner and Schwaiger describe the three main functions of Eurogroup5 as: 0

the exchange among affiliates;

concerned

of

information

with the CAP.

1988 budget (Belgian francs)

No of personnel in secretariat (excluding secretaries)

No of individual members represented

93 330 000

28

5 364 745 (1984)

20619819 11 000 000

5 5

Farmers COPACOGECA Notes: %nits of account: bAccording to Kirchner and Schwaiger the budget of UNICE as a whole amounted to 1 350000 ua compared with the COPACOGECA budget of 766 000 for the same year. Sources: Official publications of, and interviews with, the groups concerned. Coface data are taken from E. Kirchner and K. Schwaiger, The Role of interest Groups in the European Community. Gower, Aldershot, UK, 1981, pp 20-21.

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Consumers BEUC Eurocoop

Coface Food industry CIAA

37 000 uaa

3

nlab

6

15 million (30 000 sales points, 500 089 employees) nla 13 000 firms, employing more than 2 200 000

FOOD POLICY May 1989

I VIlZwl’oINT

I l l

transmitting information between affiliates and the EC institutions; influencing the policies of the EC on behalf of its affiliates.

These authors found that while COPA and the food industry federation carry out all three functions equally, the consumer groups concentrate on the information functions.‘” This view was confirmed in an interview with the BEUC, who said that their main aim was to influence the climate in which debate on the reform of the CAP took place. A major reason for the BEUC’s annual statement on the price proposals was that most reform occurs at this time. The food industry organizarion

The CIAA, or Confederation of Food and Agricultural Industries of the EC, is the association of national federations representing the food and drink industries of the EC. It was founded in 1959 as part of UNICE (the Union of Industries of the EC) but became an independent federation in 1981. According to an official CIAA publication, its ‘sphere of responsibility includes all general matters affecting the food and drink industries, especially those resulting from the implementation of EEC policies and legislation: common agricultural policy, harmonization of food legislation, free movement of goods within the EEC, external trade, relations with developing countries, environmental and consumer affairs et?.” Like the consumer organizations, the CIAA was traditionally concerned with food legislation and quality aspects and it has only gradually become involved in agricultural price levels. COPA

“E. Kirchner and K. Schwaiger, The Role of Interest Groups in the European Commu&y, Gower, Aldershot, UK, 1981, p 15. “CIAA, About the C/AA, Brussels, 1985.

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and the EC institutions

According to COPA, its most important dealings are undoubtedly those with the Commission. Though there is no formal institutional arrangement (the link is described as being ‘offinot ‘officiel’), contacts take cieux’, place at all levels. There are close links between COPA experts and those of the Commission which take the form of working groups, informal

meetings, attendance of Commission officials at COPA/COGECA meetings, sending letters and written proposals and so on. The COPA presidium meets the Commissioner for Agriculture regularly and, when necessary, also other commissioners and the Commission President. When Mansholt was Commissioner for Agriculture meetings with the COPA presidium were almost monthly and COPA officials described the relationship as being very good: not one of consensus, but certainly one of cooperation. Now the situation is said to be more conflictual and meetings with the Agricultural Commissioner occur only every 4.5 months. Nevertheless from the interviews it emerged that COPA officials still find Directorate General (DG) VI very pro-farmers’ interests and this has even led to the rest of the Commission insisting that some agricultural decisions be taken at cabinet level so that DG VI might be overruled. The main differences between the Commission’s and COPA’s positions lie predictably in the importance which the Commission attaches to budgetary considerations and the implications of policies for third countries. The rising EC self-sufficiency ratio for many agricultural products is therefore a cause of deteriorating relations between the two institutions. One of the main aims of COPA is to influence Commission officials when they are drawing up proposals for agricultural legislation, and in this it was generally recognized to be relatively effective. In particular there is considerable collaboration over the statistics underlying the Commission’s proposals since COPA may have an imformation advantage as its members are often responsible for drawing up the national statistics on which Eurostat agricultural data are based. COPA officials stress that their ability to influence the Commission depends very much on whether they can work out a common position. The COPA presidium meets for this purpose each year, usually about September, when developments in costs, incomes and markets are analysed and attempts are made to draw up official

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I%. Harris, A. Swinbank and C. Wilkinson, The food and Farm Policies of the European Community, John Wiley & Sons, Chichester, UK, 1983, p 25. Table 2. Membership of the Economic and Social Committee of the EC.

Total membership

1974-78

1978-82

105

120

17 6 2 2 44 21

20 6 3 2 46 19

Of which

COPAJCOGECA BEUC Eurocoop Coface

ETUC” UNICE “European

Trade Unions Conference,

Source: E. Kirchner and K. Schwaiger, The Role of lnferest Groups in the European Community, Gower, Aldershot, UK, 1981, pp 7&77.

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COPA demands which avoid conflicts of interests among farmers of different types or from different countries. Only rarely (as in 1986) does COPA succeed in drawing up its official demands before the Commission’s annual proposals are published. With regard to the Commission’s role in implementing the CAP, COPA is active in the advisory committees. According lo COPA officials, some of the committees, such as that for cereals, are effective fora for discussion, while others, such as that for fruit and vegetables. are less so partly because the market is disorganized and diversified. Table 2 breaks down the composition of the Economic and Social Committee (ESC) of the EC in such a way as to indicate the share of total membership in each of the three main interest group federations considered here. As can he seen, agricultural interests are in a minority and, according to COPA, find difficulty in getting their own way. Sometimes the agricultural viewpoint is expressed as a minority opinion. Though the ESC operates as a forum for exchange and produces some very interesting reports, the Council and Commission are not hound to take the ESC’s statements into account and rarely do so. COPA also has close links with the European Parliament. and especially the Agricultural Committee and the secretariats of the various political groups. These links involve sending letters and COPA positions to MEPs, meetings and regular attendance by the Secretary General of COPA at the plenary sessions of the Parliament. When the Agricultural Committee hegins to prepare its annual opinion on the price proposals it is met by COPA. Parallel to the activities of COPA, lobbying activities are also carried out by national groups. According to COPA officials. the Council’s annual price-fixing session is often very much a repetition with slightly different stresses and some omissions of what has occurred three months earlier when the COPA presidium decides on its official demands. COPA may try to influence the Coun-

cil’s decisions both directly and indirectly through its member organizations. Direct lobbying involves sending copies of COPA positions, and meetings with the President of the Council, or the Council as a whole. However, COPA said that because the Council agricultural national

is composed ministers,

of national

the activities

of

farm groups are more impor-

tant at this stage. This is also the case for the Special Committee for Agriculture (SCA). which is composed of national officials and generally draws up the agenda for Council meetings. The CIAA The diversity of its members makes it difficult for the CIAA to arrive at a common position with regard to the price proposals as a whole, so its activities tend to he on a sectoral basis. Thus for instance in talking about its dealings with the Commission the CIAA stressed the importance of participation of its members in the advisory and management committees. According to Harris, Swinhank and Wilkinson, whereas decisions having a direct impact on farmers are generally taken by the Council, ‘decisions by management committees are of fundamental importance to food processors and traders’.” However, as the authors maintain, this does not necessarily mean that the interests of the food industry are taken into account on these committees. During the interviews it was also remarked that the CIAA’s style of lobbying was much less open than that of COPA, taking place ‘over the telephone and behind closed doors’. This, together of CIAA

with the sectoral nature

demands,

makes it difficult

to assess how effective

its lobbying

is.

The BEUC The BEUC said that they felt at a disadvantage vis-d-vis the farm lobby because they did not possess an equivalent to the agricultural network of contacts within EC institutions. On the other hand, the BEUC expressed doubts about the effectiveness of specially created institutions to deal with consumer matters, such as the Council

FOOD POLICY May 1989

13A Butt-Philip, Pressure Groups in the European Community, UACES Occasional Papers 2, UACES Secretariat, King’s College, London, 1985. ‘%. M. Senior Nello, ‘Un’analisi dell’impatto dei gruppi di interesse sulla politica agricola comune’, in La Politica economica nel settore agricolo; Atti del XXIII convegno disfudidella Sidea, II Mulino, Bologna, 1988; G. Hendriks, ‘The politics of food; the case of FR Germany’, food Policy, Vol 12, No 1, February 1987, pp 35-45. ‘%. Louwes, Squeezing structural agricultural policy: from the Mansholt Plan to a mini-policy’, in J. Pelkmans, ed, Can the CAP Be Reformed?, EIPA, Maastricht, the Netherlands, 1985.

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for Consumer Affairs created in 1983, and said that their existing direct, informal contacts with EC institutions tended to be more fruitful. Though the BEUC is represented on the the various management and advisory committees of the Commission, it argues that it has virtually no influence there, even though some of the decisions taken may have implications for consumers (and the example of butter sales to the USSR was cited). The fact that consultation was on a sectoral basis was said to create problems for the BEUC, who would prefer to work with one centralized body. The BEUC also complained that of the 12 people working on consumer affairs in the Commission (as compared with the 800 in DG VI), not one was working full-time on agriculture. They stressed the need for a watchdog just on consumer questions relating to agriculture, and for greater collaboration with consumer interests in drawing up Commission proposals. However, the BEUC argued that its real quarrel was not with the Commission but with the European Parliament. Relations were so bad, in particular with the Agricultural Committee, that on one occasion the BEUC walked out of their annual meeting together. The BEUC had hoped that direct elections would entail a more urban bias and increase the number of MEPs concerned with consumer affairs, but argued that the effect had simply been to boost the amount of lobbying in the European Parliament by farmers who wanted to maintain their positions. One exception was cited, namely the German MEP, Gaultier, whose constituency included Volkswagen workers and who deliberately became a member of the Agricultural Committee to campaign for lower food prices. With regard to the Council, the BEUC felt that it had little impact, though in some countries (FR Germany, the UK, Denmark, the Netherlands and recently also France) there was some consultation with consumer groups also at the national level. It was stressed that while the BEUC might influence the climate of debate about reform, its impact on price-

fixing was negligible as high as 0.5%.

and possibly

not

Conclusions

The above description pinpoints a number of reasons for the strength of the EC farm and food lobbies vis-d-v& consumers and taxpayers. Certain of these explanations relate to the organization of interest group federations at the European level, namely: the budgets and size of personnel of the federations, their incentives to lobby, the similarity of members’ preferences and the ability to overcome free riding by individual members of the group. Secondly, it emerges that the farm lobby has a far closer, more intricate relationship with members of the EC decision-making institutions than does the consumer federation. Indeed, COPA would seem to lend support to Alan Butt-Philip’s view that the Commission and Eurogroups need and feed off one another’13 insofar as the Commission relies on COPA for information, experts, contacts with grassroots, and help in overcoming opposition from national governments on certain issues both at Council and national government level. In addition, as argued elsewhere,‘” national electoral considerations and the importance of the farm vote render the members of all the main EC institutions particularly susceptible to COPA demands. Finally, the above discussion also illustrates how certain peculiarities of the CAP decision-making process operate in favour of farm interests. In particular, the preponderant role played by DG VI, the Council of Agricultural Ministers and the Agricultural Committee of the European Parliament has led Louwes to describe EC agricultural policy as being decided ‘in an isolated political circuit of pressure groups, client ministers and civil servants as well as specialists in parliament’.” The complex nature of EC decision-making, with the interplay of various national and European institutions at various stages of the process, also affords numerous opportunities for pressure group activities, while at the same time raising the information costs of those who have to pay for the policy.

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However, as the interviews carried out here confirm, the power of the EC lobby is considerable, but is not completely without checks. With the growing levels of EC self-sufficiency for many agricultural products and of farm spending, the threatened bankruptcy of the EC budget and the

106

interests of third countries which are agricultural producers such as the US have increasingly had to be taken into account. Moreover, at times the interests of the farm lobby have been overridden by the countervailing power of other interests, eg those of the oil companies in the case of ethanol.

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