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Evaluations of government programs
Evaluation and Progrum Planning, Vol. 5, pp. 189-191, 1982 Printed in the USA. All rights reserved.
EVALUATIONS
0149-7189/82/030189-03$03.00/O Copyright D 1983 Pergamon Press Ltd
OF GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMS
ORRIN G. HATCH United States Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
EVALUATIONS The geometric
growth
of government
programs
OF GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMS
This includes authorizing the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Education. Federal income security and health entitlement programs authorized by the Senate Finance Committee by contrast amount to about $355 billion, a total expenditure about nine times as great as our Labor and Human Resources Committee, The kinds of programs funded under our committee jurisdiction cover an extremely wide field: ranging from black lung disease to the National Science Foundation, and from birth control to the National Labor Relations Board. Tracking the expenditure of $37 billion each year over such a diverse panorama of programs becomes a great challenge for myself, my seven subcommittee chairmen, and the other eight senators who serve on our committee. And, when it is remembered that each Senator serves on three or foul different standing committees, the oversight responsibilities become truly substantial. Total federal and state government spending is now roughly equal to 43% of the National Income. By far the largest portion of government spending comes from the federal government. With 535 Members of Congress responsible for a budget of approximately $800 billion in fiscal 1983, it is obvious that careful scrutiny cannot be given to each of the federal spending programs. In fact, frequently hundreds of millions of dollars will be spent in a program before even minimal congressional oversight is ever begun. To assist Congress in its oversight responsibilities, the Congress has established the General Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO has over 5,000 employees located in Washington and several field offices throughout the country. The GAO works directly for the Congress; and, though they do initiate some of their own investigations, most of their work produc-
during
the past twenty years has meant that these programs have penetrated virtually every part of American life. Each program came into being because of a belief by Congress that, by establishing such a program, society would benefit. Regardless of the motivations or the economic circumstances which spawned these programs, Congress has a continuing obligation to examine and evaluate the ways the taxpayers’ money is being spent. Because government programs are so pervasive, Congressional oversight can be an effective means of keeping elected officials in touch with different constituencies and aware of the impact public policy is having at the grass roots level. The oversight role of the Congress embraces taking responsibility for determining program success: Are monies being spent in line with Congressional intent? Are the problems which were targeted being solved? Is the procedure fair and efficient? Are there alternative ways of meeting the same needs which would be preferable? Is the level of funding appropriate? Has the original problem been reduced enough to warrant the elimination of this program? The Congress is responsible to the taxpayers to be able to answer each of these questions intelligently and to respond appropriately with adjustments in public policy. One of my major objectives since coming to the Senate has been conducting oversight on programs for which I am responsible. In my first year as Chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, I held 21 oversight hearings. My seven colleagues, who serve as subcommittee chairmen, also held numerous oversight hearings on issues within their subcommittee jurisdiction. Our committee authorizes programs in which total spending will equal $37.6 billion or about 5 percent of the Federal Budget in fiscal 1983.
Senator Hatch (R-Utah) is Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resource. Thanks to Dr. J. Craig Peery for comments on an earlier version of this paper. Requests for reprints should be sent to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, 125 Russell, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20510.
189
190
ORRIN
tion comes at the request of members of Congress, particularly committee and subcommittee chairmen in pursuit of their oversight responsibilities. In the Executive Branch, the President has the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on which he relies for general management and budget recommendations. Additionally, each department and many subunits have inspectors general who are responsible for investigating allegations of misuse of public funds. Many departments also have a subdepartmental organization for evaluation functions. The Department of Health and Human Services, for example, has the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, which coordinates and tracks evaluation in the Department. Evaluations are also conducted internally within different offices and bureaus. Funds for internal departmental evaluations are frequently set aside within the authorizing legislation. It is unrealistic, however, to expect GAO, OMB and the agencies themselves to be able to do a comprehensive and optimal job of auditing, checking for fraud and abuse, doing qualitative evaluations, and planning alternative program suggestions for each of the federally funded programs on a consistent basis. In fact, GAO resources are limited to the extent that samples of program services in their inquiries are sometimes so small that only case-study, anecdotal approaches are possible in their final reports. There remain other substantial problems with current federal evaluation systems. Those doing the evaluating are not elected and thus not responsible directly to the taxpayer. Both OMB and GAO are predominantly staffed with career government workers; this is also true of those with evaluation responsibilities within the departments themselves. However dedicated and responsible these people may be, they are still part of a larger bureaucratic organization to which they are responsible and accountable. In the departments, frequently this also means that those closely tied to, and sometimes directly involved with, the service delivery aspect of the program are also responsible for evaluations. In order to maximize freedom from personal and political conflicts of interest, decentralized mechanisms of program evaluations must be developed. This suggests that independent evaluations, funded with monies that are not dependent on service provision and not tied to program maintenance, should be encouraged. If data on programs at the local and state level were available, the GAO, OMB and the departments could use such data as the base from which to develop a national perspective. The role of the federal government as a clearing house and source of information about activities reported from each of the states is compatible with the current administration’s thrust for decentralization.
G. HATCH
As federal programs have become top-heavy and inefficient, one of the recent thrusts of the Reagan administration, and one backed by Congress, has been to return control of programs back to states and local communities. The mechanism for this return of power has been the “block grant.” The theory behind the block grant approach is that the federal government sends the money spent on a series of programs directly to the state in a “block.” The state then decides how to allocate the proportion of program funds spent within the block according to local needs. The federal costs and administrative bureaucracy for carrying out the programs are largely eliminated. Block grants mean that state legislatures and governors will become more responsible for oversight of the funds. Consequently program evaluation and planning functions previously carried out at the federal level must be addressed by the states in the block grant era. In the original Health Services and Health Prevention Block Bills (S. 1027 and S. 1028) I introduced in the 97th Congress and which were reported favorably out of the committee, there were some proposals for helping the states deal with these increased evaluation responsibilities. First we proposed that one to five percent of the funds be set aside for program evaluation. Second, we proposed that colleges and universities within the states be consulted in designing and carrying out the evaluation responsibilities. Third, we proposed that the state legislatures have direct jurisdiction in allocating these block grant funds. Unfortunately, none of these provisions were in the final block grants which passed as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act (P.L. 97-35), and I feel we may have left some oversight responsibilities pressing on the states without giving them adequate means to accomplish them. There is no question that Congress will want information about the success of the block grant approach, both qualitatively and quantitatively, when these programs come up for reauthorization. In reauthorizing the National Institutes for Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse and for Drug Abuse (S. 2365) this year, our committee unanimously voted to include my amendment calling on the Secretary of Health and Human Services to report on the effectiveness of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Block Grant in dealing with alcohol and drug problems. In conjunction with this report we directed the Secretary to work with appropriate national organizations to develop a uniform system of data collection that would allow comparability of program effectiveness between states. I see no reason why national organizations representing those interested in professional evaluation should not be among those consulted by the Secretary in developing this data collection system. Such information on block grant functioning will serve several purposes. As state governors and legisla-
Evaluations
of Government
tors seek to determine how to spend block grant funds, they will want to know how programs in their states compare with programs in other states. Information exchange between states, while not mandated in the block grants, will be one of the necessary outcomes if states are to be able to evaluate their relative successes. As comparable state data are available, these can be compiled at the federal level and made available to the Congress and the departments, as the public policy modifications continue. Involving colleges and universities in the evaluation process could have several positive outcomes. The institutions of higher education already exist and have capacities to help with such evaluations. They are independent and can be separated from the service providers. Students who are preparing to become involved in service activities could gain firsthand insight into program planning and evaluation by assisting in evaluations. This concept has been implemented in two programs during the 97th Congress: Both the Adolescent Family Life program (Title XX of the Public Health Services Act) and the reauthorization of the Headstart program have provisions requiring colleges and universities within the states where services are provided to be involved in the evaluation of the effectiveness of those services. As these mechanisms for evaluation begin to develop and diversify, we will learn
Programs
191
much concerning the possible interface of institutions of higher education into a national system of program evaluation. Such a system could have a great potential for providing detailed state and regional information on program successes that is not available under present or past centralized systems. It remains my firm conviction that every program authorized in the public sector should have a built-in evaluation component which is operated by independent, non-service providers. Legislators at all levels need to be in a feedback loop that includes information about the effects of the programs they have developed. Targeted evaluations aimed at specific policy questions need to be conceived in advance of program implementation. Qualitative evaluations, in addition to standard auditing and checks for fraud, need to be developed. We need to know if the authorized work is actually being performed and if it is being successful in addressing the perceived needs. This means that oversight must come to be seen by taxpayers and service providers alike as a helpful and necessary check designed to improve the system and not just to find fault with it. I believe we can develop this kind of approach to oversight and evaluation. I believe we must move ahead with this kind of oversight if decentralized government functions and the best use of limited resources are to be developed.
EVALUATIONS
0149-7189/82/030189-03$03.00/O Copyright D 1983 Pergamon Press Ltd
OF GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMS
ORRIN G. HATCH United States Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resources
EVALUATIONS The geometric
growth
of government
programs
OF GOVERNMENT
PROGRAMS
This includes authorizing the Department of Health and Human Services, the Department of Labor, and the Department of Education. Federal income security and health entitlement programs authorized by the Senate Finance Committee by contrast amount to about $355 billion, a total expenditure about nine times as great as our Labor and Human Resources Committee, The kinds of programs funded under our committee jurisdiction cover an extremely wide field: ranging from black lung disease to the National Science Foundation, and from birth control to the National Labor Relations Board. Tracking the expenditure of $37 billion each year over such a diverse panorama of programs becomes a great challenge for myself, my seven subcommittee chairmen, and the other eight senators who serve on our committee. And, when it is remembered that each Senator serves on three or foul different standing committees, the oversight responsibilities become truly substantial. Total federal and state government spending is now roughly equal to 43% of the National Income. By far the largest portion of government spending comes from the federal government. With 535 Members of Congress responsible for a budget of approximately $800 billion in fiscal 1983, it is obvious that careful scrutiny cannot be given to each of the federal spending programs. In fact, frequently hundreds of millions of dollars will be spent in a program before even minimal congressional oversight is ever begun. To assist Congress in its oversight responsibilities, the Congress has established the General Accounting Office (GAO). The GAO has over 5,000 employees located in Washington and several field offices throughout the country. The GAO works directly for the Congress; and, though they do initiate some of their own investigations, most of their work produc-
during
the past twenty years has meant that these programs have penetrated virtually every part of American life. Each program came into being because of a belief by Congress that, by establishing such a program, society would benefit. Regardless of the motivations or the economic circumstances which spawned these programs, Congress has a continuing obligation to examine and evaluate the ways the taxpayers’ money is being spent. Because government programs are so pervasive, Congressional oversight can be an effective means of keeping elected officials in touch with different constituencies and aware of the impact public policy is having at the grass roots level. The oversight role of the Congress embraces taking responsibility for determining program success: Are monies being spent in line with Congressional intent? Are the problems which were targeted being solved? Is the procedure fair and efficient? Are there alternative ways of meeting the same needs which would be preferable? Is the level of funding appropriate? Has the original problem been reduced enough to warrant the elimination of this program? The Congress is responsible to the taxpayers to be able to answer each of these questions intelligently and to respond appropriately with adjustments in public policy. One of my major objectives since coming to the Senate has been conducting oversight on programs for which I am responsible. In my first year as Chairman of the Senate Labor and Human Resources Committee, I held 21 oversight hearings. My seven colleagues, who serve as subcommittee chairmen, also held numerous oversight hearings on issues within their subcommittee jurisdiction. Our committee authorizes programs in which total spending will equal $37.6 billion or about 5 percent of the Federal Budget in fiscal 1983.
Senator Hatch (R-Utah) is Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Labor and Human Resource. Thanks to Dr. J. Craig Peery for comments on an earlier version of this paper. Requests for reprints should be sent to Senator Orrin G. Hatch, 125 Russell, Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C. 20510.
189
190
ORRIN
tion comes at the request of members of Congress, particularly committee and subcommittee chairmen in pursuit of their oversight responsibilities. In the Executive Branch, the President has the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) on which he relies for general management and budget recommendations. Additionally, each department and many subunits have inspectors general who are responsible for investigating allegations of misuse of public funds. Many departments also have a subdepartmental organization for evaluation functions. The Department of Health and Human Services, for example, has the Office of the Assistant Secretary for Planning and Evaluation, which coordinates and tracks evaluation in the Department. Evaluations are also conducted internally within different offices and bureaus. Funds for internal departmental evaluations are frequently set aside within the authorizing legislation. It is unrealistic, however, to expect GAO, OMB and the agencies themselves to be able to do a comprehensive and optimal job of auditing, checking for fraud and abuse, doing qualitative evaluations, and planning alternative program suggestions for each of the federally funded programs on a consistent basis. In fact, GAO resources are limited to the extent that samples of program services in their inquiries are sometimes so small that only case-study, anecdotal approaches are possible in their final reports. There remain other substantial problems with current federal evaluation systems. Those doing the evaluating are not elected and thus not responsible directly to the taxpayer. Both OMB and GAO are predominantly staffed with career government workers; this is also true of those with evaluation responsibilities within the departments themselves. However dedicated and responsible these people may be, they are still part of a larger bureaucratic organization to which they are responsible and accountable. In the departments, frequently this also means that those closely tied to, and sometimes directly involved with, the service delivery aspect of the program are also responsible for evaluations. In order to maximize freedom from personal and political conflicts of interest, decentralized mechanisms of program evaluations must be developed. This suggests that independent evaluations, funded with monies that are not dependent on service provision and not tied to program maintenance, should be encouraged. If data on programs at the local and state level were available, the GAO, OMB and the departments could use such data as the base from which to develop a national perspective. The role of the federal government as a clearing house and source of information about activities reported from each of the states is compatible with the current administration’s thrust for decentralization.
G. HATCH
As federal programs have become top-heavy and inefficient, one of the recent thrusts of the Reagan administration, and one backed by Congress, has been to return control of programs back to states and local communities. The mechanism for this return of power has been the “block grant.” The theory behind the block grant approach is that the federal government sends the money spent on a series of programs directly to the state in a “block.” The state then decides how to allocate the proportion of program funds spent within the block according to local needs. The federal costs and administrative bureaucracy for carrying out the programs are largely eliminated. Block grants mean that state legislatures and governors will become more responsible for oversight of the funds. Consequently program evaluation and planning functions previously carried out at the federal level must be addressed by the states in the block grant era. In the original Health Services and Health Prevention Block Bills (S. 1027 and S. 1028) I introduced in the 97th Congress and which were reported favorably out of the committee, there were some proposals for helping the states deal with these increased evaluation responsibilities. First we proposed that one to five percent of the funds be set aside for program evaluation. Second, we proposed that colleges and universities within the states be consulted in designing and carrying out the evaluation responsibilities. Third, we proposed that the state legislatures have direct jurisdiction in allocating these block grant funds. Unfortunately, none of these provisions were in the final block grants which passed as part of the Omnibus Reconciliation Act (P.L. 97-35), and I feel we may have left some oversight responsibilities pressing on the states without giving them adequate means to accomplish them. There is no question that Congress will want information about the success of the block grant approach, both qualitatively and quantitatively, when these programs come up for reauthorization. In reauthorizing the National Institutes for Alcoholism and Alcohol Abuse and for Drug Abuse (S. 2365) this year, our committee unanimously voted to include my amendment calling on the Secretary of Health and Human Services to report on the effectiveness of the Alcohol, Drug Abuse and Mental Health Block Grant in dealing with alcohol and drug problems. In conjunction with this report we directed the Secretary to work with appropriate national organizations to develop a uniform system of data collection that would allow comparability of program effectiveness between states. I see no reason why national organizations representing those interested in professional evaluation should not be among those consulted by the Secretary in developing this data collection system. Such information on block grant functioning will serve several purposes. As state governors and legisla-
Evaluations
of Government
tors seek to determine how to spend block grant funds, they will want to know how programs in their states compare with programs in other states. Information exchange between states, while not mandated in the block grants, will be one of the necessary outcomes if states are to be able to evaluate their relative successes. As comparable state data are available, these can be compiled at the federal level and made available to the Congress and the departments, as the public policy modifications continue. Involving colleges and universities in the evaluation process could have several positive outcomes. The institutions of higher education already exist and have capacities to help with such evaluations. They are independent and can be separated from the service providers. Students who are preparing to become involved in service activities could gain firsthand insight into program planning and evaluation by assisting in evaluations. This concept has been implemented in two programs during the 97th Congress: Both the Adolescent Family Life program (Title XX of the Public Health Services Act) and the reauthorization of the Headstart program have provisions requiring colleges and universities within the states where services are provided to be involved in the evaluation of the effectiveness of those services. As these mechanisms for evaluation begin to develop and diversify, we will learn
Programs
191
much concerning the possible interface of institutions of higher education into a national system of program evaluation. Such a system could have a great potential for providing detailed state and regional information on program successes that is not available under present or past centralized systems. It remains my firm conviction that every program authorized in the public sector should have a built-in evaluation component which is operated by independent, non-service providers. Legislators at all levels need to be in a feedback loop that includes information about the effects of the programs they have developed. Targeted evaluations aimed at specific policy questions need to be conceived in advance of program implementation. Qualitative evaluations, in addition to standard auditing and checks for fraud, need to be developed. We need to know if the authorized work is actually being performed and if it is being successful in addressing the perceived needs. This means that oversight must come to be seen by taxpayers and service providers alike as a helpful and necessary check designed to improve the system and not just to find fault with it. I believe we can develop this kind of approach to oversight and evaluation. I believe we must move ahead with this kind of oversight if decentralized government functions and the best use of limited resources are to be developed.