Evidence for a depressive self-focusing style

JOURNAL

OF RESEARCH

20, 95-106 (1986)

IN PERSONALITY

Evidence for a Depressive Self-Focusing Style TOM PYSZCZYNSKI University

of North

Carolina

AND JEFF GREENBERG University

of Arizona

An experiment was conducted to assess the possibility that depressed persons have a unique self-focusing style in which they increase their level of self-focus after failures and decrease their level of self-focus after successes. Nondepressed and mildly depressed college students were randomly assigned to succeed or fail on a supposed test of verbal abilities or to a no-outcome control group that did not take the test. Subjects were then taken to a second room and given 10 min to work on two sets of puzzles, one of which was positioned in front of a large mirror. As in previous research on self-focus, the amount of time spent in front of the mirror was taken as a measure of aversion to self-focus. As predicted, depressed success subjects spent significantly less time in front of the mirror than did depressed control, depressed failure, or nondepressed success subjects. The time spent in front of the mirror by nondepressed subjects, however, was apparently unaffected by their performance outcomes. Implications of this depressive self-focusing style for the esteem, attributions, affect, motivation, and performance of depressed persons were discussed. D 1986 Academic PESS. IW.

The possibility that self-focused attention plays an important role in the development and maintenance of depression has been noted by a number of theorists (e.g., Alloy, 1982; Ganellen & Blaney, 1981; Greenberg & Pyszczynski, 1984; Lewinsohn, Hoberman, Teri, & Hautzinger, 1984; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1985, in press; Smith & Greenberg, 1981). Indeed, research has shown a consistent positive correlation between private self-consciousness (a measure of the dispositional tendency to self-focus) and depression (Ingram & Smith, 1984; Smith & Greenberg, 1981; Smith, Ingram, & Roth, in press). Given that the two phenomena appear to be related, it becomes important to ask under what conditions Send reprint requests to Dr. Tom Pyszczynski, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27514. 95 0092-6X6/86 $3.00 Copyright 0 1986 by Academic Press, Inc. All rights of reproduction in any form reserved.

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do depressed individuals engage in high levels of self-focus. Interestingly, recent research suggests that the self-focusing preferences of depressed individuals may be very different from those of nondepressed individuals. Consistent with Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) theory of objective selfawareness, research has shown that after failure, when a negative discrepancy between a current state and a standard has been made salient, people tend to avoid self-focus-enhancing stimuli, such as mirrors or tape-recordings of their voices (e.g., Duval, Wicklund, & Fine, reported in Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Gibbons & Wicklund, 1976; Greenberg & Musham, 1981). We recently replicated this finding with a sample of nondepressed college students (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1985). The depressed subjects in the study, however, clearly did not show the typical pattern; in fact, they tended to prefer self-focus after failure over selffocus after success. The major purpose of the present study was to provide further evidence concerning the possibility that depressed persons avoid self-focus after success and seek self-focus after failure. If depressed persons do indeed have reversed preferences for selffocus after performance outcomes, it would suggest a simple but elegant framework for integrating a wide range of findings concerning the cognitive, motivational, and emotional characteristics of depressed persons. Previous research on the consequences of self-focus after success and failure indicates that self-focus generally intensifies the effects of such outcomes (see Carver & Scheier, 1981; Wicklund, 1975, for reviews). Thus, by avoiding self-focus after success, the depressed person is prevented from reaping the psychological benefits of the positive outcome. By increasing his/her level of self-focus after failure, the depressed person intensifies the aversive consequences of the negative outcome. More specifically, the depressive self-focusing style could help account for differences between depressed and nondepressed persons in self-esteem, attributions, affect, motivation, and performance. According to self-awareness theories (Carver, 1979; Carver & Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Wicklund, 1975), focusing attention on the self leads to the instigation of a self-evaluative process by which one’s present state on a currently salient dimension is compared with whatever standard for that dimension is most salient at the time. If one exceeds the standard, self-focus produces positive affect and a tendency to maintain the self-focused state. However, if one falls short of the standard, self-focus produces negative affect and either attempts at reducing the discrepancy or avoidance of the self-focused state. If depressed persons seek self-focus after failure and avoid self-focus after success, it follows that they should be especially critical of themselves after failure but relatively unaffected by success. This, of course, is consistent with both clinical observation and empirical research (e.g., Beck, 1967; Laxer, 1964; Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1985).

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Duval and Wicklund (1973) also suggested that self-focus may influence the attributions people make for their behavior and outcomes. When attention is focused on the self, the self becomes more salient as a locus of causality (cf. Taylor & Fiske, 1978). An increased tendency to make internal attributions under conditions of enhanced self-focus has been demonstrated by Duval and Wicklund (1973), Fenigstein and Levine (1984), and others. A depressive self-focusing style would thus be expected to increase the internality of depressed persons’ attributions for failures and decrease the internality of their attributions for successes. This, of course, is consistent with studies showing that, unlike their nondepressed counterparts, depressed persons do not exhibit a self-serving attributional bias (e.g., Kuiper, 1978; Rizley, 1978; Seligman, Abramson, Semmel, & Von Baeyer, 1979). Self-focused attention has also been shown to increase the intensity of emotional states (e.g., Scheier, 1976; Scheier & Carver, 1977; Scheier, Carver & Gibbons, 1981). Directing attention inward increases the salience of internal bodily changes and, consequently, increases both the subjective intensity and behavioral manifestation of emotional states. A depressive self-focusing style would thus be expected to increase the intensity of the negative affect experienced after failure and decrease the intensity of the positive affect experienced after success. Depression is, by definition, characterized by an overabundance of negative affect and a shortage of positive affect. A depressive self-focusing style may contribute to these tendencies. Finally, self-focus has important consequences for motivation and performance. According to Carver and Scheier’s (1981) self-regulatory model of self-awareness processes, self-focus amplifies the effect of outcome expectancies on subsequent performance. Research has shown that selffocus facilitates performance when outcomes expectancies are positive, but inhibits performance when outcome expectancies are negative (e.g., Brockner, 1979; Carver, Blaney, & Scheier, 1979; Scheier & Carver, 1982). Thus, if depressed persons tend to self-focus after failures, when expectancies for future outcomes are likely to be low, and not after successes, when expectancies for future outcomes might be more favorable, their motivation and performance would be expected to be especially low. Research has shown that depressed persons do, indeed, generally exhibit lower motivation and poorer performance than their nondepressed counterparts (see Miller, 1975, for a review). Clearly, then, the notion of a depressive self-focusing style provides an explanatory mechanism that offers insights into a broad range of depression-related phenomena. Unfortunately, the evidence available for such a reversal in self-focusing preferences is merely suggestive. In our initial study (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1985), depressed and nondepressed college students took a supposed test of verbal intelligence, consisting

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of either easily solvable or impossible anagrams, thus producing either success or failure. They were then taken to a second room and given 3 min to work on each of two sets of word puzzles, one of which was worked on in the presence of a mirror. Their preferences for the puzzles were then assessed by asking them to rate their relative liking for the two puzzles and which of the two they would choose, if given the opportunity, to work on for an additional 10 min. Significant depression x outcome interactions were found on both measures. While nondepressed subjects clearly liked the mirror-associated puzzle more after success than after failure, depressed subjects tended to like the mirror-associated puzzle more after failure than after success (p < . 10). In addition, compared to nondepressed subjects, depressed subjects liked the mirror-associated puzzle more after failure and were less likely to choose it after success. Although these findings suggested the possibility of a depressive selffocusing style, further evidence is needed because the tendency toward a reversal fell short of statistical significance. Subjects’ self-focusing preferences were assessed in the initial study via their verbal reports of liking for puzzles they worked on in the presence or absence of a mirror. Since which of the two puzzles was worked on in the presence of the mirror was counterbalanced, any differences in liking for the puzzles as a function of outcomes presumably reflects subjects’ affective reactions to the self-focused state brought on by the mirror.’ This was, admittedly, a rather indirect way of measuring subjects’ tendencies to seek and avoid self-focus. In the present study, a more direct, behavioral measure was employed. As in the initial study, one of the puzzles was positioned in front of a mirror so that subjects were confronted with their mirror images whenever they worked on it. The amount of time spent in front of the mirror during a free choice period, along with which of the two puzzles was initially chosen to work on, served as dependent measures. We predicted that, whereas nondepressed subjects would show the usual pattern of avoiding self-focusenhancing stimuli after failure, depressed subjects would show a unique self-focusing style, preferring mirror exposure after failure over mirror exposure after success. Given the design of our previous study, it was impossible to ascertain whether depressed persons avoid self-focus after success, seek self-focus after failure, or both. To shed light on this issue, a no-outcome control group was included in the present study. Another issue that we attempted to begin to address here was the relationship between mirror exposure and performance on the puzzles. To this end, subjects recorded their solutions to the puzzles on paper, and correlations between mirror exposure and performance were assessed. ’ For a review of evidence on the self-focus-enhancing properties of mirrors, see Carver and Scheier (1981).

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METHOD Subjects Subjects were selected on the basis of their scores on the Beck Depression Inventory (BDI; Beck, 1967), which was administered in several large lecture sections of introductory psychology. Individuals with BDI scores of four or less were classified as nondepressed, and individuals with BDI scores of eight or above were classified as depressed. Mean BDI score was 2.06 for subjects classified as nondepressed and 13.61 for subjects classified as depressed. From the initial pool, 28 males and 38 females participated in the experiment within 2 weeks of initial screenings. Depressed and nondepressed subjects were randomly assigned to experimental conditions in a 2 (depression: depressed vs nondepressed) x 3 (performance outcome: success vs no-outcome control vs failure) factorial design. The experiment was conducted in individual sessions with each subject, with the experimenter blind to subjects’ classifications on the depression variable.

Procedure The procedure was a modified version of that used by Pyszczynski and Greenberg (1985). Upon arriving at the laboratory, subjects were informed that the study was concerned with the verbal intellectual abilities of college students and that, as part of the study, they would take the “Thomdike Anagram Test” and later work on some sets of word puzzles. The Thomdike Anagram Test was, of course, bogus and was described as “one of the best tests of verbal intelligence available.” Performance outcome was manipulated by giving one-third of the subjects a set of 20 easily solvable four-letter anagrams and onethird a set of 20 difficult and impossible five-letter anagrams. The other third of the subjects, constituting the no-outcome control group, were not given the anagram test. For the success subjects, a uniformly high level of performance was guaranteed by employing a consistent pattern of letters for all 20 anagrams. For the failure subjects, 14 of the 20 anagrams were unsolvable. Upon completion of the test, the experimenter scored it and returned it to the subject, remarking in the success condition, “H’mm, it looks like you did very well. You got (x) correct. That’s one of the highest scores I’ve seen. The average score is about (x - 5) correct.” In the failure condition, the experimenter commented, “H’mm, it looks like you didn’t do very well. You got (x) correct. I guess you’re just not very good at this sort of thing. The average score is about (x + 5) correct.” The experimenter was blind to the outcome manipulation for success and failure subjects until she scored the tests. The experimenter then led the subject to a second room for the next part of the study. A “Mirror Image Study” sign was on the door, and the experimenter commented that she had to share this room with another researcher, due to a lack of space. The room was 4 x 3 m and contained two tables, with a puzzle set on top of each one, at opposite ends of the room. A large 60 x 50-cm mirror was located on the wall behind one of the tables and was positioned such that a person sitting in the chair at the table would be confronted with his/her mirror image. A sign which read “Please do not move” was taped above the mirror. The puzzle on each table was the adult game “Perquacky” (by Lakeside). It consisted of a set of lettered dice and a tumbler, and the subject’s task was to shake the dice and then form as many words as possible by combining the various letters yielded by the shake. Subjects were told that when they had formed as many words as the could, they should reshake the dice and start again. In order to obtain measures of performance, subjects were asked to write the words they formed on paper that was provided and to indicate each new shake of the dice by drawing a line to separate each group of words. In order to justfy the identical puzzle sets on the two tables, subjects were led to believe that each set contained a different distribution of letters. However, in order to provide an equal basis for evaluating performance, the two puzzle sets were, in fact, identical. After

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completion of a 3-min practice period with each puzzle, subjects were given 10 min to work on whichever puzzle set they chose. They were told that they could work on either set for as much or as little of the IO-min period as they chose and that they could move from one set to the other as often as they wished. To facilitate assessment of subjects’ tendencies to escape self-focus, they were seated at the table with the mirror at the beginning of the IO-min period; this assured some exposure to the mirror for all subjects. Whether they immediately moved to the other table and the amount of time spent working on the mirror-associated puzzle were taken as dependent measures of seeking/avoiding self-focus. Upon completion of the IO-min period, subjects were thoroughly debriefed.

RESULTS Self-focusing Preferences

The primary hypothesis was that, whereas nondepressed individuals avoid self-focus after failure and seek self-focus after success, depressed individuals show a unique self-focusing style in which they avoid selffocus after success and seek self-focus after failure. The proportion of subjects who initially chose the mirror-associated puzzle was subjected to a 2 (depression) x 3 (outcome) weighted least-squares (FUNCAT) analysis (Grizzle, Starmer, & Koch, 1%9). Only the predicted depression x outcome interaction emerged, x2(2> = 6.47, p < .05. Pairwise comparisons revealed that depressed success subjects were clearly less likely to initially choose the mirror-associated puzzle than were either depressed failure subjects, x2(1) = 7.43, p < .Ol, or nondepressed success subjects, x2(1) = 4.70, p < .OS. No other pairwise comparisons involving simple main effects approached significance. The proportion of subjects who initially chose the mirror-associated puzzle is displayed in Table 1. A 2 (depression) x 3 (outcome) ANOVA conducted on the amount of time spent in front of the mirror revealed a main effect of outcome, F(2, 64) = 3.05, p = .054, and the predicted depression x outcome interaction, F(2,64) = 2.98, p = .058. Relevant cell means are presented TABLE EXPOSURE TO THE MIRROR

AS

A FUNCTION

1

OF DEPRESSION AND PERFORMANCE

OUTCOME

Outcome Depressed

Nondepressed Success

N Initial choice” Mirror timeb

11 354 5.39

Control

Failure

10 .70 7.00

11 .45 5.37

Success 11 .18 2.01

Control 10 .50 5.08

Failure 12 .75 7.65

0 Values reflect the proportion of subjects who initially chose the mirror-associated puzzle. b Values reflect the number of minutes out of the IO-min period spent in front of the mirror.

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in Table 1. Planned pairwise comparisons* revealed that, as predicted, depressed success subjects clearly spent less time in front of the mirror than did depressed failure subjects, t(21) = 3.34, p < .OOl, and nondepressed success subjects, t(20) = 1.97, p < .05, thus replicating our earlier findings. Comparisons with the no-outcome control condition revealed that depressed success subjects spent less time in front of the mirror than depressed control subjects, t(19) = 1.74, p < .OS. Although the failure vs control comparison among depressed subjects was in the appropriate direction, it fell short of statistical significance, t(20) = 1.49, p > . 10. The amount of time spent in front of the mirror by nondepressed subjects, however, was not affected by their performance outcomes, all t’s < 1. Puzzle Performance

Performance on the puzzles was assessed by counting the total number of words, letters, and errors (mispelled or nonexistent words), and computing the average number of letters per word for each subject. Analysis of variance revealed main effects of depression, F(1, 64) = 8.98, p < .005, outcome, F(2, 64) = 5.98, p < .005, and a depression x outcome interaction, F(2,64) = 3.67, p < .05, on the number of errors committed. No other effects on performance were obtained. As may be seen in Table 2, depressed subjects made more errors than did nondepressed subjects (M’s = 1.67 vs 0.66). In addition, there was an overall trend for more errors to be made with poorer performance outcomes. Pairwise comparisons revealed, however, that whereas the performance of nondepressed subjects was not affected by outcome, all t’s < 1.02, depressed success subjects made less errors than either depressed control subjects, t(19) = 3.10, p < .Ol, or depressed failure subjects, t(21) = 4.13, p < .OOl. Depressed control and depressed failure subjects did not differ from each other. Looked at differently, depressed subjects made more errors than nondepressed subjects in the failure, t(21) = 2.82, p < .02, and control, t(18) = 2.83, p < .02, conditions, but not in the success condition. Thus, the success experience apparently mitigated the typical performance deficits that occurred for the depressives. TABLE ERRORS

DURING

PUZZLE

2 PERFORMANCE

Outcome

Depressed Nondepressed ’ Theoretically

derived directional

Success

Control

Failure

0.27 0.55

2.10 0.40

2.58 1.00

hypotheses were tested via one-tailed t tests

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TABLE CORRELATIONS

BETWEEN MIRROR

GREENBERG

3

EXFQSURE AND PUZZLE

PERFORMANCE

Performance measure Condition Depressed success Depressed control Depressed failure Nondepressed success Nondepressed control Nondepressed failure

Total words

Total letters

.17 .44 .08 .38 .09 .06

.13 .44 .ll .39 .08 .13

Total errors .69* -.18 - .53 - .32 - .26 - .33

Letters per word - .61* .22 .23 .17 - .21 .09

* p < .05.

The relationship between self-focusing tendencies and performance on the puzzles was assessed by computing within-cell correlation coefficients between the amount of time spent in front of the mirror and each of the performance measures. As may be seen in Table 3, exposure to the mirror had relatively little effect on performance, except among the depressed success and failure subjects. In the depressed success condition, longer exposure to the mirror was associated with more errors (r = .69, p < .02) and less letters per word being used (r = - .61, p < .05). In the depressed failure condition, longer exposure to the mirror was associated with less errors (r = .53, p < .OS). These findings are consistent with the possibility that self-focus after positive outcomes is discomforting to depressed individuals and thus impedes their performance and that self-focus after failure is anxiety reducing and thus facilitates their performance. DISCUSSION

These findings demonstrate that, unlike nondepressed persons, depressed persons prefer self-focus after failure over self-focus after success. Whereas our previous findings on a self-report measure of liking for a mirrorassociated puzzle (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1985) were merely suggestive of such a counterdefensive depressive self-focusing style, the present study’s behaviorial measure of mirror avoidance provides strong support for such tendencies. This is encouraging, since the behavioral measure is a more direct measure of the tendency to seek or avoid self-focus. Another improvement over the previous study was the inclusion of a no-outcome control group. This enabled us to assess whether the successfailure difference primarily reflects a tendency to seek self-focus after failure, avoid self-focus after success, or both. Although the pattern of means for depressed subjects suggests a linear trend, only the success vs control and success vs failure comparisons reached conventional levels

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of statistical significance. Thus, although we can conclude that depressed persons avoid self-focus after success, if the tendency to seek self-focus after failure exists, it appears to be considerably weaker. Although the findings for the depressed subjects were quite consistent with predictions, the findings for the nondepressed subjects were not. Unlike the nondepressed subjects in our prior study (Pyszczynski & Greenberg, 1985), who showed a definite preference for self-focus after success over self-focus after failure, the nondepressed subjects in the present study did not differ in their preferences for self-focus as a function of performance outcome. This inconsistency may have resulted from a difference in procedures between the two studies. In the present study, the puzzles were presented in a much more evaluative, performanceoriented manner than they were in the earlier study. Subjects recorded their solutions on paper and were given 10 min in which to work on them; in the prior study, subjects were given only a 3-min “practice period” with each puzzle and were never asked to record their puzzle solutions. Thus, the nondepresseed subjects in the present study may have viewed the puzzle task as a way to reduce the negative discrepancy created by the failure on the anagram test. Carver and Scheier (1981) have argued that efforts at self-standard discrepancy reduction, which necessarily include periods of self-focus, are the preferred responses after a failure unless the perceived probability of successful discrepancy reduction is low; only then will self-focus be avoided. Consistent with this reasoning, Steenbarger and Aderman (1979) found that self-focus is avoided after failure only when there is no readily available way of reducing the self-standard discrepancy created by the failure. Thus, if nondepressed subjects viewed the puzzles as a way to reduce the discrepancy created by their prior poor performance, they would not be expected to avoid self-focus. Before considering the general implications of the present findings, it is important to consider possible limits on generalizability due to our use of a subclinical student sample with a mean BDI score of 13.61. This sample was chosen because of its availability and because of the ethical problems inherent in creating a failure experience for more severely depressed individuals. Clearly, our results can be generalized with greater confidence to mildly and moderately depressed individuals than to severely depressed individuals. Caution may also be advised when applying these results to particular subcategories of depression. Further research on depressed individuals of a variety of types and levels of severity is needed to determine the precise range of applicability of these findings. However, clinical observations from a variety of sources are consistent with the general notion that depressed individuals dwell excessively on their failures, but resist reflecting on their successes (e.g., Arieti & Bemporad, 1978; Beck, 1967; Brown & Harris, 1978; Kanfer & Hagerman, 1981). The

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present research provides more rigorous empirical confirmation of these observations and a theoretical model and laboratory paradigm that can be used for further investigations of this phenomenon. Taken together, our two studies demonstrate that depressed persons avoid self-focus after success; although the hypothesis that depressed persons actually seek self-focus after failure was not strongly supported, further research on this possibility seems worthwhile. What is particularly intriguing about these findings is that they suggest an active attempt on the part of depressed individuals to undermine a positive self-image. The question arises, then, as to why depressed individuals manifest this unique and counterdefensive self-focusing style. Perhaps the simplest explanation is that depressed individuals are motivated to maintain a negative selfimage. Consistent with this possibility, a variety of theoretical perspectives suggest that a negative self-image serves a significant function for depressed persons. For example, Rothbaum, Weisz, and Snyder (1982) proposed that individuals attempt to accomodate themselves to their environments when the believe they cannot alter their environments to suit their wishes. Depressed individuals, who often feel helpless and hopeless, may thus try to exert a form of secondary control in which they strive to predict negative outcomes before they occur. By keeping their expectancies for future positive outcomes low, negative outcomes that do occur may become more tolerable (cf. Pyszczynski, 1982). Other theorists have proposed that a negative self-image helps depressed persons maintain a stable identity, justify dependence on others, and/or make sense out of their bleak positions in the world (e.g., Adler, 1924; Becker, 1962, 1973; Gaylin, 1968). Thus, a negative self-image may provide the depressed individual stability, security, and protection in a threatening, uncontrollable world (cf. Mollon & Parry, 1984). For a depressed person, considering the implications of success may threaten this relatively safe, unassailable negative self-image. Consequently, self-focus after success produces anxiety, uncertainty, and apprehension and thus, is largely avoided. The finding that, for depressed subjects, self-focus after success was associated with poor puzzle performance is consistent with this reasoning, because it suggests that depressed subjects who engaged in self-focus were hindered by anxiety and discomfort. In contrast, considering the implications of failure may help reinforce a negative self-image. Consequently, self-focus after failure may be less aversive and thus not avoided. It is interesting to note that the success condition was the only one in which depressed subjects avoided self-focus and did not make more errors than nondepressed subjects; this was also the only condition in which exposure to the mirror was negatively associated with performance on the puzzles (more errors, less letters per word). These findings suggest that success experiences can facilitate depressed persons’ performance,

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but only to the extent that such individuals do not engage in high levels of self-focus; depressed subjects who did not avoid the mirror after success performed worse than those who did. As discussed in the introduction, the self-awareness literature suggests that the self-focusing tendencies exhibited by depressed individuals may contribute greatly to their unfavorable self-attributions, low self-esteem, negative affect, and low motivation. Thus, it is highly likely that the depressive self-focusing style is maladaptive; indeed, it could be suggested that reversing these tendencies may be one way to alleviate some of the symptoms of depression. However, confidence in the value of such a strategy would be greatly enhanced by research directly demonstrating a causal influence of these self-focusing tendencies on other symptoms of depression. REFERENCES Adler, A. (1924). The practice and theory of individual psychology. London: Kegan Paul. Alloy, L. B. (1982). Depression and social comparison: IlIusory self or other perceptions. Paper presented at the Society for Experimental Social Psychology meeting, Nashville, TN, October 28-30. Arieti, S., & Bemporad, J. (1978). Severe and mild depression. New York: Basic Books. Beck, A. T. (1967). Depression: Clinical, experimental, and theoretical aspects. New York: Hoeber. Becker, E. (1962). The birth and death of meaning. New York: Free Press. Becker, E. (1973). The denial of death. New York: Free Press. Brockner, J. (1979). The effects of self-esteem, success-failure, and self-consciousness on task performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1732-1741. Brown, Ci. W., & Harris. (1978). Social origins of depression: A study of psychiatric disorder in women. New York: Free Press. Carver, C. (1979). A cybernetic model of self-attention processes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31, 1251-1281. Carver, C. S., Blaney, P. H., & Scheier, M. F. (1979). Reassertion and giving up: The interactive role of self-directed attention and outcome expectancy. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37, 1895-1870. Carver, C. S., & Scheier, M. F. (1981). Attention and self-regulation: A control-theory approach to human behavior. New York: Springer. Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. (1972). A theory of objective self-awareness. New York: Academic Press. Duval, S., & Wicklund, R. (1973). Effects of objective self-awareness on attributions of causality. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 9, 17-31. Fenigstein, A., & Levine, M. P. (1984). Self-attention, concept activation, and the causal self. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 20, 231-245. Ganellen, R., & Blaney, P. H. (1981, August). A cognitive model of depressive onset. Paper presented at symposium: New theoretical approaches to the psychology of depression. Los Angeles: Annual Convention of the American Psychological Association. Gaylin, W. (1968). The meaning of despair: Psychoanalytic contributions to the understanding of depression. New York: Science House. Gibbons, F. X., & Wicklund, R. (1976). Selective exposure to self. Journal of Research in Personality, 10, 98-106. Greenberg, J., & Musham, C. (1981). Avoiding and seeking self-focused attention. Journal of Research in Personality, 15, 191-200.

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