Examining new geographies of coal: Dissenting energyscapes in Colombia and Turkey

Applied Energy 224 (2018) 398–408

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Applied Energy journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/apenergy

Examining new geographies of coal: Dissenting energyscapes in Colombia and Turkey

T

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Andrea Cardosoa,b, , Ethemcan Turhanc Universidad del Magdalena, Carrera 32 No 22 – 08, Código Postal No. 470004, Santa Marta, Colombia Institut de Ciencia i Tecnologias Ambientals, Universitat Autónoma de Barcelona, Edifici Z, Carrer de les Columnes, E-08193 Bellaterra, Spain c Environmental Humanities Lab, Division of History of Science, Technology and Environment, KTH Royal Institute of Technology, 10044 Stockholm, Sweden a

b

H I GH L IG H T S

injustices underlie the new geographies of coal in South-South axis. • Energy provide a frame to explore connectivity in socio-political landscapes of coal. • Energyscapes analyze multiscalar spatial, material and discursive sides of Colombia-Turkey coal chain. • We energyscapes opens possibilities for a shift towards transnational energy democracy. • Connected • In-depth studies on networked social movements could inform democratic energy decisions.

A R T I C LE I N FO

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Coal Environmental conflicts Energyscapes Energy justice Colombia Turkey

Global energy geographies are changing, call it by will or by market forces. As coal production declines or consumption is phased out in parts of the Global North, the future of coal will likely be decided in the Global South. In this article, we explore energyscapes, as multiple and nested sites of connectivity over energy, and their relation to energy justice, environmental conflicts and social movements in new geographies of coal. By putting into question the reproduction of multiple levels of socio-environmental injustices related to coal’s extraction and consumption, we trace the emerging South-South coal links with an empirical focus on Colombia and Turkey. Coal extraction and consumption, respectively, in these geographically distant but increasingly connected countries are linked by multiscalar socio-ecological interactions and conflicts. After exploring these interactions, we examine the changing energyscapes of coal operating on different layers (the market, the physical, and the socio-environmental damages) between the two countries. Our analysis reveals that these new geographies are anchored in cross-scalar environmental injustices and democratic deficits, only sustained with topdown measures and emerging bilateral dependencies. The coming challenge for energy justice, therefore, is to link local communities' claims and democratization of energyscapes between the supply and the demand sides.

1. Introduction Despite a global trend of declining carbon intensity driven by economic restructuring and the rising share of non-hydrocarbon energy, the world still faces a bumpy ride in terms of undertaking rapid decarbonization required to stay within 'well below 2 °C' target of Paris Agreement while also ensuring access to affordable, reliable, sustainable and modern energy for all in line with UN SDG 7 [1]. This is a challenge that requires a breakneck speed transformation to widespread low-to-zero carbon energy, as well as a reduced global energy demand overall [2]. Notwithstanding the trend toward decarbonizing global energy systems, new carbon-intensive energy geographies are also ⁎

emerging. Particularly with the decline of “king coal” in China [3–4], new cross-scalar relations around the extraction, trade, and consumption of coal are being forged in the Global South, even as coal seems to be heading downhill in the Global North [5–6]. Similarly, although the establishment of Powering Past Coal Alliance in COP23, where more than a dozen OECD countries and other developing nations pledged coal phase-out, is promising, the fact that these countries barely account for 3% of global coal consumption is telling [7]. Then, the future of coal in the global energy mix will very likely be determined by extraction and consumption in the Global South coming attached with increasing locked-in emissions due to replacing old coal-fired power plants (CFPPs) in developed countries by new CFPPs in developing countries.

Corresponding author at: Universidad del Magdalena, Carrera 32 No 22 – 08, Código Postal No. 470004, Santa Marta, Colombia. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A. Cardoso), [email protected] (E. Turhan).

https://doi.org/10.1016/j.apenergy.2018.04.096 Received 30 September 2017; Received in revised form 23 March 2018; Accepted 28 April 2018 0306-2619/ © 2018 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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through all these dimensions is the importance of cross-scalar justice1, particularly given the interconnected nature of supply and demand patterns in energy trade [21]. Given this interconnectedness, a focus on multiscalar energy justice requires diverse expertise on spaces and values as well as respect for multiple epistemologies, both formal and non-formal [15]. Consequently, interconnected energy geographies are central to understanding and addressing existing energy justice dilemmas in which the global and national levels are the principal circuits [22]. Nevertheless, most political actions relating to energy, including resistance to climate and environmental injustice, take place at the local and/or national level [23]. That said, the recent research on ‘new geographies of energy’ [24–25] shows changing landscapes in the production and consumption of energy by combining the perspective of globalization processes operating at multiple scales by also taking into consideration the impacts of global environmental changes and responses to them [12,26]. Overall, it is useful to address the matter of energy justice within the framework of interconnected landscapes, since this helps draw attention both to the political economy of energy investments and to “the interaction of natural, technical, and cultural phenomena” in spatially and temporally connected geographical settings [27]. In line with this, we believe that rethinking extraction and consumption as deeply interwoven practices through uneven socio-environmental interactions across a variety of scales and new geographies is necessary [23]. In this article, we argue that a focus on the notion of ‘energyscapes’ as fluid and irregular yet connected socio-political landscapes providing connectivity across grievances and environmental struggles [28] can help to better depict relations that exist beyond the commodity chain. Our approach here is one that treats energyscapes as multiform, connected and relational landscapes [29], encompassing social, spatial, material and discursive relations which shape and are shaped by production, transportation and consumption of energy [30]. These energyscapes are based in the notion of scapes as “the inter-coupled nature and dynamics of social–ecological–technological systems, the socionatural changes and associated power relations” [31]. Consequently, they help us shed light on power and politics in energy relations not only at the geopolitical scale (as in typical North-South analysis) but also in “micro-politics and local scales of development on the ground” [32]. Yet we further assert that energyscapes, like carbonscapes [33], not only refer to uneven physical or material conditions characterized by “path-dependencies and ruptures” [32:6], but also create continuums of institutional political struggles against the undemocratic appropriation of social, cultural, and material spheres, thereby creating cross-scalar assemblages. These fragmented struggles are progressively connected through translocal climate justice solidarities [34] that act from, on, and in contested spaces, eventually constructing new spaces [35]. Both the Paris Agreement and tireless push from the global climate justice movement seems to have created a momentum to further document and analyze the forces driving coal production and consumption, including an attention to the global power structures that shape coal-related conflicts [36–37]. Climate change, with coal being its archenemy, becomes a violation of the basic human rights, not only because of the unevenness of climate impacts and the lack of compensation for loss and damage but also because it involves other forms of injustices such as a lack of recognition and participation in political decision-making [38–39]. Climate justice movements focus increasingly on keeping fossil fuels in the ground.2 We believe, such actions generate a pressing need to further document and understand the

Thus, despite the premature predictions on coal's endgame, the future trajectory of global coal markets seems to be 'moving East' albeit in a weak manner [8–9]. This future will be further shaped by the emerging trade relationships that are embedded in geopolitical and economic interests in South-South axes [10]. Notably, such axes include countries like India, South Africa, Colombia, Vietnam and Turkey, all of which have increased their coal trade in recent years [3,11]. In this paper, we specifically explore the imminent energy (in) justices through an empirical focus on the multiscalar relations between environmental conflicts and anti-coal movements in new geographies of coal. Subsequently, we call into question the reproduction of multiple levels of socio-environmental injustices related to the interconnectedness of extraction and consumption in these new geographies. By analytically mobilizing ‘energyscapes’, as complex spatial and temporal combinations of supply, demand, and imposed infrastructures within connected landscapes [12], we focus on two developing economies with distinct yet interconnected characteristics: Colombia and Turkey. Examining the emerging geographies of coal in-and-between Colombia and Turkey, we present a concrete example through which to understand energyscapes that interconnect on many levels, including through South-South development cooperation [13], in such a way as to obscure emergent socio-ecological inequalities. In what follows, we present the Colombian and Turkish cases as they operate at different layers (the market, the physical, and the socioenvironmental) and at multiple scales. Section 2 briefly revisits the emerging literature on energy justice and energy geographies. Then, in section 3, we present our double case study methodology. Section 4, explains the dynamics of the new geographies of coal across SouthSouth cooperation, pro-coal policies and energyscapes in both countries Colombia and Turkey. In section 5, we analyze the interaction of the multiple layers of this South-South coal chain and discuss the reproduction of energyscapes in both countries. Finally, we conclude by offering some insights into the democratization of energy on both the supply and the demand side. 2. Seeking justice in new energy geographies Exploring justice in the area of energy requires attention to the distributional, recognition, and procedural dimensions of energy decisions [14]. However, this in itself is not enough to capture the interconnectedness of energy injustices, which are often contested at the local level but have much wider implications [15]. Seeking energy justice across multiple territorial and locational disparities require as much of a spatial focus on demand side as well as the supply side [16]. Alternative approaches in tune with work in the field of political ecology emphasize the distributed character of energy decisions and how they reproduce power and shape broader political and societal outcomes [17]. Challenging such power also implies challenging different forms of societal domination over energy decisions via ‘disruptive’ changes in social, cultural, political, and economic spheres [18]. Energy justice, by its very definition, pays attention to the scale of the problem and to geographies of responsibility. As Jenkins et al. [19] demonstrate, energy justice is based on a powerful normative and analytical grounding that builds bridges between John Rawls’ (distribution, procedure) and Nancy Fraser’s (recognition) work on operationalizing justice over the entire lifecycle of energy. It provides us both with a normative and evaluative/analytical tool to mobilize in answering questions on “where, when, why and who is implicated in developing energy solutions, for both production and consumption” [19:2]. Operationalizing this notion, Sovacool [20] charts a ten-point conceptual framework encompassing availability, affordability, due process, transparency and accountability, sustainability, intragenerational equity, intergenerational equity, responsibility, resistance, and intersectionality. A key issue running

1 Within the scope of this article, we refer to cross-scalar justice as justice for humans and non-humans along the commodity chain across space and time. 2 As proposed since 1997 by Ogonization and Yasunization movements [40] and more recently by the global grassroots climate campaign https://350.org/ and by Naomi Klein with her notion of “Blockadia”[41].

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Fig. 1. Coal mining area in the Colombia Caribbean region (La Guajira and Cesar) and CFPPs projects in Zonguldak province, Turkey. Source: Authors, based on Colombian mining registry (July 2014) and [129].

environmental agency officials, the Colombian embassy deputy chief of mission, and lawyers working on CFPPs. We also paid utmost attention to have gender balance in our interviews in the field to get a fuller picture. To capture the complexity inherent in challenging the energyscapes we follow a whole-energy systems approach [45]. By concentrating on the elements, interconnections, and overall functions of energy investments, this approach allows us to take a broader view of the roots and the consequences of energy injustices beyond the local level. It also helps us to ground cosmopolitan justice concerns in the context of energy decisions, which bear consequences beyond the immediately visible actors and spaces [21].

effects of coal on global and local environments and to analyze the forces that drive coal production and consumption [36]. Therefore, any examination of the interactions between coal, climate, and development calls for not only a comparative perspective, but also a perspective of interconnectedness [42]. To this end, in order to emphasize the socio-political dimensions of this interconnectedness, this article will zoom in on Colombia, where 34% of its extracted steam coal is exported to Europe, and on Turkey, which accounts for 17% of coal purchases in Europe [43]. Turkey is the largest importer of Colombian hard coal. In 2016, 43% of the coal imported by Turkey came from Colombia [3,44]. 3. Methodology

4. New geographies of coal: Emerging South-South links

Positioned at the academic borderlands to produce relevant knowledge on energy-space-society continuum [25], this case study focuses on the emerging links between the extraction of coal in Colombia and its consumption in Turkey, as elaborated in Fig. 1. The Colombian case is based on fieldwork undertaken between January and March 2014, in the departments of Cesar and La Guajira. Thirty semistructured interviews were conducted with leaders of representative organizations and governmental institutions working in the coal mining sector, including miners, union representatives, community leaders, NGOs, and a panel of experts (medical doctors, geologists, and engineers). To trace the other end of this coal chain, we also conducted a total of eighteen semi-structured interviews in Istanbul, Ankara, Zonguldak, and Çatalağzı in Turkey in November 2015. Our respondents included energy company and trade mission representatives, anti-coal activists, national NGOs, local journalists, energy ministry officials,

In today’s climate-challenged world, coal is central to the debates around carbon modernity and its diametrical opposite, post-carbon society [46]. Nonetheless, interconnected social and spatial politics of coal have not so far received the same attention as other energy debates in the past decades (ibid). Despite the declining global production since 2014, most recent figures from [3] suggest that in 2016 global coal trade has been on the upward trend by being 21.7% above 2010 levels and almost double the amount it was in 2000. This has not always been the case. The history of modern steam coal trade only goes as much as four decades when it was triggered by the 1970s oil crises but accelerated in the past three decades [43,47]. Yet, it has been on the rise as long as the cost of bunker fuel compared to the value of transport is favorable. New geographies of coal are embedded in these trade 400

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authorities.4 In connection with this, we also found that Turkish energy companies developed a particular interest in investing in La Guajira. One well-known Turkish investment was a transaction between CCX (a subsidiary of Brazil’s EBX Group) and Turkey’s Yıldırım Holding, which in March 2014 signed a purchase agreement for US$125 million to acquire three coal mines in La Guajira. Having finally secured the deal in 2016, Yıldırım’s intention is to directly export the locally produced coal to its own 4000 MW CFPPs in Turkey [53].

relationships, increasingly more so between developing economies also called as South-South relations [48]. The dynamics of coal trade in South-South axis perpetuates and increase the environmental conflicts born from socio-environmental damages at each stage of the coal trade. Moreover, the democratic deficits understood as tensions that arise from the imbalance between the weakness of social movements and the governments’ strong pro-coal policies, make the South-South coal trade less transparent in terms of socio-ecological injustices, human rights violations, public health loss, and socio-environmental damages [10]. As the forth-major exporter of coal after Australia, Indonesia and Russia [3], Colombia provides, on one hand, an interesting case as a country whose relevance in global energy trade became more obvious from 1990s onwards [43:237]. On the other hand, Turkey’s increasing role in the energy markets as the eighth major coal importer and its geopolitical relevance as an east-west energy corridor are well-recognized [49]. Nonetheless, so far there are no studies delving on the recently emerging and rapidly expanding interdependence between these two distant countries. In what follows, we explore emerging energyscapes connecting Colombian coal mines to CFPPs in Turkey. The Colombia-Turkey coal trade is by no means the only interesting South-South coal relationship3, yet it is undeniably an important one with Turkey as the primary Colombian coal importer in the Europe/Mediterranean region with a national market predicted to grow to 80 million tons/year by 2025, equal to the sum of coal imported by the whole region in 2016 [43:11].

4.2. Development policies and the energy sector On the supply side, Colombia is an upper middle-income economy that is Latin America’s fourth largest overall [54]. Despite having been mired in half a century of internal war, over the past decade Colombia has seen a rapid increase in direct foreign investment, and since 2013 has begun the process of joining the OECD [55]. The country has also been hailed by some for its progressive position at UN climate negotiations [10], where it committed to reducing its greenhouse gas emissions by 20% by 2030, or even potentially by 30%, if international support is provided [56]. However, these intentions neither take into account CO2 emissions when the exported coal is consumed in the importing countries nor the ‘ambivalent nature’ of Colombian state’s climate action arguably “at odds […] with the material and social conditions” [57] of its people and territories. While most of the world’s 50 coal-producing countries use coal for domestic energy production, Colombia exports over 90% of its coal [44] (Fig. 2A). The country’s annual production of 85 million tons of hard coal corresponds roughly to 1.7% of global production in 2016 [58]. Measured coal reserves have been estimated at 6419 Mt, with potential reserves at 16,347 Mt; given the current rate of exploitation, this means that Colombia can continue to produce coal for another 100 years [44]. In 2015, just 7.5% of the electricity generated in Colombia came from coal, with 69.7% coming from hydropower [59]. National energy policy has focused on tilting the energy mix toward hydropower owing to its feasibilities (topographic features and climatic regime) and to foreign direct investment in the sector [60]. However, during the country’s recent electricity crisis caused by El Niño (October 2015–April 2016), thermal power plants based on coal, gas and diesel served to cover 47% of the electricity demand [61]. The government projection for 2050 outlines plans to diversify the electricity mix, with greater participation by renewable energies in addition to coal [59]. The Colombian government promotes coal mining arguing that it generates great revenues (taxes, royalties, and surface canon - annual license fee for exploration and exploitation) that contribute to national and local development [62–63]. The factors behind Colombia’s increasing coal exports are a combination of the boom in commodity prices and the respective governments’ neoliberal policies, which consider mining a “development locomotive” offering investment incentives to foreign firms [64]. In this context, the neoliberal Colombian mining code (Law 685/ 2001) put an end to state mining companies, limiting state participation to a regulatory role and favoring foreign investment [64–65]. Moreover, several multinational coal mining companies now benefit from tax exemptions and deductions. Rudas and Espitia [66] studied the Colombia state participation in coal mining income, comparing the royalties with the tax exemptions for the coal-mining sector. They found that mining tax exemptions and deductions ranged from 68% to 103% of the total coal mining royalties. Practically, the Colombian government has given away its royalties to multinationals [67]. Strambo et al. [68] found that both the government and coal mining companies use the economic development discourse to justify tax exceptions and other support structures that benefit coal mining activities. On the demand side, we see Turkey as an upper middle-income

4.1. Trade agreements and coal trade between Colombia and Turkey “Today we celebrate Turkey and Colombia growing closer, above and beyond mere geographical distance, and recognize that they are similar and complementary in many ways.” —Colombian President Juan Manuel Santos on a visit to Turkey [50] The South-South cooperation materialized in the creation of trade agreements among developing countries, based on the ideas of a common identity, equality and the defense of the sovereignty [13]. An example of such cooperation is the commercial links between Turkey and Latin America that have recently become a new horizon for strategic relationships [51]. As part of its diplomatic expansion in Latin America, Turkey opened an embassy in Bogota in 2010, while Colombia responded by opening an embassy in Ankara in 2011. This opening culminated in Colombia and Turkey free trade negotiations in 2011 during President Juan Manuel Santos’ visit to Turkey. Coinciding with the reciprocal visit of Turkish President Erdoğan to Colombia in February 2015, a number of bilateral agreements were signed, including cooperation agreements in the areas of energy and mining, defense, tourism and agriculture. Consequently, the Turkish Cooperation and Development Agency (Türk İşbirliği ve Koordinasyon İdaresi Başkanlığı, TİKA) decided to open its second regional office in Bogota, following the one previously opened in Mexico City. In addition, Turkish Airlines began direct flights between Istanbul and Bogota route in 2016. As a consequence, Colombia became Turkey’s second biggest trade partner in Latin America, with a trading volume of US $1.1 billion—a figure heavily dominated by the coal trade in a short timespan [52]. As the driver of this rapprochement, Colombian coal exports to Turkey has seen a rapid rise since the onset of new relations from 2011 (Fig. 2C). Coal export to Turkey increased by 468% from 2.71 million tons (Mt) in 2010 to 15.39 Mt in 2016 [44]. While Turkey increased its hard coal imports by 51% from 23 Mt in 2010 to 36.2 Mt in 2016 [3]. Turkey is a net energy importer, importing 75.9% of the country's energy, whereas Colombia is a net exporter, exporting the equivalent of 294% of the country's energy used (Fig. 2B). The Colombian embassy in Turkey has strong relations with the coal trade consultancies that facilitate business negotiations between the two countries, as well as with major importers and the Turkish

4 Interview with the Colombian embassy deputy head of mission in Ankara, Turkey (November 2015). Curiously enough, the deputy head of mission was previously a consultant active in trading or brokerage activities for coal and petroleum as well as being a project development consultant in mining and petroleum sectors.

3 A larger coal chain connects Indonesia to Japan, India and China, Australia to China and Japan and a slightly smaller one, South Africa to India.

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Fig. 2. Changing patterns of coal production in Colombia and coal consumption in Turkey. Source: [44,130–132].

strategy aims to use all domestic lignite and hard coal potential for energy generation purposes, while at the same time relying heavily on imported coal with high calorific value, such as the coal from Colombia, in order to ensure supply-side security (Fig. 2D). Furthermore, Turkey’s energy demand is estimated to double by 2023, with an approximate 90% increase in the primary energy demand [72–73]. On the face of such rapid transformation, Turkish government's notorious ‘coal rush’ framed as Milli Enerji6 is based on full utilization of domestic coal (both plentiful lignite and scarce hard coal), largely because of a budget account deficit and geopolitical tensions with Russia, a country on which Turkey has a very high level of hydrocarbon dependency [74–75]. This cannot be better demonstrated than in the

developing country with significant uneven geographical development, a turbulent (geo)political landscape, and mounting pressure on its ecosystems. Coal, along with natural gas, plays a significant role in the country’s production of electricity. In 2016, for example, coal accounted for 19.7% of the total electricity production with a 22% share in installed capacity [69]. Imported coal made up for 9.5% of this capacity, eventually doubling the number of CFPPs to run on imported coal from five to ten only in six years between 2010 and 2016 (ibid). Between 2004 and 2015, the installed capacity of CFPPs in Turkey increased by 77% [70]. Parallel to, and as a consequence of such moves in electricity generation, Turkey also saw a rise of 122% in greenhouse gas emissions between 1990 and 2015 [71]. Currently, Turkey ranks 4th in the world in terms of new CFPPs—after China, India, and Russia—with more than 49 projects in the pipeline almost tripling the current capacity.5 The country's energy

6 Milli Enerji (National Energy) is the rebranding of business-as-usual neoliberal energy policies under Erdoğan government's tripartite economic policy relying on expansion of construction, energy and defense sectors. A key component of this policy is the rhetoric on domestic coal revival, presented in a video aptly titled “Our coal, our energy”. Nonetheless, existing data shows that coal imports accelerated and reached more than three-folds since Erdoğan's coming into power in 2002. See the video: https://aa.com.tr/ tr/vg/video-galeri/enerji-ve-tabii-kaynaklar-bakanligindan-yerli-komur-videosu6.

5 44 CFPPs projects with 44.2 GW capacity is being considered while 5 projects with 4.5 GW are already announced. This amounts to 2.75-fold increase from Turkey’s present day installed capacity for CFPPs. (Personal communication with Climate Action Network, January 2018)

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[86] and 1.33% of the National GDP in 2016 [87]. Coal mining extractions in La Guajira began more than 30 years ago, at Cerrejón, whose open-pit coal mine covers 69,000 ha, making it one of the ten largest open-pit mines in the world [88]. In 2000, the Colombian government sold its shares of Cerrejón to three transnational corporations—BHP Billiton, Glencore, and Anglo American—and currently the mine accounts for 47% of Colombia’s total coal exports [44]. The coal from Cerrejón travels 150 km by train to reach the port of Bolívar, with both the railway and the port entirely owned by mine operators. Environmental grievances by the local communities on this railway line is merely seen as a “logistics threat” by the coal sector, whose fears came true in 2013 when the court briefly suspended coal train operations [40:239]. Being among the top three coal producers in Colombia, Cerrejón is the coal company that provides the most coal to Turkish companies [44]. During the period 2004–2015, more than 66 million tons of Colombian coal was exported to Turkey, 98% of which was exported by Cerrejón [44]. This was mainly due to the fact that it was apparently the only Colombian producer capable of shipping coal that could satisfy Turkey’s restrictions regarding volatile matter.10 However, in 2014, the Turkish Ministry of the Environment and Urbanization increased the limit on the volatile matter of imported coal from 40% to 43% air dried basis, thereby enabling other major mining companies operating in Colombia to also become eligible to export to Turkey [90]. In 2015, Cerrejón sold more than 3Mt coal to Eren Holding, a business conglomerate with major investments in Çatalağzı which we explore below.11 Aviva Chomsky [91] notes that there is a surprising invisibility around Cerrejón coal production, which not only acts as a ‘spatial fix of empire’ in ecological outsourcing costs but also enables selective amnesia regarding the region’s landscape and people, due to the severe socio-environmental and health impacts. Various studies [10,88,92–94] have documented the human rights violations occurring at the coal mines of La Guajira. These studies report that the social and environmental conditions at coal mines often fail to meet international standards for the protection of workers, communities, and the environment [93]. They also indicate that, in order to weaken the protests, resistance against coal extraction has been criminalized [92]. Structural violence, both physical and political, has managed to silence local critical voices, preventing them from further denouncing the human, social, and environmental consequences of mining [88]. Even with the level of oppression, the various impacts of the Cerrejón mining activities in La Guajira—such as air, soil, and water pollution; cultural uprooting; health problems; and violations of the right to food and the right to a healthy environment—have been denounced by the local communities including indigenous peoples, AfroColombian communities, and peasant farmers. Their objection to these mining activities is linked mainly to dispossession [95] and appropriation of communal water sources [96], which have led to local communities losing their health and livelihood, not to mention their identity and territorial rights [97]. For instance, the affected Afro-Colombian and indigenous communities came together in a large protest on 7–9 August 2014 to host a popular tribunal in La Guajira against aggression by the mine in their territory [88]. As part of this event, they visited sacred Afro-Colombian and indigenous sites and performed autonomous consultation voting. Representatives of national and international NGOs and human rights organizations also attended the event as observers and as jury members on the tribunal [98]. The verdict found Cerrejón guilty of violating community and labor rights. It also found the Colombian state complicit by omission, declaring that

words of President Erdoğan, who referred to anti-coal groups in the following manner: “Do not listen to them. We need to do whatever is needed […] [Turkey has] local coal reserves. Rather than using, for example, five-units of imported coal [we] can use 10-units of local reserves, thus pushing down the current account deficit. This step must be taken” [76]. Yet in spite of such rhetoric, 95% of the fuel used by the CFPPs built in Turkey over the last five years has, in fact, been imported [77]. Indeed, when he was asked whether the company would consider investing in domestic coal in Turkey, CEO of Yıldırım Enerji responded as follows: “Export power of Turkish coal is low and it is costly. While we produce for 3.5 USD cents [in Colombia], domestic coal costs 6 USD cents. […] The state needs to incentivize us and provide financial resources. Turkish Hard Coal Institution should back us up. We will produce in Colombia but we are able to bring it to Turkey. “Make it local” jargon turned into show business. Obviously, we are not against investing in local resources but after all, there is an energy deficit. […] We need to make our energy [system] independent. For this, we need to invest globally]”[78] Despite the populist, nationalist rhetoric of Milli Enerji, a recent case of tax and import duty exemptions7 provided to a 1334 MW coal-fired power plant with Chinese investor to run on coal imported from Colombia, South Africa, USA and New Zealand is self-explanatory.8 Obviously, this shift does not occur in a vacuum. A report by Deloitte [79] argues that “[u]ncertainties related to natural gas power plants and unexpected delays in lignite projects lead investors to hard coal as a relatively more eligible and cheaper energy source.” Although one of the main challenges is the country’s current account deficit arising from skyrocketing energy imports [80], the new energy policy after geopolitical reshuffling focuses on diversifying the sources of imports while also pushing for more lignite. Within this context, Colombian coal appears to the private sector and the Turkish government as a good substitute (Fig. 2D and F). Moreover, an amendment to the Electricity Market Law enacted on 4 June 2016 brought substantial changes to electricity production in Turkey, granting ‘environmental immunity’ by way of exemption to domestic lignite-powered plants through 2020, in addition to exempting state-owned CFPPs privatized before 2018 from environmental legislation [81]. In a recent attempt to address the budget deficit, the Turkish government benefited from an ongoing state of emergency declared after the failed coup d’état of July 15, 2016, by imposing an import duty of 15 USD/ton on coal imported for power generation through August 20169 [64]. Hence, while these legislative changes might be read as a counterattack on energy imports, in fact Turkey’s thermal coal imports in 2015 increased by 6.5% annually with a 29.5% jump in March year-on-year [82]. Leading the imported coal market in Turkey since 2014, Colombia accounted for 3.6% of all energy consumed in the country in 2013, in 2016 this figure soared to 8.9% [83]. To be precise, Turkey received 32.98 million tons of thermal coal with Colombian coal dominating 51.4% of its imports in 2017 [84]. This, undoubtedly, has consequences for people and spaces on both ends of the coal continuum. 4.3. Converging energyscapes between Colombia and Turkey “Colombia is set to cash in on a surge of coal-fired power generation in Turkey expected for much of this decade” comments a seasoned energy analyst in a recent analysis [85]. The coal exported by Colombia comes mainly from the departments of La Guajira and Cesar (see Fig. 1), where coal production represents 42% and 52% of local GDP, respectively 7 Ministry of Economy of Republic of Turkey, Investment Incentive Documents Issued between 01.01.2016 and 31.12.2016, http://bit.ly/2D6M27d7. 8 Adana Metropolitan Municipality, Investment of Chinese Capital in Adana is Pleasing, 12 October 2016, http://bit.ly/2Fpkn348. 9 The price of Colombian coal in August 2016 was 57.85 USD/ton. As of January 2018, the price stands at 86.38 USD/ton. The import duty fraction has been oscillated between 17% and 26% of the Colombian coal price.

10 Volatile matter in coal refers to the coal components release, except for moisture, at high temperature in the absence of air. Coal combustion releases methane, oxides of nitrogen, oxides of sulfur, mercury and others [89]. 11 Interview with Eren Holding official (November 2015).

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region, estimated to be of the same capacity. Eren facilitated its permit processes by legitimizing the use of local coal, yet it also obtained permits to construct a nearby coal port, which not only serves the company itself, but also enables it to sell Colombian coal to other companies [104]. Çatalağzı and Zonguldak province currently produce 7% of Turkey’s electricity, and once current investments have been realized, this figure is estimated to go up to 10% [105]. Despite the recent political push on the companies by the Turkish government to turn towards use of local hard coal in the region [106], declining hard coal yields and existing infrastructures fit for burning high-calorific imported coal in the region suggest a lock-in. However, all these investments in Çatalağzı face serious opposition from local residents, most of whom are either former employees of the nearby coal mines or workers retired from the formerly state-owned CFPP. Together with national environmental groups, local community activists are denouncing the socio-environmental impacts of the CFPPs, impacts that include unemployment, respiratory diseases, increasing risk factors for childhood asthma [107], the appearance of cancers due to the radioactivity of coal and ash [108], a loss of traditional crops due to acid rain, and an increase in the surface temperature of the region [109]. Furthermore, the failure of Eren Holding to comply with EIA commitments, as well as the failure of the government to require and enforce pollution controls, exacerbated local resistance [110]. Given this context, it is perhaps not surprising that no cumulative impact assessments have ever been performed in relation to the planned development of multiple CFPPs in Çatalağzı [111]. The sidelining of the dissent in Çatalağzı is also linked to intimidation of local politicians, as an influential activist explained as follows:

the state had shirked its responsibility to protect, respect, and guarantee the communities’ rights.12 In 2012, the coal resistance came to national attention when Cerrejón began a project to divert the Ranchería River, announcing that 500 Mt of coal under the river would generate royalty income for the local community. In La Guajira, a very dry region, many local organizations came together as part of a “La Guajira Dignity Group” organized to resist the diversion of the river. This group stated that not only had they seen no royalty income invested in their territory over the previous 30 years of coal exploitation, but also that the diversion of the river would undermine local communities’ ability to survive [99]. In fact, La Guajira already ranks third in terms of poverty in Colombia, with 65% of its population lacking basic needs [100]. Even though the local communities – with the support of national and international allies – ultimately won the legal battle to halt the diversion of the river, Cerrejón is now attempting to divert the river stream by stream, thereby creating new landscapes and triggering further social resistance. The leader of the La Guajira Dignity Group responded to these new attempts with the following statement, issued in June 2016: “The government cannot continue granting mining titles here, and Cerrejón cannot come every two years and say “We are planning to divert this stream, and tomorrow another, and so on.” We have to limit this expansion because this is a desertified region and has a limited water supply. Cerrejón cannot continue diverting streams to increase profits; in order to achieve 70Mt, they will end up destroying everything, even all of us.” The picture is not so different at the other end of this coal chain. Over 100 new CFPPs are planned in southeastern Europe, of which around 49 are estimated to be in Turkey [101]. Among the CFPPs in Turkey that burn Colombian coal, a prime example is ZETES (Zonguldak Eren Termik Santrali; Zonguldak Eren Thermal Plant) in Çatalağzı (see Fig. 1), which has an installed capacity of 1390 MW. There is broad opposition in the region, with local coal mining communities opposed to the coal imports and other local groups campaigning against new CFPPs [102]. The region, however, is no stranger to 'black diamond'. The first coal mine in Zonguldak opened in 1848, marking a turning point in the history of this coastal town. In 1896, a concession was granted allowing private French, Italian, and Turkish companies to mine in the local basin [103]. A significant portion of this coal was destined for consumption abroad (see Fig. 3). In 1940, the government nationalized Zonguldak’s mines, with the state coal company henceforth becoming a major provider of infrastructure investments, including social, cultural, and even municipal services. This led to the establishment of the first state-owned CFPP in the region in 1948, which started at a capacity of 86 MW and gradually grew to reach 300 MW by the time of its privatization in 2014 [102]. With the liberalization of the Turkish mining and energy markets in the aftermath of the 2001 economic crisis, along with low yields of coal in the region, the primary economic strategy in Zonguldak started to shift from coal production to the consumption of imported coal. This is vividly captured in the words of an anti-coal activist in Çatalağzı, who himself has worked in the CFPP for 30 years: “They would like to transform Zonguldak from a city of labor to a city of pensioners”.13 The Turkish government has explicitly declared its intention to create an ‘energy hub’ on the western Black Sea coast, which has made it significantly easier for major energy companies like Eren Holding to obtain permits. In addition to its existing 1390 MW installed capacity, the company was also granted the license for ZETES-3, which is under construction and will have an installed power capacity of 1400 MW (2 × 700 MW). The company has also applied for its fourth plant in the

“Four of us, all women, we went to the villages and distributed our brochures. We explained that they shouldn’t agree, they shouldn’t believe in the promises of employment. Coincidentally, there was the public meeting with the mayor that day, in which he let us speak freely. But later, when I went to those villages again I discovered that the Party14 warned the mayors that they shouldn’t attend to the public meetings [on CFPPs]. There is an intimidation policy, too. (Local activist, 17 November 2015) One especially large protest took place in Çatalağzı in November 2015, when Turkey hosted the G20 summit. Local groups, with the support of national NGOs with international connections, seized the moment to reveal politically and economically incentivized coal imports by calling out to the G20 countries. This new step in the history of local resistance also marked a new stage in addressing energy injustices on a transnational scale. Local struggles in Çatalağzı arguably moved beyond the concerns about local pollution and public health, but now also aim to establish cross-scalar connections between Colombia and Turkey, thereby linking their struggles with broader climate justice debates [112]. 5. Discussion There are economic and political powers that reproduce coal energy injustices and are spread across all the relevant steps in what Bridge [113] refers to as a ‘hydrocarbon commodity chain’. Coal chains start with extraction, commodification, refining, and transportation, and at the destination encounter de-commodification through consumption, dissociation, and disposal [113]. These steps, however, are not manifested solely in the market and material spheres, nor do they occur exclusively between a periphery and a core. Indeed, we argue that they occur in “enclosures, sociospatial ordering, and the shaping of subjectivities” [114]. Thus, by their very nature, environmental conflicts and resistance in La Guajira and Zonguldak are linked by the coal trade between the two countries. Where Wilde-Ramsing and Steinweg [93]

12 The judgment of the popular tribunal against Cerrejón can be read at http://www. colectivodeabogados.org/?Sentencia-Tribunal-Etico-y-Politico-Agresion-Minera-en-LaGuajira (Accessed September 29, 2017). 13 Zonguldak'ı emek şehrinden emekli şehrine çevirmeye çalışıyorlar.“ (Local activist, 16 November 2015)

14

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Erdoğan's AKP, Justice and Development Party.

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Fig. 3. Export figures for Turkish coal in 1934. Italy, Greece, Egypt, France and British Mandate of Palestine appear as primary importers.. Source: MTA, http://dergipark.gov.tr/download/article-file/110126

Fig. 4. The three layers of the coal trade between Colombia and Turkey. Source: Adapted from [93,116].

envisioned the coal chain as two layers—the market and the physical—we add a third layer; namely, “the socio-environmental damages” caused by the coal trade between Colombia and Turkey (Fig. 4).

There are at least three ways through which these energyscapes are connected. First, while the dynamics of the South-South coal trade laden in silenced environmental dissent and overt government support 405

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the post-carbon development concerns of residents exposed to CFPPs (for a research agenda, see also [128]).

facilitate the processes for extraction and consumption, they also help to shirk responsibility for socio-environmental damages [92]. Yet, there are also apertures allowing linkage between these countries’ socio-environmental movements. As Brown and Spiegel [37] underline, translocal anti-coal solidarities “draw our attention to the myriad ways in which coal is imagined, experienced, and enmeshed within complex assemblages”. Particularly involvement of networked national and transnational civil society actors increase the chances of success for environmental justice in these energyscapes [115]. Secondly, coal dust dispersion, air pollution, public health loss, and climate change are the critical socio-environmental damages present throughout the trade in all the scales. Nevertheless, it is local communities that bear the heaviest social and environmental costs [116]. In the case of La Guajira, these are the indigenous and Afro-Colombian communities [117], while in Çatalağzı, it is the working-class communities living around the CFPPs that are most affected. On top of these, coal energyscapes unevenly contribute to climate change, typically affecting the most vulnerable [118]. Under fossil fuelled capitalism, as Harrison and Popke remind us, “spatial arrangements […] provide the means to challenge the structures, discourses and assemblages that sustain relations of power and inequality” [119]. Then again, these grievances can provide leverage for dissent across energyscapes. As a third point, the interconnectedness of coal in the Global South should not be viewed only in terms of its impacts on environmental and climate justice, but also as both a consequence and a trigger of combined, uneven development processes [13,22]. Coal's robustness vis-à-vis the contradictions of neoliberalism is predicated “on state intervention to sustain [coal] industry in the face of crisis and failures” [120]. Our analysis shows that transformations in the Colombia-Turkey coal trade are heavily influenced by the political and economic power of both governments as well as by multinationals’ interests. On the one hand, Turkey’s main interest is to diversify the electricity mix, owing to its dependence on gas imports from Russia. On the other hand, the trade agreements between the two parties benefit the privileged multinationals in Colombia, with few royalties for the local communities from coal exports. Our analysis reveals that the new geographies of coal are anchored in connected environmental and energy injustices exacerbated by local democratic deficits that call into question the very legitimacy of energy decision-making processes [121]. Yet even so, an overarching energy justice agenda across connected energyscapes opens possibilities for a transnational energy democracy agenda to be advanced. In this way, as Jenkins [122] argues for the normative and analytical capacities of energy justice, we contend that energy justice can only be achieved with political power when mobilized in tandem with ‘the activist past’ and ‘networked’ character of environmental and climate justice movements. Despite the local opposition to CFPPs in Turkey on the grounds of environmental justice and to coal mining in Colombia mostly on the grounds of human rights violations, no explicit international network linking the energyscape between these two countries has yet emerged. We see this as an opportunity to connect the multiscalar energy justice claims (see [123]). Further social science inquiry into interconnected energyscapes could come to inform democratic energy decisions by identifying the diverse needs of different social groups, by enabling the democratic exercise of social agency, and by more effectively addressing inherent conflicts [124]. Such an approach can also be instrumental in identifying barriers to success [125] and in proposing alternative modes of public participation in energyscapes [126]. This also calls into attention potential and imminent translocal solidarities among and between environmental and labor movements in two countries brought together through energyscapes of coal [127]. The growing interest of climate justice groups in the connectedness of energyscapes could potentially build alliances across these countries such as Beyond Coal Europe movement15, notably through reconciling just transition concerns for coal miners with

15

6. Conclusion In this paper, we have attempted to analyze the justice dimensions of new geographies of coal through the example of the coal trade between Colombia and Turkey, with our aim being to demonstrate how this trade shapes cross-scalar environmental conflicts and produces energyscapes. Our analysis reveals that these energyscapes are anchored in socio-ecological injustices associated with mining and coal consumption, as well as in the profound tensions between public health, economic gain, and political power in these two increasingly linked countries in the Global South. The layers and scales of the coal trade demonstrate how spatial organization and political power regimes contribute to the emergence of these energyscapes. Due to the changing nature of South-South relations, dissident voices face marginalization or even outright repression together with bilateral development aid serving to create consent. However, Colombia and Turkey’s emergent anticoal movements, are increasingly successful in exposing the impact of coal and multiscalar injustices across these energyscapes. Overall, our analysis shows that the new geographies of coal foster an interaction that shapes South-South relations, allowing for a fuller understanding of energy justice at multiple scales. Future research on such SouthSouth energyscapes could potentially assess the networked actions and strategies of environmental justice organizations along the coal chain. Acknowledgments We are grateful to Joan Martinez-Alier for his invaluable guidance and support; to the post-extractivismo group in Barcelona for their helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts; to Barış Sanlı for bringing the historical graph in Fig. 3 into our attention. Andrea Cardoso wishes to acknowledge the support of Colciencias (Convocatoria 529-2011), Universidad del Magdalena and EnvJustice project (GrantNo. 695446). Ethemcan Turhan would like to thank Katip ÇelebiNewton Fund for a visiting period in Durham University as well as Acknowl-EJ project funded by ISSC and Sida. We thank the editors and three anonymous reviewers for their constructive engagement as well as Tamra Gilbertson and Michael Sheridan for their support in language editing. Needless to say, all shortcomings are ours. References [1] Spangenberg JH, Settele J. Precisely incorrect? Monetising the value of ecosystem services. Ecol Complex 2010;7:327–37. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.ecocom.2010. 04.007. [2] van Vuuren DP, van Soest H, Riahi K, Clarke L, Krey V, Kriegler E, et al. Carbon budgets and energy transition pathways. Environ Res Lett 2016;11:75002. http:// dx.doi.org/10.1088/1748-9326/11/7/075002. [3] IEA-International Energy Agency. Coal information; 2017. [4] Wang Q, Li R. Decline in China’s coal consumption: an evidence of peak coal or a temporary blip? Energy Policy 2017;108:696–701. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j. enpol.2017.06.041. [5] Greenpeace. Coal’s terminal decline; 2015. < https://www.greenpeace.org/ archive-international/Global/international/briefings/climate/COP21/Coalsdecline-report-PRESS-new.pdf > [accessed March 7, 2018]. [6] IEEFA-Institute for Energy Economics and Financial Analysis. Carpe Diem: eight signs that now is the time to invest in the global energy market transformation; 2015. < http://ieefa.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/Carpe-Diem-Report. pdf > [accessed March 7, 2018]. [7] Plumer B, Popovich N. 19 Countries vowed to phase out coal. New York Times: But They Don’t Use Much Coal; 2017 https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2017/11/ 16/climate/alliance-phase-out-coal.html > [accessed March 7, 2018]. [8] Liu B, Geman H. World coal markets: Still weakly integrated and moving east. J Commod Mark 2017;5:63–76. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.jcomm.2017.02.002. [9] Edenhofer O, Steckel J-C, Jakob M, Bertram C. Reports of coal’s terminal decline may be exaggerated. Environ Res Lett 2018;13. doi:10.1088/1748-9326/aaa3a2. [10] AbdelGawad N, Bustos C, Gomez K, Ismail F, Kaufman E, Kaur H, et al. Digging deeper: the human rights impacts of coal in the global south. Center for Law, justice and Society (Dejusticia) & Business and Human rights Resource Centre; 2015. [11] Oei P-Y, Mendelevitch R. Prospects for steam coal exporters in the era of climate policies: a case study of Colombia. Clim Policy 2018:1–19. http://dx.doi.org/10.

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