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Journal of Safety Research 68 (2019) 187–196
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Applicability of accident analysis methods to Chinese construction accidents Jiangshi Zhang, a,⁎ Wenyue Zhang, a Peihui Xu, a Na Chen b a b
School of Resources and Safety Engineering, China University of Mining and Technology, D11, Xueyuan Road, Haidian District, Beijing 100083, China School of Mechanics and Engineering Science, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, 100 Science Avenue, Zhengzhou City, China
a r t i c l e
i n f o
Article history: Received 27 March 2018 Received in revised form 27 August 2018 Accepted 29 November 2018 Available online 2 January 2019 Keywords: Chinese construction accidents Accident causation models Accident analysis Applicability
a b s t r a c t Introduction: It is necessary to clearly understand construction accidents for preventing a rise in Chinese construction accidents and deaths. Better analysis methods are required for Chinese construction sector accidents. Methods: Choosing and analyzing a typical construction accident based on four popular contemporary accident causation models: STAMP, AcciMap, HFACS, and the 2-4 Model. Then we evaluated the models' applicability to construction accidents, including their usability, reliability, and validity. Results: STAMP addressed how complexity within the accident system influenced the accident development, and its output makes the responsibilities clearer for the accident. AcciMap described the entire system's failure, the entire accident's trajectory, and the relationship between them. AcciMap showed that the accident was a dynamic developing process, and this method has a high usability. The taxonomic nature of HFACS is an important feature that provides it with a high reliability. In the accident reviewed here, we found that poor management was a critical factor rather than the individual factor in the accident. The 2-4 Model provided detailed causes of the accident and established the relationship among the accident causes, the safety management system, and the safety culture. It also avoided capturing all of the complexity in the large sociotechnical system and revealed a dynamic analysis and developing process. We confirmed that it has a high usability and validity. Therefore, the 2-4Model is recommended for future Chinese construction accident analysis efforts. Practical Applications: The study provides a useful, reliable, and effective analysis method for Chinese construction accidents. © 2018 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction 1.1. Background In China, construction is a high-risk industry. Since 2012, the number of deaths in the construction sector has surpassed that of coal mines, ranking first out of all the industrial production sectors in China (Chen, Zhao, Tian, & Li, 2013). Compared to other industries, the construction industry has poor working environments, a complex situation, high labor turnover rate, lack of safety management, poor educational standards, and poorly trained workers (Hu, 2017). The statistics released by the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development of the People's Republic of China (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of the People, 2017) about the numbers of construction accidents from 2004 to 2016 are shown in Fig. 1. During the first nine years shown in the figure, the number of accidents declined because the Chinese government formulated some policies in 2004; one particularly important policy, “Regulations on Safety Production Management of Construction Projects,” was initiated in February, 2014. However, in the ⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (J. Zhang), [email protected] (N. Chen).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsr.2018.11.006 0022-4375/© 2018 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
last three years of the graph, the number of accidents has shown little decrease, which is still higher than that of many developed countries. In 2016, there were 634 accidents, which is similar to the number from 2010. Correspondingly, the death toll in the construction sector shows the same trend (Fig. 2). Therefore, the feasibility condition must be improved. In order to prevent a rise in construction accidents and deaths, it is necessary to clearly understand construction accidents. 1.2. Literature review There are some accident causation models that are widely used, such as Reason's (1990) omnipresent Swiss Cheese model, which uses the layers and holes in Swiss cheese to represent the defenses within a system and their associated inadequacies(Lawton & Ward, 2005); Rasmussen's (1997) risk management framework, which makes a series of predictions in relation to the performance and safety in complex sociotechnical systems(Johnson & de Almeida, 2008; Cassano-Piche, Vicente, & Jamieson, 2009; Salmon, Williamson, Lenne, Mitsopoulos, & Rudin-Brown, 2010; Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002); Rasmussen (1997), named after his risk management framework, which was developed as a means of graphically representing factors from different system levels that contribute to accidents(Kontogiannis, 2012; Margaret,
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Paul, & Michael, 2014); the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), which is a theory-based tool for investigating and analyzing human error associated with accidents and incidents(Daramola, 2014); Leveson's (2004) Systems Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes model (STAMP), which considers technical (including hardware and software), human, and organizational factors in complex sociotechnical systems(Ouyang, Hong, Yu, & Fei, 2010); and the 2-4 Model (2005), proposed by Fu, which builds a circuit from the idea that one-time behavior comes from habitual behavior, and habitual behavior comes from the organizational safety management system, which is led by the safety culture(Fu, 2013; Fu, Yang, Yin, & Dong, 2014).
1.2.1. STAMP methodology Professor Leveson first used STAMP to analyze the accident that occurred on the American Challenger space shuttle. It views systems as hierarchical structures with multiple control levels. Each level in the hierarchy imposes constraints on the activity of the level beneath it, and the events leading to losses only occur when the safety constraints are not successfully enforced or the constraints have been violated (Leveson, 2011). It describes various forms of control, including managerial, organizational, physical, operational, and manufacturing-based controls. The STAMP taxonomy, along with a generic sociotechnical system control structure, is presented in Fig. 3. Samadi used STAMP in a general programmatic risk analysis for CO2 capture, transport, and storage (Samadi, 2012). Georges used it to analyze the risk of quality loss in complex system design (Goerges, 2013).
The STAMP process provides the framework for the structured leading indicator identification process. The functional safety control structure is designed with the safety responsibilities identified for each component and these control responsibilities are traceable to the system safety constraints (Leveson, 2015). However, it is difficult to obtain the extensive data associated with the overall system required for a thorough and in-depth analysis. The recommendations generated in the analysis may also be difficult to carry out substantially and in a timely manner (Kim, Nazir, & Øvergård, 2016).
1.2.2. AcciMap methodology AcciMap is a system method based on the control theory. Rasmussen believed that the accident is the result of losing control to potentially harmful physical processes, and each organizational level in the system affects the control of these hazards (Rasmussen, 1997). AcciMap was developed from analyzing a series of interaction events and the decision-making process, which are beyond control in the system. This method of analysis typically focuses on the failures across the following six organizational levels: government policy and budgeting; regulatory bodies and associations; local area government planning and budgeting (including company management); technical and operational management; physical processes and actor activities; and equipment and surroundings (Salmon, Cornelissen, & Trotter, 2012). The AcciMap method is presented in Fig. 4. This method was applied to examine the safety leadership decisions and actions in the mining industry, and it demonstrated its utility in
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2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 Years Fig. 2. Death toll in construction accidents, 2004–2016.
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Report
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Fig. 3. The control structure of STAMP.
the analytical HFACS mechanism, showing four main levels: (1) management organization is missing; (2) insecure leadership; (3) prerequisites for unsafe behavior; and (4) unsafe behavior (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Each level includes some sub-factors. Unsafe behavior is the most obvious cause of accidents, and this is designated as the lowest level. The remaining three levels are the hidden faults. This model emphasizes the impact of high-level errors on low-level errors and the top-level's organized management impact on accidents. HFACS has been successfully applied to provide a retrospective analysis of minor incident investigations in the rail industry (Madigan, Golightly, & Madders, 2016) and the nuclear industry to reveal the hazards and their relationships in terms of organizational factors (Kim, Yong, Tong, Oh, & Shin, 2014). The HFACS taxonomy can be used to analyze and search for trends that point to weaknesses in certain areas of the system. Moreover, conducting association analysis among the HFACS categories can help identify additional areas for improvement (Ergai, Cohen, & Sharp, 2016). However, reliable HFACS data are not easy to obtain. Therefore, in order to improve its practical value, HFACS was integrated with other methods. The ANP model was used
applying systems-thinking methods to examine safety leadership as a characteristic of positive system performance (Donovan & Salmon, 2017). In addition, it was used to represent the dependencies and linkages within and across system levels in the road freight transportation industry and to identify common factors and interactions across multiple crashes (Sharon & Natassia, 2015). AcciMap has generated both theoretical and practice-oriented debates, but its emphasis is perhaps more on conceptual and theoretical descriptions, rather than data-driven analysis and evaluation. Therefore, “mixing and matching” and “remixing” of many of the models are likely the future directions for analysis methods (Waterson, Jenkins, Salmon, & Underwood, 2017). The further development of “hybrid” accident models based on the basic AcciMap format, rather than new models, is an especially likely occurrence (Coze, 2013). 1.2.3. HFACS methodology The HFACS system was originally developed and tested within the U.S military. Later its framework was used to analyze and classify operator errors in naval aviation accidents by Wiegmann in 2000 (John, Schmidt, & Figlock, 1999). Fig. 5 illustrates the general framework of
System level Current assessment prerequisites
1.Government policy and budgeting 2.Regulatory bodies and associations 3.Local area government (plan and budget) company management
4.Technology and operational management
Decision
Priority
Policy
Function Plan
Decision Policy
Task or activity 5.Physical processes and actor activities
6.Equipment and surroundings
Direct result
Conclusion
Indirect result
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Task or activity
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Current assessment prerequisites
Fig. 4. AcciMap's framework.
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First level:
Management vulnerabilities
Management organization missing
Management cultural defects Unreasonable management resources Inadequate supervision
Second level:
Improper operation plan
Insecure leadership
No corrections found Supervise the violation Staff resource management
Third level:
Personal ready state Mental state
Prerequisites for unsafe behavior
Physiological state Physical and intellectual limitations Physical environment Technical environment
Fourth level:
Unsafe behaviors
Violation
Skill errors
Error
Decision making error Misunderstanding
Fig. 5. Hierarchical classification diagram of HFACS.
to help calculate the priority weights of the accident causes related to human error (Akyuz, 2017). In addition, the F-DEMATEL technique was adopted to conduct the inner dependency analysis in order to analyze railway accidents (Zhan, Zheng, & Zhao, 2017). 1.2.4. 2-4 Model methodology The 2-4 Model is a modern accident cause theory, based on Heinrich's classical accident cause chain, as well as Wigglesworth, Bird, Loftus, Reason, and Stewart's view points (Fu et al., 2014). In
this model, the direct factors are still a human's unsafe behavior and the situation's unsafe conditions, as in Heinrich's accident cause chain. The indirect factors include safety knowledge, safety consciousness, habit, and physiological and psychological states, which are different from Stewart's model (Fu, 2013). The safety management system was thought to be a part of the safety culture, so it is regarded as a radical cause. The safety culture is the root cause. As seen in the Fig. 6, the occurrence of the accident was the result of two organizational levels and individual levels, as well as the
External Factors Unsafe acts
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Safety knowledge Safety awareness Safety habits Psychological status Physiological status
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Legends: Organization boundary
Clear impacts
Fig. 6. The 2-4 Model.
Result of the behaviors
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development of four stages: guidance, operation, and the habitual and one-time behaviors. Therefore, it was called the 2-4 Model. The 2-4 Model was first used for the safety culture measurement, and then it was further developed and improved. From 2005 to 2017, it has been modified four times; these modifications made up for the model's initial failure to take into consideration the impact of the internal and external causes of the accident and have made it more comprehensive when it comes to revealing the causes of accidents (Fu et al., 2014). The 2-4 Model has been widely used in the coal, chemical, fire, and other industries. It was applied to the safety training systems in coal mining (Fu, Yin, Dong, Fan, & Zhu, 2013) as well as to the typical cases of chemical and fire accidents to verify its reliability (Fu, Liu, Ge, & Tao, 2015; Kang, Fu, Fu, & Gao, 2017). These causation models have their own unique features, but these features are rare in the construction accidents. Therefore, the aim of this paper was to compare and contrast the four methods (STAMP, AcciMap, HFACS, and the 2-4 Model) for construction accident analyses.
2. Incident descriptions A whole steel system collapsed at a construction site, which killed 10 workers who were installing drains and banding cross bars in the middle of the upper and lower layers of a steel grid at 8:20 am on December 29, 2014. A brief description of the accident is given below. The project was planned to build five floors above ground and two floors underground. Reinforcement work is processing at the time of the accident. Two layers of steel grids were arranged inside a floor. The two layers of steel grid used double-row two-way steel bars, and the upper steel grid was supported by “horse stool”.1 Building the lower reinforcement, placing the “horse stool” and laying the upper steel bars had been completed before the accident occurred. On the afternoon of 28 December, the labor captain of the construction team arranged to have the tower crane lift steel material to the upper layer of the steel grid. From 17:58 to 22:16 on the 28th and 7:27 to 7:47 on the 29th, there were a total of 24 bundles of steel material lifted, 21 bundles on the 28th and 3 bundles on the 29th. At 6:20 am on 29 December, the workers began to work again, placing the steel reinforcement bars and banding them together. At around 7:00, a worker found that the “horse stool” did not correspond with the calibrated axis, and he informed the labor captain. Then, the labor captain reported it to the deputy manager. At 8:10, it was confirmed that the whole steel system had moved 10 cm to the east. Later, the deputy manager asked the team leader to tell the workers to stop working. While they were planning to remove the bundles of steel rods from the upper layer and firm up the junctions of the “horse stool” and layers, the steel system collapsed. The duration of the collapse was less than 2 s. Ten workers were killed in the middle of the upper and down layers of the steel grid. A simple description and the collapse scene are presented in Figs. 7 and 8, respectively. According to the accident investigation report, the investigation group found that the diameters of the steel rods were 25 and 28 mm, not the standard 32 mm. The spacing between the junctions of the “horse stool” varied, and the average spacing was far more than that specified in the safety standards. Poor welding between the junctions of the “horse stool” of the upper and lower layers was also a major problem. Worse, the supervising departments did not fulfill their own responsibilities to all the units because they failed to provide adequate site management, ensure the safety of the workers, or provide the necessary technical documentation and records.
1 “Horse stool” is commonly known as “support tendons”. It is used for reinforcing the upper and the lower steel mesh plate, as well as separating the upper and lower mesh to maintain the spacing. It has different sizes and it is perpendicular to the upper and lower layers.
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Fig. 7. A brief structure of the steel grid.
3. Re-analyses of the accident reasons 3.1. The output by using STAMP The STAMP analysis consisted of two phases. The control structure was the first output, shown in Fig. 9. The legislature is the highest level of government for promulgating laws and regulations. Then, the safety administration of the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development of the People's Republic of China receives these instructions and constrains the local government construction department and safety supervision department using specifications and standards. The Safety Supervision department guides the construction projections before the projects begin. Before it starts work, Party A needs to sign a contract with the supervision unit, designers, and owner. Party B also needs a construction unit, which is achieved by a contract, too. The supervision unit should supervise the duties of the construction unit and its workers. Designers draw the project plans and give them to the construction unit. The laborers are constrained by the construction unit, but they can provide feedback if they find problems. The second output was identifying the faults and responsibilities of the participants involved in each level in the accident. The involved participants are shown in Fig. 9. The Local Administration and Work Safety department and the other local supervision departments did not check all the construction materials as required, and the time of the examinations was not sufficient. Party A compressed the specified working duration by 27.6% to complete the project ahead of schedule, and they did not inform the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development of the start date. Moreover, when Party A found the manager was off duty, they did not quickly rectify the problem. The designer was also irresponsible. There were some mistakes in the construction drawings. The checked construction unit records were incomplete, and the records of the contract explanations were different from the actual deal. The supervision unit is important for the project, but the supervisors ignored the fact that the project manager was off duty and failed to perform the necessary safety education and training for the workers.
Fig. 8. Scene of after the collapse.
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Report
Report Report Ministry of Local Housing and administrati Urban-Rural on and work Development Party A safety and Legislature and State local Administration supervision and Work departments Safety Supervision Laws and Specification and guidance regulations and standard
Supervision unit
Feedback
Construction unit
Designers
Labor
Constraint
Party B
Fig. 9. Safety control structure of the project.
Worse, the project managers did not follow the requirements and safety standards for steel construction projects. Party B allowed someone who was not on the staff of the company to sign the contract. They did not follow the correct procedures to change the manager on record. The construction unit lacked the technical documentation for the project and neglected the safety education and training of the workers. The members of the construction unit also failed to find that the workers' workload was excessive and that the steel rods were on the upper layers in bundles, which contributed to the concentrated load. The most direct factors were that the workers used non-standard steel rods, increased the distance between the two junctions of the “horse stool” at will, and badly welded the upper and lower layers of the grid together. These issues were caused by the workers' lack of education, knowledge, and safety awareness.
3.2. The output by using AcciMap Using the accident's outline and its investigation report, we created a timeline for the incident, as shown in Fig. 10. The timeline shows the incident's developing process, including the tasks, policies, plans, decisions, and faults. By combining these data with Fig. 4, we classified these factors and placed them on six levels to better illustrate their relationships to each other. Our AcciMap diagram is shown in Fig. 11. The root causes of this accident were all the responsibility of Party B due to its poor management of the project. Although there were many contributory factors from the physical processes and actors' activities, Party B's actions directly caused the accident.
2014.2.27
2014.3
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2014.6.30
3.3. The output by using HFACS Although there are limitations to HFACS, its approach to human physiological and physical states is more exhaustive than that of the other methods. However, poor management accounted for a large proportion of this accident. The workers' physiological and physical states were not discussed in the investigation, and so this part of the method is not applicable. The workers directly caused problems by reducing or increasing the required parameters at will and welded badly; these errors can be categorized as unsafe acts, as shown in Fig. 12. 3.4. The output by using the 2-4 Model Fig. 6 shows that we can classify the causes into two levels and four phases, as shown in Fig. 13. The direct causes were the workers' unsafe acts and the unsafe conditions. Reducing the diameter of the steel rods, increasing the spacing, bad welding, and centralized stacking directly contributed to the collapse. Party B's poor management was the most severe factor. From preparing the bid to the accident investigation, Party B's unprofessional staff managed the project, which caused the operating system to have many weak points. In addition, the supervision department and designer were both guilty of dereliction of duty. 4. Discussion and conclusions We compared and contrasted four popular contemporary accident analysis methods based on their application to the analysis of a
2014.7
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2014.7.18
2014.8.1
Obtained the Party B Party B Mr. Yang The Mr. Yang permission of the obtained some Party B Obtained employed Miss Li formulated construction joined the tax money won the provincial “the steel housing urban and to undertake the plan was staff of the bid construction rural construction and gave it to permission budget and passed company Mr. Yang plan” accounting work committee 2014 12.28 17:58
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Construction began even though there was a lack of technical documentation
8:20 Timeline
Transport of the first bundle of steel rods
Transport of the second bundle of steel rods
Workers begin to work
Transport of A worker the third realizes the bundle of structure is steel rods moving
Fig. 10. Time line of the accident.
The entire steel Collapse structure moves 10 cm
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1. Government policy and budgeting
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Allowing to design and calculate
2.Regulatory bodies and associations
Lack of a timely check on materials
3.Local area government planning and budgeting. company management
Lack of management coordination
4.Technology and operational management
Lack of the contract explanation
Increasing the distance between 2 junctions
5.Physical processes and actor activities
Being responsible for quality and safety supervision
Did not correct illegal behavior immediately
Employed an unqualified person
Some mistakes in the construction drawings
Lack of professional safety managemant workers
Lack of safety training and safety education
Used nonstandard steel rods
Ignore safety education
Unreasonable subcontract management
Placed the first bundle of steel rods on the upper layer Bad welding
Placed the second bundle of steel rods on the upper layer
Compressed the working schedule by 27.6% 6.Equipment and surroundings
Incomplete check
Placed the third bundle of steel rods on the upper layer
Speeding up the construction progress
Fig. 11. The AcciMap analysis.
HFACS
Organizational influences
Prerequisites for unsafe acts
Unsafe supervision
Unsafe acts or operations
Management vulnerabilities
Unreasonable resource management
Inadequate supervision
Supervise the violation
Technical environment
Violations
Employing unqualified person
Safety investment costs not in its place
The project manager was off duty
Lack of professional safety officers
Some mistakes in the construction drawings
Compressed the specified working duration by 27.6%
Management cultural defects
Failure to correct problem
Personnel readiness
Errors
Lack of safety education and training
Failure to stop placing steel rod bundles on the upper layer
Inadequate training
Used non-standard materials, increasing the distance between junctions, and utilized poor welding practices
Fig. 12. The HFACS analysis.
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Event
Unsafe acts and unsafe conditions
The whole steel system collapsed.
1. Too many bundles of steel with centralized stacking. 2. Non-standard steel rods were used (standard rods are 32 mm in diameter, but the rods used in the project were 25 mm or 28 mm in diameter). 3. Increased the distance between 2 junctions and had uneven spacing. 4. Badly welded, so the rods did not form a solid, whole structure.
Flaws in safety knowledge, safety 1. Lack of safety knowledge and awareness causing some mistakes in the drawings. 2. Workers’ bad habits failed to meet construction standards. awareness and safety habits
Deficiencies in safety management system
Deficiencies in safety culture
1. Poor management and a lack of technical documentation and records. 2. Registered manager was off duty and there was a lack of professional safety officers. 3. Lack of a professional manager. 4. Ignored the lack of a project manager. 5. Did not find that workers did not meet the requirements for steel construction projects. 6. Did not find the lack of safety technical explanations and safety education training. 7. Building management department did not check all the materials. 8. Short, insufficient check times were implemented by the building management department. 9. Lack of safety education training and safety awareness.
Safety is the first priority; safety performance lies on good safety awareness; the importance of safety laws and regulations; the importance of safety training; the importance of safety management system; the importance of top management commitment
Fig. 13. The 2-4 Model analysis.
construction accident. The differences among the methods in regard to their usability, reliability, and validity were clarified. Usability refers to the probability that a method was chosen to use to analyze accidents. The terms and models used in a method will determine whether the method will be chosen for use, although assessing how easy the analysis tools are to understand and apply clearly involves the subjective opinion of the user. The reliability of a method must also be considered. Some methods do not provide a detailed taxonomy of the contributory factors, which further reduces their reliability. However, this also means that the analyst can classify such factors with more freedom. The validity refers to the credibility of the output. These four methods are based on a recognized theory of accident causation and have been used across multiple domains, which suggests that an acceptable degree of external validity exists (Fu, Cao, Zhou, & Xiang, 2017; Kim et al., 2016; Reason, 1990; Salmon, Goode, & Archer, 2014).
4.2. The application of AcciMap
4.1. The application of STAMP
Due to the background of HFACS, its terms are limited to those of the aviation field, so its usability is lower. Worse, HFACS is entirely dependent upon the quality of the data provided and the analysts involved. However, the taxonomic nature of HFACS is an important feature of the method. HFACS not only has its own frame, but it also makes a detailed division of each level. That division enhances its reliability. In the construction accident reviewed here (see Fig. 12), we can see that organizational influences, unsafe supervision, and unsafe acts or operations account for a large proportion of the causes of the accident. However, the workers' physiological and psychological states were not mentioned in the accident report. Furthermore, there is no classification hierarchy that can contain the laws and regulatory factors of the participating units. This method cannot address the many factors that caused this accident.
The usage guidance provided for STAMP is considerable, which provides the analyst with a body of information that can facilitate a more effective and efficient analysis. We found that each level in the control system corresponded to the construction accident. STAMP has been improved by detailed descriptions of safety factors and accident causes, and the model usage guidance for this method means that its reliability is high. Moreover, STAMP addresses how the complexity within a system influences accident events and its output makes the responsibilities of the actors clear. However, it was not easy to distinguish all the major factors in the reviewed construction accident. Capturing all of the complexity in a large sociotechnical system and the resource constraints of an accident investigation are beyond the capability of an individual analysis model.
AcciMap purposefully sets out to analyze the dynamic behavior that exists within a system and how it contributes to accidents. Our timeline shows how the causes gradually progressed towards the collapse. The guidance available for AcciMap also provides a detailed description about the conceptual aspects and purpose of the method, that is, the analysis of a system's dynamic behavior that reduces or increases the required parameters. However, the AcciMap guidance material provides little support for the method in comparison to that of STAMP (Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002). Therefore, this method is considered to have a low reliability.
4.3. The application of HFACS
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4.4. The application of the 2-4 Model The 2-4 Model was devised specifically for the purposes of accident analysis. The model and the terms are easy to understand and so it is used frequently, which is the most obvious advantage over the other methods. In addition, the 2-4 Model classifies the causes of the accident into four phases and has clear boundaries between the two phases. We found all the factors contributing to the collapse using the inverted order of Fig. 6, which can also make the factors more accurate. In addition, the dynamic analysis process was shown and the liability in this accident can be classified as “direct responsibility”. This method combines the advantages of the other three methods. We compared four popular contemporary accident causation models using their usability, reliability, and validity for a construction accident. Our analysis revealed the differences between the four methods. Construction accidents are caused by various issues, and the causes of all accidents vary. Therefore, the analysis methods chosen to analyze construction accidents should be generalized. First, the results of this paper show that the AcciMap and 2-4 Model have universal applicability. However, AcciMap has a low reliability because the qualitative nature of the model negatively impacts on its reliability. In reviewing this accident, we had more freedom in how to classify such factors. Second, STAMP and AcciMap are more comprehensive in determining factors. However, it was not easy to distinguish the major factors in this accident. The complexity of the system and the material collection of the accident were beyond the capability of an individual to determine. Third, the results of the HFACS and 2-4 Model are more reliable than those of the other methods, as determined by the nature of the classification and the characteristics that are applicable to multi-case study analysis. HFACS's development for aviation accidents limits its application. Further, the errors and contributing factors of the HFACS taxonomies cannot conceivably be classified by the method in its original format. In the present analysis, some factors in this accident could not be classified, such as the regulatory factors. In this case, the 2-4 Model made up for these shortcomings in the HFACS and the low reliability of AcciMap, focusing on the divisions of responsibility rather than the causes like STAMP. Direct causes, indirect causes, radical causes, and root causes were compartmentalized and detailed, and this method of classification covered most of the factors involved in the accident. In addition, it takes external factors, such as government regulation and social politics, into consideration. Finally, the responsibility divisions are provided and accident prevention methods have a basis to follow. This article presented a case-study-based comparison of four accident analysis methods: STAMP, AcciMap, HFACS, and the 2-4 Model. Although it may be not representative to choose one construction accident out of all the accidents in the Chinese construction sector, the analysis process provides guidance for synthesizing the strengths of the various methods to apply to accidents in the construction sector. The 2-4 Model seems to offer more practical applicability, so it is recommended that the 2-4 Model is further developed into a method that incorporates flexible taxonomies for future construction accident analysis efforts.
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Jiangshi Zhang is an Associate Professor and researcher who is currently working at School of Resources and Safety Engineering, China University of Mining and Technology, Beijing. He has worked and studied in higher education for more than 10 years. His research focus on behavioral safety, safety management, and safety culture. Wenyue Zhang is a postgraduate at School of Resources and Safety Engineering, China University of Mining and Technology, Beijing. She majored in construction safety engineering in Chang'an University in Xi'an as an undergraduate. After graduation, she does some researches on accident cause theories and accidents prevention in China University of Mining and Technology, Beijing. Peihui Xu is a postgraduate at School of Resources and Safety Engineering, China University of Mining and Technology, Beijing. He did some research on occupational health when he was an undergraduate. After graduation, his research focus includes occupational health and dust explosion in China University of Mining and Technology, Beijing. Na Chen is an Associate Professor and lecturer working at School of Mechanics and Engineering Science, Zhengzhou University. She was a visiting scholar in University of Michigan, School of Engineering, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering during 2015–2016. Her area of expertise is safety management, Safety ergonomics and Emergency behavior and management.
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Journal of Safety Research journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/jsr
Applicability of accident analysis methods to Chinese construction accidents Jiangshi Zhang, a,⁎ Wenyue Zhang, a Peihui Xu, a Na Chen b a b
School of Resources and Safety Engineering, China University of Mining and Technology, D11, Xueyuan Road, Haidian District, Beijing 100083, China School of Mechanics and Engineering Science, Zhengzhou University, Zhengzhou 450001, 100 Science Avenue, Zhengzhou City, China
a r t i c l e
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Article history: Received 27 March 2018 Received in revised form 27 August 2018 Accepted 29 November 2018 Available online 2 January 2019 Keywords: Chinese construction accidents Accident causation models Accident analysis Applicability
a b s t r a c t Introduction: It is necessary to clearly understand construction accidents for preventing a rise in Chinese construction accidents and deaths. Better analysis methods are required for Chinese construction sector accidents. Methods: Choosing and analyzing a typical construction accident based on four popular contemporary accident causation models: STAMP, AcciMap, HFACS, and the 2-4 Model. Then we evaluated the models' applicability to construction accidents, including their usability, reliability, and validity. Results: STAMP addressed how complexity within the accident system influenced the accident development, and its output makes the responsibilities clearer for the accident. AcciMap described the entire system's failure, the entire accident's trajectory, and the relationship between them. AcciMap showed that the accident was a dynamic developing process, and this method has a high usability. The taxonomic nature of HFACS is an important feature that provides it with a high reliability. In the accident reviewed here, we found that poor management was a critical factor rather than the individual factor in the accident. The 2-4 Model provided detailed causes of the accident and established the relationship among the accident causes, the safety management system, and the safety culture. It also avoided capturing all of the complexity in the large sociotechnical system and revealed a dynamic analysis and developing process. We confirmed that it has a high usability and validity. Therefore, the 2-4Model is recommended for future Chinese construction accident analysis efforts. Practical Applications: The study provides a useful, reliable, and effective analysis method for Chinese construction accidents. © 2018 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction 1.1. Background In China, construction is a high-risk industry. Since 2012, the number of deaths in the construction sector has surpassed that of coal mines, ranking first out of all the industrial production sectors in China (Chen, Zhao, Tian, & Li, 2013). Compared to other industries, the construction industry has poor working environments, a complex situation, high labor turnover rate, lack of safety management, poor educational standards, and poorly trained workers (Hu, 2017). The statistics released by the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development of the People's Republic of China (Ministry of Housing and Urban-Rural Development of the People, 2017) about the numbers of construction accidents from 2004 to 2016 are shown in Fig. 1. During the first nine years shown in the figure, the number of accidents declined because the Chinese government formulated some policies in 2004; one particularly important policy, “Regulations on Safety Production Management of Construction Projects,” was initiated in February, 2014. However, in the ⁎ Corresponding author. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (J. Zhang), [email protected] (N. Chen).
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jsr.2018.11.006 0022-4375/© 2018 National Safety Council and Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
last three years of the graph, the number of accidents has shown little decrease, which is still higher than that of many developed countries. In 2016, there were 634 accidents, which is similar to the number from 2010. Correspondingly, the death toll in the construction sector shows the same trend (Fig. 2). Therefore, the feasibility condition must be improved. In order to prevent a rise in construction accidents and deaths, it is necessary to clearly understand construction accidents. 1.2. Literature review There are some accident causation models that are widely used, such as Reason's (1990) omnipresent Swiss Cheese model, which uses the layers and holes in Swiss cheese to represent the defenses within a system and their associated inadequacies(Lawton & Ward, 2005); Rasmussen's (1997) risk management framework, which makes a series of predictions in relation to the performance and safety in complex sociotechnical systems(Johnson & de Almeida, 2008; Cassano-Piche, Vicente, & Jamieson, 2009; Salmon, Williamson, Lenne, Mitsopoulos, & Rudin-Brown, 2010; Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002); Rasmussen (1997), named after his risk management framework, which was developed as a means of graphically representing factors from different system levels that contribute to accidents(Kontogiannis, 2012; Margaret,
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Paul, & Michael, 2014); the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS), which is a theory-based tool for investigating and analyzing human error associated with accidents and incidents(Daramola, 2014); Leveson's (2004) Systems Theoretic Accident Modeling and Processes model (STAMP), which considers technical (including hardware and software), human, and organizational factors in complex sociotechnical systems(Ouyang, Hong, Yu, & Fei, 2010); and the 2-4 Model (2005), proposed by Fu, which builds a circuit from the idea that one-time behavior comes from habitual behavior, and habitual behavior comes from the organizational safety management system, which is led by the safety culture(Fu, 2013; Fu, Yang, Yin, & Dong, 2014).
1.2.1. STAMP methodology Professor Leveson first used STAMP to analyze the accident that occurred on the American Challenger space shuttle. It views systems as hierarchical structures with multiple control levels. Each level in the hierarchy imposes constraints on the activity of the level beneath it, and the events leading to losses only occur when the safety constraints are not successfully enforced or the constraints have been violated (Leveson, 2011). It describes various forms of control, including managerial, organizational, physical, operational, and manufacturing-based controls. The STAMP taxonomy, along with a generic sociotechnical system control structure, is presented in Fig. 3. Samadi used STAMP in a general programmatic risk analysis for CO2 capture, transport, and storage (Samadi, 2012). Georges used it to analyze the risk of quality loss in complex system design (Goerges, 2013).
The STAMP process provides the framework for the structured leading indicator identification process. The functional safety control structure is designed with the safety responsibilities identified for each component and these control responsibilities are traceable to the system safety constraints (Leveson, 2015). However, it is difficult to obtain the extensive data associated with the overall system required for a thorough and in-depth analysis. The recommendations generated in the analysis may also be difficult to carry out substantially and in a timely manner (Kim, Nazir, & Øvergård, 2016).
1.2.2. AcciMap methodology AcciMap is a system method based on the control theory. Rasmussen believed that the accident is the result of losing control to potentially harmful physical processes, and each organizational level in the system affects the control of these hazards (Rasmussen, 1997). AcciMap was developed from analyzing a series of interaction events and the decision-making process, which are beyond control in the system. This method of analysis typically focuses on the failures across the following six organizational levels: government policy and budgeting; regulatory bodies and associations; local area government planning and budgeting (including company management); technical and operational management; physical processes and actor activities; and equipment and surroundings (Salmon, Cornelissen, & Trotter, 2012). The AcciMap method is presented in Fig. 4. This method was applied to examine the safety leadership decisions and actions in the mining industry, and it demonstrated its utility in
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the analytical HFACS mechanism, showing four main levels: (1) management organization is missing; (2) insecure leadership; (3) prerequisites for unsafe behavior; and (4) unsafe behavior (Shappell & Wiegmann, 2000). Each level includes some sub-factors. Unsafe behavior is the most obvious cause of accidents, and this is designated as the lowest level. The remaining three levels are the hidden faults. This model emphasizes the impact of high-level errors on low-level errors and the top-level's organized management impact on accidents. HFACS has been successfully applied to provide a retrospective analysis of minor incident investigations in the rail industry (Madigan, Golightly, & Madders, 2016) and the nuclear industry to reveal the hazards and their relationships in terms of organizational factors (Kim, Yong, Tong, Oh, & Shin, 2014). The HFACS taxonomy can be used to analyze and search for trends that point to weaknesses in certain areas of the system. Moreover, conducting association analysis among the HFACS categories can help identify additional areas for improvement (Ergai, Cohen, & Sharp, 2016). However, reliable HFACS data are not easy to obtain. Therefore, in order to improve its practical value, HFACS was integrated with other methods. The ANP model was used
applying systems-thinking methods to examine safety leadership as a characteristic of positive system performance (Donovan & Salmon, 2017). In addition, it was used to represent the dependencies and linkages within and across system levels in the road freight transportation industry and to identify common factors and interactions across multiple crashes (Sharon & Natassia, 2015). AcciMap has generated both theoretical and practice-oriented debates, but its emphasis is perhaps more on conceptual and theoretical descriptions, rather than data-driven analysis and evaluation. Therefore, “mixing and matching” and “remixing” of many of the models are likely the future directions for analysis methods (Waterson, Jenkins, Salmon, & Underwood, 2017). The further development of “hybrid” accident models based on the basic AcciMap format, rather than new models, is an especially likely occurrence (Coze, 2013). 1.2.3. HFACS methodology The HFACS system was originally developed and tested within the U.S military. Later its framework was used to analyze and classify operator errors in naval aviation accidents by Wiegmann in 2000 (John, Schmidt, & Figlock, 1999). Fig. 5 illustrates the general framework of
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First level:
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Fig. 5. Hierarchical classification diagram of HFACS.
to help calculate the priority weights of the accident causes related to human error (Akyuz, 2017). In addition, the F-DEMATEL technique was adopted to conduct the inner dependency analysis in order to analyze railway accidents (Zhan, Zheng, & Zhao, 2017). 1.2.4. 2-4 Model methodology The 2-4 Model is a modern accident cause theory, based on Heinrich's classical accident cause chain, as well as Wigglesworth, Bird, Loftus, Reason, and Stewart's view points (Fu et al., 2014). In
this model, the direct factors are still a human's unsafe behavior and the situation's unsafe conditions, as in Heinrich's accident cause chain. The indirect factors include safety knowledge, safety consciousness, habit, and physiological and psychological states, which are different from Stewart's model (Fu, 2013). The safety management system was thought to be a part of the safety culture, so it is regarded as a radical cause. The safety culture is the root cause. As seen in the Fig. 6, the occurrence of the accident was the result of two organizational levels and individual levels, as well as the
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Fig. 6. The 2-4 Model.
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development of four stages: guidance, operation, and the habitual and one-time behaviors. Therefore, it was called the 2-4 Model. The 2-4 Model was first used for the safety culture measurement, and then it was further developed and improved. From 2005 to 2017, it has been modified four times; these modifications made up for the model's initial failure to take into consideration the impact of the internal and external causes of the accident and have made it more comprehensive when it comes to revealing the causes of accidents (Fu et al., 2014). The 2-4 Model has been widely used in the coal, chemical, fire, and other industries. It was applied to the safety training systems in coal mining (Fu, Yin, Dong, Fan, & Zhu, 2013) as well as to the typical cases of chemical and fire accidents to verify its reliability (Fu, Liu, Ge, & Tao, 2015; Kang, Fu, Fu, & Gao, 2017). These causation models have their own unique features, but these features are rare in the construction accidents. Therefore, the aim of this paper was to compare and contrast the four methods (STAMP, AcciMap, HFACS, and the 2-4 Model) for construction accident analyses.
2. Incident descriptions A whole steel system collapsed at a construction site, which killed 10 workers who were installing drains and banding cross bars in the middle of the upper and lower layers of a steel grid at 8:20 am on December 29, 2014. A brief description of the accident is given below. The project was planned to build five floors above ground and two floors underground. Reinforcement work is processing at the time of the accident. Two layers of steel grids were arranged inside a floor. The two layers of steel grid used double-row two-way steel bars, and the upper steel grid was supported by “horse stool”.1 Building the lower reinforcement, placing the “horse stool” and laying the upper steel bars had been completed before the accident occurred. On the afternoon of 28 December, the labor captain of the construction team arranged to have the tower crane lift steel material to the upper layer of the steel grid. From 17:58 to 22:16 on the 28th and 7:27 to 7:47 on the 29th, there were a total of 24 bundles of steel material lifted, 21 bundles on the 28th and 3 bundles on the 29th. At 6:20 am on 29 December, the workers began to work again, placing the steel reinforcement bars and banding them together. At around 7:00, a worker found that the “horse stool” did not correspond with the calibrated axis, and he informed the labor captain. Then, the labor captain reported it to the deputy manager. At 8:10, it was confirmed that the whole steel system had moved 10 cm to the east. Later, the deputy manager asked the team leader to tell the workers to stop working. While they were planning to remove the bundles of steel rods from the upper layer and firm up the junctions of the “horse stool” and layers, the steel system collapsed. The duration of the collapse was less than 2 s. Ten workers were killed in the middle of the upper and down layers of the steel grid. A simple description and the collapse scene are presented in Figs. 7 and 8, respectively. According to the accident investigation report, the investigation group found that the diameters of the steel rods were 25 and 28 mm, not the standard 32 mm. The spacing between the junctions of the “horse stool” varied, and the average spacing was far more than that specified in the safety standards. Poor welding between the junctions of the “horse stool” of the upper and lower layers was also a major problem. Worse, the supervising departments did not fulfill their own responsibilities to all the units because they failed to provide adequate site management, ensure the safety of the workers, or provide the necessary technical documentation and records.
1 “Horse stool” is commonly known as “support tendons”. It is used for reinforcing the upper and the lower steel mesh plate, as well as separating the upper and lower mesh to maintain the spacing. It has different sizes and it is perpendicular to the upper and lower layers.
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Fig. 7. A brief structure of the steel grid.
3. Re-analyses of the accident reasons 3.1. The output by using STAMP The STAMP analysis consisted of two phases. The control structure was the first output, shown in Fig. 9. The legislature is the highest level of government for promulgating laws and regulations. Then, the safety administration of the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development of the People's Republic of China receives these instructions and constrains the local government construction department and safety supervision department using specifications and standards. The Safety Supervision department guides the construction projections before the projects begin. Before it starts work, Party A needs to sign a contract with the supervision unit, designers, and owner. Party B also needs a construction unit, which is achieved by a contract, too. The supervision unit should supervise the duties of the construction unit and its workers. Designers draw the project plans and give them to the construction unit. The laborers are constrained by the construction unit, but they can provide feedback if they find problems. The second output was identifying the faults and responsibilities of the participants involved in each level in the accident. The involved participants are shown in Fig. 9. The Local Administration and Work Safety department and the other local supervision departments did not check all the construction materials as required, and the time of the examinations was not sufficient. Party A compressed the specified working duration by 27.6% to complete the project ahead of schedule, and they did not inform the Ministry of Housing and Urban–Rural Development of the start date. Moreover, when Party A found the manager was off duty, they did not quickly rectify the problem. The designer was also irresponsible. There were some mistakes in the construction drawings. The checked construction unit records were incomplete, and the records of the contract explanations were different from the actual deal. The supervision unit is important for the project, but the supervisors ignored the fact that the project manager was off duty and failed to perform the necessary safety education and training for the workers.
Fig. 8. Scene of after the collapse.
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Fig. 9. Safety control structure of the project.
Worse, the project managers did not follow the requirements and safety standards for steel construction projects. Party B allowed someone who was not on the staff of the company to sign the contract. They did not follow the correct procedures to change the manager on record. The construction unit lacked the technical documentation for the project and neglected the safety education and training of the workers. The members of the construction unit also failed to find that the workers' workload was excessive and that the steel rods were on the upper layers in bundles, which contributed to the concentrated load. The most direct factors were that the workers used non-standard steel rods, increased the distance between the two junctions of the “horse stool” at will, and badly welded the upper and lower layers of the grid together. These issues were caused by the workers' lack of education, knowledge, and safety awareness.
3.2. The output by using AcciMap Using the accident's outline and its investigation report, we created a timeline for the incident, as shown in Fig. 10. The timeline shows the incident's developing process, including the tasks, policies, plans, decisions, and faults. By combining these data with Fig. 4, we classified these factors and placed them on six levels to better illustrate their relationships to each other. Our AcciMap diagram is shown in Fig. 11. The root causes of this accident were all the responsibility of Party B due to its poor management of the project. Although there were many contributory factors from the physical processes and actors' activities, Party B's actions directly caused the accident.
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3.3. The output by using HFACS Although there are limitations to HFACS, its approach to human physiological and physical states is more exhaustive than that of the other methods. However, poor management accounted for a large proportion of this accident. The workers' physiological and physical states were not discussed in the investigation, and so this part of the method is not applicable. The workers directly caused problems by reducing or increasing the required parameters at will and welded badly; these errors can be categorized as unsafe acts, as shown in Fig. 12. 3.4. The output by using the 2-4 Model Fig. 6 shows that we can classify the causes into two levels and four phases, as shown in Fig. 13. The direct causes were the workers' unsafe acts and the unsafe conditions. Reducing the diameter of the steel rods, increasing the spacing, bad welding, and centralized stacking directly contributed to the collapse. Party B's poor management was the most severe factor. From preparing the bid to the accident investigation, Party B's unprofessional staff managed the project, which caused the operating system to have many weak points. In addition, the supervision department and designer were both guilty of dereliction of duty. 4. Discussion and conclusions We compared and contrasted four popular contemporary accident analysis methods based on their application to the analysis of a
2014.7
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2014.8.1
Obtained the Party B Party B Mr. Yang The Mr. Yang permission of the obtained some Party B Obtained employed Miss Li formulated construction joined the tax money won the provincial “the steel housing urban and to undertake the plan was staff of the bid construction rural construction and gave it to permission budget and passed company Mr. Yang plan” accounting work committee 2014 12.28 17:58
22:16
2014 12.29 6:20
7:27
7:50
8:10
2014.10
Construction began even though there was a lack of technical documentation
8:20 Timeline
Transport of the first bundle of steel rods
Transport of the second bundle of steel rods
Workers begin to work
Transport of A worker the third realizes the bundle of structure is steel rods moving
Fig. 10. Time line of the accident.
The entire steel Collapse structure moves 10 cm
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1. Government policy and budgeting
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Allowing to design and calculate
2.Regulatory bodies and associations
Lack of a timely check on materials
3.Local area government planning and budgeting. company management
Lack of management coordination
4.Technology and operational management
Lack of the contract explanation
Increasing the distance between 2 junctions
5.Physical processes and actor activities
Being responsible for quality and safety supervision
Did not correct illegal behavior immediately
Employed an unqualified person
Some mistakes in the construction drawings
Lack of professional safety managemant workers
Lack of safety training and safety education
Used nonstandard steel rods
Ignore safety education
Unreasonable subcontract management
Placed the first bundle of steel rods on the upper layer Bad welding
Placed the second bundle of steel rods on the upper layer
Compressed the working schedule by 27.6% 6.Equipment and surroundings
Incomplete check
Placed the third bundle of steel rods on the upper layer
Speeding up the construction progress
Fig. 11. The AcciMap analysis.
HFACS
Organizational influences
Prerequisites for unsafe acts
Unsafe supervision
Unsafe acts or operations
Management vulnerabilities
Unreasonable resource management
Inadequate supervision
Supervise the violation
Technical environment
Violations
Employing unqualified person
Safety investment costs not in its place
The project manager was off duty
Lack of professional safety officers
Some mistakes in the construction drawings
Compressed the specified working duration by 27.6%
Management cultural defects
Failure to correct problem
Personnel readiness
Errors
Lack of safety education and training
Failure to stop placing steel rod bundles on the upper layer
Inadequate training
Used non-standard materials, increasing the distance between junctions, and utilized poor welding practices
Fig. 12. The HFACS analysis.
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Event
Unsafe acts and unsafe conditions
The whole steel system collapsed.
1. Too many bundles of steel with centralized stacking. 2. Non-standard steel rods were used (standard rods are 32 mm in diameter, but the rods used in the project were 25 mm or 28 mm in diameter). 3. Increased the distance between 2 junctions and had uneven spacing. 4. Badly welded, so the rods did not form a solid, whole structure.
Flaws in safety knowledge, safety 1. Lack of safety knowledge and awareness causing some mistakes in the drawings. 2. Workers’ bad habits failed to meet construction standards. awareness and safety habits
Deficiencies in safety management system
Deficiencies in safety culture
1. Poor management and a lack of technical documentation and records. 2. Registered manager was off duty and there was a lack of professional safety officers. 3. Lack of a professional manager. 4. Ignored the lack of a project manager. 5. Did not find that workers did not meet the requirements for steel construction projects. 6. Did not find the lack of safety technical explanations and safety education training. 7. Building management department did not check all the materials. 8. Short, insufficient check times were implemented by the building management department. 9. Lack of safety education training and safety awareness.
Safety is the first priority; safety performance lies on good safety awareness; the importance of safety laws and regulations; the importance of safety training; the importance of safety management system; the importance of top management commitment
Fig. 13. The 2-4 Model analysis.
construction accident. The differences among the methods in regard to their usability, reliability, and validity were clarified. Usability refers to the probability that a method was chosen to use to analyze accidents. The terms and models used in a method will determine whether the method will be chosen for use, although assessing how easy the analysis tools are to understand and apply clearly involves the subjective opinion of the user. The reliability of a method must also be considered. Some methods do not provide a detailed taxonomy of the contributory factors, which further reduces their reliability. However, this also means that the analyst can classify such factors with more freedom. The validity refers to the credibility of the output. These four methods are based on a recognized theory of accident causation and have been used across multiple domains, which suggests that an acceptable degree of external validity exists (Fu, Cao, Zhou, & Xiang, 2017; Kim et al., 2016; Reason, 1990; Salmon, Goode, & Archer, 2014).
4.2. The application of AcciMap
4.1. The application of STAMP
Due to the background of HFACS, its terms are limited to those of the aviation field, so its usability is lower. Worse, HFACS is entirely dependent upon the quality of the data provided and the analysts involved. However, the taxonomic nature of HFACS is an important feature of the method. HFACS not only has its own frame, but it also makes a detailed division of each level. That division enhances its reliability. In the construction accident reviewed here (see Fig. 12), we can see that organizational influences, unsafe supervision, and unsafe acts or operations account for a large proportion of the causes of the accident. However, the workers' physiological and psychological states were not mentioned in the accident report. Furthermore, there is no classification hierarchy that can contain the laws and regulatory factors of the participating units. This method cannot address the many factors that caused this accident.
The usage guidance provided for STAMP is considerable, which provides the analyst with a body of information that can facilitate a more effective and efficient analysis. We found that each level in the control system corresponded to the construction accident. STAMP has been improved by detailed descriptions of safety factors and accident causes, and the model usage guidance for this method means that its reliability is high. Moreover, STAMP addresses how the complexity within a system influences accident events and its output makes the responsibilities of the actors clear. However, it was not easy to distinguish all the major factors in the reviewed construction accident. Capturing all of the complexity in a large sociotechnical system and the resource constraints of an accident investigation are beyond the capability of an individual analysis model.
AcciMap purposefully sets out to analyze the dynamic behavior that exists within a system and how it contributes to accidents. Our timeline shows how the causes gradually progressed towards the collapse. The guidance available for AcciMap also provides a detailed description about the conceptual aspects and purpose of the method, that is, the analysis of a system's dynamic behavior that reduces or increases the required parameters. However, the AcciMap guidance material provides little support for the method in comparison to that of STAMP (Svedung & Rasmussen, 2002). Therefore, this method is considered to have a low reliability.
4.3. The application of HFACS
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4.4. The application of the 2-4 Model The 2-4 Model was devised specifically for the purposes of accident analysis. The model and the terms are easy to understand and so it is used frequently, which is the most obvious advantage over the other methods. In addition, the 2-4 Model classifies the causes of the accident into four phases and has clear boundaries between the two phases. We found all the factors contributing to the collapse using the inverted order of Fig. 6, which can also make the factors more accurate. In addition, the dynamic analysis process was shown and the liability in this accident can be classified as “direct responsibility”. This method combines the advantages of the other three methods. We compared four popular contemporary accident causation models using their usability, reliability, and validity for a construction accident. Our analysis revealed the differences between the four methods. Construction accidents are caused by various issues, and the causes of all accidents vary. Therefore, the analysis methods chosen to analyze construction accidents should be generalized. First, the results of this paper show that the AcciMap and 2-4 Model have universal applicability. However, AcciMap has a low reliability because the qualitative nature of the model negatively impacts on its reliability. In reviewing this accident, we had more freedom in how to classify such factors. Second, STAMP and AcciMap are more comprehensive in determining factors. However, it was not easy to distinguish the major factors in this accident. The complexity of the system and the material collection of the accident were beyond the capability of an individual to determine. Third, the results of the HFACS and 2-4 Model are more reliable than those of the other methods, as determined by the nature of the classification and the characteristics that are applicable to multi-case study analysis. HFACS's development for aviation accidents limits its application. Further, the errors and contributing factors of the HFACS taxonomies cannot conceivably be classified by the method in its original format. In the present analysis, some factors in this accident could not be classified, such as the regulatory factors. In this case, the 2-4 Model made up for these shortcomings in the HFACS and the low reliability of AcciMap, focusing on the divisions of responsibility rather than the causes like STAMP. Direct causes, indirect causes, radical causes, and root causes were compartmentalized and detailed, and this method of classification covered most of the factors involved in the accident. In addition, it takes external factors, such as government regulation and social politics, into consideration. Finally, the responsibility divisions are provided and accident prevention methods have a basis to follow. This article presented a case-study-based comparison of four accident analysis methods: STAMP, AcciMap, HFACS, and the 2-4 Model. Although it may be not representative to choose one construction accident out of all the accidents in the Chinese construction sector, the analysis process provides guidance for synthesizing the strengths of the various methods to apply to accidents in the construction sector. The 2-4 Model seems to offer more practical applicability, so it is recommended that the 2-4 Model is further developed into a method that incorporates flexible taxonomies for future construction accident analysis efforts.
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Jiangshi Zhang is an Associate Professor and researcher who is currently working at School of Resources and Safety Engineering, China University of Mining and Technology, Beijing. He has worked and studied in higher education for more than 10 years. His research focus on behavioral safety, safety management, and safety culture. Wenyue Zhang is a postgraduate at School of Resources and Safety Engineering, China University of Mining and Technology, Beijing. She majored in construction safety engineering in Chang'an University in Xi'an as an undergraduate. After graduation, she does some researches on accident cause theories and accidents prevention in China University of Mining and Technology, Beijing. Peihui Xu is a postgraduate at School of Resources and Safety Engineering, China University of Mining and Technology, Beijing. He did some research on occupational health when he was an undergraduate. After graduation, his research focus includes occupational health and dust explosion in China University of Mining and Technology, Beijing. Na Chen is an Associate Professor and lecturer working at School of Mechanics and Engineering Science, Zhengzhou University. She was a visiting scholar in University of Michigan, School of Engineering, Department of Civil and Environmental Engineering during 2015–2016. Her area of expertise is safety management, Safety ergonomics and Emergency behavior and management.