Explaining the de facto open access of public property commons: Insights from the Indus Delta mangroves

Environmental Science & Policy 66 (2016) 151–159

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Explaining the de facto open access of public property commons: Insights from the Indus Delta mangroves Junaid Alam Memon, Assistant Professora,* , Gopal B. Thapa, Professorb a b

Pakistan Institute of Development Economics, PO Box 1091, QAU Campus, Islamabad, Federal Territory 44000, Pakistan School of Environment, Resources and Development, Asian Institute of Technology, PO Box 4, Klong Luang, Pathumthani-12120, Thailand

A R T I C L E I N F O

Article history: Received 14 February 2015 Received in revised form 30 August 2016 Accepted 31 August 2016 Available online xxx Keywords: Public property commons Mangroves Indus delta Policy analysis Institutional analysis Natural resources management

A B S T R A C T

Public property common pool resources in many developing countries are often portrayed as being in a dismal state, allegedly due to their governments’ inability to manage them sustainably. While this explanation may have some merit, it is certainly inadequate. Instead, we argue that public property commons degrade partially because governments, in their attempt to obtain an overall societal balance, sometime accord low priority to some resources and bestow their ownership to an agency that may lack the appropriate mandate. While for many governments, this tendency is deliberate, it results in a de jure public property commonly exhibiting de facto open-access status and creates a situation where anybody may benefit but nobody feels responsible for the conservation and management of such resources. Based on the policy and institutional analyses of mangrove management in the Indus Delta of Pakistan, we propose such a case for theoretical debate on the issue. We conclude that instead of packaging and allocating rights to a single entity, rights in complex CPRs may be defined and allocated separately to different entities to produce socially desired goods and services. No matter how complex it seems, such an arrangement is necessary to deal with the complexity inherent in various socio-ecological systems like mangroves. ã 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction The intergenerational well-being of humankind requires prudent use of the earth’s finite resources. Societies often establish property rights institutions to conserve important common pool resources (CPR) to fulfill the requirements of both current and future generations. Scholars generally agree that effective CPR conservation requires stewardship (Agrawal et al., 2008; Gibbs and Bromley, 1989; Hardin, 1968, 1998; Ostrom, 1990), but noticeably disagree over the effectiveness of different forms of property in this regard. For the last few decades, theoretical debates and empirical research have attempted to define various concepts related to CPR situations (Dietz et al., 2002) and their outcomes when managed under private, communal or public property arrangements (Ostrom, 2009; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). Subsequently, researchers undertook many studies of CPR outcomes under different property arrangements, and they drew conclusions about one property regime’s supremacy over the others (e.g., Ahmed

* Corresponding author. Tel.: +92 18126060012. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected] (J.A. Memon), [email protected] (G.B. Thapa). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2016.08.014 1462-9011/ã 2016 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

et al., 2012; Andersson et al., 2014; Bonilla-Moheno et al., 2013). Findings are converging on the point that, regardless of any forms of property, “successful” CPR management largely depends on the effectiveness of the compliance mechanism underlying any property regime (Agrawal et al., 2008; Coleman, 2009; Ostrom, 1992; Schlager and Ostrom, 1992). Nonetheless, the conceptual, analytical and prescriptive clarity that comparative research on property-rights regimes provides is helpful until one assumes that different owners (e.g., individuals, communities, or government agencies) of a resource system (e.g., a forest) may be pursuing a generic objective (which can be anything, including sustainably using resource system for subsistence and/or profit-generating purposes). We contend that in realworld CPR situations, it is not necessary to hold this assumption consistently, as owners may have varying concerns for their resource endownment. Thus, they may take good care of some resource system components more than the others, depending on the importance they place on different components within that resource system. Thus, it is easy to conceptualize a private forest owner losing his/her interest in forests and favoring other land uses, showing more concern about the land than the vegetation covering it. Examples include the Doi Moi policy in Vietnam that gave

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mangrove parcels to individual households in order to conserve them. Conversely, this policy furthered mangrove loss, as many households preferred using forestland for aquaculture, considering that they owned the property and they could use it the way they wanted (Hong, 1993). The same is possible, even for common property, if the community can build such a consensus, which may be difficult due to intra-group inequalities and conflicts (Agrawal et al., 2013; Andersson and Agrawal, 2011), but certainly not impossible. A similar possibility also exists regarding public property, but is not that obvious because scholars often deal with this form of property as a monolithic concept. However, our argument is not only valid but also most crucial in the case of public property primarily for two reasons, which we will proceed to explain. First, public property is inherently an aggregate concept, since it stems from the concept of a “government” consisting of nothing but a set of diverse institutions, organizations and agencies designed to achieve an overall societal balance (social, economic and environmental) within and outside its national boundaries. Therefore, under the caption of “public or government property,” different state agencies may own different patches of a forest, rangeland or other resource system. In view of the bundle of rights associated with different positions (see, Schlager and Ostrom, 1992), a government agency that retains a public property may be termed a “proprietor.” However, we prefer the term owner here, following Sabatier (1987) and Staudt (1991)’s argument that not only private, but also government agencies and ministries compete with each other for resources and jurisdictions in the pursuit of meeting their vested interests. Depending on such agencies’ primary mandates, their actions may complement, overlap or contradict the national objectives of sustainable conservation and management of different types of renewable natural resources. In Thailand, for example, despite being under the same ministry, the Forest Department had been restoring the degraded mangroves,

while the Fisheries Department was granting mangrove concessions for aquaculture development (Huitric et al., 2002). Secondly, the diversity underneath the concept of public property is important in the case of forest, rangelands and wetlands due to the amount of these resources that the government owns. For example, FAO (2010) reported that about 80 percent of the global forestlands are state-owned. Given the size of government ownership and number of owners/subcontractors who actually maintain the lands, the concern over public property is proportionately high. A general explanation that governments in many developing countries lack adequate resources to effectively manage and conserve their CPRs may still hold, but it is certainly inadequate. Our explanation postulates that public property commons are in a dismal state partially because governments, in their attempt to obtain an overall societal balance, sometimes accord them low priority and transfer their ownership to an apparently unconcerned agency. This is particularly true for land-based resources like forests, including mangroves, rangelands and wetlands, where many agencies would be interested in owning the land but not necessarily in caring about the grass, trees and mangroves or other parts of the property. In such cases, the de facto open-access status of public property CPRs is deliberate and conceptually different from “management failure,” an idea only relevant when an agency or owner officially subscribes to the objective of sustainable conservation and management of a CPR. Accepting our explanation of the de facto open access of de jure public property commons lead to a great deal of complexity into our analyses because it poses broader research questions, such as why some governments are able to bring better outcomes for their CPRs than others while attempting a balance among social, economic and environmental choices. Normally, our narrow disciplinary view and training does not allow for the holistic but messy analyses required for answering such broad questions. To

Fig. 1. Location of the study area showing the boundaries of the PQA, SFD and SBR.

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deal with this problem, we propose an analysis of institutional appropriateness for public property CPRs under the jurisdictions of different government agencies and their operations within the broader policy framework of a nation state. We exemplify our proposal by using the Indus Delta mangroves in Pakistan as a case. It is an appropriate example as the mangrove commons are under the jurisdictions of multiple agencies, each having its own primary mandate. We will begin by elaborating on our methodological approach (Section 2), and then we will present the results of our policy and institutional analyses of the Indus Delta mangrove conservation and management (Section 3). Based on our results, we will discuss our findings from a broader theoretical perspective and will draw conclusions of theoretical and empirical importance (Section 4). 2. Research methods 2.1. Location and selection of study area The Indus is the most prominent trans-Himalayan river system in South Asia. It originates from Lake Mansarovar near Mount Kailash, runs about 3180 kilometers southwestward through China and India, and enters Pakistan, where it widens into a 250 kilometer-wide delta to empty itself into the Arabian Sea (Fig. 1). The Indus Delta constitutes about one fourth of Pakistan’s coastline, but it harbors more than 90 percent of its mangrove cover (IUCN-Pakistan, 2005). Since the ownership of the Indus Delta region rests with multiple government agencies, we selected it as our study area. Nevertheless, we did not cover the entire Indus Delta region, particularly in our institutional analysis. This was because the excluded area either did not contain any mangroves (such as in the Badin District), or their share was negligible (such as the Karachi Port Trust (KPT), which houses less than one percent of the mangroves). Finally, we considered only three agencies: the Port Qasim Authority (PQA), the Sindh Forest Department (SFD) and the Sindh Board of Revenue (SBR) altogether claiming 90 percent of the mangroves in Pakistan (Fig. 1). 2.2. Policy and institutional analyses criteria and indicators Contrary to the contemporary thinking that considers mangroves to be complex ecosystems, policymakers in Pakistan still

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treat these ecosystems primarily as a type of forest. Thus, the forest policies have always had a major influence on mangrove management. However, the National Conservation Strategy and the Environment and Climate Change Policies also have some explicit concerns about mangroves. We analyzed all these policies based on four indicators: (1) broader policy objectives and their emphasis on mangrove conservation, (2) preferred management regimes to achieve the intended objectives, (3) attitude towards the forest-dependent communities, and (4) the state of policy implementation. We conceptualized our institutional analysis based on the work of Agrawal (2002) and Agrawal et al. (2008) who systematically reviewed the published research to enlist the factors influencing CPR governance under common property arrangements. Considering that the entire list of factors is not universally applicable to diverse CPR situations, (Agrawal, 2002; Gautam and Shivakoti, 2005; Nightingale, 2011), and particularly in the case of public property commons, we considered only four criteria for the institutional analysis. The criteria were: (1) boundary and property rights issues; (2) efforts made in the restoration and conservation of mangroves; (3) the mechanism for monitoring the use and status of mangroves; and, (4) mechanisms to ensure local communities’ participation in mangrove management. Each of these criteria comprised several indicators as reflected in Table 1. 2.3. Study approach and data collection and anlaysis For our policy and institutional analyses, we relied on published sources (such as mangrove management plans, forest and forest related policy documents), in-depth interviews with key governmental and non-governmental officials, and group discussions with local people. The first author spent about 15 months in the field during 2009 and 2014. He personally carried out 18 semistructured interviews in private settings, of which 12 were with the officials working for the three government agencies, three with the representatives of two environmental INGOs, and three with the representatives of local NGOs involved in mangrove conservation. Government officials included the conservator, divisional and range forest officers, forest guards, officials of the Environment and Safety (E&S) Division of the PQA, and local revenue officials from the Thatta district. Although the in-depth interviews mostly served the institutional analysis, the policy analysis also benefited from

Table 1 Framework for the institutional analysis of mangrove management. Parameters and Indicators

Data type and sources

1. Boundary and property rights in mangrove areas - Delineation of boundaries - Managerial staff’s familiarity with the boundaries - Field staff’s familiarity with the boundaries - Stipulation of property rights in mangrove areas - Stipulation of access and withdrawal rights of local communities

Qualitative data from field observation, interviews, policy documents

2. Capacity to monitor local activities in mangroves - Provision of field staff for monitoring - Enforcement of the laws on the use of mangroves - Authority to take legal action against violators of the rules

Qualitative data obtained through interviews and FGDs

3. Restoration and conservation of mangroves - Efforts taken for restoration and conservation - In-house expertise in planting and restoration - Partnership with other agencies for mangrove conservation

Qualitative and Quantitative data from interviews, field visits & project documents

4. Community participation initiatives - Community participation in mangrove management - Community participation in mangrove restoration - Community awareness-raising on the importance of mangroves

Qualitative data from interviews and FGDs

Note: “FGDs” stands for Focus Group Discussions.

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this exercise, as it helped us to understand the linkages between policies and their impact on mangrove management. He also interviewed male members1 of nine arbitrarily selected communities, three from the jurisdiction of each agency. He used the Sindhi and Urdu languages in all official and community interviews. See Supplementary materials for interview protocols, details of the questions asked and selected snapshots of the field activity. We analyzed the interview and group discussion data by customizing McCracken’s five-step approach to analyze long interviews (McCracken, 1988). We started by reading the interview and discussion transcripts multiple times to better understand the content and identify useful notes and observations. We then worked out descriptive and analytic categories for these notes and observations; wrote memos to link them with relevant literature, theories, and our thoughts; and created free codes. We then examined these codes to highlight consistent and divergent patterns running through the data; clustered them around the study’s basic themes; and drew analytic conclusions. 3. Results 3.1. Evolving policy concerns The scientific management of South Asian forests is rooted in the revenue-seeking policies of the British colonial rulers during 1858–1947. They declared the Sunderbans (now Bangladesh and India) and Matang (Malaysia) mangroves as “reserve forests” to be managed through a silvicultural system (Iftekhar, 2008). The Indus Delta region as a whole did not attract the British, apparently because of its perceived low economic value, except in the Kharo Chan and Keti Bandar sub-districts, where flood recession agriculture was possible. The remaining deltaic lands were unsuitable for agriculture, but had extensive natural mangrove growth. Therefore, the British rulers designated the non-cultivable deltaic lands, including mangrove forests, as wasteland. Since the cultivated lands were sources of revenue, the entire area comprising both cultivable and non-cultivable lands came under the administrative jurisdiction of the then-Board of Revenue. In 1946, one of the colonial foresters proposed the scientific management of the Indus Delta mangroves (SFD, 1985) but his proposal went unnoticed, as it came at the time when colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent was about to end. After its independence in 1947, Pakistan continued the British-Indian Forest Policy (1894) for seven years until the policymakers realized that the country needed forest expansion to meet the domestic demand for forest products. By 1954, it was already clear that the colonial policy would not help in forest “expansion” as it primarily sought to “preserve” the existing forests (Table 2). Therefore, the country urgently sought a policy with provisions for forest “expansion.” In response, the government announced the National Forest Policy (1955), which emphasized planting fast-growing exotic species along roads, railways and canals, and on wastelands (Table 2). This policy was a watershed for Indus Delta mangrove management, as it spurred the Sindh Forest Department (SFD, 2012) to demand the ownership of the deltaic “wastelands,” which were already covered with mangrove forests. In 1958, the Forestry Section of the West Pakistan Food and Agriculture Department declared these mangroves as a “protected forest.” This decision bestowed SFD with the ownership and management of 344,870 ha (out of a total of 604,870 ha) of deltaic land area. The land transferred to SFD was comprised of two blocks, namely the Keti

1 Due to religious and cultural restrictions, it was not possible to bring female members in the group discussions.

Bandar Block and Shah Bandar Block, and in between these two lay the cultivable part of the delta that still rests with the then-Board of Revenue, now called the Sindh Board of Revenue (SBR) (Fig. 1). For the effective management of mangroves, the SFD established a Coastal Zone Afforestation Division (CZAD) with three main objectives. The first objective was to take over the full control of mangroves, which were the main source of firewood and fodder for local communities, and generate revenue from them. With a little agitation, the local communities conceded the mangroves’ ownership to the SFD and agreed to pay a nominal fee for the materials collected from mangroves. The second objective was to plant mangroves on fallow mudflats, and the third and most important objective was to collect the information it required to prepare a scientific management plan for mangroves in compliance with the forest policy (Table 2). The CZAD introduced the SFD’s first mangrove management plan for twenty years, valid from 1963 to 1983. With scant in-house knowledge on mangroves and their management, the plan relied substantially on experiences gained from having managed the Sunderbans of the then-East Pakistan (Bangladesh since 1971). Following the Forest Policies of 1962 (Table 2) during this period, the SFD primarily sought to plant commercially valuable exotic mangrove species on empty mudflats. The plan’s other objective was to keep a healthy mangrove cover in order to protect the coastline, inland agriculture, and human settlements from cyclones and saline water intrusion (SFD, 1964). Still halfway through its implementation, the plan failed to fulfill the main policy objective, viewing forests as a source of national income (Table 2). Hitherto this point, the SFD was auctioning the standing mangrove trees on the condition that the bidder would bear all costs associated with timber harvest and transportation. Soon the department realized that the dominant Avicennia marina species (making up more than 90 percent of the vegetation in their area) could produce only a poor quality (fourth grade) firewood and had no other direct economic value (see the mangrove wood classification by Becking et al., 1922 in Chapman, 1976). Additionally, transporting wood from creeks by boats was also uneconomical. In some cases, the cost of tree felling and transportation was twice the revenue. Obviously, no one was enthusiastic to bid for mangroves, resulting in the abolition of the CZAD in 1975 (SFD, 1985). As a last resort, the department established a Mangrove Forest Utilization Wing for absolute departmental exploitation that, too, proved futile on economic grounds. Ultimately, the idea of commercial mangrove exploitation was abandoned (SFD, 1985). During the 1970s, the government created the Port Muhammad Bin Qasim Authority (PQA) to foster the naval trade and asked the SFD to hand over 64,000 ha of mangrove-covered areas to the Authority. Given the low direct economic benefit from mangroves, the SFD lacked justification for not making this decision. Besides this, the longstanding British-Indian Forest Policy (1894) considering forests subordinate to other “valuable” land uses, such as agriculture (Table 2), tacitly facilitated the transfer of mangroves to the Authority (Fig. 1). Apparently, at that time virtually no serious policy concern existed about the ecological, aesthetic and social values of mangroves. The PQA cleared a few thousand hectares of mangroves for the construction of basic port infrastructure and facilities. Occasionally, they still clear mangroves, albeit at a small scale each time, to construct new jetties. However, the remaining standing mangroves under the jurisdiction of the PQA still hold “protected forest” status. The SFD did virtually nothing for mangrove management until it prepared the second working plan for mangroves, also valid for twenty years (1985–2005). It also created a Coastal Forest Division

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Table 2 Salient features of forestry and related national policies in Pakistan. Policy

Salient features and emphasis

- Function-based classification of forests (Balaji, 2002) British-Indian Forest Policy 1894 (continued - Forest as a source of revenue for the state (Ali, 2009; Millat e until 1955) MUSTAFA, 2002) - Permanent agriculture superior to forests (Millat e MUSTAFA, 2002) - Community rights confined to second-class forests (Millat e MUSTAFA, 2002; Babar et al., 2007) - Forest preservation rather than expansion (Babar et al., 2007) - Forest Department (FD)a to determine what local communities could collect from forests (Suleri, 2003)

Implementation - Implemented effectively due to strict command and control of colonial foresters (Ali, 2009; Babar et al., 2007)

Forestry Policy Resolution, 1955

- Ineffective due to lack of funds and reluctant bureaucrats (Ali, 2009; - Forests as contributors in economic development (Ali, 2009; Millat e MUSTAFA, 2002; Nizamani and Shah, 2004; Suleri, 2003) Babar et al., 2007) - Utility-based classification of forests (Ali, 2009; Millat e MUSTAFA, 2002) - Forest management through Working Plans (Ali, 2009; Millat e MUSTAFA, 2002; Nizamani and Shah, 2004) - Afforestation of wastelands, road and canal sides (Ali, 2009; Babar et al., 2007; Nizamani and Shah, 2004; Suleri, 2003) - Integrated forest, wildlife and soil conservation (Millat e MUSTAFA, 2002)

Directives on Forestry, Watershed, Range Management and Soil Conservation, 1962

- Intensive forest management (Ali, 2009; Millat e MUSTAFA, 2002; - Policy remained ineffective Nizamani and Shah, 2004) - Idea of evacuation was abandoned as resettlement issues were not - Transfer of wastelands to FD for afforestation (Millat e MUSTAFA, addressed (Babar et al., 2007; Suleri, 2003) 2002; Nizamani and Shah, 2004) - Research on fast-growing exotic species (Ali, 2009; Millat e MUSTAFA, 2002; Babar et al., 2007) - Farmers to plant a minimum number of trees on their farmlands (Babar et al., 2007; Nizamani and Shah, 2004; Suleri, 2003) - Forest fencing and evacuation of the local people (Ali, 2009; Babar et al., 2007; Nizamani and Shah, 2004; Suleri, 2003) - Forest Act 1927 expanded upon area earlier excluded (Ali, 2009; Nizamani and Shah, 2004) - Provision of penalties for forest offenses (Ali, 2009; Nizamani and Shah, 2004) - Extensive mangrove replanting (Nizamani and Shah, 2004)

Decision of the Council of Common Interest, 1975

- Exotic species to enhance forest productivity (Ali, 2009; Nizamani - Became redundant due to coup d’état in 1977 (Babar et al., 2007) and Shah, 2004) - Protection of forests and woody areas (Ali, 2009; Suleri, 2003) - Limited community rights to use forests (Ali, 2009; Nizamani and Shah, 2004; Suleri, 2003) - Deforestation control through education and awareness; adoption of punitive measures only as a last resort (Babar et al., 2007) - Private Forest Owners’ Cooperatives (Babar et al., 2007; Nizamani and Shah, 2004; Suleri, 2003) - FD’s authority to harvest timber from both public & private forests (Babar et al., 2007; Nizamani and Shah, 2004; Suleri, 2003)

National Agricultural Policy, 1980

- Afforestation of wastelands with exotic species (Babar et al., 2007; - Ineffective due to lack of concrete initiatives (Suleri, 2003) Nizamani and Shah, 2004; Suleri, 2003) - Monopoly of FDs on timber harvesting (Babar et al., 2007; Nizamani and Shah, 2004) - Community participation in afforestation (Babar et al., 2007; Nizamani and Shah, 2004; Suleri, 2003) - Creation of national parks (Babar et al., 2007)

National Forest Policy (NFP), 1991

- Social forestry linked with biodiversity, forest conservation and Ineffective due to vague prescription for achieving the policy objectives habitat improvement (Ali, 2009; Babar et al., 2007) (Babar et al., 2007; Suleri, 2003) - NGO intervention in participatory forest management (Ali, 2009) - Lease of public lands for private forestry (Ali, 2009) - Artificial regeneration of forests with high-quality seed (Ali, 2009) - Vast discretionary powers to FD to determine what local communities could collect from forests (Babar et al., 2007)

Executive Order 1993

- Ban was extended until 2001 (Suleri, 2003; Aftab and Hickey, 2010) - Two-year ban on commercial logging companies to check uncontrolled tree felling (Nizamani and Shah, 2004; Suleri, 2003; - Illegal felling increased (Nizamani and Shah, 2004; Suleri, 2003; Aftab Aftab and Hickey, 2010) and Hickey, 2010)

National Conservation Strategy (NCS), 1992

- Mangrove conservation emphasized in two of the 14 priority areas - Successful in awareness-raising but ineffective in implementation due (Starke, 1992) to unrealistic prescriptions (Ali, 2009; Hanson et al., 2001) - Community Forestry for second-class forests (Ali, 2009; Starke, 1992) - FD to control Reserve Forests until communities gain foresight (Ali, 2009)

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Table 2 (Continued) Policy

Salient features and emphasis

Implementation

National Forest Policies 2001–02, 2007, 2010 (Drafts) (all have mostly similar content)

- Sustainable development of Renewable Natural Resources (RNR) (MOELGRD, 2001; Raza Asif, 2007) - Provinces to decide commercial logging (MOELGRD, 2001; Raza Asif, 2007) - Substitutes to forest products to lessen stress on forests (MOELGRD, 2001) - Banned conversion of forests into other land uses (Raza Asif, 2007) - Provision of RNR management institutions (MOELGRD, 2001; Raza Asif, 2007) - Community participation in RNR management (MOELGRD, 2001; Raza Asif, 2007) - Conservation of fragile ecosystems like mangroves (MOELGRD, 2001; Raza Asif, 2007)

- None of the NFPs has been approved by the Parliament (Email communication with Babar Shahabaz, Forest Policy Analyst at Agriculture University, Faisalabad) - Provinces implemented a few prescriptions from the 2001 and 2010 NFPs (MCC, 2016)

National Forest Policy 2015 (Draft)b

- Massive reforestation, particularly on privately owned, communal/shamlat and Guzara forests (MCC, 2016) - Federal Forest Board to regulate inter-provincial timber movement/trade (MCC, 2016) - Ecological corridors to link forests ecosystems spatially and functionally (MCC, 2016) - Integreted approach to forest, wildlife and biodiversity management

- Parliamentary approval is pending. - So far, none of the provinces have committed financial resources for its implementation.

National Environmental Policy, 2005

- NCS as basis for environmental management (MOELGRD, 2005) - Ineffective due to weak institutional support (TEI, 2008) - Coastal pollution and deforestation as key problems (MOELGRD, 2005) - Effective implementation of forest policies (MOELGRD, 2005) - Community participation in mangrove rehabilitation (MOELGRD, 2005)

National Climate Change - Mangroves classified primarily as a type of forest (MCC, 2012) Policy 2012 - Mangrove restoration for carbon sequestration and coastal protection (MCC, 2012) - Adaptive forest management with greater community participation (MCC, 2012) - Environmental flows downstream for healthy mangrove ecosystem (MCC, 2012) a b

- Still unknown

As most policies have a broader scope (nationl or transnational), the term Forest Department (FD) is more appropriate than the Sindh Forest Department (SFD). Among various other changes, the 18th ammendement in the Constitution of Pakistan enhanced provincial autonomy in various sectors, including forestry.

(CFD) to implement the plan smoothly. Henceforth, the management envisaged expanding the mangrove cover. Although the key objectives of this plan were similar to those of its predecessor, it explicitly acknowledged the mangroves’ protective and productive values (SFD, 1985). Additionally, the department also considered raising public awareness on the indirect benefits of mangroves. The plan was also concerned about the sustained supply of firewood and fodder to the local communities. Following the plan, the department planted more mangroves (IUCN-Pakistan, 2005). Since the second working plan expired in 2005, the SFD has not made any new plan yet specifically for the mangroves. Meanwhile, Pakistan was busy in developing the world’s largest irrigation network on the Indus River. The network was so huge that by the 1970s it diverted most of the river water into the upstream canals and reduced the flood regimes to the downstream delta region (Memon and Thapa, 2011). Consequently, the central delta’s agricultural mudflats (Keti Bandar and Kharo Chan subdistricts) could no longer support cultivating red paddy and largescale livestock herding, and they were eventually abandoned (Memon and Thapa, 2011). In the absence of fresh water, the sea intruded into these lands and facilitated natural mangrove growth. These newly emerged mangroves came under the SBR’s jurisdiction by default (Fig. 1). It is pertinent to note throughout the evolution of forestry policies in Pakistan that mangroves first received explicit attention in 1962, were almost overlooked during the interim period until the NCS in 1992, and have been a matter of continuous concern thereafter (Table 2). The revitalized interest in mangrove

conservation was partly inspired by an emerging global view during the 1980s that mangroves are highly valuable ecosystems providing numerous productive and protective services to humankind. The most recent policies, such as the draft Forest Policies of 2001, 2007 and 2015, the Environmental Policy of 2005, and the Climate Change Policy of 2012, have also emphasized mangrove conservation in view of their ecological, social and economic significance (Table 2). Nevertheless, the then-governments could not take any solid meaningful action due to the draft status of the 2001 and later forest policies. Meanwhile, the Environmental Climate Change Policies provide an overarching framework for mangrove conservation, though no meaningful actions pertinent to these policies have been taken yet (Table 2). 3.2. Institutional arrangements 3.2.1. Boundary and property rights issues in mangrove areas The demarcation of mangrove areas under the jurisdictions of the PQA, SFD and SBR was clear, as most of the time, creeks served as a boundary. In areas where creeks were absent, the SFD had installed concrete pillars in 1962 to prevent any encroachment from agriculture and human settlements. Later, when the department realized that encroachment was unlikely due to the unavailability of fresh water in mangrove areas, it stopped maintaining the pillars, which have now almost entirely disappeared from the scene. In the SBR area, besides creeks, various manmade features like canals and roads also served as boundaries. In addition to the SBR

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officials, many local people could easily identify such boundaries. However, the headquarters-based PQA and SFD officials were unclear about the boundaries. In particular, SFD officials could identify only those boundaries where the demarcating feature was one of the 17 major creeks of the Indus Delta, but they were unsure of boundaries marked by a minor or unnamed creek. Moreover, the frequent transfer and postings in these agencies hinder the managerial staff’s ability to familiarize themselves with boundaries in a conventional way. Land rights in SFD and PQA areas were straightforward, as land there was a public property without any private claim. However, the land rights in the SBR area were somewhat complex. It was gathered based on ZDA (2011) that about 25 percent of the lands in the Keti Bandar and Kharo Chan sub-districts were private individually-owned property (locally called Qabooli land). Five percent of the land accounted for settlements, roads and canals. The remaining two thirds of the land was public property (locally called Na-Qabooli land). Local communities’ access and withdrawal rights in the SFD and PQA-claimed mangrove areas were clear due to their status as “protected forests.” In a protected or second-class forest, local people could legally collect forest products for their subsistence but not for commercial purposes. However, an official of the Coastal Forest Division (SFD) mentioned that: “ . . . In reality, it is difficult to protect a second-class forest [mangroves]. We [SFD] simply cannot stop local people even from extremely harmful practices such as reckless camel browsing on mangroves done in the name of their [local people’s] subsistence. This is happening because the mangroves are protected forests where we have limited control. I would rather propose to declare these [mangroves] as ‘Reserve Forests’. .” Regarding the mangroves in the SBR area, the agency felt virtually no concern about access and use rights, as mangrove management was not its primary responsibility. Despite such limitations, the local communities do not collect wood from these mangroves, since these mangroves were still young, lacking the required amount of dead wood. The communities living in the SBR area were collecting firewood from the mangroves located along Dabbo, Chan and Kajhar Creeks an area that belong to the SFD. While the departmental boundaries were meaningless for local people, SFD could not strictly enforce rules protecting its mangroves. 3.2.2. Institutional capacity to monitor mangroves All three agencies had field staff, but none, except the SFD, had held them specifically responsible for monitoring and managing mangroves. Reportedly, the SFD also could not monitor mangroves effectively due to an inadequate number of field staff and difficult logistics, such as securing patrolling boats. The SFD had legal provisions in place (like fines and sanctions) on the prohibited use of mangroves, but arresting and prosecuting violators rarely happened in the SFD’s case. The group discussions held with the local communities revealed that they held a tacit consensus that herders would avoid grazing their camels in the planted mangroves, whereas the SFD would not strictly prohibit their activities in the naturally grown mangroves. Both the PQA and SBR did not report any professional forestry staff. In the PQA’s case, the concerned official reported that although they did not appoint anybody to monitor the use and status of mangroves, their security guards were doing the needed task while routinely watching the port’s other assets and infrastructure. The fact was, however, not consistent with what the officials said, as reflected in the following expression from a group discussion in the PQA area:

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“ . . . Every day, I collect fodder from [PQA] mangroves for my cattle. . I do not collect much [ ]. . The security guards [of PQA] never stop me or any other villagers no matter what amount of fodder or firewood we collect. They stop us only when we approach the designated ‘danger zone’ [route of cargo ships].” Since the SBR had not specified any set of rules and regulations on mangrove use, primarily because their mandate was to collect revenue from the private land owners and mangroves were nothing but wild vegetation on its wastelands. Therefore, the local communities had free access to mangroves in their jurisdiction. 3.2.3. Restoration and conservation of mangroves The SFD had pioneered mangrove restoration and conservation in the Indus Delta. They had planted nearly 20,000 ha of mangrove in discrete locations (IUCN Pakistan, 2005). Although at a smaller scale, the PQA had also supported planting at least 1200 ha of mangroves (IUCN Pakistan, 2000; WWF Pakistan, 2003). Most plantings replaced the mangroves cleared for the development of additional port facilities. However, mangrove planting was not a matter of concern for the SBR. With an underlying objective of enhancing the mangroves’ financial viability, the SFD had made significant attempts to propagate the extinct and exotic mangrove species in the Indus Delta. To some extent, the agency had been successful in reintroducing Rhizophora mucronata. In the past, the SFD introduced various commercially important exotic species, such as Excoecaria agallocha and Nypa fruticans, but did not continue with them because of their low survival rates. Therefore, only the Rhizophora mucronata species is currently planted in the Indus Delta. The SFD has built their in-house capacity for mangrove planting through a long process of trial and error, while PQA and SBR lack such capacity. The PQA had tried to overcome such difficulty by seeking the needed technical assistance from the relevant local and international NGOs. None of the agencies, including the SFD, had made any systematic efforts for building institutional capacity in mangrove conservation and restoration through professional trainings and exposure trips for their staff. The SFD realized that this need existed, but they reportedly lacked the required financial resources, while the PQA and SBR had no concern about this aspect of mangrove management. The SFD had accomplished almost all mangrove plantings in collaboration with regional and international agencies, such as the World Bank, the United Nations, the IUCN and the WWF. It had a long-established partnership with the aforementioned agencies while pursuing mangrove conservation and restoration (IUCNPakistan, 2005). The PQA had also collaborated with NGOs like Shirkat-Gah, the WWF and the IUCN for mangrove planting. However, the SBR had not carried out any such activity, either independently or in collaboration with other agencies. It neither encourages nor discourages any agency from launching a planting scheme in their jurisdiction, as this agency lacks concern for the deltaic land, which it considers to be wasteland. 3.2.4. Community participation in mangrove management and conservation None of the three agencies had any kind of arrangement for mustering local participation in mangrove conservation and management. Obviously, the PQA and SBR were unconcerned with mangroves due to the lack of formal mandate for it. However, despite being concerned with mangrove conservation and management but lacking the needed institutional capacity, the SFD also did not mobilize local communities to accomplish its mandate. It had simply prepared a list of mangrove-dependent communities for the entire Indus Delta region in 1998 (Shah, 1998).

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This list had become outdated and the department never utilized it for any demonstrable purpose. Contrary to the ground reality, SFD and PQA officials claimed that they were involving the local communities in mangrove restoration and planting. A follow-up discussion revealed that the so-called community participation was limited to the local people’s engagement as wage laborers for mangrove planting. Beyond this, none of the agencies had made any institutional arrangement to facilitate true community participation in mangrove conservation that required active community involvement in decision-making, planning and implementing various management and conservation activities. All three agencies lacked serious interest in participatory mangrove management systems that the National Conservation Strategy of 1992 advocates, at least for protected forests like mangroves (Table 2). 4. Discussion and theoretical implications The above analyses of policy and institutional arrangements for Indus Delta mangrove management exemplify our argument that public property is an aggregate concept that may disguise a whole range of government and quasi-government agencies claiming a CPR. Depending on the differences in their mandates, one can expect variations in their concerns over the sustainability of a public property resource and choice of management styles for such resources, which may lie along a continuum ranging from effective management to open access. The evolution of forest policies in Pakistan clearly suggests that the claim of agencies acting seemingly unconcerned about vast tracts of mangroves is an outcome of weak forest policies, showing a failure to appreiciate the full value of these ecosystems. The institutional analysis highlights that each of the three agencies, claiming to own deltaic lands, had a different level of concern for the mangroves under their possession. While the SFD was primarily concerned with mangroves, it also required land rights to protect them. However, the PQA was primarily interested in some land and creeks to facilitate its naval operations, but as such was unconcerned with mangroves. Nevertheless, the PQA’s showcased concern for mangroves was clearly strategic, as without being in the coastal region, where mangroves coexist, this agency cannot perform its operations. By adopting a rhetoric of concern for mangroves and carrying out replacement plantings, this agency preempts the possibility that the civil society would criticize them for occasionally clearning mangroves (see, Hagler-Baily, 2009). The SBR was the least concerned agency in relation to mangroves because the area covered with mangroves does not provide them any revenue. Therefore, the SBR treats these areas as “wastelands.” As both the PQA and SBR do not have any positive duty towards mangroves, it is just a matter of time until these deltaic lands, where they stand, no longer have any economically attractive use and these forests’ existence is threatened. Neither forest policies nor any other associated policy explicitly restrict PQA and SBR from activities which may threaten the mangroves’ existence. Upon seeing more lucrative opportunities, these agencies will not hesitate to sacrifice the mangroves in their area. In fact, various government agencies, including the PQA, SBR and KPT, and the land mafia frequently express their interest in creating urban development in these areas. Recently, the government announced a new coastal megacity called Zulfiqarabad, whose construction may result in losing at least 50 percent of the mangroves in Pakistan (Memon, 2012). However, the SFD may control any future encroachment of mangroves in its area if it has a strong commitment towards conserving these resources. Despite its demonstrated failure to protect mangroves in the past, the optimism with the SFD stems from the fact that mangrove conservation stands at the top of

environment and biodiversity conservation groups’, various national and international agencies’, and civil society organizations’ agendas. However, the degree to which the department may succeed would depend on its seriousness and ability to lobby against those who encroach upon mangrove areas. One may misperceive our institutional analysis as a comparison of different agencies and argue that, given the differences of their mandates, these agencies cannot be blamed for not managing the mangroves. We reiterate that we neither compare nor propose it as such. Instead, we ask if mangrove management is appropriately institutionalized. Therefore, for whatever reason, if an entity demands to own an ecologically important resource like mangroves, society must ensure that the entity is capable of managing it sustainably. Answering this question would enable us to determine what is and what is not reasonable to expect from the institutions in place for a particular resource. Until resource management is placed in the hands of seriously concerned owners, the societal desire for their intergenerational sustainability is mere daydreaming. While it seems easy to criticize governments for their inability to manage resources sustainably, we must not forget the conflicting societal objectives (social, economic and environmental) they strive to achieve simultaneously. Undoubtedly the governments struggle in their ability to enact effective resource stewardship (Danielson, 1995), in part due to our naïve policy prescriptions based on oversimplified models of society and its natural resources. This is due to the ignorance of two highly commonplace observations, which together deserve a central place in any theoretical debate on society and its natural resources and are defined in the following paragraph. Firstly, resources systems like forests have multiple functions, such as providing timber and other forest products, regulating hydrological and atmospheric regimes, and maintaining biodiversity. Secondly, societies also have multiple objectives and aspirations associated with such resource systems. However, in between these two, our theory remains incompatible, because while theorizing about societies and their natural resources, more often than not, we treat forests as only their land and trees, wetlands as only their land, water, and fish, and so on. Thus, often implicitly, we ignore other components of these systems and combine all associated property rights into a single package of ownership bestowed on exclusive owners (an individual, a community or a government entity). Such owners would frequently fail to do equally well with all components of these resource systems, due to their limited capacity, narrow focus, ignorance, or a variety of other reasons (e.g., Pandit and Thapa, 2003). In reality, however, both complex resource systems (such as forests, rangelands and wetlands), and multiple societal objectives for these resource systems are compatible with each other, albeit not with our theoretical models promoting “exclusive” ownership. For the intergenerational transfer of ecologically important resources, it is extremely important to abandon the practice of packaging different rights together and assigning them to a single enitity. The rights necessary to carry out socially desired activities may be allocated to different entities separately. In this kind of arrangement, entities like the PQA may have the right to carry out their naval activities, but may not have the right to ignore mangrove management; and therefore must yield to the SFD for such tasks and vice versa. This may create a complex set of rights and bring together diversified rights holders in a resource system, and these rights holders may come into conflict if their interests collide. Nevertheless, no matter how complex such an arrangement may look, it may be necessary in order to deal with the complexity inherent in various socio-ecological systems like mangroves. To achieve this objective, research may help to find

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ways to economize and simplify these complex and seemingly costly rights regimes and, in turn, increase their wider feasability in policy circles. Acknowledgements The authors would like to thank Miss Zubaida Birwani and Messrs Abudul Ghafar (Raju) Qureshi, Yaqoob Murger, Saleh Jat, Shafi Murger, Akhtar Samoon, and Mustafa Khudai for their support in the fieldwork. We are particularly thankful to our respondent communities and individuals, particularly Messrs. Sadiq Mughal, Agha Tahir Hussain, Madad A. Shah of the Sindh Forest Department, Messrs. Mumtaz H. Shah and Imtiaz Ahmad of the Port Qasim Authority, and Mr. Muhammad K. Khatti of the Sindh Board of Revenue. Last but not least, we are extremely thankful to two anonymous reviewers from Environmental Science and Policy and various researchers at Vincent and Elinor Ostrom’s Workshop in Political Theory and Policy Analysis, Indiana University, Bloomington, for their invaluable comments and suggestions for the manuscript. Appendix A. Supplementary data Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j. envsci.2016.08.014. References Aftab, E., Hickey, G.M., 2010. Forest administration challenges in Pakistan: the case of the Patriata Reserved Forest and the ‘New Murree Development’. Int. For. Rev. 12, 97–105. Agrawal, A., Chhatre, A., Hardin, R., 2008. Changing governance of the world’s forests. Science 320, 1460–1462. Agrawal, A., Brown, D.G., Rao, G., Riolo, R., Robinson, D.T., Bommarito Ii, M., 2013. Interactions between organizations and networks in common-pool resource governance. Environ. Sci. Policy 25, 138–146. Agrawal, A., 2002. Common resources and institutional sustainability. In: Ostrom, E., Dietz, T., Dolšak, N., Stern, P.C., Stonich, S., Weber, E.U. (Eds.), The Drama of the Commons. National Academy Press, Washington, DC, pp. 41–85. Ahmed, S., Perret, S.A., Nawaz, R., Shivakoti, G.P., 2012. Relationships between farm size and operational performances in irrigated cropping systems under contrasted governance systems in Punjab (Pakistan). J. Food Agric. Environ. 10, 463–467. Ali, J., 2009. Deforestation in the Himalayas: Mainstream Views, Institutional Failure and ‘Alternative Systems' A Case Study from Northern Pakistan. Norwegian University of Life Sciences, Norway. Andersson, K., Agrawal, A., 2011. Inequalities, institutions, and forest commons. Global Environ. Change 21, 866–875. Andersson, K., Benavides, J.P., León, R., 2014. Institutional diversity and local forest governance. Environ. Sci. Policy 36, 61–72. Babar, S., Ali, T., Suleri, A.Q., 2007. A criticial analysis of Forest Policies of Pakistan: implications for sustainable livelihoods. Mitig. Adapt. Strateg. Global Change 12, 441–453. Balaji, S., 2002. Forest policy in India–in retrospect and prospect. IUFRO Science/ Policy Interface Task Force Regional Meeting. Swaminathan Research Foundation, Chennai, India 16–19 July. Bonilla-Moheno, M., Redo, D.J., Aide, T.M., Clark, M.L., Grau, H.R., 2013. Vegetation change and land tenure in Mexico: a country-wide analysis. Land Use Policy 30, 355–364. V.J. Chapman, 1976. Mangrove vegetation, Vaduz.: J. Cramer Germany. Coleman, E.A., 2009. Institutional factors affecting biophysical outcomes in forest management. J. Policy Anal. Manage. 28, 122–146. Danielson, P., 1995. Who should own our forests? (Version 4.5). Earlier Presented at Symposium on Ethical Challenges for Foresters (September 27–28, 1991), Faculty of Forestry University of British Columbia. Dietz, T., Dolsak, N., Ostrom, E., Stern, P.C., 2002. The drama of the commons.. In: Ostrom, E., Dietz, T., Dolsak, N., Stern, P.C., Stonich, S., Elke, U. (Eds.), The Drama of the Commons. National Academy Press, Washington D.C, pp. 3–35. FAO, 2010. Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010: Main Report. Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, pp. 378. Gautam, A.P., Shivakoti, G.P., 2005. Conditions for successful local collective action in forestry: some evidence from the hills of Nepal. Soc. Nat. Resour. 18, 153–171. Gibbs, C.J.N., Bromley, D.W., 1989. Institutional arrangements for management of rural resources: common-property regimes. In: Berkes, F. (Ed.), Common

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