Policy note Falklands fishing The decision by the British Government to enforce control over the fisheries around the Falklands has probably been welcomed by most of those fishing there, although in some cases the welcome has been carefully hidden. The waters around the Falklands were the last great fishing area free of any national or international control. As such they had attracted increasing numbers of fishing vessels from East and West Europe and from Asia. This uncontrolled fishing was having the usual consequences of declining stocks, and falling catch rates. Operations still appear to be profitable. although this would be unlikely to continue if participation in the fishery continued to grow without control. Most participants would accept, if not welcome, controls, provided they were imposed reasonably, since this would give them a future in which there is less chance of the stocks collapsing, and in which the catch rates, and potential profits are higher, and possibly much higher, than would occur in the absence of controls. This is true even if some of the potential increase in profits is funnelled to the management authority as licence fees. The imposition of fishery controls has raised problems. Some of the more obvious ones, such as disputed sovereignty, are not discussed here. but there are a number of fishery issues that are highlighted by the British action. One is the benefits that can be derived by the coastal state. Most coastal states have seen extension of limits mainly as a step towards the replacement, wholly or partly. of the foreign fleets by local vessels. With the crews of the fishing fleets during the peak season numbering several times the total Falklands population, any replacement will be only marginal. Similarly the immediate prospects for developing shore facilities to handle more than a small fraction of the total catch are slim. The best prospects for the Falklands to receive a significant share of the
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benefits from the rich fisheries around the islands are from licence fees. Elsewhere comparatively little attention has been paid, except in the South Pacific, to licence fees as the main source of benefits. As a result there is an expectation that licence fees will be little more than nominal, perhaps covering the immediate c,>sts of management, and amounting to only a few percent of the first-hand value of the catch. In a potentially highly profitable fishery like the Falklands squid fishery there seems no reason why the licence fee could not account for a large part of the gross. with the fishery still being attractive to the foreign fleets. That is, with the total annual value of the catch being several tens of millions of dollars, the licence fees could well run into eight figures. The level of licence fee, and the number of licences issued can be decided by the Falklands authorities alone, although if they are set too high no one will fish. The Falklands can also determine by itself the other conditions under which fishing is done, eg the type of vessel, or level of catch, and conditions of reporting, vessel marking, etc needed to ensure, at minimum cost to the coastal state, that the conditions of access are being complied with. Two other matters require some degree of coordinated interaction.
Less direct knowledge One applies to any stock exploited by several countries. This is the pooling of data and research studies on the state of the stocks and the measures (eg the level of total allowable catch) required to conserve the stock and to achieve any other management objective, for example. to allow the generation of maximum licence fees. This might be done by the Falklands alone, using such data, eg detailed catch and effort statistics, as are supplied by the fishing countries. including data supplied as part of the condition of a licence. However British scientists have much less direct knowledge of the biology of the species than scientists in several of the fishing countries, and are also less well placed to carry
out studies at sea. The quality of the scientific assessments will obviously be higher if the experience and knowledge of these other scientists are available when the assessments are made. The other matter applies to those stocks that move between the zone round the Falklands and waters under other jurisdictions. If the movements are appreciable, uncontrolled fishing elsewhere could undermine, to a greater or lesser extent, the effectiveness of management measures taken within the Falklands zone. Both matters might bc handled by some form of international body. The record of these bodies is mixed. Scientists benefit from working together, and it is not surprising that the scientific analyses and advice produced by the various regional fisheries Commissions and similar bodies has often been very good. In taking management decisions, however, these bodies are usually constrained by having to reach unanimity, or near unanimity. Nearly all decisions that have been taken have been too weak or too late. Effective decisions on the management of the fisheries of the Patagonian shelf as a whole will have to wait until the UK and Argentina can sit down together. The prospects for scientific collaboration are better. FAO is already preparing a study of the resources of the area, which is in part a continuation of a study carried out by an FAO working party in 1983. The present study is being done by FAO staff, based on information submitted by all interested countries. It is to be hoped that it will soon be possible for all the scientists to work more closely together. whether through FAO, or under some other formal or informal arrangements. When that is done, there should be further improvements in our knowledge of the resources in the area, and hence in the ability to manage them.
John A. Gulland Marine Resources Assessment Group, imperial College London, UK
MARINE POLICY July 1987