False Allegations & Law Enforcement

C H AP TER 1 2

False Allegations & Law Enforcement Brent E. Turvey, PhD (USA)1, Det. John O. Savino (ret.) (USA)2 Forensic Solutions, LLC, & The Forensic Criminology Institute1; Manhattan Special Victim Squad, New York City Police Department, New York2

KEY TERMS Code of Silence or Blue Wall of Silence  “An unwritten code in many departments which prohibits disclosing perjury or other misconduct by fellow officers, or even testifying truthfully if the facts would implicate the conduct of a fellow officer” (Chin & Wells, 1998, p. 238). As explained further in Cooper (2009, p. 7): “Its foundational norm dictates that ‘cops protect cops.’” Noble cause  A cause that is characterized by high-moral traits, values, and ideals. Noble cause corruption  The belief that corruption is justified by having a noble cause, or being on the morally correct side of a conflict; that the ends justify the means refers to corrupt or illegal acts committed by law enforcement to secure or maintain an arrest or conviction, or some other worthy end.

Law enforcement officers have a primary capacity in false reporting as prescribed by their oaths of office and statutory duty of care. They serve as criminal investigator. They are responsible for receiving reports of crime; investigating reports of crime; and arresting those determined to be responsible. Making a false allegation, it has been established, is a criminal act. Law enforcement officers are therefore responsible for identifying false reporters and arresting them, just as they would any criminal. This should not need explaining, but so few law enforcement officers understand this responsibility that must be repeated, as often as possible. Apart from this role, it is necessary to accept the fact that law enforcement intersects with false allegations in at least two other ways. Firstly, they can be the party that makes the false allegation. And secondly, they can be the object, or victim, of the false allegation. To fully understand the circumstances under which these scenarios can occur, it is first necessary to review law enforcement culture, noble cause corruption, the blue wall of silence, and the role of deception throughout.1

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The first half of this chapter has been adapted from material first published in Turvey (2013).

False Allegations. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/B978-0-12-801250-5.00012-4 Copyright © 2018 Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved.

CONTENTS Law Enforcement Discretion and Integrity������������� 282 Traits of Law Enforcement Culture�������������� 282 Noble Cause and Corruption��������� 283 The Blue Wall of Silence��������������� 285 The Use of Deception���������� 290 Law Enforcement as the False Reporter������������ 294 Means of False Reporting������������������ 294 Motives for False Reporting������������������ 296

Law Enforcement as the Victim of False Reporting� 298 Solutions to False Reporting in Law Enforcement����� 301 281

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Summary����������� 302 References�������� 303 Further Reading305

These issues must be considered in light of the fact that law enforcement is also uniquely situated to be an essential gatekeeper with respect to false reports. Not just of those brought forth by pseudovictims in the public realm. Law enforcement, of all strata, is in a unique position to craft and even validate false allegations of crime made by themselves, or been their own. In the same way, they control the manner of filing grievances and seeking redress.

LAW ENFORCEMENT DISCRETION AND INTEGRITY To do their work, it is understood that law enforcement agents will need to violate some of the laws that the rest of us must abide, including those related to traffic ordinances, privacy, firearms possession/use, property seizure, the use of coercive force, and the use of lethal force (Bopp & Schultz, 1972; Brennan, Rostow, Davis, & Hill, 2009; Chappell & Piquero, 2004; Kleinig, 1996; Leonard, 1969; Marche, 2009). In other words, the police must sometimes break the law to uphold it. They are, in fact, exempt from numerous legal conventions and enjoy the privilege of exercising tremendous authority over regular citizens, as long as they are working in an official capacity (Brennan et al., 2009; Chappell & Piquero, 2004; Kleinig, 1996; Waddington, 1999). This means that those employed by law enforcement agencies are required to walk a fine line while discharging their duties. On one hand, they must strive to represent law and justice to the community through honest, fair, and professional conduct. On the other hand, they are uniquely permitted to break laws that regular citizens are required to uphold. As explained in Waddington (1999, p. 287): “The notion that the police possess a distinctive occupation sub-culture… derives from the discovery that police work is rarely guided by legal precepts… police officers exercise extensive discretion in how they enforce the law.” Ideally, this requires the ability to exercise discretion without a great deal of direct supervision, while consistently refusing endless opportunities to engage in graft and corruption (Chappell & Piquero, 2004; Hickman, Piquero, Lawton, & Greene, 2001; Kleinig, 1996; Klockars, Ivkovich, Harver, & Haberfeld, 2000; Seron, Pereira, & Kovath, 2004; Westmarland, 2005).

TRAITS OF LAW ENFORCEMENT CULTURE The literature provides numerous studies on the cardinal traits of law enforcement culture. Although this body of research has not identified a universal police culture, there are reoccurring themes and elements. Though often developed to protect an agency and its members, many, if not most, of these traits can be seen as eventual facilitators of corruption. Waddington (1999) describes law enforcement as a canteen or clannish subculture, explaining (p. 287): “The core referents of ‘police sub-culture’ are clear enough: its sense of mission; the desire for action and excitement, especially the

Noble Cause and Corruption

glorification of violence; an Us/Them division of the social world with in-group isolation and solidarity on the one hand, and racist components on the other; its authoritarian conservatism; and its suspicion and cynicism, especially towards the law and legal procedures.” This is reinforced by the research presented in Terrill, Paoline, and Manning (2003) that occupational pressure, anxiety, and strain “produce two defining outcomes of police culture–isolation and group loyalty,”(p. 1006). Paoline (2004) goes on to report that law enforcement (p. 207): “attitudes, values, and norms include a distrust and suspiciousness of citizens and a prescription to assess people and situations in terms of their potential threat (i.e., maintaining the edge), a lay-low or cover-your-ass orientation to police work that would discourage the initiation of contacts with citizens and supervisors, a strong emphasis on the law enforcement elements of the police role, a we-versus-they attitude toward citizens, and the norm of loyalty to the peer group.” Cancino and Enriquez (2004) similarly note the following as central traits: the employment of “street justice,” secrecy, solidarity, and the acceptance of peer-retaliation for violating any of these. Wolfe and Picquero (2011) agree, providing that (p. 334): “Policing is characterized by a close-knit subculture because the ‘unique demands that are placed on police officers, such as the threat of danger as well as scrutiny by the public, generate a tightly woven environment conducive to the development of feelings of loyalty,’ (Skolnick, 2005, p. 302).” Based on the body of literature referenced in this work, the reoccurring traitthemes in law enforcement culture include the following: 1. A “Noble Cause” belief system. 2. Professional identity attached to authoritative/coercive control of citizens. 3. Professional identity attached to masculinity and aggression, to the point of open discrimination and harassment within law enforcement ranks. 4. Solidarity/loyalty to the group. 5. Fierce protection of group and coworker image of integrity. 6. Deception as a viable means to an end. 7. Isolation/“Us versus Them” outlook/mistrust of outsiders. 8. Cynicism and mistrust towards the law. 9. Secrecy/“Code of Silence”/“The Blue Wall of Silence.” 10. Punishment and ostracism for those who break the code.

NOBLE CAUSE AND CORRUPTION Law enforcement culture is defined by the belief that theirs is a noble cause. A feature of this belief is that a war against crime is currently being waged against particular evils or societal ills (e.g., drugs, terrorism, gang violence), and that those working for law enforcement are on the only good or moral side of the

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conflict. By extension, anyone not working with or supporting law enforcement is on the wrong side of the conflict, protecting or practicing evil. Commitment to this noble cause means an absolute commitment to preventing illegal activity and apprehending criminal offenders, also referred to as “getting bad guys off the street” (Caldero & Crank, 2004, p. 29). As described in Garcia (2005, p. 68): The officer is expected to seek out situations where crimes can be detected and criminals apprehended. Accordingly, the good officer holds to the noble cause of fighting crime and helping the victim… and to an image of being adventurous and brave… The good officer must carry a gun and handcuffs and ‘charge the tower’ at the sight of crime. However, in the process of becoming a good officer and internalizing police culture, the good officer also becomes cynical and distrusting of the citizens he or she polices…

Dedication to the noble cause both inspires the values of law enforcement culture and acts as justification for individual officer decisions (Crank, Flaherty, & Giacomazzi, 2007). Noble cause corruption, as it is termed, refers to corrupt or illegal acts committed by law enforcement to secure or maintain an arrest or conviction, or some other worthy end (Caldero & Crank, 2004; Crank et al., 2007; Martinelli, 2006; Porter & Warrender, 2009). It reflects dilemmas faced by law enforcement agents in which they must (Crank et al., 2007, p. 105) “select between competing ethics. They either selected the legal means, playing by society’s rules even if sometimes that meant letting dangerous offenders go free, or they sought a good end: they acted to prevent truly dangerous offenders from committing additional crimes, however that end was accomplished.” The justification for noble cause corruption stems from the siege mentality of law enforcement officers who believe either they are at war or that their cause is particularly righteous. In this mindset the ends justifies the means, facilitating false allegations or reports to enable unlawful arrests and wrongful convictions. This is a learned belief system, and the corresponding illegal behavior must be culturally reinforced and molded through experience within the group culture (Sunhara, 2004). When law enforcement culture reinforces a model of ends justifying the means, noble cause corruption becomes the norm that every “good” officer or agent aspires to. This in turn mandates acceptance of and reliance on “The Blue Wall of Silence” for both individual and organizational survival. When law enforcement investigates, arrests, and punishes its own under such circumstance, it provides the only real deterrent and the only evidence of their impartiality to the general public. The opposite is also true. Consider, for example, the case of former Burlington Police Officer, Christopher Lopez. He wrote an affidavit accusing a suspect of a crime, but his sworn

The Blue Wall of Silence

statement was contradicted by his own body cam footage. Details were reported in True (2017): The Chittenden County state’s attorney’s office plans to dismiss 14 cases this week after determining that a Burlington police officer lied under oath about a drug investigation. Officer Christopher Lopez resigned Monday, the day before police had made clear they planned to fire him at a disciplinary hearing. Lopez wrote in a sworn affidavit that he smelled marijuana during an October traffic stop, but footage from his body camera contradicts that assertion, according to a transcript of the footage filed in court. State police and the state’s attorney have begun a criminal investigation of Lopez, who has hired attorney Lisa Shelkrot, with the firm Langrock Sperry and Wool. Shelkrot declined to comment Thursday. State’s Attorney Sarah George said she has enough evidence Lopez made “patently false statements” in his affidavit that her office can no longer rely on his testimony in other cases. Whether that amounts to a crime is still being investigated, she said. The Burlington Police Department had received one “courtesy complaint” about Lopez since he joined the force in September 2014. Lopez previously served with the Baltimore Police Department since 2012. Burlington police said he had no disciplinary actions in his personnel file from Baltimore. The state’s attorney’s office will dismiss pending charges that can’t be proven without Lopez’s testimony, George said. The office has identified 26 pending cases where Lopez is involved, but plans to dismiss 14 where his testimony is crucial to the state’s case.

This decisive and public action on the part of the Burlington Police Department, and then the State’s Attorney’s Office, was intended to send a coordinated message from the community leadership: false reports from law enforcement officers will not be tolerated, and they will result in consequences. This message is made all the more effective by continuing to pursue a criminal investigation despite the officer’s resignation, which is not typical. Generally speaking these investigations remain internal, and out of the public eye if possible, with the officer quietly resigning—without a review of cases.

THE BLUE WALL OF SILENCE The “Code of Silence,” aka “The Blue Wall of Silence,” has long been a feature of the literature related to law enforcement culture, as an international phenomenon (Chin & Wells, 1998; Cooper, 2009; Knapp Commission, 1972; Koepke, 2000; Mollen, 1994; Rothwell & Baldwin, 2007; Shockley-Eckles, 2011; Skolnick, 2002, 2005; Wolfe & Picquero, 2011). It is described as (Chin & Wells, 1998,

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p. 238): “an unwritten code in many departments which prohibits disclosing perjury or other misconduct by fellow officers, or even testifying truthfully if the facts would implicate the conduct of a fellow officer.” As explained further in Cooper (2009, p. 7): “what many people know as the ‘Code of Silence’ or ‘Blue Wall of Silence’- merits concern. The police subculture is dominated by the Cop Code. Its foundational norm dictates that ‘cops protect cops.’”2 According to Koepke (2000), the culture of secrecy is transferred between law enforcement members via overt peer pressure (pp. 214–215): “The Blue Wall of Silence is legendary among law enforcement officers and is arguably the strongest form of peer pressure. Because of the Blue Wall of Silence, police brutality and police perjury have been, and continue to be, protected and facilitated by the police culture.” This is echoed in Wolfe and Picquero (2011), who explain (p. 334): “Policing is characterized by a close-knit subculture because the ‘unique demands that are placed on police officers, such as the threat of danger as well as scrutiny by the public, generate a tightly woven environment conducive to the development of feelings of loyalty’ (Skolnick, 2005, p. 302). The code of silence, therefore, develops into a subcultural attitude on how one must behave to be perceived as a ‘good’ officer by peers.” Gottschalk (2011) describes the problem as systemic, with all police officers involved in some level of corruption by virtue of engaging in either culturally approved illegal practice or its concealment (p. 170): “The role of the police culture in terms of protection of each other reduces the likelihood of being caught for corruption. This called the code, the code of silence, or the blue curtain, or the blue wall of silence–the informal prohibition in the occupational culture of policing against reporting the misconduct of fellow police officers.” Shockley-Eckles (2011) goes further, arguing that the culture of secrecy in law enforcement protects not only those members in an immediate employment environment, but also those who have “gone rogue,” been forced out of an agency, and then relocated elsewhere (p. 292): Now referred to as The Blue Wall or The Thin Blue Line, the solidarity that defines police work is not without its critics and its proponents. Many in mainstream society view The Blue Wall as an impenetrable fortress whereby contemporary police officers protect their own—including those who engage in misconduct—beneath a cloak of secrecy…

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To be clear, these are police officers describing themselves and not being criticized by outsiders. In fact, many in law enforcement take their commitment to maintaining the code of silence as a badge of honor. And they are equally disdainful of those who violate it. Again, they do not see it as a negative, but as a necessary unspoken contract with each other to prevent public knowledge of things that the public would regard as overt corruption.

The Blue Wall of Silence

The question of significance for the research presented here thus becomes, how far does loyalty extend itself when those in law enforcement find themselves working alongside the officer whose history is one of misconduct in another jurisdiction? A little-known practice among most in the general public, but one that affects all in law enforcement, is the officer shuffle (see Goldman 2003 and Goldman and Puro 2001, 1987). As defined by Goldman (2003) and Goldman and Puro (2001, 1987), the officer shuffle refers to the ease with which disreputable officers move across jurisdictions, thus maintaining their police certification and continuing to serve in law enforcement. These officers, referred to as gypsy cops or rogue officers, place communities at risk while often tainting the image of all police. Aptly named, the officer shuffle (see Goldman 2003; Goldman and Puro 2001, 1987) perpetuates the transmission of police corruption and misconduct over time and through space.

All of this conforms with Wolfe and Picquero (2011), which explains (p. 334): “Research has shown that officers who adhere to the code of silence are less likely to report fellow officer excessive use of force or corruption… and more likely to commit perjury during a trial.” Wolfe and Picquero (2011) further agree that the problem is cultural, and that individual officer corruption is a reflection of their associations and group perceptions (p. 347): …officers who associate with deviant peers are more likely to subscribe to the police subcultural belief that an officer should protect his or her colleagues regardless of allegations of misconduct. Furthermore, association with deviant officer peers places officers at increased risk to believe that violating suspect constitutional rights is required if one is to achieve justice and protect the public from harm. Conversely, officers adhere to the code of silence less strictly and have fewer beliefs that justify noble-cause corruption if they view their agency to behave in organizationally just ways. That is, as officers’ perceptions of organizational justice increase, their level of attitudes favorable to the code of silence and noble-cause corruption is likely to decrease.

While there are many forms of law enforcement corruption, Gottschalk (2011, p. 170) found that the “Blue Wall of Silence” provided the most protection for those officers accepting “gratuities” or using “excessive force.” These are among the most tolerated forms of misconduct in law enforcement culture. This is detailed by research prepared in Chappell and Piquero (2004, p. 90): …acceptance of meals and gifts is the most common and most extensive form of police corruption… Many cities actually allow officers to accept free or discount meals. It is often accepted behavior when it is an act of gratitude toward the police, but sometimes the motive is to buy protection from the police. In other words, some businesses offer free items or services in expectation for quicker response times and extra protection from the police.

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The “Blue Wall of Silence,” or “Code of Silence” pressures new officers into conformity by exploiting their commitment to group loyalty and the threat of peer retaliation; it protects long-standing group members from exposure by ensuring that nobody talks to outsiders, and that “cops protect cops”; and it allows for the shuffling, or continued employment, of “gypsy cops” that would otherwise have been terminated or in extreme cases indicted on criminal charges. In essence, it makes those law enforcement officers who abide into liars, either by what they report or fail to report with respect to corrupt activity. Consider the following case, in which law enforcement used excessive force during a domestic call and then attempted to conceal it by charging the victim with resisting arrest, as well as making additional false charges against her husband, as reported in Lopez (2017):

FIGURE 12.1 Jillian Beck photographed subsequent to her arrest by Las Cruces police officers later found to have used excessive force. To conceal their misconduct, the officers charged her and her husband with criminal offenses meant to deflect their own responsibility. The charges were later dropped, and a federal jury awarded the couple 1.6 million in damages.

The Blue Wall of Silence

Four years ago, a dispute between neighbors turned violent when a Las Cruces police officer threw a stay-at-home mother onto gravel and intentionally slammed her face into the rocks, causing profuse bleeding, a broken nose and a fractured wrist. On Friday, after more than three years of legal wrangling, an eight-member federal jury awarded the woman and her husband, Jillian and Andrew Beck, both formerly of Las Cruces, $1.6 million in damages. The verdict was reached at the end of a five-day trial in U.S. District Court in Las Cruces. The trial centered on allegations in the couple’s civil-rights lawsuit against Officer Isaiah Baker and Officer Joseph Campa, both of the Las Cruces Police Department. After about three hours of deliberations, the jury determined Baker had used unreasonably excessive force on Jillian Beck in violation of the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution. He also committed a battery in violation of New Mexico law, the jury ruled. Because the latter was not a criminal charge, Baker is not facing any time behind bars. The jury further concluded that Campa had unlawfully seized and arrested Andrew Beck, also in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The couple was awarded $1 million in punitive damages as a result of Baker’s “willful, malicious, wanton and reckless conduct,” according to their attorneys, Margaret Strickland and Mollie McGraw of Las Cruces. The couple received an additional $600,000 in compensatory damages… In an interview, Strickland said Jillian Beck was “relieved that the officers were going to be held accountable.” Strickland, in a statement, added: “The jury sent a clear message that this type of behavior towards civilians will not be tolerated in our community.” In arguments made before the jury, Strickland and McGraw said a “blue wall of silence” at LCPD had shielded the officers’ misconduct and subsequent cover-up for four years. The incident occurred on the evening of Jan. 5, 2013, according to the lawsuit. Police had been dispatched to the 7500 block of Vista de Oeste Place, where the couple lived with their 4-year-old son, in response to a neighbor dispute. Baker and Campa were among the officers who responded to the call. Jillian Beck, then 26, had been “upset with a neighbor who was throwing rocks and blowing an air horn in the middle of the night at another neighbor’s dog,” the lawsuit stated. She explained her complaint to Baker, according to the lawsuit. But as she turned to walk away from the officer, he “unexpectedly grabbed her arm, twisted it behind her back, and slammed her to the ground.”

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At trial, it was revealed that Beck had tried to lift her head off the ground in an effort to call out to a neighbor to remove her son from the scene. But as she lifted her head, Baker slammed her face onto rocks, her attorneys said. When she was lifted off the ground by Baker, her face was covered in blood, the lawsuit stated. Her husband then attempted to help her, but when he stepped forward, he was detained by Campa… During the trial, a police audio recording of the incident was played for the jury. In the recording, Baker can be heard saying “she got thrown” and she got a “face full of rocks,” Strickland said. A female officer then said “cool” in response. Jillian Beck was then placed under arrest and charged with battery on a peace officer, resisting an officer and disorderly conduct. The battery and resisting charges were dismissed, court records show, and she pleaded no contest to disorderly conduct. Her husband also was arrested and charged with resisting an officer. But the charge was later dismissed, Strickland said. According to the city’s Human Resources Department, both Baker and Campa are still employed with LCPD as officers. Human resources would not say if the officers were ever disciplined over the incident.

This case demonstrates how some law enforcement agencies act to protect officers engaged in misconduct to avoid responsibility. Such attitudes ensure a culture where false allegations made against citizens will continue in the form of contrived charges, as concern for consequence is all but removed. In these kinds of cases, civil remedy is the only course of action for the victims. In this case, a civil lawsuit was successful in procuring a favorable judgment with heavy damages that send a clear message of both fault and consequence.

THE USE OF DECEPTION When agents of law enforcement lack sufficiently reliable evidence to lawfully arrest a prime suspect in a criminal investigation, they tend to focus their efforts on obtaining a confession (Magid, 2001; Thomas, 2007). One means of obtaining a confession is through the use of deception. The courts tend to have a variable yet generally permissive attitude toward the police use of deception to gain inculpatory evidence from criminal suspects—to include under-cover work and ploys where false witness statements, false coconspirator statements, and fabricated evidence are referenced or presented during interrogations (Kassin et al., 2010). Consequently, the use of pretense, trickery, and lies are standard instruments found in many police toolkits.

The Use of Deception

There are limits set on the acceptable use of deceptive methods, generally established by state laws and departmental policy. However, some criminal justice commentators argue that deception, and outright lying, is an integral feature of law enforcement culture. One overall view is presented in Slobogin (1997), which offers a continuum of falsity that runs from justifiable to inexcusable (pp. 775–776): Many police, like many other people, lie occasionally, and some police, like some other people, lie routinely and pervasively. Police lie to protect innocent victims, as in hostage situations, and they tell “placebo lies” to assure or placate worried citizens. They tell lies to project nonexistent authority, and they lie to suspects in the hopes of gathering evidence of crime. They also lie under oath, to convict the guilty, protect the guilty, or frame the innocent. Some of these lies are justifiable. Some are reprehensible. Lying under oath is perjury and thus rarely permissible. On the other hand, lying that is necessary to save a life may not only be acceptable but is generally applauded (even if it constitutes perjury). Most types of police lies are of murkier morality, however.

A more chilling perspective on police deception is reported in the research compiled by Dorfman (1999, pp. 460–461): Police officers can be expected to omit, redact, and even lie on their police reports, sworn or unsworn; they will conceal or misrepresent to cover up corruption and brutality; they are trained to deceive citizens during investigations as part of good police practice; they will obscure facts, and even lie, to cover up the misconduct of fellow officers. Additionally, command practice and policy gives officers every incentive to lie to cover for lack of productivity or to aggrandize themselves for recognition and promotion. And yes, police officers will commit perjury in our courts of law.

What this describes is, in fact, false reporting. In any case, it is generally agreed that there must be clearly defined limits set against the use of deception-based police tactics, given the tremendous power that agents of the government wield (Dorfman, 1999; Kassin et al., 2010; Magid, 2001; Thomas, 2007). However, unless there are equally clear penalties associated with violations of those limits, it seems unlikely that long-standing attitudes toward the use of deception will be changed. Consider the following case example of police deception gone too far (repeatedly and without consequences). It involves the use of deception by a police detective during the course of a suspect interrogation. As reported in Griffy (2007a), Matthew Christian, a detective with the San Jose Police Department in California, fabricated a report from the district attorney’s

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crime lab (the regional crime lab is a division of the district attorney’s office: “The Santa Clara County District Attorney’s Criminalistics Laboratory”). Det. Christian used the official crime lab seal to construct the fake report, and he also invented a false criminalist’s name to “confirm” the presence of semen on a blanket related to an alleged sex crime. He then used this “report” as evidence during a suspect interview to gain an inculpatory statement. Det. Christian testified later that he forgot about his deception when he put the “ruse report” into his case file alongside a real lab report that contradicted it. The district attorney proceeded to trial thinking she had hard physical evidence of the defendant’s guilt—denying several defense requests inquiring after the contradictory lab results provided in pretrial discovery. When asked about it on the stand during a preliminary hearing, Det. Christian falsely testified as though the fake lab report and fake criminalist were real—as though the laboratory findings had actually been inculpatory. The nonexistent criminalist was even placed on the district attorney’s witness list. With trial approaching, defense counsel was able to speak directly with the crime lab and the scope of the detective’s deception was revealed. This information was forwarded to the district attorney’s office, which had yet to contact their lab and verify the report. In December of 2006, all charges were dropped against the accused. However, the use of false laboratory reports remains standard practice for the San Jose Police Department.3 Details regarding the civil case were reported in Wadsworth (2013): A fake crime lab report that already cost the city of San Jose years of court battles and lost time will now take $150,000 to settle. San Jose will likely use cash from its liability claims reserve fund to pay off Michael Kerkeles, who in 2005 was accused of raping a mentally disabled woman with the cognitive capacity of an 8-year-old. The case fell flat because a San Jose police officer testified about a fake piece of evidence as if it were real. Preparing to question the suspect back in 2005, detective Matthew Christian typed up a report by a fictional Santa Clara County Crime Lab technician named Rebecca Roberts, who claimed in her fictional report that semen was found on a blanket taken from Kerkeles’ garage. Kerkeles invoked his Miranda rights, remaining silent and bypassing any questions. Christian

3

In 1990, the same police department had been warned by the judiciary to cease the practice of creating phony lab reports. However, in 2002, “detective Juan Serrano [of the San Jose Police Department] described the use of ruse crime lab reports as ‘standard procedure’ at that time” (Griffy, 2007b).

The Use of Deception

never got his chance to use his meticulously crafted stage prop, so he filed it away with the rest of the evidence. Fast-forward a year and four months: The case made it to a preliminary hearing and witnesses were called to the stand. Christian testified under oath that Rebecca Roberts’ report was the whole truth and nothing but the truth. It just totally slipped his mind that he doctored the whole thing, the city says. The only reason anyone found out is because Kerkeles’ attorney called the crime lab to ask for the technician’s resume—only to learn she didn’t exist. It sounds outrageously unconstitutional, this whole making-up-evidenceas-you-go business. But City Attorney Richard Doyle says it’s actually OK as long as it’s used as an interrogation tool and it’s not coercive. Police say it’s a rare tactic. Doyle says the only reason the city is settling is to avoid more legal back-and-forth. “While we believe that there was insufficient evidence supporting the claim of a conspiracy, and that the officer truly did not remember that he had prepared the report as a ruse when he testified … there are always risks in proceeding to trial, and this settlement avoids those risks,” Doyle writes in a memo going before the council May 7. But the attorney who won the civil suit for Kerkeles begs to differ. The appellate court that reinstated Kerkeles’ claim against the city did so based on evidence that San Jose officers “routinely created false crime lab reports and there had been other instances where fake reports had been presented in court as genuine,” according to a press statement released by attorney Timothy McMahon two years ago. The justices unanimously agreed to let Kerkeles sue Christian for conspiring with Jamie Stringfield, a former Santa Clara County deputy district attorney, to pass off a fake report as the real deal, McMahon stated. “The DA’s office went so far as to list the fictitious crime lab employee on the trial witness list in order to give credibility to their deceptive strategy,” says McMahon, adding that prosecutors bullied Kerkeles into taking a plea deal. Stringfield told the Mercury News after the case got dismissed in 2007 that she still believed Kerkeles was “in no way … factually innocent.” Thanks to the sloppily executed and ethically questionable—though technically legal—policework, that’s now forever relegated to speculation.

This case involves a police detective fabricating a false lab report regarding physical evidence to leverage a suspect confession—and a District Attorney who validated this false report for a period of time, using it as further leverage in legal proceedings. The false reporter in this case was law enforcement,

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bolstered by unethical police work in violation of judicial admonishment. The victim was a criminal suspect, and the result was a civil suit in which the Plaintiff prevailed winning a substantial cash award.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AS THE FALSE REPORTER As already discussed, law enforcement is in a unique position to act as an effective false reporter. It must be remembered that because law enforcement sign reports, affidavits, and give testimony under penalty of perjury on a regular basis, they are often afforded extraordinary credibility and latitude by the court. Sometimes this is earned, and sometimes this pro forma with a blind rubber stamp.

Means of False Reporting Law enforcement have the following extensive mechanisms for making false allegations against those they encounter, and the unique ability to arrest them, which provides a heavy layer of visual credibility afforded no other pseudovictim: 1. False reports regarding crimes that did not occur to justify either offbook police activity, bonuses, or overtime (e.g., falsely reporting their crime-related statistics, traffic stops, other duty-related activity—while they either engage in misconduct or attend to personal business on Department time). 2. False accusations and reports that describe the officer witnessing crimes that did not occur (e.g., suspect possessing a firearm that did not exist and pointing it at an officer; making “furtive” moves that did not actually occur; making verbal threats that were never actually spoken). 3. Official police reports that include summaries of interviews which falsely describe the demeanor of suspect; false attribute statements that were not made; or that exclude pertinent details. 4. False investigative reports that an officer conceals his/her own crimes or misconduct, or that of a fellow officer. 5. Unlawful arrest and detention—either for show, or to give the officer time to “find” charges to legitimize the arrest. 6. Interviews in which an officer conceals his/her own crimes or misconduct, or that of a fellow officer. 7. Edited or censored recordings or videos of interviews or interactions. 8. Testimony that leaves out details to create a false impression before the court. 9. Overtly false testimony or sworn statements that promote any of the above. A common scenario was reported in Detroit, where two officers planted evidence to support false reports of crime to effect an arrest (Bartkowiak, 2016).

Law Enforcement as the False Reporter

FIGURE 12.2 Two former Officers with the Detroit Police Department, Stephen Fultz (left) and John McKee (right) were charged with misconduct in office and filing a false police report in relation to a case involving possession of illegal drugs. Two former Detroit police officers have been charged with misconduct in office and filing a false police report. Steven Fultz, 34, and John McKee, 43, are accused of filing a false report about watching a 27-year-old man toss a suspected bag of drugs from his vehicle Jan. 5, 2015 in the 19500 block of Alcoy. Due to information in the officers’ report, the driver was charged with possession of heroin. However, according to the Wayne County Prosecutor’s Office, while the evidence in the case was being reviewed in preparation for a trial in the case, audio evidence from the police car used by Fultz and McKee revealed that they allegedly filed false police reports. Consequently, the trial prosecutor dismissed the case against the driver. The Prosecutor’s Office said more specific facts about the case will be presented at the preliminary examination. Both officers have resigned from their positions at the Detroit Police Department.

This case is an important reminder that law enforcement officers engaged in false reporting will do so even when they are being recorded by audio or video, with no fear of actual consequences. This indicates that the behavior is not only common, but that these recordings are not being examined often enough by law enforcement supervisors or during the course of defense investigations. Another all too common scenario was reported in Arlington, Texas, where the reported activity of almost a dozen officers amounted to fraud. The details were reported in Steele (2016):

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Nine Arlington police officers have been fired after an investigation into whether they exaggerated reports on the number of traffic stops they made. Lt. Christopher Cook, an Arlington Police Department spokesman, said in May that an audit revealed “suspicious” reports of traffic stops. Fifteen officers were placed on paid leave then while the city investigated; an additional officer was put on leave later. Cook said in a news release Friday evening that the nine fired officers all sustained administrative charges of being untruthful on department reports, not conforming with the law and unbecoming conduct. Two of the nine also had an administrative charge related to testimony and answering questions. Cook said that three other officers left the police department before the investigation was complete. Four employees are still under investigation, he said. Cook did not release the officers’ identities. A criminal investigation of the officers’ actions has been sent to the Tarrant County district attorney. No fictitious citations were given to motorists, Cook said. Officers record the reason for a traffic stop and information about the motorists in their reports, as well as whether the vehicle was searched or an arrest was made. The department analyzes the data for an annual report on whether racial profiling is occurring. Cook said in May it did not seem like the number of fake stops in the officers’ reports would affect the annual report.

As suggested in the Texas cases, the motive for false reporting could include an attempt to make it appear as though racial profiling was not a factor in car stops by falsely reporting a higher number of white motorists being pulled over—even though no fictitious citations were actually issued. The purpose was to defraud the department and the community with the phony (inflated) crime stats. Even more importantly, this was not one officer engaged in the practice; it was an entire group of them within the department. This would suggest supervisory failings in addition to what was reported at the street level.

Motives for False Reporting Law enforcement effect false reports, or create the threat of false reporting, to satisfy the following general motivations: 1. Arrest of a suspect they believe to be guilty despite actual evidence. 2. To coerce or “flip” a witness against a suspect they believe to be guilty despite actual evidence.

Law Enforcement as the False Reporter

3. To obligate an informant, to have something against them to gain their compliance as a confidential informant (aka, “CI”). 4. To harm the credibility of a potential witness in a criminal or civil matter. 5. To blackmail drug dealers into paying for “protection.” 6. To coerce citizens, especially prostitutes, into performing sexual favors. 7. To protect themselves or one of their own from consequences. 8. Apathy or laziness, to avoid work or related responsibilities. Consider the case of two Los Angeles police officers charged with covering up a vehicle crash by tampering with witnesses, evidence, and making a false report, as reported in Hamilton (2016): Following an internal affairs inquiry, Officers Rene Ponce and Irene Gomez were charged Sept. 6 with a felony count each of filing a false report and conspiracy to commit an act injurious to the public, according to the Los Angeles County district attorney’s office. Both pleaded not guilty last week. The two were patrolling the Hollenbeck Division’s Boyle Heights area on Oct. 26, 2014, when they were dispatched to a crash in the 3000 block of East Side Boulevard. Prosecutors said an intoxicated driver had smashed into two parked vehicles, but the officers opted not to conduct a drunk driving investigation. In their report, Ponce, 39, and Gomez, 38, lied and wrote that the driver had fled the scene, according to the felony complaint filed in Los Angeles County Superior Court. The two officers then put the driver in their patrol car and drove him home to his apartment complex, telling him to sleep, prosecutors say. Larry Chavez, 63, said he lives near where the collision occurred along East Side Boulevard and the rumble of the crash awoke him in the early morning hours. Chavez, a refinery superintendent, said the driver of a white or grey Mustang smashed into his neighbor’s cars and tried to run. With two neighbors, Chavez gave chase and eventually caught up with him. “We held him down till one of the cops came,” Chavez told The Times. “He was so drunk.” Police arrived and handcuffed the driver before putting him in the back seat of a patrol car for about 90 minutes, Chavez recalled… The defense attorney representing Gomez, Ira M. Salzman, denied that his client ferried a drunk driver home and later submitted a false report. He said Gomez and her colleague carried out standard protocol for a hit-andrun case, including impounding the driver’s Mustang. “This is an ordinary traffic collision,” Salzman said. Gomez has no prior connection to the alleged drunken driver, the attorney said. He questioned why it took nearly two years to bring charges against his client, whom he praised as a dedicated officer.

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“My client has an outstanding record, with an outstanding reputation for truth and honesty,” Salzman said. “She’s well-respected by her peers.” …If convicted, each faces up to three years in county jail. Police presented evidence about the incident to the Los Angeles city attorney’s office to determine whether a misdemeanor hit-and-run charge should be filed against the driver, but city prosecutors declined to file charges. Deputy Dist. Atty. Martha Carrillo, the prosecutor who signed the criminal complaint against the two officers, said the officers and the driver had no personal or professional connection.

The motive in this case is reported to be laziness—the officers wanted to ensure they got off their shift on time so they filed a false report to avoid having to process the suspect, as reported in Tchekmedyian (2017): Deputy District Atty. Martha Carrillo argued that the officers were in a rush to wrap up their shift and told the driver to lie about the crash instead of conducting a thorough investigation to determine if he was driving under the influence. They then wrote false reports about the incident, Carrillo alleged. “Clearly they took the easy way out,” Carrillo said after the two-day hearing. The judge ruled there was sufficient evidence to bind the pair over for trial on felony charges of filing a false report and conspiracy to commit an act injurious to the public during the 2014 incident. Both have pleaded not guilty… “One can only surmise that they wanted to be done with it and the easiest way to do that is to write it up as a hit-and-run,” Carrillo said.

This case represents a common form of law enforcement false reporting that on surface does not appear as serious as cases involving allegations of rape or assault, and harm against citizens. And certainly those cases frequent. However, this case speaks to the issue of the fundamental integrity that is required for officers to perform their duties with the trust of the courts and the communities they serve. If they are willing to make false allegations, and risk their careers, when the stakes are this low, then imagine what such officers are capable of when the stakes are higher.

LAW ENFORCEMENT AS THE VICTIM OF FALSE REPORTING Because law enforcement has the power to arrest and effect the prosecution of criminal suspects, while representing the deep pockets of the government, this makes them a target for false allegations. Motives for false reports against law enforcement can include revenge, attempts to avoid criminal

Law Enforcement as the Victim of False Reporting

responsibility, and financial gain from legal action. Under these circumstances and with these incentives, law enforcement officers can easily become the victim of false allegation by members of the public who they encounter, detain, or arrest. False reports against law enforcement commonly include allegations of: 1. Theft 2. Excessive use of force 3. Domestic violence 4. Assault 5. Sexual harassment 6. Sexual assault and coercion 7. Racism or racial profiling4 Again, these false reports tend to occur in the context of suspects attempting not only to avoid criminal penalties, but also to provide them with the basis for financial gain in the form of civil actions against departments and their officers. This is separate from false allegations of domestic violence, which tend to occur in the context of the pseudovictim discovering infidelity; amidst divorce proceedings; and during highly contested custody battles. For example, consider a case involving a pregnant women who accused two police officers with the Detroit Police Department of sexually assaulting her in their patrol car. Their good deed (common act of community service among those in professional police agencies), offering her a ride, turned into a false allegation with the potential to end their careers. The details are reported Shaykhet (2016): A pregnant woman accused two Detroit cops of a heinous crime, but exclusive video we’ve obtained tells a different story. It was 5:30 a.m on the streets of Detroit, when two Detroit police officers from the 10th precinct responded to a call of a disturbance. They came across a woman who said she was pregnant and needed a lift across town. From the area of Livernois and Grand River to the east side of Detroit, the woman is seen riding in the backseat of the patrol car for a total of 18 miles. “She gets in the car, they drive from point A to point B,” says Detroit Police Officers Association President Mark Diaz. “They open the door and she

4

In a rather high-profile case, actress Daniele Watts falsely accused Los Angeles police officers of mistreating her because of her race. Best known for her role in the film “Django Unchained,” she pleaded no contest to disturbing the peace and was ordered to write an apology letter to the sergeant involved (Mather, 2015).

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gets out. The officers leave and go back to their command.” The otherwise uneventful trip seemingly ends without any trouble at Mack and Cadillac, but a short while later the same woman makes a startling allegation. “After they dropped her off, she then claimed they had raped her,” says Diaz. At Detroit Receiving Hospital she reiterated to investigators that she was sexually assaulted during her trip. She alleged officers even said to her: “I am the police. I run this bitch. Ain’t nobody gonna believe you.” At the hospital, a thorough exam known as a “rape kit” was administered. A registered nurse documented no sign of injury or trauma. Still, the troubling accusation quickly led to an internal investigation. Both officers turned in their uniforms for inspection. “These officers were facing losing their freedom--going to prison for 20 years at least,” says Diaz. Detectives go back to the surveillance video. From inside the police car, the entire ride is once again closely reviewed. There are no signs of distress or any complaints. Then, within 24 hours, comes a bombshell. After learning of the in-car video, the woman makes yet another statement where she admits no sexual assault took place. The woman later said she was under the influence of alcohol and under medication for a serious mental condition. She apologized for making up the whole story and potentially destroying the lives of those officers. “The allegation itself is damning, what it does to a person’s credibility just to be accused of something,” says Diaz. “We don’t always have cameras there to provide it, but in this case we do.” Diaz says, sadly, fake claims of this nature are common - often times people are filing lawsuits just to see if the city will settle out of court for a cash payout. “In the past, there have been so many cases where a municipality will actually settle out of court instead of litigating a case, just to save the cost of litigating a case,” says Diaz. In this case, surveillance video made all the difference. The woman now finds herself in trouble with the law. “This is nothing short of urban terrorism,” says Diaz. “These people try to take freedom away from those who do nothing more than try to keep our citizens safe.” …“I believe these individuals should be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law,” says Diaz. “It has to stop, we have to all make a solid stance against this. We have to protect our protectors is what it comes down to.”

Police officers with any time on the job soon come to appreciate the frequency with which false reports are made against police officers. This example demonstrates not only the nature of the problem, but also the simplicity of the solution. This will be the focus of the next section.

Solutions to False Reporting in Law Enforcement

SOLUTIONS TO FALSE REPORTING IN LAW ENFORCEMENT Whether law enforcement is the perpetrator of the false report or the victim of one, the solutions are the same. A useful argument is provided by the Public Policy Center out of Texas (2017): In the wake of the August 9, 2014, shooting of Michael Brown by Officer Darren Wilson in Ferguson, Missouri, there has been national call for increased use of body worn cameras (BWCs) by police officers. Brown was killed by Wilson during the course of an arrest for an alleged robbery under highly disputed circumstances. And while Wilson was not indicted for his actions, the incident demonstrated the tremendous difficulties of determining crucial facts relating to use of force by police against members of the public. These difficulties lead directly to officers’ inability to completely justify righteous use of force in the realm of public perception, as well as the difficulty of holding officers accountable if force is misused. Equipping police officers with BWCs can resolve these problems. BWCs— which are worn on the lapel of an officer’s uniform—accurately capture officers’ interactions with the public, filling in gaps in information that are ever-present when an officer’s actions are questioned. Though only a few police departments nationally have BWCs in place, outcomes in those jurisdictions demonstrate that BWCs are beneficial to officers and the public alike. In Rialto, California, use of force incidents declined by 60% and citizen complaints against officers dropped by 88% in the first year after every officer was equipped with a BWC. Further, while there would be costs associated with providing BWCs to local police departments, as well as storing materials and reviewing footage, the research suggests that those costs would be outweighed by long-term cost-savings in the form of decreased officer liability. Each BWC costs between $200 and $1,000. However, the city of Dallas alone has paid out in excess of $6 million in settlements related to alleged police misconduct since 2011. By substantially reducing allegations against officers, and exonerating them when allegations are made, BWCs would pay for themselves over time. …Recognizing that every law enforcement agency is unique, each agency should also be required to develop its own policy for use of BWCs in the community; this policy should address specific domains, such as guidelines for when the camera should be on or off; provisions related to data retention, public access, and officer access; and procedures for internal oversight.

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In specific, the author and editor of this work recommend the following steps be taken to reduce false reporting across the board: 1. Law enforcement officers should never be alone with criminal suspects, witnesses, or victims. 2. Body cams must be active at all times when responding to any calls or during any contact with the public. 3. Body mics must be active at all times when responding to any calls or during any contact with the public. 4. Dash cams must be active at all times, front and back, with no ability of officers to disable on site. 5. Internal vehicle cams must be utilized to document in car interviews or transportation of citizens (e.g., witnesses, victims, or suspects). 6. Supervisors must review all footage to confirm any statements made about interactions with the public, and officers must become accustomed to this happening, to anticipate accountability. 7. All law enforcement camera and audio related to any arrest must be immediately turned over to the defense, unedited, and officers must become accustomed to this happening, to anticipate accountability. 8. There must be severe penalties for intentionally deactivating any recording equipment during public contact. These solutions are a beginning, and individual agencies will be bound by the restrictions within their legal jurisdictions. However, the attitude should be universal. Create mechanisms for documentation and accountability; and be open about them with the public. Otherwise it looks like there is something to hide, and this cannot be image or reality for agencies committed to engendering public trust and respect.

SUMMARY Law enforcement intersects with false allegations in at least two other ways. Firstly, they can be the party that makes the false allegation. And second, they can be the object, or victim, of the false allegation. Law enforcement culture, which is characterized by secrecy and loyalty, has long worked against the transparency required to ferret out instances of either. This leaves the public vulnerable to false allegations from law enforcement and law enforcement vulnerable to false allegations from members of the public. The solution is ensuring that all interactions with the public are recorded in every context, and then made public when there is a criminal complaint; to ensure that both law enforcement supervisors and the defense become accustomed to reviewing related audio and video documentation; and to penalize those officers found in violation, to ensure that everyone understands there are consequences for misconduct.

References

References Bartkowiak, D. (April 21, 2016). Ex-Detroit police officers accused of filing false reports in drug possession case. ClickOnDetroit.com. Retreived from http://www.clickondetroit.com/news/ ex-detroit-police-officers-accused-of-filing-false-reports-in-drug-possession-case. Bopp, W., & Schultz, D. (1972). Principles of American law enforcement and criminal justice. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas. Brennan, A., Rostow, C., Davis, R., & Hill, B. (2009). An investigation of biographical information as a predictor of employment termination among law enforcement officers. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 24, 108–112. Caldero, M., & Crank, J. (2004). Police ethics: The corruption of noble cause. Cincinnati, OH: Anderson. Cancino, J., & Enriquez, R. (2004). A qualitative analysis of officer peer retaliation. Policing: An International Journal of Police Strategies and Management, 27(3), 320–340. Chappell, A., & Piquero, A. (2004). Applying social learning theory to police misconduct. Deviant Behavior, 25, 89–108. Chin, G., & Wells, S. (Winter 1998). The “blue wall of silence” as evidence of bias and motive to lie: A new approach to police perjury (Vol. 59). University of Pittsburgh Law Review, 233–299. Cooper, C. (2009). Yes Virginia, there is a police code of silence: Prosecuting police officers and the police subculture. Criminal Law Bulletin, 45(2), 4–20. Crank, J., Flaherty, D., & Giacomazzi, A. (2007). The noble cause: An empirical assessment. Journal of Criminal Justice, 35, 103–116. Dorfman, D. (1999). Proving the lie: Litigating police credibility. American Journal of Criminal Law, 26, 455–503. Garcia, V. (2005). Constructing the “other” within police culture: An analysis of a deviant unit within the police organization. Police Practice and Research, 6(1), 65–80. Gottschalk, P. (2011). Management challenges in law enforcement: The case of police misconduct and crime. International Journal of Law and Management, 53(3), 169–181. Griffy, L. (December 16, 2007a). Sex case hinged on phony lab report: S.J. officer’s ruse became evidence. San Jose Mercury News. Griffy, L. (December 23, 2007b). Fake lab reports were common: Judge warned cops about using ruses. San Jose Mercury News. Hamilton, M. (September 13, 2016). DUI crash, taking the driver home and filing false police report. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-lapdofficers-charged-dui-crash-20160913-snap-story.html. Hickman, M. J., Piquero, A. R., Lawton, B. A., & Greene, J. R. (2001). Applying tittle’s control balance theory to police deviance. Policing, 24(4), 497–519. Kassin, S., Drizin, S., Grisso, T., Gudjonsson, G., Leo, R., & Redlich, A. (2010). Police-induced confessions: Risk factors and recommendations. Law and Human Behavior, 34, 3–38. Kleinig, J. (1996). The ethics of policing. New York: Cambridge University Press. Klockars, C., Ivkovic, S., Harver, W., & Haberfeld, M. (May 2000). The measurement of police integrity. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. NCJ 181465. Knapp Commission. (1972). Report of the New York city commission to investigate allegations of police corruption and the City’s anti-corruption procedures. New York: Bar Press. Koepke, J. (2000). The failure to breach the blue wall of silence: The circling of the wagons to protect police perjury. Washburn Law Journal, 39(2), 211–241. Leonard, V. (1969). The police, the judiciary, and the criminal. Springfield, IL: Charles C. Thomas.

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Lopez, C. (February 13, 2017). Jury awards couple $1.6M in suit against LCPD officers. Las Cruces Sun News. Retrieved from http://www.lcsun-news.com/story/news/crime/2017/02/13/ jury-awards-couple-16m-suit-against-lcpd-officers/97873962/. Magid, L. (2001). Deceptive police interrogation practices: How far is too far? Michigan Law Review, 99, 1168–1210. Marche, G. (2009). Integrity, culture, and scale: An empirical test of the big bad police agency. Crime, Law and Social Change, 51(5), 463–486. Martinelli, T. (2006). Unconstitutional policing: The ethical challenges in dealing with noble cause corruption. Police Chief, 73(10), 148, 150, 152–154, 156. Mather, K. (May 4, 2015). ‘Django’ actress Daniele Watts, boyfriend plead to disturbing peace. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-actress-danielewatts-boyfriend-plead-no-contest-20150504-story.html. Mollen, M. (1994). Commission report, the city of New York. Commission to investigate allegations of police corruption and the anti-corruption procedures of the police department. published July 7. Paoline, E. (2004). Shedding light on police culture: An examination of officers’ occupational attitudes. Police Quarterly, 7(2), 205–236. Porter, L. E., & Warrender, C. (2009). A multivariate model of police deviance: Examining the nature of corruption, crime and misconduct. Policing and Society, 19(1), 79–99. Public Policy Center. (2017). Equip police officers with body cameras to protect officers from false accusations of misconduct and protect the public from unreasonable uses of force. Texas Criminal Justice Coalition. Retrieved from http://publicpolicycenter.texascjc.org/equip-policeofficers-with-body-cameras-to-protect-officers-from-false-accusations-of-misconduct-and-protect-the-public-from-unreasonable-uses-of-force. Rothwell, G., & Baldwin, J. (2007). Whistle-blowing and the code of silence in police agencies: Policy and structural predictors. Crime and Delinquency, 53(4), 605–632. Seron, C., Pereira, J., & Kovath, J. (2004). Judging police misconduct: “Street-Level” versus professional policing. Law and Society Review, 38(4), 665–710. Shaykhet, S. (May 6, 2016). Squad car video clears two Detroit police officers after woman accuses them of rape. W-XYZ. Retrieved from http://www.wxyz.com/news/region/detroit/ squad-car-video-clears-two-detroit-police-officers-after-woman-accuses-them-of-rape. Shockley-Eckles, M. (August 2011). Police culture and the perpetuation of the officer Shuffle: The paradox of life behind “The Blue Wall”. Humanity & Society, 35, 290–309. Skolnick, J. H. (2002). Corruption and the blue code of silence. Police Practice and Research, 3, 7–19. Skolnick, J. H. (2005). Corruption and the blue code of silence. In R. Sarre, D. K. Das, & H. J. Albrecht (Eds.), Police corruption: An international perspective. Oxford: Lexington Books. Slobogin. (Winter 1997). Deceit, pretext, and trickery: Investigative lies by the police. Oregon Law Review, 76, 775–816. Steele, T. (December 9, 2016). 9 Arlington police officers fired for falsifying their reports of traffic stops. Dallas Morning News. Retrieved from http://www.dallasnews.com/news/ arlington/2016/12/09/9-arlington-police-officers-fired-falsifying-reports-traffic-stops. Sunhara, D. F. (December 16, 2004). A social–psychological model of unethical and unprofessional police behaviour. Canadian Review of Policing Research, 1. Retrieved from http://crpr. icaap.org/index.php/crpr/issue/view/1. Tchekmedyian, A. (January 19, 2017). LAPD officers ordered to stand trial on charges they covered up crash, filed false reports. Los Angeles Times. Retrieved from http://www.latimes.com/local/ california/la-me-lapd-charges-cover-up-20170120-story.html. Terrill, W., Paoline, A., & Manning, P. (2003). Police culture and coercion. Criminology, 41(4), 1003–1034.

Further Reading

Thomas, G. (Summer 2007). Regulating police deception during interrogation. Texas Tech Law Review, 39, 1293–1319. True, M. (February 23, 2017). State to drop 14 cases that rely on officer accused of perjury. Vermont Digger. Retrieved from https://vtdigger.org/2017/02/23/state-drop-14-cases-rely-officer-accusedperjury/. Turvey, B. (2013). Forensic fraud: Evaluating law enforcement and forensic science cultures in the context of examiner misconduct. San Diego, CA: Elsevier. Waddington, P. (1999). Police (canteen) sub-culture: An appreciation. British Journal of Criminology, 39(2), 287–309. Wadsworth. (April 26, 2013). Fake lab report could land alleged rapist $150,000 settlement. San Jose Inside. Retrieved from http://www.sanjoseinside.com/2013/04/26/4_26_13_ fake_lab_report_settlement_alleged_rapist_police/. Westmarland, L. (2005). Police ethics and integrity: Breaking the blue code of silence. Policing and Society, 15(2), 145–165. Wolfe, S., & Picquero, A. (2011). Organizational justice and police misconduct. Criminal Justice and Behavior, 38(4), 332–353.

Further Reading Benson, B. (1988). An institutional explanation for corruption of criminal justice officials. Cato Journal, 8(1), 139–163. Benson, R. (January 2001). Changing police culture: The Sine Qua Non of Reform. Loyola of Los Angeles Law Review, 34, 681–690. Cooley, C., & Turvey, B. (2014). Miscarriages of justice. San Diego: Elsevier Science. Crowder, S., & Turvey, B. (2013). Ethical justice: Applied issues for criminal justice students and professionals. San Diego: Elsevier Science. Crowder, S., & Turvey, B. (2017). Forensic investigation. San Diego: Elsevier Science. Klockars, C. (1984). Blue lies and police placebos: The moralities of police lying. American Behavioral Scientist, 27(4), 529–544. Klockars, C., Ivkovic, S., & Haberfeld, M. (December 2005). Enhancing police integrity. U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Justice Programs, National Institute of Justice. NCJ 209269.

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