Finding a place in the world-economy

Pnlirrcul Grography, Vol. 14, No. 3, pp. 295-308, 1995 Copyright 0 1995 Elsevier Science Ltd Printed in Great Britain. All rights reserved 0962-6298/95 $10.00 + 0.00

Finding a place in the world-economy Party strategy and party vote: the regionalization of SNP and Plaid Cymru support, 1979 - 92 ROGER

LEVY

School of Public Administration and Law, lhe Robert Gordon University, 352 King Street, Aberdeen AB9 2TQ, Scotland, lJK The dealignment

ABSTRACT.

a regionalization party support.

of the British electorate

of the vote and the consequent Ostensibly,

for Scottish

relationship

between

1979, their strategies of their support. developed

of

One result of this has been the secular rise

and Welsh nationalist

parties.

This paper explores

the

the need of these parties to attract Labour voters since for doing so and the changes

(if any) in the regional bases

Using regional models of the Scottish and Welsh electorates

by Johnston

regional changes changing

by

concentration

it has also made ‘issue politics’ and party strategies

more important to voter decisions. in support

has been accompanied

geographical

as

et al. (1988) and Balsom (19X5), the paper reviews

in party support over four general elections

in the context

of

party strategies.

With the decline

of partisanship

issue orientated

than they used to be. Since the appearance

in the UK, it is now almost

axiomatic

that voters

are more

of the dealignment

thesis

(Crewe et al., 1977) in the wake of the 1974 general elections, studies of successive British elections parties

have shown heightened and voters

persistence concentration dealignment

and even

issue sensitivity, a further weakening

later voter

decisions.

In addition

of ties between

to the growth

and

of nationalist parties in Scotland and Wales, there has been a simultaneous of the geographical of the electorate

The identification

support base of the two major national UK parties.

has been accompanied

by a regionalization

of place and space as determinants

The

of the vote.

of political behaviour in Scotland

and Wales is not new. Starting with Hechter’s (1975) seminal work applying the internal colonial

model to the political development

been a steady interest, e.g. Balsom 1987), Johnston

(1979,

et al. (19SS>, Lutz (1990).

of Ireland, Scotland 19851, Balsom Indeed,

and Wales, there has

et ul. (1983),

Agnew (1984,

both Hechter and Agnew use their

empirical case studies in support of more general theoretical models linking place and politics. However, while Hechter’s model essentially views local variations as the product of wider national or international forces (Hechter, 1975: IO-16), Agnew takes the view that the bigger picture is the sum of local agglomerations of social, economic and cultural forces (Agnew, 1987: 43-44). Some of the issues raised by the literature are discussed at more length in part Two of this paper, but suffice it to say here that none of the models referred to are

296 Party strategy andpatiy specifically indeed

concerned

with party strategy

a more significant

reference Cymru

and

regionalization.

to the electoral

between This

performance

in the four general

elements

and

regionalization.

variable in influencing

then there should be a relationship realignment

of SNP and Plaid Cymru support, 1979-92

vote: the regionalization

If party strategy

voter behaviour

party strategies and emerging

paper

seeks

to

is

than it used to be,

examine

this

patterns of problem

by

of the Scottish National Party (SNP) and Plaid

elections

between

1979

are brought together in the overall analysis-a

and

1992.

To this end,

three

review of the changing policy

agendas of the two parties over the period, a regional analysis of the voting swings for and against the two parties, and opinion survey data of voter attitudes on key issues in Scotland and Wales.

Policy development,

1979- 93

In 1992, both the SNP and Plaid Cymru (hereafter parties which also happened

to be nationalist.

Plaid) could be described

as socialist

It would have been difficult to make the

same judgement in 1979. While Plaid was moderately left of centre (but not overtly socialist), the SNP’s position varied from one annual conference to another. Attempts to adopt an overtly ‘social democratic’ opposition

platform in the mid-1970s

met with fierce internal

(Levy, 1990). In addition, the voting record of SNP MPs between

1978 showed that they opposed the Labour Government it on social and economic Between

1974 and

more times than they supported

issues (Mishler and Mughan, 1978).

1974 and 1979, the SNP and Plaid could define their nationalism through their

ability to bring opposition.

the (Labour)

government

down

by voting

with the (Conservative)

This was no longer the case after 1979. Instead, the two parties have sought

to redefine their policies with the objective of increasing their support. Given the Labour Party’s dominance its persistent

in the traditionally industrialized areas of both Scotland and Wales and

overall majority in both countries,

this meant attacking

the Labour vote.

Thus, Plaid and the SNP have adopted a socialist agenda as part of their offensive against what is usually described strategy is of necessity There

are

transformation

three

as the ‘English Tory government’.

In this context,

a socialist

a regionalist strategy. common

themes

to

what

can

be

described

as

of Scottish and Welsh nationalism. These include opposition

ism’, the strategy for constitutional

socialist

change and the place of Scotland and Wales in the

European Community. Of the three, opposition of the principal battlegrounds

the

to ‘Thatcher-

of left-right

to ‘Thatcherism’ predictably has been one

factionalism within the two parties, necessarily

taking in a multitude of issues in its sway. The radical agenda of the early Thatcher years served to widen existing

ideological

divisions in the nationalist

parties between

those

who advocated an equally radical, if not militant response from an overtly socialist perspective, and those who supported a continuance of the single-issue approach, In general,

it is clear that the left has been

victorious

prolonged and debilitating periods of factionalism, time to time.

in each

a phenomenon

party, but not without which still erupts from

In addition to a socialist policy agenda, the left within both parties has promoted the use of civil disobedience tactics. With the exception of Gwynfor Evans’s hunger strike in 1980 over the government’s decision (later reversed) to abandon the Welsh-language TV channel, all these activities have been associated with left-wing issues and activism. Some forms of nationalist militancy have fallen outside the bounds of conventional acceptability-the burning of holiday homes in Wales being the most obvious example-and

R~CEKLI;.w have not been officially sanctioned. is compounded

‘207

Plaid has had a special problem in this regard which

by its own oft-stated opposition

property in Welsh rural communities.

to incomers (i.e. English people) buying

It has not been able to escape guilt by association

in the minds of many voters for the fire-raising campaign. For the most part however, civil disobedience campaigns.

has comprised

token

occupations,

demonstrations

and

Direct action campaigns by Plaid have included a water non-payment early 1980s as a protest against rising water charges (eventually

non-payment

campaign in the

called off after a court

case in 19831, material support to miners and their families during the miners’ strike of 1984-85,

and similar backing to slate quarry workers. Plaid also mounted an anti-poll tax

campaign in 1989, but this did not advocate mass non-payment-rather,

it invited people

‘to use all lawful measures to obstruct collection of the poll tax’ ( Welsh Nation, 63.1.). The campaign did, however, pledge support to those who did not pay the tax, and established a ‘Committee of 100’ ‘can-pay-won’t-pay‘ Plaid’s commitment

to (community)

non-payers. socialism is embodied

in its constitution.

Plaid is

formally affiliated with CND Cymru, and has affiliated trade union and women’s sections within its own structure. The formal commitment

of socialism was made as early as 1981.

and stems from the majority report of the five-member established concept

in the wake of the 1979 debacle.

of community

socialism,

party Commission

The report suggested

and advocated

of Inquiry

a distinctive Welsh

less involvement

with Westminster

politics and other parties generally (such isolationism was also evident in the SNP after the referendum

experience).

Sections of the party, most readily epitomized by the leadership

of Dafydd Elis Thomas (elected in 1984) and the semi-official embraced

such fashionable

totems as feminism,

ecology,

socialist regimes in Nicaragua and Cuba, opposition anti-racism. According (Davies,

to Davies,

this ‘bewildered

party journal Radical Wake.s, anti-nuclear’ism’,

the more traditional

1985: 157). Since its confirmation

of the party members’

at the 1985 conference,

and the subsequent

winding up of the Hydro group, there has been little serious opposition community

socialist

resumption

by Dafydd Wigley of the party leadership.

tide towards direction.

goal,

socialism

despite

within

the retirement

Plaid, there

In the words of Radical

ment to socialism

Within

south

reasons

‘to reassess

for this new

and revitalise its

Wales]’ as this was essential

to its future

later wrote that the 1981 commit-

had been part of a strategy ‘to replace

political party’ (Radical

to the party’s

in 1990 and the

But in addition to any moral

instrumental

Wales, winter 1983). Elis Thomas

(Radical

industrial

of Elis Thomas

Wales, Plaid needed

efforts in these areas [i.e. English speaking success

were

support for

to US ‘imperialism’ and support for

Labour as the major Welsh

Wales, spring 1985), in effect a manifesto for winning votes in

Wales.

the SNP, the left’s progress

Plaid, and the waxing of this. In the early

and waning

has been

rather

more

of civil disobedience

198Os, the left in the SNP advocated

arduous

tactics

than

has been

and participated

is the case one

in

measure

in ‘industrial’

campaigns, where activity ranged from occupying job centres to supporting worker occupations. Backed by the party conference for a while, this strategy of .direct action’ was abandoned in 1982 with the temporary defeat of the left in the party. However. it continued indirectly

in a rather through the

disobedience a community in Scotland.

low-key way in local involvement of party

protests activists

at nuclear in Scottish

waste sites, CND. The

and civil

strategy was to re-emerge in full in 1987 when it was decided to support charge (poll tax) non-payment campaign over the introduction of the tax

298

Party strategy andparty vote: the regionalization of SNP and Plaid Cymm support, 197Sr92

In the meantime, commitment

the party adopted

a variety

of socialist

policies

including

to a ‘worker’s charter’, withdrawal from NATO, nuclear disarmament,

of ‘anti trade union’ legislation

and the renationalization

of the Scottish steel industry

(Levy, 1990: Chs 4 and 5). The 1992 election manifesto consolidated

these commitments,

added extra ones in the areas of public housing, increased state pensions on health. The decisions socialist orientation,

taken at the 1992 annual conference

building in new commitments

in all its forms (including

the

repeal

and spending

reaffirmed

the party’s

for example in opposing privatization

British Rail, the ‘next steps’ reforms in the civil service, the

purchaser-provider

model in the NHS, Scottish water), and supporting state intervention

in more industries

(textiles,

forestry

October 1992). adoption of this agenda

and film making

were added to the list) (SCOWS

Independent, The

has had predictable

regional

effects.

For example,

traditional areas of strong SNP support (i.e. rural areas) showed above-average poll tax payment,

and this may be one reason why the non-payment

levels of

campaign

wound down in 1991. Attempts have also been made to reverse the commitment renationalization.

However, the consternation

was

to steel

caused within the SNP by the decision of

the party leader Alex Salmond (himself elected on a left-wing platform in 1991) to support the government subsequent

during

The question

of the Maastricht

legislation

in 1993,

is central for both parties and has

source of difficulty, particularly for the SNP. The controversy

Labour government’s of internal

devolution

friction

and his

on the issue, shows the strength the left now musters.

of how to achieve self-government

been a continual cause

the passage

hasty back-tracking

proposals

within

between

over the

1974 and 1979 was the principal

the SNP and seriously

damaged

the party. While

devolution has hardly been at the top of the policy agenda during the era of Conservative government,

it has not gone away; moreover,

opposition

parties seeking constitutional

Throughout collaboration referendum

the

1980s

there

in achieving

were

calls

self-government,

on the constitutional

the issue of cooperation from

within

an assembly

the

SNP for

or staging

issue. It never actually materialized,

of the SNP towards a socialist agenda. Relationships

cross-party

a multi-option

however, despite

the ‘tartanizing’ of parts of the Labour Party in Scotland (Levy and Geekie, movement

within those

change has been very much to the fore.

between

1989), and the the two parties

are probably as bad now as they have ever been, most graphically illustrated by the SNP’s decision

not to participate in

in the cross-party

Convention

established

1989,

participation

in the Convention

even

(but Labour-dominated)

though

SNP

members

Constitutional

thought

that

System 3 poll). While there are still those within the party who support devolution tactic and who continue 1991)

to urge a united front with other opposition

the ‘Independence-Nothing

non-

would harm the party (Glasgow Herald, 30 March 1989,

Less’ policy has predominated

as a

parties (Bayne,

since 1979.

Historically, Plaid has been less concerned about sovereignty and more concerned about cultural preservation. ‘Devolution’ therefore is not so much of a bogeyword, although the 1979 referendum campaign has hardened the party’s official policy. Plaid now calls for a parliament for Wales with full ‘national status’ and independent representation in the EU. However, in the mid-1980s it supported the creation of a devolved assembly in the form of a IOO-member Senate (Y Senedd), and the party continues to use the term ‘selfgovernment’ in preference to ‘independence’, so leaving some room for ambiguity. Since 1979, many anti-devolutionists in the Welsh Labour Party have been won over to the cause of devolution as a result of their prolonged experience of opposition and, as in Scotland, all-party groups such as the Campaign for a Welsh Assembly have sought to galvanize a cross-party campaign. At its 1992 conference,

the Wales TLJC called for the establishment

ROGERLEVY of a cross-party produced broaden

‘convention’,

299

and this was welcomed

by Plaid. Such initiatives have not

the desired result so far, and are unlikely to do so as long as Plaid seeks to its electoral base into the Labour heartlands.

In the 1992 general ‘Independence

election,

Plaid and the SNP officially

in the EC’. In both cases, this represented

the 1970s when the two parties opposed

EC membership.

supported

a policy

a substantial turnaround Baxter-Moore

points out that

it was Plaid rather than the SNP which led the change in strategy (Baxter-Moore, ll),

although

annual

it only adopted the ‘Independence

conference.

conference

The turning

dropped

point

but positive approach. proclaiming

in 1983, when

to EC membership

The formal commitment

five years later at the 1988 conference,

1992:

in Europe‘ policy officially at its 1990

for the SNP came

its outright opposition

of

from

the party

in favour of a pragmatic

to ‘Independence

in Europe’ was made

but that did not stop leading figures in the party

it as official policy in the period in between

(Levy, 1990: 121).

Supporters of the policy argue that Scotland and Wales are legally bound to accept the agreements

entered into by their predecessor

economy

and Scotland

remainder

of the UK economy),

stability and continued and Welsh constraints

and Wales’s close

state. Given the realities of the European integration

‘Independence

into it (in particular,

in Europe’ would ostensibly

into the guarantee

access to these markets. At the same time, independent

governments of European

could

defend

national

interests

within

Scottish

the framework

of

Union institutions and policies, and would have representation

right up to the ‘top table’ of the Council of Ministers. Whatever the merit of these arguments, the SNP’s ‘Independence been

at least in part designed

members

to overcome

and the caution and conservatism

the gap between

in Europe’ policy has the aspirations

of SNP

of potential nationalist voters. In this sense,

it is an equally neat solution for Plaid. In seeming to promise all benefits and no costs and minimal disruption in the meantime, voters, although

‘Independence

in Europe’ has proved popular with

it is clear that many of them like it much more as an idea than as a

practical policy. If it were otherwise, negotiate) for independence into the embarrassing

the nationalists

might be negotiating

(or trying to

now. Instead, the SNP’s election slogan of ‘Free in ‘93’ turned

reality of ‘Three [MPsl in ‘93’.

Nationalist voting and public opinion Discounting

the exceptional

circumstances

of by-elections,

the late 1960s and early 1970s

was the period of sustained growth in support for the two nationalist parties. The best performance obtained

by the SNP at a general election

30.4 percent

performance

of the Scottish

was achieved

vote and won

has been slightly different.

It achieved

in October

11 parliamentary

1974 when it seats.

Plaid’s

its highest share of the vote (11.5

percent) in 1970 when it won no seats, but won four seats (the highest total ever) in 1992

TAIXE1. Support for the SNP and Plaid Cymru at general elections 1979-92

o/ouote in Scotland or Wales

1979

1983

1987

1992

SNP PC

17.3 8.1

11.8 8.0

14.0 7.3

21.5 8.8

Sooz4rce.~:

I.inton (ed.) 1992; 7be

Times (13

June 1987)

300 Party strategy and party uote: the regionalization

when it gained performance weakened

only 8.8 percent

of SNP and Plaid Cymru support, 1979-92

of the vote. As Table

of the two parties between

1 shows,

whilst the electoral

1979 and 1992 confirms

that support

has

since the 197Os, it has remained significantly above the levels typical (around

5%) in the mid-1960s. Thus, the overall change in share of the vote for these two parties in Scotland and Wales over the 1979-92

period reveals little beyond

an initial decline followed

by a modest

recovery. In the case of Plaid Cymru, there is very little variation indeed, with a low of 7.3 percent

share in 1987 and a high of 8.8 percent

in 1992. In the case of the SNP the

variation is greater, with a low share of 11.8 percent in 1983 against a high of 21.5 percent in 1992. The national results are a blunt instrument against which to review the possible effects of party strategy on vote. If the results are disaggregated into geographical or functionally based groups of constituencies, however, then some very distinct trends emerge. The initial problem with this approach

is in identifying appropriate

and Welsh constituencies.

criteria for the group aggregation

satisfy three basic requirements:

(a) that all Scottish or Welsh constituencies

(b) that there are a sufficient number of constituencies relevant to nationalist voting are not obscured earlier provide a basis for constituency

are included,

in each group and (c) that variables

by the aggregating

The spatially based models of political behaviour (1983)

of Scottish

There is no easy and neat solution to this, but any scheme must

criteria.

in Scotland and Wales referred to

grouping: Balsom (1979, 1985) and Balsom et al.

for Wales; Agnew (1984, 1987) and Lutz (1990) for Scotland; Johnston

et al. (1988)

for Scotland and Wales. While all these models utilize variables other than place in their overall explanatory framework, not all theories explaining the rise and fall in nationalist support in Scotland and Wales use place as an independent variable. In general, all theories (including the spatially based models) can be grouped into two main categories which are nevertheless

sometimes interlinked by their proponents.

focus on UK-wide factors such as the decline in partisanship, voting and/or the development concentrate

on the importance

of post-material of indigenous

There are those which

the rise of issue and protest

values among voters, and those which

cultural and issue factors.

In this debate, there is far less disagreement about the nature of Plaid support compared with the electoral base of the SNP. Studies carried out since the 1970s (Balsom, 1979, Balsom

et al., 1983, Balsom,

strongly correlated

with language

most Welsh-speaking

1985) have shown that support for Plaid Cymru is variables,

and is geographically

concentrated

in the

counties. Thus, whatever the origin of the initial surge in the 1960s

continued

Plaid voting

Following

his earlier

behaviour,

Balsom

is primarily work

(1985)

classified geographically

which

interpreted identified

has suggested

as a culturally a four-area

a ‘three Wales’ model

by the dominant characteristics

based

model

phenomenon,

of Welsh

political

of voting behaviour,

of national self-identification

and

first language (see Table 2). These three areas are ‘Welsh Wales’ (14 of the most heavily populated south Wales constituencies where Welsh national self-identification predominates over British self-identification), ‘Y Fro Gymraeg’ (the six constituencies in the west and north-west which have the highest proportion of Welsh speakers and where Welsh national self-identification predominates), and ‘British Wales’ (17 constituencies in the east and south-west of Wales where British self-identification predominates over Welsh national self-identification). Only in Y Fro Gymraeg, where it holds all four of its parliamentary seats currently, is Plaid a serious challenger for office. Elsewhere, it has generally trailed in third or fourth, although, as might be expected, it performs better in Welsh Wales than British Wales

RO(;EKLevv TAHLF 2. Constituencies British Wules Alyn & Radnor. Central, Cardiff

Wales’ model

Welsh Wales

Deeside, Brecon and Bridgend, Cardiff Cardiff S and Penarth, W. Clwyd NW, Clwyd

Y Fro Qwnraeg

Aberavon, Blaenau Gwent. Caerphilly, Cynon Valley. Gower, Islwyn, Llanelli. Merthyr Tydfil and Rhymney,

SW. Delyn, Monmouth. Montogomery. Newport E. Newport W, Pembroke, Glamorgan. Wrexham

301

in the ‘Three

Caernarfon, Ceredigon h, Conwy,

nant Conay. Ynys Mon (12 = 5)

Neath, Ogmore, Pontypridd, Rhondda. Swansea E, Swansea W. Torfaen (I? = 15)

Vale of

Carmarthen. and Pembroke Meionnydd

(~2= 17)

Since 1979, this pattern has been reinforced.

In Welsh Wales, the party managed to save

eight deposits in 1992 (but would have saved only one under the old 12.5 percent threshold), while in British Wales it has averaged less than one saved deposit per election since 1979. Aggregate data for the change in Plaid support over the four general elections between 1983-92

1979 and 1992 show three instances where there was a swing to Plaid (1979-92, and 1987-92), and three instances where there was a swing against (1979-83,

1979-87

and 1983-87)

(see Table 3).

There were some significant changes in constituency boundaries in 1983, but the trends are clear. In Y Fro Gymraeg, all swings to Plaid have been well above average and there have been

no swings against in the aggregate.

In British Wales, on the other hand. there

has been only one swing to Plaid (well below average),

with all the swings against bar

one being above average. Welsh Wales presents a more balanced to Plaid being neutral and below average over the 1979-92

picture, with the swing

period but roughly average

over the 1983-92 period. Even if all the 1979 figures are discounted boundary changes, the picture of consistent Plaid overperformance underperformance is confirmed.

in British Wales and approximate

because of the 1983 in Y Fro Gymraeg.

average performance

in Welsh Wales

If Plaid has been trying to diversify its support base. then it has singular11

failed to do so. Its strength has become

increasingly

concentrated

in the Welsh-speaking

areas. Given Plaid’s socialist and nationalist orientation, might have been expected.

TABLF 3. Change

in support

197S92

for Plaid Cymru,

in British Wales

1979-92,

% average

swing

(+I-)

198.3- 92

1987-92

197S8.3

1979-87

198.+-87

1.5 2.2

-0.1 - 1.0 1.6 - 1.1

-0.8 -2.2

-0.7 - 1.2 2.0 -0.r

0.7

0.8

Welsh Wales Y Fro Gymraeg British Wales

0.0 7.4 -1.1

1 .o 5.8 0.0

04

Sozrrcr~ Linton (1992):

The Times (13 June

1987): Balsam

wdles

underperformance

On the other hand, its socialist agenda has singularly failed to

3.8

(1985).

3.6 -1.5

302 Party strategy andparty vote: the regionalization of SNP and Plaid Cymru support, 197%92 make inroads in Welsh Wales where the Labour Party has enjoyed a dominance unparalleled elsewhere in the UK, and where public support for a socialist agenda is strong. Evidence from the 5th and 9th ‘British Social Attitudes’ surveys (Jowell et al., 1988,

1992), shows that attitudes to income

redistribution

and inequality

were significantly

more ‘socialist’ in the North, Scotland and Wales than in the rest of England. Controlling for social class and housing tenure factors, Jowell and his colleagues found that there was an independent

regional effect (which was at its strongest in Wales in the 1992 survey),

although the gap narrowed between the 1988 and 1992 surveys (see Jowell et al., 1988: 134-135; Jowell et al., 1992: 80-84). Clearly, there is something inimical in Plaid’s combination

of socialism and nationalism to voters in south Wales which is unproblematic

for voters in the rural Welsh-speaking

areas.

There is more ambiguity about both the nature and the origin of SNP voting. Early studies (McLean, 1970; Kellas, 1973) tended to focus on the heterogeneous

social base of

SNP support (very similar to that of the Liberals), arguing that nationalist supporters were either voters with no pre-existing

party loyalties (‘non-partisans’),

previous abstainers, or

disaffected weak partisans of the major parties. Voting for the SNP was thus essentially a protest phenomenon. As the nationalist vote persisted and then strengthened, view. One interpretation represented

(Hanby, 1976; Jaensch,

the development

of a national or ethnically based partisanship,

either replaced or added a new dimension Thus, the SNP-or mobilize

to political allegiances

any other party proclaiming

these voters irrespective

issues or not. The issue-driven focused

of whether

be able to

party policy on specific

and North Sea (‘Scottish’)

oil during

that voting decisions were determined

towards the issues, at least as far as the SNP was concerned,

but no more so, arguably, than any of the other explanations.

studies suggesting a combination have much to recommend

which had

model (Miller et al., 1980; Miller, 1981) of SNP voting has

the formative period of the 1970s. Its conclusion is debatable,

this

based on social class.

its ‘Scottishness’-might

they supported

principally on attitudes to self-government

in large part by orientations

later studies challenged

1976; Brand, 1978) was that SNP voting

of explanations

(Baxter-Moore,

In this context,

1979; Brand et al., 1983)

them.

Latterly, the debate has been incorporated

into the wider discussion

concerning

the

development of post-industrial values among electors, with some studies claiming to show that nationalist voters are more likely than others to adhere to a post-industrial issue agenda (Studlar and McAllister, 1988). In the context the party, there has also been Newman’s electorate

a re-examination

recent study (Newman, is becoming

of the changing

1992) lends weight to the view that the nationalist

more like that of the Labour Party in Scotland,

does not sit particularly

strategy of

of the social base of SNP support.

easily with the apparently

greater disposition

a finding which towards

post-

industrial values, however. Agnew (1984, 1987) and Lutz (1990) have attempted ‘regionalist’ analyses of the SNP vote, although their models are quite different from each other. There is a certain circularity in the contagion model deployed by Lutz which argued that the SNP is more likely to grow in areas of pre-existing nationalist strength or in constituencies adjoining areas of nationalist strength. Nevertheless,

Lutz identifies some important variables which

correlate negatively with the nationalist vote, including Liberal/Alliance voting, council house tenure and non-manual occupations (Lutz, 1990: 259). Agnew’s earlier model uses the general and regional election results in the nine Scottish local government regions to identify a ‘nationalist region’ based in the outlying and rural parts of Scotland (Agnew, 1984: 198). However, these areas are not purported to represent concentrations of

ROGER LEVY

linguistic

and cultural

Balsom

‘Scottishness’

comparable

303

with the cultural

heartland

identified

by

in Wales.

Agnew’s

later work

makes

it clear

that concentrations

of SNP (or indeed

any other

party) support are a result of spatial agglomerations of those social, economic, cultural (essentially linguistic) and religious variables which are generally accepted to have a bearing

on

political

idiosyncratic Indeed,

behaviour.

Because

local circumstances,

the displacement

there

of the nationalists

Labour since 1987 illustrates

are

so

the value of this model

this problem,

many

in the Western

although

variables

as a predictive

and

Isles and Dundee

it could be argued

such

tool is not great. East by

that the incumbent

Labour representatives are ‘really’ nationalists in disguise (the ‘tartanization’ thesis--see Levy and Geekie [1989]). Agnew does posit a link between the SNP’s policy/ideological appeals-which

he claims

1987: 136-I%)-and data to substantiate The most found

these

developed

in Johnston

Applying

these

lirban

two

based

Scotland),

models

They

constituencies there

or three

two

(Agnew.

are no survey

results

Constituencies,

geographical

one

are to be

based

on their geographical

in a set

Scottish

regions

groupings

approaches,

and the other

to Scotland

Industrial

of constituency

suggest

of constituencies models

Scottish

to particular

but unfortunately

claims.

et al. (1988).

characteristics

to appeal

for the party,

empirically

functional (Clydeside,

are tailored

voter support

of four

on

the

location.

functional

regions

Rural Areas and Modestly

Affluent

(Strathclyde,

East Central

Scotland

and

Rural Scotland). The

functional

developed indicators parties. factors

regions

derive

to discriminate

constituencies,

geographical

model

underpinned diverse

by spatial

must

rather

socially

and

nothing

to the model

politically, solution

East Central

is to modify

the functional Isles,

South,

of issue

only 65 of the 72 reason

alone.

The

constituencies.

includes region

but is

in a tack of

constituencies

as

is a fairly coherent

somewhere

in between,

this

Gordon

region

Edinburgh and

model

Central,

Glasgow

by allocating Edinburgh

Hillhead-to

the

South, the

most

urban constituencies to the Modestly Isles and Gordon to the Scottish Rural

Table 4).

The difficulty of classifying rural of nationalist regions differentiates nationalist (namely, Galloway), and those mean leaving seven category. tuencies,

Lutz)

itself.

Aberdeen

(see

Scotland

by

and Conservative

This results

which

the Strathclyde

appropriate category in the model (the five Affluent IJrban Scotland category, and Western Areas category)

for that

variables.

category,

West. While

constituencies-Western

West,

use

all the Scottish

socio-economic

used

and the importance

is not ideal. It also includes

of including

with

(also

range of socio-economic

for the Labour

be of questionable

than

and Dundee

block

Edinburgh

support

in the ‘Rural Scotland’

owes

missing

such a model

and

particularly

A compromise

between

classification on a limited

social base of SNP support

has the virtue

as Dumfries

seven

earlier

designed

to ‘third’ party voters,

coherence,

an

and Fox (1984), and are based

Given the heterogeneous

Scottish

from

by Crewe

Given their there is only

Northern

Scotland is not new. Agnew’s between those rural arras

Grampian,

which are not. If this constituencies out of

Eastern

Tdysidr,

modification the proposed

(1984, which Western

1987) model are strongly Isles

and

m’ere adopted, it would Scottish Rural Areas‘

functional characteristics shared with other rural constia case for omitting the seven if the swings in them made a

decisive change to the pattern. In fact, the only result of excluding them would be to accentuate the trends of SNP underperformance in the rural group which arc detailed in Table 5. Thus, including these constituencies reinforces the argument that

304 Party strategy andparty

wte: the regionalization

TABLE4. Scottish constituencies Clydeside

Aberdeen N, Dundee E, Dundee W, Edinburgh E, Edinburgh Leigh, Glasgow Cathcart, Glasgow Central, Glasgow Garscadden, Glasgow Govan, Glasgow Maryhill, Glasgow Pollock, Glasgow Provan, Glasgow Rutherglen, Glasgow Shettleston, Glasgow Springburn, Greenock and Port Glasgow, Paisley N (n = 17)

of SNP and Plaid Cymru support, 1979-92 by functional region

Scottish Industrial Constituencies

Modestly Afjuent Urban Scotland

Scottish Rural Areas

Clackmannan, Clydebank and Milngavie, Cumnock and Doon Valley, Dunfermline E, Dunfermline W, Clydesdale, Cumbernauld and Kilsyth, Cunninghame N, Cunninghame S, Dumbarton, East Kilbride, Falkirk E, Falkirk W, Fife C, Hamilton, Kircaldy, Linlithgow, Livingston, Midlothian, Kilmarnock and Loudon, Monklands E, Monklands W, Motherwell N, Motherwell S, Paisley S (n = 25)

Aberdeen S, Ayr, Eastwood, Edinburgh Pentlands, Edinburgh Central, Edinburgh S, Edinburgh W, Glasgow Hillhead, Renfrew W and Inverclyde, Stirling, Strathkelvin and Bearsden (n = 11)

Angus E, Argyll and Bute, Banff and Buchan, Caithness and Sutherland, Dumfries, East Lothian, Fife NE, Galloway and Upper Nithsdale, Gordon, Inverness Nairn and Lochaber, Kincardine and Deeside, Moray, Orkney and Shetland, Perth and Kinross, Ross Cromarty and Skye, Roxburgh and Berwickshire, Tayside N, Tweedale Ettrick and Lauderdale, Western Isles (n = 19)

Source: Johnston et al. (1988).

the SNP was 1992. Yet since obtain

losing

ground

relatively

confirmation

1979, and in broad

its highest

vote

in its rural areas

of strength

of Lutz’s findings,

in rural constituencies

where

between

1979 and

the SNP has continued

the Liberal vote

is low.

to All

of the three seats the party holds currently fall into the ‘Rural Scotland’ or ‘Scottish Rural Areas’

categories.

and moderately

It

performs

elsewhere,

worst

in

with Edinburgh

‘Modestly

Affluent

and Glasgow

Urban

showing

below

Scotland’ average

support. In

comparison

geographically

with

the

Plaid

and demographically.

vote,

SNP support is now quite diffuse both This is best illustrated by the fact that the party did

not lose a single deposit at the last election (indeed, its vote fell below 10 percent in only two constituencies). 1983-87,

1983-92

Between

1979 and 1992,

and 1987-92)

there were

four occasions

(1979-92,

when there was a swing to the SNP and two occasions

TABLE5. Change in support for the SNP, 1979-92, % average swing (+/-I

Scotland Clydeside Scott. Indt. Constits. Scott. Rural Areas Modest. Affl. Urban Scot.

1979-92

1983-92

1987-92

197%8_3

197%87

1983-87

4.2 7.8 5.3 -0.3 2.6

2.2 2.3 3.5 0.8 1.4

9.7 11.4 11.9 5.5 7.7

7.5 9.1 8.4 5.3 6.3

-5.5 -3.3 -6.8 -5.2 -5.7

-3.3 -1.4 -3.3 -6.0 -3.8

Sources: Linton (ed)., 1992, Parry, 1988, Johnston et al., 1988

ROGERLEVY (1979-83

and 1979-87)

the functional

305

when there was a swing against. After aggregating

regions

suggested

above,

Table 5 shows the changing

the data into

pattern of SNP

support over the period. Taking the 1983 changes in constituency First, the party has been performing ‘Clydeside’-style

constituencies

boundaries

into account, two trends stand out.

better than average in urban/industrial Scotland and

in particular. In the latter, swings to the party are all above

average, and swings against are all below average. On the other side, the nationalists have been losing ground either relatively or absolutely in rural Scotland, their ‘traditional’ area of strength, with swings there showing party’s performance

an opposite

trend to those in ‘Clydeside‘. The

is also well below average in affluent urban areas.

These developments

are in striking contrast with the further concentration

of the Plaid

vote in the 1980s. In the case of the SNP, the party has been experiencing repositioning in the electoral therefore Labour-held) areas-a One consequence

of the party moving in this direction

rather than less geographically The process is nowhere

a gradual

market-place towards the western and industrial (and strategy advocated by many SNP activists over the years. diffuse, a development

near complete,

is that support becomes

more

which brings its own problems.

and the party still has a long way to go before it

represents a really serious challenge to Labour hegemony. But while progress may be slow, it is unmistakable, and adds weight to Newman’s observations on the changing composition

of the nationalist electorate

As indicated earlier, the ideological Scottish electorate,

in Scotland.

basis for SNP ‘socialism’ is clearly present in the

although the Scottish regional effect on attitudes was less in 1992 than

198X (it is interesting

that the Scottish and Welsh survey samples reversed their relative

positions over the period). It is perhaps the case that the relatively greater fluidity of the Scottish

electorate

comfortable

has favoured

the SNP which,

as we have argued,

has been

less

with its socialism than Plaid has.

The other attitude factors which have favoured the nationalists. however, have little to do with socialism and more to do with the nationalist agenda per se namely, attitudes on ‘home rule’ and ‘London’ government.

Fortuitously for the SNP, the group of voters closest

to nationalist voters on these issues have tended to be Lahour supporters. rule question,

Labour voters have consistently

1979, despite

the waxing

and waning

On the home

been closest to nationalist voters since

of support

for devolution

generally. This has meant that Labour and SNP enthusiasm

and independence

for these options has moved

in tandem. In February 1979, 84 percent of SNP voters and 56 percent of Lsbour voters supported the government’s

(Glasgow

independence voters

devolution proposals, but only 19 percent of Conservative voters did so

27 February 1979, System 3 poll). In 1983, when support for was at its lowest, only 34 percent of SNP voters, I6 percent of kdbOLlr

Herald,

and 13 percent of all electors supported this option with Conservative and Alliance

figures at 4 percent and 3 percent respectively

(Glasgow Herald, 21 May 1983, System S

poll). In 1992, on the other hand, 81 percent of SNP voters, 56 percent of Labour voters and 48 percent of all voters supported independence when given a choice between independence and the status quo, with Conservative and Liberal Democrat figures at 18 percent and 37 percent respectively

(Glasgow Herald, 5 January

1992, System 3 poll). In

polls carried out for 7;be Scotsman by MORI in February 1989 and February 1990. Labour and SNP voters were closest on support for the two independence options (inside or outside the EC), although not on devolution with the UK (McCrone, 1990, 1991). SNP and Labour voter attitudes were also closest on the fairness or otherwise of the community

charge/poll

tax (Glasgow Herald, 5 May 1986, System 3 poll). and it is thus

306 Party strategy and party vote: the regionalization of SNP and Plaid Cymru support, 197%92 not surprising that a survey carried out in May 1987 found that the biggest proportion of potential SNP ‘switchers’ (21 percent of all SNP voters) would switch to the Labour Party if they were unable to vote nationalist (Glasgow

Herald, 29 May 1987, System 3

poll). All these data add weight to the view that the SNP electorate is becoming more like that of the Labour party, and that significant sections of Labour’s Scottish support have more in common

with the SNP than with any alternative

competitor.

The nationalist

drive

towards the Labour vote has been built on an underlying sympathy for home rule among Labour voters, an advantage which Plaid has not had.

Conclusions This brief survey of policy development

in Plaid Cymru and the SNP since 1979 has

shown that the two parties have adopted an overtly anti-Conservative agenda on most issues, and a socialist agenda on social and economic issues. While there is residual hostility to this agenda amongst ‘traditionalists’ in both parties, they have been and still are in a minority. The underlying logic of this strategy is to poach disaffected

Labour voters,

so that Plaid and the SNP can replace Labour as the dominant party in Wales and Scotland respectively. The evidence from the regional voting analysis suggests that the SNP has been far more successful than Plaid in this endeavour. Indeed, Plaid seems to have been singularly unsuccessful

in diversifying its support base. Labour voters in Scotland appear to be more

receptive than those in Wales to the repackaging An explanation

of nationalism

in socialist colours.

supportive of the partisanship thesis would be that Welsh Ldbour voters

simply retain stronger residual loyalties to their party, and are relatively immune to the policy manoeuvrings

of Plaid. These voters may be more issue orientated, but only up to

a point. As some Plaid members have observed in the pages of Radical Wales, explaining the difference on the doorstep between ‘community’ and Labour-style socialism has not met with resounding

success.

On the other hand, we have suggested that the difference could have more to do with the relative strength of support for the nationalist issue agenda in the two countries. The 1979

devolution

referendum

results

and subsequent

opinion

surveys

provide

firm

evidence that this agenda commands much greater support in Scotland than it does in Wales. Thus, nationalism and the SNP enjoy a greater degree of general acceptance in Scotland than nationalism agenda

in a socialist

socialism’

and Plaid do in Wales. Plaid’s attempts to diversify its policy

direction

notwithstanding,

another party proclaiming

are understandable

in this context

but, ‘community

it is difficult to see why Labour voters should

switch to

itself to be broadly similar except on the one issue where it is

at a disadvantage. Plaid’s primary raison d’&e has always been the defence of the Welsh language and Welsh culture against homogenizing and corrosive forces spilling over from its English neighbour. While this is evidently of relevance in the rural heartland of Welsh-speaking Wales, it finds only a faint echo elsewhere in the principality. The promotion of the Welsh language is not of prime importance to the majority of unilingual English-speaking Welsh voters. To sacrifice completely the party’s base of support in Welsh-speaking Wales in favour of uncertain rewards in south Wales is a risk Plaid has not been willing to take. By contrast, the SNP appears to be more sanguine about its ability to hold on to rural areas while appealing to Labour voters elsewhere.

Rocmt LEVY

AGNEW,

J. (19&i). PLMXAND 191-206.

307

POLITICALBEI-IKVIOLR~-riw ~;~BG~~A~IIYOF kcnns~~

NA’IIONAUSY. h~rtYc>~

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VAN MECHELEN,D. (1983). Scnwx 13(3), 299-325.

BALSOM, n.. MADGWICK, P. m (IIOKX

TIII!

&I>

AND ‘I’III: GIWW:

PKIIERNS ot’ pARl1SAK

&i-77.UIJOt!RliAI. up Pounced

BAXTER-MOORE.N. (1979). TII~:. ~lsr AND FALL or -rw SNP: RP.~ISI’I’I:I>. PAI~I IX%lVCRBI)n7 nw GHOI:PWORKSHOY. hINIX>N, o,WARlO, 37-19 I)p1:EMBKR. BAXTER-MOORE,N. (1992). INDR~RNI>RN
OF nw CANALWAXPOUII~AI. &:IIXX

EIIRO~I~I

Pt II.I’I~N

IHIIX~~~A’IIO~.PA~KR

Assrr:~~~wN, CIIARIA~WXWW,

31 MAS-2

JI XI-:.

BAYNE, 1.0. ( 19911. TIII! IMFA~~ cw 1979on; IIIE &SNl?IN NA~~INVAIXWIN 771~Nrrvrnrrrs(T. GAWHER

WI.). EIXNIBIXI;II:

Pt )I.Y
(197H). ‘li~fiN47lonsu MO-

/N &rt7YAN/J. h?lI)ON:

th>ltll.l4Xil%

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J.

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v.

id.

PARI-I~N I~~-AUGNMRS~ IN HR~AIN

CYMRI~ IN TRANsmoN. IN i%~A!mckwr

1)m.n:

AGAIN: Wu71

Au.rncu.

Bw77w JMRXAI. (IIF

Iwwnn

kv 771~1980’~

GOMIZR.

(1976). TliR RLKAI%%ANIH 01’ TIIE

TR~.YI,v/QMs: fi&.7lck~

Q~.zmuv

1964-1974.

AM,

SNY: EROM I%:CAN-~RI~: To CZAtlI’AI<;NINli(‘RI’sAI~ER.h

VALI/H IN CM77??*)rRARY IIRMK~A~~~~ CL. MAKEI. I:.I,.I -

I’I’.

6UAQ;f.?X; <,h.W/+Wf;.V

217-241.

BIVAKIS HIIJ_\:

(iA
HBCHTER,M. ( 1975). I,W~KU C~JLCWAI~~ i%? ~%m: Fww.~ IXB~mir

~%hYtbVAb Ihu.rsww~;

15.%- 1!X%.IA)KI I(m:

Rc>IwLl!Ix;I:.

JAENSCH.D. (1976). Tars Snrms71 vtm. 1974: A REAIIONINC.PARW svsncc? POWIUI. Jzl~rnis 24(3), 306-319. JOHNSTON. R.J., PAlTIE, C.J. AND ALL!!)! J.G. (1fWl). A N477r~w4113uw~xw;: fiw Eimnnw. MAP OF <;Xxr 19-87. hNIX7N: hNG?dAN. JOWELL. H.. HROOK, L.. PRIOR, G. AND TAYLOR, 13.EDS (1992). Lbm.w S~N.A/. ,477777.711x 771~ 977r

/%WL~W

R/DIY:

AI.I~KIII w: ~IAKIBKIL~SCPR.

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h.YAL

Amn

YH~ZYrrf! .571/XHI’~~Y:Arn>tw~ or8’1’:

Cc WI;R/SCPR.

KELLAS.J. (1973,[19#td]).T,rr!

Stxn~‘.w

!bu?7cxr

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l?nN

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CAMRHI[X?K CA~(WRIIX;I: ~~RIYRRRI.II

PRE!!. LEVY. R. (1-k

TIIIRIB PARIS IXCUNI! IN nig

1 l(3), 57-74. LEVY. R. (1990). .Q.rmt.wNAYXM LJ3Y.

Llii,

R. (1992).

UK:

ma

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AT Y~+EC~WNMI~~.

ANIB

SDP IN (IBMPARA~VI?PERSPI%.‘~~B.W~xrfium~w~

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Ly NATKIINAUSME PALIL’OPRW~~IN: IX us 1711 ~‘E~ccsw. Cavfl~mwts 16, 129-W.

R. ANI) GEEKIE, J. (1989). 4x31, 399-411.

bwumoN

AND mi!

‘L’ARI’ANISAI~(IK op nlK LAS II!K P~tnv. ~~~~4.wm7l;lrrr~

Awxnts

308 Party strategy and party vote: the regionalization MILLER, W. (1981).

THE END OF BRI~SI, Pounc.~: Smn-

of SNP and Plaid Cymru support, 197%92

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AND ILZ~IALS~JDEY

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Pum

CYURU:S PR~CRAMM~FOR WA.XS IN Ermw~. CARIXFF: PLAIDCYMRU.

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NATIONALISMIN Smn.~~o:

48-62.

TIIE Smw

OF NA~ONAUSM IN Sccm~~u

HARMONIXWOR~:PENGUIN.

OF PLAID CYMR~ THE PAXIY 01: Wx.w.

ARERYSTWYTH: PLAIDCYMHIJ.

AND