Fishery benefits and stakeholder priorities associated with a coral reef fishery and their implications for management

environmental science & policy 44 (2014) 258–270

Available online at www.sciencedirect.com

ScienceDirect journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/envsci

Fishery benefits and stakeholder priorities associated with a coral reef fishery and their implications for management Christina C. Hicks

a,b,

*, Natalie Stoeckl c, Joshua E. Cinner b, Jan Robinson b,d

a

Center for Ocean Solutions, Stanford University, CA, USA ARC Centre of Excellence for Coral Reef Studies, James Cook University, Townsville, QLD 4811, Australia c School of Business, James Cook University, Townsville, QLD 4811, Australia d Seychelles Fishing Authority, Mahe, Seychelles b

article info

abstract

Available online 11 June 2014

Fishers often behave in ways that were neither intended, nor anticipated, by managers or policy makers. This is in part because the factors that motivate and constrain behavior –

Keywords:

people’s preferences and their social characteristics – are overlooked. We used a case study

Benefits

of coral reef artisanal fishers in Seychelles to assess likely responses to different manage-

Co-management

ment approaches by identifying the benefits fishers associate with their coral reef envi-

Common pool resource system

ronment, the extent to which they prioritize these benefits, and examining how these

Decentralized

priorities relate to their social characteristics. We found that fishers identified a diversity of

Fisheries management

benefits associated with the fishery but overall fishery, option, bequest, and existence

Policy

benefits were assigned the highest priorities. Fishers who prioritized fishery benefits, identified as ‘‘income’’, were different to the fishers who prioritized option and bequest benefits, identified as ‘‘a right of access for all’’ and ‘‘for our children’’ – differences that were also reflected in their social characteristics. Fishers who prioritized option and bequest benefits identified avenues to resolve conflicts and were more likely to take action when a norm was broken – characteristics thought to enable cooperation. There was a clear relationship between fishers’ earnings and the extent to which they prioritized both fishery benefits and option benefits. Specifically, fishers with higher earnings tended to prioritize option whereas fishers with lower earnings tended to prioritize fishery benefits. These findings have important implications for fisheries management decision-making. For example, decentralized approaches, such as fisheries co-management, are only likely to succeed for the group of fishers who demonstrated a high likelihood of cooperation. Due to the relationship between earnings and fishers’ priorities, management that influences fishers’ earnings (e.g. through a tax), must consider the likely influence on fishers’ priorities if it is to avoid unexpected or perverse outcomes. # 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

* Corresponding author at: Center for Ocean Solutions, Stanford University, CA, USA. E-mail addresses: [email protected], [email protected] (C.C. Hicks). http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.envsci.2014.04.016 1462-9011/# 2014 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

environmental science & policy 44 (2014) 258–270

1.

Introduction

Effectively governing natural resources so that they are used sustainably is a formidable challenge for many societies. This is partly because problems relating to sustainable resource use are inherently trans-disciplinary and need to balance social, political, ecological, and economic considerations (Jennings, 2004; Max-Neef, 2005; Ostrom et al., 2007; Gelcich et al., 2010). Fisheries management is a classic example of such a transdisciplinary challenge where managers and scientists seek to address livelihood, conservation, and governance issues, all of which are inextricably linked (Allison et al., 2012; Hilborn et al., 2004; McClanahan and Hicks, 2011). Small-scale fisheries employ 95% of those engaged in the world’s fisheries sector, with 90% in developing countries (Be´ne´ et al., 2010; Mahon et al., 2008); but they receive the smallest proportion of fisheries science efforts (Mahon, 1997; Pauly, 2006). There is consequently a particular need in small-scale fisheries for trans-disciplinary solutions that will enable sustainable resource use. Small-scale fisheries provide multiple benefits to the people that depend on them. These benefits, which are provided from nature, are called ecosystem services (MA, 2003; Hicks, 2011). People’s preferences for these benefits are likely to differ even when their activities are similar. For example, from a seemingly identical fishing trip some fishers prioritize income benefits, others prioritize social or cultural benefits, and others prioritize the benefits of maintaining a healthy and diverse ecosystem (Bavinck et al., 2012; Hicks et al., 2013). Fisheries management generally seeks to maximize specific objectives, such as increasing fisheries productivity or conserving biodiversity. These objectives address specific fishery benefits (e.g. income or biodiversity), but managers and policy makers seldom investigate the way resource users prioritize a range of benefits. This can result in resource users responding to policies in ways that were neither intended nor anticipated (Fulton et al., 2011). If fisheries management is to succeed in influencing fishers’ behavior, then in setting management objectives, managers need to identify the relevant fishery benefits and understand the extent to which different fishers prioritize them (Bavinck et al., 2012). Fisheries managers generally achieve their objectives by controlling who fishes, where they fish, or how fishing is conducted (Jennings, 2004). There are many rules1 that can be employed to achieve these controls; for example, issuing fishing licenses may limit the number of fishers or boats allowed; no-take marine protected areas may limit where people can fish; and legal minimum mesh sizes may limit the types or specifications of gears that can be used and consequently the species or sizes of fish landed. Although these rules can be decided upon and implemented in a number of ways, representing different governance approaches (Stoker, 1998), there is no agreement on the best approach (Hilborn et al., 2004). Governance approaches can be seen to lie along a continuum from decentralized to centralized 1 Rules are shared understandings among those involved that refer to enforced prescriptions about what actions (or states of the world) are required, prohibited, or permitted.

259

approaches. Decentralized approaches, such as co-management or community-based management, involve stakeholders in a social process and have gained in popularity for managing common property systems (Field and Field, 2008; Fulton et al., 2011, but see Blaikie, 2006). These approaches rely on resource users interacting to reach agreement. As a result they are more likely to succeed where social characteristics that enable cooperation are present. For example, co-managed fisheries generally perform well when people are aware of their role in ecosystem decline (Cinner et al., 2012), when people participate in decision-making, and when conflict resolution mechanisms exist (Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 1990, 2009). Centralized governance approaches do not have the same information requirements as decentralized approaches and are not dependent to the same extent on interactions and negotiations. This creates the perception that approaches within a centralized governance framework are cheaper and easier to implement; but there are still key factors that need to be considered in the design and implementation of centralized approaches (Costello et al., 2010; Field and Field, 2008). For example, price-based approaches are often employed within a centralized system and typically take the form of a tax or subsidy on fishing. A subsidy in this sense is designed to reward fishers for reducing their fishing impact. For example, buy back schemes may pay fishers to give up the use of a destructive gear. However, these approaches need continual monitoring because there is likely to be new investments made in the fishery that result in an increase in effort so that buy backs that succeed at removing gears in the short term, may fail in the long term (Grafton and Nelson, 2005). A tax on fishing works in the opposite direction to a subsidy by penalizing fishers for a fishing impact; thus, increasing their costs. For example, gillnet fishers in California are required to pay a turtle tax related to turtle mortality (Grafton and Nelson, 2005). The rational behind a tax is that when an activity becomes more expensive, people will engage in the activity less. However, this assumes that people are equally able to stop the activity (e.g. fishing); when in fact the likelihood of fishers exiting a fishery is influenced by social characteristics, and most notably, fishers from poorer households are less likely to stop or reduce their fishing (Daw et al., 2012). The feasibility of price based fisheries management approaches are therefore influenced by the relationship between fishers’ earnings and their attachment to fishing. The way resource users respond to fisheries management will therefore be influenced by the extent to which management aligns with the fishery benefits they consider a priority (e.g. income versus social benefits) as well as by key social characteristics (e.g. participation in decision making and wealth) that have been show to influence the outcome of specific management approaches (e.g. decentralized and price based). Designing locally appropriate management therefore involves balancing a diversity of competing priorities with an understanding of the social characteristics that interact to affect behavior (Armsworth and Roughgarden, 2001; Becker, 1976). There is a growing realization that social data is an important component of fisheries management decisionmaking (Pomeroy and Hunter, 2008), yet few studies have investigated how management policies can be designed to

260

environmental science & policy 44 (2014) 258–270

reflect both individual priorities and local social conditions (Fulton et al., 2011). Furthermore, management agencies tend not to know what social data constitutes and how it should be collected or interpreted; this information is therefore seldom incorporated into decision-making processes (Pomeroy and Hunter, 2008). To begin to fill this gap, we use a case study of artisanal coral reef fishers in Seychelles to: (1) identify the benefits associated with the fishery; (2) quantitatively prioritize each fishery benefit; (3) examine the extent to which the characteristics that enable cooperation are aligned with prioritized fishery benefits; and (4) determine the relationship between fishers’ earnings and the extent to which they prioritize key fishery benefits. We then discuss how these findings may inform the development of management approaches.

1.1.

Seychelles context

The Seychelles is an archipelagic nation of 115 islands spread across a vast exclusive economic zone (EEZ) of 1.4 million km2 in the western Indian Ocean. The population is small (87,000) and largely confined to the 3 largest islands. It is an upper middle income country (GNI per-capita: US$ 10,300), with tourism and fisheries constituting the principal economic sectors. Traditional small-scale fisheries are confined to the populated granitic islands, primarily Mahe´, Praslin and La Digue, which are situated centrally on the large (41,400 km2) and shallow (0–75 m) Mahe´ Plateau. Agriculture production is land-limited (total land area of 455 km2) and fish contributes significantly to food and nutrition security. On independence from the UK in 1976, Seychelles adopted a socialist agenda with centralized state control of economic sectors. Consequently, fisheries management was largely top-down and decentralization of decision-making was limited. Although some fish stocks in Seychelles are relatively healthy (McClanahan et al., 2011; Robinson et al., 2011), fishing capacity is growing, and most small-scale fisheries remain open access and unmanaged in terms of input or output controls (e.g. how, and how much fishing is allowed or what types of, and how much fish can be removed). Operational fisheries management plans do not exist and regulations are limited to licensing of commercial fishing vessels and nets, as well as mesh size limits for the trap fisheries. A proactive approach to destructive and unselective gears has been adopted, with trawls, explosives, and poisons prohibited, and beach seines phased out (Mees et al., 1998). The trap fishery is the principal fishery operating in the inshore fishing grounds. There are a number of small (ranging from <1 to 30 km2) no-take reserves in the granitic islands, covering less than 2% of the inshore fishing grounds, which are managed by the state or NGOs. The perceptions of benefits from these reserves by fishers are mixed and compliance varies from low to high depending on location (Daw et al., 2011; Robinson et al., 2011; Wood, 2004). Fisheries management in the Seychelles is likely to remain largely centralized for the foreseeable future, relying on incentives and monitoring. Enforcement capacity tends to be high with the government responsible for the regulation and enforcement of fisheries management policies (Wakeford, 2000, Fisheries Act, 1986, as amended), employing 15 permanent

staff with good technical capacity. However, most of the enforcement capacity is directed toward the high economic value industrial and sea cucumber fisheries, rather than the small-scale trap fishery. This is because the small-scale fisheries are less economically valuable and socially, state control of this fishery is not desirable. These fisheries are therefore dependent on voluntary or incentivized compliance, such as through a fuel subsidy system that encourages fishers to report their landings and fishing trips. However, this approach does not work for the worst offenders who tend not to register or claim fuel subsidies. As the country increasingly moves toward a market-based economy, fishers associations are receiving a degree of support from government and a program to introduce decentralized co-management for the inshore fisheries is ongoing (Daw et al., 2011). This has resulted in the development of a co-management plan that includes monitoring, control and surveillance, and although this is yet to be implemented it has received support from both fishers and government. The lower levels of enforcement capacity directed at Seychelles inshore trap fishery and the desire to reduce reliance on state control has led to the realization that not all fisheries management can rely on existing and welldirected enforcement capacity making this an ideal case to examine how and whether social science can inform fisheries management decisions-making.

2.

Methods

We used a combination of focus groups, open ended, and semi-structured questionnaires to interview inshore trap fishers about the benefits they associate with the fishery, how they prioritize those benefits, and their social characteristics.

2.1.

Identifying the benefits associated with a fishery

We conducted five open-ended interviews (with three fishers, one manager, one scientist) to discuss the benefits fishers associated with the fishery, how these benefits were experienced, and decide on suitable wording to describe these benefits (Table 1). We then conducted two focus groups (one with fishers and one with managers and scientists) to validate the benefits identified and descriptions developed in the interviews (Hicks et al., 2013). To enable comparisons with the broader literature, we assigned each benefit to the most closely associated good or service specifying the relevant ecosystem service (MA, 2003) and total economic value (Bateman et al., 2002) category (Table 1).

2.2.

Prioritizing the benefits associated with a fishery

We conducted individual semi-structured questionnaires with 36 additional fishers, selected across the age and geographic range of those involved in the industry in Praslin and Mahe´ Islands. Due to variations in working hours and the opportunistic nature of fishing, we used non-probability sampling techniques, including convenience and snowball sampling (Henry, 1990). Those interviewed were all from different crews

261

environmental science & policy 44 (2014) 258–270

Table 1 – Coral reef fishery benefits, categorization and definitions of the benefits identified through discussions with local experts and focus groups; their associated good or service and ecosystem service category. Benefit identified

Income

Access for all

For our children

Existence

Acquiring and transferring knowledge

Relaxation and entertainment

Blessings and ceremonies

Skin and stress treatment

A diverse ecosystem

Habitat refuge and settlement

Protection from storms

Clear seawater

Description developed

Most closely associated good or service (TEV category) and Ecosystem service category

All fishers sell some of their catch and take some of it home for food. Fishers identified the benefit gained from the fishery in terms of income and food. Currently Seychelles waters are open access. Fishers identified the benefit of knowing the right to use the sea is maintained for – fishers and non-fishers alike. The way our generation treats the sea will influence the benefits future generations have access to. Fishers identified the benefit of knowing their children and their children’s children will be able to benefit from the sea in the same way that they do. All living things have the right to exist, beyond any benefits that people may derive from them. Fishers identified the importance of the right of the sea to exist, as created by God. Knowledge about the sea, fishing norms, practices, and skills are learnt at sea, and passed on to younger generations in various ways. Fishers identified these skills, practices, and knowledge, and the ways in which they are passed on as fishery benefit. Weekends and evenings are often spent with families and friends relaxing and enjoying the sea. Fishers identified the benefits gained from relaxing and enjoying the marine environment. Some fishers, and members of the community gather periodically to bless their boats with religious leaders. Fishers identified the benefits gained from these cultural and religious connections to the sea. The sea is believed to contain therapeutic qualities that can treat certain skin conditions and relieve stress. Fishers identified the benefits gained from the sea in treating these ailments. A diversity of species and ecological functions are necessary to maintain a healthy functioning ecosystem. Fishers identified the benefit of having a healthy, diverse coral reef. Various species seek refuge from predators, or need space for larval settlement that is provided by an intact coral reef matrix. Fishers identified the benefit of having a structurally complex reef with refuge holes. An intact reef can provide inland waters and coastal communities a buffer from the impact of waves and storms. Fishers identified the benefit of having the reef buffer the force of the waves. Key ecological processes are responsible for breaking down the sediment and nutrient load that is washed into the sea; however, decades of land reclamation in Seychelles have influenced these processes and impacted the water quality. Fishers identified the benefit of having these processes to maintain clear water.

and represented 80% of all trap fisher crews across the three inhabited islands in the Seychelles. We started each interview by discussing the fishery benefits (Table 1), and then estimated the extent to which fishers prioritized these benefits in two ways. First, each respondent was asked to score each benefit as 1, 2, or 3 according to how important the benefit was to them, 3 being very important (Ronback et al., 2007). We used a Kruskall–Wallis test to test for differences in the scores (1, 2, or 3) assigned to each benefit. We followed this up with a Games-Howell post hoc analysis to establish where significant differences lie and thus determine which benefits were considered most important across the fishery (Field, 2009, IMB SPSS Statistics 20). Four benefits were considered the highest priorities, across the fishery: the income benefit gained from catching and selling fish (fishery from here on); the benefit of maintaining the right of access for all (option from

Fishery (Direct use) Provisioning Option (option) Cultural Bequest (Non-use) Cultural Existence (Non-use) Cultural Education (Direct use) Cultural Recreation (direct use) Cultural Culture (Direct use) Cultural Medicine (Direct use) Provisioning Biodiversity control (Indirect use) Supporting Habitat refuge (Indirect use) Supporting Coastal protection (Indirect use) Regulating Water quality maintenance (Indirect use) Regulating

here on); the benefit of maintaining the fishery for our children and their children so that they will also benefit from the sea (bequest from here on); and the benefit of knowing the sea exists in its own right, as created by god (existence from here on).

2.3.

Using scenarios to quantify priorities

Second, we developed hypothetical scenarios to estimate the extent to which respondents were willing to make sacrifices to maintain the benefits identified as most important across the fishery. Environmental economics has developed a number of approaches that measure people’s preferences for a change in one good (or benefit) over another. These approaches range from determining the actual market value of the good sold in a market (known as revealed preference), to asking people hypothetically, how

262

environmental science & policy 44 (2014) 258–270

much they would be willing to pay for a good or service (known as stated preference) (Bateman et al., 2002). Although we did not estimate an environmental value, our approach borrows concepts used within stated preference methods to develop a series of hypothetical scenarios that estimate how important it is for each fisher to maintain a specific benefit associated with the Seychelles trap fishery. We modified scenarios developed in a Kenyan fishery (Hicks et al., 2009) to the Seychelles context. The scenarios were translated into Creole and independently translated back to English to check details and ensure subtle meanings in the scenarios were retained. The scenarios were then piloted prior to commencing the study and further modified where necessary. The option and bequest scenarios asked each respondent how much extra traveling time they were willing to incur when fishing in order to maintain each benefit. The fishery scenario asked the respondent how much money they would need to be compensated before they were willing to forgo this benefit. The amounts offered in the scenarios were increased gradually until the respondent accepted (for fishery) or no longer accepted (for option and bequest) (see appendix for further details and wording contained in the scenarios). We designed a scenario for the existence benefit that asked each respondent how much they would need to be compensated for by a hypothetical project (port development) that would provide alternative and economically equivalent occupations, but destroy the coral reef they fished off. A large number of respondents refused to answer the question, suggesting the scenario was not plausible, or the benefit so intangible that it is difficult to define and articulate. Indeed, existence values are particularly difficult to conceptualize and since they have ethical motivations their valuation is often resisted (Hicks et al., 2009).

2.4.

Quantifying fishery priorities

We calculated the priorities each respondent assigned to the fishery, option and bequest benefits as a proportion of their total fishing time (option and bequest benefits) or a proportion of their earnings (fishery benefits). For example, a fisher who normally fishes 40 h a week and agrees to incur an additional 4 h travel time a week to maintain the option benefit would voluntarily increase their working week by 10%, we would therefore calculate the extent to which they prioritize option benefits as 0.1. A similar conversion was made for additional hours incurred for the bequest and the fishery benefits. For the fishery benefit, we used the amount of compensation each respondent accepted as a proportion of his or her average weeks earnings from fishing. We standardized the estimates derived for fishery, option, and bequest benefits to put them on a common scale of 0–1. This is because there may be an inherent bias in the scenarios between what someone is willing to accept (e.g. to forego fishery benefits) and what they are willing to endure (e.g. to ensure option benefits). We then checked our data for normality with Shapiro–Wilk W test and log transformed the data to achieve normality.

2.5.

Contextual characteristics

The final part of the semi-structured questionnaire was used to gather information on 16 socio-economic and fisheries attributes, within six broad categories, that are thought to influence the ability of communities to self-organize and collectively manage their resources (Ostrom, 1990, 2009, 2011) (Table 2). We categorized all statements into binary (e.g. yes, no) or categorical (e.g. happy, not affected, concerned) scales (Table 2). Where multiple responses related to a single attribute (e.g. levels of support), we combined the responses in a single metric using a principle component analysis (Cinner et al., 2011; Field, 2009, IMB SPSS Statistics 20). All other attributes were reported as continuous numbers (e.g. for age, catch, effort, expenditure). We determined earnings from respondents stated fishing earnings, corroborated with the calculated market value of fishers’ reported catch (i.e. price  catch).

2.6.

Data analysis

We used a redundancy analysis (RDA) to examine the relationship between the characteristics that enable cooperation and individuals’ priorities for fishery, option, and bequest benefits (based on the scenarios). A redundancy analysis combines a multiple regression with an ordination to bring out the difference in two-dimensional space (Legendre and Legendre, 1998; ter Braak and Smilauer, 2002, CANOCO 4.5). This allowed us to examine associations between the priorities individual fishers assigned to specific benefits and characteristics that enable cooperation. However, prior to the RDA, we used an exploratory stepwise regression analysis, based on minimum AIC values, to reduce the number of variables that have been shown to influence the likelihood of cooperation down to only those that also contribute to the variation in fishery, option, and bequest benefits (Field, 2009, JMP Pro 10). Due to differences in the scale that socio-economic variables were calculated or measured, we normalized all variables onto a common scale based on the range of reported values so that each variable has a mean of 0 and a standard deviation of 1. Finally, we used a regression analysis to determine the relationship between fishers’ earnings and the extent to which they prioritize fishery, option, and bequest benefits (Brashares et al., 2011).

3.

Results

3.1. Identifying and prioritizing the benefits associated with a fishery We identified 12 benefits associated with the Seychelles’ coral reef fishery, specified the most relevant good or service, and categorized them into their associated TEV and MA categories (Table 1). Four benefits were assigned a high priority: fishery, bequest, option, and existence. The estimates assigned to these high priority benefits differed significantly from the two benefits that were assigned a low priority: treatments (medicine from here on) and blessings and ceremonies

Table 2 – Contextual characteristics measured, indicators contained in each characteristic, questions asked, response type given, and average response for each social characteristics used relating to the efficacy of management approaches. Characteristic

Indicator

Questions asked

Type of response

Response

Response to norm breaking

1. What would you do if you saw or heard of another fisher leaving traps overnight during the spawning season in a spawning site?

Statement

30% of respondents would take some action if they felt a norm had been broken. Responses included talking to the person responsible, reporting it to the authorities, or taking physical action to remove the offending fishing gear.

Social capital

Participation in ceremonies Participation in community organizations Involvement in decisions

1. Do you participate in any community events or ceremonies? 1. Are you a member of any community or fisher organizations? 1. Are you involved in decisions concerning the marine environment? 2. Do you feel involved in decisions concerning your community? 1. Do you feel supported by: a. Other trap fishers? b. Other fishers c. The district? d. The government? 2. Are you willing to offer support in return?

Yes/no

31% of respondents participated in community ceremonies

Yes/no

14% of respondents were involved in an organization

Yes/no

26% of respondents felt involved in decisions concerning the community and marine environment

Yes/no

51% of respondents felt supported by other trap fishers 43% felt supported by other fishers 66% felt supported by their district 46% felt supported by their government 23% of fishers were happy to offer support to other trap fishers and other fishers in general

Perceived levels of support

Knowledge of Social ecological system/mental models

Ecological knowledge

1. Respondents were asked to choose between three pictures and descriptions of fishing grounds that differed based on fish composition, presence of key functional groups and abundance (all key functional groups present but lowest abundance, some key functional groups missing medium abundance, only herbivores present, high abundance). 2. Respondents were presented with a hypothetical scenario based on Graham et al. (2007) where a climatic event had affected the habitat structural complexity with a resultant decline in small-bodied fish and asked how they would feel about this situation.

A, B, C Happy, not affected, concerned

94% of respondents recognized the importance of species diversity. 26% of respondents recognized the importance of habitat structural complexity.

Conflict resolution mechanisms

Response to problem

1. Individuals were asked what they would do if they were to conflict with other fishers over marine resource issues, for example if they felt fishers were using unacceptable gears.

Qualitative response (classified)

74% of fishers identified avenues they would follow if they had a fishing issue that need to be resolved.

environmental science & policy 44 (2014) 258–270

Norms

263

264

Table 2 (Continued ) Characteristic Importance of resource

Indicator

Type of response

Response

1. How many fishing trips do you go on in a week? 2. How many gear types do you use? 3. How long do you spend fishing?

Number List Hours

Catch

1. What would your catch be on a fishing day that was: (a) good; (b) average; (c) bad 1. What jobs do you do that brings in money or food? 2. What jobs do others in your household do that brings in money or food? 2. What is your primary occupation?

Kg

An average a fisher goes on 2.5 fishing trips a day, 6 days a week. Most fishers own 2 types of gears but only use one at a time, depending on the season. On average a fisher fishes for 5 h a day A fisher catches, on average 26 kg of fish a day

List, number

An average fishing house has 3 occupations fishing and salaried employment are the most common.

Specify

1. How many people live in your house that are a. Men b. Women c. Girls d. Boys 2. In a fortnight how much do you spend on food and entertainment? 1. What is your average fortnightly income from fishing? 2. How much do you sell a kilo of fish for

Number

100% of fishers stated that fishing was their primary occupation There are four people living in the average fishing house, but this ranges from 1 to 9.

Rs/fortnight Rs/week Rs/kg

The average household spends $270 on food per fortnight

1. How old are you? 1. Where are you originally come from? 2. How long have you lived here?

Years Statement Years/ months

The average fisher is 45 years old 26% of fishers had moved to where they live from another Island or other part of the same Island.

Importance of fishing Number of dependents

Expenditure Earnings

Age Migration status

A fisher’s average annual earnings are $16,441

environmental science & policy 44 (2014) 258–270

Effort

Number of occupations

Socio-economic attributes

Questions asked

265

environmental science & policy 44 (2014) 258–270

(culture from here on) ( p < 0.005). The remaining 6 benefits: clear seawater (water quality maintenance from here on); protection from storms (coastal protection from here on); habitat refuge and settlement (habitat refuge from here on); diverse ecosystems (biodiversity control from here on); relaxation and enjoyment (recreation from here on); and, acquiring and transferring knowledge (education from here on), were assigned an average priority but did not differ significantly from the other benefits.

3.2.

Using scenarios to quantify priorities

Using the hypothetical scenarios, fishers’ priorities were highest for the bequest benefit (average 0.36 s.e. 0.05), then the option benefit (average 0.33 s.e. 0.04), and lowest for the fishery benefit (average 0.21 s.e. 0.04). A small number of respondents refused to answer the option, fishery and bequest benefit scenarios (1, 3, and 4 respectively). This represented 8%, 3% and 11% of all responses. If we were to assign these refusals a zero value, the values we report would be 0.30, 0.18, 0.27 for option, fishery, and bequest benefits respectively. Based on our experiences in the field we had reason to believe that these refusals reflect a problem in understanding or communicating the scenario, rather than fishers not valuing these benefits at all. We therefore do not include these zero responses in subsequent analysis. However, we did run sensitivity checks and there were no differences in the results of subsequent analysis between the data that included the zeros and the data with these zeros removed.

3.3.

(6% variation explained by the second axis; C2) (Fig. 2). The differences in fishers’ priorities can be explained by differences in their socio-economic characteristics (F = 3.2, p = 0.004). Specifically, fishers who prioritized option and bequest: would take action when a norm was broken (respond to norm breaking) and had access to conflict resolution mechanisms (conflict resolutions) (Fig. 2). Importantly, these characteristics have been shown to enable cooperation (Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 2009). Fishers who prioritized option were also likely to have greater average catches (catch); and those who prioritized bequest were likely to have fewer occupations (occupations) (Fig. 2). Individuals who prioritized fishery had: lower average catches (catch); more dependents (dependents); were more likely to participate in community ceremonies (ceremonies), and; lacked conflict resolution mechanisms (conflict resolutions) (Fig. 2).

3.4.

Relationship between earnings and fishers priorities

The regression analysis showed that fishers with lower earnings assigned a greater priority to fishery benefits than fishers with higher earnings ( p = 0.0002, F1,34 = 17.9, r2 = 0.39) (Fig. 3a). Conversely, fishers with higher earnings assigned a greater priority to option benefits than fishers with lower earnings ( p = 0.02, F1,32 = 5.9, r2 = 0.16) (Fig. 3b). There was a marginal relationship between earnings and bequest benefits ( p = 0.05, F1,31 = 4.1, r2 = 0.15) (Fig. 3c). This suggests earnings are likely to have an influence on the extent to which fishers prioritize fishery and option benefits, and a marginal influence on the extent to which they prioritize bequest benefits.

Characteristics that enable cooperation

The variation in fishers’ priorities was explained by the combination of differences in their responses to norm breaking, participation in community ceremonies, awareness of conflict resolution mechanisms, number of occupations, number of dependents, and average catch ( p < 0.01) (Table 3, Fig. 2). The greatest variation in respondents’ priorities was explained by the first axis of the redundancy analysis (94% variation; C1). This variation was driven by differences between individuals who prioritized fishery benefits (found on the left hand side) and individuals who prioritized option and bequest benefits (found on the right hand side). To a lesser extent, individuals who prioritized option benefits were also distinct from those who prioritized bequest benefits

4.

Discussion

There is a growing realization that management should consider the way people are likely to respond to social, institutional, and environmental change (Fulton et al., 2011). Such an approach needs to consider key determinants of people’s behavior; including their values, preferences (Rokeach, 2008; Rohan, 2000; Becker, 1996), and the structural features of their social settings (Camerer, 2003; Ostrom, 2011). We therefore set out to investigate the extent to which the management of an artisanal coral reef fishery in Seychelles may be designed to reflect people’s priorities and their social characteristics. We first identified the key benefits associated with a coral reef fishery and the extent to which they were

Table 3 – Exploratory stepwise regression analysis based on lowest AIC values to establish which user characteristics contributed to the variation in priorities assigned to option, bequest, and fishery benefits. Option AIC Conflict resolution mechanisms Number of dependents Respond to norm breaking Number of occupations Participation in ceremonies Catch

1

62 >64 3 64 >64 >64 2 62

Bequest

p

F

0.8 NS 0.4 NS NS 0.1

3.2 – 0.6 – – 2.4

Subscripts (1, 2, 3) indicate order entered into the model.

AIC 3

52 2 52 >53 4 53 >53 1 52

Fishery

p

F

AIC

p

F

0.1 0.09 NS 0.2 NS 0.05

2.4 2.9 – 1.7 – 3.8

>70 >70 3 70 >70 2 74 1 78

NS NS 0.02 NS 0.01 0.0002

– – 5.1 – 2.4 14

266

environmental science & policy 44 (2014) 258–270

Fig. 1 – Average importance of 12 identified fishery benefits with Wstandard errors of the mean included. Importance is based on a ranking exercise, categorized into high, medium, and low categories based on Games-Howell post hoc analysis where benefits of a high importance are significantly different to those of low importance ( p < 0.005). Black bars represent benefits of high importance, gray represents medium importance, and white represents low importance.

prioritized. Next, we explored whether social characteristics that enable cooperation are associated with fishery benefits that are considered a high priority; and thus, how likely a decentralized approach to fisheries management is to succeed. Finally, we examined the relationship between fishers’ earnings and the fishery benefits that were considered a high priority; and thus, how likely it is that price based tools in fisheries management will be successful. Three key findings that are relevant to management were evident. Our first key finding was that fishers identified a broad range of different benefits associated with their fishery (Fig. 1). This illustrates the social complexity, and diversity of interests, that exists within groups of similar individuals (Agrawal and Gibson, 1999; Fabinyi et al., 2010). Although the Seychelles inshore trap fishery represents a relatively homogenous group of male fishers who use the same gear and consider fishing to be their primary and usually sole occupation, there are different priorities that need to be considered by management. Respondents identified fishery, bequest, option, and existence benefits to be their highest priorities. Fishers in Seychelles tend to be wealthier than fishers from other countries in the region, for this reason a different suite of benefits are likely to emerge as more and less important elsewhere. For example fishers in Kenya, Madagascar, and Tanzania tend to prioritize fishery benefits, followed by

Fig. 2 – Distribution in the extent to which fishers prioritize the benefit of maintaining the option, bequest, and fishery benefits, and how these priorities are associated with key socio-economic characteristics that are thought to influence collective action. Analysis is based on a redundancy analysis (C1 = 94%, C2 = 6% of variation (F = 3.2, p = 0.004).

education, and habitat benefits (Hicks et al., 2013). Although all benefits are dependent on the maintenance of a certain level of ecosystem health, specific ecosystem health benefits including habitat and biodiversity were not considered a high priority (Fig. 1). This realization that people do not necessarily prioritize aspects of the environment that they are ultimately dependent on, is not new and has led to attempts, notably by the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MA, 2003), to reframe nature as the benefits they provide to humans; thus, aligning ecosystem health with human well being. Despite this reframing, and as evidenced in our work, studies repeatedly find regulating or supporting services, that are more closely associated with ecosystem health, traded off in favor of provisioning or cultural services (MA, 2005; Raudsepp-Hearne et al., 2010; Rodrı´guez et al., 2006; Martı´n-Lo´pez et al., 2012). Because the ecosystem health benefits are not a high priority for fishers, fisheries managers will need to balance ecosystem or environmental targets (such as maintaining habitat) with fisher’s priorities. Such an approach could involve setting critical thresholds beyond which fishable biomass should not drop, similar to those proposed by McClanahan et al. (2011) for the region, or setting aside critical habitats where extraction is prohibited (McCook et al., 2010). Our second key finding distinguished fishers who prioritized fishery benefits from those who prioritized option and bequest benefits, and characterized both groups according to the key social characteristics responsible for their differences (Fig. 2). Distinctions based on priorities and social characteristics can enable an understanding of how people intend to

environmental science & policy 44 (2014) 258–270

Fig. 3 – Relationship between earnings and the extent to which fishers prioritize: (a) fishery benefits ( p = 0.0002, F1,34 = 17.9, r2 = 0.39); (b) option benefits ( p = 0.02, F1,32 = 5.9, r2 = 0.16); and (c) bequest benefits ( p = 0.05, F1,31 = 4.1, r2 = 0.15).

behave (Ajzen, 1991) making it possible for managers to plan appropriate strategies. For example, decentralized fisheries management approaches rely on collective action; they need people to come together to make decisions concerning resource use, confident that those rules will be adhered to. Indicators of social capital that can include the existence of and adherence to norms (Coleman, 1987), make it more likely that people will come together to make decisions and rules (Cox et al., 2010). Similarly, groups are more likely to stick to those rules, or norms, if they feel the rules are being monitored, they know what to do when a problem arises, and they feel they are enforced (Cox et al., 2010; Ostrom, 1990, 2009, 2011; Rothstein, 2005). Fishers who prioritized option benefits identified avenues for resolving conflicts, and were more likely to be proactive in upholding an existing norm (Fig. 2); characteristics that encourage people to come together

267

for collective action. Therefore, if these fishers were interested in changing fisheries management, decentralized approaches would be likely to work. Interestingly, these fishers tend to be wealthier than their counterparts who prioritize fishery benefits, making these findings consistent with research from the region (Madagascar, Tanzania, and Kenya) and beyond (Papua New Guinea and Indonesia) where wealthier fishers perceive livelihood benefits associated with decentralized management arrangements (MacNeil and Cinner, 2013). Conversely, fishers who prioritized fishery benefits came from households with more dependents, lower catches, and lacked conflict resolution mechanisms (Fig. 2). The combination of lower catches and more dependents, with the number of occupations and importance of fishing remaining constant suggests these households are more heavily dependent on fishing. It is possible that the higher levels of dependence among fishers that prioritize fishery benefits, mean these fishers are focused on meeting their basic needs and less motivated to pursue other benefits, such as maintaining the option benefits (Chai and Moneta, 2010; Engel, 1857). This tendency to prioritize meeting basic needs (e.g. food and shelter) before being motivated to fulfill any subsequent needs (e.g. conservation) has been reported elsewhere (Cinner and Pollnac, 2004), and most notably in work on Maslow’s hierarchy of needs theory from psychology (Maslow, 1943). So, although the fishers who prioritize fishery benefits are in greater need of resource management, they are also less likely to engage in decentralized approaches. This indifference to decentralized management amongst the poor is consistent with research from neighboring countries, but this research also shows that when poorer fishers do become involved in decision-making they are the most likely to perceive livelihood benefits (MacNeil and Cinner, 2013). This suggests getting involved in decision making may be a critical way for poorer fishers to benefit from management (MacNeil and Cinner, 2013). Alternate, complementary, strategies are therefore needed that engage these fishers and enable them to participate in decision-making. These individuals currently participate in more community ceremonies, suggesting a staring point for building social capital. It is possible that once people’s most basic needs are met, they have the time to further invest in the social interactions and reciprocal arrangements needed to build trust, co-ordinate negotiations, and reach decisions, thus creating the conditions that are conducive to a decentralized policy approach. Our third key finding identified a relationship between earnings and the extent to which fishers prioritized certain benefits (Fig. 3). Fishers with lower earnings prioritized fishery benefits more than fishers with higher earnings, suggesting management approaches designed to reduce the amount of fishing, that do not compensate for lost earnings, are likely to impact the poor disproportionately more than the rich (Flores and Carson, 1997). Furthermore, if these management efforts impact fisher’s earnings, fishers are likely to become more dependent on the fishery and need to fish more, rather than less, creating perverse outcomes. This situation is analogous to a poverty trap; the poorer households become, the fewer options they have, so the less willing or capable they are of exiting a fishery and the more they ultimately need to fish (Cinner et al., 2011; Daw et al., 2012; Cinner, 2011). Maintaining

268

environmental science & policy 44 (2014) 258–270

a minimum acceptable level of earnings should therefore be aligned with fisheries and conservation efforts, particularly where management proves challenging. Other studies have investigated how willing fishers are to leave, switch, or stay in a fishery (Daw et al., 2011; Wakeford, 2000). Wealth and levels of economic development are consistently significant predictors of the decisions fishers’ make. However, the relationship is not simple. At regional scales (i.e. across the western Indian Ocean) greater economic development is negatively correlated with the likelihood of leaving the fishery (Daw et al., 2011). Conversely, at smaller scaler; for example, within Seychelles, and aligned with our findings, it is poorer fishers who are the least likely to leave the fishery (Wakeford, 2000; Daw et al., 2011) suggesting it will be most challenging to find strategies to reduce fishing amongst the poor in Seychelles. Until the recent emphasis on co-management, fisher preferences were not taken into consideration in Seychelles fisheries management; instead, decision making was topdown only requiring stakeholder consultation after the ministry had made a decision (Fisheries Act, 1986, as amended). This failure to take fisheries preferences into consideration has been detrimental to fisheries management in Seychelles and elsewhere. For example, in Seychelles, there are a number of marine protected areas adjacent to the near shore fishing grounds. A number of management agencies have claimed that these parks are a benefit to the fishery, but fishers are aware that these parks were declared to protect other interests, creating conflict. The failure to understand fishers’ perceptions of the parks and the process through which they were implemented has resulted in high levels of poaching (Wood, 2004). This disconnect between fishers, managers, and scientists perceptions of management has led to similar failures in other geographies, for example many Pacific Islanders see, closed areas as a means of stockpiling a resource for a specific purpose, whereas scientific agencies see them as a means to sustain or maximize yield (Foale and Manele, 2004). The effect is, apparently successful MPA’s are fished out at a moments notice with no lasting fisheries benefit (Foale and Manele, 2004). The mis-match between resource users’ and scientific and management agencies’ perceptions has resulted in ineffective management, the proliferation of paper parks (Alcorn, 1993), and a growing realization that management can often be most effective when it has community support (McClanahan et al., 2006).

result in a greater strain on fish resources. Addressing fisher’s basic needs should therefore feature as both fisheries and conservation priorities. Because successes in fisheries management are felt beyond their focus (McClanahan et al., 2008), management can, and should, take advantage of opportunities. For example, individuals who prioritized option benefits, had lower levels of dependence, possessed the characteristics that enable cooperation, and were therefore most likely to engage in decentralized approaches to management. These individuals would make good candidates to engage in a collaborative effort between fishers and the fisheries authorities to facilitate a process for rule making or devolving power to fishers associations. Indeed, a collaborative process is evolving in the Seychelles, which should be encouraged and built on (King and Nageon deLestang, 2009). Management should therefore build on successes in areas where suitable levels of trust and support exist, and elsewhere focus on engaging fishers in decision making processes and building capacity in the characteristics that will make desirable approaches to management conducive in the future.

Acknowledgements Research clearance was provided by Seychelles Bureau of Standards. The Seychelles Fisheries Authority provided technical and logistical assistance – many thanks to Maria Cedras for help with translations and particularly to the late Danny Julie whose work in the field was invaluable. This work was supported by grants from the Western Indian Ocean Marine Sciences Association (WIOMSA) and the Rufford foundation. The manuscript was improved through the comments of N.A.J. Graham.

Appendix A. Supplementary data Supplementary data associated with this article can be found, in the online version, at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/ j.envsci.2014.04.016.

references

5.

Conclusion

Although Seychelles’ fisheries are in a better condition than much of the western Indian Ocean (McClanahan et al., 2011), fisheries management should be proactive, developing effective policies before decline is evident. The diversity of benefits associated with the Seychelles’ fishery suggests that a diversity of management approaches will be necessary (Ostrom, 2009). There are some challenges to managing the Seychelles’ inshore trap fishery, particularly where dependence is highest and the characteristics that enable cooperation are lowest. Policies that attempt to reduce fishing where it is most needed, without considering the broader sociopolitical context, are likely to create perverse outcomes that

Agrawal, A., Gibson, C.C., 1999. Enchantment and disenchantment: the role of community in natural resource conservation. World Dev. 27, 629–649. Ajzen, I., 1991. The theory of planned behavior. Organ. Behav. Hum. Decis. Process. 50, 179–211. ˚ sga˚rd, B., Willmann, R., Pomeroy, R., Allison, E.H., Ratner, B.D., A Kurien, J., 2012. Rights-based fisheries governance: from fishing rights to human rights. Fish Fish. 13, 14–29. Anon., 1986. Fisheries Act, 1986. Supplement to Official Gazette 15th September. 29–44. Armsworth, P.R., Roughgarden, J.E., 2001. An invitation to ecological economics. Trends Ecol. Evol. 16, 229–234. Bateman, I.J., Carson, R.T., Day, B., Hanemann, M., Hanley, N., ¨ zdemiroglu, Hett, T., Jones-Lee, M., Loomes, G., Mourato, S., O

environmental science & policy 44 (2014) 258–270

E., 2002. Economic Valuation with Stated Preference Techniques: A Manual. Edward Elgar, Cheltenham, UK. Bavinck, M., Pollnac, R., Monnereau, I., Failler, P., 2012. Introduction to the special issue on job satisfaction in fisheries in the global South. Soc. Indic. Res. 1–10. Becker, G.S., 1976. The Economic Approach to Human Behavior. University of Chicago Press, USA. Becker, G.S., 1996. The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior: The Nobel Lecture No. 69. Hoover Press. Be´ne´, C., Hersoug, B., Allison, E.H., 2010. Not by rent alone: analysing the pro-poor functions of small-scale fisheries in developing countries. Dev. Policy Rev. 28, 325–333. Blaikie, P., 2006. Is small really beautiful? Community-based natural resource management in Malawi and Botswana. World Dev. 34, 1942–2019. Brashares, J.S., Golden, C.D., Weinbaum, K.Z., Barrett, C.B., Okello, G.V., 2011. Economic and geographic drivers of wildlife consumption in rural Africa. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 108, 13931–13936. Camerer, C., 2003. Behavioral Game Theory: Experiments in Strategic Interaction. Princeton University Press, USA544. Chai, A., Moneta, A., 2010. Retrospectives Engel curves. J. Econ. Perspect. 24, 225–240. Cinner, J.E., 2011. Social-ecological traps in reef fisheries. Global Environ. Chang. 21, 835–839. Cinner, J.E., Pollnac, R.B., 2004. Poverty, perceptions and planning: why socioeconomics matter in the management of Mexican reefs. Ocean Coast. Manage. 47, 479–493. Cinner, J.E., Folke, C., Daw, T., Hicks, C.C., 2011. Responding to change: using scenarios to understand how socioeconomic factors may influence amplifying or dampening exploitation feedbacks among Tanzanian fishers. Global Environ. Chang. 21, 7–12. Cinner, J.E., McClanahan, T.R., MacNeil, M.A., Graham, N.A.J., Daw, T.M., Mukminin, A., Feary, D.A., Rabearisoa, A.L., Wamukota, A., Jiddawi, N., Campbell, S.J., Baird, A.H., Januchowski-Hartley, F.A., Hamed, S., Lahari, R., Morove, T., Kuange, J., 2012. Comanagement of coral reef socialecological systems. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 109, 5219–5222. Coleman, J.S., 1987. Norms as social capital. Econ. Imperialism 133–155. Costello, C., Lynham, J., Lester, S., Gaines, S.D., 2010. Economic incentives and global fisheries sustainability. Annu. Rev. Resour. Econ. 2, 299–318. Cox, M., Arnold, G., Villamayor, T., 2010. A review of design principles for community based natural resource management. Ecol. Soc. 15 (4) 38. Daw, T.M., Robinson, J., Graham, N.A.J., 2011. Perceptions of trends in Seychelles artisanal trap fisheries: comparing catch monitoring, underwater visual census and fishers’ knowledge. Environ. Conserv. 38, 75–88. Daw, T.M., Cinner, J.E., McClanahan, T.R., Brown, K., Stead, S.M., Graham, N.A.J., Maina, J., 2012. To fish or not to fish: factors at multiple scales affecting artisanal fishers’ readiness to exit a declining fishery. PLOS ONE 7, e314. Engel, 1857. Die Productions und compsumptionsverhaltnisse des konigrechs sachsen. IsiBulletin 9, 1–74. Fabinyi, M., Knudsen, M., Segi, S., 2010. Social complexity, ethnography and coastal resource management in the Philippines. Coast. Manage. 38, 617–632. Field, A.P., 2009. Discovering Statistics Using SPSS: (and Sex and Drugs and Rock ‘n’ Roll). Sage, London, UK856. Field, B.C., Field, M.K., 2008. Environmental Economics. McGraw-Hill Irwin, 512. Flores, N.E., Carson, R.T., 1997. The relationship between the income elasticities of demand and willingness to Pay. J. Environ. Econ. Manage. 33, 287–295.

269

Foale, S., Manele, B.B., 2004. Social and political barriers to the use of Marine Protected Areas for conservation and fishery management in Melanesia. Asia Pacific Viewpoint 45, 373–386. Fulton, E.A., Smith, A.D.M., Smith, D.C., van Putten, I.E., 2011. Human behaviour: the key source of uncertainty in fisheries management. Fish Fish. 12, 2–17. Gelcich, S., Hughes, T.P., Olsson, P., Folke, C., Defeo, O., Ferna´ndez, M., Castilla, J.C., 2010. Navigating transformations in governance of Chilean marine coastal resources. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107, 16794–16799. Grafton, R.Q., Nelson, H.W., 2005. The effects of buy-back programs in the British Columbia salmon fishery. In: Economics and Environment Network Working Papers. Australian National University. Henry, G.T., 1990. Practical Sampling. Sage Publications, Newbury Park, CA, USA144. Hicks, C.C., 2011. How do we value our reefs? Risks and tradeoffs across scales in ‘‘biomass-based’’ economies. Coast. Manage. 39 (4) 358–376. Hicks, C.C., McClanahan, T.R., Cinner, J.E., Hills, J., 2009. Tradeoffs in values assigned to ecological goods and services associated with different coral reef management strategies. Ecol. Soc. 14 (1) 10. Hicks, C.C., Graham, N.A.J., Cinner, J.E., 2013. Synergies and tradeoffs in how managers, scientists, and fishers value coral reef ecosystem services. Global Environ. Chang. 23, 1444–1453. Hilborn, R., Punt, A.E., Orensanz, J., 2004. Beyond band-aids in fisheries management: fixing world fisheries. Bull. Mar. Sci. 74, 493–507. Jennings, S., 2004. The ecosystem approach to fishery management: a significant step towards sustainable use of the marine environment? Mar. Ecol. Prog. Ser. 274, 279–282. King, M., Nageon deLestang, J., 2009. The co-management of hand line and trap fisheries in the Republic of Seychelles. UNDP-GEF Mainstreaming Biodiversity Project Seychelles Fishing Authority. Legendre, P., Legendre, L., 1998. Numerical Ecology, 2nd ed. Elsevier Science, Amsterdam. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2003. Ecosystems and Human Well-being: A Framework for Assessment. Island Press, Washington, DC, USA25. Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 2005. Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Our Human Planet: Summary for Decision-makers. Island Press, Washington, DC, USA128. MacNeil, A.M., Cinner, J.E., 2013. Hierarchical livelihood outcomes among co-managed fisheries. Global Environ. Chang. 23 (6) 1393–1401. Mahon, R., 1997. Does fisheries science serve the needs of managers of small stocks in developing countries? Can. J. Fish. Aquat. Sci. 54, 2207–2213. Mahon, R., McConney, P., Roy, R.N., 2008. Governing fisheries as complex adaptive systems. Mar. Policy 32, 104–112. Martı´n-Lo´pez, B., Iniesta-Arandia, I., Garcı´a-Llorente, M., Palomo, I., Casado-Arzuaga, I., Garcı´a Del Amo, D., Go´mezBaggethun, E., Oteros-Rozas, E., Palacios-Agundez, I., Willaarts, B., Gonza´lez, J.A., Santos-Martı´n, F., Onaindia, M., Lo´pez-Santiago, C., Montes, C., 2012. Uncovering ecosystem service bundles through social preferences. PLoS ONE 7, e38970. Maslow, A., 1943. A theory of human motivation. Psychol. Rev. 50, 26. Max-Neef, M.A., 2005. Foundations of transdisciplinarity. Ecol. Econ. 53, 5–16. McClanahan, T.R., Hicks, C.C., 2011. Changes in life history and ecological characteristics of coral reef fish catch composition with increasing fishery management. Fish. Manag. Ecol. 18, 50–60.

270

environmental science & policy 44 (2014) 258–270

McClanahan, T.R., Marnane, M.J., Cinner, J.E., Kiene, W.E., 2006. A comparison of marine protected areas and alternative approaches to coral-reef management. Curr. Biol. 16 (14) 1408–1413. McClanahan, T.R., Hicks, C.C., Darling, E.S., 2008. Malthusian overfishing and efforts to overcome it on Kenyan coral reefs. Ecol. Applicat. 18, 1516–1529. McClanahan, T.R., Graham, N.A.J., MacNeil, M.A., Muthiga, N.A., Cinner, J.E., Bruggemann, J.H., Wilson, S.K., 2011. Critical thresholds and tangible targets for ecosystem-based management of coral reef fisheries. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 108, 17230–17233. McCook, L.J., Ayling, T., Cappo, M., Choat, J.H., Evans, R.D., De Freitas, D.M., Heupel, D.M.M., Hughes, T.P., Jones, G.P., Mapstone, B., Marsh, H., Mills, M., Molloy, F.J., Pitcher, C.R., Pressey, R., Russ, G.R., Sutton, S., Sweatman, H., Tobin, R., Wachenfield, D.R., Williamson, D.H., 2010. Adaptive management of the Great Barrier Reef: a globally significant demonstration of the benefits of networks of marine reserves. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107, 18278–18285. Mees, C., Shotton, R., Marguerite, M., 1998. An Inshore Fisheries Management Strategy for the Seychelles. Seychelles Fishing Authority/FAO, Victoria, Seychelles. Ostrom, E., 1990. Governing the Commons: The Evolution of Institutions for Collective Action. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, UK298. Ostrom, E., 2009. A general framework for analyzing sustainability of social-ecological systems. Science 325, 419–422. Ostrom, E., 2011. Background on the institutional analysis and development framework. Policy Stud. J. 39, 7–27. Ostrom, E., Janssen, M.A., Anderies, J.M., 2007. Going beyond panaceas. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 104, 15176–15178. Pauly, D., 2006. Major trends in small-scale marine fisheries, with emphasis on developing countries, and some implications for the social sciences. Maritime Stud. 4, 7–22.

Pomeroy, C., Hunter, M.S., 2008. Integrating Social Science Research into Marine Resource Management: Experiences, Evaluation, and Policy Recommendations. California Policy Research Center, 29. Raudsepp-Hearne, C., Peterson, G.D., Bennett, E.M., 2010. Ecosystem service bundles for analyzing tradeoffs in diverse landscapes. Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. U.S.A. 107, 5242–5247. Robinson, J., Samoilys, M., Grandcourt, E., Julie, D., Cedras, M., Gerry, C., 2011. The importance of targeted spawning aggregation fishing to the management of Seychelles’ trap fishery. Fish. Res. 112, 96–103. Rodrı´guez, J., Beard, T., Bennett, E., Cumming, G., Cork, S., Agard, J., Dobson, A., Peterson, G., 2006. Trade-offs across space, time, and ecosystem services. Ecol. Soc. 11 (1) 28. Rohan, M.J., 2000. A rose by any name? The values construct. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 4, 255–277. Rokeach, M., 2008. Understanding Human Values. Free Press. Ronback, P., Crona, B., Ingwall, L., 2007. The return of ecosystem goods and services in replanted mangrove forests: perspectives from local communities in Kenya. Environ. Conserv. 34, 313–324. Rothstein, B., 2005. Social Traps and the Problem of Trust. Cambridge University Press, New York, USA256. Stoker, G., 1998. Governance as theory: five propositions. Int. Soc. Sci. J. 50, 17–28. terBraak, C.J.F., Smilauer, P.P., 2002. CANOCO Reference Manual and CanoDraw for Windows User’s Guide: Software for Canonical Community Ordination (version 4.5) Microcomputer Power, New York. Wakeford, R.C., 2000. Management of the Seychelles Artisanal Fishery. (PhD thesis)Imperial College London. Wood, L., 2004. Motives for poaching in marine protected areas in the Seychelles. Western Indian Ocean J. Mar. Sci. 3, 10.