Fishing in muddy waters: Exploring the conditions for effective governance of fisheries and aquaculture

Marine Policy 38 (2013) 124–132

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Fishing in muddy waters: Exploring the conditions for effective governance of fisheries and aquaculture Agni Kalfagianni n, Philipp Pattberg Institute for Environmental Studies, VU University Amsterdam, 2985 Dep. Environmental Policy Analysis, De Boelelaan 1085, 1081 HV Amsterdam, The Netherlands

a r t i c l e i n f o

a b s t r a c t

Article history: Received 28 March 2012 Received in revised form 22 May 2012 Accepted 22 May 2012 Available online 21 June 2012

Over the past fifteen years a number of transnational certification and labeling schemes have emerged with the aim to foster sustainable fisheries and aquaculture practices worldwide. Despite notable successes in the uptake and implementation of these standards, few measurable environmental improvements have been achieved on a global scale to date. This paper explores the conditions for effective governance taking into account external and internal attributes of the relevant rule-setting organizations. The analysis provided in this paper is situated in a broader debate regarding the effectiveness of transnational forms of governance and thereby contributes to recent efforts to build clearer theoretical propositions on the basis of more nuanced theoretically and empirically informed analyses. & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Keywords: Transnational rule-setting organizations Marine governance Effectiveness Sustainability Fisheries Aquaculture

1. Introduction One of the most profound challenges in contemporary global environmental governance is the sustainability of the marine ecosystems. Oceans and freshwater lakes, rivers and streams provide unique ecosystem services, food security and jobs to millions of people worldwide [1]. However, increases in waste disposal, pollution, climate related acidification, and, most importantly, over-fishing are threatening species and habitats. As of 2012, about 80% of the world’s commercial fish stocks are depleted or have been fished beyond their biological carrying capacity, with estimated economic losses of US $50 billion annually [2]. Simultaneously, the growth of aquaculture activities driven by increasing consumer demand further intensifies the destruction of coastal zones, mangroves and wetlands by impairing their function as natural spawning grounds and nurseries for marine species [3,4]. Recognizing these challenges, a number of transnational rulesetting organizations initiated by private actors have emerged over the past fifteen years with the aim to foster sustainable fisheries and aquaculture practices worldwide, using the mechanism of certification and labeling. In a process that resembles in many respects that of intergovernmental negotiations, these

n

Corresponding author. Tel.: þ31 20 59 82949; fax: þ31 20 59 89553. E-mail addresses: [email protected] (A. Kalfagianni), [email protected] (P. Pattberg). 0308-597X/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2012.05.028

organizations create norms, rules and standards in the context of institutionalized cooperation in which public authority (e.g. governments and international organizations) is either not present at all, or not the predominant form of political authority [5–7]. In contrast to the traditional governmental command-andcontrol paradigm, however, the rules promoted by transnational organizations are voluntary in nature, relying on market forces and public scrutiny to exert pressure on their target group and generate environmental protection. There is an extensive literature to date on the role and relevance of transnational governance institutions in sustainability politics. While some scholars, particularly from a neoliberal perspective, perceive transnational governance institutions as an opportunity to foster sustainability objectives, especially in cases where governments are unwilling or unable to regulate [8], others warn against several negative consequences, such as failure to address the underlying causes of environmental problems, perpetuation of market fetishism and exacerbation of poverty [9,10]. In the case of fisheries and aquaculture, more specifically, despite some notable successes, particularly at the local level, few measurable environmental improvements have been achieved globally as a result of transnational governance initiatives [4,11]. What explains this failure? Under what conditions can transnational forms of governance effectively contribute to the fostering of sustainability objectives? And, are such conditions fulfilled in practice? This paper pursues these questions with regards to rule-setting organization in the area of fisheries and aquaculture. Drawing on distinct theoretical perspectives, the paper develops

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and applies indicators to evaluate the potential for effective marine governance on the basis of transnational rules and standards. While an ultimate assessment of the effectiveness of transnational governance initiatives will have to focus on measurable environmental, economic and social improvements on the ground, this contribution assesses existing initiatives against a set of conditions derived from scientific literature. The paper understands the conditions for effectiveness as a combination of factors including (i) problem structure, (ii) comprehensiveness and stringency of standards, (iii) quality of audits, (iv) access of relevant societal actors to decision-making venues and procedures, and (v) uptake of standards by relevant actors. With its analysis the paper contributes to recent efforts to arrive at more nuanced theoretical and empirical understanding of effective governance mechanisms at the transnational level (see also [12,13]). The analysis proceeds as follows: Section 2 briefly introduces the private organizations that have emerged in the governance of fisheries and aquaculture at the transnational level. Section 3 discusses the conditions for effective transnational governance, Section 4 explores whether these conditions are met in the governance of fisheries and aquaculture more specifically, and Section 5 concludes the analysis.

2. Transnational rule-setting organizations in the global governance of fisheries and aquaculture In response to growing concerns about the future sustainability of marine ecosystems a number of transnational organizations initiated by private actors with the aim to regulate fisheries through private rules and standards have emerged. Early examples include the single species eco-labels and seafood guides by organizations such as the Earth Island Institute and the Audubon Society [9]. More recent examples include organizations operating at the global level and targeting multiple environmental problems, e.g. overfishing and by-catch as well as problems caused by aquaculture. These transnational organizations are briefly presented below: 2.1. Marine Stewardship Council The Marine Stewardship Council (MSC) is a label for sustainable fisheries, created in 1997 as a result of an agreement between Unilever, one of the largest consumer product companies and the, at that time, world’s largest buyer of frozen fish, and the World Wide Fund for Nature (WWF), one of the leading conservation organizations. The idea behind MSC is to address world-wide decline in fish stocks by awarding sustainably managed fisheries with a certification and a label that could be affixed to retail products [14]. It can be applied to a wide range of marine and freshwater fisheries found across the world [15]. In its current form, the MSC aims at specific fisheries rather than species that could come from multiple fisheries and does not cover aquaculture [16] (http://www.msc.org/). MSC comprises two standards. The MSC Chain of Custody standard for seafood traceability aims to ensure that the MSC label is only displayed on seafood from a MSC certified sustainable fishery. The MSC environmental standard for sustainable fishing is the standard that a fishery must meet to become certified, and is, therefore, the focus of this analysis. Specifically, the MSC standard is based on three principles (maintenance of the target fish stock, minimal environmental impact, and effective management) and 31 performance indicators.1 1 MSC principles and criteria can be found online at http://www.msc.org/ documents/scheme-documents/mscstandards/MSC_environmental_standard_for_ sustainable_fishing.pdf.

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2.2. Global Aquaculture Alliance The Global Aquaculture Alliance (GAA) was created in 1997 as an international, non-profit trade association aiming to advance environmentally and socially responsible aquaculture. It developed the Best Aquaculture Practices (BAP), an international certification scheme that covers the entire aquaculture supply chain-farms, hatcheries, processing plants and feed mills-in order to ensure the production of ‘‘healthy foods through environmentally and socially responsible means’’ (http://www.gaalliance.org/). 2.3. GlobalGAP GlobalGAP — initiated in 1997 by European retailers — is a private sector body that sets voluntary standards for the certification of agricultural products around the globe. It aims to establish a generic standard for Good Agricultural Practice (GAP) with different product applications capable of fitting to the whole range of global conventional agricultural products. GlobalGAP is a pre-farm-gate standard, which means that the certificate covers the processing of the certified product from farm inputs, such as feed or seedlings, and all the farming activities until the product leaves the farm. Moreover, it is a business-to-business standard not directly visible to consumers. GlobalGAP covers a range of supply chains, including fruits and vegetables, flowers, coffee, and meat. Aquaculture was included in GlobalGAP in 2009 (http:// www.globalgap.org). 2.4. Friend of the Sea Friend of the Sea (FOS) was founded in 2006 by Paolo Bray, European Director of the Earth Island Institute’s Dolphin-Safe Project. Friend of the Sea is now an international certification project for products originating from both sustainable fisheries and aquaculture (http://www.friendofthesea.org/). FOS also has two standards, one related to capture (wild) fisheries and one to aquaculture. 2.5. Aquaculture Stewardship Council The Aquaculture Stewardship Council (ASC) was founded in 2009 by WWF and Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) to manage the global standards for responsible aquaculture, which are under development by the Aquaculture Dialogues, a program of roundtables initiated and coordinated by WWF. The ASC is the most recent standard and is currently (March 2012) performing its first audit for Tilapia (http://www.ascworldwide.org/).

3. Conditions for effective transnational governance Effectiveness can be understood as the level of success of institutional performance towards some objective that motivated its establishment [17,18]. In marine governance this objective is broadly defined as the sustainability of fisheries and aquaculture. Instead of measuring sustainability performance directly on the basis of certain biophysical characteristics, however, this paper evaluates effectiveness indirectly on the basis of indicators that derive primarily from social science research. This approach is preferable to direct measurements of impacts as it can neglect broader socio-economic factors that also influence on-the-ground conditions and thus would make a causal attribution of impacts to governance initiatives almost impossible. In addition, measuring theoretical potential makes initiatives comparable while measuring direct impacts is hampered by problems of comparison across cases (e.g. between marine fisheries and aquaculture). The analysis

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follows the assumption that on-the-ground effectiveness depends to a large extent on institutional effectiveness in fostering and implementing sustainability objectives [19,20]. Accordingly, the paper evaluates potential rather than actual effectiveness. Drawing on the existing global governance literature and international regime theory [49], previous research on agrifood and forestry, and ongoing research on fisheries, five conditions that are likely to determine the effectiveness of transnational institutions in fostering sustainability objectives have been identified. These conditions can be classified in three broad categories: (i) the combination of factors intrinsic to fisheries and aquaculture that may have an influence on effective sustainability governance, understood here as problem-structure; (ii) the quality of the rules, norms and procedures developed by the organizations to address sustainability concerns. These are distinguished by the stringency of standards, the quality of the audit and access to decision-making by different societal actors; and (iii) the consequences flowing from the implementation of organizational rules in terms of changes in behavior of the relevant target group. 3.1. Problem structure Problem structure is the combination of factors intrinsic to a particular problem that may have an influence on its effective governance independent of organizational attributes. The following characteristics of problem structure can explain the effectiveness of transnational governance: the nature of problems organizations try to address, the scientific uncertainty associated with the causes and consequences of the problem at hand, the level of awareness in society, and the prior existence of public regulation [21–24].2 First, more specifically, some problems are more difficult to address than others because of their complex and systemic nature. Second, this difficulty may be exacerbated by lack of scientific certainty regarding the causes of environmental change, its impacts, interlinkage of causes and response actions and, therefore, decisions over the appropriate courses of action [25]. Third, several studies show that the level of awareness in society can have a positive influence on the effectiveness of transnational governance by creating social pressure potentially catalyzing a change in purchasing behavior and ultimately reducing the environmental impacts [26]. Fourth, likewise, numerous examples show that the prior existence of public regulation can reinforce the effectiveness of transnational governance institutions by creating positive synergies both nationally and internationally [13]. 3.2. Stringency of standards Stringency refers to the degree to which the standards require actors to implement strict prescriptions for environmental and social conduct [1]. Stringent standards are expected to foster greater environmental improvements in relation to standards that lack these characteristics. Without strict prescriptions behavioral changes by the targeted actors tend to be weak (on average) and, accordingly, the overall impact of the private governance institution is lower than desired [27]. The following indicators are used to evaluate stringency: (i) detail: a standard is considered detailed when it develops at least 3 indicators specifying each of the overarching principles and criteria; (ii) quantifiable targets: the standard includes targets that are quantifiable (e.g. biomass limits thresholds); (iii) ambition: the standard goes beyond existing regulation (when such regulation exists) and/or it envisions 2 In that sense, problem structure is defined differently from Underdal’s understanding of malign and benign problems.

greater environmental change relative to other private standards;3 (iv) performance: the standard includes targets that measure actual performance (e.g. monitoring fish stocks levels, environmental impacts, etc.); and (v) management: the standard requires the development of sustainable management plans (e.g. use of fishing methods that minimize habitat loss). In evaluating stringency holistically, the following scaling is used. A standard is considered very stringent when all indicators of stringency are satisfied; it is considered stringent when four indicators of stringency are satisfied; medium stringent when three indicators of stringency are satisfied; and lenient when two or less indicators of stringency are satisfied. 3.3. The quality of the audit Very stringent standards might only be met by those actors who are environmentally responsible already. Thus, instruments that allow the organization to ensure that the target group conforms to the behavioral and performance standards set by the organization is a fundamental requirement. Such instruments include monitoring and enforcement mechanisms, which introduce penalties and rewards providing incentives for adjusting behavior in accordance with the organization’s objectives. The presence of such mechanisms is particularly important in cases where actors who are complying with a particular private governance institution do not participate in the day-to-day operation of the respective organization; hence legitimacy is not a source of compliance [22]. Moreover, enforcement mechanisms become essential in the context of large and heterogeneous groups of actors, where cheating becomes a more attractive option due to collective action problems (see also [22,28]). The quality of audit is evaluated on the basis of the following indicators: (i) third-party auditing: compliance with the standard requirements are evaluated by an independent auditing firm and not by the organization itself; (ii) the auditing firm is accredited by independent organizations: the auditing firm is accredited by an independent body, such as the International Organization for Standardization (ISO); (iii) the standard requires 100% compliance with its rules: this means, for example, that the standard makes no distinction between rules that have to be implemented and rules that can be implemented on a voluntary basis; (iv) the audit results are publicly available and, (v) the standard includes severe sanctions in cases of non-compliance; specifically, revocation of license and exclusion of membership. As with stringency, strictness is evaluated holistically using the following scaling. Compliance methods are considered very strict when all criteria for strictness are satisfied; they are considered strict when at least four criteria are satisfied, of which one is criterion one (third-party auditing); medium strict when at least three criteria are satisfied, of which one is criterion one (third-party auditing); flexible when at least two criteria are satisfied; and very flexible when only one of the criteria is satisfied. 3.4. Access to decision-making venues and procedures Access inquires into the types of actors included in the organizations’ decision-making venues and procedures. According to some scholars access forms the basis for effective governance as it enhances accountability and legitimacy and may improve compliance and acceptance of the rules by the relevant target group [29]. Three broad categories of actors can have access to transnational governance institutions in principle: state actors, 3 We acknowledge, of course, the difficulties associated with the concept of ambition in that its meaning may be context dependent.

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business actors and civil society organizations (see also [30]). These are also the actors directly or indirectly affected by the relevant rules and standards [30]. Business and civil society organizations as the representatives of the general public are those actors directly affected by rules and standards set by the transnational organizations. State actors are indirectly affected when transnational rules interact and interfere with public regulation. Next to the type of actors involved, attention needs to be paid to their region of origin. Specifically, in a global governance context one needs to consider access patterns between representatives of the South and those of the North [31]. 3.5. Uptake Uptake needs to be included in an assessment of effectiveness, since a standard may be stringent and comprehensive, but not have any relevant market share. Such a standard therefore would not be effective in improving sustainability. Uptake is assessed on the basis of membership size and type (the number of rule-takers or rule-taking entities, e.g. a fishery, as well as the physical and institutional characteristics of the actors adopting the relevant standard), collective share of the resource that needs to be protected, and spatial coverage (the geographic areas rule-takers are active in). Membership type is an important indicator of potential effectiveness as the voluntary nature of participation on the side of the industry makes it possible for the biggest ‘‘polluters’’ to opt out (see also [32,33]). Likewise, actors adopting the certification scheme in question may already behave environmentally responsible, in which case, participation might primarily serve as a marketing tool without leading to any substantive behavioral shifts [1]. Furthermore, effectiveness is compromised when the organization might fail to attract a sufficiently large number of rule-takers or fail to realize an appropriate geographic coverage in order to achieve its goals.

4. Results and discussion The results of this study, summarized in Table 1, are based on detailed analysis of the relevant case study literature as well as documents and websites of the five organizations and can be summarized as follows:4

 The complex problem-structure presents an obstacle to an effective governance of marine resources;

 Environmental standards are not particularly stringent overall;  The quality of the audit exhibits significant variation;  Discrimination in access can be observed affecting primarily

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EEZ and international waters [34]. This creates a tension between collective and individual incentives that make the problem difficult to address. According to the economic argument, the establishment of property rights via labeling and certification schemes is therefore a promising approach to sustainability and a de facto condition for effective governance. There are two concerns associated with this thesis, however. One is that the assignment of property rights on the basis of voluntary instruments can exacerbate poverty by creating access limitations to some groups [35]. The other is that in the absence of a broader regulatory framework for sustainability the assignment of property rights to some of the world’s fisheries may remain an ineffective response. For example, the Patagonian toothfish in South Georgia has been found to be drastically overfished by pirate boats across the southern oceans despite its MSC certification [36]. Second and related to that, commitments by governments and intergovernmental organizations, such as the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement and the 1995 Food and Agriculture Organisation (FAO) Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries Practices, remain weak and implementation has been taxing [1,37]. More recently, the WTO has been promoting a harmonized policy on eliminating governmental subsidies for fishing fleet to advance free international trade with additional environmental benefits [4]. Subsidies are considered responsible for encouraging excess capacity of fishing fleets which in turn leads to overfishing. While this is a laudable development at some level, the uniform abolition of subsidies seems too general to be effective in all different locations as local conditions are largely ignored by the WTO approach [4]. Third, regarding fisheries again, there is an uncertainty about almost every aspect including population estimates, reproductive cycles, ecosystem characteristics and human behavior [34]. At any given point in time no one actually knows how many fish of a given species exists in a particular area of the ocean and it is often unclear whether these numbers are increasing or decreasing. Population estimates in fisheries have been estimated in part by examining catch statistics and how the difficulty of catching fish has varied over time or season (Catch per Unit Effort). However, this method is problematic as often there is a lack of reporting, illegal fishing etc. while other existing methods face similar limitations. Fourth, consumer awareness regarding sustainability concerns associated with fisheries and aquaculture is limited. Studies show, for instance, that the primary demand for eco-labeled products (including fish) is still confined to pockets of the European market (Germany, Netherlands, United Kingdom) and the United States (especially in the food service industry) [38]. This is problematic as about two-thirds of the world’s seafood is consumed in Asia where very few Asian consumers discriminate between products in the context of environmental issues [39,40].

civil society organizations and Southern actors;

 Uptake has been modest so far, particularly in aquaculture, but

4.2. Condition 2: stringency of standards

trends are promising.

4.1. Condition 1: problem-structure The problem-structure of fisheries in particular is rather complex. First, fish is mobile and difficult to contain within national borders or Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ).5 Most fishery resources including some of the most vulnerable fish either live in international waters or swim between different EEZ or between 4 Semi-structured interviews with organizations’ representatives have been conducted to complement desk study research. 5 Zones over which a state has special rights over the exploration and use of marine resources stretching from the edge of the state’s territorial sea to 200 nautical miles from coast.

In evaluating the stringency of environmental standards, at a first glance, the organizations evaluated in this paper fulfill most of the relevant criteria. In more detail, they include both performance and management criteria as well as some quantifiable targets. Accordingly, stringency is at least medium overall while two of the standards, MSC and ASC, are considered ‘stringent’ on the basis of the definition provided earlier. Looking closer, however, a number of caveats can be revealed. First of all, in aquaculture both GlobalGAP and GAA set targets that vary in different national contexts, resulting in different levels of stringency. In GlobalGAP, for instance, quantifiable aspects such as the Maximum Residue Limits are determined according to the market(s) where the farmed product is traded in (domestic or international). Similarly, the standard does not specify effluent limits and water quality indicators but allows them to vary

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Table 1 Comparison of transnational rule-setting organizations in global fisheries and aquaculture governancea Organizations

MSC

FOS

Domain

Fisheries

Fisheries

Stock status

Stock status

Stringency

Performance targets

Harvest strategy

Ecosystem impact Functional relationship Selectivity (by among species catch and discards Endangered, threatened or protected species Habitats

Ecosystem

ASC

GAA

GlobalGAP

Aquaculture

Aquaculture

Aquaculture

Aquaculture

Site location

Water and land resources

Water usage and disposal

Infrastructure

Energy consumption

Fattening

Biosecurity

Wetland and biodiversity conservation Sediment and water quality Fishmeal and fish oil conservation

Feed (not essential)

Genetic integrity of local populations

Escapees

GMOs and Growth Hormones Disease prevention and use of drugs Hazardous substances

Genetic diversity

Genetic engineering

High Conservation value areas Genetic engineering

Genetic engineering

Predator and wild life interactions

Escapees

Storage and disposal of Feed farm supplies Veterinary medicine and chemicals storage Predator control

Feed

Veterinary medicine and chemicals Predator control

Detail Ambition

O 

Compliance with relevant Management of legal frameworks aquaculture installation (not essential) (including energy Farm management plan Development of management/not management essential and plans in accordance with waste management) FAO (including conversion of (including energy natural ecosystems, site management/not connectivity, water use, waste essential and management and feed use on waste the farm) management)      

Third-party auditing The auditing firm is accredited by a third party Public accessibility of audit reports Minimum compliance threshold

O

O

O

O

Management targets

Compliance with relevant legal frameworks Development of fisheries specific management plans

(including waste management, collaboration in data collection etc.)

Quality of audit

Severe sanctions in cases of noncompliance Board Access to decision- Membership making

Compliance with relevant legal frameworks

Compliance with relevant legal frameworks

Biodiversity Biosecurity

Escapees

Veterinary medicine and chemicals Predator control Compliance with relevant legal frameworks

Development of Area Hatchery management Management Agreements (between farms and local communities)

 

O 

O

O

O

O

O

In process of being accredited by ISO

O

partially

O (upon completion of the audit)





Score at least 80/100 in 100% for essential and important all performance requirements indicators

100% for all requirements

100% for Major 100% for critical requirements and 70% Musts and 95% for Minor Musts for permitted requirements

O

Information not available

O

O

O

Environmental and social NGOs (3), consultants to the seafood industry (3)

Industry (2,5), Environmental NGOs (1,5)b

Industry (12), GAA (2), BAP (1)

Retailers (5), Suppliers (5)

N. America (3), Europe (2), India (1)

Europe (2), N. America (2)

N. America (14), Europe (2), Australia (1) Thailand (1) Malaysia (1)

Europe (7), N. America (2), Ecuador (1)

Science (5), Seafood industry (4), Environmental NGOs (3), Retail (Carrefour) (1) Geographic Europe (6), N. America representation (4), Australia (1), N. Zealand (1), Japan (1)

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Table 1 (continued ) Organizations

MSC

FOS

Domain

Fisheries

Fisheries

104 fisheries representing 12% of world catch Predominately Europe North America and Asia Pacific (New Zealand)

50 farms 30 fisheries representing 10% (500,000 metric tons) of world’s catch Europe, N. America, S. America, Asia, Australia and Africa

Uptake

Fisheries and Fish farms Geographic coverage

a b

Aquaculture

GAA

GlobalGAP

Aquaculture

Aquaculture

Aquaculture

(Not known yet)

245 farms (585,000 metric tons)

(Not known yet)

Predominately Asia (Thailand, Vietnam, China and India) with a few in N. and S. America

144 Farms (500,000 metric tons) Europe, N. America, S. America, Asia, Australia and Africa

Own assessment and representation of data based on information available at organizations’ websites. ASC includes in its Board the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) whose own Board consists of business and civil society interests.

according to local legislation. Likewise, permission to use genetic modification varies in GAA on the basis of national legislation. Moreover, stringency is limited by the overall lack of detail in most cases. Only the MSC in capture fisheries and the ASC and GlobalGAP in aquaculture can be considered detailed. In turn, this constrains the extent of scrutiny that the standards demand from the auditing firms. Moreover, standards differ in ambition. The MSC, for instance, adopts a more ambitious ecosystem-based approach for fisheries sustainability in relation to FOS where certification is based on the sustainability of stock rather than the fishery (see also [38]). Likewise, in aquaculture the ASC covers a wider variety of management and performance related environmental targets envisaging a broader set of changes and can, thus, be considered more ambitious in relation to the rest (see also [41]). However, none of the standards is particularly ambitious. In capture fisheries, neither the MSC nor the FOS go beyond the basic requirements for sustainability as determined by the FAO Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, which provides for the broader framework for private standard development. Measures to avoid the ‘‘overexploitation’’ of fish stocks, such as catch limits, have been evaluated as modest by marine biologists [42]. In aquaculture, scholars observe that the overall ambition of standards is low [41]. In this context, experts also question the focus on farming as the primary source of environmental degradation. Indeed, life-cycle analyses reveal that feed production is the most destructive stage [12]. At the moment, even though most standards pay attention to feed origin, requirements differ considerably. While ASC bans feed from unsustainable fisheries (collaborating with the MSC in this regard), FOS, GAA and GlobalGAP perform their own certification for sustainable feed, while FOS does not consider this requirement as essential (see below). In sum, while all organizations surveyed for this paper can be considered somewhat stringent according to the criteria developed, a number of caveats have to be taken into account, including variation of stringency in different national contexts, limited detail of standards, and lack of ambition compared to the problem at hand.

4.3. Condition 3: the quality of the audit Compliance with all organizational rules is certified through a ‘third-party’ certification scheme. Certificates are issued by certification bodies and auditors who are independently accredited to be able to perform assessments of fisheries and businesses against the standards.6 Auditing takes place regularly, normally on a yearly basis. When a fishery meets the relevant standards, its 6

ASC

MSC and ASC are certified by the Accreditation Services International (ASI), while GlobalGAP and GAA by the International Accreditation Forum. FOS is certified by various auditors.

certificate is valid for one year in the case of GAA, GlobalGAP and ASC, three years for FOS and five years for MSC. During this period, the performance of the fishery is reviewed at least once a year to check that it continues to meet the standard requirements. After a specified time, the fishery must be reassessed in full if it wants to continue to be certified. Details of the audit, however, remain confidential in most cases. Only the MSC currently provides full access to all audit reports.7 With the exception of ASC, none of the other standards require full compliance with the relevant rules, suggesting a relative flexibility in the implementation of targets.8 Specifically, in the MSC, fisheries are certified on the basis of a default assessment tree attributing scores to each performance indicator. There is a scale from 60 to 100 that determines the participation of fisheries in MSC. A ‘‘perfect fishery’’ gets the score of 100, defining the upper boundary of the scoring. A score of 80 defines the unconditional pass mark for a performance indicator for that type of fishery. A score of 60 defines the minimum, conditional pass mark at the criterion level for that type of fishery. Any score below 60 represents a performance level that is unsatisfactory. While such a scoring system may undermine stringency, an analysis of the audit reports for certified fisheries reveals that the average score is currently 87.5, above the unconditional pass mark and far beyond the conditional one. The three remaining organizations use a hierarchical ruling system where some rules are assigned higher importance and require stricter compliance than others. This, in turn, constrains the overall strictness of certification and lowers effectiveness especially when the affected rules concern crucial sustainability issues. In the cases examined here, flexibility is allowed specifically in cases of interrelations between the aquaculture farm and broader sustainability concerns, including climate change and overfishing. More specifically, in FOS, certification requirements are distinguished in essential (41/46 for fisheries, 37/50 for aquaculture), important (2/46 for fisheries, 10/50 for aquaculture) and recommendations (3/46 for fisheries, 3/50 for aquaculture). Essential requirements demand full conformity and any shortfall with regard to these requirements is considered as a major nonconformity and corrective actions are necessary, to be carried out within a maximum term of three months from the date of the nonconformity finding. Important requirements also demand full conformity but any shortfall with regard to these requirements is considered as a minor nonconformity and corrective actions (declaration of intent and plan of action) must take place within one year. Finally, recommendations are not strict requirements 7 The ASC has pledged to provide full access to audit reports upon completion of the audit. 8 ASC could not be fully assessed in terms of audit quality as such a document has not been published yet at the time of writing this paper.

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but possible corrective action is encouraged by the organization. Recommendations include, for instance, the role of the stock under consideration in the food web and the calculation of carbon footprint. To be certified by GAA’s BAP, applicants need to comply with all (100%) of the critical inspection requirements, score at least 70% (52 of 75 points) on the permitted requirements and maintain specified production records for traceability for at least three months. After five years, certified facilities need to comply with all critical requirements and score 80% or better on the permitted requirements. GlobalGAP aquaculture requirements are distinguished in 161 major musts, 30 minor musts and six recommendations. For major musts 100% compliance is compulsory, whereas for minor musts 95%. Recommendations must be inspected by certification bodies, but are not a prerequisite for the granting of a GlobalGAP certificate. Examples of recommendations include: the monitoring of impact on benthic fauna and sediment, the certification of broodstock, the introduction of breeding programs to strengthen stocks, and the use of well or potable water to lower salt concentration in the pond. Turning to sanctions, organizations demand revocation of license as the ultimate measure in cases of non-compliance.9 In the case of MSC, violation of rules results in suspension or withdrawal of the fishery certificate if after 90 days the annual on-site surveillance audit has not been completed or progressed satisfactorily. However, in hierarchical ruling systems, severe sanctions apply only when violation concerns rules assigned a major status. Consequently, in FOS, suspension results in cases of major rather than minor non-conformities (see above). In GAA, suspension occurs in cases of non-compliance with critical requirements if corrective action has not been taken with 28 days.10 Likewise, GlobalGAP provides a period of suspension (28 days) during which the producer is prevented from using the GlobalGAP logo. The suspension can be lifted when there is sufficient evidence of corrective action but can result in the cancellation of the contract in the opposite case. A producer that has received a cancellation cannot be accepted back to GlobalGAP within 12 months. In sum, the strictness of compliance methods in transnational fisheries/aquaculture rule-setting organizations ranges from strict (MSC and ASC) to medium (FOS, GAA, and GlobalGAP). Note that medium strictness tends to correlate with medium stringency and is primarily associated with organizations providing limited access to civil society, a point which is discussed in Section 4.4.

4.4. Condition 4: access to decision-making A first observation concerning access to decision-making is a certain level of discrimination against members of civil society in top decision-making bodies. In all cases, governments are absent. Taking a closer look, the organizations that provide the least access are GlobalGAP and GAA where civil society plays only a consultative role, resulting in weaker rules, and potentially undermining accountability and legitimacy to a broader public as sources of effectiveness. Specifically, in GAA decisions are formally taken by a Board of Directors that by and large represents business interests (12 out of 15 members). In GlobalGAP both the Board and the aquaculture sector committee (the body responsible for technical decision-making relevant to aquaculture), comprises an equal number of retailers and suppliers. In 9

Information regarding the ASC is not available at this stage. http://www.gaalliance.org/cmsAdmin/uploads/BAP-PangasiusF-810.pdf (15.06.2011). 10

contrast, MSC’s authoritative decision-making body, the Board of Trustees, comprises five trustees from science, four from the seafood industry, three from environmental NGOs, one from the retail sector.11 ASC has two half members from the industry, one environmental NGO and one representative from the Dutch Sustainable Trade Initiative (IDH) consisting of business and civil society interests. FOS’s highest decision-making authorities are the Director (Paolo Bray) and President (Franco Bray, father of Paolo Bray). FOS also has an Advisory Board that provides technical advice to FOS and is composed of volunteers from environmental and social NGOs (3 members) and consultants to the seafood industry (3 members). Despite differences in the type of societal actors included in their boards, organizations are similar in the geographic representation of the board members with the vast majority coming from the industrialized countries. In the case of MSC, for instance, almost all Trustees come from Europe and North America, one comes from Japan, while there are no trustees from developing countries. In FOS, five board members are from Europe and North America and one from India. ASC has a balanced participation of members from Europe and North America, while in GAA, 14 members are from North America, two from Europe, one from Australia and two from Asia. Finally, GlobalGAP has seven members from Europe, two from North America and one from Ecuador. In its aquaculture sector committee, however, all thirteen members are European. In sum, Southern actors are underrepresented in all five organizations. Accordingly, they have limited voice in governance decisions that affect resources and livelihoods, which may constrain the acceptance of transnational rules in the South and weaken implementation in practice. 4.5. Condition 5: uptake Uptake is relatively high in capture fisheries with MSC and FOS together certifying 22% of world’s fisheries, but rather small in aquaculture. More specifically, the MSC currently certifies 12% of world’s fisheries12 (see also [40]) and the FOS 10% [38]. The two organizations, however, differ in the type of fisheries they certify as well as their spatial coverage. Specifically, the majority of fisheries currently adopting the MSC are small-scale and large-scale fisheries in the developed world [32,43,44]. Only ten of the certified fisheries and eleven of those under assessment — representing 8.5% of all fisheries involved in the MSC — are situated in a developing country. This is a serious shortcoming as nine out of the top ten global fish producers are developing countries [38] and contain some of the most vulnerable marine ecosystems [4]. In this context, commentators note that the fisheries dominating the scheme are not necessarily those that are most environmentally threatened, but rather the ones that target high-value markets where the additional price for labeled fish can be paid [4], creating doubt about MSC’ sustainability impact. In contrast, the spatial uptake of FOS is much wider, covering Europe, North America, South America, Asia Pacific and Africa making it more relevant from a transnational governance perspective. Regarding aquaculture, currently 245 farms certified for shrimp and tilapia comply with GAA rules representing 585 thousand metric tons.13 The farms are predominately situated in Asia (Thailand, Vietnam, China and India) with a few in North and 11 http://www.msc.org/about-us/governance/structure/board-of-trustees/ whos-on-the-msc-board, (14.04.2011). 12 http://www.msc.org/business-support/key-facts-about-msc (23.02.2011). 13 http://www.aquaculturecertification.org/index.php?option=com_con tent&task=view&id=121&Itemid=104 (15.06.2011); http://www.seafoodbusiness. com/articledetail.aspx?id=4294994299 (06.10.2011).

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South America. Likewise, GlobalGAP’s uptake trend is spectacular. With only two years in operation 144 mainly larger farms have already received their GlobalGAP certification status, in 19 countries on all continents, offering over 500 thousand tons of harvested products leaving the farms, which are composed of Shrimp (70,000 t), Tilapia (30,000 t), Salmon (335,000 t) and Pangasius (95,000 t).14 In contrast, FOS has awarded its logo to 50 aquaculture producers out of 75 who have seeked certification, which correspond to 500 thousand tons according to the organization [38]. While these numbers may appear impressive, in reality aquaculture certification schemes cover only a fraction of global production. Collectively they certify about 1.585 million tons of farmed fish and mollusks, out of the total 50 million tons produced annually [34].

5. Conclusion This paper explored the conditions for effective transnational fisheries and aquaculture governance through certification and labeling. Overall, the results indicate that these conditions are not entirely fulfilled for the five organizations analyzed in this paper. The complex problem-structure presents an obstacle to effective governance of marine resources. The prevalence of less than stringent rules cannot be expected to address fundamental sustainability concerns. And the relatively low uptake — even under conditions of flexible compliance and modest stringency — creates concerns about the reliance on market forces to foster sustainable development objectives in the global governance of fisheries and aquaculture. In sum, our assessment questions the ability of the overall policy field of marine and aquaculture certification to deliver effective governance solutions for the challenge of sustainable marine ecosystems. Of course, some organizations fulfill more of the effectiveness conditions than others. In fisheries, for instance, the MSC has relatively more stringent standards, stricter compliance methods and is more inclusive in relation to FOS. Similar observations apply for the ASC in aquaculture. Yet, we cannot conclude with certainty that these organizations are necessarily more effective in reaching sustainability goals. This would require weighting effectiveness conditions or to assume that an aggregation of conditions determines effectiveness. We are reluctant to make such claims, not least because of the existence of certain tradeoffs between the different conditions, suggesting that it may be difficult for all of them to be satisfied simultaneously. One important conclusion from this analysis is that uptake seems to be inversely related with stringency and access. Thus, the more inclusive MSC and ASC standards are correlated with more stringent rules and stricter compliance methods. However, MSC’s uptake is limited to a rather ‘privileged’ target group in the global North (for ASC data is not yet available) (see also [48]). This seems to be a general observation for transnational governance where higher stringency tends to be associated with rather limited uptake. In the forestry sector, for instance, the less stringent standards of producer-backed schemes, such as the Programme for the Endorsement of Forest Certification (PEFC), have attracted, on average, higher participation on the side of the industry in relation to the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) [9,45]. Similar observations are made for sustainable coffee initiatives [46]. Such trade-offs represent a real obstacle for achieving sustainability. 14 http://www.globalgap.org/cms/upload/Resources/Publications/Newsletter/ 101005_AR10_web_doublepages-low.pdf (21.06.2011).

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In this context, a number of pathways that could improve the effectiveness of transnational fisheries and aquaculture certification, as a policy field, are considered below. First, the maintenance of the current multi-tier system with different organizations operating different standards is one option. As mentioned earlier, however, such a system encourages certification with less stringent standards presenting a real obstacle to make the use of marine and other resources more sustainable. At the same time, given the number and heterogeneity of (potential) rule-takers on a global scale, such a system may also encourage the elimination of worst practices, as long as uptake increases in the future to cover most of the mainstream market. Alternatively, standards may converge. This could generate sustainability benefits to the extent that standards converge towards higher stringency and strictness. Such a meta-governance system, however, would need to be accompanied by the appropriate incentives for both laggards and leaders to participate. At the moment it is unlikely that convergence will take place among fisheries and aquaculture certification schemes due to the disparities observed among the different organizations and their standards. A third possibility is the move towards systems of certification operating at the national rather than global level. GlobalGAP, for instance, has benchmarked national GAP programs, such as KenyaGAP, in order to account for the needs of horticulture smallholders. Likewise, one can find ChileGAP, MexicoGAP and NewZealandGAP among the national standards fully approved by GlobalGAP.15 The benefits of this approach are obvious: producers are developing their own interpretation of Good Agricultural Practice, which they then benchmark to an internationally recognized standard. However, in these cases too, the question is whose interpretation dominates as the exclusion of marginal actors in decision-making processes has been identified as an area of major concern [47]. Whichever path prevails, one message from this analysis is that the transnational governance has clear limitations that need to be taken into account in the design of sustainable resource management in a global context. As there is no indication that this form of governance will wane any time soon — rather the opposite seems to be the case — closer scrutiny and understanding of the conditions under which it can effectively contribute to sustainability objectives in marine governance and beyond becomes paramount for policymakers and practitioners alike. References [1] Auld G, Gulbrandsen LH, McDermott CL. Certification schemes and the impacts on forests and forestry. Annu Rev Environ Resour 2008;33:187–211. [2] UNEP. Fisheries subsidies, sustainable development and the WTO. Geneva: UNEP; 2010. [3] Garcia SM, Cochrane K, Van Santen G, Christy. F. Towards sustainable fisheries: a strategy for FAO and the World Bank. Ocean Coastal Manage 1999;42(1):369–398. [4] Osterveer P. Governing global fish provisioning: Ownership and management. Ocean Coastal Manage 2008;51:797–805. [5] Cutler C, Haufler V, Porter T. Private authority and international affairs. 1999. [6] Dingwerth K, Pattberg P. World politics and organisational field: the case of transnational sustainability governance. Eur J Int Relat 2009;15:707–743. [7] Falkner R. Private environmental governance and international relations: exploring the links. Glob Environ Polit 2003;3(2):72–87. [8] Gulbrandsen HL. Transnational environmental governance: the emergence and effects of the certification of forests and fisheries. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; 2010. [9] Quilliam ET, Lee M, Cole RT, Kim M. The impetus for (and limited power of) business self-regulation: the example of advergames. J Consum Aff 2011;45(2): 224–247. [10] Mansfield B. Assessing market-based environmental policy using a case study of North Pacific fisheries. Glob Environ Change 2006;16:29–39.

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