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Floating nuclear power plants: Potential implications for radioactive pollution of the northern marine environment
Marine Pollution Bulletin 58 (2009) 174–178
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Floating nuclear power plants: Potential implications for radioactive pollution of the northern marine environment W.J.F. Standring *, M. Dowdall *, I. Amundsen, P. Strand Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, P.O. Box 55, N-1332 Østerås, Norway
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Keywords: Floating nuclear power Arctic Northern regions Radioactive waste Marine Nuclear transport
a b s t r a c t Recent media reports as to the development, construction and possible deployment of floating nuclear power plants in the northern regions has generated significant interest in the matter. This paper presents background to the concept of floating nuclear power plants, information as to possible designs and iterations and some aspects of potential concern with respect to safety and the potential for environmental or other impacts as a result of the development and use of such systems in the northern regions. Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction Since the mid to late 1990s occasional reports in the media have pointed to the potential development by Russia of floating nuclear power plants (hereafter FNPPs) for potential deployment both in the Arctic regions and around the world. The general public and policy makers are acutely sensitive to the issue of nuclear power and radioactive pollution of the environment, a sensitivity that has been somewhat heightened for the northern regions as they have come under intense scrutiny as a valuable (and rapidly opening up) economic resource of major importance. Given such sensitivity, this article attempts to present an introduction based upon available information as to FNPPs and the potential for environmental consequences. Despite media assertions to the contrary, Russia is not constructing the first FNPP having been preempted by the United States over four decades ago who constructed the Sturgis in 1967, a barge mounted pressurized water (PWR) FNPP of over 10 MW (using an MH-1A design plant), by converting the Charles H. Cugl WWII liberty ship. The Sturgis was moved to the Panama Canal area in 1967 after testing in Virginia and remained there until 1976 having generated power over the intervening nine years. The vessel was back in Virginia by 1977 where the first steps in the (ongoing) decommissioning process were initiated. American interest in FNPP’s continued with plans to use them to provide power to the mainland and facilities were built during the 1970s on Blount Island off the coast of Florida in order to construct two 1.2 GW plants. Environmental impact assessments were performed, the projected plants were deemed to pose no major environmental risk, and the project was underway when the oil crisis of the mid * Corresponding authors. Fax: +47 67 14 74 07. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Dowdall). 0025-326X/$ - see front matter Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.marpolbul.2008.11.025
1970s caused problems for the largest potential energy customer, the oil and petrochemical industry. The project was then suspended and interest in America for FNPPs waned. The 1980s saw interest in the concept from Russia for the provision of offshore power in the far north and progress advanced as far as feasibility studies. Among early designs, a model based on water cooled and moderated ABV-1.5 reactors was described by Golovin et al. (1981) and aspects of the design (non-propelled barge, self-contained, waste handling, tandem reactors, etc.) are evident in the designs approaching actualisation in Russia today. Fundamental to the current development of FNPPs is the availability of small, low-capacity nuclear power plants and these have followed their own development trajectories in both Russia and the US, the latter having developed and installed reactors with power capacities between 0.3 and 3.0 MW in regions as diverse as Alaska, Antarctica and Greenland (see Bratton, 1961). Russia commenced development of a range of small reactor types from about 1956 onwards for a variety of purposes (Sidorenko, 2004). In the 1980s interest in Russia for low-capacity power plants began to focus on provision of power and heat for remote areas and, as mentioned, FNPP use of such plants began to receive attention. Maturation of the idea of FNPPs as a viable energy concept required a certain political and socio-economic environment and the right conditions can be seen to have arisen in recent years. Russian nuclear industry development has undergone and is undergoing major restructuring and reorganisation, initiated and sustained at the highest political level that has preceded and is underpinning the planned large-scale expansion of nuclear energy within Russia. The potential of nuclear power generation as a domestic energy source and a major export opportunity has been recognised in Russia which has embarked upon a consolidation of companies and entities at all stages of the nuclear cycle into one large organisation known as AtomEnergoProm. Towards the end of 2006 the
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government of Russia adopted The Federal Targeted Program on the Development of Russia’s Atomic Energy Complex which sets out Russia’s nuclear industry plans forward to 2016. The aims of this program are domestic nuclear power expansion and the radical expansion of Russia’s share of the international nuclear market. The end result of this ongoing consolidation will be an industrial nuclear complex of sufficient size to compete on the international market with established entities such as AREVA, ENEL, Siemens and Toshiba. The inception of this complex facilitates Russia’s domestic nuclear energy expansion for driving industrial development and freeing fossil fuel resources for export as well as positioning Russia as a leading international provider of nuclear energy, fuel and technology. This development of Russian nuclear capacity occurs in a wider context which can be seen to facilitate nuclear power development. Environmental concerns regarding fossil fuel carbon emissions, dwindling supplies of those fuels, security concerns regarding energy supplies, demands for cheap energy to solve problems such as lack of freshwater supplies and the need for novel energy solutions to drive development and industry in remote but resource rich areas such as the Arctic have resulted in significant attention on FNPPs as a potential solution. This is evidenced by a number of initiatives and large projects conducted by bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in relation to FNPP technology (IAEA, 1997a); small and autonomous reactor design (IAEA, 2004a, 2007a); nuclear desalination (IAEA, 2002, 2007b) and the use of propulsion reactors for heat/electrical supply (2000). Thus it can be seen that the idea of FNPPs in Russia has came to fruition in an environment affected by Russia’s reorganisation of its nuclear industry and an international environment focussing more and more on small nuclear plants to deliver solutions for problems evident since the mid 1990s. It should be noted that Russia is not the only state pursuing FNPPs, and associated technologies and Japan, Argentina, Canada and others are developing their own related concepts. However Russia is perhaps the only country with approaching more than half a century of relevant experience in running a civilian nuclear fleet, with extensive nuclear R&D capabilities and a large nuclear infrastructure for serving both military and civilian nuclear fleets. In 1991 the entity known as JSC Malaya Energetika announced a competition for the best design of a small nuclear power plant and this was won ultimately by a design submitted by Atomenergo. By 1996 reports were appearing in the media as to intentions for FNPPs at a variety of locations in the Russian north. These reports continued periodically as plans appeared to go through various modifications until following a series of official announcements it became clear that the keel of the Academician Lomonosov had been laid at the Sevmash shipyards at Severodvinsk on April 15th 2007 and was to be completed by 2010 although recent reports (during 2008) indicate that further construction will be conducted at yards near St. Petersburg.
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ating unit and main pumps. The life span of the reactor is 40 years with a between refuelling period stated to be 3–4 years. The nature of the fuel to be used in the KLT-40S has been the subject of some discussion but all recent indications are that it will be <20% enriched (for non-proliferation purposes) uranium in a silumin matrix (see Vatulin et al., 2003; IAEA, 2004b). The vessel itself is intended to be a non-powered barge and will be some 140 m long, 30 m wide with a maximal draught of 5.6 m (Polushkin et al., 2000). The vessel will be towed to its location and connected to a jetty-type structure which serves to join the FNPP to purpose built shore based facilities which serve the transfer of heat/power to the target grid and provide ancillary support services. The vessel is to be equipped with fuel handling facilities, waste treatment and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage capabilities. The vessel will carry enough fuel and have handling capacity to allow two refuellings (three reactor cycles) before being returned to base after 12 years for overhaul. The tandem reactors allow for refuelling without loss of power provision. The reactors safety systems and some details regarding projected waste volumes etc., are described by Beliaev and Polunichev (2000). Other designs intended for future use in FNPPs and at various stages of design and development include the ABV-6M (47 MW(t)) (OKBM) small PWR reactor with integrated steam generation capacity and designed to run for 8–10 years without refuelling (16% 235U enrichment) thereby eliminating the need for storage of fresh and spent fuel between returnto-base overhauls (described in detail by Kostin et al. (2004), Baranaev et al. (1997)). A similar concept is that of the KLT-20 design as described in IAEA (2007a), a 20 MW(e) PWR modification of the KLT-40 S without on-site refuelling. The other predominant designs are the PWRs VBER-150 and VBER-300 (110 and 295 MW(e) respectively) (Kostin et al., 2007a,b) both featuring long refuelling cycles eliminating the need for fuel storage on board. Barge designs for these variants differ from that currently under construction in size, draught, etc. All of these designs are stated to use fuel with >20% 235U. The reactor units themselves are all relatively compact and have the typical four layers of defence: the ceramic fuel itself (resistant to seawater), the zirconium alloy cladding (corrosion resistant), the reactor vessel (typically pearlitic steel with anti corrosion facings) and finally a steel and concrete containment vessel. The containments are designed such that in the event of sinking, self actuating valves allow for the influx of water to prevent the containment being crushed. The containments hold the reactor, steam generator, main pumps and a water and metal radiation shielding. No seawater is present within the containment. The plants are reported to conform to relevant Russian and international regulations regarding reactor design and construction. The currently being constructed plant was originally intended to remain at the Sevmash yards at Severodvinsk providing power for the plant and likely serving as a proof of concept model for the viability of the design although, given transferral of construction to St Petersburg, the final intended location of this and other future plants is less than clear.
1.1. The academician lomonosov 2. Siting of FNPPs The FNPP currently under construction is based on the winning design of the 1991 competition and will, according to reports, utilise two modified icebreaker reactors of a design known as KLT-40 and used in icebreaker’s such as Sevmorput for over 20 years without major incident. Some details are known as to the KLT-40 design following a visit by Sevmorput to Norway in the early 1990s and are provided by Reistad and Ølgaard (2006). The KLT-40S (sometimes termed KLT-40C) designed by OKBM (Russia) is a two circuit 35 MW(e), 85 MW(t) PWR reactor to be mounted in pairs on the design currently under construction (Belyayev and Leontyev, 2004). The reactor plant consists of the reactor itself, steam gener-
Media reports have featured a wide range of estimates as to the total number of plants to be built; from one per year to a total of fifteen over a range of time-spans. Estimating the total number is impossible as a number of factors come into play. The concept appears to be have been developed at least partially, if not totally, as a commercial product and it is likely that the number built will reflect to some extent its success as such. Russia has marketed FNPP technology internationally for a number of years and there is evidence that countries such as China are involved in the development program and a range of other countries have apparently
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expressed varying levels of interest. During an international conference entitled ‘‘Small Power Plants: Results and Prospects” held in Moscow on 10–11th October 2001, Minatom stated that some 33 towns in the Russian far north and far east will be powered by small nuclear power plants and of these, 11 will be FNPPs: Severodvinsk and Onega (Arkhangelsk Oblast), Vilyuchinsk (Kamchatka Oblast), Pevek (Chukotka Autonomous Okrug), Sovetskaya Gavan and Nikolayevsk-na-Amure (Khabarovsk Kray), Nakhodka, Olga and Rudnaya Pristan (Primorskiy Kray), Dudinka (Taymyr Autonomous Okrug), and the site of the Trukhanskaya hydro-electric plant (Evenkiyskiy Autonomous Okrug). Russia has also floated the possibility of using such plants to power oil and gas extraction activities in the rapidly opening up resource rich Barents Sea. Shallow draught plants based round the smaller reactors are suitable for use on the large rivers of Russia facilitating their use in the interior. It is perhaps likely that the industrial infrastructure for manufacture, refuelling, servicing and decommissioning of FNPP’s may be based, at least initially, around the Kola Peninsula/Arkhangelsk region of north west Russia which already is the site of bases and support centres for the Russian military and civilian nuclear fleets with the necessary heavy and specialised infrastructure required for FNPP construction, refuelling, etc. Should significant numbers of FNPP’s be built, not only will there be the obvious increase in the total numbers of reactors in the Arctic but there will also be an increase in nuclear traffic within and potentially in and out of the Arctic, of both vessels loaded with fresh fuel and possibly more significantly, SNF and nuclear waste.
3. FNPPs as commercial products FNPPs can potentially serve as power sources for remote regions or industries and as heat sources for either industrial processes or domestic supplies (see IAEA, 1997b, 1998) and attention has been devoted by Russia in these directions. Of perhaps more commercial potential is the use of FNPPs to power desalination plants as freshwater shortages become one of the more pressing problems of our time for many regions and the situation regarding fossil fuels (both in relation to carbon emissions, price and dwindling supply) as an energy source in this regard worsens. The economics of nuclear powered desalination have become more favourable with time and in the current market are cheaper or equivalent to other energy sources (see: IAEA, 1997a, 2007b, 2007c). A number of states already run large desalination plants and FNPP’s are an attractive option for states planning to use nuclear power to solve freshwater supply and security problems. Russia has been active in this regard and is reported as having established a joint venture with a Canadian supplier of desalination technology using a KLT-40S power plant in a nuclear desalination plant design (Kostin et al., 2007a,b; Humphries and Davies, 2000). While the Russian domestic need for such facilities may be small, though not insignificant, the future commercialisation of such systems will again involve transport of FNPPs in and out of the Arctic through the northern marine environment. Known Russian plans for the marketing of FNPPs for any of many potential uses involve a ‘‘Build Own Operate” model whereby the plant is provided as a turn-key solution. Shore infrastructure will be built in the customer country and the plant itself built in Russia. The plant is then transported and installed, being run by Russian operatives. Russia takes responsibility for the operation of the plant and when the time arrives for the plant to be overhauled, it is transported back to Russia with its spent fuel and waste aboard, to be removed and treated in Russia before the plant is refuelled and returned to operation. In this way the customer buys power or heat or freshwater and avoids the large financial
layout in building a power plant and associated nuclear facilities, problems in finding a site for such a land based plant and problems dealing with waste etc. Such a business model requires serial production of reactors in a process involving a production-line system and the benefits of this are discussed by Mitenkov et al. (2007). Although such a business model for FNPPs is in accordance with recent general trends in the global nuclear business (for example the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership of the United States, the Global Nuclear Infrastructure Initiative of Russia etc.) and reflects the thinking of other suppliers of nuclear materials and technology such as Australia, it should be pointed out that there is little precedent for how such a model functions in practice and there are obviously a number of areas with the potential to cause problems.
4. FNPPs and the northern marine environment The concept of an FNPP industry in the northern regions has a number of aspects of potential concern. These are related primarily to the Siting and operation of such plants in the northern regions from a accident/waste/emissions perspective. The transport of them into, within and out of the region. The operation of a supporting land based nuclear industry. Security and non-proliferation. Although environmental/safety assessments are mentioned in various references to current FNPPs, no results of such assessments are easily available. Assessments performed in the 1970s for American plants tended to indicate that such plants would exhibit more significant effects with respect to thermal discharges, physical disturbance, emissions of non-radioactive pollutants, etc. and that radioactive releases as a result of a major accident would have less impacts on human populations than from land based plants due to location. It should be pointed out that such assessments were conducted at a time when the concept (and practice) of applying environmental assessments was in its infancy. The majority of current Russian designs appear to be for ‘‘zero-discharge” plants where all waste is stored on board for removal during overhaul but the risk of an accident involving a plant is nonetheless at least the same as for any nuclear powered surface vessel. The consequences of an accident involving such a plant are of course of interest and in this regard a number of studies exist which may be of use. Two nuclear vessels have been lost previously in the northern regions, the Komsomolets submarine in 1989 south of Bjørnoya and the Kursk submarine in 2000 in the Barents Sea. Studies on the actual and potential impacts of the Komsomolets have consistently shown that the submarine represents no significant radiological hazard (see Høibråten et al., 1997) to man or environment and similar studies conducted for the Kursk, including worst case scenarios involving total and instantaneous discharge of the entire reactor inventory, conclude that no radiological hazard was presented to either man or environment (see Amundsen et al., 2002). An indication of what can occur however in accidents involving refuelling operations is provided by the events at Chazhma Bay (near Vladivostock) in August 1985 (Sivintsev et al., 1994). The submarine K431 was being refuelled when events led to removal of control rods from the reactor and the resulting criticality destroyed much of the submarine, resulted in the deaths of a number of the crew and ejected fresh fuel from the reactor resulting in dispersal of contaminants over a significant area. The release inventory of non-noble isotopes 1 h after the accident was estimated to be 1000 Ci with contamination occurring over an area of some square kilometres. The Arctic areas have long contained a wide variety of dumped nuclear objects and reactors and assessments conducted on these
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items (IAEA, 1997c) has determined that both the long term releases of radionuclides from and the risk of criticality accidents with these items are very low. Given the advances in reactor safety systems and the designs of the proposed plants it appears that the risk of health or environmental impacts of a sunken nuclear power plant are probably low although until more information is available a significant uncertainty remains. As such plants have a significant monetary value and will most likely operate in shallow coastal waters, estuaries etc., it is also perhaps unlikely that a sunken reactor would remain at the site without attempts being made at recovery. Irrespective of the potential risk of health or environmental impacts, the Barents Sea and associated marine areas are an important fisheries resource and consumers remain acutely sensitive to the perception of contaminant levels in food products. In that respect, any incident involving an FNPP or even just the operation of such facilities may potentially cause significant economic impacts. Regarding the transport of FNPPs into, out of and within the northern regions, a number of factors must be taken into account in trying to determine possible risks. Transportation of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive materials is covered by a wide range of regulations and recommendations from such international organisations as the International Maritime Organisation and the IAEA (see for example IAEA, 2005; IMO, 2000) as well as national regulations developed for the Russian Federation. These documents cover vessel design, container design, signage, categories of wastes and materials, good practice guides etc. Although the applicability of such regulations in the wider legal context has been the subject of much controversy relating to transport of nuclear materials (see Nadelson, 2000) such discussion is beyond the scope of this article. The risks posed by transports of nuclear materials under the broad requirements of such regulations have been evaluated (IAEA, 2001) and determined, for a variety of accident types and scenarios, to be low with regard to release of radioactive materials. It must again be emphasised that the response of consumers to even rumours of contamination can be significant and is essentially impossible to quantify a priori. Russia’s military and civilian nuclear fleets are served by a network of shipyards, technical bases and facilities primarily located in the north western regions of Russia. This network has been involved in the refuelling, servicing, decommissioning, storage and processing of radioactive wastes and SNF arising from operation of the civilian and military nuclear fleets. Problems with these facilities from a contamination point of view are well known and relatively well documented and are the subject of ongoing international and Russian efforts at remediation. Although there is little information as to the potential nature of any future FNPP industrial development with respect to facilities and infrastructure, it is pertinent to refer to the types of problems experienced in the past in the civilian fleets in order to highlight potential future problems for an FNPP industry. In general the operations and equipment of the Russian civilian nuclear fleet over recent decades have accorded with relevant international and national regulatory instruments. The main problems associated with the operation of the fleet have been related to the handling and storage of SNF and associated wastes and the capacity of the necessary systems and infrastructure to conduct these operations efficiently and effectively. The situation concerning, for example, the Lepse storage/ support vessel is of concern although it is possible that improvements in the general Russian nuclear industry would mean that such a situation is less likely to arise again. Operations at Atomflot (the operator of the civilian nuclear Russian fleet) have included a number of aspects that posed or may pose a risk of environmental contamination. These include radioactive gas releases from reactors on vessels and from SNF during the first months of its storage. The concentrations of such gasses outside of reactors on board nuclear icebreakers and during refuelling operations are stated to
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have never exceeded Russian radiological safety norms (AMAP, 1997). Icebreaker reactor cores over four years of operation generate waste volumes of the order of 130 m3 of LRW and 32 m3 of SRW most of which is subsequently treated and handled at the Atomflot base. Studies have shown that despite these operations and the handling of significant amounts of SNF and radioactive waste at the Atomflot site, significant contamination of Kola Bay has not occurred although traces of contaminant isotopes can be observed at levels that give no cause for concern (AMAP, 1997). A significant concern given past experiences relating to nuclear fleets is the capacity of land based industry/support services to keep pace with the number of reactors. Current indications are that the production models to be employed could result in an increase in the number of reactors produced and in operation (either within the northern regions or externally but requiring return for servicing/refuelling/ etc) and should FNPPs as a product be successful, a situation could feasibly arise whereby the extant infrastructural assets are insufficient to handle the volumes of wastes generated. This scenario is essentially that which caused significant problems for the military/civilian fleets in the past. Should an FNPP industry flourish, there is however a buffer period before which the first reactors would start returning to base, which could allow for the development of the necessary infrastructure. The operations of the civilian nuclear fleet can be argued to have not, over the years, generated environmental problems of the same magnitude of those associated with for example the military nuclear fleet where shore based facilities have been the cause of international concern due to large amounts of improperly stored SNF and radioactive and other wastes in hazardous condition. The situation regarding historical handling of radioactive wastes from the civilian nuclear fleet has been far from optimal however and legacy problems remain and which require addressing. In this regard, the planned development of Saida Bay as a regional centre may go some way towards improving the general situation. Of the civilian fleet and the military fleet, it would appear logical to assume that any FNPP industry would most resemble that associated with the civilian fleet’s operations. Given the advances in the general Russian nuclear industry with respect to safety and environmental awareness since the Chernobyl accident of 1986 and the assumed necessity for an FNPP industry to compete and gain acceptance on the open international market it would appear unlikely that such an industry could commercially tolerate the development of a situation whereby problems of the past, in particular with respect to sites associated with the military fleet, would be replicated. The constraints imposed by competing on an international market are, in essence, novel with respect to the Russian nuclear fleet and it is difficult to hypothesise the effects of them on any future FNPP industry although it is probable that they will exert some influence. Uncertainty however remains with regard to how a future FNPP based industry would operate and any predictions as to the development of future situations must remain speculative. Aside from noting that the presence or transport of FNPP’s in or through the northern regions and the establishment of an associated nuclear industry will present an elevated risk for the environment, it is difficult to ascertain the level of that risk for a number of reasons. It is currently unknown how successful FNPPs may be as a commercial reality, how many will be built, where and how they will operate or their exact design. Drawing conclusions based on earlier situations relating to military and civilian fleets is also fraught with uncertainty as an FNPP industry will be expected to function under constraints that were non-applicable for the two potential examples and in a socio-political environment that did not exist for much of their lifetime. That FNPPs, as with any nuclear facility, pose an environmental risk is indisputable and it is possible that this nascent industry will upon maturation present one of
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Floating nuclear power plants: Potential implications for radioactive pollution of the northern marine environment W.J.F. Standring *, M. Dowdall *, I. Amundsen, P. Strand Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority, P.O. Box 55, N-1332 Østerås, Norway
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Keywords: Floating nuclear power Arctic Northern regions Radioactive waste Marine Nuclear transport
a b s t r a c t Recent media reports as to the development, construction and possible deployment of floating nuclear power plants in the northern regions has generated significant interest in the matter. This paper presents background to the concept of floating nuclear power plants, information as to possible designs and iterations and some aspects of potential concern with respect to safety and the potential for environmental or other impacts as a result of the development and use of such systems in the northern regions. Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction Since the mid to late 1990s occasional reports in the media have pointed to the potential development by Russia of floating nuclear power plants (hereafter FNPPs) for potential deployment both in the Arctic regions and around the world. The general public and policy makers are acutely sensitive to the issue of nuclear power and radioactive pollution of the environment, a sensitivity that has been somewhat heightened for the northern regions as they have come under intense scrutiny as a valuable (and rapidly opening up) economic resource of major importance. Given such sensitivity, this article attempts to present an introduction based upon available information as to FNPPs and the potential for environmental consequences. Despite media assertions to the contrary, Russia is not constructing the first FNPP having been preempted by the United States over four decades ago who constructed the Sturgis in 1967, a barge mounted pressurized water (PWR) FNPP of over 10 MW (using an MH-1A design plant), by converting the Charles H. Cugl WWII liberty ship. The Sturgis was moved to the Panama Canal area in 1967 after testing in Virginia and remained there until 1976 having generated power over the intervening nine years. The vessel was back in Virginia by 1977 where the first steps in the (ongoing) decommissioning process were initiated. American interest in FNPP’s continued with plans to use them to provide power to the mainland and facilities were built during the 1970s on Blount Island off the coast of Florida in order to construct two 1.2 GW plants. Environmental impact assessments were performed, the projected plants were deemed to pose no major environmental risk, and the project was underway when the oil crisis of the mid * Corresponding authors. Fax: +47 67 14 74 07. E-mail address: [email protected] (M. Dowdall). 0025-326X/$ - see front matter Ó 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved. doi:10.1016/j.marpolbul.2008.11.025
1970s caused problems for the largest potential energy customer, the oil and petrochemical industry. The project was then suspended and interest in America for FNPPs waned. The 1980s saw interest in the concept from Russia for the provision of offshore power in the far north and progress advanced as far as feasibility studies. Among early designs, a model based on water cooled and moderated ABV-1.5 reactors was described by Golovin et al. (1981) and aspects of the design (non-propelled barge, self-contained, waste handling, tandem reactors, etc.) are evident in the designs approaching actualisation in Russia today. Fundamental to the current development of FNPPs is the availability of small, low-capacity nuclear power plants and these have followed their own development trajectories in both Russia and the US, the latter having developed and installed reactors with power capacities between 0.3 and 3.0 MW in regions as diverse as Alaska, Antarctica and Greenland (see Bratton, 1961). Russia commenced development of a range of small reactor types from about 1956 onwards for a variety of purposes (Sidorenko, 2004). In the 1980s interest in Russia for low-capacity power plants began to focus on provision of power and heat for remote areas and, as mentioned, FNPP use of such plants began to receive attention. Maturation of the idea of FNPPs as a viable energy concept required a certain political and socio-economic environment and the right conditions can be seen to have arisen in recent years. Russian nuclear industry development has undergone and is undergoing major restructuring and reorganisation, initiated and sustained at the highest political level that has preceded and is underpinning the planned large-scale expansion of nuclear energy within Russia. The potential of nuclear power generation as a domestic energy source and a major export opportunity has been recognised in Russia which has embarked upon a consolidation of companies and entities at all stages of the nuclear cycle into one large organisation known as AtomEnergoProm. Towards the end of 2006 the
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government of Russia adopted The Federal Targeted Program on the Development of Russia’s Atomic Energy Complex which sets out Russia’s nuclear industry plans forward to 2016. The aims of this program are domestic nuclear power expansion and the radical expansion of Russia’s share of the international nuclear market. The end result of this ongoing consolidation will be an industrial nuclear complex of sufficient size to compete on the international market with established entities such as AREVA, ENEL, Siemens and Toshiba. The inception of this complex facilitates Russia’s domestic nuclear energy expansion for driving industrial development and freeing fossil fuel resources for export as well as positioning Russia as a leading international provider of nuclear energy, fuel and technology. This development of Russian nuclear capacity occurs in a wider context which can be seen to facilitate nuclear power development. Environmental concerns regarding fossil fuel carbon emissions, dwindling supplies of those fuels, security concerns regarding energy supplies, demands for cheap energy to solve problems such as lack of freshwater supplies and the need for novel energy solutions to drive development and industry in remote but resource rich areas such as the Arctic have resulted in significant attention on FNPPs as a potential solution. This is evidenced by a number of initiatives and large projects conducted by bodies such as the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in relation to FNPP technology (IAEA, 1997a); small and autonomous reactor design (IAEA, 2004a, 2007a); nuclear desalination (IAEA, 2002, 2007b) and the use of propulsion reactors for heat/electrical supply (2000). Thus it can be seen that the idea of FNPPs in Russia has came to fruition in an environment affected by Russia’s reorganisation of its nuclear industry and an international environment focussing more and more on small nuclear plants to deliver solutions for problems evident since the mid 1990s. It should be noted that Russia is not the only state pursuing FNPPs, and associated technologies and Japan, Argentina, Canada and others are developing their own related concepts. However Russia is perhaps the only country with approaching more than half a century of relevant experience in running a civilian nuclear fleet, with extensive nuclear R&D capabilities and a large nuclear infrastructure for serving both military and civilian nuclear fleets. In 1991 the entity known as JSC Malaya Energetika announced a competition for the best design of a small nuclear power plant and this was won ultimately by a design submitted by Atomenergo. By 1996 reports were appearing in the media as to intentions for FNPPs at a variety of locations in the Russian north. These reports continued periodically as plans appeared to go through various modifications until following a series of official announcements it became clear that the keel of the Academician Lomonosov had been laid at the Sevmash shipyards at Severodvinsk on April 15th 2007 and was to be completed by 2010 although recent reports (during 2008) indicate that further construction will be conducted at yards near St. Petersburg.
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ating unit and main pumps. The life span of the reactor is 40 years with a between refuelling period stated to be 3–4 years. The nature of the fuel to be used in the KLT-40S has been the subject of some discussion but all recent indications are that it will be <20% enriched (for non-proliferation purposes) uranium in a silumin matrix (see Vatulin et al., 2003; IAEA, 2004b). The vessel itself is intended to be a non-powered barge and will be some 140 m long, 30 m wide with a maximal draught of 5.6 m (Polushkin et al., 2000). The vessel will be towed to its location and connected to a jetty-type structure which serves to join the FNPP to purpose built shore based facilities which serve the transfer of heat/power to the target grid and provide ancillary support services. The vessel is to be equipped with fuel handling facilities, waste treatment and spent nuclear fuel (SNF) storage capabilities. The vessel will carry enough fuel and have handling capacity to allow two refuellings (three reactor cycles) before being returned to base after 12 years for overhaul. The tandem reactors allow for refuelling without loss of power provision. The reactors safety systems and some details regarding projected waste volumes etc., are described by Beliaev and Polunichev (2000). Other designs intended for future use in FNPPs and at various stages of design and development include the ABV-6M (47 MW(t)) (OKBM) small PWR reactor with integrated steam generation capacity and designed to run for 8–10 years without refuelling (16% 235U enrichment) thereby eliminating the need for storage of fresh and spent fuel between returnto-base overhauls (described in detail by Kostin et al. (2004), Baranaev et al. (1997)). A similar concept is that of the KLT-20 design as described in IAEA (2007a), a 20 MW(e) PWR modification of the KLT-40 S without on-site refuelling. The other predominant designs are the PWRs VBER-150 and VBER-300 (110 and 295 MW(e) respectively) (Kostin et al., 2007a,b) both featuring long refuelling cycles eliminating the need for fuel storage on board. Barge designs for these variants differ from that currently under construction in size, draught, etc. All of these designs are stated to use fuel with >20% 235U. The reactor units themselves are all relatively compact and have the typical four layers of defence: the ceramic fuel itself (resistant to seawater), the zirconium alloy cladding (corrosion resistant), the reactor vessel (typically pearlitic steel with anti corrosion facings) and finally a steel and concrete containment vessel. The containments are designed such that in the event of sinking, self actuating valves allow for the influx of water to prevent the containment being crushed. The containments hold the reactor, steam generator, main pumps and a water and metal radiation shielding. No seawater is present within the containment. The plants are reported to conform to relevant Russian and international regulations regarding reactor design and construction. The currently being constructed plant was originally intended to remain at the Sevmash yards at Severodvinsk providing power for the plant and likely serving as a proof of concept model for the viability of the design although, given transferral of construction to St Petersburg, the final intended location of this and other future plants is less than clear.
1.1. The academician lomonosov 2. Siting of FNPPs The FNPP currently under construction is based on the winning design of the 1991 competition and will, according to reports, utilise two modified icebreaker reactors of a design known as KLT-40 and used in icebreaker’s such as Sevmorput for over 20 years without major incident. Some details are known as to the KLT-40 design following a visit by Sevmorput to Norway in the early 1990s and are provided by Reistad and Ølgaard (2006). The KLT-40S (sometimes termed KLT-40C) designed by OKBM (Russia) is a two circuit 35 MW(e), 85 MW(t) PWR reactor to be mounted in pairs on the design currently under construction (Belyayev and Leontyev, 2004). The reactor plant consists of the reactor itself, steam gener-
Media reports have featured a wide range of estimates as to the total number of plants to be built; from one per year to a total of fifteen over a range of time-spans. Estimating the total number is impossible as a number of factors come into play. The concept appears to be have been developed at least partially, if not totally, as a commercial product and it is likely that the number built will reflect to some extent its success as such. Russia has marketed FNPP technology internationally for a number of years and there is evidence that countries such as China are involved in the development program and a range of other countries have apparently
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expressed varying levels of interest. During an international conference entitled ‘‘Small Power Plants: Results and Prospects” held in Moscow on 10–11th October 2001, Minatom stated that some 33 towns in the Russian far north and far east will be powered by small nuclear power plants and of these, 11 will be FNPPs: Severodvinsk and Onega (Arkhangelsk Oblast), Vilyuchinsk (Kamchatka Oblast), Pevek (Chukotka Autonomous Okrug), Sovetskaya Gavan and Nikolayevsk-na-Amure (Khabarovsk Kray), Nakhodka, Olga and Rudnaya Pristan (Primorskiy Kray), Dudinka (Taymyr Autonomous Okrug), and the site of the Trukhanskaya hydro-electric plant (Evenkiyskiy Autonomous Okrug). Russia has also floated the possibility of using such plants to power oil and gas extraction activities in the rapidly opening up resource rich Barents Sea. Shallow draught plants based round the smaller reactors are suitable for use on the large rivers of Russia facilitating their use in the interior. It is perhaps likely that the industrial infrastructure for manufacture, refuelling, servicing and decommissioning of FNPP’s may be based, at least initially, around the Kola Peninsula/Arkhangelsk region of north west Russia which already is the site of bases and support centres for the Russian military and civilian nuclear fleets with the necessary heavy and specialised infrastructure required for FNPP construction, refuelling, etc. Should significant numbers of FNPP’s be built, not only will there be the obvious increase in the total numbers of reactors in the Arctic but there will also be an increase in nuclear traffic within and potentially in and out of the Arctic, of both vessels loaded with fresh fuel and possibly more significantly, SNF and nuclear waste.
3. FNPPs as commercial products FNPPs can potentially serve as power sources for remote regions or industries and as heat sources for either industrial processes or domestic supplies (see IAEA, 1997b, 1998) and attention has been devoted by Russia in these directions. Of perhaps more commercial potential is the use of FNPPs to power desalination plants as freshwater shortages become one of the more pressing problems of our time for many regions and the situation regarding fossil fuels (both in relation to carbon emissions, price and dwindling supply) as an energy source in this regard worsens. The economics of nuclear powered desalination have become more favourable with time and in the current market are cheaper or equivalent to other energy sources (see: IAEA, 1997a, 2007b, 2007c). A number of states already run large desalination plants and FNPP’s are an attractive option for states planning to use nuclear power to solve freshwater supply and security problems. Russia has been active in this regard and is reported as having established a joint venture with a Canadian supplier of desalination technology using a KLT-40S power plant in a nuclear desalination plant design (Kostin et al., 2007a,b; Humphries and Davies, 2000). While the Russian domestic need for such facilities may be small, though not insignificant, the future commercialisation of such systems will again involve transport of FNPPs in and out of the Arctic through the northern marine environment. Known Russian plans for the marketing of FNPPs for any of many potential uses involve a ‘‘Build Own Operate” model whereby the plant is provided as a turn-key solution. Shore infrastructure will be built in the customer country and the plant itself built in Russia. The plant is then transported and installed, being run by Russian operatives. Russia takes responsibility for the operation of the plant and when the time arrives for the plant to be overhauled, it is transported back to Russia with its spent fuel and waste aboard, to be removed and treated in Russia before the plant is refuelled and returned to operation. In this way the customer buys power or heat or freshwater and avoids the large financial
layout in building a power plant and associated nuclear facilities, problems in finding a site for such a land based plant and problems dealing with waste etc. Such a business model requires serial production of reactors in a process involving a production-line system and the benefits of this are discussed by Mitenkov et al. (2007). Although such a business model for FNPPs is in accordance with recent general trends in the global nuclear business (for example the Global Nuclear Energy Partnership of the United States, the Global Nuclear Infrastructure Initiative of Russia etc.) and reflects the thinking of other suppliers of nuclear materials and technology such as Australia, it should be pointed out that there is little precedent for how such a model functions in practice and there are obviously a number of areas with the potential to cause problems.
4. FNPPs and the northern marine environment The concept of an FNPP industry in the northern regions has a number of aspects of potential concern. These are related primarily to the Siting and operation of such plants in the northern regions from a accident/waste/emissions perspective. The transport of them into, within and out of the region. The operation of a supporting land based nuclear industry. Security and non-proliferation. Although environmental/safety assessments are mentioned in various references to current FNPPs, no results of such assessments are easily available. Assessments performed in the 1970s for American plants tended to indicate that such plants would exhibit more significant effects with respect to thermal discharges, physical disturbance, emissions of non-radioactive pollutants, etc. and that radioactive releases as a result of a major accident would have less impacts on human populations than from land based plants due to location. It should be pointed out that such assessments were conducted at a time when the concept (and practice) of applying environmental assessments was in its infancy. The majority of current Russian designs appear to be for ‘‘zero-discharge” plants where all waste is stored on board for removal during overhaul but the risk of an accident involving a plant is nonetheless at least the same as for any nuclear powered surface vessel. The consequences of an accident involving such a plant are of course of interest and in this regard a number of studies exist which may be of use. Two nuclear vessels have been lost previously in the northern regions, the Komsomolets submarine in 1989 south of Bjørnoya and the Kursk submarine in 2000 in the Barents Sea. Studies on the actual and potential impacts of the Komsomolets have consistently shown that the submarine represents no significant radiological hazard (see Høibråten et al., 1997) to man or environment and similar studies conducted for the Kursk, including worst case scenarios involving total and instantaneous discharge of the entire reactor inventory, conclude that no radiological hazard was presented to either man or environment (see Amundsen et al., 2002). An indication of what can occur however in accidents involving refuelling operations is provided by the events at Chazhma Bay (near Vladivostock) in August 1985 (Sivintsev et al., 1994). The submarine K431 was being refuelled when events led to removal of control rods from the reactor and the resulting criticality destroyed much of the submarine, resulted in the deaths of a number of the crew and ejected fresh fuel from the reactor resulting in dispersal of contaminants over a significant area. The release inventory of non-noble isotopes 1 h after the accident was estimated to be 1000 Ci with contamination occurring over an area of some square kilometres. The Arctic areas have long contained a wide variety of dumped nuclear objects and reactors and assessments conducted on these
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items (IAEA, 1997c) has determined that both the long term releases of radionuclides from and the risk of criticality accidents with these items are very low. Given the advances in reactor safety systems and the designs of the proposed plants it appears that the risk of health or environmental impacts of a sunken nuclear power plant are probably low although until more information is available a significant uncertainty remains. As such plants have a significant monetary value and will most likely operate in shallow coastal waters, estuaries etc., it is also perhaps unlikely that a sunken reactor would remain at the site without attempts being made at recovery. Irrespective of the potential risk of health or environmental impacts, the Barents Sea and associated marine areas are an important fisheries resource and consumers remain acutely sensitive to the perception of contaminant levels in food products. In that respect, any incident involving an FNPP or even just the operation of such facilities may potentially cause significant economic impacts. Regarding the transport of FNPPs into, out of and within the northern regions, a number of factors must be taken into account in trying to determine possible risks. Transportation of spent nuclear fuel and radioactive materials is covered by a wide range of regulations and recommendations from such international organisations as the International Maritime Organisation and the IAEA (see for example IAEA, 2005; IMO, 2000) as well as national regulations developed for the Russian Federation. These documents cover vessel design, container design, signage, categories of wastes and materials, good practice guides etc. Although the applicability of such regulations in the wider legal context has been the subject of much controversy relating to transport of nuclear materials (see Nadelson, 2000) such discussion is beyond the scope of this article. The risks posed by transports of nuclear materials under the broad requirements of such regulations have been evaluated (IAEA, 2001) and determined, for a variety of accident types and scenarios, to be low with regard to release of radioactive materials. It must again be emphasised that the response of consumers to even rumours of contamination can be significant and is essentially impossible to quantify a priori. Russia’s military and civilian nuclear fleets are served by a network of shipyards, technical bases and facilities primarily located in the north western regions of Russia. This network has been involved in the refuelling, servicing, decommissioning, storage and processing of radioactive wastes and SNF arising from operation of the civilian and military nuclear fleets. Problems with these facilities from a contamination point of view are well known and relatively well documented and are the subject of ongoing international and Russian efforts at remediation. Although there is little information as to the potential nature of any future FNPP industrial development with respect to facilities and infrastructure, it is pertinent to refer to the types of problems experienced in the past in the civilian fleets in order to highlight potential future problems for an FNPP industry. In general the operations and equipment of the Russian civilian nuclear fleet over recent decades have accorded with relevant international and national regulatory instruments. The main problems associated with the operation of the fleet have been related to the handling and storage of SNF and associated wastes and the capacity of the necessary systems and infrastructure to conduct these operations efficiently and effectively. The situation concerning, for example, the Lepse storage/ support vessel is of concern although it is possible that improvements in the general Russian nuclear industry would mean that such a situation is less likely to arise again. Operations at Atomflot (the operator of the civilian nuclear Russian fleet) have included a number of aspects that posed or may pose a risk of environmental contamination. These include radioactive gas releases from reactors on vessels and from SNF during the first months of its storage. The concentrations of such gasses outside of reactors on board nuclear icebreakers and during refuelling operations are stated to
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have never exceeded Russian radiological safety norms (AMAP, 1997). Icebreaker reactor cores over four years of operation generate waste volumes of the order of 130 m3 of LRW and 32 m3 of SRW most of which is subsequently treated and handled at the Atomflot base. Studies have shown that despite these operations and the handling of significant amounts of SNF and radioactive waste at the Atomflot site, significant contamination of Kola Bay has not occurred although traces of contaminant isotopes can be observed at levels that give no cause for concern (AMAP, 1997). A significant concern given past experiences relating to nuclear fleets is the capacity of land based industry/support services to keep pace with the number of reactors. Current indications are that the production models to be employed could result in an increase in the number of reactors produced and in operation (either within the northern regions or externally but requiring return for servicing/refuelling/ etc) and should FNPPs as a product be successful, a situation could feasibly arise whereby the extant infrastructural assets are insufficient to handle the volumes of wastes generated. This scenario is essentially that which caused significant problems for the military/civilian fleets in the past. Should an FNPP industry flourish, there is however a buffer period before which the first reactors would start returning to base, which could allow for the development of the necessary infrastructure. The operations of the civilian nuclear fleet can be argued to have not, over the years, generated environmental problems of the same magnitude of those associated with for example the military nuclear fleet where shore based facilities have been the cause of international concern due to large amounts of improperly stored SNF and radioactive and other wastes in hazardous condition. The situation regarding historical handling of radioactive wastes from the civilian nuclear fleet has been far from optimal however and legacy problems remain and which require addressing. In this regard, the planned development of Saida Bay as a regional centre may go some way towards improving the general situation. Of the civilian fleet and the military fleet, it would appear logical to assume that any FNPP industry would most resemble that associated with the civilian fleet’s operations. Given the advances in the general Russian nuclear industry with respect to safety and environmental awareness since the Chernobyl accident of 1986 and the assumed necessity for an FNPP industry to compete and gain acceptance on the open international market it would appear unlikely that such an industry could commercially tolerate the development of a situation whereby problems of the past, in particular with respect to sites associated with the military fleet, would be replicated. The constraints imposed by competing on an international market are, in essence, novel with respect to the Russian nuclear fleet and it is difficult to hypothesise the effects of them on any future FNPP industry although it is probable that they will exert some influence. Uncertainty however remains with regard to how a future FNPP based industry would operate and any predictions as to the development of future situations must remain speculative. Aside from noting that the presence or transport of FNPP’s in or through the northern regions and the establishment of an associated nuclear industry will present an elevated risk for the environment, it is difficult to ascertain the level of that risk for a number of reasons. It is currently unknown how successful FNPPs may be as a commercial reality, how many will be built, where and how they will operate or their exact design. Drawing conclusions based on earlier situations relating to military and civilian fleets is also fraught with uncertainty as an FNPP industry will be expected to function under constraints that were non-applicable for the two potential examples and in a socio-political environment that did not exist for much of their lifetime. That FNPPs, as with any nuclear facility, pose an environmental risk is indisputable and it is possible that this nascent industry will upon maturation present one of
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