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Focusing and Presupposition in the Understanding of Sentences
LANGUAGE AND COMPREHENSION J.-F. Le Ny. W. Kintsch (editors) © North-Holland Publishing Company. 1982
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FOCUSING AND PRESUPPOSITION IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF SENTENCES Johannes Engelkamp, Hubert D.Zimmer and Pierre Leclere Fachrichtung Psychologie Universitat des Saarlandes 6600 SaarbrUcken, West-Germany
Until now, the function of grammatical subjectivization and the clefting of concepts have only been discussed and examined separately. This is probably due to the fact that subjectivization has principally been seen from the point of view of focusing of attention, whereas the study of cleft sentences has centred on the presuppositional structure of the clauses, together with the processing of given information. In this paper, however, subjectivization and clefting will be examined from the point of view both of focusing and of presupposition. The interaction of subjectivization and clefting with regard to both functions will thus be given special attention. We conclude that subjectivization in the context of cleft sentences has only a focusing function, and not a presuppositional one. With regard to focusing, subjectivization and clefting serve mainly to reinforce each other. INTRODUCTION This contribution is concerned with the question of what role subjectivization and clefting of a concept play in the understanding of sentences. Basically, we start from the assumption that in the understanding of sentences, it is propositional knowledge which is activated (Clark & Clark 1977, Engelkamp 1976, Kintsch 1974). We further assume that, among other things, the structure of the sentence determines which knowledge is activated, and how it is activated; in other words, what structure the activated knowledge has. In our opinion, the stylistic features of a sentence playa part in determining the method of activating knowledge, and the structure of the knowledge activated. Two such features, and their role in the understanding of sentences will be analysed more closely; the role of subjectivization, and that of clefting of concepts. By a subjectivized concept, we mean the nominal concept which functions as the grammatical subject in a sentence. By a clefted concept, we understand the nominal concept which is fronted in the form uEs ist Xu (It is X) in a sentence like (1): (1) It is Peter who praised Charles. Until now, the function of subjectivization and clefting of concepts have only been examined and discussed separately (e.g. Carpenter & Just 1977a, b; Clark 1977; Clark & Haviland 1977; Langford & Holmes 1980; Singer 1976). Apart from Engelkamp (1979) and Engelkamp & Krumnacker (1978), a possible interaction between these two variables has not been considered. Here it is placed in the foreground. The aim of this paper is to contribute towards interpreting the function of these two sentence features, by studying them together. We will concentrate on their role in the understanding of sentences, paying only marginal attention to the conditions which contribute to their production (c.f. Engelkamp & Zimmer 1982, on production).
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We will analyse the following two functions successively for both features; the function of directing attention or focusing, and the function of marking a certain piece of information in the sentence as given or new; that is, the function of presupposition. We assume that the two features can be used in either function, which does not preclude that these features can have other functions, or that they have our particular functions in every case. THE FOCUSING FUNCTION OF SUBJECTIVIZATION According to a hypothesis about the function of subjectivization for the hearer, the subject of a sentence attracts the attention of the hearer; in other words, he centres the proposition which is communicated and activated by the sentence around the subject-concept. According to Ertel (1974, 1977), concepts which are in the centre of attention are more accentuated, more contoured, and more likely to be conceptualized as figures than concepts which are not. Thus, if the grammatical subject attracts the attention of the hearer, then the subjectivized concept should be perceived as more accentuated and more "definite" than the object-concept. Johnson-Laird (1969) has already established that subject-concepts are more "definite" than object-concepts. According to Johnson-Laird, the meaning of the quantifier "some" depends on the syntactic position of the quantified concept: "Some" in the subject nominal group will be interpreted as "more definite" than "some" in the object nominal group. (2) Some boys love all girls. (3) All girls love some boys. Sentence (2) is understood by most hearers to mean that there is a definite set of boys, of whom each loves all girls. The meaning of "some boys" in (3) is, on the other hand, differently interpreted. The interpretation which suggests itself for sentence (3) is that each of the girls loves a certain sub-set of boys from the set of all boys, and that this sub-set is different for each girl. If sentence (3) is passivized, the interpretation becomes analogous to that of (2). Now there is a certain set of boys who are loved by all girls. Ertel (1974) adds further to this observation by Johnson-Laird (1969). He shows that, other conditions being equal, a "definite" noun is more easily understood than an "indefinite" noun.
(4) Irgendeine Frau wird Hans schon zum Tanz auffordern. (Some woman will ask (5)
Hans to dance. /Hans will ask some woman to dance.) Hans wird schon irgendeine Frau zum Tanz auffordern. (Hans will ask some woman to dance.)
Whereas in sentence (4), both "irgendeine Frau" and "Hans" may be perceived as either subject or object, sentence (5) really only allows the possible interpretation of "Hans" as the subject. Johnson-Laird (1968) also demonstrated that the accentuation of the subject-concept is to be found with the cognition of non-verbal reference. Using the hypothesis that subjectivization serves to accentuate the concept in question, Johnson-Laird presented his subjects with sentences of the following type: (6) Blue follows (or precedes) Red. (7) Red is followed (or preceded) by Blue. It was the task of the subjects to assign coloured squares to these sentences; in other words, to express them by means of coloured squares.
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The results show that the grammatical subjects "Blue" in sentence (6) and "Red" in sentence (7) were assigned larger squares than the grammatical object. The differences between the red and blue squares were bigger with passive sentences than with active ones. To summarize: Both the findings of Johnson-Laird (1968. 1969) and Ertel (1974. 1977), as well as those of other authors (e.g. Flores d'Arcais, 1973; Olson & Filby 1972; Tannenbaum & William, 1968; Turner & Rommetveit. 1968) tend to show that the subjectivization of a concept draws the listener's attention to this concept, and that this is more marked for passive sentences than for active ones. In this connection, Johnson-Laird writes (1968), that "the passive implies that the logical object is more important than the logical subject, whereas the active implies that there is a minimal difference in the importance of these two entities, or that the logical subject slightly predominates" (p.7). THE FOCUSING FUNCTION OF CLEFTING If one accepts that the subject is usually found in ini'tia1 position in a sentence, then the focusing effect of subjectivization may also partially be a result of position. Hence, the subjectivized patient-concept is moved into initial position in German passive sentences. Therefore it would not be surprizing that in a cleft sentence such as (1). in which the clefted concept is moved to initial position and is further emphasized by the formula "It is an X", that this c1efted concept should attract the particular attention of the listener, that is, that it should become the focus of the listener's attention. We attempted to verify this hypothesis in various experiments (Zimmer & Enge1kamp 1981). The basic idea of our experiments was to use the c1efting of a concept to make it the centre of the knowledge activated by the whole sentence; to demonstrate that the knowledge corresponding to the clefted concept is foca1ised we chose a setting which allowed to show that a picture of this concept offered directly after the sentence, is scrutinised more closely, and at greater length, than a picture of an unc1efted concept. Corresponding to the larger surface area accorded to the subject-concept in the experiment of Johnson-Laird (1968), our clefted concept should be accorded a longer inspection time. To test this hypothesis, we offered our subjects German cleft sentences which had been prepared by an adequate context. and immediately afterwards we gave them the possibility of projecting alternative visual images (on slides) of the two nominal concepts. The time the volunteers spent looking at the two concepts during the first showing was measured in micro-seconds. A result of this series of experiments was that inspection time was longer for the images of a clefted concept than for an unc1efted concept. In summarizing, we can state that clefted concepts, too, atract the attention of the hearer. THE INTERACTION OF FOCUSING THROUGH SUBJECTIVIZATION AND CLEFTING The fact that both the subjectivization and the c1efting of a concept can attract the attention of the hearer, raises the interesting question of what happens if subjectivization and c1efting focus the attention on two different concepts, in other words, if a sentence induces two foci of attention. To answer this question, let us analyse the following four sentences in detail: (8) Es ist der Po1izist, der den Pfarrer grUBt. (It is the policeman who greets the vicar. (9) Es ist der Pfarrer, den der Po1izist grUBt. (It is the vicar whom the
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policeman greets.)
.....
(10) Es ist der Polizist, von dem der Pfarrer gegruBt wlrd. (It lS the pollce( 111
man by whom the vicar is greeted.) Es ist der Pfarrer, der von dem Polizisten gegrUBt wird. (It is the vicar who is greeted by the policeman.)
Whereas in sentences (8) and (11) subjectivization and clefting direct the attention of the hearer to one and the same concept, and we would therefore expect to observe a clear focus on this concept compared with the alternative concept, the attention of the hearer is directed to two different concepts in sentences (9) and (10). This should lead to a division of attention. From what we have already stated, namely that the subjecitivization effect is more marked in the passive than in the active, we can expect the effect of division of attention to be greater in passive agent cleft sentences like (10) than in active pati~nt cleft sent~nces like (9). Although the active patient cleft sentence also actlvates two fOC1, the focus of subjectivization should be weaker here, because an active sentence is involved. With regard to the inspection time of the pictures representing ~he two arg~ments, it follows that the inspection times for concepts in sentences wlth two fOC1. should be more similar than those for sentences with one focus. We tested thlS in experiments with the previously described setting. Subjects do, in ~act, spend almost the same inspection time on the two slides of the two concepts ln cleft. sentences with two foci of attention, whereas in the case of cleft sentences wlth one focus, the inspection time for the slide showing the focused concept is longer than that of the alternative concept (Engelkamp & Zimmer 1982). Let us now consider an experiment in which each sentence was followed by a picture showing, side by side, the agent and the patient mentioned in the sentence. Here we would expect more eye movements between the two figures when the sentence in question has two foci than when it has only one focus. In this experiment we recorded the frequencies of eye movements between the two figures of the agent and the patient after having heard sentences in the various types (8) to (11). Eye movements were more frequent between the two concept images when subjects heard a cleft sentence with two foci than when the sentence only contained one focus (Engelkamp &Zimmer 1982). We were further able to show in both kinds of experimental settings that the effects of two diverging foci in passive agent cleft sentences like (10) are more marked than in active patient cleft sentences like (9). This confirms the expectation that the subjectivization effect is weaker in active sentences than in passive ones. Noreover, the effect of subjectivization is, on the whole, weaker than the effect of clefting. The fact that the subjectivization effect occurs at all, also shows, however, that it is not completely reduceable to an effect of position, since in the sentences with two foci (9) and (10), the subject is not in sentence initial position, but must compete with the clefted concept which ~ in this position. We can summarize by saying that for both subjectivized and clefted concepts, the focusing effects on the listener are demonstrable; that the distribution of the two features onto two concepts has the effect of dividing the attention; that subjectivization has a weaker effect in active sentences than in passive ones; and finally, that clefting has a more marked effect than subjectivization. One aspect of these findings will be more closely analysed and discussed in the following pages, and that is: How should a sentence with two foci of attention be evaluated? To answer this question we will use findings concerning the production of such sentences. It would seem natural to assume that the speaker does not spontaneously tend to. construct sentences with two foci of attention, and that the listener does not tend to consider them adequate. Indeed, both of these hypotheses can be verified by experiment. In the production of the four cleft
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sentences (8) to (11), the passive agent cleft sentence is clearly the one most strenuously avoided, it hardly ever occurs (Engelkamp & Zimmer 1982). In a choice experiment relating cleft sentences to the description of a corresponding picture, it was chosen no more than 17 times out of 252 (6.7%). Whereas the passive patient cleft sentence with one focus was chosen 57 times (22.6%). It should be noted that the active patient cleft sentence with one strong and one weak focus was chosen 24 times (9.5%). The results of an acceptability rating were similar. Here, too, the passive agent cleft sentence was given the lowest value (Engelkamp & Zimmer 1982). Our interpretation of these results is that only sentences with one focus are normally used in communication. The passive agent cleft sentence is constructable, but is virtually never used. THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL FUNCTION OF SUBJECTIVIZATION Whereas some of the aforementioned authors such as Ertel (1974, 1977) or JohnsonLaird (1968) see it as the central function of subjectivization to concentrate the attention of the hearer on the subjectivized concept, others, such as Anisfeld & Klenbort (1973), regard the subject-predicate structure as a mechanism to indicate to the hearer which information in a sentence is to be regarded as given, and which as new. Klenbort &Anisfeld (1974, p.190) state: 'sentential information can be presented in such a way as to indicate which part of it is to be taken as given and presupposed, and which part of it is to be considered new and the focal point of the assertion ... The grammatical subject is important as the theme of the sentences and the grammatical object as the focus of the sentential assertion.' As with the focusing function, the presuppositional function is here either completely or largely limited to the passive. According to Klenbort &Anisfeld (1974, p.190), the above statement is only valid for passive sentences: 'The active is expected to have a relatively "flat" perspective, the assertional focus being distributed over the entire sentence, with no information designated as presupposed background' (cf . also Grieve & Wales 1973). Let us illustrate by means of an example from Anisfeld & Klenbort (1973), what such authors understand by given and new information: (12) The principal had been angered by one parent. They state: "The presupposition, then, is that the principal had.been angered by someone. In other words, this sentence presupposes as known or glven that the principal had been angered, and it provides the new information that it was the parent who was responsible for this" (p.124). Klenbort &Anisfeld (1974) attempted to corroborate this interpretation of the presuppositional structure, by means of the so-called negation test: T~ey assume that in a sentence, the general negation ''It is not true that ... " 1S 1nterpret~d by the speaker to relate to the "assertional focus rather than t~ the presuPPos1tion" (cf. Langendoen & Savin 1971). They were able to show exper1mentally that their subjects related the general negation of passive.sentences to t~e agents of the action significantly more often than to the pat1ent. No such d1fference was observed for active sentences. Grieve &Wales (1973) and Hupet &Bouedec (1975) report similar findings (cf. Engelkamp 1981). We may conclude that in passive sente~ces the ag~nt-p~edica~e r~la~ion~hi~ is negated, rather than the patient-pred1cate relat1onsh1p. Th1S f1nd1ng 1~ 1nterpreted by some authors as indicating that in.passive.sentences, the pat1ent~ predicate relationship is seen as the known 1nformat1on, and the agent-pred1cate relationship as the new information. THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL FUNCTION OF CLEFTING It is generally accepted (cf. e.g. Carpenter &Just 1977a, b; Clark 1977; Clark &
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Haviland 1977; Hornby 1972, 1974; Singer 1976) that clefting indicates a presuppositional structure, and that the clefted part of a cleft sentence contains the information seen as new, and the rest the given information. The negation test is seen as the most important support for this assumption. If one negates a cleft sentence, as in (13), then only the new information is negated; the truth value of the given or presupposed information remains unchanged. (13) Es ist nicht wahr, daB es der Polizist gewesen ist, der den Pfarrer gegrUBt hat. (It is not true that it was the policeman who greeted the vicar.) Even after negation it remains the case, in sentence (13), that someone greeted the vicar. All that is denied that this someone was the policeman. The agent-predicate relationship is marked as new by the clefting of the agent, and the patient-predicate relationship by the clefting of the patient. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL FUNCTION OF SUBJECTIVIZATION AND OF CLEFTING If one considers simultaneously the presuppositional structure signalled by passivization and clefting, it is clear that, in a passive patient cleft sentence like (11), the same information is marked as both given and new. According to the findings of Klenbort &Anisfeld (1974), among others, the passive structure suggests to the hearer that the speaker takes it as known that the vicar was greeted, and that the hearer should consider as new information the fact that the policeman was the person doing the greeting. On the basis of the cleft sentence structure of (11), however, the hearer is to consider as known information the fact that the policeman is greeting someone, and what is new here is that that someone is the vicar. How is this contradiction to be resolved? Let us consider the passive sentences again. Although subjects asked to negate one argument-predicate relationship in passive sentences presented in isolation, negate the agent-predicate relationship more often than the patient-predicate relationship, it should be stressed that this in only a dominant tendency. Isolated passive sentences are generally interpreted in this way, but they may also be interpreted differently, as shown, for example, in the negation test. Although the majority of subjects in a negation experiment with sentences like (12) do not understand the patient-predicate relationship to be negated (in sentence (12), that the principal had been angered), a minority do so - and it is possible to do so. It is perfectly admissible to form a passive sentence 1ike (14): (14) Nicht der Pfarrer wurde von dem Polizisten gegrUBt. (It was not the vicar who was greeted by the policeman.) From this, we draw the conclusion that passive sentences are ambiguous with regard to their presuppositional structure. They may be interpreted in different ways, according to what they signal as given or new. Passive sentences offered in isolation and out of context are usually interpreted by the hearer as though the patient-predicate relationship were known; this tendency can, however, be altered completely by the influence of additional factors. One such additional factor of influence is, in our opinion, the simultaneous existence of a cleft sentence structure. Cleft sentences, in contrast to passive sentences allow of only one given-new interpretation. A cleft sentence structure clearly indicates that the clefted information is to be interpreted as new, and the unclefted as given. Sentence (11) should, in our opinion, be interpreted by the hearer as though the known information is that the policeman is greeting someone, and the new information is that the person being greeted is the vicar. A negation such as that in sentence (15) should therefore be regarded as in-
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adequate, unless the negation is seen as an integral part of the presuppositional information, and not as a result of the global negation. (15) Es ist der Pfarrer, der nicht von dem Polizisten gegrUBt wird. (It is the vicar who is not being greeted by the policeman.) CONCLUDING REMARKS The theoretical arguments and empirical findings presented in this paper lead us to suppose that the subjecitivization of concepts in the context of cleft sentences has only a focusing function, whereas the presuppositional function is suspended. In cleft sentences, therefore, the clefted part should always contain the information marked as new, and the unclefted part should always contain the information marked as given, independend of the voice of the verb. The interpretation is supported by the fact that it does not make sense either to indicate twice which information is given, and which is new, or to indicate the same information as given and new simultaneously. Whereas it does make sense to focus more or less strong~on a concept of a propositional structure, it seems to us senseless to label an argument-predicate relationship as more or less known. The speaker either assumes that the hearer knows that the agent or the patient is involved in an action, or he assumes that the hearer does not know this. The ambiguity of the presuppositional structure of a passive sentence means that the passive structure of a sentence offered in isolation does not signal clearly enough which given-new interpretation should be preferred by the hearer. This does not mean that the hearer accepts more or less strongly a certain given-new interpretation. In normal communication, the given-new interpretation of passive sentences is probably made clear by additional signals. Hence, in the context of cleft sentences, only the focusing function of subjectivization is affective. This causes a stronger focus in the passive, and a weaker focus in the active. The result of interaction with c1efting in both passivepatient and active-agent sentences is that a marked focus of attention arises, because c1efting and subjectivization work together here. In active-patient cleft sentences and in passive-agent cleft sentences on the other hand there are two competing foci. Whereas, in the active-patient cleft sentence the focus of subjectivization is weak, that is, a strong primary focus and a weak secondary focus arise, in the passive-agent cleft sentences, two strong, competing foci are found. This latter type of sentence is evidently avoided by speakers, and is perceived by hearers as confusing. REFERENCES: [1] Anisfe1d, M. and Klenbort, J., On the functions of structural paraphrase: The view from passive voice, Psychol .. Bull. 79 (1973) 117-126. [2] Carpenter, P.A. and Just, M.A., Reading comprehension as eyes see it, in: Just, M.A. and Carpenter, P.A. (eds.), Cognitive processes in comprehension (Erlbaum, Hillsdale, N.J., 1977a). [3] Carpenter, P.A. and Just, M.A., Integrative processes in comprehension, in: LaBerge, D. and Samuels, S.J. (eds.), Basic processes in reading: Perception and comprehension (Er1baum, Hillsdale, N.J., 1977b). [4] C1ark,H.H.,Inferences in comprehension, in: Laberge, D. and Samuels, S.J. (eds.), Basic processes in reading (Er1baum, Hillsdale, N.J., 1977). [5] Clark, H.H. and Clark, E.V., Psychology and language (Harcourt Brace, New York, 1977). [6] Clark, H.H. and Haviland, S.E., Comprehension and the given-new contract, in: Freedle, R.O. (ed.), Discourse production and comprehension, Vo1.1 (Ablex,
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Norwood, N.J., 1977). [7] Engelkamp, J., Satz und Bedeutung (Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1976). [8] Engelkamp, J., Bild und Satz, in: Eckensberger, L. (ed.), Bericht Uber den 31. KongreB der Deutschen Gesellschaft fUr Psychologie in Mannheim 1978, 1979). Bd.l (Hogrefe, G~ttingen, [9] Engelkamp, J., Given and new information. Theoretical positions and empirical evidence, in: Flores d'Arcais, G.B. and Jarvella, R. (eds.), The process of language understanding (Wiley, in press, London, 1981). [10] Engelkamp, J. and Krumnacker, H., The effect of cleft sentence structures on attention, Psychol. Res. 40 (1978) 27-36. [11] Engelkamp, J. and Zimmer, H.D., The interaction of subjectivization and concept placement in the processing of cleft sentences, Quart. J. expo Psychol. 34A (1982) in press. [12] Ertel, S., Where do the subjects of sentences come from? in: Rosenberg, S. (ed.), Sentence production. Developments in research and theory (Erlbaum, Hillsdale, N.J., 1977). [13] Ertel, S.,Satzsubjekt und Ich-Perspektive, in: Eckensberger, L. (ed.), Bericht Uber den 28. KongreB der Deutschen Gesellschaft fUr Psychologie in SaarbrUcken 1972. Bd.1 (Hogrefe, G~ttingen, 1974). [14] Flores d'Arcais, G.B., Some perceptual determinants of sentence construction, unver~ffentlichtes Manuskript, Psychologisches Institut der Universitat Leiden (Leiden, 1973). [15] Grieve, R. and Wales, R., Passives and topical ization, Brit. J. Psycho l , 64 (1973) 173-182. [16] Hornby, P., The psychological subject and predicate, Cogn. Psychol. 3 (1972) 632-642. [17] Hornby, P., Surface structure and presupposition, J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 13 (1974) 530-538. [18] Hupet, M. and Le Bouedec, B., Definiteness and voice in the interpretation of active and passive sentences, Quart. J. exp.. Psychol. 27 (1975) 323-330. [19] Johnson-Laird, P.H., The interpretation of the passive voice, Quart. J. expo Psychol. 20 (1968) 69-73. [20] Johnson-Laird, P.N., Reasoning with ambiguous sentences, Brit. J. Psychol. 60 (1969) 17-23. [21] Kintsch, W., The representation of meaning in memory (Erlbaum, Hillsdale, N.J., 1974). [22] Klenbort, J. and Anisfeld, M., Markedness and perspective in the interpretation of active and passive voice, Quart. J. expo Psychol. 27 (1974) 189-195. [23] Langendoen, D.T. and Savin, H.B., The projection problem for presuppositions, in: Fillmore, C.J. and Langendoen, D.T. (eds.), Studies in linguistic semantics (Holt, Rinehart &Winston, New York, 1971). [24] Lanford, J. and Holmes, V.M., Syntactic presupposition in sentence comprehension, Cognition 7 (1979) 363-383).
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[25] Olson, D.R. and Filby, N., On the comprehension of active and passive sentences, Cogn. Psychol. 3 (1972) 361-381. [26] Singer, M., Thematic structure and the integration of linguistic information, J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 15 (1976) 549-558 [27] Tannenbaum, P.H. and Williams, F., Generation of active and passive sentences as a function of subject or subject focus, J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 7 (1968) 246-250. [28] Turner, E.A. and Rommetveit, R., Focus of attention in recall of active and passive sentences, J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 7 (1968) 543-548. [29] Zimmer, H.D. and Engelkamp, J., The given-new structure of cleft sentences and their influence on picture viewing, Psych. Res. 43 (1981) 375-389.
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FOCUSING AND PRESUPPOSITION IN THE UNDERSTANDING OF SENTENCES Johannes Engelkamp, Hubert D.Zimmer and Pierre Leclere Fachrichtung Psychologie Universitat des Saarlandes 6600 SaarbrUcken, West-Germany
Until now, the function of grammatical subjectivization and the clefting of concepts have only been discussed and examined separately. This is probably due to the fact that subjectivization has principally been seen from the point of view of focusing of attention, whereas the study of cleft sentences has centred on the presuppositional structure of the clauses, together with the processing of given information. In this paper, however, subjectivization and clefting will be examined from the point of view both of focusing and of presupposition. The interaction of subjectivization and clefting with regard to both functions will thus be given special attention. We conclude that subjectivization in the context of cleft sentences has only a focusing function, and not a presuppositional one. With regard to focusing, subjectivization and clefting serve mainly to reinforce each other. INTRODUCTION This contribution is concerned with the question of what role subjectivization and clefting of a concept play in the understanding of sentences. Basically, we start from the assumption that in the understanding of sentences, it is propositional knowledge which is activated (Clark & Clark 1977, Engelkamp 1976, Kintsch 1974). We further assume that, among other things, the structure of the sentence determines which knowledge is activated, and how it is activated; in other words, what structure the activated knowledge has. In our opinion, the stylistic features of a sentence playa part in determining the method of activating knowledge, and the structure of the knowledge activated. Two such features, and their role in the understanding of sentences will be analysed more closely; the role of subjectivization, and that of clefting of concepts. By a subjectivized concept, we mean the nominal concept which functions as the grammatical subject in a sentence. By a clefted concept, we understand the nominal concept which is fronted in the form uEs ist Xu (It is X) in a sentence like (1): (1) It is Peter who praised Charles. Until now, the function of subjectivization and clefting of concepts have only been examined and discussed separately (e.g. Carpenter & Just 1977a, b; Clark 1977; Clark & Haviland 1977; Langford & Holmes 1980; Singer 1976). Apart from Engelkamp (1979) and Engelkamp & Krumnacker (1978), a possible interaction between these two variables has not been considered. Here it is placed in the foreground. The aim of this paper is to contribute towards interpreting the function of these two sentence features, by studying them together. We will concentrate on their role in the understanding of sentences, paying only marginal attention to the conditions which contribute to their production (c.f. Engelkamp & Zimmer 1982, on production).
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We will analyse the following two functions successively for both features; the function of directing attention or focusing, and the function of marking a certain piece of information in the sentence as given or new; that is, the function of presupposition. We assume that the two features can be used in either function, which does not preclude that these features can have other functions, or that they have our particular functions in every case. THE FOCUSING FUNCTION OF SUBJECTIVIZATION According to a hypothesis about the function of subjectivization for the hearer, the subject of a sentence attracts the attention of the hearer; in other words, he centres the proposition which is communicated and activated by the sentence around the subject-concept. According to Ertel (1974, 1977), concepts which are in the centre of attention are more accentuated, more contoured, and more likely to be conceptualized as figures than concepts which are not. Thus, if the grammatical subject attracts the attention of the hearer, then the subjectivized concept should be perceived as more accentuated and more "definite" than the object-concept. Johnson-Laird (1969) has already established that subject-concepts are more "definite" than object-concepts. According to Johnson-Laird, the meaning of the quantifier "some" depends on the syntactic position of the quantified concept: "Some" in the subject nominal group will be interpreted as "more definite" than "some" in the object nominal group. (2) Some boys love all girls. (3) All girls love some boys. Sentence (2) is understood by most hearers to mean that there is a definite set of boys, of whom each loves all girls. The meaning of "some boys" in (3) is, on the other hand, differently interpreted. The interpretation which suggests itself for sentence (3) is that each of the girls loves a certain sub-set of boys from the set of all boys, and that this sub-set is different for each girl. If sentence (3) is passivized, the interpretation becomes analogous to that of (2). Now there is a certain set of boys who are loved by all girls. Ertel (1974) adds further to this observation by Johnson-Laird (1969). He shows that, other conditions being equal, a "definite" noun is more easily understood than an "indefinite" noun.
(4) Irgendeine Frau wird Hans schon zum Tanz auffordern. (Some woman will ask (5)
Hans to dance. /Hans will ask some woman to dance.) Hans wird schon irgendeine Frau zum Tanz auffordern. (Hans will ask some woman to dance.)
Whereas in sentence (4), both "irgendeine Frau" and "Hans" may be perceived as either subject or object, sentence (5) really only allows the possible interpretation of "Hans" as the subject. Johnson-Laird (1968) also demonstrated that the accentuation of the subject-concept is to be found with the cognition of non-verbal reference. Using the hypothesis that subjectivization serves to accentuate the concept in question, Johnson-Laird presented his subjects with sentences of the following type: (6) Blue follows (or precedes) Red. (7) Red is followed (or preceded) by Blue. It was the task of the subjects to assign coloured squares to these sentences; in other words, to express them by means of coloured squares.
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The results show that the grammatical subjects "Blue" in sentence (6) and "Red" in sentence (7) were assigned larger squares than the grammatical object. The differences between the red and blue squares were bigger with passive sentences than with active ones. To summarize: Both the findings of Johnson-Laird (1968. 1969) and Ertel (1974. 1977), as well as those of other authors (e.g. Flores d'Arcais, 1973; Olson & Filby 1972; Tannenbaum & William, 1968; Turner & Rommetveit. 1968) tend to show that the subjectivization of a concept draws the listener's attention to this concept, and that this is more marked for passive sentences than for active ones. In this connection, Johnson-Laird writes (1968), that "the passive implies that the logical object is more important than the logical subject, whereas the active implies that there is a minimal difference in the importance of these two entities, or that the logical subject slightly predominates" (p.7). THE FOCUSING FUNCTION OF CLEFTING If one accepts that the subject is usually found in ini'tia1 position in a sentence, then the focusing effect of subjectivization may also partially be a result of position. Hence, the subjectivized patient-concept is moved into initial position in German passive sentences. Therefore it would not be surprizing that in a cleft sentence such as (1). in which the clefted concept is moved to initial position and is further emphasized by the formula "It is an X", that this c1efted concept should attract the particular attention of the listener, that is, that it should become the focus of the listener's attention. We attempted to verify this hypothesis in various experiments (Zimmer & Enge1kamp 1981). The basic idea of our experiments was to use the c1efting of a concept to make it the centre of the knowledge activated by the whole sentence; to demonstrate that the knowledge corresponding to the clefted concept is foca1ised we chose a setting which allowed to show that a picture of this concept offered directly after the sentence, is scrutinised more closely, and at greater length, than a picture of an unc1efted concept. Corresponding to the larger surface area accorded to the subject-concept in the experiment of Johnson-Laird (1968), our clefted concept should be accorded a longer inspection time. To test this hypothesis, we offered our subjects German cleft sentences which had been prepared by an adequate context. and immediately afterwards we gave them the possibility of projecting alternative visual images (on slides) of the two nominal concepts. The time the volunteers spent looking at the two concepts during the first showing was measured in micro-seconds. A result of this series of experiments was that inspection time was longer for the images of a clefted concept than for an unc1efted concept. In summarizing, we can state that clefted concepts, too, atract the attention of the hearer. THE INTERACTION OF FOCUSING THROUGH SUBJECTIVIZATION AND CLEFTING The fact that both the subjectivization and the c1efting of a concept can attract the attention of the hearer, raises the interesting question of what happens if subjectivization and c1efting focus the attention on two different concepts, in other words, if a sentence induces two foci of attention. To answer this question, let us analyse the following four sentences in detail: (8) Es ist der Po1izist, der den Pfarrer grUBt. (It is the policeman who greets the vicar. (9) Es ist der Pfarrer, den der Po1izist grUBt. (It is the vicar whom the
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policeman greets.)
.....
(10) Es ist der Polizist, von dem der Pfarrer gegruBt wlrd. (It lS the pollce( 111
man by whom the vicar is greeted.) Es ist der Pfarrer, der von dem Polizisten gegrUBt wird. (It is the vicar who is greeted by the policeman.)
Whereas in sentences (8) and (11) subjectivization and clefting direct the attention of the hearer to one and the same concept, and we would therefore expect to observe a clear focus on this concept compared with the alternative concept, the attention of the hearer is directed to two different concepts in sentences (9) and (10). This should lead to a division of attention. From what we have already stated, namely that the subjecitivization effect is more marked in the passive than in the active, we can expect the effect of division of attention to be greater in passive agent cleft sentences like (10) than in active pati~nt cleft sent~nces like (9). Although the active patient cleft sentence also actlvates two fOC1, the focus of subjectivization should be weaker here, because an active sentence is involved. With regard to the inspection time of the pictures representing ~he two arg~ments, it follows that the inspection times for concepts in sentences wlth two fOC1. should be more similar than those for sentences with one focus. We tested thlS in experiments with the previously described setting. Subjects do, in ~act, spend almost the same inspection time on the two slides of the two concepts ln cleft. sentences with two foci of attention, whereas in the case of cleft sentences wlth one focus, the inspection time for the slide showing the focused concept is longer than that of the alternative concept (Engelkamp & Zimmer 1982). Let us now consider an experiment in which each sentence was followed by a picture showing, side by side, the agent and the patient mentioned in the sentence. Here we would expect more eye movements between the two figures when the sentence in question has two foci than when it has only one focus. In this experiment we recorded the frequencies of eye movements between the two figures of the agent and the patient after having heard sentences in the various types (8) to (11). Eye movements were more frequent between the two concept images when subjects heard a cleft sentence with two foci than when the sentence only contained one focus (Engelkamp &Zimmer 1982). We were further able to show in both kinds of experimental settings that the effects of two diverging foci in passive agent cleft sentences like (10) are more marked than in active patient cleft sentences like (9). This confirms the expectation that the subjectivization effect is weaker in active sentences than in passive ones. Noreover, the effect of subjectivization is, on the whole, weaker than the effect of clefting. The fact that the subjectivization effect occurs at all, also shows, however, that it is not completely reduceable to an effect of position, since in the sentences with two foci (9) and (10), the subject is not in sentence initial position, but must compete with the clefted concept which ~ in this position. We can summarize by saying that for both subjectivized and clefted concepts, the focusing effects on the listener are demonstrable; that the distribution of the two features onto two concepts has the effect of dividing the attention; that subjectivization has a weaker effect in active sentences than in passive ones; and finally, that clefting has a more marked effect than subjectivization. One aspect of these findings will be more closely analysed and discussed in the following pages, and that is: How should a sentence with two foci of attention be evaluated? To answer this question we will use findings concerning the production of such sentences. It would seem natural to assume that the speaker does not spontaneously tend to. construct sentences with two foci of attention, and that the listener does not tend to consider them adequate. Indeed, both of these hypotheses can be verified by experiment. In the production of the four cleft
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sentences (8) to (11), the passive agent cleft sentence is clearly the one most strenuously avoided, it hardly ever occurs (Engelkamp & Zimmer 1982). In a choice experiment relating cleft sentences to the description of a corresponding picture, it was chosen no more than 17 times out of 252 (6.7%). Whereas the passive patient cleft sentence with one focus was chosen 57 times (22.6%). It should be noted that the active patient cleft sentence with one strong and one weak focus was chosen 24 times (9.5%). The results of an acceptability rating were similar. Here, too, the passive agent cleft sentence was given the lowest value (Engelkamp & Zimmer 1982). Our interpretation of these results is that only sentences with one focus are normally used in communication. The passive agent cleft sentence is constructable, but is virtually never used. THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL FUNCTION OF SUBJECTIVIZATION Whereas some of the aforementioned authors such as Ertel (1974, 1977) or JohnsonLaird (1968) see it as the central function of subjectivization to concentrate the attention of the hearer on the subjectivized concept, others, such as Anisfeld & Klenbort (1973), regard the subject-predicate structure as a mechanism to indicate to the hearer which information in a sentence is to be regarded as given, and which as new. Klenbort &Anisfeld (1974, p.190) state: 'sentential information can be presented in such a way as to indicate which part of it is to be taken as given and presupposed, and which part of it is to be considered new and the focal point of the assertion ... The grammatical subject is important as the theme of the sentences and the grammatical object as the focus of the sentential assertion.' As with the focusing function, the presuppositional function is here either completely or largely limited to the passive. According to Klenbort &Anisfeld (1974, p.190), the above statement is only valid for passive sentences: 'The active is expected to have a relatively "flat" perspective, the assertional focus being distributed over the entire sentence, with no information designated as presupposed background' (cf . also Grieve & Wales 1973). Let us illustrate by means of an example from Anisfeld & Klenbort (1973), what such authors understand by given and new information: (12) The principal had been angered by one parent. They state: "The presupposition, then, is that the principal had.been angered by someone. In other words, this sentence presupposes as known or glven that the principal had been angered, and it provides the new information that it was the parent who was responsible for this" (p.124). Klenbort &Anisfeld (1974) attempted to corroborate this interpretation of the presuppositional structure, by means of the so-called negation test: T~ey assume that in a sentence, the general negation ''It is not true that ... " 1S 1nterpret~d by the speaker to relate to the "assertional focus rather than t~ the presuPPos1tion" (cf. Langendoen & Savin 1971). They were able to show exper1mentally that their subjects related the general negation of passive.sentences to t~e agents of the action significantly more often than to the pat1ent. No such d1fference was observed for active sentences. Grieve &Wales (1973) and Hupet &Bouedec (1975) report similar findings (cf. Engelkamp 1981). We may conclude that in passive sente~ces the ag~nt-p~edica~e r~la~ion~hi~ is negated, rather than the patient-pred1cate relat1onsh1p. Th1S f1nd1ng 1~ 1nterpreted by some authors as indicating that in.passive.sentences, the pat1ent~ predicate relationship is seen as the known 1nformat1on, and the agent-pred1cate relationship as the new information. THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL FUNCTION OF CLEFTING It is generally accepted (cf. e.g. Carpenter &Just 1977a, b; Clark 1977; Clark &
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Haviland 1977; Hornby 1972, 1974; Singer 1976) that clefting indicates a presuppositional structure, and that the clefted part of a cleft sentence contains the information seen as new, and the rest the given information. The negation test is seen as the most important support for this assumption. If one negates a cleft sentence, as in (13), then only the new information is negated; the truth value of the given or presupposed information remains unchanged. (13) Es ist nicht wahr, daB es der Polizist gewesen ist, der den Pfarrer gegrUBt hat. (It is not true that it was the policeman who greeted the vicar.) Even after negation it remains the case, in sentence (13), that someone greeted the vicar. All that is denied that this someone was the policeman. The agent-predicate relationship is marked as new by the clefting of the agent, and the patient-predicate relationship by the clefting of the patient. INTERACTION BETWEEN THE PRESUPPOSITIONAL FUNCTION OF SUBJECTIVIZATION AND OF CLEFTING If one considers simultaneously the presuppositional structure signalled by passivization and clefting, it is clear that, in a passive patient cleft sentence like (11), the same information is marked as both given and new. According to the findings of Klenbort &Anisfeld (1974), among others, the passive structure suggests to the hearer that the speaker takes it as known that the vicar was greeted, and that the hearer should consider as new information the fact that the policeman was the person doing the greeting. On the basis of the cleft sentence structure of (11), however, the hearer is to consider as known information the fact that the policeman is greeting someone, and what is new here is that that someone is the vicar. How is this contradiction to be resolved? Let us consider the passive sentences again. Although subjects asked to negate one argument-predicate relationship in passive sentences presented in isolation, negate the agent-predicate relationship more often than the patient-predicate relationship, it should be stressed that this in only a dominant tendency. Isolated passive sentences are generally interpreted in this way, but they may also be interpreted differently, as shown, for example, in the negation test. Although the majority of subjects in a negation experiment with sentences like (12) do not understand the patient-predicate relationship to be negated (in sentence (12), that the principal had been angered), a minority do so - and it is possible to do so. It is perfectly admissible to form a passive sentence 1ike (14): (14) Nicht der Pfarrer wurde von dem Polizisten gegrUBt. (It was not the vicar who was greeted by the policeman.) From this, we draw the conclusion that passive sentences are ambiguous with regard to their presuppositional structure. They may be interpreted in different ways, according to what they signal as given or new. Passive sentences offered in isolation and out of context are usually interpreted by the hearer as though the patient-predicate relationship were known; this tendency can, however, be altered completely by the influence of additional factors. One such additional factor of influence is, in our opinion, the simultaneous existence of a cleft sentence structure. Cleft sentences, in contrast to passive sentences allow of only one given-new interpretation. A cleft sentence structure clearly indicates that the clefted information is to be interpreted as new, and the unclefted as given. Sentence (11) should, in our opinion, be interpreted by the hearer as though the known information is that the policeman is greeting someone, and the new information is that the person being greeted is the vicar. A negation such as that in sentence (15) should therefore be regarded as in-
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adequate, unless the negation is seen as an integral part of the presuppositional information, and not as a result of the global negation. (15) Es ist der Pfarrer, der nicht von dem Polizisten gegrUBt wird. (It is the vicar who is not being greeted by the policeman.) CONCLUDING REMARKS The theoretical arguments and empirical findings presented in this paper lead us to suppose that the subjecitivization of concepts in the context of cleft sentences has only a focusing function, whereas the presuppositional function is suspended. In cleft sentences, therefore, the clefted part should always contain the information marked as new, and the unclefted part should always contain the information marked as given, independend of the voice of the verb. The interpretation is supported by the fact that it does not make sense either to indicate twice which information is given, and which is new, or to indicate the same information as given and new simultaneously. Whereas it does make sense to focus more or less strong~on a concept of a propositional structure, it seems to us senseless to label an argument-predicate relationship as more or less known. The speaker either assumes that the hearer knows that the agent or the patient is involved in an action, or he assumes that the hearer does not know this. The ambiguity of the presuppositional structure of a passive sentence means that the passive structure of a sentence offered in isolation does not signal clearly enough which given-new interpretation should be preferred by the hearer. This does not mean that the hearer accepts more or less strongly a certain given-new interpretation. In normal communication, the given-new interpretation of passive sentences is probably made clear by additional signals. Hence, in the context of cleft sentences, only the focusing function of subjectivization is affective. This causes a stronger focus in the passive, and a weaker focus in the active. The result of interaction with c1efting in both passivepatient and active-agent sentences is that a marked focus of attention arises, because c1efting and subjectivization work together here. In active-patient cleft sentences and in passive-agent cleft sentences on the other hand there are two competing foci. Whereas, in the active-patient cleft sentence the focus of subjectivization is weak, that is, a strong primary focus and a weak secondary focus arise, in the passive-agent cleft sentences, two strong, competing foci are found. This latter type of sentence is evidently avoided by speakers, and is perceived by hearers as confusing. REFERENCES: [1] Anisfe1d, M. and Klenbort, J., On the functions of structural paraphrase: The view from passive voice, Psychol .. Bull. 79 (1973) 117-126. [2] Carpenter, P.A. and Just, M.A., Reading comprehension as eyes see it, in: Just, M.A. and Carpenter, P.A. (eds.), Cognitive processes in comprehension (Erlbaum, Hillsdale, N.J., 1977a). [3] Carpenter, P.A. and Just, M.A., Integrative processes in comprehension, in: LaBerge, D. and Samuels, S.J. (eds.), Basic processes in reading: Perception and comprehension (Er1baum, Hillsdale, N.J., 1977b). [4] C1ark,H.H.,Inferences in comprehension, in: Laberge, D. and Samuels, S.J. (eds.), Basic processes in reading (Er1baum, Hillsdale, N.J., 1977). [5] Clark, H.H. and Clark, E.V., Psychology and language (Harcourt Brace, New York, 1977). [6] Clark, H.H. and Haviland, S.E., Comprehension and the given-new contract, in: Freedle, R.O. (ed.), Discourse production and comprehension, Vo1.1 (Ablex,
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Norwood, N.J., 1977). [7] Engelkamp, J., Satz und Bedeutung (Kohlhammer, Stuttgart, 1976). [8] Engelkamp, J., Bild und Satz, in: Eckensberger, L. (ed.), Bericht Uber den 31. KongreB der Deutschen Gesellschaft fUr Psychologie in Mannheim 1978, 1979). Bd.l (Hogrefe, G~ttingen, [9] Engelkamp, J., Given and new information. Theoretical positions and empirical evidence, in: Flores d'Arcais, G.B. and Jarvella, R. (eds.), The process of language understanding (Wiley, in press, London, 1981). [10] Engelkamp, J. and Krumnacker, H., The effect of cleft sentence structures on attention, Psychol. Res. 40 (1978) 27-36. [11] Engelkamp, J. and Zimmer, H.D., The interaction of subjectivization and concept placement in the processing of cleft sentences, Quart. J. expo Psychol. 34A (1982) in press. [12] Ertel, S., Where do the subjects of sentences come from? in: Rosenberg, S. (ed.), Sentence production. Developments in research and theory (Erlbaum, Hillsdale, N.J., 1977). [13] Ertel, S.,Satzsubjekt und Ich-Perspektive, in: Eckensberger, L. (ed.), Bericht Uber den 28. KongreB der Deutschen Gesellschaft fUr Psychologie in SaarbrUcken 1972. Bd.1 (Hogrefe, G~ttingen, 1974). [14] Flores d'Arcais, G.B., Some perceptual determinants of sentence construction, unver~ffentlichtes Manuskript, Psychologisches Institut der Universitat Leiden (Leiden, 1973). [15] Grieve, R. and Wales, R., Passives and topical ization, Brit. J. Psycho l , 64 (1973) 173-182. [16] Hornby, P., The psychological subject and predicate, Cogn. Psychol. 3 (1972) 632-642. [17] Hornby, P., Surface structure and presupposition, J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 13 (1974) 530-538. [18] Hupet, M. and Le Bouedec, B., Definiteness and voice in the interpretation of active and passive sentences, Quart. J. exp.. Psychol. 27 (1975) 323-330. [19] Johnson-Laird, P.H., The interpretation of the passive voice, Quart. J. expo Psychol. 20 (1968) 69-73. [20] Johnson-Laird, P.N., Reasoning with ambiguous sentences, Brit. J. Psychol. 60 (1969) 17-23. [21] Kintsch, W., The representation of meaning in memory (Erlbaum, Hillsdale, N.J., 1974). [22] Klenbort, J. and Anisfeld, M., Markedness and perspective in the interpretation of active and passive voice, Quart. J. expo Psychol. 27 (1974) 189-195. [23] Langendoen, D.T. and Savin, H.B., The projection problem for presuppositions, in: Fillmore, C.J. and Langendoen, D.T. (eds.), Studies in linguistic semantics (Holt, Rinehart &Winston, New York, 1971). [24] Lanford, J. and Holmes, V.M., Syntactic presupposition in sentence comprehension, Cognition 7 (1979) 363-383).
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[25] Olson, D.R. and Filby, N., On the comprehension of active and passive sentences, Cogn. Psychol. 3 (1972) 361-381. [26] Singer, M., Thematic structure and the integration of linguistic information, J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 15 (1976) 549-558 [27] Tannenbaum, P.H. and Williams, F., Generation of active and passive sentences as a function of subject or subject focus, J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 7 (1968) 246-250. [28] Turner, E.A. and Rommetveit, R., Focus of attention in recall of active and passive sentences, J. Verb. Learn. Verb. Behav. 7 (1968) 543-548. [29] Zimmer, H.D. and Engelkamp, J., The given-new structure of cleft sentences and their influence on picture viewing, Psych. Res. 43 (1981) 375-389.