Food safety governance in China: Change and continuity

Food Control 106 (2019) 106752

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Review

Food safety governance in China: Change and continuity

T

Yi Kang Department of Government and International Studies, Hong Kong Baptist University, Hong Kong

A R T I C LE I N FO

A B S T R A C T

Keywords: Food safety governance in China Legislation and regulation Industry compliance Civil society

This review article brings together English-language studies from a wide array of social science disciplines using diverse methodological approaches to provide a roadmap of the developments in real practices, theoretical concerns, and research agendas in four major realms of food safety governance in China: legislation, institutional constellations, consumer responses, and industry incentives.

Food safety problems pose tremendous threats to public health in China. There have been outbreaks of large food scandals, such as the melamine-tainted milk powder problem that incited widespread fear and fury and the domestic and foreign media reports on numerous food safety incidents in China, including food contamination by heavy metals, food poisoning from additives and preservatives, and fake foods. While food safety problems are a global focal point of government regulation and scholarly research, the damage they do to social and political trust in China is incomparably worse than it is anywhere else. What has been done to improve food safety in China in the past several decades? This review article seeks to answer this question by examining the change over time in the three “poles” of the food system: the state's legislation and institutional constellations, consumer responses, and industry incentives. While safe food mainly relies on production/processing processes, food safety governance composed of state regulatory control and societal efforts to improve food safety has continuously (re) shaped food producers/processors' motivations and actions. The 2015 Food Safety (2015 FSL) defines the scope of food safety governance in China, encompassing production and processing, sales and catering services, the production of and trade in additives and foodrelated materials, the use of additives and food-related products by food producers and traders, the storage and transport of food, safety management, additives, and food-related products (Article 2). This multidimensional scope entails broad and diverse food safety research concerning the food itself, the environment, food-related hazards, public health, education, consumer behaviour, industrial management, regulatory systems, etc. In this article, English-language studies from across the social sciences (sociology, anthropology, economics, political science, law) using diverse methodological approaches (case study, ethnography, survey, content analysis, archival research) are brought together to provide a roadmap of developments in real practice, theoretical concerns, and research agenda in food safety governance in

China. These studies largely complement each other in addressing different problems and adopting different angles. By combining them, we can see that food safety governance in China is characterized by a paradox of inadequate state regulatory capacity and exclusive state domination. The government has a strong political will and faces a great deal of pressure to shoulder sole responsibility for food quality, despite its difficulty in regulating on a dauntingly substantial scale. Citizen-customers who have strong motivations to fight food-related risks remain excluded and suppressed by the state to maintain social stability (weiwen 維穩). Under circumstances in which regulatory enforcement remains lax and clumsy and customers do not have adequate information and channels through which to identify and punish dishonest food producers/processors, the various state and social efforts to improve food safety have not yet translated into adequate incentives for food producers/processors to enhance the quality of their products. A caveat should be noted: two rich bodies of literature, one on the distinct production relations and consumption patterns in different food sectors and the other on cross-country comparisons of food safety governance, are not systematically reviewed here due to space constraints. Particular attention is paid to agricultural production, which is located upstream in the food supply chain. Cross-policy domains and cross-national comparative research are cited to explain how food safety practices are shaped by the Chinese context and informed by foreign experiences. 1. Progress in legislation Since food is an “essential” item of daily life, states have long assumed major responsibility for guaranteeing food safety through regulatory systems. However, the complexity and scale of contemporary food provision, the geographic dispersal of food-related public health threats, and the intricate intersections of food safety and a broad array

E-mail address: [email protected]. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.foodcont.2019.106752 Received 21 February 2019; Received in revised form 14 May 2019; Accepted 4 July 2019 Available online 09 July 2019 0956-7135/ © 2019 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

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Roberts & Lin, 2016; Wang, 2018]; the law is widely considered “the most comprehensive and severe piece of legislation on food safety thus far” [Geng, Liu, & Beachy, 2015]. Scholars regard the risk-based processes highlighted in the 2015 FSL, which are largely modelled on the EU's risk analysis system [Chen, Wang, & Song, 2015], as a significant step forward for food safety regulation in China on several fronts: quality risk analysis facilitates the synchronization of regional and international food safety standards [Geng et al., 2015], the science-based process is “a departure from some of the more rigid administrative decision-making and enforcement processes in China that focus on a one-size-fits-all solution” [Balzano, 2012]; the shift of focus from ex post inspection to ex ante precaution indicates greater flexibility and realism in law and governance [Balzano, 2012; Lu, 2016], and the requirement of social co-governance through comprehensive risk assessment and communication leads to the transformation of governance logic [Wang, 2018]. However, observers also note the continuing lack of concrete procedures for implementing many risk-management and risk-communication tasks [Roberts & Lin, 2016; Wang, 2018; Ma & Liu, 2017]. A describes the current institutional arrangements in China as more “rule-based” than “risk-based”: indicators are poorly associated with the likelihood of risk, the consideration of track records is misleading, and more attention is paid to documented or formal control arrangements than the substantive dimension of internal food safety control. A warns that the “rule-based” legislative style may fail to meet regulators' expectations of risk assessment and suggests that China can learn from UK practices [An, 2018].

of policy agendas render regulatory oversight extremely difficult. The challenge is more significant in China given the country's enormous geographic and bureaucratic size and the extensive local diversity of food production. Some observers attribute the food safety crisis in China to a lack of political will to address the issue in the central government [Hsueh, 2011], noting that it passes responsibility for policy implementation to local governments [Fewsmith & Gao, 2014]. However, this approach is less successful with regard to food safety. Studies of public opinion show that the state is held accountable for food safety scandals [Tam & Yang, 2005; Wu, Yang, & Chen, 2017]. The central government also faces tremendous pressure to enhance the quality and reputation of Chinese products globally [Yasuda, 2015]. The top leadership is actually well aware of the political significance of food safety for social stability and state authority. In a speech at the Central Rural Work Conference in December 2013, Xi emphasized that “food safety had become a major test of the Chinese Communist Party's governing ability,” and the failure to ensure it “would allow critics to raise the question of the Party's right to rule.” The central government's strong political will to improve food safety does not lead to effective regulatory performance however. Severe food safety scandals continue. Scholars have identified several causes of China's regulatory failure. Above all, there are daunting structural problems: the sheer geographic scale and the immense number and diversity of food producers and processors – most of which are small in scale – makes monitoring through China's unitary regulatory structure extremely difficult and costly [Fewsmith & Gao, 2014; Yasuda, 2015; Wu & Chen, 2013; Chung & Wong, 2013; Jiang & Zhu, 2016; Roberts & Lin, 2016; Zhou, Li, & Liang, 2015]. Yasuda has extensively discussed the regulatory challenges of the “politics of scale” [Yasuda, 2017]. The issue is exacerbated by the legal and institutional inadequacies of food safety governance in response to daunting structural problems [Jiang & Zhu, 2016; Balzano, 2012]. For example, several observers point out that food governance in China has long had a campaign style, which interrupts routine monitoring and surveillance work, fuels regulatory tensions, and simply moves problems from one location to another [Yasuda, 2015; Wu & Chen, 2013; Castellucci, 2010]. Yasuda argues that macro-governing frameworks have important consequences for regulatory performance and thus prescribes a “wholescale systems design,” which he himself admits is difficult to attain [Yasuda, 2017]. Fortunately, food safety governance in China after the 2008 melamine in milk incident has been moving in this direction with long-term rational institution building gradually replacing ad hoc remedies, as shown by the literature on the legislative changes to China's food safety regulatory framework. Building upon the Food Hygiene Law (FHL) of 1983, the 2009 Food Safety Law (2009 FSL) redefined the aspirational scope of food safety regulation by using the word “safety” [Roberts & Lin, 2016] and highlighting the comprehensive management of the food system (from “farm to fork”), creating mechanisms to centralize management, introducing more technically rigorous processes and encouraging the incorporation of scientific expertise into bureaucratic regulatory tools, and more specifically defining government and industry roles [Balzano, 2012]. While the 2009 FSL lacked a criminal dimension, the Criminal Code was amended in 2010 to include punishment for producing toxic food [Balzano, 2012], and the Supreme People's Court's judicial interpretation in 2013 provided new guidelines for handling criminal cases involving food safety incidents [Snyder, 2015]. In 2012, the State Council reviewed the progress in food safety regulation and released the 12th Five-Year Plan for National Food Safety Regulation, which “recommended further amendments to the 2009 FSL” [Roberts & Lin, 2016], leading to the 2015 FSL. The 2015 FSL encompassed the whole process of food safety supervision, tightened standards and sanctions for violations, further streamlined management and consolidated coordination mechanisms, emphasized comprehensive risk assessments, and established food traceability and recall systems [Snyder, 2015;

2. Adjustment of institutional constellations The Chinese leadership has demonstrated its strong will to improve food safety by enacting more regulations and establishing more regulatory agencies over time. In 2012, there were “already 1070 national food standards and 1164 industry-specific standards in China” [Chung & Wong, 2013], and there were over 3,000 food laws, regulations, and standards in 2015 [Fewsmith & Gao, 2014]. This complexity weakens rather than strengthens regulatory capacity. Severe coordination problems have continuously undermined enforcement. The literature focuses on two major coordination problems in China's food safety governance: 1) institutional fragmentation resulting in poorly demarcated responsibilities and competition among regulatory authorities and 2) principal-agent problems between central and local governments, weakening regulatory enforcement. 2.1. Solving fragmentation The complexity and fragmentation of regulatory authority are considered central to the Chinese government's overall regulatory ineffectiveness [Fewsmith & Gao, 2014; Yasuda, 2015; Chen et al., 2015; Lieberthal, 1992; Li, Qi, & Liu, 2010]. In food safety governance, this problem dates back to the FHL, which empowered the Ministry of Health to oversee food hygiene nationwide and left many enforcement problems unresolved. For instance, food safety inspection agencies lacked the power to punish violators, and industrial ministries retained control over key areas of food production [Holtkamp, Liu, & McGuire, 2014]. In the 1990s, the state gradually withdrew from the food production sector and started to build a food safety regulatory system, with regulatory authority shared between “the Ministry of Health (MOH), Ministry of Agriculture (MOA), the General Administration of Quality Supervision, Inspection and Quarantine (AQSIQ), the Ministry of Commerce, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce, and a host of other agencies involved in the different stages of food production and storage” [Yasuda, 2015; Holtkamp et al., 2014]. In the 2000s, the food safety system was restructured to strengthen coordination and centralization. The State Food and Drug Administration (SFDA) was founded in 2003 but was ineffective since it 2

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examples of food safety incidents for which officials should be dismissed [Wang, 2018]. The 2015 amendment of the Criminal Law further stipulates that “misconduct or negligence by food safety monitoring officials, causing serious or very serious damage, is punishable with a maximum of five to ten years imprisonment respectively” [Jiang & Zhu, 2016]. While it remains to be seen how effective administrative and legislative measures are in addressing the lack of local incentives in food safety governance, researchers also pay attention to the weak local capacity for enforcing national standards [Jiang & Zhu, 2016; Chen et al., Holtkamp et al., 2014; Li, Ma, Gong, & Yang, 2007], which eventually dampens regulatory incentives [Tam & Yang, 2005]. Yasuda argues that “central government policies often give little consideration to the cost of regulation as one moves down each level of scale” [Yasuda, 2017]. The severe urban-rural gap in food safety management is a good example, which is largely explained by the significant disparities in economic development, resources, and personnel [Liu & McGuire, 2015]. Fiscal and personnel constraints in rural areas have necessitated compromises in surveillance and created opportunities for regulatory capture [Chung & Wong, 2013; Geng et al., 2015; Li et al., 2010; Holtkamp et al., 2014]. As a result, “over 80% of food safety incidents and 90% of food-borne diseases originate in rural areas” [Liu & McGuire, 2015]. In the long run, these rural food safety problems can easily spill over into urban areas, despite the much stronger enforcement capability of urban authorities. The safety regulation of China's agricultural production faces substantial challenges [Zhou et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2015] from the overuse of chemical fertilizers and pesticides [Yan, 2012], water pollution and soil erosion [Economy, 2014], and the millions of small farms render monitoring and supervision extremely difficult. The prescription by many researchers is that transferring responsibilities to local government ought to be followed by the transfer of law enforcement capacity [Wang, 2018], and higher levels of government must consider lower-level fiscal concerns and resource endowments if policies are to succeed [Yasuda, 2017]. The 2015 FSL incorporates these issues, requiring the development of local enforcement capacity through the provision of working funds and law enforcement equipment, facilities, and training [Wang, 2018]. We still need time to determine how these requirements will be put into practice. Compared with a solution of top-down resource investment to boost local competence regarding food safety governance whose effects have not yet been assessed, a few researchers notice the existing various public-private partnerships in agricultural production that can help improve food safety [Ding et al., 2015; Scott, Si, Schumilas, & Chen, 2018; Qiao, Martin, He, Zhen & Pan, 2018]. Since the 1990s, Chinese local governments have worked closely with the private sector to promote and facilitate the organic agriculture sector within their jurisdictions by implementing favourable policies, providing various subsidies and extension services, and helping establish market linkages, as they realize its potential to alleviate rural poverty and foster rural development. These market-driven initiatives, however, have curtailed the already limited role of small farmers whose long food supply chain also limits direct communication with consumers [Scott et al., 2018]. There is constant debate about the optimal central-local relations for policy implementation. In practice, central-local relations in China have oscillated between centralization and decentralization [Chen, 2017]. Centralization enables national integration and standardization but risks disregarding local knowledge and hindering local incentives; decentralization encourages flexibility and innovation in policy implementation but may result in cronyism, corruption, predatory behaviour, and regulatory disparities across localities [Fewsmith & Gao, 2014; Yasuda, 2015]. Through a series of legal and institutional reconfigurations, Chinese food safety governance has progressively moved towards a “steering state” style [Simoulin, 2018], with the central government establishing standards and plans and local governments assuming the practical management of risks. Local agencies

lacked authority over both food approval and routine supervision [Yasuda, 2015]. As a vice-ministry-level bureau, the SFDA could not coordinate multiple ministry-level organizations [Li et al., 2010]. In 2007, a special committee led by Vice Premier Wu Yi was created. However, the 2009 FSL gave the MOH a greater coordinating role and sole responsibility for disclosure [Chen et al., 2015]. In 2010, to better implement the 2009 FSL, the National Food Safety Commission (NFSC) led by Vice Premier Li Keqiang and food safety committees at each level of government were established. While the NFSC oversaw the national food safety system, enforcement was divided among five different agencies. Until 2013, food safety regulatory responsibilities in China were shared by as many as 14 agencies at the national level alone [Wu & Chen, 2013; Lancet, 2012]. To further streamline and consolidate supervision, in 2013, the China Food and Drug Administration (CFDA) was created based on the SFDA. It is a ministerial-level agency operating directly under the State Council [Yasuda, 2015; Connolly, Luo, Woolsey, Lyons, & Phillips-Connolly, 2016] directed to provide streamlined regulation of food and drug safety under the 2015 FSL. The latter law also consolidated the food production, operation and catering licences stipulated in the 2009 FSL into the production and business licence to centralize the CFDA's power [Lu, 2016]. While some observers note significant progress – clearer interagency divisions of labour have been gradually established but remain suboptimal – others argue that a continual shifting of authority with different food safety and quality standards has only increased friction along the managerial dimension [Roberts & Lin, 2016; Yasuda, 2017] and food businesses’ compliance costs [Chen et al., 2015]. Several problems persist: “the number of agencies with direct responsibilities for food safety management remained too large” [Chen et al., 2015]; “the MOA and the CFDA in some cases oversee the same product simultaneously; ” “regulatory jurisdiction over agricultural products shifts back and forth along the farm-to-table continuum; ” “there seems to lack a clear division of labour among corresponding institutions and operational procedures to facilitate different stages of risk analysis (especially risk communication), which poses challenges to meaningful implementation of the risk analysis approach” [Roberts & Lin, 2016]; “Giving the health management department the authority to both assess risks and develop standards can easily lead to conflicts of interest; ” and “separate licences … have been combined … the respective rights and powers of the various agencies concerned are currently unclear.” [Wang, 2018] Finally, “a lack of clarity regarding how regulatory tasks at the local level are to be coordinated with broader national food safety plans has led to regulatory confusion” [Yasuda, 2017]. 2.2. Solving principal-agent problems Local obstructionism has long been blamed for China's food safety failures. While local governments' (county-level or above) food safety regulatory responsibilities are set out in both the 2009 and 2015 FSLs [Chen et al., 2015], researchers see a lack of incentives. Local officials are corrupt and collude with violators, manipulating food safety audit reports, engaging in local protectionism, etc. [Tam & Yang, 2005; Yasuda, 2017; Balzano, 2012; Liu, 2010; Yan, 2012]. Much research on other policy domains similarly finds that local administrators are largely uninterested in implementing central policies that do not directly benefit their career advancement and/or personal enrichment [Fewsmith & Gao, 2014, Mei & Wang, 2017; Göbel, 2011; Edin, 2003; O'Brien & Li, 1999; Economy, 2014]. Administrative and legislative imperatives have continually addressed the lack of local incentives in food safety governance [Yasuda, 2015; 2017]. In 2012, food safety was first used as a performance indicator for local governments' annual assessments [Lancet, 2012]. The 2015 FSL “calls for the establishment of grassroots and frontline food supervision agencies, and stipulates that tasks such as troubleshooting, information reporting, law enforcement assistance, etc. must be undertaken by township governments and sub-district offices” [Wang, 2018]. The law also sets out 3

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food (tegong 特供) [11, Yan, 2012]. Awareness of food risks and ability to find “safer” options are largely shaped by income and education [Yan, 2012; Klein, 2013]. Foodrelated risks are thus unequally distributed across social groups and regions, leading to diverse perceptions and demands. Researchers consistently report that, despite the inferior quality of food sold in the countryside, rural residents show little concern about food safety risks [Holtkamp et al., 2014; Liu & McGuire, 2015]. Liu and McGuire observe that public outcry over food safety in Changping came mostly from urban citizens, leading local food regulators to strategically allocate resources [Liu & McGuire, 2015]. Indeed, most victims of the “bigheaded” baby and Sanlu milk powder scandals were rural children. Lower levels of education, limited information, prioritizing price over quality due to lower incomes, and greater trust in local food systems all account for rural consumers’ false perceptions of food safety [Liu & McGuire, 2015]. Scholars are concerned about the socially destabilizing effects of the unequal distribution of food-related risks, which coincides with the unequal distribution of wealth. Both Yan and Yasuda think this problem will cause a sense of social injustice and even hatred among the poor towards wealthier, privileged members of society. While Yan presents cases of individuals in socially disadvantaged positions using personal experience of social injustice to justify doing harm to others (e.g., making fake blood pudding), Yasuda predicts that the unequal distribution of risks will fuel social unrest [Yasuda, 2015]. The manner in which Chinese consumers manage food-related risks echoes the “individualization” argument in Ulrich Beck's depiction of a “risk society” [Yan, 2012; Klein, 2013] but is also greatly shaped by China's unique socio-political environment: the government closely monitors public opinion [Lei & Zhou, 2015] and harshly suppresses citizens' attempts to act upon food safety threats, especially “untied” individuals [Yang, 2013]. Frequent scandals have provoked widespread public concern and discontent, but thus far, Chinese consumers have made few organized attempts to demand that the state improve food safety regulation. Parents might become the most active, courageous, and united collective to act on food safety problems. Surveys consistently show that parents perceive higher food safety risks than other groups [Klein, 2013; Dong & Li, 2016]. However, the government's confrontational attitude and harsh treatment of parents' activism after the Sanlu milk powder scandal shows that collective action pressing for safer food products entails high risks and costs given the state's prioritization of social stability. Observers disagree on the effects and prospects of the “individualization” of Chinese consumers' management of food-related risks. Veek et al. believe that individualistic shopping strategies coupled with “a stable, varied, and affordable food supply” in urban China are “offsetting the fear of potential hazards in the food system” [Veeck, Yu, & Burns, 2010]. Klein sees no positive effects of individual strategies in Kunming; he quotes a taxi driver as follows: “There's nothing to be done. You've still got to eat!” Klein also doubts that people will address food safety concerns “outside the domain of everyday food provisioning,” as citizen activism is “monitored by the state and further contained by the existence of ‘alternatives.’” Moreover, NGOs and activist-entrepreneurs encouraging and facilitating people to buy “alternatives” “have reinforced notions of individual consumer responsibility for their ‘food choices.’” Nonetheless, Klein expects consumer reaction when access to certain “alternatives” is “further limited by the state's own public hygiene policies” [Klein, 2013]. While individual navigation of the food system is often considered self-relief or overt defiance, some researchers see its potential to cause change. Augustin-Jean's analysis of how the Japanese reformed their thinking in the uncertainty after the Fukushima nuclear disaster of 2011 shows that individual actions in defiance of official regulations can converge into a remarkable force prompting the private sector to implement “new”, more stringent standards than the government [Augustin-Jean, 2018]. Theresa and Scott argue that the Chinese

are given greater political latitude to interpret and enforce the law [Balzano, 2012]. However, local officials' openness to policy experimentation varies. Factors such as “local pressure to respond to governance problems, imitating peers’ innovations, individual preferences for innovation” and “mission-driven agency” “filter” institutional incentives from the evaluation system [Shin, 2017; Teets, Hasmath, & Lewis, 2017]. Further empirical case studies are needed to investigate how the latest legislation and institutional change have shaped local policy innovation dynamics. Much of China's economic success is attributed to local governments that serve as policy laboratories and compete for development [Fewsmith & Gao, 2014; Heilmann, 2008; Montinola, Qian, & Weingast, 1995]. “The key to China's success lies in what one might call ‘adaptation,’ that is, substituting policy reforms with fundamental institutional changes” [Chen, 2017]. When opportunities for enhancing revenue emerge, local governments are motivated to initiate policy innovations. Nonetheless, as the Chinese state only supports “mainstream” food practices, intervenes in bottom-up initiatives, and is reluctant to adopt robust institutional mechanisms to engage civil society, space for innovation to improve food risk management remains limited. The Xi administration has also intensified centralization and emphasizes top-level designs. This approach may suppress local actors' incentives to engage in policy innovations and experimentation [Chen, 2017], which weakens the state's regulatory capacity in many domains, including environmental protection and public health. A more fundamental issue in explaining food safety outcomes is local governments’ public accountability. The Chinese cadre management system revolves around vertical accountability but lacks bottomup accountability [Fewsmith & Gao, 2014]. Even if legislation and institutional design improve, it is unclear how to motivate active food safety regulatory enforcement by local governments when there is no effective public accountability. In sum, despite the significant progress in food safety-related legislation and the multiple waves of government adjustments of institutional constellations for food safety governance, observers still conclude that China has a relatively limited governance toolbox for dealing with food safety problems [Connolly et al., 2016; Thompson & Hu, 2007]. It is thus essential to involve other stakeholders, such as consumer and media watchdogs and industry associations, to support and supplement government efforts to ensure the safe production and processing of food. 3. Change in consumer reactions Due to the high incidence and prevalence of food risks in China and the foremost food safety problem being adulteration with illegal additives that cannot be easily detected or corrected with hygienic foodhandling practices at home [G. Veeck, Veeck & Zhao, 2015; Klein, 2013], there is “a deeply felt sense of insecurity” among Chinese consumers, leading to widespread distrust in strangers and social institutions [Zhou et al., 2015]. Perceiving quick improvement as unlikely, people express fury online and largely opt out of the state regulatory system. Researchers have recorded Chinese consumers’ individualistic strategies to create trust in food. For example, Kunming residents adopted everyday approaches relying on familiar networks to handle food-related risks [Klein, 2013]. Farmers in Shandong adopted a relational mechanism for self-protection in food safety crises, balancing relational versus economic interests by providing insiders with “family food” and outsiders with “stranger food” [Lin, Fang, Zhou, & Xu, 2018]. The well-educated, mostly urban, middle class enthusiastically seeks “safer” alternatives and is willing to pay more [Yan, 2012; G. Veeck, Veeck, & Zhao, 2015, Pritchard & Chan, 2016; Shi, Cheng, Lei, Wen, & Merrifield, 2011; Schumilas & Scott, 2016]. Parents have emptied stores overseas of quality foreign baby formula, causing temporary shortages for local residents and stirring up resentment [Pritchard & Chan, 2016]. A few elites count on a long-standing “special supply” of 4

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perception of risks and thus reduces concerns. Citizens can have “critical trust,” which indicates the coexistence of trust and scepticism [Poortinga & Pidgeon, 2004]. More importantly, incentives for food suppliers to improve quality will be strengthened if consumers can distinguish good products from bad products. In most countries, scientists, experts, independent consumer organizations, and NGOs are important sources of knowledge. Unfortunately, in China, these information channels are poorly developed and fail to “play any noticeable role in supporting citizens’ causes” [Yang, 2013]. For instance, the Chinese public has little knowledge of biotech and its potential risks because the state restricts public access to information and suppresses public debate, both in fear of social unrest and to protect the domestic biotech industry. Moreover, no domestic NGO is active in the field of biotechnology [Ho, Vermeer, & Zhao, 2006]. In a system in which numerous watchdogs closely monitor foodrelated risks and the public can actively contribute ideas, resources, and expertise to improving food safety, risk prevention, lesson-taking and self-healing are easier, and risks can be better managed. However, the Chinese government has recently “tightened its control over outspoken newspapers as well as online news websites, while also destroying social networks connecting liberal-leaning lawyers, journalists, NGOs, and intellectuals” [Lei & Zhou, 2015]. This approach will undoubtedly hamper the state's capacity to improve food safety, as citizen participation in social co-governance is blocked and their distrust is significantly exacerbated. Furthermore, as Yang predicts, “When even channels for diffused contention are closed, activists may be forced to take more radical action” [Liu, 2010].

middle class's growing interest in certified locally grown, organic and natural food gave rise to self-consciously sustainable agriculture [G. Veeck et al., 2015; Shi et al., 2011]. The authors' recent study of Chinese alternative food networks (AFNs) finds that the largely “consumerdriven” AFNs, such as community-supported agriculture (CSA), home delivery, buying clubs, and farmers' markets, have won public support for a broad New Rural Reconstruction Movement (NRRM) that reflects on mainstream “modernization” [Ye, 2015] and attempts to create alternative paths of rural development [Scott et al., 2018]. Although bottom-up self-protection responses to China's food safety crisis face “structural pressures from market forces and challenges of governance, consumer awareness and peasant organisation” [Zhang & Qi, 2018], researchers believe that civil society initiatives aiming to tackle the problem in a non-confrontational manner, such as seeking “safer” options, are less politically sensitive and thus enjoy greater freedom in their development [Scott et al., 2018]. Since the government, especially at the local level, is eager to solve daunting governance problems such as food safety and environmental degradation, it increasingly recognizes the contribution of civil society actors who need state support or at least acceptance to fulfil their objectives. This symbiotic relationship [Saich, 2000; Spires, 2011] enables “embedded activism” [Ho & Emonds, 2007], although it also constrains civil society actors' visions and agendas [Gaudreau, 2018; Cody, 2018]. Moreover, Chinese AFNs show that society-led initiatives to improve food safety may tap into broader state developmental agendas and connect to other governance domains such as environmental protection, which opens a convenient and promising space to develop civil society capacity and solve urgent social problems [Scott et al., 2018]. Research on consumers' everyday resistance [Scott, 1985] and bottom-up initiatives might easily exaggerate their important roles in improving food safety. Civil society reactions to food risks can barely affect substantive transformations, especially in the Chinese context, unless they are channelled into legitimate and routine participation in social co-governance. The 2015 FSL emphasizes a risk-based approach to food safety governance whose efficiency is contingent upon effective risk communication. The law thus sets out a new orientation towards social co-governance and encourages media supervision, citizen reporting of offences, independent third-party inspections, and information sharing between the state and society [Roberts & Lin, 2016; Wang, 2018; Geng et al., 2015]. Following the legal changes, scholarly attention has shifted from Chinese citizens' evasion of the state regulatory system to their potential participation in it. Jiang and Zhu detailed how the “food safety informants” community has contributed to minimizing food safety risks at the grassroots level in Shanghai [Jiang & Zhu, 2016]. However, many have noted that the norms for social co-governance are incomplete, lacking legal consequences, balance between rights and responsibilities, and concrete operational mechanisms [Wang, 2018; Chen et al., 2015]. Thus, the extent to which the government embraces social participation and advocacy in food safety regulation remains arbitrary, and the threat of repression is ever present [Balzano, 2012]. This problem is evident in the development of open media. All too often, regarding food safety scandals, as with many other public incidents, the “Chinese government has deployed its hegemonic power by suppressing information, framing issues and repressing advocates seeking redress” [Yang, 2013]. The government's response to the melamine-tainted Sanlu milk powder case was typical and only undermined public trust [Yang, 2013; Lei & Zhou, 2015]. Nonetheless, while the party-state's propaganda system attempts to retain control over public discourse, cyberspace hosts an increasingly active public sphere in which unorganized individuals collectively define and discuss food safety problems [Lei & Zhou, 2015; Peng, Li, Xia, Qi, & Li, 2015; Blockchain Alliance for Food Safety in Chen & Tan, 2018]. More trustworthy information about food risks may not immediately lead to improved food safety and enhanced public confidence, but it does help establish a more realistic knowledge base and

4. Creating incentives for industry compliance Ultimately, safe food mainly relies on its production/processing processes. State regulatory control and consumer reactions all aim to (re)shape the incentives for the food industry to ensure that its products are safe. The Chinese institutional constellation for food safety control has long had many disincentives for producing high-quality food. First, spot checks, fragmented monitoring, and campaign-style enforcement encourage opportunism and risk taking [Liu, 2011; Jiang & Zhu, 2013]. Inspectors generally focus on large and medium-sized firms and ignore “the nearly 70% of China's food enterprises that employ ten workers or less” [Holtkamp et al., 2014, p. 33] given their relatively small budgets. Second, the many regulatory agencies involved in food safety have close ties with business interests, rendering regulatory capture more likely [Yasuda, 2015]. Third, the government's over-reliance on licencing and permits results in excessive attempts to eliminate unlicensed food providers and inadequate attention to the quality assurance of licensees [Liu, 2011]. Moreover, local governments responsible for licencing lack resources but have many opportunities for corruption [Chung & Wong, 2013]. Finally, given the low transparency and traceability involved, it is extremely difficult to verify food providers' honesty and catch dishonesty. Food operators are thus emboldened to maximize profits at the cost of food safety [68]. A co-regulation approach, where the state sets broad quality standards and industry correspondingly develops its own standards and practices, may enhance regulatory efficiency as it is more responsive to food providers' interests and facilitates their coordination [Chung & Wong, 2013]. Yamaguchi reported large, industrialized egg producers cooperating to supply each other's customers with quality eggs after an avian influenza outbreak when public compensation for an infected farm did not cover consequent business losses [Yamaguchi, 2018]. Legal changes in China's food safety governance embody a transformation of regulatory logic from state dominance to co-regulation [Roberts & Lin, 2016; Wang, 2018; Martinez, Fearne, Caswell, & Henson, 2007]. The 2015 FSL requires trade association representatives to serve as members on the National Food Safety Standard Review Committee and food industry associations to restrain members by establishing disciplinary regulations. While such new co-regulation 5

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“Delivering safe food to the dinner table is the culmination of the work of many people” [US Food and Drug Administration, 2006]. Throughout the food supply chain, numerous biological, physical, and chemical hazards may spiral out of control and cause food to be harmful to humans. Thus, it is a daunting task to trace and govern the complex food production process. This challenge becomes more significant in China, where the state carries sole regulatory responsibility but lacks the capacity to effectively monitor and enforce its regulations given the country's enormous geographic and bureaucratic size as well as the extensive local diversity in food production. Coordinated and collaborative efforts by a broad range of actors would be one solution to this problem. The division of responsibilities between producers/processors who supply food products, state agents who regulate food provision, and consumers who press for food safety improvement is a central issue [Kjaernes et al., 2007]. Other players, such as food experts, the media, and NGOs, also have a significant share of responsibility. As Shambaugh sharply speculates, the “path of Hard Authoritarianism is not a solution for the multiple problems” in China [Shambaugh, 2018]. Unless the Chinese government succeeds in establishing more inclusive approaches, such as social co-governance and industry co-regulation, that rely on a broader pool of participants and information for policymaking and implementation, increasingly stringent regulation cannot effectively reorient food suppliers' incentives towards food safety improvement. The effort to “string the separate pearls together” in this article also delineates the complexities involved in the food safety problem and demonstrates the value of a patchwork approach. As already mentioned, Yasuda prescribes a “wholescale systems design” to resolve the “politics of scale” that causes China's failure in food safety control. Nonetheless, Yasuda admits that such a macro-solution is difficult to attain [Yasuda, 2017]. The 2015 FSL that introduced novel governance logic and stipulated overarching restructuring can be seen as the Chinese government's move in this direction. However, changes, given their diversity and complexity, as seen in the existing literature, are feasible only in a gradualist, patchwork manner. A full realization of effective food safety governance depends on progress in the various fundamental components of the system: from superficial to substantive law, from fragmented to coordinated inter-governmental relationships, from passive to active consumer responses, and from exogenous to endogenous industry compliance incentives. Moreover, changes are place-based and context-specific. There are always trade-offs between macro analyses, such as Yasuda's work, and the presentation of thick descriptions and explanations of evolving dynamics. While there are always distinctively “Chinese” ways of doing things, due to the country's unique socio-political development trajectory, food safety is a global challenge concerning consumers and governments in many other countries. There is a rich body of comparative research examining how food safety governance is pursued elsewhere and how China's food regulations relate to international norms [Yasuda, 2017; Balzano, 2012; Snyder, 2015; Geng et al., 2015; Chen et al., 2015; Kan & Yuen, 2018], which are not systematically reviewed here due to space. This literature broadens our vision and imagination by delineating diverse trajectories through which effective institutions and good practices for assuring food safety have developed in different systems and investigates food safety regulation in China by closely examining the feasibility of transplanting foreign lessons to the Chinese context. To identify a way out of the current hardships faced in China, it would be fruitful to consult this literature to learn how improvements in food safety have been accomplished elsewhere. In addition to crossnational comparisons, cross-issue comparisons within China are also helpful in suggesting solutions. We can gain an advantage by looking for issue domains in which the policy enforcement and regulatory capacity of Chinese government agencies have been improving and by probing the precise mechanisms contributing to these improvements.

initiatives take time to take effect, researchers have identified the pitfalls of a number of long-existing co-regulatory approaches adopted by the Chinese government. For example, the “Dragonhead” enterprises and farmers' cooperatives used by the state to rationalize agricultural production have weak control over their respective supply chains, and the two models “conflict with one another” [Yasuda, 2017]. Other scholars find that intermediary organizations have contributed to poor farmers' subordinate status and limited autonomy vis-à-vis other actors in the agri-food supply system [Scott et al., 2018; Ke & Hisano, 2018; Yan & Chen, 2015; Zhang, 2015]. Since a co-regulation system is still far from mature, industry supervision on its own cannot create enough pressure to establish a quality food supply. Direct accountability mechanisms between consumers and food producers/processors can be helpful in pushing the latter to refrain from dishonesty, thus reducing regulatory costs. The food industry naturally seeks to maximize profit. If marketing substandard products improves returns, providers are tempted to do so [Connolly et al., 2016]. When consumers or investors reward honest, responsible performance, food producers and processors institute selfdiscipline, as they care about their reputations. Direct accountability mechanisms between consumers and food suppliers are weak in China [Liu, 2011], where a “bad product driving out good” is a recurring phenomenon, as high-quality products, whose production costs are high, tend to be pushed out of the market because there is no clear and trustworthy way to prove that they are worth more than less expensive products. Moreover, given the current consumption pattern in China (most consumers still prefer less expensive goods), food producers and processors cannot supply high-quality products and maintain profits and, thus, their survival [Jiang & Zhu, 2016]. The 2015 FSL seeks to establish direct accountability between food providers and consumers. The law places legal responsibility for the safety of foodrelated products on providers and significantly increases the penalties for offenders. Food operators are also responsible for implementing recall and traceability systems [Chen et al., 2015]. More stringent regulations might create negative incentives for dishonesty in food production and operation but nonetheless impose high compliance costs on providers. In contrast, various bottom-up initiatives by civil society actors, such as the AFN movement, can particularly benefit small-scale food producers by assisting them to build direct linkages with consumers [Scott et al., 2018; Ke & Hisano, 2018]. Cyberspace is also “an emerging realm that enhances producerconsumer connections,” where information about AFNs is widely spread [Scott et al., 2018; Chen & Tan, 2018] and new technologies to enhance the transparency and traceability of food production and processing are continually developing [Blockchain Alliance for Food Safety, 2018]. These developments remain less explored themes in the existing literature and are worth further study. 5. Conclusion The existing studies on food safety governance in China have enabled readers to understand the different problems in the current system from divergent perspectives. However, we cannot see the full picture unless we put these piecemeal stories together. This review article seeks to accomplish this goal by mapping out changes in all three “poles” of the food system: state legislation and institutionalization endeavours, consumer reactions and industry incentives. This article also delves into the interplay of these three areas. This approach allows us to detect a coherent logic underlying the various, recurrent difficulties regarding food safety governance in China: governance is characterized by a paradox of inadequate state regulatory capacity and exclusive state domination. As shown in the review, the Chinese government has consistently invested in extensive legislation and institution building while continuously vacillating between unleashing and suppressing societal power to compensate for its weak regulatory capacity. 6

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Acknowledgements

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Further reading Kang, Y. (2014). Disaster management in China in a changing era. Berlin: Springer.

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