Foreseeability and self-interest as moral judgment factors with normal and acting-out adolescent boys

JOURNAL OF APPLIED DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY 8 , 377-390 0987]

Foreseeability and Self-Interest as Moral Judgment Factors with Normal and Acting-Out Adolescent Boys DANIEL SANVITALE HERBERT D . SALTZSTEIN RANDAL BLANK

Graduate Center of the City University of New York

Thirty-two male adolescents pa~icipated in a study of moral judgment and its relationship to social functioning. Half of the subjects were selected for frequent actingout, aggressive behavior, and half were selected from regular eighth-grade classes and matched for intelligence. The moral stories featured good intentions with bad outcomes and varied as to whether or not the outcome was foreseeable and in the actor's self-interest. Subjects judged the actor, attributed judgments to adults, and causally explained the outcome. The difference in judgments between foreseeable and nonforeseeable actions was greater for "normal" subjects. Furthermore, although normal subjects judged foreseeable actions more harshly than acting-out subjects, the reverse was true for, nonforeseeable actions. Judgments attributed to adults were harsher than subjects own judgments, and this difference was greater for acting-out subjects. Causal attributions (personal vs. situational) and other reasoning related strongly to the foreseeability and self-interest factors but not to subject group.

A widely expressed criticism o f moral judgment research has been that findings from studies o f moral thought, especially those based on judgments o f hypothetical moral situations, are unrelated to actual social behavior and functioning (e.g., Kurtines & Greif, 1974; Liebert, 1979). Some reviewers have concluded that variations in moral judgment represent little more than intellectual exercises which are peripheral to the study o f social development. Our primary goal was to determine if variations in moral judgments, specifically the uses o f intentionality in evaluating action, relate to actual social functioning. Rather than selecting some particular social behavior, such as resistance-to-temptation or helping, we

This study served as the fLrst author's independent research project and was supported by a Faculty Research Award to the second author. The authors wish to thankDrs. David Bearison, Glen Hass, Dalton Miller-Jones, David Rindskopf, Alan Weiner, and Barry Zimmerman for critically reading an earlier draft of the manuscript; to Colette Sanvitaie for aiding in coding the reasons; and to Dr. James CJentilcore,Superintendent of School of the Central Islip School District, for his splendid cooperation. Correspondence and requests for reprints should be sent to Herbert D. Saltzstein, Department of Psychology, Graduate Center of C.U.N.Y., 33 West 42 Street, Room 606, New York, NY 10036. 377

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decided to contrast the comprehension and use of these moral criteria by groups known to differ significantly in their social functioning, namely aggressive, acting-out versus nonaggressive adolescent boys. (Subjects were all male because of their greater availability in the former category.) The tendency to base moral responsibility on an assessment of intentionality--what may be called the moral intentionality principle--has long been recognized in law, philosophy, and everyday discourse (e.g., Kcasey & Sales, 1977). It became a concern of psychology with the rediscovery by Piaget (1965) of a turn of-the-century finding (Schallenberger, 1894) that children, as they get older, increasingly base moral responsibility on the actor's motives and intentions rather than on the outcome of the act. Research since then has confirmed the basic finding that there is a relative shift in moral judgment criteria between ages 5 and 12 from an emphasis on outcome to an emphasis on motives and intentions (cf. reviews by Grueneich, 1982; Kamiol, 1978; Keasey, 1977; Lickona, 1976). Most moral judgment research has relied on a somewhat simplistic concept of moral intentionality, where outcomes are clearly intentional or unintentional, and motives are purely good or bad. Clearly the principle needs to be elaborated in ways that take into account more of the complexity of moral situations. Yet, with the exception of a few studies, such as Kugelmas and Breznitz (1968) with adolescents and Sedlak (1982) with adults and children, little research has been focused directly on factors such as foreseeability, preventability, ambivalent or unconscious motivation, and so forth, whicha~ed to be included in any explanation of the role of moral intentionality in natural social behavior. Moral and legal concepts such as negligent homicide, reckless endangerment, unconscious hostility, passive aggression, and carelessness illustrate the importance of contextual modifiers that call for a more comprehensive formulation of moral intentionality than is commonly invoked by most researchers. Two of these contextual modifiers of moral intentionality principle have special relevance to the social functioning of acting-out adolescents: (a) the degree to which the outcome of an act was foreseeable, and (b) the degree to which the outcome rebounded to the (self-) interest of the actor. (a) Foreseeability may be inferred from clues as to the probability of the outcome before commission of the act, and should render the actor more responsible for the outcome regardless of his or her "good intentions" (Sedlak, 1982). (b) Evidence that the outcome was in the actor's self-interest is inferred from different information and has other implications. That actors typically seek outcomes that are in their self-interest is, of course, an important assumption of causal attribution theory (e.g., Jones and Davis, 1965). Consequently, intentions to produce an outcome--especially ulterior motives--are often inferred from the fact that the outcome is in the actor's self-interest. Thus, the actor is rendered liable to blame, despite the ostensible "good intentions." We expected then that, in general, story actors committing acts with ostensi-

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bly unintended outcomes, which were (a) foreseeable, or (b) in their self-interest, would more likely be perceived as having enacted an intentional outcome (as reflected in the moral ratings) than those which were neither (a) nor (b). In addition, we thought it likely that the self-interest factor might be especially important in assessing responsibility for a bad outcome that was judged to be foreseeable. Acting-out adolescents, in particular, are often described as lacking in the ability to anticipate the social consequences of their actions (e.g., Pine, 1980). It is not uncommon for them to disclaim responsibility for literally unintended but nonetheless foreseeable bad outcomes because they "didn't mean for it [the outcome] to happen." Therefore, our second hypothesis was that acting-out subjects' moral judgments are less responsive to variations in the foreseeability factor than "normal" subjects'. Regarding the second modifier of moral intentionality, the self-interest an actor has in an outcome, the rational was different. Information regarding the actor's self-interest in the putatively unintended outcome raises doubts as to the actor's stated motives and intentions. We expected acting-out adolescents to be more sensitive to this kind of information in forming their moral judgments because such attributions fit their reportedly suspicious view of others. Dodge and Frame (1982) and Dodge, Murphy, and Buchsbaum (1984) found that sociometrically rejected boys, who are typically reported to be aggressive to peers, often attribute hidden and malevolent motives to others when intentionality of the act and outcome is ambiguous. Such attributions may further serve to justify their own breach of moral norms, and thus help them to defend against recognition of personal responsibility. Thus, our third hypothesis was that the acting-out adolescent subjects' moral judgments are more responsive than normal subjects' to whether or not the outcome was in the actor's self-interest. A third aim of the research was to explore how the foreseeability and selfinterest factors in moral judgment are related to causal attributions. Of particular importance, in our view, is whether attributions are more likely made to the situation or the person. We reasoned that attributions which explain a (bad/good) unintended outcome in terms of the situation would serve to resolve the implicit attributional problem of how to explain the unintended outcome, enabling the subject to judge the actor according to the stated intention. If a situational attribution is not tenable, the subject is forced either to reinterpret the actor's motives or to attribute nonmotivational characteristics (e.g., incompetence) to the actor in order to account for the outcome. A motivational, personal attribution of a bad outcome should lead to a harsher moral judgment than should a situational attribution. Indirect support for this hypothesis can be found in a study by Berndt (1977). Berndt found that the positive/negative acts which were reciprocations for previous positive/negative acts were more likely attributed to the situation (prior provocation) and were judged less extremely than nonreciprocal acts.

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Furthermore, we expected actions with outcomes, which were foreseeable and/or in the actor's self interest, to be more likely attributed to the actor's person than to the situation, compared to those which were not, and the actor, therefore, would be judged more harshly. Actions which were both foreseeable and in the actor's self-interest were expected to be attributed to the actor's motives and intentions in particular, rather than to his or her ability. As a final aim of the study, we were interested in seeing if any differences between the normal and acting-out adolescents in the use of foreseeability and self-interest as moral judgment cues are related to their beliefs about how adults use these same criteria. This would provide us with an extension of previous research on younger children's representation of adult's moral beliefs in which we asked them how they think adults would judge the same situations that they themselves were asked to judge. In prior studies in which the stories involved simple motive-outcome information (Saltzstein et al., 1987), children's (ages 6-12) own judgments of story actors were compared to those they attributed to adults. The judgments attributed to adults were harsher than the children's own judgments, but primarily when the acts involved bad outcomes. Also, reasons justifying own judgments consistently stressed the actor's intentions or motives more than reasons justifying the attributed judgments. This pattern suggests that children develop an emphasis on the moral intentionality criterion somewhat independently of their conception of adult norms. Differences between own and attributed moral judgments have not been explored with adolescents or with judgments of complex intentionality, that is, those involving foreseeability. This aspect of the study was therefore exploratory. To summarize, we expected to find: (a) the overall effects of the foreseeability and self-interest factors on the subjects' moral judgments, and on their causal attributions regarding the outcome; (b) that the difference between judgments of foreseeable and nonforeseeable acts are greater for the normal (non-acting-out) than for the acting-out subjects; whereas, (c) that the difference between judgments of acts that were and were not in the self-interest of the actor are greater for the acting-out subjects; and (d) that the subjects' causal attributions are affected by the story factors (foreseeability and self-interest) and related to their moral judgments. Investigation of differences between own and attributed judgments by story factor and group was basically exploratory, to see whether own- attributed judgement differences found in elementary school-age children judging simple moral situations would also hold for young adolescents judging more complex moral situations.

METHOD Subjects Thirty-two male students from one junior high school, half recruited from regular eighth grade classes and half from equivalent special education classes for the

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emotionally disturbed, served as the subjects. Parental consent was obtained. The 16 acting-out subjects were randomly selected from a pool of 28 such subjects from four existing special education classes. In selecting the final sample of acting-out subjects the following criteria were used: (a) The student had been classified as emotionally disturbed by the Committee on the Handicapped of the school district. This precludes designation as mentally retarded, learning disabled, culturally deprived, and so forth. The selection is based on a battery of intellectual, academic, and psychological tests. (b) The acting-out subjects were reported to have been involved in at least five instances of verbal or physical aggression to peers or teachers in the student's school record. And, (c) there was no evidence of a thought disorder, psychosis, or severe organicity as determined by the first author from the psychological battery. Another set of 16 subjects with no record of aggression was randomly selected from four normal ("mainstream") classes in the same junior high school. These students were from the middle track of the eighth grade, thus permitting a rough control on the subjects' intellectual level (IQ scores) which ranged between 92 and 115 for the acting-out group and between 90 and 111 for the normal group. IQ scores were based on a form of the group-administered California Test of Mental Maturity (CTMM short form, level 2). All 16 of the acting-out subjects originally chosen agreed to participate; one of the normal subjects could not because his parent permission form was not returned. He was replaced in the normal sample. All subjects resided in a small town near a large metropolitan area, and were from a lower-middle-class community. The mean chronological age of the acting-out subjects was 13 years, 7 months (13-1 to 14-1), and the mean of the normal subjects was 13 years, 7 months (13-1 to 14-3). Materials Thirteen tape-recorded moral judgment stories were constructed, of which seven were heard by each subject. The first (practice) story presented, featuring neutral motives (neither altruistic nor malevolent) and bad outcome (material damage), was to familiarize the subjects with the task. The remaining stories were constructed according to a 3 x 2 x 2 (Theme x Foreseeability x Self-Interest) design. Except for the practice story, all the stories had a competition or rivalry setting to permit variation in the self-interest element. Three themes were used in order to insure generalization across related but different content areas: a competitive game with a prize, sexual rivalry, and social rivalry. One story within each content area featured a foreseeable outcome. There were two alternative (self-interest/non-self-interest) endings to each of the resulting six stories. One ending involved an outcome that was to the benefit of the main story character, that is, he left the party with the girl in whom he was interested, or he won a prize in the contest. The other ending involved an outcome that was not of benefit to the protagonist, that is, someone else (neither the actor nor the victim) left with the attractive girl or won a prize in the contest. The subjects heard six stories,

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half with endings which were in the self-interest o f the story protagonist and half which were not. O f these six stories, three had outcomes which were foreseeable and three had outcomes which were not. Foreseeability was thus a within-subject factor, and self-interest was a between-subject factor, with each subject receiving all stories with and without outcomes in the actor's self-interest. All stories featured protagonists o f the same sex as the subject (male). The story themes were chosen as a result of informal pretesting with adolescents to maximize relevance to the subjects. The stories were also pretested with a group o f three graduate students and four school psychologists who rated them along 70 m m scales for intentionality, foreseeability, self-interest, and degree o f rivalry, which showed that the stories varied as expected. 1 An example o f a foreseeable and a nonforeseeable story follows. Each is presented f'wst with the non-selfinterest ending and next with the self-interest ending.

PARTY DIRECTIONS (Foreseeable, sexual theme) Bob was invited to a party. He knew that his friend, Mark, had nothing to do that night, so he arranged for Mark to come, too. They both were excited about going because there was a girl who was going to be there whom they both liked. Bob said that he would get the directions and give them to his friend later. The directions were complicated and although Bob had them in his jacket pocket, he gave the directions to his friend off the top of his head. Bob told his friend to take the # 5 bus when he should have taken the # 4 . So B o b ' s friend Mark came to the party two hours late. By then, another guy had left with the girl they both liked. (Or) By then, Bob had left with the girl they both liked. P A R T Y A D D R E S S S T O R Y (Nonforeseeable, sexual theme) One o f the girls in the class decided to have a real " b l a s t " that Friday night. She asked Randy to come and bring any friend he wanted. Randy remembered that his friend, Mike, was looking to meet a new girl who had recently entered the school, so he told Mike about the party. Both Randy and Mike were really looking forward to the party and to meeting the girls.

IThe mean ratings of the foreseeable versus nonforeseeable, and of the self-interest versus nonself-interest stories were calculated for each rater. The means of these (mean) scores were then compared across story types by a t-test for correlated means. The mean foreseeability rating was 55.78 mm for the foreseeable stories and 22.22 for the nonforeseeable stories, t (6) = 18.59, p < .001; the mean self-interest ratings were 41.50 for the self-interest stories and 24.39 for the nonself-interest stories, t (6) = 11.17, p < .001. The stories did not differ significantly in other story characteristics such as degree of rivalry between story characters.

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Randy said he would get the address of the party. He got the address and called Mike to tell him, but no one was home at Mike's house, so he left a note with the address on it in Mike's school locker. But that day Mike had to change lockers because the lock on his regular locker had been broken, and so he never got Randy's note. Randy went to the party and met the cute new girl, but she bad come with another boy whom she was dating. (Or) Randy went to the party and met the cute new girl whom he started to go out with.

Procedure and Design Each subject was individually tested by the first author, a male school psychologist acquainted with the subjects. 2 Participation was voluntary. The subjects were told that the study was being conducted to gather information about what junior high school students think about certain social situations. They were also told that there were no right or wrong answers and that their responses would remain confidential. To control for serial effects, the order of the stories was randomized for each subject. The series always began with the practice story to familiarize the subject with the task. The next story contained one of three randomly selected themes (sexual, social, game) where either a foreseeable or nonforeseeable story version was presented first, again according to random selection. The other version of the same theme followed. Next, one of the two remaining themes was randomly chosen with the foreseeable or nonforeseeable version, again selected randomly, and so on. After hearing each story the subject was asked to rate the act of the protagonist (own judgment) along a 9-point scale with labels ranging from "very, very good" to "very, very bad," and then was asked about the reason for his rating (e.g., "What do you think about what Eddie did?"). Next, the subject was asked to rate the act by the protagonist as he would expect an adult to rate it (attributed judgment). The subject was again asked for an explanation of his rating. Following these scale judgments and reasons, an interview was conducted to tap other reasons for the judgment and to have the subject elaborate upon the intentionality variable. The interviewer wrote down the responses verbatim. We asked whether (actor) could have known (outcome) would happen if he performed the act. Did (actor) know the (outcome) was going to happen? Did something about (actor) cause (outcome) to happen? What? How do you feel about (actor)? Do you like (actor)? Could (actor) have prevented or have kept (outcome) from happening? Did (actor) like the way things turned out? The actual questions referred to the

2The interviewer(f'u'stcoder) knew the subject's group membershipalthough the second coder did not. Althoughthis has obviousdisadvantages, in our judgmentthese disadvantagesare morethan made up for by the rapport this allowed between interviewerand subject.

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name of the actor and the specific outcome (e.g., "Did something about Eddie cause the stereo to blow?"). Codes were devised in order to systematically analyze the reasons provided. The eight codes were as follows: (1) Intentionality (spontaneous) included whether or not the subject mentioned the intentions (or lack of intentions) of the story protagonist spontaneously to the first open-ended question; (2) intentionality (elicited) indicated the subject's judgment of whether the act/outcome was intentional or unintentional, as elicited by specific questions in the interview; (3) modifiers of stated intentionality refers to how the purported unintentionality of the action was qualified by, for example, inferences of carelessness, and devious or hidden motivation; (4)foreseeability (could) assessed the subject's beliefs as to whether the protagonist could have foreseen the outcome; (5) foreseeability (did) similarly tapped whether the subject believed that the protagonist actually did foresee the outcome; (6) preventability assessed the subject's belief as to whether the protagonist could have controlled the outcome once the action had begun; (7) affinity with the protagonist provided an index of the subject's liking for the protagonist; and finally, (8) causal attribution indicated to what kind of cause the subject attributed the outcome. Responses to this last question were coded into three categories: (a) Explanations in terms of situational factors (e.g., "it [the vacuum cleaner] was defective"); (b) personal explanations in nonmotivational/nonvolitional terms (e.g., " h e was just clumsy"); and (c) personal explanations in terms of the actor's motives or intentions (e,g., " h e wanted it real bad"). Interrater reliabilities (% agreement) of the codes for a subsample of 12 subjects ranged from .82 to .99, with most above .93. The format utilized a 2 × 2 x 2 x 2 factorial design (normal vs. acting-out subjects x own vs. attributed judgment × self-interest vs. not self-interest in outcome x foreseeable vs. not foreseeable outcome), with two between-subject variables (group and self-interest) and two within-subject variables (foreseeability and own-attributed judgment mode). 3 Judgments were collapsed across stories within the story categories (foreseeability vs. nonforeseeability; self-interest vs. non-self-interest). Frequencies were dichotomized at or near the median split. RESULTS Scale Judgments The repeated measures MANOVAs yielded two significant main effects of the story variables: Acts with foreseeable outcomes were rated more harshly than those with nonforeseeable outcomes, F (1, 28) = 156.7, p < .001; and out-

3Though it would have been desirable to make both story parameters, foreseeability and selfinterest, within-subject factors, this would have required increasing the number of stories which we felt would have stretched the patience of our subjects. Because we were more interested in the effect of foreseeability, this was designated as the within-subject factor.

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MORAL JUDGMENTS TABLE 1 Mean Moral Judgments of Foreseeable and Nonforeseeable Stories by Normal and Acting-Out Subjects Story Group

Foreseeable

Nonforeseeable

Normal Acting-out

6.95 6.3

4.6 5.5

Note. The judgments may range from 1 (lenient) to 9

(harsh).

comes which might have been in the self-interest of the actor were judged more harshly than those not in his self-interest, F (1, 28) = 23.54, p < .001. Both of these findings support the first hypothesis. Although no main effect was obtained for the group contrast, normal versus acting-out subjects, a fast-order interaction was obtained between group and foreseeability, F (1, 28) = 30.77, p < .001. This interaction revealed a greater judgment difference between foreseeable and nonforeseeable outcomes by the normal subjects (2.35) than by the acting-out subjects (0.8), as expected (see Table 1). The group differences were significant both for the foreseeable and nonforeseeable stories, Fs (1, 28) = 5.26 and 23.43, respectively, p < .01 for both. Furthermore, although normal subjects judged the foreseeable stories more harshly than did the acting-out subjects, the reverse was true for the nonforeseeable stories. This confirms the second hypothesis. Contrary to the third hypothesis, however, there was no interaction between group and the self-interest story variable. There was also a main effect for the own versus attributed judgment factor, F (1, 28) = 110.3, p < .001, with attributed judgments harsher than own judgments overall, and a strong interaction between group and own-attributed judgment mode, F (1, 28) = 46.17, p < .001 (see Table 2). The normal/acting-out group difference was significant for both the own and attributed judgment modalities, Fs (1, 28) = 5.76 and 11.93, respectively, p < .01 for both. However, whereas normal subjects' own judgments were harsher than those TABLE 2 Mean Own and Attributed Moral Judgments by Normal and Acting-Out Subjects Judgment Mode Group

Own

Attributed

Normal Acting-out

5.6 5.3

5.9 6.6

Note. The judgments may range from 1 (lenient)

to 9 (harsh).

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made by the acting-out subjects, the acting-out subjects' attributed judgments were harsher than the normal subjects'.

Reasons Most of the significant differences in frequencies of reasons occurred for the systematically varied story elements, foreseeability and self-interest, rather than between the subject groups. In general, beliefs about intentionality varied according to whether or not the outcome was foreseeable and in the self-interest of the actor. The outcomes in the foreseeable stories were far more frequently judged to have actually been foreseen ("did foresee"), potentially foreseen ( " c o u l d " ) , and preventable than the nonforeseeable stories, p < .001 for all. Furthermore, the unintentional nature of the action was mentioned spontaneously or by direct questioning more often for nonforeseeable than for foreseeable stories, p < .001 for both. In fact, in responding to the foreseeable stories, 12 of the 32 subjects asserted for at least one story that the putatively unintentional actions were actually intentional. Outcomes in the actor's self-interest were more often judged to have actually been foreseen, and therefore intentional (spontaneous or elicited), than outcomes not in the actor's self-interest, p < .001 for all differences. Thus, the subjects generally appear to have used a "hedonistic" assumption to infer various aspects of intentionality. Examination of how the stated (good) intentions were modified revealed two main kinds of responses: Carelessness, mentioned either to condemn or to exculpate the story character, and hidden motivation were mentioned only twice in 96 possible instances in discussing the nonforeseeable stories, whereas such inferences were frequently mentioned for the foreseeable stories--76 in 96 possible instances. All 32 subjects made reference to carelessness or hidden motivation at least once in discussing the foreseeable stories, in contrast to only two subjects for the nonforeseeable stories, ×2 (1) = 28.03, p < .001. The kind of inference made in response to the foreseeable stories depended on whether the story was or was not in the story character's self-interest. With the non-self-interest stories, 15 of 16 subjects mentioned carelessness in discussing at least one of the three stories, usually to exculpate the story character, whereas only six did so with the self-interest stories, ×a (1) = 8.87, p < .01. In contrast, mention of or allusion to hidden (devious) motivation was made at least once by 14 of the 16 subjects in the self-interest condition, but only by 5 of the 16 subjects in the non-self-interest condition, ×2 (1) = 8.29, p < .01. In reasoning about stories with foreseeable outcomes, subjects infer carelessness when the outcome is not in the actor's self-interest, and hidden (devious) motivation when the outcome is in the actor's self-interest. All of this indicates that subjects go well beyond the facts provided when making moral judgments. No simple group (normal vs. acting-out) differences emerged from any of the above analyses, with one exception. When asked how much they liked the main story characters in the foreseeable stories, three times as many acting-out sub-

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jects (15/16) indicated liking for the protagonist in at least one of the stories than did the normal subjects (5/16), X2 (1) = 10.81, p < .001. Also, more subjects in general (23/32) said they liked the story protagonist in at least two of the nonforeseeable stories than in the foreseeable stories (2/32), ×2 (1) = 16.0, p < .001. There was an overwhelming difference between causal explanations of the foreseeable and nonforeseeable outcomes, regardless of group. Twenty-nine of the 32 subjects gave a situational explanation of at least 2 of the 3 n0nforeseeable stories, but none of the subjects did so with the foreseeable stories. In explaining the outcome of the foreseeable stories, a difference between the self-interest and non-self-interest stories also emerged. Thirteen of the 16 subjects explained the putatively unintentional but foreseeable outcome in terms of the story character's motive on at least 2 of the 3 stories in the self-interest condition, whereas only 1 of 16 subjects did so in the non-self-interest condition, ×2 (1) = 15.4, p < .001. With the non-self-interest stories, causal explanations of the outcome were typically stated in nonmotivational or nonvolitional terms. Once again, no group differences were apparent. Thus, although causal attribution responses appear to relate rather strongly to the morally relevant story characteristics, they do not seem to depend on whether the subjects belong to the normal or acting-out group. DISCUSSION Foreseeability and self-interest appear to be rather integral types of information in forming moral judgments; systematic manipulation of them, while keeping the remaining story parameters the same, affected both the moral ratings of the purportedly unintentional acts and the reasons justifying them. Story actors were judged more harshly when there was evidence that the bad outcome could have been forseen or was in the actor's self-interest. The expected interaction between the two story factors did not appear in the moral ratings although it was reflected in the reasons justifying the ratings, especially in the causal attributions of the outcome. Nonforeseeable outcomes were primarily attributed to situational causes, whereas personal (motivational and/or nonmotivational) factors were more frequently invoked to account for the foreseeable outcomes. The kind of personal attribution further depended on the self-interest factor; with self-interest absent, a nonmotivational personal attribution such as clumsiness was likely, but with selfinterest present, the (stated) good intention was likely to be at least partially discounted, and devious or bidden motivation was likely to be attributed to the protagonist. Indeed, causal attributions were so strongly related to story parameters that any correlations with moral judgments within story type (e.g., foreseeable, self-interest) were precluded by restriction of range! As expected, the difference in moral judgments between the foreseeable and nonforeseeable stories was greater for the normal subjects. Furthermore, although the normal subjects were harsher in judging foreseeable acts, the acting-

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out group was harsher in judging nonforeseeable acts. The third hypothesis, however, was not confirmed, that is, compared to the normal subjects the actingout subjects' moral ratings did not differentiate more between actions which were and those which were not in the actor's self-interest. This was not because the acting-out subjects failed to understand or ignored the self-interest factor. The interviews showed, on the contrary, that they were well aware of this factor, but suggested that the information was employed to a different end. A fairly typical response was that "It [the act] was o k a y . . , because he got the girl," or that " I would have done the same thing." Thus, although tending to infer or entertain negative intentions on the actor's part, they nonetheless considered the act as justified. This is consistent with research (e.g., Hudgins & Prentice, 1973) showing that the moral reasoning by delinquent adolescents often equates moral justification with self-interest. Following this, it is possible, perhaps even likely, that acting-out subjects would be more negatively disposed towards such actions (i.e., those with ostensibly unintended negative outcomes) when they themselves--rather than a third party--were the victim. This is consistent with findings by Dodge and Frame (1982). Thus, future research on the use of self-interest as a moral judgment factor would do well to take into account the self-relevance of the outcome for the subject. In general, a distinction must be kept in mind between (a) the degree to which an aspect of human action is recognized or given attention as relevant to a moral judgment, and (b) how it is used to form a moral judgment. It is possible that acting-out subjects are more sensitive to the self-interest factor than their normal peers, but use it for exculpation rather than moral condemnation. We now return to the group difference that did occur in response to the foreseeability of the unintended bad outcome. Again, a critical issue is whether this difference should be interpreted in terms of differences in the way subjects in the two groups interpreted the story (Saltzstein & Weiner, 1985) or in terms of the weightings which the two kinds of subjects assigned to the story parameters (e.g., Leon, 1980). Definitive information is lacking in these data. That so few group differences were found in the reasons given to justify the moral rating, the differential weighting explanation would seem to be favored. However, it should also be noted that the study was not specifically designed to answer this question. Furthermore, it is clear that young adolescents, in going beyond the information given, do make inferences as to actor's state of mind. A more satisfactory explanation of individual differences in moral reasoning would need to incorporate the implicit rules for interpreting and weighting the information about the action provided, and how these inferential processes systematically vary across individuals. Regarding the nonattributed judgment difference, the greater harshness of attributed over own judgments is consistent with a previous study (Saltzstein et al., in press) with elementary school children judging simpler good motive/bad outcome actions. Although the basic own-attributed contrast here did not appear

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to depend on the foreseeability or self-interest factor, the difference was greater for the acting-out subjects. A few interpretations of this finding may be offered. Adults, especially parents, prominent in the lives of the acting-out adolescents may react more harsly or inconsistently to unintended outcome produced by their children than parents of more normal adolescents. This difference may depend on differences in parental education, personality, and so forth (e.g., Hoffman, 1975), or on greater provocativeness or in appropriateness on the part of the acting-out adolescents (e.g., Bell, 1968; Saltzstein, 1976). The acting-out adolescents may also tend to distort the meaning of adult reactions in the direction of harshness more than their more normal peers. It is likely that some kind of threeway process is involved whereby inappropriate behaviors by the acting-out adolescents, harsher reactions to them by adults, and distorted comprehension of adult reactions all feed into each other in creating and maintaining a pathogenic cycle. In summary, the most important of the findings are (a) that the factors of foreseeability and self-interest modify moral judgments and causal attributions in predictable ways, suggesting a complex pooling of factors in evaluating moral actions, and (b) that two groups which function differently in the social world respond in predictably different ways to hypothetical moral situations. This latter finding adds to the growing body of research showing a relationship between moral thought and moral action (Blasi, 1980). Furthermore, the acting-out boys showed a greater discrepancy between their own moral judgments and those they attributed to adults, thus suggesting a relationship between their acting-out propensity and their perception of the adult moral world.

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